

The field of solidarity in times of a pandemic: Results of an online survey in Hungary*

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Abstract

Despite its central importance, solidarity is seldom analysed in a comprehensive manner. Most related studies target only specific aspects of its complex mechanisms, such as the functioning of redistributive systems, the private networks and practices of care, or civil society. Our study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis by understanding solidarity as a field in Bourdieu's sense: involving supportive interactions; competition for the related symbolic capital; *illusio* that provides legitimate frames of deservingness and respectability; and habitus depending on the broader structural position. To understand the contemporary solidarity field of Hungary, these dimensions are mapped all at once in a unified framework: types of problems and needs of individuals; sources and perceptions of received support; types of support provided to family members and friends; and finally, types of support provided to generalised others – these factors constitute the dimensions of a cluster analysis that describes ideal-typical positions. The positions are analysed from the perspective of their structural background and the related attitudes. From a sociological perspective, situations like the pandemic provide a unique opportunity for analysing otherwise tacit patterns of solidarity. Besides this opportunity, the pandemic is also used as a comparative framework: in the final section, the changes occurring in the various positions are also overviewed to highlight the dynamics of the solidarity field.

Keywords: solidarity; COVID-19; Hungary; Bourdieu

1. Introduction

Solidarity is one of the main integrative forces in society: the related interpretations and praxes outline legitimate requests to others; they define the responsibilities that ground 'moral economies'; and they determine technologies of intervention associated with various forms of social support. In most cases, the meanings and praxes related to solidarity are embedded in the lifeworld, thus they organise social interactions in a naturalised manner (Habermas, 1984). However, in extraordinary times characterised by the intensification or overburdening of the

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networks and institutions of social support, the naturalised patterns of solidarity cease to be taken for granted: legitimate needs are contested; moral responsibilities are debated; interventions are reconfigured. The impact of a pandemic can be understood from this perspective: solidarity networks are set in motion and individual reflection on the related meanings intensifies, while previously latent conflicts become manifest. From a sociological perspective, situations like this provide a unique opportunity for analysing otherwise tacit patterns of solidarity.

Based on these presumptions, in our survey an attempt is made to explore those values, motivations, and strategies that ground the interpretations of deservingness and responsibility while organizing supportive interactions. The parallel analysis of support provided and received and the structural positions and relevant attitudes outlines the Hungarian 'field of solidarity' in a Bourdieusian sense. Such a model – elaborated through a cluster analysis – reveals not only the various positions characterised by divergent, often conflicting interests and attributions, but also the potential field dynamics generated by the pandemic. Our analysis is constituted of five steps. First, the social theoretical background is outlined by answering two questions: in what sense can we talk about solidarity as a field, and how is it affected by the structural transformations of late modernity? Second, the Hungarian context is introduced: What are the specificities of the local solidarity field, with Central Europe as a reference? Third, data and methods are introduced briefly. In the fourth section, the ideal-typical positions of the solidarity field are elaborated and described according to their structural and attitudinal features. Finally, based on these positions an attempt at theorizing is made: the interrelatedness of the positions is mapped in order to describe the field dynamics generated by the pandemic.

2. Solidarity as a field

Solidarity is a peculiar notion; its many connotations leave researchers perplexed. Various uses of solidarity may emphasize its social theoretical (integration), moral philosophical (part of justice), political (a means of handling unjust constellations), or social policy (welfare state) aspects (Bayertz, 1999). Furthermore, it is not only analytically heterogeneous, but also surrounded by actual public debate: in the extraordinary times when the principles of solidarity become relevant, previously latent conflicts may sharpen and crystallize around such concepts. In this sense, solidarity as a form of recognition implies struggles in the public sphere (Honneth, 1996). These basic features could serve as references when it comes to conceptualising solidarity: on the one hand, it can be grasped through supportive interactions that become manifest in times of crisis; on the other hand, beyond cooperative interaction it also includes conflict. According to these premises, the complex patterns of solidarity can be ideally analysed among 'liminal' conditions (Thomassen, 2014), or in times of crisis (Habermas 1975). Also, solidarity can be understood according to models that combine the ambivalent tendencies of normative support (cooperation) and moral competition (conflict).

To grasp the complexity of solidarity, a social theoretical framework is needed that can conceptualize its many aspects, while also grounding an empirical analysis. Such a framework is provided by Bourdieu's *field theory*. Fields are social structures defined by symbolic and material capitals. To get involved in a certain field, an actor must approve its *illusio*, which outlines a specific set of common values and the rules of acquisition (Bourdieu, 1998). In this sense, fields are integrated by shared tacit knowledge about what is 'worthy' and how value can be accumulated. However, integration does not only imply cooperation: acquiring symbolic and

material capitals may often become a zero-sum game. Actors move on trajectories defined by 'objective interests' that originate from their – former, present, and anticipated – positions in various fields. This is ensured by a set of dispositions incorporated as *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1990). Even if the habitus encompasses aspirations, desires, bodily attunement, automatic behaviour and unintentional communicative patterns as well, it should not be viewed as deterministic (as it is often criticised for being: e.g. Jenkins, 1992). As actors are involved in various parallel fields throughout their lives, their habitus are shaped by unique patterns of structural constraints, which result in stable but not unchangeable dispositions (Bourdieu, 1984). *Illusio* is also a dynamic notion: while outlining a common set of rules, actors continuously compete for interpretative privileges. Those who are in an elite position intentionally or unintentionally adjust the rules of field struggle to their interest. Beside these inner dynamics, the fields are also dynamized by external factors. While the coexistence of various autonomous fields is the benchmark of modern societies, it does not mean that field boundaries are necessarily secure. As the expansion of the political or the economic field indicates, capitals of power or money may violate the independence of specific fields such as the science or the arts. In this sense, fields are dynamic entities, continuously forced to secure their boundaries that are stretched by internal and external impacts (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

While Bourdieu did not implement field theory on solidarity, his conceptual tools provide a unique opportunity to create a comprehensive and coherent framework. To understand solidarity as a field, those specific symbolic capitals and *illusio* need to be highlighted that integrate it as an autonomous space of action, while also embedding it in the broader context of complementary fields. For this purpose, a preliminary historic overview is needed, so that the late modern structural constituents of the solidarity field may be grasped.

