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

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VERA MESSING AND BENCE SÁGVÁRI *

Central European Societies on the Map of Europe: A Thematic Issue Dedicated to the European Social Survey's Central European Data

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* [vera.messing@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest); [sagvari.bence@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest)

We dedicated this thematic issue of *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics (EEJSP)* entitled 'Central European Societies on the Map of Europe' to the studying of social phenomena of the region based on data from the *European Social Survey (ESS).* The collection brings together papers that analyse the state of societies in Central and East Europe in a comparative and/or longitudinal perspective. The ESS provides an excellent source for analysing the changes in our societies both across time and location and analyse a variety of social phenomena on supra-national, national and subnational levels.

The European Social Survey is an academically driven cross national survey; one of the most well-known, trusted and widely used comparative European research projects providing internationally comparative data on political and social attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty countries. It supplies demands for data on topics studied across many social science disciplines, such as sociology, political science, public policy, minority studies etc. The ESS was initiated by the European Commission in 2001 with the aim to provide bi-yearly data on the demographic and social characteristics of Europe's as well as its populations' political and public preferences, social attitudes and values influencing people's behaviour. In 2005 the ESS was the winner of the Descartes Prize for Research & Science Communication and in 2013 it was awarded the European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) status which twenty-five countries have joined as regular members and a further six countries have gained guest status. As of now, it is the largest Research Infrastructure Consortium in the EU.

In addition to its time and geographical coverage the greatest asset and value of ESS is its quality. The preparation of the survey, translation of questionnaires, sampling as well as the actual fieldwork all follow a very strict procedure, which is constantly controlled and tested by scholars collaborating with ESS headquarters. Thanks to these efforts the ESS became the most reliable cross-national comparative survey in the continent.

Sampling is one of the key prerequisites of quality data and comparability across countries. The objective of the ESS sampling strategy is the design and implementation of workable and equivalent sampling plans in all participating countries. Samples must be representative of all persons aged 15 and over (no upper age limit) resident within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language. Individuals are selected by strict random probability methods at every stage. All countries aim for a minimum 'effective

achieved sample size' of 1,500 or 800 in countries with ESS populations of fewer than 2 million after discounting for design effects.

The questionnaire and its translation is the other key point of the quality of an international comparative survey. The ESS questionnaire consists of seven modules, five of which – the so called core modules – are repeated every second year. Two modules however, – so called rotating modules – change.

Questionnaire content of the nine Rounds of the European Social Survey

- **Round 1 (2002)**
- Immigration
- Citizenship, involvement and democracy (CID)
- **Round 2 (2004)**
- Family, work & well-being
- Economic morality in Europe
- Health and care seeking
- **Round 3 (2006)**
- Personal and social wellbeing
- Timing of life
- **Round 4 (2008)**
- Ageism
- Welfare
- **Round 5 (2010)**
- Trust in the police & courts
- Work, family & well-being
- **Round 6 (2012)**
- Understanding/evaluation of democracy
- Personal and social wellbeing
- **Round 7 (2014)**
- Health inequalities
- Immigration
- **Round 8 (2016)**
- Climate Change, Energy Security and Energy Preferences
- Welfare Attitudes
- **Round 9 (2018)**
- Justice and fairness
- Timing of life
- **Round 10 (2020, in progress)**
- Digital Social Contacts in Work and Family Life
- Understandings and Evaluations of Democracy

Multi-national teams of researchers are selected through an open call to contribute to the design of two rotating modules for the questionnaire. Questions incorporated into the questionnaire are selected and tested in multiple rounds. Translation of the questionnaire also follows a uniquely complex and multi-layered process, which guarantees that responses to questions are comparative across languages and cultures to the highest possible levels.

The European Social Survey is a public good: data and the entire documentation of ESS is open access to any interested scholar, policy analyst and student. It is extensively used in higher education both as a data source for courses or as a source for dissertations. It is also widely used in academia. It has almost 135 thousand registered users 66.5 per cent of whom are students, 18 per cent are faculty and researchers, 7 per cent PhD students and the rest includes private, non-governmental and governmental organizations. The ESS provided a source for over 3000 academic publications in the past fifteen years. However, in the Central East European region ESS data is still somewhat underused: with the exceptions of Poland, Slovenia and Hungary the number of registered users as well as publications relying on ESS data still have a wide open space for expansion. With this special issue we

aimed to contribute to this expansion and publish studies that focus on this region of Europe, which has been the most turbulent part of the European Union in terms of changes to its societies, political and social attitudes and values that drive the behaviour of its populations. There has been a lot happening to societies and ESS provides a fertile ground to analyse and explain some of the phenomena that are rather distinct from the rest of Europe and explain the differences from the rest of Europe and within the region.

This special issue of Intersections EEJSP is interdisciplinary in the sense that it includes six original research articles that discuss various aspects of societies and politics of Central East European countries in the light of ESS data, and a review of an edited volume based also on data from the ESS.

The first paper, co-authored by Messing, Ságvári and Simon, and entitled 'Methodological challenges in cross-comparative surveys: The case of understanding attitudes towards democracy in Hungary' is of a methodological nature. Two of the authors serve as lead researchers of the European Social Survey in Hungary and this paper was inspired by their experiences concerning the challenges and difficulties that designing and implementing such a huge cross-country comparative survey poses. In their paper they discuss the validity of questions measuring attitudes towards democracy in a cross-country comparative survey. The authors apply statistical and qualitative (focus group discussion) methods to show dilemmas of understanding responses to questionnaire block assessing attitudes towards democracy. The study shows that validity and reliability of data of cross country comparative surveys have to be treated with care even in the case of the most well-designed and carefully implemented projects such as the ESS and that there are limitations of analysing such data that need to be taken into consideration.

The paper authored by Cichocki and Jablowski from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań examines the impact of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 on the attitudes of the populations of the four Visegrad countries, based on survey rounds before (R7 in 2014) and after (R8 in 2016) the crisis. Their focal question is the role of basic human values – such as Security and Humanitarianism – in transforming attitudes. The analysis demonstrates that the securitisation of the immigration question in public discourse seems to have had a strong impact on the structure of anti-immigration attitudes in Czechia, Hungary and Poland.

The Thematic Issue includes another paper that discusses the impact this significant event had on populations on Central and East Europe. Barna and Koltai in their article entitled 'Attitude change towards immigrants in the turbulent years of the migrant crisis and the anti-immigrant campaign in Hungary' focus on Hungary, the country which has acted as a core source of anti-immigrant political narratives and whose population has become the most negative towards any kind of migration since 2015. Hungary is an interesting case also, because while earlier it fitted into the pattern of post-communist countries with minor migration flows, lack of knowledge and awareness about migration but still relatively strong anti-immigrant sentiments, it became a stronghold of anti-immigrant discourses and attitudes within Europe, not independently from the government initiated anti-immigration campaign.

Takács and Szalma's study of social attitudes towards homosexuality in two still quite similar, but in many respects different Central East European countries –

Hungary and Romania – aims to answer the question how religious denomination influences these attitudes. The two countries while similar in their recent historical traits, post-communist traditions and levels of economic development are different in terms of dominant denominations in their societies: in Hungary this is the Catholic Church, while in Romania the Orthodox Church is the dominant religion. In addition to European Social Survey data they include European Value Survey data in their analysis too.

Fedakova and Veira Ramos discuss the issue of job security. They compare Central European countries with Northern and Southern European countries based on ESS Round 5 data from 2010/11, when work, wellbeing in recession was the topic of one of the Rotating Modules of the survey. They examine predictors of subjective job security in the three country clusters against personal demographic background characteristics, job characteristics and organizational characteristics. They found that in the three country clusters these explanatory variables drive the feeling of one's job being secure to a different extent: while in Visegrad countries mainly job characteristics explained the perception of job security, in the Southern country cluster it is individual's education and age whereas in the Northern countries organizational characteristics played a more significant role in explaining how people feel about job security.

The paper written by Nagy, Grajczjár and Örkény compares developments in attitudes towards different types of solidarity in Austria and Hungary. The main argument is that recent times of crisis induced by the economic turmoil and the mass inflow of refugees to Europe provided abundant opportunities for right-wing populists to prosper. Solidarity is defined at macro, mezzo and micro levels, and a wide range of the available ESS variables are used to operationalize the concepts. Based on the merged dataset of the two countries and applying multivariate methods five distinct clusters were identified and they are presented in detail in the paper. Results show that basic dynamics of solidarity patterns are quite similar in both countries, but some notable differences could be observed. In Austria different types of solidarity are mostly ideology- and value-based, while in Hungary there is a general right-wing radicalization tendency and rather individual problems and subjective perceptions explain patterns of solidarity.

The paper written by Piterová and Výrost focus on social solidarity and social differentiation as two elements of welfare attitudes. The authors compare results from the 4th and 8th round of the ESS, and compare three distinct country groups. The Visegrad countries (without Slovakia) are compared to Northern and Western Europe. Results suggest that differences in welfare attitudes might not be so obvious, but diverging patterns crystallize along individual characteristics such as interpersonal and institutional trust and basic human values.

In the last section we included the review of two edited volumes that both utilize data from the ESS and cover important social issues. The book review written by Ságvári summarizes the content and most important findings of the book *Values and identities in Europe: Evidence from the European Social Survey* edited by Michael J. Breen and published by Routledge in 2017. Daniel Oross has written a review on *New Uncertainties in Europe*, a book published by Peter Lang. The book's

chapters focus on migration and the related phenomena of discrimination and xenophobia.

VERA MESSING, BENCE SÁGVÁRI
AND DÁVID SIMON *

Methodological Challenges in Cross-comparative Surveys: The Case of Understanding Attitudes towards Democracy in Hungary

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* [vera.messing@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest); [sagvari.bence@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest); [simon.david@tatk.elte.hu] (Eötvös Loránd University)

Abstract

Our paper examines the validity of the rotating questionnaire block about perceptions about and attitudes towards democracy included in the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS). The preliminary assumptions that inspired our analysis were that respondents' understanding of the questions formulated in such an internationally comparative survey may be challenged due to diverging theoretical constructions and narratives that feed historically developed notions of 'democracy.' Moreover, even within the same country people with a different socioeconomic, ethnic, and educational background may have different perceptions about the same questionnaire 'items.' We applied a multi-method approach to analyze the above methodological puzzle: a complex statistical analysis of the Hungarian ESS data served to help examine the consistency of answers to individual items and the entirety of the questionnaire block, while supplementary focus group research helped us apprehend the variety of interpretations of and perceptions about the individual items, as well as problems with understanding various terms included in the questions that assessed attitudes towards democracy. Our findings support the initial hypothesis: respondents had obvious difficulties understanding some of the items designed to assess attitudes towards democracy, while many others had differing interpretations. We conclude that even though the ESS is one of the most refined, well-prepared and validated comparative surveys in Europe, the related data cannot be analyzed without careful consideration of what the individual questions might mean in different contexts.

Keywords: European Social Survey (ESS), Hungary, cross-national survey, validity, reliability, attitudes, democracy.

1. Introduction

One of the most exciting projects in the field of social sciences is the application of international comparative surveys that apply the same methodology across a number of countries characterized by diverging societies, languages, historically developed cultures and norms. However, this process involves numerous risks, especially when examining perceptions and attitudes that are deeply rooted in the cultural and social characteristics of the given communities. The linguistic and cognitive differences in the connotations of various terms can pose further interpretational difficulties, especially if such historically and culturally rooted abstract concepts such as *democracy*, *migration*, *welfare state*, *institutional trust*, etc. are the focus.

With most international surveys, the compilation of questionnaires involves the joint effort of researchers from different countries. However, this does not mean that the questions, or the theoretical constructions behind some of the questions, are completely free from the country-specific worldviews of researchers, dominant narratives, or national circumlocutory characteristics. Thus, despite thorough preparation and precise methodology, it can be difficult to compare results from various countries since the questions do not apply to the same theoretical and cognitive structures.

Researching attitudes towards a complex concept is difficult enough without the international comparative dimension and opens the door to various types of tricky situations. It is hard to measure how seriously respondents take their answers, whether they have definite opinions about the given topics, if they are honest at all, and what degree of social conformity exists, either conscious or unconscious.

We have based our study on the findings of a single survey to examine certain elements of this problem. We used *European Social Survey* (ESS) data for Hungary and also undertook focus group research to reveal the interpretational problems the respondents might have had when answering questions about certain details pertaining to democracy. Our paper was inspired by our experience as the Hungarian coordinators of ESS. We have personally faced the difficulties and interpretational limits of this large-scale European project and are aware of the immense work involved in collecting, analyzing and interpreting the data. We find it important to analyze and address these methodological challenges, even though we believe that ESS provides the best possible quality of comparative data about the attitudes of European populations and we are aware of the immense intellectual input and preparation that the development of questionnaire items demand. No better cross-comparative survey data is being produced with contemporary survey research technologies, nor probably can be.

Our preliminary assumption when planning the research was that some of the respondents might have had difficulties in interpreting (or even understanding) the complex questions in the ESS with reference to democracy. Moreover, some questions could have given rise to various subjective interpretations. We believe that if our hypotheses are true, we should take into consideration these uncertainties when analyzing and interpreting the data, remaining aware of the interpretational limits and traps that may bias seemingly objective results.

2. Theoretical considerations

There is an immense amount of literature about the problems of international survey- and attitude research, but we emphasize only two important aspects here. One concerns the difficulty of creating a multilingual questionnaire, while the other relates to the attitudes of respondents that raise concern about the reliability of answers.

2.1 Difficulties with a multilingual questionnaire

Various factors may influence the reliability and validity of responses to survey questionnaire items (Krosnick, 2018). Obviously, the validity of measurement of an attitude depends primarily on the wording of the question (Chessa and Holleman, 2007; Oskamp and Schultz, 2005, Saris et al., 2010). In the case of international surveys, the quality of any translation is just as important (Dorer, 2015; McGorry, 2000). The ESS is one of the most thoroughly planned and controlled surveys from this point of view. After initial wording of the preliminary items, a question goes through seven steps before entering into the questionnaire of the given country, including preliminary testing across various countries and languages that applies the qualitative methodology of cognitive interviewing (where interviewees are asked to explain with regard to each question what exactly they had in mind when interpreting the question and why they chose the given response). As part of the quality pre-check process, an analytical technique – Survey Quality Predictor (SQP) – uses a continuously expanding international database and various metadata about the questions to create a prognosis of the 'quality' of the questions and answer categories. All this effort is aimed at measuring opinions and attitudes with the highest possible accuracy, and minimizing the risks of interpretational problems (Saris and Gallhofer, 2007). However, this does not mean that such questions are perfect (one can hardly say such things in the world of surveys) because it is impossible to avoid all the difficulties of adapting original, often abstract concepts to the various nations and shifts in the social context (since it takes 2–3 years from the first concept of the questionnaire to the time of collection of data).

2.2 Difficulties with measuring attitudes quantitatively: When people give the 'wrong' answers

Even an almost perfect question and an even more perfect translation does not guarantee that answers will be reliable and valid. Academic literature speaks about the interviewer effect, referring to the bias inherent in the demographic features of the interviewer (gender, age, racial or ethnic background) and their preconceptions about the topic (Groves, 1989).[1]

The other type of bias discussed in the academic literature is inherent to the actual respondent: there are numerous intentional and non-intentional behaviors that can influence the quality of the answers significantly. Here, we distinguish between general problems and those that are specifically related to the surveying of attitudes.

[1] We do not deal with this bias in this article in more depth.

The growing 'indicator-fetishism' and 'data-hunger' of governments, companies, academics and NGOs is posing problems internationally and, as a result, societies are becoming 'over-researched.' Even though commonplace, the overwhelming amount of research, the spread of multitasking (especially among the young), and a decrease in trust mean that people are becoming less and less capable of and willing to answer long questionnaires that require in-depth, intensive thinking and the formation of opinions about abstract notions. The ESS faces serious problems in this regard because it is a complex survey of social phenomena and the interviews usually take an hour, or even more. It is a significant dilemma whether respondents can manage to maintain their motivation, attention, and honesty for such long questionnaires, especially with regard to topics that presumably many of them have not previously given a thought to. This leads us to the issue of how to generate statistically interpretable respondent behaviour that does not decrease the reliability and validity of certain questions, and thus that of the whole survey.