The history of solidarity is inseparable from the long-term processes of functional differentiation. While in pre-modern constellations the criteria of worthiness, moral responsibilities, and praxes of support were embedded in family and local community relations (including feudal ties), modern solidarity operates according to the logic of social security. As expert institutions – managed by the state – take over the supportive tasks of the community, the extent and content of social help becomes linked to political struggles (Castel, 2002). The most mature form of this paradigm is represented by the welfare state, which is facing various challenges in late modernity. On the economic level, the system of social security is being undermined by unemployment (Castel, 2009) and by an emerging global capitalism that limits the agency of nation states (Castells, 2010). On the political level, the construction of solidarity is burdened with value and legitimacy crises, as expressed by the deterioration of the quality of the public sphere (Davis, 2020) that is embedded in the platforms of an information society that undermines communicative rationality (Lash 2002); by the emergence of populist nationalism (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017) that is sharpening social tensions and narratives of exclusion and xenophobia (Linke & Smith, 2009); and by the controversies associated with the media construction of suffering (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2013). On the level of expert knowledge that organizes institutional solidarity praxes, a dual crisis arises: on the one hand, the objectifying gaze of 'biopolitical' institutions threaten with alienated and objectifying supportive interactions (Rose, 1999, Dubet, 2002); on the other hand, criticism of expert authority originating from risk society (Beck, 1992) threatens through the relativization of any approved forms of knowledge, resulting in a post-truth constellation (van der Linden & Löfstedt, 2019). On the level of actors, solidarity is undermined by new, precarious forms of inequality that further fragment group identity and collective responsibility (Standing, 2012), and the new trends of individualization that limit actors' horizons to aesthetic reflexivity (Lash, 1999) and

the consuming of outstanding experiences (Schulze, 2008; Micheletti, 2003). Taken together, these tendencies weaken the classical modern paradigm of solidarity, which is based on the inclusive ideals of the welfare state. Consequently, falling out of the web of social security maintained by expert institutions is becoming not only a realistic possibility for many, but also a fear, thus transforming the collective horizon of expectations. Such change affects the state, civil society, and private actors alike: the actual experiences of the dysfunctionalities and gaps in welfare solidarity undermine the legitimacy of the system in general. These historical constraints outline the space of the potential of solidarity as an autonomous field.

To talk about solidarity as a field, its specific symbolic capital first needs to be described based on the above-described historical context. The symbolic capital of solidarity is twofold: on the one hand, it concerns the merit of being supported by others – that is, deservingness; on the other hand, it concerns the recognition given to those who provide support; that is, moral respectability. While in the premodern era deservingness and respectability were embedded in the context of a community-based everyday morality, the emergence of state social security systems enabled the birth of an autonomous field. Deservingness and respectability have become a distinct area of discursive battle as the circle of the included and the extent of services depend on ever-changing state regulations (Castel, 2002).

On the one hand, various social groups have attempted to prove their worthiness in the public sphere. The stake of these discursive exchanges was differentiation between the decent, thus supportable, and the self-defeating, thus ignorable poor (e.g. van Oorschot, 2000; Hofmann et al., 2019). On the other hand, the positions of providing support also implied symbolic battles: the criteria of appropriate and counterproductive support have been contested both in philanthropic (Maclean et al., 2015) and expert circles (Chambon et al., 1999). These symbolic battles aimed at different goals: acquiring deservingness as symbolic capital enables the needy to access more resources and support, while acquiring respectability as symbolic capital equips the supporter with moral supremacy. At the same time, these battles took place on a common platform: namely, through supportive interactions.

Solidarity is primarily performed in those interactions in which actors in need and/or supporters are involved.¹ Such interactions are motivated by personal interests on the one hand, and normative or moral principles on the other (potentially, though not necessarily, in conflict with personal interests). These sources of motivation are embedded in personal and collective interpretations closely tied to discourses of worthiness, responsibility, and adequacy. Accordingly, these interpretations are related to various structural positions indicated by the relevant symbolic capitals and the broader context of material and cultural capitals. During acts of solidarity, not only are interpretations renewed (or reinforced), but symbolic and material forms of capital are also exchanged. Furthermore, these transactions are followed by competition for discursive dominance among various positions: while actors follow strategies that express their reflected and habitual interests, they also reproduce the framework of the solidarity field.

According to the overviewed diagnoses of times, the contemporary solidarity field is characterised by fundamental contingencies. Due to transformations affecting the state, the political sphere, expert institutions, NGOs and subjects, the basis of both deservingness and respectability becomes highly contested. Such inner instability is complemented with external structural uncertainty that threatens the autonomy of the field of solidarity: ‘managerialism’ or ‘neoliberalism’ are just two of the most obvious examples of how the administrative

1 This analytical distinction is needed to also take into consideration those cases in which a needy situation remains unsupported, or support targets non-existent or misunderstood needs.

or economic fields enforces their functionality on supportive interactions (Timor-Shlevin & Benjamin, 2021). Due to these external impacts, the illusion of the solidarity field also loses its intactness: the rules of acquiring deservingness or respectability may be overwritten by external field logics of either economic efficiency, or political nepotism.

To understand the pandemic as a source of crisis, this already controversial constellation should be taken into consideration as a general context. As health-related, economic, social and political challenges generated by the pandemic are addressed by the already contested actors of the field of solidarity, not only does the uncertainty of deservingness and respectability become more explicit, but so do the critical or evasive strategies of everyday actors. In order to have a more nuanced picture of the general constituents of the Hungarian field of solidarity, those pieces of empirical research have to be reviewed that analyse the local features of the above-mentioned dimensions.

3. The solidarity field in Hungary

Most related studies on solidarity target only specific aspects of these complex mechanisms, such as the functioning of redistributive systems; related values; private networks of care; or civil society.² Even if such studies do not provide a comprehensive picture of the solidarity field (as they neglect the interrelatedness of its various components), they are essential for contextualising the Hungarian case.

When it comes to comparing the welfare states of Europe, policy studies usually differentiate five major clusters: Mediterranean countries (e.g. Italy, Spain); small European states (e.g. Luxembourg); the old European countries (e.g. Germany, France); and Central (e.g. Hungary) and Eastern European (e.g. Ukraine) countries. Based on indicators such as income inequality; percentage of temporary contracts; gender ratio of unemployment; government expenditure; and social contributions as a share of GDP, Central European countries are characterised by less extensive welfare institutions compared to the old and Mediterranean ones, and more comprehensive ones compared to those of Eastern Europe (Lauzadyte-Tutliene et al., 2018). Besides these macro characteristics, the Hungarian welfare model has gone through fundamental transformations recently, expressed most explicitly by constitutional changes. While the state of social rights in Hungary has been contested by many since the post-socialist transition (Ferge, 2012), it was the new Fundamental Law of Hungary that explicitly declared a transition to a workfare state (Juhász, 2015). The consequent social politics combines pragmatic (strengthening the middle class) and ideological (differentiating between worthy and unworthy social groups) elements, while applying selective praxes (Szikra, 2019; Kremer, 2017). As a consequence of replacing unemployment benefits and reintegration projects with a comprehensive public employment programme, the unemployed have a greater chance of getting stuck in a deprived position (Scharle & Szikra, 2015). Also, such social politics lead to the underfinancing of educational, health care, and social work institutions (Czibere et al., 2017).

Values related to solidarity are characterised by stark East–West differences among European states: on the one hand, the citizens of Central and East European countries tend to prefer greater state responsibility for welfare measures; on the other hand, they tend to be less satisfied with the actual efficiency of their welfare institutions (Svallfors, 2012). However, that does not

2 Of course, there are some exceptions, such as a complex comparative analysis of solidarity in Europe that covers both the social-spatial aspect and the deservingness of needy groups. According to this comparison (based on a survey made in 2017), Hungary shows a consistently lower level of solidarity than the EU average (Halman & Sieben, 2021).

imply some form of inevitable ‘learned helplessness’ or ‘unreflected egalitarianism,’ often attributed to *homo sovieticus*. These paradoxical attitude patterns are rather the consequence of a historical path of modernization that combines authoritarianism with egalitarian social transformation (Ferge, 2008). Nevertheless, the Hungarian patterns of trust in others and in institutions, and in support for values related to private or public solidarity, are equally below the European averages (Giczi & Sik, 2009). These characteristics severely limit the emergence of supportive networks in various ways. On a general level, Hungarian social networks are traditional in the sense that family relations play a more decisive role compared to friendships (Albert & Dávid, 2018). Consequently, social support – which is supposed to be provided primarily by the paternalistic, yet in many regards dysfunctional state – mostly burdens family ties, especially females (Gregor & Kováts, 2018). Private support networks also directly reflect structural inequalities, instead of complementing the missing material capital with a social one (Albert & Hajdú, 2016). Furthermore, altruism is considered to be a rare phenomenon even in the case of family ties: the potential for receiving help is strongly dependent on the capability of providing support – a bias implying patrimonial solidarity ties (Utasi, 2013, pp. 43–46).

The contemporary patterns of civil society are shaped by institutional forces congruous throughout Central Europe. After the transition, civil organizations were mainly financed externally by global and EU funds, which affected their goals and priorities. The joining of the EU reconfigured this constellation: as the former external financiers gradually withdrew their support, national governments stepped forward. While civil organisations previously were considered by political actors to be promoters of both democratization and solidarity, nationalist-populist governments – especially in Poland and Hungary – started to view them as ‘foreign agents’ illegitimately contesting their authority (Meyer et al., 2020). These tendencies have placed the already weak and loosely embedded civil organisations in a precarious position (Kuti, 2016). Besides these institutional and political constraints, the recruiting of activists also remains a contingency. Even if the number of activists and the areas covered by them have both increased since the transition, their structural background has remained the same. Participation in civil society is still the privilege of actors capable of accessing above-average material and cultural capital (Czike & Kuti, 2006, p. 17; Gerő & Hajdú, 2015). Consequently, civil support remains a hierarchical interaction, wherein the perspective of those in need is often neglected (Zakariás, 2018).

Based on this short review of literature, it may seem that the Hungarian field of solidarity is burdened with the general distortions of late modernity, amplified by local dysfunctions. The paradigm of the welfare state was built up reluctantly in Central Europe and was openly replaced in Hungary by the paradigm of the workfare state; already weakened values of solidarity are openly being defied by the proudly illiberal-nationalist government; actors in already precarious positions are faced with the inadequacy of state support, mistrust, and traditional-patriarchal private networks of support; while NGOs already marginalised by biopolitical authority are explicitly persecuted. On the one hand, it may be argued that the symbolic battle for deservingness is particularly sharp-edged in Hungary: as state policy differentiates between worthy and unworthy citizens, those who are excluded either find alternative supportive networks, or are faced with being completely ignored. On the other hand, it may be argued that the symbolic battle for respectability has been emptied out: as the social security sector is greatly underfinanced and NGOs are politically persecuted, providing support barely generates symbolic capital of its own. Due to these tendencies, the illusio of the solidarity field loses its autonomy: the chances of economic (i.e. managerialism) and political take-over (i.e. nepotism) equally increase.

The first wave of the pandemic affected such a solidarity field, already burdened with severe challenges. Thus, its crisis potential is extreme: as state institutions already weakened by a chronic lack of resources are burdened with extra tasks, the intensification of pre-existing selective tendencies becomes probable; as the proportion of those who have access to poorer quality services (or no service at all) grows, the general experience of dysfunctionality increases, which may undermine the legitimacy of expert institutions; furthermore, the already weakened values of solidarity and the poor democratic quality of the public sphere may result in sharpening social conflict and in the growing neglect and exclusion of minority groups. Our empirical research aims at mapping the impact of the pandemic on such a solidarity field – the following section summarises the details of the analysis.

4. Research design

Despite the above-discussed tendencies, it may not be argued that the Hungarian field of solidarity is on a predetermined track, whereby agency is limited to individual escapist strategies or complete helplessness. As structural constraints affect actors differently, mapping the actual positions within the field of solidarity characterised by various patterns of needs and support remains an empirical question. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the field of solidarity, three limitations of previous research need to be overcome: (1) being both a potential recipient as well as providing support should be included in the analysis; (2) various substantive aspects that are the content of needs and support should be regarded in parallel (e.g. health related, psychological, and ultimately, material ones); (3) various institutional dimensions of solidarity should be included in the model (that is, besides private, individual action, state and civil society institutional actors as well). As the symbolic battles of deservingness and respectability are ultimately fought in everyday symbolic interactions, research aimed at mapping the post-pandemic field of solidarity needs to focus on this level.

Based on these presumptions, field analysis was designed. As a first step, various structural positions were described within the field of solidarity based on the parallel analysis of the experiences of being in need, being supported, providing care, and helping generalised others. In the second step, the related habitus was characterised based on the broader structural background (demographic, material, and cultural variables). In the third step, the various readings of *illusio* were explored according to attitudes related to the political sphere, the exclusivity of deservingness, and the attributions of social responsibility. By assembling these elements, a way opens up for drawing some theoretical conclusions concerning the potential field dynamics. In what follows, this theoretical design is translated to the operationalized level of empirical analysis.

Our research is based on an online survey (n=800), with a sample representing the adult Hungarian population according to gender, age group, region and educational attainment.³ The questionnaires were filled out in July 2020 (data were collected by Inspira Research Ltd.).

3 While such a dataset has certain advantages (i.e. it permits representative insight), it also has shortcomings, which need to be reflected on. The first limitation concerns the nature of quantitative data: while it allows for the identification of various structural positions, it lacks the hermeneutic depth required for the appropriate characterisation of *illusio* and habitus. The second limitation concerns the online platform: while the sample was representative, it is well-known that the most deprived groups are more difficult to reach online. The third limitation concerns the biases of self-administered surveys: the desire to construct a normatively more acceptable picture potentially affected respondents of varying social background to a different extent. While these limitations could not have been prevented in a systematic manner, they should be mentioned in order to avoid the over-generalisation of conclusions.

First, variables expressing the positions in the field of solidarity were aggregated into continuous variables (the exact process is described in Table 2). The following six variables were constructed: types of problems and needs since the pandemic (health, psychological, financial, care); sources of received support (family, friends, state, civil sector); experience related to support received; types of support provided to family members (health, psychological, financial, care); types of support provided to friends (health, psychological, financial, care); types of support provided to generalised others; and last, the state of being informed about support that is provided.

Second, these aggregated variables were standardized, and a K-means cluster analysis was undertaken. Based on the interpretability and the distribution of cases in each cluster, the five-category model was chosen as the optimal classification. Table 1 shows the results of this analysis. In order to provide a more realistic picture, instead of the standardized values, the cluster centres are represented by the original values so that they can be interpreted as descriptive indicators, not just relative indicators.⁴ When it comes to interpreting the clusters, it is important to emphasize that they express ideal types, which are constructed by enlarging the positive or negative statistical differences from the average. On the level of real types, patterns are usually more heterogeneous and inconsistent. This should be kept in our mind when reading the distribution of clusters: they do not express estimations of distinctive real types in the population, but rather the relative weights of various positions in the field of solidarity.