This problem has been researched by many, and in various ways (see e.g. Schwartz and Sudman, 1992, Groves et al., 2002; Saris and Sniderman, 2004; Kamoen et al., 2018). In this paper we only examine the distortions inherent to answers that involve using a scale to respond to questions about attitudes. Table 1 summarizes the most characteristic problems and their possible consequences for the quality of data. We distinguish between two basic types of issues: 1) the respondent does not give a substantive answer and indicates that they have no opinion about the subject matter ('Don't know' answers) or refuses to provide an answer for some other reason; and, 2) the respondent chooses a clear answer from the scale but the validity of this choice is questionable.

Table 1. Basic types of respondent behaviour that threaten the reliability and validity of attitude surveys

		Respondent behaviors that threaten reliability	**Pattern**	**Consequence**
Respondent behaviour follows a systematic pattern		No answer or "Don't know" answer	-	Lack of data
	YES	Excessive agreement with statements	○○○○○●●	Higher average, decrease in the difference between variables
		Excessive disagreement with statements	●●○○○○○	Lower average, decrease in the difference between variables
		Excessive and systematic use of middle values	○○○●○○○	Approximation to average parameters, decrease in variance, decrease in the difference between variables

		Respondent behaviors that threaten reliability	**Pattern**	**Consequence**
		Excessive and systematic use of extreme values	●○○○○○●	Increase in variance, increase in difference between variables
		Systematic avoidance of extreme values	○●●●●●○	Decrease in the difference between variables, approximation to average parameters
	NO	Lack of motivation, random answers	○○○○○○○	False results
		(False) conformity with socially acceptable answers	○○○○○○○	Approximation to expected average, decrease in variance, increase in the relations of variables

The reasons for giving no answer can be complex. Respondents might be under-motivated or simply do not want to consider the question and thus refuse to answer. Also, it is possible that they are willing to answer, but do not understand the question and feels that it is inappropriate to start a debate with the interviewer. If a respondent understands the question, they still might not have enough information to form an opinion with regard to the topic. Alternatively, the respondent may have so much information that they have a detailed opinion, but the answers on the scale do not reflect the complexity of their opinion or attitude. The respondent can also have an opinion they do not wish to share for some reason.

All in all, it is very difficult to identify the exact reasons for this type of data gap. One might follow up the various interview situations using statistical analysis (involving the personality of the interviewer, the circumstances of the interview, the demographics of the respondent, the individual and the overall patterns of data gaps) which factors may help to highlight systematic errors in the questions and the interviews, but this information mostly only helps with designing future surveys.[2]

Even when definite answers are given to questions we cannot be satisfied because the existence of an answer does not guarantee its quality. There can be several reasons for giving an answer that is 'wrong' from a researcher's point of view. Some of these reasons are very similar to the ones we have discussed with reference to the lack of answers. Under-motivation can be present in a refusal to answer, but it is even more problematic when it appears in the form of giving random answers. Also, one does not necessarily have to understand a question or have an attitude in relation to a subject to choose a response option from the scale, leading to the provision of false data. A key issue discussed in the literature is the problem of how to manage or avoid situations such as when the respondent does not really have an opinion about the given topic, but during the interview eventually 'develops' one. The main problem

[2] This question is amplified in Pillók (2010).

with this phenomenon is that researchers become part of a 'mental coin flip' (Converse, 1964), meaning that respondents produce an opinion or attitude in the course of an interview to meet the presumed expectations of the interviewer, or in other words, they simply provide evaluations of (to them) non-existent policy issues (Bishop et al., 1984; 1986). Others frame this behaviour in terms of a process of cognitive opinion-making; namely, a phenomenon whereby the respondent does not have enough information about the subject matter, but by applying knowledge and opinions concerning other fields that are deemed relevant 'produces' an opinion (Schuman and Presser, 1980; Sturgis and Smith, 2010) that can be labeled satisfying. (Krosnick, 1991). Respondent behaviour can also be affected by a desire for conformity with social expectations and a conscious or unconscious approximation of mainstream or emotionally safe, socially acceptable answers.

The positive and negative wording of statements also influence responses. The potential bias involved in using negative vs. positive question polarity, and unipolar vs. bipolar questions is another major concern when studying attitudes. There is evidence that negative questions are more difficult to process and take more processing effort than their positive equivalents. It is presumed that negative statements have to be cognitively converted into positives before they are understood and judged (Kaup et al., 2006).

All these distortions in respondent behaviors are hard to pinpoint systematically in the data, because the answers have no certain direction. There may be cases, however, when the use of answer scales for questions about attitudes show systematic bias. For example, such a bias may involve excessive agreement ('yea-saying'), or excessive disagreement that reflects a false preference for extreme values. The opposite of such answering behaviour can also happen: when the respondent systematically leans towards medium values (i.e. does not have an opinion or does not want to share it) and avoids extremes. The statistical consequence of these problems manifests itself in the distortion of the average and the variance, while in the case of a multi-item attitude survey the variables may show invalid covariance. The statistical consequences of these systematic distortions are summed up in Table 1.

3. The Methodology of the Survey

3.1 Democracy-related items in the ESS questionnaire

From the very start, the European Social Survey, in addition to the five question modules of the core questionnaire (repeated identically in each round; that is, every second year), has always included two varying questionnaire modules that inquire about specific key topics relevant to European societies. One of the rotating questionnaire modules of Round 6 in 2012 investigated attitudes towards democracy (*Understanding and evaluating democracy*).[3] We used 2x14 questions from the almost 50 questions (variables) of this questionnaire block to analyze aspects of response and data reliability and validity. The former asked about expectations and ideals regarding democracy (henceforth: abstract context) and opinions about the Hungarian situation for the same dimensions (henceforth: concrete context).

[3] This rotating module was repeated in the ninth round of ESS in 2018/2019.

The attitudes we examined were captured using the following statement: (1) 'Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general,' and (2) 'Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think each of the following statements applies in Hungary.'[4]

The items in the question block we examined were the following:[5]

1. *National elections are free and fair.*
2. *Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote.*
3. *Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another.*
4. *Opposition parties are free to criticize the government.*
5. *The media are free to criticize the government.*
6. *The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government.*
7. *The rights of minority groups are protected.*
8. *Citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.*
9. *The courts treat everyone the same.*
10. *Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job.*
11. *The government protects all citizens against poverty.*
12. *The government explains its decisions to voters.*
13. *The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels.*
14. *Politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions.*

The ESS fieldwork in Hungary took place between November, 2012 and January, 2013 and the sample included 2014 respondents. All questions had to be answered using a scale of 0–10, but respondents could refuse to give an answer or indicate 'Don't know.' For the items concerning the abstract context the smallest element on the scale (0) was labeled 'Not at all important for democracy in general,' while the largest number (10) was considered 'Extremely important for democracy in general.' For the concrete (national) context the corresponding two extreme values of the scale shown to the survey respondents were described as 'Does not apply at all' and 'Applies completely', respectively. The interview was administered face to face using the CAPI (computer-aided-personal-interviewing) method – that is, the interviewer asked the questions and registered the answers on a laptop. It is important to mention that respondents were always provided with a show card that contained the values between 0 and 10 and the associated labels.

[4] During the interviews, first all the statements related to Question 1 were asked, and then the same questions regarding the situation in Hungary.

[5] The original variable names of the items in the ESS database were the following: (1) fairelc, dspplvt, dfprtal, oppcrgv, medcrgv, meprinf, rghmgpr, votedir, cttresa, gptpelc, gvctzpv, gvexpdc, grdfinc, pltavie (*14 variables for general expectations*), illetve (2) fairelcc, dspplvtc, dfprtalc, oppcrgvc, medcrgvc, meprinfc, rghmgprc, votedirc, cttresac, gptpelcc, gvctzpvc, gvexpdcc, grdfincc, pltaviec (*14 variables for the concrete Hungarian situation*).

3.2 Focus group research

Additionally, we conducted focus group research after the survey was completed in order to examine the cognitive structures, the interpretational difficulties, the ambiguities and the possibly misleading connotations of the concepts that might have occurred in the Hungarian context. A total of four focus groups were organized in Budapest and Ajka (a mid-size town in western Hungary) in June 2014. At both locations separate groups were arranged for low- and high-status participants. Status was defined by highest level of education. All participants of the high-status groups had finished tertiary education, while those in the lower status groups had completed primary and secondary education. The age and gender composition of the participants was balanced, but no participants were younger than 25 years old or older than 65. Prior to the focus groups, the political attitudes and party preferences of the participants were not examined. Focus groups lasted 90 minutes. After participants introduced themselves, their first task was to individually fill out the section of the ESS questionnaire on democracy, and indicate how difficult it was to answer each of the items. The group discussion was primarily devoted to a discussion of the statements in detail, one by one, with the moderator.

3.3 Defining the problem within the framework of research

During the analysis of the database we made the preliminary assumption that participants who were in some sense unsure when interpreting a statement in the democracy block either:

a) had not answered the question, or answered it with 'Don't know';
b) had answered the question by choosing the middle, neutral value of the scale;[6]
c) had answered the question, but whose answers – compared to those of other respondents – correlated differently to other questions.

Naturally, all the above possibilities could have happened for other reasons too, but we assumed that if we experienced all three of the above-mentioned phenomena with regard to a statement it would confirm the suspicion that the respondents (or some of them) had difficulties interpreting the statement.

In addition, we had the unique opportunity to examine each statement in different interpretational contexts; namely, regarding its (1) importance to democracy in general (abstract context), and (2) its realization in Hungary (concrete context). Thus, it was possible to further differentiate the issue of interpretation:

1. If there were signs of ambiguity with regard to a statement in both contexts, this could mean that its wording *per se* had caused difficulties.
2. If the interpretational difficulties only appeared in the abstract context but not in the concrete context we can assume that the concrete references helped with understanding the question, and thus evaluating the Hungarian situation was less problematic than making the evaluation in the abstract context.

[6] Naturally, this was differentiated from the well-known phenomenon of regression towards the mean.

3. In other cases we considered that the statement might be difficult to interpret in the Hungarian context either because it was less relevant to this context, or because the respondents had difficulties forming an attitude to it.

We applied different statistical tools to measure each of the above three phenomenon.

1. No answer was measured by the lack of data (i.e. 'Don't know' answers or refusals).
2. When measuring neutral values that occurred due to the respondents' ambiguity, we made two preliminary assumptions with regard to their frequency:
a. One was based on the assumption that the attitude questions have more or less normal variance, thus the average and the distribution can be used as parameters to determine the expected frequency of the neutral (middle) value.
b. We also assumed that the variance of the answers could be characterized by their unimodal distribution, thus the frequency of the answers would strictly monotonously decrease from the most frequent in both directions. In this case, the expected frequency of the neutral value was approximated by the average of the two neighbouring values if the average was not close to the neutral value.
3. In the case of the third phenomenon – when the covariance of the statements showed some disorder – we assumed that the statements measured some kind of latent attitude in both contexts that could be called a 'democracy attitude.' In these cases, we performed a reliability analysis. We considered the items as one index and assumed that the lower item index correlations could have occurred due to interpretational problems.

4. Results

4.1 Lack of answers in the data

In examining the simple distribution of 'Don't know' answers and the lack of answers with regard to each item we found that in both groups of questions (the abstract and the concrete) the proportion of those who *refused to answer* was relatively stable, but in the case of questions related to the concrete Hungarian situation there were always 1.5–1 percentage points more such responses (Figure 1).

Decidedly larger differences were seen in the '*Don't know*' answers: in the case of the ideal democracy items they ranged between 1.6 per cent and 5.8 per cent, while regarding the Hungarian situation the share of 'don't know' answers varied between 3.3 per cent and 11.4 per cent. This means that in the case of all democracy items there were more respondents who did not give valid answers regarding the situation in Hungary. It is difficult to determine why respondents chose one of these two answers, but it ultimately may not be too important to know the reason. In the ideal case, refusal to answer indicates a strong opinion, whereas a 'Don't know' answer suggests a lack of information that results in indecision. However, this is by no means certain, as the proportion of refusals might depend on the interviewing techniques and culture of the interviewers.



Figure 1. Proportion of 'Don't know' answers and refusals to answer questions regarding concrete and abstract aspects of democracy.
Item numbers are in the same order as the above-mentioned items in the ESS questionnaire and the database

Examining the two types of data gap together, 73.2 per cent of respondents gave an answer ranging between 0 and 10 to the 2x14 questions, meaning that 26.8 per cent of them gave a 'no answer' (NA) or a 'don't know' answer (DK) to at least one of the questions.

4.2 The quest for exaggerated 'neutrality'

Based on the theoretical, assumed distribution (normal and unimodal) of the answers, we summed up the proportion of those who refused to answer for some reason and the surplus answers of the neutral category, as presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Indices showing ambiguity in an abstract and concrete context and their differences (assuming a normal and unimodal distribution of answers, respectively) (ESS, 2012, Hungarian data) *

Democracy item	**Democracy in general**		**In Hungary**		**Difference**	
	normal	**unimodal**	**normal**	**unimodal**	**normal**	**unimodal**
	distribution		**distribution**		**distribution**	
National elections are free and fair	4.21%	3.50%	9.44%	13.98%	5.23%	10.48%
Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote.	5.36%	8.09%	11.52%	16.31%	6.16%	8.22%

Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another.	7.08%	6.56%	12.37%	16.83%	5.29%	10.27%
Opposition parties are free to criticize the government.	5.77%	5.95%	8.09%	12.32%	2.32%	6.37%
The media are free to criticize the government.	6.19%	7.49%	6.78%	10.75%	0.58%	3.26%
The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government.	5.03%	4.57%	10.00%	13.57%	4.98%	9.00%
The rights of minority groups are protected.	4.66%	6.80%	5.33%	9.28%	0.66%	2.48%
Citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.	5.59%	5.23%	9.37%	13.78%	3.79%	8.55%
The courts treat everyone the same.	5.15%	3.79%	12.94%	17.43%	7.79%	13.65%
Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job.	5.93%	6.18%	10.12%	14.80%	4.18%	8.62%
The government protects all citizens against poverty.	3.67%	3.72%	4.37%	8.46%	0.70%	4.74%
The government explains its decisions to voters.	4.75%	4.67%	6.32%	10.78%	1.57%	6.11%
The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels.	3.99%	3.34%	6.59%	10.80%	2.60%	7.45%
Politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions.	10.09%	13.63%	16.85%	21.00%	6.76%	7.37%

* The shading of each cell was determined according to the minimum and maximum values of the columns - darker shades indicate higher values.

What is most striking in the results is that the concrete context (questions like 'To what extent do you think this statement applies in Hungary?') caused more ambiguity than the abstract context (questions like 'How important do you think it is for democracy in general?') This tendency was apparent in the case of each examined item, and some of the questions showed explicitly significant differences. This result accords with the tendencies found during the analysis of missing answers.

We cannot determine the reasons for this phenomenon, but we can form hypotheses. Further detailed statistical analysis would be needed to verify these, and even this might not be successful. However, we can assume that this finding is the result of some special attitudes: for example, the concealment of opinions regarding the Hungarian situation. We can also take the risk of assuming that many of the respondents have no mature opinion with regard to some of the items because these issues do not appear in public discourse.

4.3 The correlation of answers to each item

After the former finding of presumable concealment, or 'lack of attitude,' let us see how complex the system of correlations is among the democracy items. We assumed that since these questions had a deep theoretical founding and were rigorously tested, they could be used as components of composite indices that reflect general expectations towards democracy and the opinions of citizens regarding the functioning of democracy in their country. If there were no interpretational problems we could assume that there was a coherent image of the 'ideal democracy' and no extreme discrepancies among these items concerning opinions about the functioning of democracy in specific countries either. But in the presence of statements that did not fit the overall image, we presumed that the interpretation of these items was problematic. The numerical results that represent this train of thought are summed up in Table 3, where interpretational ambiguities were approximated by changes of structure in the correlations of opinions regarding certain statements. The items of the abstract and concrete dimensions were used to create a simple index where correlations with each item were calculated by leaving out the value of the given item.