Third, the ideal-typical field positions are analysed from the perspective of their broader structural background, thereby expressing their situatedness in other key fields (demographics, material and economic capital, cultural capital, experiences of deprivation or discrimination) and the related attitudes that express the related *illusio* and *habitus* (personal and institutional trust, subjective well-being, horizon of expectations, political preferences, religious attitudes). The correspondences were initially analysed using two methods: logistic regression and crosstabs/means comparisons. While the first option promised to reveal the independent impact of each background variable, we decided to choose the better interpretable second option (see Tables 3–5). Even if crosstabs/means comparisons do not allow for the filtering of individual impacts, in our case this goal was less important than the capability of revealing patterns in a comprehensive way.

Finally, the impact of the first wave of the pandemic is investigated. A strictly ‘causal’ explanation would require a longitudinal research design. Lacking the opportunity for such analysis, our goal remains humbler. The impact of the pandemic is first analysed through retrospective questions that map the pre-pandemic patterns of the problem horizon regarding received and provided support; second, it is analysed through questions directly inquiring into specific transformations related to the pandemic (e.g. related to working conditions) (see Tables 6–10).

4 This is important for a more refined interpretation. For example, the ‘type of support provided to family members’ is equally below the average in case of the first and the third clusters; however, this indicates an actual lack of providing support only in the third case, where the cluster centre is 0.6. In the first cluster, the centre is 1.1, meaning that in this case at least one supportive relation is probable – a significant difference, which is inaccessible in standardized form.

5. Ideal-typical positions in the field of solidarity

The following table summarises the results of the cluster analysis:

Table 1: *Ideal-typical positions in the solidarity field*

Cluster centres	unsupportive deprived (21%)	broker of solidarity (10%)	negligent bystander (42%)	private supporter (14%)	volunteer activist (13%)	Total
types of problem since the pandemic (health, psychological, financial, care)	2,65	2,61	0,82	1,39	0,78	1,46
sources of received support (family, friends, state, civil sphere)	2,89	3,03	0,33	0,87	0,77	1,27
problematic aspects of received support	0,81	1,34	0,05	0,26	0,07	0,38
types of support provided to family members (health, psychological, financial, care)	1,19	2,91	0,59	3,09	1,64	1,44
types of support provided to friends (health, psychological, financial, care)	0,86	2,86	0,30	2,76	1,10	1,13
types of support provided to generalised others	1,19	8,09	0,79	1,42	4,46	2,17
sources of information about the provided support	0,13	1,09	0,05	0,09	1,55	0,36

The first ideal-typical position (21 per cent of the sample) is characterised by an above-average number of problems, received support, criticism of support, and a consistently below-average pattern of provided support. Those who belong to this group are integrated in the field of solidarity one-sidedly: while receiving – not necessarily satisfying – support for their many challenges, they are not contributing either in private or in public chains of support. Such a one-sided position implies an ambivalent integration: even if they possess the symbolic capital of deservingness, this is only partly convertible into adequate support, as expressed by the relatively high level of dissatisfaction. From a broader structural perspective (see Table 3), it may be argued that the members of this group are on the losing side of the global market competition: their rural (mostly village) spatial position and lack of cultural capital prevents them from applying for expertise-based positions, which is expressed both in the relatively high level of unemployment and the far-below-average economic status.

Based on its structural helplessness, this group is supposed to be the primary target of state social policy. However, according to the perspective of its members, it seems that selective and under-financed institutions cannot effectively support them. As is expressed by the consistently below-average satisfaction with health, education, economic, and democratic institutions, members of this group are interacting with an institutional system that is failing them. Accordingly, they find themselves between two stools: not only are they suffering from economic disadvantages, but they are also left on their own by the state. Such an experience of marginalization could easily lead to a nationalistic and xenophobic habitus. However, in case of this group, the opposite is experienced: despite their deprived structural position, members of this group are characterised by a refusal of any form of nationalism: supporters of the governing (Fidesz) and oppositional (Jobbik) right-wing parties are both under-repre-

sented among their ranks (see Table 3). This surprising tendency is explainable by the high proportion of those who have experienced discrimination. It seems that personal experiences of exclusion, complemented by ones originating from the failure of a discursively protectionist-nationalistic state, do not result in susceptibility to xenophobic populism. These experiences rather lead to disappointment and defeatism. Individuals who belong to this ideal type do not trust others, are not satisfied with the present, see no future (see Table 4). They seem to express the worst-case scenario of atomisation and marginalisation: as they do not have the resources to provide support, they cannot engage in reciprocity relations, which leaves them in a helpless position in which they have no alternative but to rely on alms instead of calling on their right to services.

From their perspective, the *illusio* of the solidarity field is a cruel one: among them the exclusive logic of deservingness is above average (see Table 5). This indicates their involvement in battles for scarce symbolic capital: to achieve a more deserving position, they tend to devaluate many rival social groups. Such tense contestation for deservingness is complemented with a paternalistic view of responsibilities. The unsupportive deprived tend to look at state-level actors (including the EU and global organisations) as primarily responsible for handling social crises such as the pandemic (see Table 10).

The second ideal-typical position (10 per cent of the sample) is characterised by an above-average level of needs, received support, and problems with received support; and also an above-average level of private and public provided support and awareness of supportive interactions. Those who belong to this group are in an exceptional position as they accumulate the symbolic capital of deservingness and respectability at the same time. Such a position is not only unique because of its access to both the perspectives of the receiver and the provider of support, but also because of its potential to express informed criticism that reaches beyond the private sphere. The members of this group are not only critical about received support, but also ready to seek alternative paths. This possibility is enabled partly by their demographic characteristics, as the solidarity brokers are mostly younger metropolitans with larger than average families, and partly by structural position: the members of this group have jobs, savings, and above-average living conditions. Although they do not have a high level of cultural capital, most of them have expertise or skills that can be sold on the job market. In this sense, even if they do not belong to the privileged of global capitalism, the spectre of unemployment does not haunt them (see Table 3).

Accordingly, despite their hardships, the members of this group are not in a hopeless position at all. They benefit from the advantageous side of selective social policies, which is expressed in satisfaction with health, education, economic and democratic institutions. Also, they are embedded in both private and public networks of support, which is expressed in their high level of trust in others. Despite the higher-than-average experiences of discrimination, the members of this group are satisfied overall with their life and prospects (see Table 4). In this sense, their *habitus* represents the possibility of succeeding in a challenging social environment. While the unsupportive deprived suffer from both economic deprivation and exclusion from welfare, which prevents them forming solidarity ties, brokers profit from selective state social policy and succeed on the job market as well, which also enables them to complement the missing components of solidarity. This is expressed in political preferences as well: both support for Fidesz and the left and the right wing of the new opposition is over-represented among their ranks, which expresses the fact that various paths of advocacy are equally included in their toolset.

From their perspective, the *illusio* of the solidarity field is a secure one: while being certain about their deservingness, they also generously support various social groups. Due to their confidence of being recognised, they do not view others as rivals of deservingness, but rather as potential targets of support that provides respectability (see Table 5). The certainty of deservingness paired with a willingness to provide support affects the attribution of social responsibility as well. Solidarity brokers tend to view NGOs as almost as important actors of solidarity in times of crises as state-level organizations, which is the result of a relatively high level of trust in the former and distrust of the latter (see Table 10).