Table 3. Reliability check (corrected item-index correlation; index without the given item)

Democracy item	**Democracy in general**	**In Hungary**
	.749	.607
National elections are free and fair	.513	.456
Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote.	.766	.640
Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another.	.724	.568
Opposition parties are free to criticize the government.	.676	.671
The media are free to criticize the government.	.778	.629

Democracy item	Democracy in general	In Hungary
The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government.	.607	.506
The rights of minority groups are protected.	.751	.729
Citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.	.718	.590
The courts treat everyone the same.	.651	.604
Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job.	.637	.706
The government protects all citizens against poverty.	.714	.765
The government explains its decisions to voters.	.645	.718
The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels.	.262	.548

Results show that regarding the general principles of democracy, the interpretation of the statements 'Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote' and 'Politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions' do not fit the responses given to the other fourteen items. These two questions were also associated with the highest proportion of answer gaps (don't know / no answer): while the proportion in the case of all the other items was 3–4.5 per cent, it was 5.3 per cent and 7.4 per cent for these two items. Regarding responses to questions assessing the Hungarian situation, in addition to the above, three further statements seemed to deviate from the rest of the items: 'The rights of minority groups are protected,' 'Opposition parties are free to criticize the government,' and 'The courts treat everyone the same.'

5. Interpretation of the results based on focus-group research

The focus group research inquired into the interpretation of the 16 items in the democracy questionnaire block and tried to identify difficulties with understanding as well as differences in interpretation. The results of the statistical analysis and the focus group discussion jointly pinpointed four groups of items in terms of understanding and interpretations issues.

5.1 Understandable, unambiguous items

The first group consists of 'understandable items' that show a low level of ambiguity in every context. Based on the statistical and qualitative research, the statement 'The government explains its decisions to voters' is easy to understand and assess according to all three indices. However, the focus group research showed that while all respondents thought this was very important with regard to democracy in general, there was no consensus with regard to how much it is the situation in Hungary. Several people believed that it was not the case in Hungary, while others thought that the

government explained its decisions, but not always in a comprehensible way. The most common opinion was that the government tries to explain only the beneficial outcomes of its decisions, so even if it gives explanations they are not always trustworthy. This means that it was not found to be difficult to understand the question, but that the term 'explain' could be interpreted in different ways: either as political communication, or as providing explanations that citizens understand and trust.

Based on the statistical analysis, the statement 'The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels' belongs to this category. This item generated more debate in the focus group research. Everybody agreed that the principle of reducing differences was important, but people differed in their opinions about the level to which a democratic government should reduce these. The debate in the focus group that included upper-middle-class people concluded that income differences were necessary as long as they reflected differences in performance. The question is thus on what grounds and to what extent the state should intervene in reducing income differences. Regardless of settlement and status, all participants agreed that the Hungarian situation does not meet this expectation. During the discussion of this topic, the affluence of politicians was often mentioned with participants stating that, based on their accomplishments, politicians earned way more than they deserved. In sum, this question was not difficult to understand and interpret; however, providing a proper answer would have necessitated defining what 'government measures' mean in this respect.

5.2 Items that were understood but interpreted in different ways

Three questions belong to this category. The statistical analysis found low ambiguity in both the concrete and the abstract contexts for these items, but the results of the focus group research showed some contradiction with the statistical analysis. The statements 'The rights of minority groups are protected', 'The government protects all citizens against poverty,' and 'The media are free to criticize the government' are examples of this category. The protection of the rights of minority groups and the issue of how important this is for democracy caused significant debate in some groups. Participants mostly (but not unanimously) agreed that it was an important element of democracy, but there were significant differences in defining what the concept of minorities meant. Some associated the term with ethnic origins (Albanian, Romanian, Russian), others associated it with the thirteen historical national minorities of Hungary (such as Schwabs, Slovaks, Serbs, etc.), some with ethnic minority groups (Roma), and some with religious groups (such as Jews). Some people associated the term minority with social disadvantages or physical handicaps, while others defined it in terms of social status ('the downtrodden, the poor'). Some groups simply defined it in numerical terms ('those who are fewer in number,' 'any minority means that their number is less than others'). This question showed how a seemingly simple question and the terms often used in everyday discourse may be interpreted in very different ways, signifying very different population groups.

Another issue of interpretation concerning this item relates to understanding of the term 'minority rights.' What are minority rights? And why should minorities have different rights? The debates showed that interpretations varied according to the

demographic characteristics and political sympathies of the respondents. We may presume that even those who answered this question might have had different groups and different concepts of rights in their minds when they responded.

The statement that 'The government protects all citizens against poverty' caused similar, though slightly less interpretational ambiguities. Based on the statistical analysis this item was not problematic at all, but focus group discussions revealed that the word 'all' generated interpretational problems. During the debates participants mentioned several social groups and poverty-related factors that they did not feel solidarity with, such as those who did not want to work due to different kinds of addition (alcohol or gambling). The other dilemma that was mentioned in some of the groups concerned, irrespective of how much one agreed with the former statement, to what extent state protection from poverty is an essential condition of democracy. Many participants argued that this task was the responsibility of the state during the communist era, but this is not the case in today's democracies.

5.3 Items lacking clarity

This group consist of items that showed a high level of ambiguity and proved to be 'potentially uninterpretable' according to all three statistical analyses and the focus group research. Items such as 'Politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions,' 'Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job,' and 'Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote' belong to this category.

Focus group discussions showed the reasons for the interpretational difficulties. Participants were clearly very troubled by the idea that it was important for democracy that politicians should take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions. Why should they take these into account, and whose views should they consider? Does this question refer to the European Union? What does it have to do with democracy? Some of the participants mentioned that it never does any harm to take the opinions of others into account, but this should not necessarily influence the decisions of the government. Another group mentioned that the subject matter of the decision was an important issue here: whether the issue under debate influenced other countries, or countries of the European Union, or only the given state. Some participants mentioned 'the values of the EU' and claimed that as long as the decision did not go against the basic values of the EU, other governments should not have the right to intervene.

The statement 'Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job' also generated interpretational problems during the discussions. Here, the various connotations of the word 'punish' caused significant ambiguity. The socioeconomic status of the group appeared to be significant. Participants of the higher status group associated the word with voting during national elections and the possibility of overthrowing the government (thus, some kind of 'political punishment'), whereas participants of the lower status groups employed a wider and more direct interpretation of the term. They mainly mentioned criminal accountability and, beyond that, moral, financial, or even physical punishment. Some of the respondents even mentioned the possibility of life imprisonment and capital punishment. The

debate showed that social status may influence interpretation of the term ‘punishment’ and cause significant inconsistency in the answers.[7]

The qualitative research revealed two types of problems with the statement ‘Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote.’ Some participants wondered what this had to do with democracy: ‘This question is totally senseless’; ‘I think this sentence fragment has nothing to do with democracy. No matter if it is a democracy, a dictatorship, an empire or a monarchy, I am going to discuss [these issues] with my family – or not’; ‘An opinion is like one’s arse. Everybody has one, but this does not necessarily mean you want to see others’.’ These answers show that many people do not think that open political discourse is a condition of democracy. The other problem is connected to the present Hungarian situation. Many people are afraid, and some of them shared their experience of how discussing political topics had led to severe conflict within the family and circle of friends. ‘Well, I have heard of families that fell apart because of such stupid things.’ Although many participants confirmed that it is important to talk about politics because different information and points of view can help us understand problems, many believed that it was not worth the risk of personal and family conflict.

5.4 Diverse types

The statements we categorized as diverse can be best described as ones that are difficult to interpret in the Hungarian context. The statements ‘National elections are free and fair’; ‘Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another’; ‘Courts treat everyone the same,’ and ‘The media are free to criticize the government’ belong in this category. These items produced the highest variation in response in abstract and concrete contexts (that is, in how important they are ideally, and how much they actually apply to Hungary).

There was general agreement that all four items were essential for democracy. However, discussion of the statement ‘National elections are free and fair’ in the focus group raised the issue that the item contained actually two questions, one relating to free elections, the other to fair voting. Participants mentioned some ambiguity about the latter in the Hungarian context. Some questioned the fairness of the present electoral law, gerrymandering, regulations about the organized transportation of voters, and political promises and gifts to voters. Many participants had difficulty interpreting the question, because while they thought that elections were free in Hungary, the circumstances of voting were not fair. This ‘two-in-one’ wording thus caused interpretational problems and signified differences between the ‘ideal’ situation and its ‘concrete’ Hungarian realization.

In contrast to the results of the statistical analysis, the focus group discussions did not reveal interpretational problems concerning the item ‘Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another.’ All four focus groups agreed that while this was very important for democracy, it is not the reality in Hungary. The political parties do not offer alternative visions, ‘they merely differ in how they blame each other.’ We had similar experiences regarding the item about equality at the courts.

[7] Not to mention the fact that the international context and cultural connotations of the English word ‘punish’ can cause severe interpretational and comparative problems.

The focus group discussions revealed that participants had no interpretational problems with the question, but felt that there was a huge gap between the importance of the principle and the Hungarian situation. There was general agreement that the former was an essential condition of democracy, but the treatment of several cases and groups were mentioned which involved violation of this principle: the Roma, everyday people, politicians and celebrities were treated differently at court: while the latter two groups were not punished even for great crimes, the former two could be sent to prison even for minor offenses. We may presume that the ambiguity shown by the statistical analysis reflects some level of concealment of opinion in the case of the above two items.

The statement 'The media are free to criticize the government' also raised interpretational challenges. While participants agreed that this is essential in an ideal democracy, their opinions about the Hungarian situation were widely variable. Members of the group from Budapest were unanimous in their opinion that the media was not free in Hungary, but there were heated debates in other groups. Some participants argued that 'everybody is free to express their opinion' and claimed that there were several forms of media that 'could operate freely despite continuously criticizing the government.' Others mentioned examples of when the media was put under political pressure. Focus group discussions highlighted three issues concerning the interpretation of this item: 1) the necessity of differentiating between public and commercial media; 2) the question whether 'freedom of media' allows the expression of the critical opinions of journalists or only objective facts; 3) differences between the formal, legal conditions of a free media and actual practice. The dilemma here was whether freedom of the media is limited to the formal, legal framework, or also to practice of the political pressure that is put on media-related employees.

6. Conclusions

An important feature of the ESS and other similar, large-scale international comparative surveys is that their data and full documentation are available to all. As for the ESS, its complex results and data are used in various fields of politics and policy making as sources of basic social indicators (which is also the main goal of the survey project), and serve as data sources for academic research too. Their data also serve to feed the hunger for data of the business world, NGOs, and the media. However, these data users very rarely question the reliability and validity of such data. The former usually just accept the validity of the data because ESS is truly one of the most professionally sound, carefully designed and managed projects in the field of international comparative surveys. Our short analysis has focused on Hungary, but its train of thought could be expanded to other countries too. However, here we hoped to point out that, despite all efforts, interpretational difficulties can still exist even in data collection processes as carefully designed and controlled as the ESS, and these might cause challenges with interpreting results, especially in international comparison.

As a general conclusion, we can say that there were hardly any items in the democracy block of the ESS R6 questionnaire that would pass both the 'soft' and 'hard' test of validity and reliability that we applied in our research. There were no items that were equally easy to understand and interpret in both the abstract and the

concrete Hungarian contexts. In some cases, respondents may have interpreted the questions in significantly different ways – for example, regarding items related to minorities (7), the media (6), and the punishment of politicians (10). The reliability of the data is further eroded by the fact that in the cases of these items the proportion of answer gaps was average, or less than average. This means that respondents were 'willing' to give answers even if they did not understand or were not sure about the meaning of the questions. In other cases, however, both the quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed interpretational problems in assessing the Hungarian situation compared to the abstract context. This fact was indicated by a higher proportion of gaps in the data, inconsistencies in the internal structure of data, and the less exact, but very informative conclusions of the focus groups.

The questionnaire module we examined contained various elements (terms and phenomena) that had widely accepted theoretical foundations but were difficult to interpret in the Hungarian situation. We may assume that certain concepts were used by the questionnaire which were thought to be universal and unambiguous, but whose interpretations proved not to be independent of the social and political culture of the given community. This is especially true with questions about democracy, because even European countries differ widely in their traditions and values in this respect. This means that we cannot be sure if the answers given to the same questions in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, Greece or Hungary refer to totally identical notions.

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PIOTR CICHOCKI AND PIOTR JABKOWSKI*

Immigration Attitudes in the Wake of the 2015 Migration Crisis in the Visegrád Group Countries: Comparative insights of ESS7 and ESS8

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* [piotr.cichocki@amu.edu.pl] (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań); [pjabko@amu.edu.pl] (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań)

Abstract

In the summer of 2015 the tensions over managing external immigration into the European Union morphed into a full-blown crisis. Political and social reactions towards the Balkan Route emergency exposed major divisions between EU member states. Notably, the Visegrád Group (V4) countries, i.e. Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, stood out as a block united by governmental opposition to immigration. This political unity of countries should not be interpreted, however, as certain proof for an underlying convergence of social attitudes to migration. This paper examines the impact of the crisis on the V4 public opinion on the basis of cross-country surveys, with special attention afforded to a comparative analysis of European Social Survey waves 7 (2014) and 8 (2016). General Linear Modelling is used to test two hypotheses concerning the linkage between opposition to immigration and normative orientations in Czechia, Hungary and Poland (with Slovakia missing from ESS7 and ESS8). We demonstrate that adherence to the values of Universalism corelates with lower levels of opposition to immigration, which had been the case prior to the 2015 crisis and has mostly remained true thereafter. When it comes to respondents expressing value-based concerns with Security, they are more likely to voice more negative opinions about immigration after the crisis, although no such association held in 2014 measurements. We postulate that this public opinion shift should be interpreted as an effect of the strong securitisation of the immigration debate in the V4 countries.

Keywords: migration crisis, opposition to immigration, human values, Visegrád Group, European Social Survey.

1. Introduction

The European migration crisis of 2015 constituted a politically transformative moment in an otherwise already turbulent period. While social and political tensions had long been brewing over increasing number of migrants from failing or failed states of Northern Africa and the Greater Middle East, the situation became recognised as a major crisis over the summer of 2015 (Luft, 2017). Although on-going European Union (EU) efforts to disrupt major Mediterranean immigration trails had garnered some prior media attention, it was the unsustainable clogging of the Balkan Route over the spring and summer of 2015 that introduced the spectrum of panic to the European public spheres (Bauman, 2017). The crisis exacerbated political tensions among new and old member states of the EU (Ágh, 2016), and put extra strain on institutions implementing migration policies at the European level. One of the explicit fault-lines developed between Germany, striving to hold the liberal line, and the V4 countries, whose immigration policies grew staunchly illiberal. Things came to a head in August of 2015, when growing concerns over deteriorating conditions along the Balkan Route precipitated the dramatic decision of Angela Merkel's government to temporarily lift existing EU restrictions on immigrant registration and mobility. This attempt at providing short-term relief grew politically contentious – even though it constituted an important gesture of solidarity with entry-point peripheral countries. The opening promptly led to a massive influx of migrants into Germany, which precipitated internal political tensions over the means, ends and limits of the liberal immigration policy that pushed the country towards actively developing new policies and practices aimed at curtailing immigration (Crage, 2016). Crucially, the German unilateral opening was only meant as an ad hoc emergency intervention – regular border-enforcement was in fact reinstated already in late September. Furthermore, Berlin swiftly started pushing for continent-wide sharing of responsibilities, which, in turn, elevated immigration policies to the forefront of EU politics (Park, 2015). Although supposedly mandatory migrant relocation quotas were formally adopted by the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council (September 14th, 2015), the Council Decision 'establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece' was adopted in spite of objections raised by many Central and Eastern European countries. Most notably, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia voted against the measure in line with the anti-resettlement September 4th Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group (V4). Even though Poland buckled under pressure at the time, this was inconsequential as only a few weeks later, following a game-changing election cycle; a new right-leaning government in Warsaw would decisively embrace the V4 anti-resettlement consensus.

Since the fall of 2015, the V4 governments stood united in opposition to liberal immigration policies as well as to German leadership on migration questions. However, while it would be an exaggeration to claim that governmental opposition to immigration is their sole unifying characteristic, on the other hand, looking at them through the prism of migration-attitudes makes them seem excessively alike (Pakulski, 2016). It should be noted that even though the Visegrád Group has been an active platform of regional cooperation since 1991, it has in fact constituted a rather politically loose club of socio-economically divergent units (Nič, 2016). Therefore, close coordination and unity of purpose in relation to immigration issues proved an

exception rather than the norm of V4 relations. Furthermore, although Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia possess strong commonalities of historical experience, e.g. the passage from Soviet domination towards EU accession or experience of externally mandated border adjustments, these countries also exhibit strong economic, social and cultural differences. Crucially, such persistent differences have also been in relation to the social attitudes towards migration (Kaźmierkiewicz, 2015).