The third ideal-typical position (42 per cent) is the complete opposite of the solidarity brokers, as it is characterised by a below-average level of needs and received support; and also a below-average level of private- and public-provided support or awareness. The members of this massive group that we name negligent bystanders are exceptional because of their complete exodus from the field of solidarity: they neither ask for nor provide support, i.e. they ignore both forms of symbolic capital. In this sense, they exemplify the widespread consequences of atomization; the disintegration of solidarity ties; and escapism to an individualised lifestyle organised around the consuming of experiences. Demographically, this group is constituted of the oldest strata living in rural towns, in below-average-sized families. From a structural perspective, they are characterised by above-average cultural capital, and a secure (often pension-based) but not particularly rich economic background (see Table 3).

While a minimal level of material resourcefulness is needed for independence in the case of negligent bystanders, this is complemented by an accepting attitude towards state social policy institutions. Furthermore, this group is also characterised by an average level of satisfaction, a lack of political preferences (only the voters of the right-wing opposition party, Jobbik, are slightly over-represented) and a lack of experiences of discrimination (see Table 4). Overall, this ideal-type represents the apathetic 'petit-bourgeois' individualism that originated in the Kadar era. Such an attitude is constituted of an emptied, disillusioned version of paternalism (involving not particularly effective, but acceptable state support) and giving up on personal responsibilities while escaping to the private sphere (Sik, 2016).

From their perspective, the *illusio* of the solidarity field is emptied. They tend to support various social groups less frequently than average; however, not because they compete with them for deservingness, but rather out of indifference (see Table 5). When it comes to social responsibility, the negligent bystanders resemble the unsupportive deprived: they consider solidarity to be the task of state-level institutions, and particularly not NGOs (see Table 10).

The fourth ideal-typical position (14 per cent of the sample) is characterised by an average level of problems, a below-average level of received support, below-average dissatisfaction, an above-average level of support provided to family members and friends, and below-average civil activity and information. Private supporters represent an ambivalent position: on the one hand, they are characterised by a focus on private networks of care as primary platforms of solidarity; on the other hand, by a one-sided integration into these networks, mainly as supporters. From a demographic perspective, this group is constituted of mostly younger or middle-aged women living in rural areas, in larger-than-average families. Their structural position is characterised by the lack of both cultural and material capitals and an insecure position in the labour market (see Table 3).⁵ Accordingly, it seems that private supporters are not only in

5 A group similar to the private supporters has also been analysed by research focusing on the impact of the pandemic on household labour distribution (Fodor et al., 2020). According to this research, it may be argued that this strongly gendered position in the field of solidarity has been burdened with new types of supportive tasks, further increasing its disadvantages.

an exploited position within the solidarity field, but also in a generally vulnerable one. They represent those mostly female actors who bear on their shoulders the consequences of a dysfunctional system of social security.

Despite these various structural disadvantages, private supporters do not express a particularly high level of criticism or dissatisfaction. Their opinion of the quality of democracy and the educational system is average – only health-related institutions are viewed more critically than average. Also, on a personal level they are overall slightly more satisfied than average. As supportive relations are limited to private networks, it is not surprising that the members of this group are also characterised by an above-average level of mistrust in others (see Table 4). This attitude expresses a quasi-traditional habitus based on local community ties instead of distant institutions or unpredictable generalised others. On the level of political preferences, this suspicion does not imply support for governing parties advertising nationalist protectionism. Instead, it implies support for Jobbik, the right-wing opposition party.

From their perspective, the solidarity field is ‘disillusioned’: they refuse both the extremities of supporting or denying various social groups – those who would support anybody or refuse everyone are both underrepresented (see Table 5). They are also disoriented about social responsibility: they do not consider state-level institutions, NGOs, or direct action to be a reliable way of providing support in times of crisis (see Table 10).

The fifth ideal-type (13 per cent of the sample) is characterised by a below-average level of problems, an average level of provided private support, and an above-average level of civil support and awareness of supportive interactions. This group is the opposite of the first one: the volunteer activists are also integrated into the field of solidarity in a one-sided manner; however, in their case this means the provision of support, without relying upon it. From a demographic perspective, this group is constituted of mostly middle-aged people living in urban areas in above-average sized families. They occupy an advantageous structural position: both their cultural and material capital is far above average, while their job position is also secure (see Table 3). Unlike in the case of solidarity brokers (who share their passion of helping in the civic sphere), in the case of the former providing support is not motivated by the need to build strong solidarity ties capable of complementing dysfunctional institutions. Unlike in the case of negligent bystanders (who share their structural position in terms of material and cultural capital), they are not satisfied with their own well-being and security. In contrast to these groups, civic volunteers reach out to those in need, and they are compensated solely by the symbolic capital of respectability (see Table 4).

Interestingly, these acts of support remain somewhat apolitical: members of this group are not only satisfied with their own personal lives, but also with the *status quo* in general, including those dysfunctional institutions that create demand for their activity in the first place. This may be closely related to another feature – a habitus shaped by an average level of the experience of discrimination. Without structural or other forms of vulnerability, the stake of the acts of support does not include personal survival. Its *illusio* is rather based on the realisation of distant utopic or religious ideals, with the hope of improving the world by lessening the suffering of others. On the level of political preferences, this attitude is expressed by an ideological heterogeneity: among the ranks of civic volunteers, supporters of new-wave opposition parties, governing parties, and apoliticals are equally represented in above-average proportions (see Table 3).

From their perspective, the *illusio* of the solidarity field is inclusive: they would support most groups in need as they do not compete with them for deservingness; rather, they rely on them as sources of gaining respectability (see Table 5). When it comes to social responsibility,

volunteer activists tend to rely more on NGOs, but unlike the solidarity brokers, this is not complemented with distrust of state-level institutions (see Table 10).

All in all, this overview reveals the complexity of the contemporary field of solidarity in Hungary. On the one hand, it may be concluded that many of those distortions and dysfunctions that were described by previous research that focused on various dimensions are reinforced by our study. On the other hand, the ideal-typical positions provide an opportunity to answer questions inaccessible to previous research. The various positions in the field of solidarity represent not only different patterns of symbolic and material capital, but also of habitus and illusion, framing divergent strategies, activities, and interactions. The dynamics of the solidarity field depend on these heterogeneous characteristics. Regarding such dynamics, various questions may be raised: how do indifferent masses in secure positions and privileged volunteers react if they experience personally or through media coverage new forms of suffering; how do the chronically deprived masses react if the already barely functioning, selective institutions of social politics are able to provide even less support; how can apolitical private supporters cope with an increase in their already overwhelming burdens; and how may brokers react if their own problems grow along with the need for the support they provide? In the last section, these trajectories are explored from the perspective of the pandemic, which set into motion the already ambiguous solidarity field.