Sociological questions concerning the degree of crisis-driven convergence in terms of the attitudes towards immigration in the V4 societies appear much more intriguing than the study of official positions of V4 governments. Although some opinion surveys indicate that the 2015 crisis precipitated convergent shifts in V4 attitudes towards immigration, other studies, and most notably the European Social Survey, point to much lower levels of attitudinal change and convergence in terms of social attitudes to immigration occurring in the V4 between 2014 and 2016. From the point of view provided by the ESS, the Polish case seems particularly interesting: Poland used to have a well-established baseline of significantly lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments than the other V4 prior to 2015 (Bachman, 2016), and in spite of notable increases in the registered opposition to immigration Polish attitudes remain less negative then those established by ESS surveys in Hungary and Czechia.

This paper does not aim at establishing equivalence between the results of different surveys, nor is it concerned with investigating the relative merits of the various ways of formulating questions about immigration-related issues. The main thrust of our analysis is indeed going to be solely based on the ESS waves 7 (2014) and 8 (2016). Furthermore, our chief concern is not with the cross-country comparisons of the degrees of opposition to various kinds of immigration – what our analysis attempts is to identify the normative factors underlying those attitudes in V4 societies. Specifically, we investigate the dynamics of opposition to immigration in the context of normative orientations as represented by the ESS scale of basic human values (Schwartz, 2007a; Schwartz, 2007b). Out of the ten component dimensions of the scale, our analysis makes use of two, i.e. orientations towards Universalism and Security.

Within the ESS, the normative orientation towards Universalism is understood to entail 'Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature', while Security denotes orientations towards 'Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self' (Schwartz, 2003b). While they need not be incompatible in principle, within the context of the migration crisis these normative preferences do seem to fall into two oposing discursive camps. In fact, this value based juxtaposition directly relates to the struggle between the two competing narratives of responsibility which played out in the media discourse throughout the crisis: 'ethical responsibility towards refugees' versus 'responsibility to protect own people' (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017). In turn, using terms popularised by Haidt (2016), these opposing viewpoints could be seen as an aspect of the larger normative conflict between the globalists (cosmopolitans) and the nationalists (particularists). From this point of view, the migration crisis triggered a discursive divide between normative camps whose viewpoints are mutually exclusive and often abhorrent. A core belief of the globalist worldview is that all forms of tribal loyalty are morally suspect because they ascribe primacy to arbitrary birthright attributes (Cichocki, 2017). On the other hand, accentuating such cosmopolitan views leads to a

greater sense of urgency on the part of the nationalists whose security concerns push them towards thinking about migration in terms of existential threats.

Our first line of inquiry concerns bridging public opinion and the public sphere. Just as at the level of public discourse, where a messaging focus on the universal human rights and responsibility was typically associated with higher propensity for expressing sympathy with immigrants; a normative orientation towards universal human values should corelate with lower levels of opposition to immigration among survey respondents. On the other hand, ESS participants that express value-based concerns with security should be more likely to voice stronger opposition to immigration – mirroring the discourse level fact that framing the crisis as a struggle against an external threat would typically underwrite desensitisation to the immigrant plight. Our second analytic avenue involves the diachronic effect of the 2015 crisis on the V4 social attitudes. Comparing the pre- and post-crisis ESS waves, we examine whether the surveys registered an effect of the imposition of outspoken securitisation on questions of immigration that proved a common dynamic of the V4 public spheres. Given the V4 proclivity for framing immigration in the context of the government's responsibility to protect its own people against an external threat that EU institutions are supposedly unwilling to act against due to a cosmopolitan bias (Bauerová, 2018), normative orientations towards Security should be significantly and strongly associated with opposition to immigration after the 2015 crisis, but not necessarily before it played out.

2. Visegrád Group and the crisis: unity in diversity?

Over the summer of 2015, V4 countries were exposed to a sudden, strong and synchronous stimulus, which brought their governements together politically, in spite of pre-existing differences when it comes to the social attitudes towards migration as well as the differential exposure to the crisis itself. Of course, under close inspection some country-specific differences might be noted regarding the actual application of this stimulus. For instance, Hungarian media crisis-coverage has been amplified by the government's own publicity campaign against refugees, which seems to have given an extra boost to the rising anti-immigration sentiments (Bernáth and Messing, 2016) and Slovakian public sphere mobilisation over challenges of immigration from Muslim-majority societies arose already in the spring of 2015 (Walter, 2019). However, in spite of local variations, the topicalization and timing of public mobilisation brought about by the migration-crisis was largely uniform across the V4. One of the ready ways of demonstrating this uniform spike of public apprehension comes in the form of Google Trends archival search data. Thus, Figure 1 provides information on weekly search frequencies for the term *refugee* in V4 countries. Notably, highly similar distributions would result from analysing search results for *immigrant*, as these two queries were highly correlated, e.g. in Poland searches for the two terms had a correlation coefficient of 0.95.



Figure 1 Google searches for the refugee term in CZ, HU, PL and SK.
Source: Google Trends data: 2014–2017

While the distributions exhibit some minor differences, there is a discernible pattern in all four countries: the weekly data uniformly registered a precipitous jump in early September 2015, with a slow build-up of interest since May 2015 and a long tail going forward. The common peak of queries occurred in the week starting on September 6, accompanying the main debate over the mandatory relocation quotas formally agreed upon at the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council on September 14, 2015. When it comes to Slovakia, it should be noted that the preceding spike in interest came in the week starting with a day of major street-fights in Bratislava between right-wing anti-immigrant demonstrators and their detractors on June 20, 2015. Local diversities notwithstanding, the search-data seem to provide a ready illustration of V4 opinion convergence following the anti-resettlement September 4 Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group, which in turn seems to have constituted an exception to the long-lasting rule that the Group members hardly ever commit themselves to common political resolutions.

Even though the timing of concerns was similar across V4, one must point out that there have been notable differences between Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in terms of the actual 2015 crisis-experience. It was only Hungary that found itself on the north-western extension of the Balkan Route (Pachocka, 2016). Hence, in spite of Hungary not being the desired destination for most migrants (Juhász, Hunyadi

and Zgut, 2015), it hosted large numbers of people in transit, as well as those forced to remain and register at the first country of contact (so long as the Dublin-2 rules were being adhered to). While V4 asylum registrations peaked in 2015, in line with the overall EU trend, Hungary was where the bulk of applications were filed (Czechia, Poland and Slovakia's trend-lines remained low and flat). The gravity of this contrast proves even more striking when population sizes are taken into account, e.g. in 2015, Hungary actually had the highest asylum-application rate per capita in the entire EU28 (the other three Visegrád Group members lingered at the low end of the spectrum). Naturally, 2015 proved to be an extreme outlier, and following the decision to temporarily lift the Dublin-2 requirements on the part of the German government the majority of those previously forced to register for asylum in Hungary did not actually stay in the country (Bauerová, 2018). Hence, in the following years Hungarian numbers went down steeply.



Figure 2 Asylum applications in V4 relative to EU28 countries.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_asyapp, t_demo_pop)

From the point of view of the public opinion shock-value of migrant visibility this momentary per-capita value of asylum registration should not be underestimated. Especially in view of the growing concentration of migrants stranded at Budapest train stations towards the end of August, which provided a vivid media representation of things getting out of hand (Kasparek, 2016). Yet, the impact of those events was not restricted to Hungary. In spite of the fact that the other V4 states had not been exposed to any spike of migration flows at all, the images from Hungary and other areas of tension along the Balkan Route dominated the media discourse in Czechia, Poland and Slovakia in September of 2015. Immigration was the dominant topic, and the immigration question was being framed in terms of a generalised threat against

social stability of Europe in general (Sedláková, 2017). Therefore, events in Hungary were easy to present in the media as occurring in the immediate neighbourhood, so it would no longer matter that comparable events were not happening to the other V4 countries. Thus, in spite of considerable differences on the ground, the media-driven experience of the 2015 migration crisis was highly similar across the V4 public spheres.

This similarity of discourse need not have translated into a uniform public reaction, given the well-established lack of uniformity when it comes to pre-crisis attitudes towards migration across the V4. The principal contrast would typically be drawn between Poland, where attitudes to immigration had been considered much less negative than those of Hungary or Czechia. This pre-existing juxtaposition could be attested to on the basis of multiple independent data sources. Most notably, however, an authoritative examination of the results of the European Social Survey by Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet (2009) clearly identified Poland as one of the countries where a very pronounced evolution in immigration attitudes has taken place since 2002, i.e. from one of the most restrictive countries in ESS round 1, to more and more open in later rounds. On the other hand, Hungary has consistently belonged to the least immigration-friendly countries in Europe, although Hungarian attitudes toward immigrants of the same ethnic group tended to be less restrictive then when it came to those belonging to a different racial or ethnic group. In line with this pre-crisis consensus, Hungary should have been much more open to anti-immigrant than Poland – especially since the latter experienced the 2015 crisis from afar. This would indicate that the politically coherent opposition to immigration embraced by V4 governments was somehow superimposed on persistently diverse attitudinal patterns of V4 societies.

Whether any lasting convergence of V4 immigration attitudes has in fact happened remains open to discussion and interpretation. An inconclusive yet not inconsequential body of evidence exists in favour of a V4 convergence thesis in the form of both national and cross-country surveys. Firstly, negative opinion shifts were attested to in tracking surveys conducted in individual V4 countries. For instance, when the main Polish public opinion omnibus (CBOS) introduced a question concerned with accepting refugees from war-torn countries in Poland, the fraction declaring opposition jumped from 21 per cent in May 2015 to 61 per cent in April 2016 and has since consistently remained above 50 per cent (CBOS, 2017). Comparable shifts have been attested to in Hungary and Czechia (Szeitl and Simonovits, 2019), as well as in the case of Slovakia (Bolečeková and Androvičová, 2015). Secondly, some internationally comparative surveys pointed to Poland no longer being much more accepting of strangers than the other V4 countries. For instance, PEW Research report 'Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs' made use of an index of exclusiveness of national identity based on four-question items asking respondents to judge the importance of the following characteristics for truly belonging to the national community: place of birth, knowledge of language, adherence to Christianity, and compliance with customs and traditions. While Czechia and Slovakia were not covered by PEW, Poland and Hungary prominently featured on the restrictive side of the spectrum of this index (Wike, Stokes and Simmons, 2016). Similar conclusions about the positioning of Poland and Hungary in the European context came out of the 2016 Chatham House

survey (conducted in ten European states), which found that although an overall European majority of respondents agreed that 'all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped', it was in Poland and Hungary that this statement enjoyed particularly strong support (Goodwin, Raines and Cutts, 2017). Some indications of a growing convergence of V4 immigration attitudes can also be seen in the results of Eurobarometer surveys, especially when it comes to opinions about external immigration, with Poland becoming increasingly as negative as the other V4 countries (European Commission, 2017).

Such piecemeal evidence in favour of post-crisis convergence of social attitudes towards immigration in the V4 does not provide any definitive proof for the convergence thesis, however, due to the obvious comparative constraints of judging the equivalence or accuracy of very different surveys. Even if one were to set aside differences of measurement methodology (sampling, fieldwork quality), it is impossible to ignore the fact that the questions they contain are idiosyncratic and therefore produce results incomparable across surveys. In many cases they are also one-off affairs, with questionnaires designed to provide input on current affairs. This brief review of studies supporting the thesis of post-crisis V4 convergence in terms of migration attitudes is meant to provide context and contrast for our ESS-based analysis of opposition to immigration in Czechia, Hungary and Poland. It must be noted that analyses based on the post-crisis wave 8 of the ESS do not support a strong convergence thesis, i.e. in spite of becoming more negative with respect to immigration the Poles seem still closer to the European average than to the pronounced negativity of Hungarian attitudes. For instance, on a basis of comparison of the 1st and 8th round of the ESS project, Heath and Richard (2019) found considerable stability over time in the relative position of the different countries on scales of immigration attitudes. Their analysis shows that although Poland has been consistently more positive about immigration than Hungary or Czechia, it has noticeably moved down the list relative to other European countries so as to become more similar to other Central East European countries. Our own analysis, based on one of the measures of opposition to immigration available in the ESS core-module questionnaire, indicates that some degree of convergence between Poland and the cases of Hungary and Czechia has taken place (albeit not a strong one). Crucially, however, our focus is not on the changes of the mean values of scales or indicators, which we only discuss in a descriptive fashion. What concerns us is a different kind of convergence – not of the mean scores on the scale of opposition to immigration, but of their association with the normative orientations towards Universalism or Security.

3. Measures

3.1 Dependent variable (measurement model of opposition to immigration)

The ESS features stable and well-designed measurement scales relating to multiple dimensions of migration attitudes (cf. Messing and Ságvári, 2018). These include measures of 1) opposition to immigration, 2) perception of immigrants as economic, symbolic and ethnic threats, and 3) opposition to refugees. At first glance, it is the last among them that would hold most promise for studying the impact of the 2015 crisis. Unfortunately, however, two out of three of the opposition to refugees' scales are

missing in the ESS data for Hungary due to an inadvertent fieldwork execution error. Indicators relating to the different types of perceived threats have typically been used on their own rather than as components of a scale (Davidov et al., 2018; Green et al., 2018), and thus remain of lesser interest from our perspective. Therefore, our V4 analysis is based on the set of core-module questions targeted at probing the degree of social opposition to immigration. The ESS core-module scale of opposition to immigration is based on the following three questions: 'To what extent do you think [country] should allow people: (1) of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?' [variable: *imsmetn*], '(2) of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people to come and live here?' [variable: *imdfetn*], (3) 'from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here?' [variable: *impcntr*], with the response options of 1 ('Allow many to come and live here'), 2 ('Allow some'), 3 ('Allow a few'), and 4 ('Allow none'). Note that ESS variables *imsmetn*, *imdfetn* and *impcntr* constitute an intuitively plausible descriptive index of opposition to immigration, however, there is a long-standing practice of treating it as a measurement scale valid for cross-country comparisons (cf. Davidov et al., 2015; ESS, 2015; Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009; Schneider, 2008). Previous research has also demonstrated that these variables point to one factor of opposition to immigration, i.e. the rejection of further immigration in general (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009).

For the purposes of this V4-focused analysis, a Multi-Group Structural Equation Modelling (MG SEM) approach was employed (Byrne, 2016; Jöreskog, 1971), in order to evaluate the quality of such a scale of immigration attitudes. This procedure bestows major advantages over the straightforward univariate approaches – not only does it allow for construct multidimensionality but is also equipped with unparalleled tools for equivalence-testing, i.e. finding out whether construct-based cross-country comparisons are legitimate in the first place. The final measurements models of opposition to immigration for ESS7-2014 and ESS8-2016 (presented on Figure 3) both assume cross-country configural as well as metric equivalence restrictions. Configural equivalence means that the factor structure is the same in all three countries, while metric equivalence adds a further assumption that factor loadings are equal (which translates into direct comparability of regression coefficients). On top of that, scalar equivalence would further postulate equal intercepts (which would translate into direct comparability of item averages, had it been ascertained).



Figure 3. Cross-country (CZ, HU, PL) metric equivalence model for ESS7-2014 and ESS8-2016 anti-immigration attitudes.
Source: Own calculation based on ESS7 and ESS8 datasets.

Notes: Results of a multiple group structural equation model with metric invariance restrictions.
Fit indices for ESS7: CMIN=74.0; df=4; RMSEA=0.057; NFI=0.989. Reliability and validity measures: Czechia (CR=0.821; AVE=0.624); Hungary (CR=0.725; AVE=0.502); Poland (CR=0.810; AVE=0.715).
Fit indices for ESS8: CMIN=65.9; df=4; RMSEA=0.039; NFI=0.995. Reliability and validity measures: Czechia (CR=0.850; AVE=0.656); Hungary (CR=0.755; AVE=0.516); Poland (CR=0.892; AVE=0.734).

The MG SEM analyses confirmed cross-country configural and metric equivalence for the V4 data of ESS7 and ESS8 with respect to the scale of opposition to immigration (ESS7 fit indices: CMIN=74.0; df=4; RMSEA=0.057; NFI=0.989; ESS8 fit indices: CMIN=65.9; df=4; RMSEA=0.039; NFI=0.995). In each country and in both ESS rounds, the scale has also passed the test of reliability and validity (for details see notes on Figure 3). However, given that the measurement model under consideration turned out not to comply with the strictures of scalar equivalence, it only allows for comparing the factor loadings and regression coefficients in Czechia, Hungary and Poland.

3.2 Covariates (Universalism and Security in terms of Schwartz's Basic Human Values)

A modified 21-item version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) was used in the ESS to measure basic human values (Schwartz, 2003b). Each item consists of a short two-sentence, gender-matched description of a person. Respondents then indicate on a 6-point scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all) how similar this person is to themselves. Schwartz's (2003a) syntax was used to transform the items into 10 values by taking the means of the items and subtracting their mean rating. The higher scores signify that the particular value is more important for the individual. Note that in our analysis we only included two dimensions of basic human values: Universalism and Security.

3.3 Demographic control variables

Apart from both independent variables, i.e. Universalism and Security, the following socio-demographic control factors were also included in our analysis: **Gender** (*Male; Female* [ref. cat.]), **Age** (*15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; 65+* [ref. cat.]), **Highest level of education** (*Lower secondary or less (ISCED I&II); Lower tier upper secondary (ISCED IIIb); Upper tier upper secondary (ISCED IIIa); Advanced vocational (ISCED IV); BA or MA level (ISCED V1&V2)* [ref. cat.]), **Main activity during last 7 days** (*Paid work; Education; Unemployed; Housework; Retired* [ref. cat.]) and **Household's total net income** (*Refusal; 1st and 2nd decile; 3rd and 4th decile; 5th and 6th decile; 7th and 8th decile; 9th and 10th decile* [ref. cat.])

4. Results

In order to provide a descriptive overview of the distributions of the component indicators of the scale of opposition to immigration over time, Figure 4 presents V4 country-profiles with respect to the average scores for all three variables over time. Note that missing measurements in Slovakia (due to temporary non-participation) hinder visual comparing of cross-country trend-lines (the subsequent General Linear Model analysis of ESS7 and ESS8 data would actually only cover Czechia, Hungary and Poland).



Figure 4. Opposition to allowing entry of various immigrant-types: CZ, HU, PL, SK.
Source: ESS waves 1–8, variables: imsmetn, imdfetn, impcntr

Looking at individual variables, in all V4 countries, there is a notably higher propensity to accept immigrants that are ethnically/racially similar to the majority, and the contrast is especially pronounced in Hungary. This Hungarian characteristic has usually been interpreted by reference to the fact that it is the only V4 country that has

a sizable ethnic diaspora in neighbouring lands (Kovács, 2019). However, in spite of this downward pull of a single indicator, the overall average values of the opposition to immigration in Czechia are almost as high as in Hungary, which are both in fact among the top-ranking among all ESS-participating countries. On the other hand, Poland and Slovakia used to rank much lower on all the dimensions of opposition to immigration, although in Slovakia they have been consistently rising. Poland, however, bucked the V4 rising trend: it registered declining levels of opposition to immigration in waves 2–5, only followed by a marked increase in waves 7 and 8. As demonstrated by the literature review, the ESS-based indication of a post-2015 increase in opposition to immigration in Czechia, Hungary and Poland is consistent with the results of other cross-country surveys. Yet, the ESS-results suggest a lower degree of convergence between Poland and the scores of Hungary and Czechia.

However, our analysis aims not at determining the level of V4 convergence with respect to mean scores or opposition to immigration, but rather at probing for normative as well as socio-demographic factors associated with opposition to immigration between 2014 and 2015. Therefore, we specify the following General Linear Model, i.e. Univariate Analysis of Covariance (Rutherford, 2011), for testing the impact of the normative orientations towards Universalism and Security on the opposition to immigration held by the citizens of Czechia, Hungary and Poland: *Opposition to immigration = Intercept + Universalism + Security + Gender + Age + Highest level of education (ISCED standards) + Main activity + Household's total net income.*

In all three countries for both rounds, the same linear model was tested in order to establish the impact of covariates and control variables on opposition to immigration. Tables 1 and 2 present the following GLM summary characteristics: (1) *F*-ratios demonstrating the significance of covariates and demographic control variables, (2) estimates of β parameters explaining the impact of covariates and control variables on opposition to immigration. Note that β coefficients are interpreted along the lines of simple multiple regression, i.e. a one-unit increase in the level of any covariates translates into a corresponding change in the level of the dependent variable. When it comes to control factors, it is important to bear in mind that the β coefficient for a particular level of the variable is always interpreted in relation to the coefficient of the reference-category. Note as well, that the comparisons of β coefficients between the models estimated for Czechia, Hungary and Poland are warranted by prior establishment of metric equivalence of the underlying latent constructs.

Table 1 F-ratio statistics of between-subject effects on anti-immigration attitudes

Covariates & Control factors	ESS7			ESS8		
	CZ	HU	PL	CZ	HU	PL
Universalism	28.86*	20.26*	50.63*	36.22*	1.61	43.66*
Security	2.86	1.96	1.59	16.31*	12.02*	8.71*
Gender	0.35	0.15	0.71	0.01	1.24	0.81
Age	1.24	4.79*	4,35*	1.43	1.16	4.64*
Highest level of education (ISCED standards)	7.98*	18.14*	4.65*	16.75*	8.62*	10.88*
Main activity	0.91	1.47	1.73	3.45*	1.88	8.11*
Household's total net income	3.54*	2,32	1.63	2.73*	1.44	4.67*

Source: Own calculation based on ESS7 and ESS8 dataset. Note: * p-value<0.01

Table 2 Estimates of β parameters in GLM Univariate ANCOVA explaining covariates and control variables impact on anti-immigration attitudes

Covariates & Control variables	ESS7			ESS8		
	CZ	HU	PL	CZ	HU	PL
Universalism	-0.110*	-0.098*	-0.190*	-0.106*	-0.028	-0.167*
Security	0.031	0.028	0.033	0.066*	0.079*	0.074*
Gender (male = 1)	-0.020	0.014	-0.036	-0.004	-0.041	-0.034
Age						
15 – 24	-0.130	-0.442*	-0.212**	-0.159	-0.053	-0.313*
25 – 34	-0.050	-0.067	-0.246**	-0.089	0.017	-0.117
35 – 44	-0.050	0.003	-0.307*	0.003	0.080	-0.285*
45 – 54	-0.042	-0.059	-0.254**	0.001	-0.036	-0.188**
55 – 64	-0.134	-0.056	-0.147**	0.002	-0.041	-0.237*
65 and over – *ref.*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Highest level of education (ISCED standards)						
Lower secondary or less (ISCED I&II)	0.234*	0.409*	0.244*	0.303*	0.216*	0,320*
Lower tier upper secondary (ISCED IIIb)	0.294*	0.307*	0.186**	0.285*	0.266*	0.252*
Upper tier upper secondary (ISCED IIIa)	0.150*	0.183*	0.134**	0.113	0.252*	0.201
Advanced vocational (ISCED IV)	0.132	-0.132	0.031	-0.019	0.013	0.058
BA or MA level (ISCED V1&V2) – *ref.*	-		-	-	-	-
Main activity						
Paid work	0.074	0.149	0.060	-0.013	0.026	0.038
Education	0.023	0.069	-0.154	-0.250**	-0.044	0.242**
Unemployed	0.033	0.058	0.029	0.150	-0.263	0.070
Housework	0.186	0.119	0.161	-0.183	-0.125	-0.121
Retired – *ref.*	-	-	-	-	-	-

Covariates & Control variables	ESS7			ESS8		
	CZ	HU	PL	CZ	HU	PL
Household's total net income						
Refusal	0.150**	-0.100	0.103	0.108**	0.029	0.308*
1st and 2nd decile	-0.038	0.261**	0.115	0.185*	0.074	0.292*
3rd and 4th decile	-0.035	0.138**	-0.039	0.126**	-0.050	0.285*
5th and 6th decile	0.029	0.072	0.008	0.088	-0.063	0.188*
7th and 8th decile	-0.024	0.108	0.005	0.089	-0.045	0.154**
9th and 10th decile – *ref.*	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Own calculation based on ESS7 and ESS8 dataset.
*Notes: * p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05*

The examination of the 2014 and 2016 ESS data allows for attesting to the changing patterns of association between normative orientations towards Universalism and Security and the levels of opposition to immigration in the context of the 2015 migration crisis. The GLM analysis confirmed that normative orientations towards Universalism are significantly associated with lower opposition to immigration – this finding holds for both ESS7 and ESS8 (with the exception of Hungary in 2016). On the other hand, normative orientations towards Security had not been associated with opposition to migration at all in 2014, while in 2016 this association became significant and positive in all three countries, i.e. respondents concerned with the values of Security would express consistently higher levels of opposition to immigration. With respect to the control variables, in both survey-waves there is a significant contrast between respondents with academic degrees and those with lower levels of education. The other socio-demographic control variables demonstrated no meaningful association patterns with opposition to immigration.

The fact that values of Security had not been a factor influencing immigration attitudes in ESS7 and became one in ESS8 seems important in that it constitutes a public opinion correlate of the securitisation of the debate about immigration in Czechia, Hungary and Poland (while no data for Slovakia was available there are no reasons to believe that it would register a different trend). This securitisation, stemming both from bottom-up expression of citizen anxieties, as well as top-down pressures of government policy and publicity, involved an explicit opposition to the tenets of liberal immigration policy associated with the human-rights-based stance of the European Union. Forceful framing of the immigration debate in terms of security has been well documented in Czechia (Bauerová, 2018; Sedláková, 2017), Hungary (Juhász, Hunyadi and Zgut, 2015) as well as Poland (Pasamonik, 2017). While securitisation of immigration discourses did occur in many other European countries (Chouliaraki and Stolic, 2017; Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017), in the V4 it became the officially endorsed doctrine used by the respective governments for political communication purposes (Bernáth and Messing, 2016; Brozova, Jureckova and Pacovska, 2018; Łaciak and Frelak, 2018). Thus, what our analysis of ESS data seems to indicate is that this securitisation of public debate has been followed up by a major change in the structure of public opinion (as measured by surveys). While causality cannot be established in this respect, the public opinion shift seems

reasonably likely to have been driven by the securitising discourse rather than the other way around.

When it comes to normative orientations towards Universalism, the negative association with exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants is exactly what one would expect, given that cosmopolitan universalism underpins the moral claim of liberal immigration policies, i.e. the belief that Europe must not subscribe to the chauvinism of affluence and remain open to needy immigrants and asylum seekers regardless of cultural or religious differences (Habermas, 1992). Furthermore, it is important to note that this association proved significant prior to the 2015 crisis and remained significant in Czechia and Poland thereafter in spite of strong discursive challenges to the Universalist cosmopolitan approach. What happened in Hungary, on the other hand, seems like a case of Universalist values being overwhelmed by concerns with Security. Obviously, for reasons explained above, our model does not and cannot aim at claiming anything about scalar-comparisons between countries and across time, i.e. there is no meaningful way in which to address the question whether Universalism or Security had more proponents in Hungary or Poland. Our claim is merely correlational – Universalism ceased to be associated with opposition to immigration in Hungary in 2016, while it remained a significantly associated factor in Czechia and Poland.

5. Conclusions: V4 sentiments in the European context

Our analysis demonstrates that the securitisation of the immigration question in public discourse seems to have had a strong impact on the structure of immigration attitudes in Czechia, Hungary and Poland. While normative preferences for security were not associated with stronger opposition to immigration before the 2015 crisis, they have since become a significant factor. This is likely influenced by the fact that in the V4 countries the narrative of responsibility to protect the group against perceived threats got the upper hand in public discourse. The public mood, as well as official government policies, have come down decisively on the side of scepticism towards immigration. Although the shift of opinion was readily apparent in most cross-country tracking surveys covering the V4, we demonstrate that this change of public opinion went beyond a short-term spike of anxieties. On the contrary, an association of the normative preference for Security with opposition to immigration has the potential for shaping attitudes in the long term. In terms of shaping public debate about immigration, this constitutes a strong indication that simple reiterations of Universalist arguments might not affect social attitudes towards immigrants. Instead of preaching to the converted about human rights and cosmopolitan obligations, proponents of liberal immigration policies should rather address the concerns of those who are focused on Security values.

Security is not the only public concern at issue, of course. Apart from emphasising security challenges such as the alleged links between immigration and the incidence of terrorism, the distinctive V4 approach also entailed aversion to immigration based on arguments invoking supposed cultural and religious incompatibility of newcomers with host societies (Jasiecki, 2016). Furthermore, it cannot be emphasised enough that it was only in Hungary that there was any actual presence of migrants throughout the crisis, and even that turned out to be a relatively

short-lived phenomenon. Thus, in terms of group threat theory (Blalock, 1967), the negative V4 outgroup-attitudes made apparent in the course of the migration crisis seem not to have been a function of competition over material resources, such as access to jobs or housing. What came into play were less tangible issues such as cultural and religious anxieties as well as perceived threats to public safety. Arguing whether such hazards actually existed is beside the point, what matters from the public opinion standpoint is that they were socially construed as real, i.e. constitute 'subjectively appreciated threats and challenges to group status' (Bobo, 1983; Sears and Kinder, 1985). Even though mere perceptions may prove more potent than 'objective' reality when it comes to moving public sentiments in times of crisis, and that primacy seems especially pronounced when it comes to abstract challenges to group culture and status rather than strictly material interests. Therefore, when attempting to address such concerns it would not suffice to produce statistical evidence or some other official documents reassuring the public that their concerns are misplaced or exaggerated.

When it comes to the V4 countries, there is no doubt that in spite of opinion divergences at the outset, and clear differences in the summer-of-2015 experience, the migration crisis brought Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia much closer together as political actors. Some post-2015 convergence of the V4 over migration questions has been attested to in multiple studies, even if the degree of resulting similarity remains contested. Higher V4 opposition to immigraion is likely to prevail as long as immigration remains an issue of pressing public concern, which the foreseeable near future seems likely to deliver. In a more general sense, the illiberal turn of the V4, partially but not exclusively facilitated by immigration concerns, might actually turn out to be a leading indicator of a more comprehensive challenge to the western system of liberal democracies. While alternative challenger-parties threatening the mainstream have been a lasting feature of the European political scene since the onset of the post-2008 economic crises (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016), migration anxieties resulted in further voter-flight from the centre, which could easily be framed as tainted by adherence to increasingly unpopular liberal immigration policies (Hepburn and Odmalm, 2017; Liang, 2016). The debate is quite open on the actual importance of the role played by the migration crisis of 2015 in bringing about the recent massive wave of anti-establishmentarian populism that swept across western democracies (Campani, 2018; Judis, 2016). Quite obviously, the present challenge of populism is also not a thing of the past, yet, its future is also quite uncertain. The focus on the V4 experience demonstrates the potential for mobilising public opinion by way of skilful and assertive securitisation of discourse, i.e. how liberal universalism can decisively lose on immigration.

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ILDIKÓ BARNA AND JÚLIA KOLTAI *

Attitude Changes towards Immigrants in the Turbulent Years of the 'Migrant Crisis' and Anti-Immigrant Campaign in Hungary

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* [koltai.julia@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University); [barnaildiko@tatk.elte.hu] (Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University)

Abstract

The paper discusses explanations for attitudes towards immigrants before and after the start of the 'migrant crisis'. Though the crisis caused changes in peoples' attitudes all over Europe, the Hungarian case is special due to the Hungarian government's intensive anti-immigration campaign. To explain the circumstances people encountered during the crisis and the campaign, we first prove that moral panic abounded in society. Then, we show the background effects which affected the emergence of attitudes towards immigration in a political context. In the second part of the paper, we introduce a path model to explain the presumed effect of migration. We analyze this model with regard to the different political party preference groups, assuming that the government's anti-immigration campaign affected people's opinions and that people with different party preferences had different attitudes towards immigration: namely, those who were sympathetic to the incumbent party had more negative attitudes towards immigration. This effect has two interpretations. The first is that those who sympathized with the incumbent party were more sensitive to its messages. The other is that those who resonated more with the campaign changed their party preference to favour Fidesz, but those who resonated less with the campaign but used to be sympathizers of Fidesz do not support them anymore. The models show that before the migrant crisis there were only slight differences between political preference groups regarding how anti-migrant attitudes arose. However, after the start of the crisis (and the campaign), diverse processes could be identified in the different political groups, especially in the case of Fidesz sympathizers.