6. The impact of the pandemic on the field of solidarity

Our questionnaire retrospectively measured dimensions of positions in the pre-pandemic field of solidarity. However, the limited length and complexity of the questionnaire hindered the exact reproduction of dimensions of solidarity for pre-pandemic times, and only allowed us to produce more simple indicators than those applied above to produce the actual current positions.⁶ Despite such a limitation, the questionnaire still allowed us to derive claims regarding the changes: we calculated the same – simplified – indicators for the time of the questioning and compared these present time and retrospective measures according to ideal-typical groups.

As a general tendency, it seems that the pandemic did not fundamentally reconfigure the field of solidarity; rather, it turned previously latent features into manifest ones.⁷ Regarding the number of problems (out of the three types), we see that in all five groups the average number of problems increases almost uniformly (with a slightly greater increase only in the group of unsupportive deprived respondents). Regarding changes in received support in relation to the most severe problems, we see that there is a decrease in the average number of support resources in all groups (except for the unsupportive deprived, for whom a small increase in the average of support resources is measured). As for the private help of friends or family, we see an increase in and diversification of helping, according to group averages, in all five groups (with such increase being the biggest for private supporters and the smallest for negligent bystanders – see Table 6). Last, for civic participation defined according to the helping of needy groups, we find that the majority of brokers and volunteer activists are ‘veterans’ – this

6 Changes tied to the pandemic period were thus measured based on the experience of only three types of problems (health, psychological, material-economic); the number of resources of received support concerned only the most severe problems that occurred prior to the pandemic; types of given support were asked for private relations in general (instead of asking family and friends separately); and civic activity was measured by the frequency of the most important activity, instead of the number of various causes and groups supported.

7 This conclusion is supported by research based on different methods and fields, such as one aimed at measuring the regional impact of pandemic-related state support: while the pandemic impacted various regions on a different scale, support was not differentiated, which resulted in an increase of inequalities (Kovács et al., 2020).

means they were active already prior to the pandemic. This tendency is completed by the relatively small-scale mobilisation of newcomers (to a smaller degree in the former and a greater degree in the latter group). At the same time, a major restructuring of the field is shown by more than 30 per cent of the deprived, bystanders, and private supporters withdrawing from the field of the civic helping of needy groups, despite their experience of doing so in the five years before the pandemic (see Table 7).

Probably the most direct impact of the first wave on the broader field context is related to the changing work circumstances. The two most affected clusters include the solidarity brokers and the volunteer activists: within both of these clusters, those who work in sectors either overburdened (e.g. health care, social or educational) or devastated (e.g. tourism, services) by the pandemic are over-represented. Also, work circumstances changed the most in these sectors: within both clusters those who work partly or completely from home are over-represented (see Table 8).

On the level of *illusio*, the pandemic gave rise to two distinctive patterns. The unsupportive deprived cluster was characterised by pessimism concerning imminent solutions being provided by science (an opinion shared by private supporters); criticism of human activities for being responsible for such crises; and the expectation of the long-term impact of the pandemic. Volunteer activists are also critical about the responsibility of humanity, but they express rather optimistic views about scientific solutions and the possibility of unified interventions (see Table 9).

To draw some general conclusions about the Hungarian field of solidarity, these circumstances also need to be taken into consideration. The two biggest groups within the field – the deprived and bystanders – are both characterised by their below-average involvement as supporters in solidarity interactions. This means that the majority of actors are either integrated into rather deprived positions (through the symbolic capital of deservingness) or not integrated at all. However, this constellation is not independent of the pandemic: while private helping of friends and family increased to some extent for both groups since the outburst of the pandemic (though in a similar way as in other groups, thus not changing the relative positions of these categories), the withdrawal of civic support intensified since the first wave. The sheer proportion of unsupportive actors (60% of the sample) who are either interested mostly in the symbolic capital of deservingness or completely disinterested fundamentally impacts both the space of possibilities and expectations related to solidarity. Deprived actors lack the resources; negligent ones lack interest in influencing the internal struggles of the solidarity field. Since the pandemic they have been even more stuck in their unbalanced positions (which in case of the deprived actors even means an increase in received support), thus the chance of their criticising the *status quo* while demanding the redefinition of normative interpretations and institutional praxes is even more improbable. Overall, this results in the conservation of the various local and global structural distortions that weaken solidarity ties.

These distortions affect not only the passive majority, but also those various groups that actively provide support for others. In their case, strong segmentation may be identified. Private supporters limit their activity to community ties, which is often considered to be a naturalised obligation (i.e. the 'duty' of women), not a merit – thus, these activities do not result in symbolic capital. The activists focus mostly on public cases that can generate the symbolic capital of respectability – however, these efforts are seldom rewarding otherwise. This Sisyphian role is even more important as state support for marginalised groups is continuously decreasing, while civil support for stigmatized groups is often hindered or sometimes persecuted by governmental propaganda and the authorities. On the one hand, the pandemic has

contributed to increasing the burden of volunteers, in parallel with decreasing their number. These tendencies indirectly imply a decline in the support provided by them, which further increases the hopelessness of their target groups. On the other hand, it has also mobilised newcomers who had the resources and became willing to contribute to ameliorating the condition of generalised others in need. Similar tendencies affected the brokers, who are involved in all roles, which provides access to a unique epistemic position. However, unlike in case of the activists (who are in a secure structural position and not in need of support), in the case of the former the increase in provided support is paired with a decrease in received support – that is, an overall less sustainable position.

In sum, the pandemic did not fundamentally reconfigure the solidarity field, which continues to be characterised by a large majority reproducing and naturalising distorted patterns. However, it set back many of those vulnerable supportive ties that had the opportunity of changing the horizon of negligent and the private supporters; also, it took away resources from already active supporters. These negative consequences are only slightly countered by the newcomers in the active groups. After the second and third waves of the pandemic, it remains an open question how these dynamics will evolve. Based on the above diagnoses, it is difficult to envisage any optimistic scenarios.

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APPENDIX

Table 2: *The steps of operationalization*

<i>dimension of cluster</i>	<i>survey questions</i>	<i>steps of aggregation</i>
types of problem since the pandemic (health, psychological, financial, care)	K1 Are you hindered in your everyday activities by chronic illness, bad health, disability or mental problems? If yes, then to what extent? (Think about the time since the pandemic)	In the case of K1-3 'very much' and 'to some extent' were added, and in the case of K4 'we face difficulties' and 'we barely make ends meet' were added.
	K2 Are you hindered in your everyday activities by a depressed mood, anxiety or stress? If yes, then to what extent? (Think about the time since the pandemic)	
	K3 Does it constitute a difficulty in your everyday life that you support a relative with medical condition on a regular basis or that you are at home with children? very much – to some extent – no, not at all	
	K4 Which options describe your household income the best (since the pandemic)? we are living comfortably from our incomes – we manage with our incomes – we face difficulties – we barely make ends meet	
sources of received support (family, friends, state, civil sphere)	Have you received any support for your problems related to health/ bad mood/ caring tasks/ or material challenges since the pandemic? Several options may be chosen. K5 from my family K6 my neighbours K7 my friends K8 state or municipal institutions (e.g. health care, social, educational) K9 major aid organization (e.g. Red Cross, Malta) K10 NGO K11 churches K12 private companies K13 unknown people	First, in the case of each problem a variable was constituted that measured if the subject receives help from at least one source ('yes' in K5-13). Second, the number of instances of received support was added.
problematic aspects of received support	K14 If you have received support, please evaluate its efficiency overall, it matched my needs – it helped me partly – it did not help at all – help was not provided by anyone Please indicate how much any of these characterised the received support K15 I could not express, what I need exactly. / K16 I was ashamed for being a burden on the shoulders of others. / K17 I felt that the support was provided unwillingly. / K18 I could not trust the supporter. / K19 I was afraid of being in debt. very much true – partly true – rather not true – not true at all	First, from K14 'it helped me partly' and 'it did not help at all' were added. Second, from K15-19 'very much true' and 'partly true' were also added.