Keywords: migration crisis, anti-immigration campaign, moral panic, Hungary, attitudes toward migrants.

1. Introduction

In the second half of 2014, after winning the parliamentary election, the popularity of the governing party of Hungary, Fidesz, had fallen sharply as various scandals eroded its popularity. Fidesz found a quick solution by launching an anti-immigration campaign using the tools of propaganda (Barna, 2019). In January 2015, long before the visible outbreak of the migration crisis but right after the solidarity march in Paris, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán told a reporter from the Hungarian nationwide public television channel M1 that 'We [Hungarians] do not want to see minorities of significant size with different cultural characteristics and backgrounds among us. We want to keep Hungary as Hungary.'[1] This signaled the start of the government's enduring anti-immigration campaign.

Moral panic has already been used as a framework for the analysis of the anti-immigration campaign and the related political and social turbulence about the migration crisis in Hungary (Bernáth and Messing, 2015; Barlai and Sik, 2017; Walker and Győri, 2018). However, adding to previous analyses, we concentrate on the five crucial elements of moral panic defined by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2002).

Our paper shows that in Hungary, all five elements – namely, concern, hostility, substantial and widespread consensus, disproportion, and volatility – are present. In addition, we show how an analysis of data from the European Social Survey (ESS) also supports this interpretation. We have two main hypotheses. The first is that the rejection of different immigrant groups increased and respondents' assumptions about the effect of immigration worsened from 2012 to 2017. Our second hypothesis is that attitudes toward migrants and the model that explains these attitudes changed differently for Fidesz and non-Fidesz sympathizers from 2012 to 2017. We assumed that we could identify these differences not only at the level of descriptive statistics but also in the way the rejection of immigration came into existence; namely, in differences in the models that explain the presumed effects of immigration.

2. Social context: Moral panic and its Hungarian case

In 1972, Stanley Cohen published a seminal work about moral panics (Cohen, 2002) which he defined as follows:

> 'A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned [...]; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.' (Cohen, 2002: 1)

Later, Goode and Ben-Yehuda identified *five crucial elements of moral panic*. The first is *concern* over the behavior of a certain group. The authors also underline that

[1] M1 Evening News: https://nava.hu/id/2066608#. The quoted section starts from 5:51. Accessed: 22-09-2018.

this concern should be measurable in some concrete way (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2002: 37). In the Hungarian context, the results of the standard Eurobarometer survey clearly showed that immigration had become one of the major concerns of Hungarians: while in November 2014 only four per cent of the Hungarian population listed immigration as one of the most important issues Hungary was facing, in May 2015 the number was 13 per cent, while in November 2015 it peaked at 34 per cent, and was thus the number one concern of Hungarians.[2]

The second element listed by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2002: 38) is *hostility* toward a group when the members of the given group are perceived as threats to and enemies of society. In Hungary, xenophobia, or in other words hostility against immigrants was already widespread before the anti-immigration campaign but increased after it started. TÁRKI, a Hungarian research institute primarily engaged in applied social science, has been using the same question to measure xenophobia since 1992. The organization found that in 2012[3] the proportion of xenophobes in the sample was 40 per cent and this had increased to 53 per cent by the beginning of 2016 (Sik, 2016). This same increase can also be observed using ESS data, as discussed in the next chapter. It is also important to note that xenophobia was already strong before the campaign started, which made the anti-immigrant propaganda even more successful (Barna, 2019). Some authors have focused on another aspect of hostility: the utilization of enemy images (Gerő et al., 2017) and scapegoats (Kovarek et al., 2017) used by mainstream and far-right Hungarian politics. Csepeli and Örkény (2017) argued that the overall hostility present in society is embedded in a moral crisis.

The third element which characterizes conditions as moral panic is a *substantial or widespread consensus* that the threat posed by the group is real and serious, and that this threat is the responsibility of the group members (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002: 38–40). In Hungary the former consensus is clear according to a survey by the Pew Research Center carried out in 2016 which showed that 70 per cent of Hungarians found ISIS to be a major threat to the country, and 76 per cent of Hungarians thought that the presence of refugees would increase the likelihood of terrorism in Hungary (Wike, 2016). The government thus created a link between migration and terrorism from the very beginning of their campaign. This became crystal clear when in April 2015 the government launched a 'National Consultation[4] on Immigration and Terrorism.' The rhetoric of the government also linked migration to crime and unemployment, and instead of calling immigrants asylum-seekers or refugees used expressions such as 'economic migrants,' 'illegal migrants' or 'subsistence migrants' (Barna and Hunyadi, 2016: 16–21).

The fourth element, according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2002: 40–41), is that there is *disproportion* between the perception and the actual threat, danger and

[2] Source: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm

[3] The year when the first ESS survey we use was carried out.

[4] The 'national consultation' is an institutionalized political survey aimed at 'discuss[ing] every important issue before decisions are taken' (Letter of the Prime Minister included in the national consultation on immigration and terrorism). Since 2010, there have been eight national consultations in which a 'questionnaire' accompanied by the Prime Minister's letter was sent out to every eligible voter. The questionnaires are constructed in a way that disregards the rules of quantitative social research methodology. The data processing of the questionnaires lacks any transparency and the public has to rely completely on results published by the government. All national consultations are financed through taxes.

damage caused by the given group. In replying to some critics Goode and Ben-Yehuda admit that it may be difficult or even impossible to objectively measure this disproportion. However, the authors claim that there are cases when we can be reasonably sure of such disproportions. We argue that the situation in Hungary is one such case.

Table 1. Number of asylum-seekers arrived to, foreign citizens residing in, and foreign citizens immigrating to Hungary (2015 - 2017)

	Number of asylum-seekers arrived to Hungary	Number of foreign citizens residing in Hungary	Number of foreign citizens immigrating to Hungary
2015	177,135	145,968	25,787
2016	29,432	156,606	23,803
2017	3,397	151,132	36,453

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn002b.html
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn001b.html
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn005b.html
(last download: 29 January, 2019)

As Table 1 shows, the number of foreign citizens residing in Hungary is less than two per cent of the total Hungarian population, even if we include the number of foreign citizens who immigrated into Hungary in the given year. This proportion is very low compared to the other EU Member States. In 2015,[5] Hungary was ranked twenty-first among the twenty-eight Member States according to the number of non-nationals in the resident population. Both in 2016[6] and 2017[7] it was twenty-second. It is also important to mention that the number of asylum-seekers declined dramatically from 2015 to 2016/2017, which can be explained by the physical closure of Hungary in the form of a fence on Hungary's southern border in September 2015. The intention of the government to close the country to migrants was also backed by administrative measures. However, a lack of migrants did not decrease the level of fear: on the contrary, the latter increased. The level of xenophobia measured by TÁRKI kept increasing after 2015. Moreover, people felt the need to always remain cautious. There were many examples of residents raising objections not only verbally but often in a fierce and aggressive way against migrants who had already been granted international protection by the Hungarian state. It is important to note that these incidents were always supported by government politicians; in one of the most severe cases, PM Viktor Orbán found such outrage to be an appropriate reaction[8] (Pivarnyik,

[5] Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/7/74/Share_of_non-nationals_in_the_resident_population%2C_1_January_2015_%28%25%29_YB16.png
[6] Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Share_of_non-nationals_in_the_resident_population,_1_January_2016_(%25).png
[7] Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Share_of_non-nationals_in_the_resident_population,_1_January_2017_(%25).png#filehistory
[8] Residents of Őcsény, a village in Southern Hungary, used force in protest against refugees, mostly women and children, who would have spent a few days vacationing there. A few days later, PM Viktor Orbán was asked whether he placed any responsibility on the government for inciting such hatred that led

2017; Spike, 2017a; Spike, 2017b). In other cases, distrust and suspicion went so far that women were attacked on the street for wearing a headscarf following a visit to the hairdresser (Boros, 2018), and panic broke out in a small town when residents thought that visitors to a cemetery on All Saints' Day were migrants (Rényi, 2017). Even these examples – and there are many others – show the disproportion between the real situation and the reactions to it. Barna and Koltai found that a sense of realistic and symbolic threats are important explanatory factors of attitude towards migrants (Barna and Koltai, 2018).

In creating and maintaining this disproportionality, mass media, especially pro-government media, played a pivotal role. Cohen has identified mass media as one of the most important actors in situations of moral panic, seeing the role of mass media as having three components: (1) exaggeration and distortion, (2) prediction, and, (3) symbolization (Cohen, 2002: 26–41). In Hungary, the media's exaggerated attention to the 'migration crises' touched 'a responsive chord in the general public' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002: 25) which made the outbreak and the maintenance of a moral panic possible. Pro-government media, whose share of the media market has increased to an enormous proportion, have constantly spread the government's anti-immigration campaign messages. These media outlets not only exaggerated the seriousness of events but frequently distorted information. The latter practice included using untrue elements in the news, but also another type of distortion (Bernáth and Messing, 2016; Barlai and Sik, 2017; Goździak and Márton, 2018) mentioned by Cohen (2002: 36): when reality did not meet expectations, those elements that strengthened expectations were emphasized and repeated, while contradicting ones were played down. Prediction was also an integral part of the news about the migration crisis, meaning that the former 'present[ed] in virtually every report that what had happened was inevitably going to happen again' (Cohen, 2002: 35). The media's role of symbolization, according to Cohen, rests on the symbolic power of words and images. This process can make even neutral words symbolize complex ideas and emotions, as occurred in Hungary. Just to mention one example, the word 'migrant' *(migráns)*,[9] which used to have neutral connotations, has for many now became a symbol for the enemy. Bernáth and Messing (2015; 2016) extensively examined coverage of the refugee crisis by the Hungarian media and its role in spreading xenophobia. Their analysis demonstrates the roles of the media mentioned above. Among other factors, the authors stress this role by arguing that 'the government's dehumanizing terminology about illegal migrants, welfare migrants and illegal trespassers [...] was reproduced in media reporting' (Bernáth and Messing, 2016: 59) and emphasize the significant role the pro-government media played in this. Moreover, the authors conclude that the subversive terminology used by these media outlets also penetrated other media.

Returning to the list by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2002: 41–43), the fifth element of a moral panic is its *volatility* by nature. We already know that panic

to this event. His response was the following: 'I cannot find anything wrong with this. People do not want to accept migrants. They do not want to accept them into their country and they do not want to accept them into their village.'

[9] There are other words that could be used. For example, the etymologically Hungarian word for refugee *(menekült)* or for immigrant *(bevándorló)* and asylum-seeker *(menedékkérő)*.

erupted very suddenly. However, as it started only three years ago, it is too early to predict how, and especially when, it will end.

3. Conceptual context

After describing the social context of the government's anti-immigration campaign and the moral panic it caused, in this part of our paper we deal with the conceptual background of our analysis. The starting point lies in the assumption that supporters of different political parties reacted differently to the migration crisis and the campaign. Political cleavages have been an important characteristic of Hungarian society (Bértoa, 2014; Enyedi, 2004; Kmetty, 2014; Körösényi, 2013; Soós, 2012). Previous research has proved that left–right self-identification is the most appropriate measure for grasping these political-ideological cleavages in Hungary (Angelusz and Tardos, 2005; Kmetty, 2014; Tóka, 2005). In her analysis of 21 European countries, Rustenbach (2010) found that left–right political leaning had a significant effect on attitudes toward migrants, those on the right being more negative. However, in 2016 Pew Research in its Global Attitudes Survey showed that in Hungary people from the political left and right were equally concerned about the threat of migration. We can conclude that although political cleavages are deep in Hungarian society, in the case of attitudes towards immigrants these cleavages are not distributed along the left–right political scale but are more identifiable along party preferences. Several researchers (Boda and Simonovits, 2016; Simonovits and Szeitl, 2016; Simonovits et al., 2016) have found that Fidesz and Jobbik supporters were the most xenophobic, and those of the Hungarian Socialist Party the least. This is why we can hypothesize that attitudes towards immigration differ among the supporters of different political parties.

Beside the possibility that supporters of different parties differ in terms of the degree of their anti-immigrant attitudes, it is also plausible that how these attitudes are constructed is different. Considering the background effects which form attitudes towards immigrants in the different political preference groups, we can separate macro- and also micro-level effects. Trust and satisfaction are important factors in both types.

Paas and Halapuu (2012) found that people who score higher on political trust are more tolerant. Sides and Citrin (2007) as well as Herreros and Criado (2009) found that economic satisfaction decreases opposition to migration. Beside these factors, macro-level trust and satisfaction can be interpreted as having perceived legitimacy potential. This interpretation is similar to that of Ceobanu and Escandell's assumption that '[i]nstitutional legitimacy reflects a country's socio-political and economic system and represents a type of national solidarity based on inclusion and inclusiveness' (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2008: 1151). The authors not only found that a higher level of institutional legitimacy is associated with lower level of anti-immigrant sentiments, but also that this effect is especially strong in Eastern Europe. Since Fidesz's political campaign played an inevitable role in spreading anti-immigrant thought, we assume that the level of legitimacy people assigned to the system affected the degree to which they believed the government's campaign, and could have led to different patterns in their attitudes toward immigrants.

As mentioned above, trust and satisfaction are important factors in the emergence of attitudes towards immigrants, not only at a macro- but at a micro-level

too. McLaren argued that a sense of personal threat, which is closely connected with anti-immigrant attitudes (Barna and Koltai, 2018), 'may result from other sources of distress and unhappiness' (McLaren, 2003: 915), hypothesizing that respondents who are unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives are 'more likely to blame an out-group such as immigrants and to believe that members of this out-group are contributing to negative personal conditions.' In a study, the author found that these hypothesized processes were significant. (McLaren, 2003, 919.)

There is wide consensus about the effect of generalized trust on prejudices in general, and anti-migration attitudes in particular. As Uslaner argued, generalized trusters (i.e. those who trust other people) 'are more tolerant of people who are different from themselves, [and] they are supportive of racial minorities and immigrants [...]' (Uslaner, 2008: 291). Ekici and Yucel (2015), after analyzing thirty-seven European countries included in the European Values Study, found that interpersonal trust decreases religious and racial prejudice. Various researchers (Herreros and Criado, 2009; Rustenbach, 2010; van der Linden et al., 2017) have included generalized trust in their explanation of anti-migrant attitudes in analyses of ESS data. In all the combinations of independent variables, interpersonal trust has been shown to have a strong and significant effect on anti-migrant attitudes: those who trust other people more reject immigrants less.

Sides and Citrin (2007) included both social trust and life satisfaction in their analysis, and both variables proved to be highly significant. Their results show that a higher level of social trust and life satisfaction produce weaker anti-immigrant attitudes. Although Boelhouwer (2016) and Meuleman et al. (2016) compared countries based on attitudes toward migrants, level of life satisfaction, and social trust in the overall population, they found that countries where people are more satisfied with their lives and trust other people more tend to have more positive attitudes toward immigrants.

4. Data and methods

For examining the differences between attitudes before and after the Hungarian government's anti-immigration campaign we chose the Hungarian dataset of the European Social Survey (ESS). We used data from the sixth and the eighth round. The Hungarian process of data collection for the sixth round of ESS took place mostly during the last two months of 2012 (less than six per cent of cases were administered at the beginning of 2013), while round eight data was collected in the middle of 2017. The reason we omitted the seventh round was that the related process of data collection in Hungary started four months after the prime minister's first speech about the exclusion of immigrants, and at just the same time as the 'National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism' was launched. Thus, these campaigns could have already had some effects on the results (however, since they had *only just* started, not enough time had passed for them to have a clear effect on people's opinions). This is the reason we chose one dataset for which data had been collected before the anti-immigration campaign, and another the data for which was collected a considerable time after the campaign had entered into force.

We analyzed changes in attitudes towards immigration from two perspectives: allowance of different immigrant groups, and presumed effect of migration. We measured *allowance for different immigrant groups* through the following questions:

- To what extent do you think Hungary should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most Hungarian people to come and live here?
- How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most Hungarian people?
- How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

Respondents could choose one of four answers: 'allow many,' 'allow some,' 'allow a few,' and 'allow none.' For the analysis of these questions we used descriptive statistics (namely, the proportion of respondents who would allow 'only a few' or 'none' of these immigrants).

We examined the *presumed effect of migration* using the following questions:

- Would you say it is generally bad or good for Hungary's economy that people come to live here from other countries?
- And, would you say that Hungary's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
- Is Hungary made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

Respondents were asked to indicate their answer using a scale of 0–10. We created an index that measured the presumed effect of migration, defined as the mean of the three variables, as our goal was to compare the changes between the two time points.[10]

For explaining the presumed effect of migration, we used three constructs. For each of these we created an index from the mean of the items on a scale of 0–10.

The first construct concerned *trust in other people* (generalized trust), which we built using the following items:

- Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
- Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
- Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

The second construct was the respondents' *positive outlook on life*, measured by the following questions:

- Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?

[10] Principal component analysis could also have been an appropriate solution. However, this would not have been useful as its values are standardized and are thus not comparable across different time points. Also, we did not use weights in the process of index creation as the weights of the earlier analyzed principal component were quite similar to each other, as well as very high.

- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?

The third construct was the *legitimacy potential* of the respondent. Legitimacy potential was, on the one hand, measured by trust in different institutions with the following questions:

How much do you personally trust each of the following institutions?

- The Hungarian parliament
- Legal system
- Police
- Politicians
- Political parties

On the other hand, the measurement of *legitimacy potential* also included questions about satisfaction, such as:

- On the whole, how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in Hungary?
- Thinking about the Hungarian government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?
- And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Hungary?
- Please tell us what you think overall about the state of education in Hungary nowadays.
- Please tell us what you think overall about the state of health services in Hungary nowadays.

To measure the complex relationships between these constructs we used path model analysis, where the final dependent variable was the presumed effect of migration, which is explained by the positive outlook of people, their generalized trust, and legitimacy potential. We also assumed that legitimacy potential has some effect on positive outlook and generalized trust, as we hypothesized that a positive outlook affects general trust. We controlled the model for several socio-demographic factors including gender, age, education, type of settlement, and subjective income.[11] The theoretical model can be seen in Figure 1.

[11] These demographic variables do not have strong effects on the variable that measures the presumed effect of migration. This is especially the case when their effects are controlled for other variables in the model, and when their effect sizes are compared to those of the latter. We thus decided not to display the demographic variables in the figure as they were only used to control effects at every step of the model.



Figure 1. Theoretical path model of the presumed effect of migration

As mentioned in the chapter about the conceptual context, attitudes toward immigrants may have been influenced by the Hungarian government's anti-immigration campaign. As political cleavages in Hungarian society are immensely wide (Kmetty, 2015), we assumed that these attitudes depend (beside other factors) on people's political preferences. We originally hypothesized that the campaign had a stronger effect on those who sympathized with the governing parties (Fidesz and KDNP) than on those who did not. Nevertheless, another theoretical explanation exists for these processes. It is possible that those who were Fidesz voters in 2012 but did not resonate with the anti-immigration campaign no longer sympathized with Fidesz by 2017, while those who were not Fidesz supporters in 2012 and resonated with the anti-immigration campaign had joined the group of Fidesz sympathizers by 2017. We can also assume that both explanations are simultaneously valid. Though the first explanation seems more plausible, we cannot disqualify the second one as it would only be possible to measure attitude changes with panel data which we do not have access to. Accordingly, we hypothesize that these changes exist and there may be diverse mechanisms behind them.

To test our hypotheses, we included the dimension of political preferences in the analysis and split our results not only according to Round Six and Round Eight of ESS, but also by political preferences. Political preferences were measured by a nominal variable with four categories based on a question about the party the respondent felt closest to.[12] The categories of the variable were the following: Fidesz

[12] The original question was the following: 'Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?' It is important here to mention that we could not use the question 'Which party did

sympathizer,[13] Jobbik sympathizer, other party sympathizer, and no party the respondent feels close to. It is important to note that the group of 'other' party sympathizers consists mostly supporters of left-leaning parties such as MSZP, DK, etc.

5. Results

As we mentioned above, allowing different immigrant groups into Hungary was measured by three questions that asked about different types of immigrant groups: those who were (1) from the same race/ethnic group as the majority population in Hungary; (2) those from a different race/ethnic group to the majority; and (3) those from poorer countries outside Europe. The answers were 'allow many to come and live here,' 'allow some,' 'allow a few,' and 'allow none.' Table 2 shows the proportion of responses 'allow a few' and 'allow none' – those which point more in the direction of opposing migration – for the different rounds of ESS and the different party preference groups.

Table 2. Proportions of those who would only allow 'a few' or 'none' of the different types of immigrants into Hungary (row percentages of the given subsample) (%)

		Allow a few	Allow none	Total
Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	2012 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	31.1	5.4	36.5
	2012 – Jobbik sympathizer	25.3	20.5	45.8
	2012 – other party sympathizer	36.1	15.4	51.5
	2012 – feels close to no party	35.0	15.6	50.6
	2017 –Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	15.1	31.6	46.7
	2017 – Jobbik sympathizer	15.6	34.8	50.4
	2017 – other party sympathizer	27.4	11.4	38.8
	2017 – feels close to no party	24.6	23.6	48.2
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	2012 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	45.7	24.5	70.2
	2012 – Jobbik sympathizer	35.1	44.1	79.2
	2012 – other party sympathizer	42.5	25.8	68.3
	2012 – feels close to no party	42.0	25.5	67.5

you vote for in the last election?' as in both years at the time of data collection too much time (a minimum of one year) had passed since the elections thus respondents might have changed their party preferences since then.

[13] During the analysis, we applied the label 'Fidesz sympathizers' to this group as KDNP is a micro-party that always collaborates in elections with Fidesz.

		Allow a few	Allow none	Total
	2017 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	31.7	59.4	91.1
	2017 – Jobbik sympathizer	30.9	57.7	88.6
	2017 – other party sympathizer	44.2	25.5	69.7
	2017 – feels close to no party	38.1	43.4	81.5
Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	2012 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	42.9	30.8	73.7
	2012 – Jobbik sympathizer	36.6	53.3	89.9
	2012 – other party sympathizer	37.0	37.2	74.2
	2012 – feels close to no party	37.4	33.9	71.3
	2017 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	21.3	74.9	96.2
	2017 – Jobbik sympathizer	24.1	70.9	95
	2017 – other party sympathizer	47.9	34.7	82.6
	2017 – feels close to no party	31.4	55.9	87.3

Source: ESS6 and ESS8 Hungarian dataset. Authors' own calculations.

The first group of these questions were asked about immigrants of same race/ethnic group as the majority, which in our case basically referred to ethnic Hungarians of other countries. In 2012, rejection of the immigration of same race/ethnic groups was lowest among Fidesz and Jobbik sympathizers and the highest among the sympathizers of other parties and those, who did not have a party preference. However, these proportions had changed by 2017. Rejection of allowance of ethnic Hungarian immigrants became stronger from 2012 to 2017 among Fidesz and Jobbik sympathizers; the change was bigger (almost ten percentage points) among the former group, and much smaller in the case of the latter (less than five percentage points). Among Fidesz sympathizers especially, the proportion of respondents who would allow no one into the country increased considerably from 5.4 to 31.6 per cent. At the same time, the rejection of ethnic Hungarian immigrants decreased significantly among other party sympathizers (by almost 13 percentage points) and was somewhat lower (by more than two percentage points) among those having no party preference.

Focusing on the rejection of the immigration of people of different race/ethnic groups (non-Hungarians), we can observe growth in almost every party preference group with the only exception of 'other party' sympathizers, where growth was not significant. In 2012, the level of rejection was already high in each group at between 67.5 and 79.2 per cent, with Jobbik sympathizers being at the top and other party sympathizers at the bottom of this ranking. By 2017, the level of rejection had become even higher, the aggregated proportion of the two examined categories being between 69.7 and 91.1 per cent. The greatest change (more than 20 percentage points) happened among Fidesz sympathizers: in 2017, nine of every ten Fidesz sympathizers

rejected the immigration of people of a different race/ethnic group. The only group in which the level of rejection of these immigrants did not change significantly was other party sympathizers.

Analysis of the question about immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe shows the highest rejection rates in both years. In 2012, the proportion of those who rejected the immigration of this group was between 71.3 and 89.9 per cent. The group that rejected it most strongly was the one of Jobbik voters, while the members of other groups rejected these immigrants at approximately the same level. Nevertheless, the rejection of these immigrants in every examined group had risen further by 2017 to between 82.6 and 96.2 per cent. The biggest change happened among Fidesz sympathizers, where the proportion of those who rejected such immigrants had grown by more than 20 percentage points. The smallest change (little more than 7 percentage points) was observed in the case of other party sympathizers.

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of the variables used in the explanatory model for the presumed effect of migration. To decide if the differences between the means of the four groups were significant we used Games-Howell post-hoc tests with a significance level of 0.05 as variances across groups were not equal (Field, 2009: 374–375).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the path analysis

	Presumed Effect of Migration (+: negative)		**Legitimacy Potential (+: high)**		**Positive Outlook on Life (+: positive)**		**Trust in People (+: trust)**	
	mean	**SD**	**mean**	**SD**	**mean**	**SD**	**mean**	**SD**
2012 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	4.79	1.89	5.81	1.68	6.75	1.88	5.01	2.11
2012 – Jobbik sympathizer	6.13	2.20	3.79	1.76	6.02	2.20	4.92	1.86
2012 – other party sympathizer	5.31	2.06	3.45	1.70	5.65	2.06	4.97	1.90
2012 – feels close to no party	5.45	1.91	3.77	1.75	5.59	2.15	4.78	1.95
2017 – Fidesz-KDNP sympathizer	7.14	2.01	6.27	1.30	7.17	1.57	4.59	1.70
2017 – Jobbik sympathizer	7.24	2.05	3.94	1.89	6.61	1.69	4.11	1.87
2017 – other party sympathizer	5.39	2.00	3.74	1.61	5.95	1.84	4.75	1.68
2017 – feels close to no party	6.53	2.02	4.19	1.79	6.48	2.05	4.68	1.89

Source: ESS6 and ESS8 Hungarian dataset. Authors' own calculations.
All variables are measured on a 0–10 scale.

In 2012, the mean value for the presumed effect of immigration was not significantly different among Jobbik sympathizers, other party sympathizers, and those who did not have a party they felt close to (mean values between 5.45 and 6.13 on a scale of 0–10). However, Fidesz sympathizers had a significantly lower mean value than Jobbik sympathizers and those who did not have a preferred party, which means that compared to the latter groups Fidesz supporters assumed a more positive effect from migration. There was no significant difference at that time in terms of the presumed effect of migration between Fidesz supporters and supporters of other parties (excluding Fidesz and Jobbik). In 2017, Fidesz and Jobbik sympathizers, compared to other groups, had a significantly worse opinion about the presumed effect of migration. This suggests that although in 2012 Fidesz supporters presumed a more positive effect of migration than the supporters of Jobbik, in 2017 the sympathizers of the incumbent party were on the same platform as the supporters of the far-right party regarding this issue. Although it appears that the means of all political preference groups grew from 2012 to 2017 (i.e., the opinions of all groups about the presumed effect of migration became more negative), growth was only significant in the case of Fidesz supporters and those who did not have a party to feel close to. The opinion of the other two groups (Jobbik and other party sympathizers) did not change between the two years in this regard.

In each examined year, Fidesz supporters – understandably – felt significantly higher legitimacy potential than any other political groups. The other three groups had all lower means on the legitimacy potential index and did not differ from each other significantly with regard to this question in either year. There are two groups of people who felt more legitimacy potential in 2017 than in 2012: one is the group of Fidesz sympathizers, and the other is the group of those who did not have a party preference. The perceived legitimacy potential of Jobbik and other party supporters did not change over time.

Fidesz sympathizers had a significantly more positive outlook on life than other parties and 'no party' supporters each year, except for Jobbik supporters. It is also true for both years, that the level of positive outlook was the same for all other political groups. Only Fidesz supporters and those who did not feel close to any parties had significantly higher means (thus a more positive outlook on life) in 2017 compared to 2012. The level of positive outlook did not change among Jobbik and other party supporters from 2012 to 2017.

There was no significant difference between the examined political groups according to their general trust in people in either year. There was also no significant difference between the two examined years in any political group.

As mentioned above, we used path model analysis for explaining the presumed effect of migration. In addition to the final dependent variable, the explanatory model included three variables: positive outlook on life, general trust in people, and legitimacy potential. According to our earlier analysis, we split our model into eight groups, taking into account both the year of data collection and the political preference of respondents. Figure 2 shows the results of the four models for each year.



Figure 2: Path-model analysis of the presumed effect of migration (standardized regression coefficients).
Source: ESS6 and ESS8 Hungarian dataset. Authors' own calculations.
Coefficients are significant at a level of 0.05 unless indicated in strikethrough.
Controlled for age, gender, education, type of settlement, and subjective income.

In 2012, there were no meaningful differences in the explained variance of the model in terms of the examined political groups. They were quite similar to each other (14–15 per cent); the only exception was the group of other party sympathizers, where explained variance was slightly higher (20 per cent); thus, the explanatory power of the model is the strongest for this group. As one can notice, there is only one significant path (effect) in the case of Jobbik sympathizers while all other effects are not significant, thus the explanatory power for that group is similar to that of the others. Most of these not significant effects are due to the relatively small sample size of this group. For all other groups it is true in 2012 that the greater legitimacy potential they felt, the more positive their outlook on life was, which resulted in stronger interpersonal trust leading to more positive assumptions about the effect of migration. In these groups, high legitimacy potential resulted in stronger interpersonal trust independently of positive outlook on life, together with a more positive attitude toward immigration. Only in the case of Fidesz supporters and those having no party preferences did high legitimacy potential in itself, independent of any micro-level variables, lead to a more positive presumed effect of migration. However, it is important to note that Fidesz supporters' positive outlook on life did not have a direct effect on the presumed effect of migration, only an indirect one through interpersonal

trust.[14] For other party sympathizers and those who did not have a party to feel close to, a positive outlook was associated with the positive presumed effect of migration.

In 2017, the explanatory power of the models was generally greater (24–35 per cent), with the group of those with no party preference being the exception where the explained variance remained the same. In the case of all groups but Jobbik, the more legitimacy was perceived, the more positive the outlook on life. However, from here the paths are different. In the case of Fidesz and other party supporters, this better outlook on life leads to stronger interpersonal trust and through this to a more positive opinion about the presumed effect of migration. In the case of other party supporters, a positive outlook on life can increase positive attitudes to migration in itself; however, in the case of Fidesz supporters, personal happiness and satisfaction needed to be accompanied by interpersonal trust for this to occur.

Nevertheless, the most important differences between the different political groups – more precisely, between Fidesz supporters and other groups – lie somewhere else. In the case of non-Fidesz supporters, we see similar effects as in 2012; namely, that legitimacy potential can affect attitudes toward migration through either micro-level satisfaction and happiness or generalized trust, or through both; higher legitimacy potential in itself increases interpersonal trust, leading to a more positive attitude towards the effects of migration. However, in the case of Fidesz supporters, this is only true if it is accompanied by micro-level happiness and satisfaction.

It is even more interesting how legitimacy potential affects the presumed effect of migration. In the case of Fidesz supporters and the group with no party preferences, legitimacy potential in itself has a direct effect, although in a very different way. In the case of those with no party preferences, the effect of 2017 is in accordance with the result of 2012 and the literature; namely, that higher legitimacy potential results in a more positive opinion of the presumed effect of migration. In the case of Fidesz supporters, it is the other way round. While in 2012 the more legitimacy potential the former felt the more *positive* were their opinions about the presumed effect of migration, in 2017 the direction of this effect had reversed: the more legitimacy potential they felt, the more *negative* was their opinion about the presumed effect of migration. However, with Fidesz supporters too, if this high legitimacy potential was accompanied with positive outlook on life leading to greater interpersonal trust, it resulted in a more positive opinion about the presumed effects of migration.