<i>dimension of cluster</i>	<i>survey questions</i>	<i>steps of aggregation</i>
types of support provided to family members/ friends (health, psychological, financial, care)	<p>K 22 Did you provide any support to your family members in relation to the pandemic?</p> <p>K23 Did you provide any support to your friends in relation to the pandemic?</p> <p>alleviation of physical suffering (nursing, care) / Their mental well-being (e.g. conversation) / in terms of their financial needs (e.g. donation, loan, food, etc.) / in terms of managing their everyday affairs (e.g. shopping)</p> <p>yes, on a daily basis - Yes, at least weekly - Yes, less frequently than weekly - No</p>	Those activities were added in the case of K22 and K23 when support was provided 'on a daily basis' or 'at least weekly'
types of support provided to generalised others	<p>K 24 Did you provide any form of support (donation, volunteering) to any of these groups (outside of your family):</p> <p>elderly people / patients / relatives / carers / people losing their jobs, / unemployed / people losing their homes, homeless people / people living in poverty / children having difficulty accessing online education / Roma living in poverty / addicts / minority Hungarians (e.g. Transylvanians, Transcarpathians, Moldavian Csangos) / refugees, asylum seekers / health workers, doctors, nurses / teachers / social workers / press products or cultural institutions requesting support (e.g. theatre) / animal and nature conservation organizations requesting support (e.g. shelter) / alternative economic organization (network of local producers) / other group or case</p> <p>helped - didn't help, but consider it important to help - didn't help, and don't consider it important to help</p>	Those activities were added when 'helped' was chosen
sources of information about the provided support	<p>K25 Did you get any information about the targeted problems? Multiple answers are possible.</p> <p>I gathered information from the press - I gathered expert information - I was relying on my own expertise - I discussed it with my friends</p>	Those sources were added which were accessed

Table 3: Demographic and structural background of ideal-typical position (*habitus*)

		<i>unsupportive deprived</i> (21%)	<i>broker of solidarity</i> (10%)	<i>negligent bystander</i> (42%)	<i>private supporter</i> (14%)	<i>volunteer activist</i> (13%)
gender**	Male	16,6%	12,8%	46,0%	12,3%	12,3%
	Female	24,4%	8,2%	39,3%	15,7%	12,4%
age**		20,7%	10,4%	42,4%	14,1%	12,4%
	18-29 years	18,1%	18,1%	36,8%	18,8%	8,3%
	30-39 years	25,0%	14,0%	33,8%	18,4%	8,8%
	40-49 years	15,8%	11,8%	40,8%	15,1%	16,4%
	50-59 years	27,3%	9,1%	37,2%	13,2%	13,2%
	59+ years	19,5%	3,3%	54,9%	8,9%	13,4%
			20,7%	10,3%	42,7%	14,1%
settlement type *	Budapest	18,1%	14,8%	41,6%	12,1%	13,4%
	county centre	20,8%	8,8%	48,4%	8,8%	13,2%
	town	16,7%	8,9%	44,4%	15,2%	14,8%
	village	26,8%	10,2%	37,0%	18,3%	7,7%
			20,8%	10,4%	42,5%	14,3%
education**	max. elementary school	27,7%	10,1%	38,8%	18,6%	4,8%
	vocational school	25,3%	13,5%	35,9%	12,9%	12,4%
	high school degree	18,9%	9,3%	46,3%	13,7%	11,9%
	min. BA/ BSc	11,6%	9,8%	46,8%	11,0%	20,8%
			20,7%	10,5%	42,4%	14,1%
subjective economic status**	living very well	6,0%	20,9%	41,8%	11,9%	19,4%
	managing at an acceptable level	11,5%	8,7%	47,6%	14,3%	17,9%
	having economic difficulties	34,3%	10,4%	38,2%	11,6%	5,6%
	facing serious economic hardships	34,4%	10,0%	32,2%	22,2%	1,1%
			20,8%	10,4%	42,4%	14,1%
how many month's savings do you have?***	.00	28,4%	6,9%	43,6%	15,3%	5,8%
	1.00	23,0%	4,7%	43,2%	17,6%	11,5%
	2.00	15,8%	13,7%	41,1%	15,8%	13,7%
	3.00	14,5%	16,0%	40,1%	10,8%	18,6%
			21,1%	10,4%	42,1%	14,2%
how many people live together in your family?***	1.00	23,5%	5,1%	52,0%	8,2%	11,2%
	2.00	21,2%	5,8%	50,0%	12,8%	10,2%
	3.00	24,1%	16,6%	33,7%	11,8%	13,9%
	4.00	15,8%	12,9%	37,1%	20,0%	14,2%
			20,5%	10,4%	42,6%	14,1%

		<i>unsupportive deprived</i> (21%)	<i>broker of solidarity</i> (10%)	<i>negligent bystander</i> (42%)	<i>private supporter</i> (14%)	<i>volunteer activist</i> (13%)
occupation**	paid activity or learning	18,6%	14,6%	37,8%	14,6%	14,4%
	unemployed, active job seeking	26,0%	9,6%	39,7%	17,8%	6,8%
	inactive	23,7%	1,3%	52,2%	12,7%	10,1%
		20,8%	10,3%	42,2%	14,4%	12,4%
experience of discrimination**	Yes	25,3%	18,9%	31,1%	12,6%	12,1%
	No	19,3%	7,7%	46,1%	14,6%	12,3%
		20,8%	10,4%	42,5%	14,1%	12,3%
Party preferences	DK-MSZP (post-communist socialist parties in opposition)	24,1%	9,3%	42,6%	13,9%	10,2%
	PM-LMP-Mo-mo-MKKP (post-2010 opposition)	26,8%	12,2%	40,2%	3,7%	17,1%
	Fidesz-KDNP (post-communist right-wing parties in government)	16,9%	13,5%	42,7%	12,4%	14,6%
	Jobbik (post-2010 right-wing opposition)	7,9%	11,1%	46,0%	27,0%	7,9%
	does not vote	23,7%	8,6%	42,4%	15,1%	10,1%
	no answer	21,7%	8,2%	41,5%	15,5%	13,0%

*p<0,05 **p<0,01

Table 4: Attitudes of ideal-typical positions (*illusio/ habitus*)

	<i>unsupportive deprived</i>	<i>broker of solidarity</i>	<i>negligent bystander</i>	<i>private supporter</i>	<i>volunteer activist</i>	<i>total</i>
trust in others (1–10)**	3,78	4,69	4,33	4,09	5,30	4,34
satisfaction with life (1–10)**	4,12	5,31	5,37	5,60	6,12	5,23
satisfaction with the economy (1–10)**	3,21	4,98	4,00	4,15	4,29	4,00
satisfaction with the quality of democracy (1–10)**	3,19	4,61	3,58	3,57	4,28	3,69
satisfaction with quality of education (1–10)**	3,27	4,79	3,99	3,97	4,33	3,96
satisfaction with quality of health care (1–10)**	2,94	4,28	3,21	3,08	3,75	3,32
uncertainty of future (1–10)**	3,42	5,17	4,65	4,46	5,20	4,49

*p<0,05 **p<0,01

Table 5: *The exclusivity of solidarity (illusio)*

The exclusivity of provided support
(groups in need of support included the labels mentioned in K24, see Table 2)

	<i>unsupportive deprived</i>	<i>broker of solidarity</i>	<i>negligent bystander</i>	<i>private supporter</i>	<i>volunteer activist</i>	<i>total</i>
Supports or intends to support every social group in need (0 labels refused)	22,3%	31,5%	29,4%	26,7%	38,7%	28,1%
Supports or intends to support many social group in need (1-3 labels refused)	29,0%	43,8%	24,5%	33,6%	38,7%	30,2%
Supports or intends to support a few social groups in need (4-8 labels refused)	29,5%	20,5%	27,1%	29,3%	21,3%	26,9%
Would not support most social group in need (9-18 labels refused)	19,2%	4,1%	19,0%	10,3%	1,3%	14,8%

Table 6: *The impact of the pandemic on the ideal-typical positions (problem–solution balance)*

		<i>Number of problems (health, mental, economic)</i>		<i>Number of times received support for the biggest problem</i>		<i>Number of incidences of support for family and friends</i>	
		<i>prior</i>	<i>during</i>	<i>prior</i>	<i>during</i>	<i>prior</i>	<i>during</i>
unsupportive deprived	Mean	1.10	1.54	1.21	1.32	1.77	2.41
	N	166	166	127	141	166	166
	Std. deviation	0.90	0.74	0.98	0.96	1.29	1.32
broker of solidarity	Mean	1.04	1.25	1.62	1.31	3.13	3.89
	N	83	83	68	68	83	83
	Std. deviation	0.80	0.86	1.03	1.00	0.95	0.41
negligent bystander	Mean	0.47	0.66	0.46	0.23	1.14	1.64
	N	340	340	118	154	340	340
	Std. deviation	0.68	0.78	0.65	0.51	1.19	1.38
private sup- porter	Mean	0.72	0.95	0.87	0.56	2.57	3.68
	N	113	113	64	77	113	113
	Std. deviation	0.84	0.91	0.84	1.02	1.34	0.56
volunteer activist	Mean	0.25	0.41	0.80	0.26	2.23	2.99
	N	98	98	37	44	98	98
	Std. deviation	0.45	0.60	0.79	0.57	1.20	1.07
Total	Mean	0.67	0.91	0.97	0.75	1.81	2.49
	N	800	800	413	484	800	800
	Std. deviation	0.80	0.87	0.96	0.97	1.39	1.45

Table 7: *The mobilization potential of the pandemic*

<i>Civic help before and after the pandemic ('Supported groups in need')*</i>	<i>unsupportive deprived</i>	<i>broker of solidarity</i>	<i>negligent bystander</i>	<i>private supporter</i>	<i>volunteer activist</i>	
veteran (active both before and after)	13.9%	72.3%	9.4%	15.0%	83.7%	26.8%
mobilised (active after, passive before pandemic)	3.6%	13.3%	2.9%	1.8%	16.3%	5.6%
passivized (active before, passive after pandemic)	38.0%	8.4%	31.9%	29.2%	–	26.4%
ignorant (both before and after)	44.6%	6.0%	55.8%	54.0%	–	41.2%
total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 8: *The impact of the pandemic on work*

		<i>unsupportive deprived</i>	<i>broker of solidarity</i>	<i>negligent bystander</i>	<i>private supporter</i>	<i>volunteer activist</i>
Where do you work (from)?*	home	16,5%	17,6%	34,1%	14,1%	17,6%
	workplace	17,7%	9,8%	44,9%	14,4%	13,1%
	partly home, partly workplace	22,2%	20,8%	26,4%	13,9%	16,7%
	unemployed	24,3%	6,5%	46,0%	14,2%	8,9%
		20,8%	10,3%	42,6%	14,3%	12,1%
In which economic sector do you work? *	burdened by the pandemic (health care, education, social service)	14,0%	19,6%	33,6%	11,2%	21,5%
	destroyed by the pandemic (services, tourism)	17,5%	19,6%	36,1%	9,3%	17,5%
	other (industry, agriculture)	21,6%	7,3%	43,2%	17,4%	10,4%
	unemployed	22,9%	4,0%	49,5%	14,3%	9,3%
		20,5%	9,3%	43,5%	14,3%	12,4%

*p<0,05 **p<0,01

Table 9: *Attributions related to the pandemic*

<i>How much do you agree with the statements? (1-10)</i>	<i>unsupportive deprived</i>	<i>broker of solidarity</i>	<i>negligent bystander</i>	<i>private supporter</i>	<i>volunteer activist</i>	<i>total</i>
science will find a solution soon to the pandemic*	5,22	5,53	5,59	5,21	6,39	5,55
humankind is responsible for the pandemic	7,08	6,36	6,47	6,27	6,85	6,61
our everyday life involves fundamental change**	6,99	6,52	6,17	6,15	6,80	6,45
the pandemic is an opportunity for humankind to unite	6,29	6,25	6,21	6,57	7,13	6,39

*p<0,05 **p<0,01

Table 10: *Responsibilities for managing the pandemic*

<i>To what extent are these actors responsible for finding a solution to the challenges of the pandemic?</i>	<i>unsupportive deprived</i>	<i>broker of solidarity</i>	<i>negligent bystander</i>	<i>private supporter</i>	<i>volunteer activist</i>	<i>total</i>	
State, local government**	very much	74,7%	70,7%	86,8%	72,6%	86,7%	80,6%
	a little or not at all	25,3%	29,3%	13,2%	27,4%	13,3%	19,4%
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
EU institutions*	very much	75,9%	71,1%	82,9%	72,6%	78,8%	78,3%
	a little or not at all	24,1%	28,9%	17,1%	27,4%	21,2%	21,7%
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
global institutions (WHO, UN)**	very much	77,7%	62,7%	82,9%	74,3%	83,7%	78,6%
	a little	17,5%	25,3%	11,2%	15,9%	16,3%	15,3%
	not at all	4,8%	12,0%	5,9%	9,7%		6,1%
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
citizens**	very much	68,7%	63,4%	71,5%	64,6%	76,8%	69,8%
	a little	20,5%	28,0%	23,5%	32,7%	22,2%	24,5%
	not at all	10,8%	8,5%	5,0%	2,7%	1,0%	5,8%
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
NGOs*	very much	37,9%	47,2%	28,0%	40,5%	38,7%	35,3%
	a little	48,7%	41,7%	60,1%	52,6%	52,0%	53,4%
	not at all	13,4%	11,1%	11,9%	6,9%	9,3%	11,3%
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

*p<0,05 **p<0,01