There is another major difference between the models of 2012 and 2017 that appears in the case of Jobbik supporters: namely, in terms of the effect of a positive outlook on life on the presumed effect of migration. The value of this coefficient is very similar in 2012 and 2017, but this is very likely because of the small sample size of this group that the effect was not significant in 2012 ($p = 0.08$). Nevertheless, despite the possible impact of sample size we found it important to note this finding as the effect was negative in 2012 and positive in 2017. This means that in 2012 a positive outlook was potentially associated with a positive presumed effect of

[14] The same holds for Jobbik supporters, but in their case the finding was possibly caused by the low number of respondents since the value of the standardized regression coefficient is fairly high (0.30).

migration, while in 2017 a positive outlook attended negative opinions about the presumed effect of migration among Jobbik supporters.

6. Discussion

Data from the European Social Survey, like other sets of data, showed the high level of xenophobia in Hungary even before the migration crisis broke out. Little more than half of all respondents (52 per cent) even rejected the allowance of ethnic Hungarian immigrants, meaning that they would reject allowing all or some of them to immigrate to Hungary. The rejection rate was much higher for non-Hungarian immigrants (75 per cent) and those from poorer non-European countries (81 per cent). By 2017 there had been a major increase in the rejection of all kinds of immigrant groups. Since Fidesz has always been concerned with ethnic Hungarians (partly for vote-maximization purposes), it was striking to see that the proportion of Fidesz sympathizers who would allow no ethnic Hungarian immigrants had increased by more than 10 percentage points (the highest level of growth among all political preference groups). However, looking at the data for the other immigrant groups, the increase is even more remarkable. Both in the case of non-Hungarian immigrants and those from poorer non-European countries the increase was more than 20 percentage points for Fidesz, and less for the other political preference groups. Not only did the rejection of different kinds of immigrant groups increase from 2012 to 2017, but also negative opinions about their presumed effect (regarding education, culture, and overall impact). In this case, as earlier trends also show, the opinion of Fidesz sympathizers became more negative (by 2.4 points on an eleven-point scale, as opposed to the maximum of a 1.1-point change in other political preference groups). Based on the analysis of descriptive statistics, we accept our first main hypothesis: respondents' opinions about immigrants enormously deteriorated from 2012 to 2017. Moreover, the different reactions of Fidesz and non-Fidesz supporters could also be identified. The fact that the opinion of Fidesz sympathizers worsened much more in every respect leads us to assume that the anti-immigration campaign played an important role in this – either a party's sympathizers are more sensitive to its messages than non-supporters, or those who resonated more with the message of the anti-immigration campaign became Fidesz supporters and those who did not stopped supporting the party.

In the next step of our analysis we built a model to explain the formation of respondents' opinions about the presumed effect of immigrants. In this model we connected macro- and micro-level trust and satisfaction to see the mechanism by which this hatred came into existence. We decided to connect macro- and micro-level trust and satisfaction with anti-immigrant attitudes as we agree with Csepeli and Örkény (2017) who have argued that:

> '(…) the refugee crisis, in addition to the political crisis, has a direct impact on everyday behavior, everyday culture and people's interpersonal relationships. What we can observe today, and perhaps the most worrisome consequence of the current situation, is that in many countries of the EU, the political and the

> moral crises that undermine values reach down to the deepest layers of society and into people's relationships.'[15] (Csepeli and Örkény, 2017: 74)

In 2012, the explanatory model worked in almost the same way for Fidesz and non-Fidesz sympathizers, and was consistent with our assumptions. Trust and satisfaction on the macro level (that is, high legitimacy potential) resulted in positive feelings on the micro level (that is, a positive outlook on life and a high level of interpersonal trust), which led to the positive presumed effect of migration. Moreover, in the case of Fidesz supporters and the group with no party preferences high legitimacy potential appeared to produce the same result, even independently of micro-level variables. Using either route specified in the model, the result was the same.

In 2017, however, we found a strikingly different pattern in the case of Fidesz supporters: trust in and satisfaction with the system (namely, high legitimacy potential) *in itself* led to a more negative attitude towards migration. However, we found that high legitimacy potential could also lead to a more positive opinion about the presumed effect of migration, but only if accompanied by both a micro-level positive outlook on life and interpersonal trust. The other important change in the case of Fidesz supporters is that the indirect effect of legitimacy potential through trust on the presumed effect of migration – which existed in 2012 – had disappeared.

The fact that there were major differences between Fidesz and non-Fidesz sympathizers in every respect concerning anti-migrant attitudes led us to accept our second main hypothesis. Since we cannot separate the effect of the anti-migration propaganda and that of other contextual factors we cannot say that the difference in attitudes toward the different types of immigrant in 2012 and 2017, as well as the differences we found between Fidesz and non-Fidesz sympathizers, is due to the government's anti-immigration campaign. However, knowing the all-pervasive nature of the campaign and the fact that our results are consistent in every aspect, leads us to think that it is reasonable to assume that it had at least some effect.

In this paper we have dealt with moral panic at great length by discussing its five crucial elements and their Hungarian relevance. We would now like to refer to them in the context of our results. ESS data do not provide information about the *concern* people felt about the behavior of immigrants. However, the *hostility* felt towards the latter and the presence of *substantial and widespread concern* have been identified; both phenomena valid much more for Fidesz sympathizers. Knowing that the proportion of foreign citizens in Hungary is less than two per cent of the whole Hungarian population, and that after September 2015 the number of asylum-seekers dramatically decreased, these heightened and extremely negative emotions seem to be *disproportionate*. As we have stated above, it is perhaps too early to comment on the volatility of this moral panic, although it is a fact that its outbreak was rapid. We have found it important to prove that Hungarian society has been in a state of moral panic, arguing that the landslide effects the anti-immigration campaign had, as supported by our analysis, could hardly have been achievable without this.

[15] Original text in Hungarian: '[a] menekültkrízis tehát a politikai válságon felül közvetlenül is kihat a köznapi viselkedésre, a mindennapi kultúrára és az emberek egymás közötti kapcsolataira. Amit megfigyelhetünk napjainkban, és ami talán a legaggasztóbb következménye a jelenleg kialakult helyzetnek, hogy az EU számos országában a társadalmi mélyrétegekbe és az emberek egymás közti kapcsolataiba is lecsorog a politikai és az értékeket aláásó morális krízis.'

We also found that the difference in attitudes between supporters and non-supporters of the governing party increased from 2012 to 2017. Not only had Fidesz sympathizers became more negative about migration and migrants by 2017, but the paths leading from macro-level trust and satisfaction to opinions about migration also differed more (direct and indirect effects were different for those who supported Fidesz compared to other groups). Additionally, the causatory mechanisms of the development of opinions in the case of Fidesz supporters differed from those of other party preference groups.

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JUDIT TAKÁCS AND IVETT SZALMA *

Social Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the Main Religious Denomination Matter?

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* [takacs.judit@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences); [szalma.ivett@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

This study examines social attitudes towards homosexuality in two Central-Eastern European neighbouring countries – Romania and Hungary – with many common points, but that do differ in their religious traditions.

Our main research question is whether the main religious denomination can influence social attitudes towards homosexuality, after controlling for all the important individual level variables (gender, age, education, type of settlement, family status, employment background, and attitudes related to family and gender norms). Among the examined variables we especially focus on the religious ones since the dominant denominations are different in these otherwise similar societies.

The empirical base of our study comprises two longitudinal databases: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS). We use data from two ESS rounds (of 2006 and 2008) and three EVS rounds (of 1990, 1999 and 2008). Since Romania participated only in the 3rd and the 4th rounds of the ESS (in 2006 and 2008), the Romanian results from 2008 are the most recent ones.

We apply descriptive statistics and regression models. Our main conclusion is that belonging to the Orthodox Church had a more negative effect on social attitudes towards homosexuality than belonging to the Catholic Church (as previous studies have also found).

Keywords: homosexuality, religious denomination, attitudes, European Values Study, European Social Survey.

1. Introduction

Our study examines social attitudes towards homosexuality in two Central-Eastern European countries: Hungary and Romania. We have compared empirical data from two adjacent countries within the same region, which is a relatively infrequent practice among large-scale survey based studies of social attitudes. Our investigation is based on the comparison of Romanian and Hungarian data of two large-scale longitudinal surveys, the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS), both applying multi-stage probabilistic sampling plans.

The first EVS question reviewed in our analysis is about 'justification' of homosexuality in connection with religiosity in the sense of belonging to a specific denomination. Since we assume that this variable and four others on the 'justification' of abortion, prostitution, casual sexual relationships and extramarital relationships were included in the EVS to measure the latent concept of sexual morality, we also provide a brief descriptive statistical overview on these variables. Then we examine non-preference for homosexual neighbours in comparison with other social groups and provide a brief review of social attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples in both countries. Next, we present descriptive statistical results of the ESS variable for measuring social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women. Finally, by using linear and logistic regression models we analyse factors that might explain the evolution of attitudes towards homosexuality in the two countries.

Investigation into these issues can be relevant from several aspects. For instance, marriage equality and joint adoption by same-sex couples have become legally established in many European countries, but Romania and Hungary still lack these institutions. In both countries it has often been contested whether it makes sense to consider the establishment of legal instruments providing equal family and social policy treatment for different and same-sex couples in societies characterized by a homophobic social climate. According to arguments that can often be heard from policy-makers in this context such issues could not (yet) be on the political agenda since society is not 'ready' or 'mature enough' for providing full *intimate citizenship* (Plummer, 2003) rights for gay and lesbian citizens.

Even though these two countries have many common points – their post-socialist past, the transition period, preferences towards traditional family practices, high gender inequality compared to Western societies, and a lack of long-lasting democratic traditions – they do differ in their religious traditions.

By comparing Romania and Hungary we follow the ideas of Neyer and Andersson (2008) who suggested disentangling the effects of country or region specificities on policy effects by comparing the potentially most similar contexts, which display well-recognized differences. In this case we try to understand the different homosexuality-related attitudes in two similar countries with different main or dominant religious denominations. We aim to answer the question whether different religious denominations can lead to different attitudes related to the acceptance of homosexuality. Furthermore, this study also wants to highlight that homosexuality-related attitudes are not in the least static or unified, as opinions might change both in time and depending on the various social-demographic factors as well.

2. Religiosity and social attitudes towards homosexuality: A background

A recent overview of empirical research on religiosity and prejudice concluded that 'all around the globe more religious people seem to be more likely to express homophobic attitudes as compared to not religious people' (Klein et al., 2018: 33). On the basis of analysing World Values Survey (WVS) data from 33 countries Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) found no significant difference in attitudes about homosexuality for people who live in countries with the dominant religion being Roman Catholic or Orthodox. Another study analysing WVS data from 87 countries found that while Muslims were among those expressing the most homophobic views, and non-religious respondents were characterised by the least homophobic views, Catholic, Orthodox, and Buddhist respondents fell in the middle (Adamczyk, 2017).

However, recent European findings based on analyses of European Value Study (EVS) data collected from 43 countries indicated that among those belonging to a denomination, Orthodox and Muslim respondents displayed the highest levels of homophobia, while Protestants were the least prejudiced regarding both the moral rejection of homosexuality as a practice and intolerance towards homosexuals as a group (Doebler, 2015). The author also pointed out that regarding social distancing 'both Orthodox and Muslims stand out as the most intolerant denominations independent of their levels of religious practice and belief, while Catholics and Protestants are no more likely than people with no affiliation to reject homosexuals', and this difference between denominations remained robust when controlling for religious, political and economic national contexts (Doebler, 2015: 14).

Another study, also using EVS data, explored the relationship between religious authority and tolerance by comparing opinions on homosexuality among Orthodox citizens in Romania and Bulgaria, and found that 'while all Orthodox churches may denounce homosexuality, not all churches wield equivalent influence over their members' beliefs and attitudes' (Spina, 2016: 37). More specifically, the findings indicated that in comparison to Bulgaria, Romanian Orthodox citizens seemed to be influenced more by the church in developing negative attitudes towards homosexuality regardless of how active they were in the church.

Regarding our two examined countries, both the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church consider homosexual behaviour as morally wrong. Since they are perceived as credible moral authorities by their followers, both churches are able to frame homosexuality related issues according to their preferences as 'ostensibly credible elites' can do, when citizens seek guidance from them (Druckman, 2001: 1045).

According to the 2008 ESS dataset, 93 per cent of the Romanian and 59 per cent of the Hungarian respondents considered themselves as belonging to a particular religion or denomination (where identification was meant, not official membership), and according to self-assessed religiousness, Romania (with a mean value of 6.79) is shown to be much more religious than Hungary (with a mean value of 4.29).[1]

[1] Respondents had to answer to the question 'Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?' on an eleven-point scale, where 0 meant 'not at all religious' and 10 meant 'very religious'. Another more practical indicator of religiousness is the frequency of attending religious services, which we will also use in our analyses.

According to the latest (2008) EVS data, among those who belong to a denomination three-quarters identified as belonging to the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, while in Romania almost 90 per cent identified as belonging to the Orthodox denomination.[2]

The notable difference regarding religiosity of the two examined countries is also reflected in the data that 82 per cent of the Romanian respondents identified as being a religious person, 12 per cent as a non-religious person, and 1 per cent considered themselves a convinced atheist, while in Hungary 53 per cent identified as a religious person, 43 per cent as non-religious and 4 per cent as a convinced atheist (EVS 2008 data). Figure 1 indicates how the respondents evaluated the importance of religion in their life in both countries.



Figure 1. Importance of religion (%)
Source: EVS 2008; own calculation

Concerning the general social acceptance of lesbian women and gay men, numerous cross-national surveys were conducted that discussed the issue in respect of the respondents' gender, age, religiosity, concept of traditional gender roles and heterosexism, views on gender equality and abortion, and moral and political attitudes (for detailed references see Takács and Szalma, 2013: 9). Findings on religiosity and homophobia often indicate that not just belonging to a denomination, but the type of denomination also matters. For example, in our previous studies (Takács and Szalma, 2011; 2013) we also found that those who belonged to the Orthodox Church had less tolerant attitudes towards gays and lesbians than those who belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.

[2] Among those who considered themselves as belonging to a specific denomination 74.5 per cent identified as Roman Catholic and 23.2 per cent as Protestant in Hungary, while in Romania 88.8 per cent identified as Orthodox, 5.2 per cent as Roman Catholic and 2.5 per cent as Protestant.

However, the relationship between religious denominations and attitudes towards abortion or assisted reproduction technologies (ART) does not coincide with these results, namely those who belong to the Orthodox Church have more tolerant attitudes towards abortion and ART than those who belong to the Catholic Church (Deflem and Weismayer, 2002; Szalma and Djundeva, 2014). This contradiction might derive from the fact that the Orthodox Church is dominant in the Western Balkans where religion serves to bolster national and cultural identities, and homosexuality is socially created as an internally unifying enemy (van den Berg et al., 2014), but ART and abortion are not included in this national and cultural enemy image. In Romania the Orthodox Church had an important role in providing differentiation from the significant Hungarian minorities (around 6.6 per cent of the population according to the Romanian census in 2001) belonging to the Roman Catholic or Protestant denominations.

Attitudes towards homosexuality are also highly influenced by the current legal regulations of the specific countries. In countries where legislation in the field had already been introduced, public opinion also seemed more supportive: for example, an analysis of ESS data from 20 countries collected between 2002 and 2008 found that social attitudes towards homosexuality were the most favourable where the legal institutions of marriage and adoption by same-sex couples existed (van den Akker, van der Ploeg and Scheepers, 2013). Similar results were found about European attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples (Takács, Szalma and Bartus, 2016). Such approaches can be criticized for their assumption of reverse causality: a more tolerant society is beyond doubt more likely to introduce ‘gay-friendly’ institutions. However, we do have reason to suppose that legal institutions also affect the shaping of social attitudes (as indicated in one of our earlier studies: see Takács and Szalma, 2011).

Even within the European Union great variety can be observed concerning which countries offer same-sex marriage, registered partnership and joint adoption by same-sex couples as legal options. Table 1 summarizes dates between 1989 and 2018 when these institutions were established in 23 countries in Europe. Marriage and joint adoption for gay and lesbian couples was allowed for the first time in the world in the Netherlands in 2001, when Dutch policy-makers decided to make the institution of marriage equally available in the Netherlands for different- as well as same-sex couples. At the same time the ‘opening’ of marriage for same-sex couples also implied the extension of parental rights, unlike for example in Belgium and Portugal, where introducing the legal institution of same-sex marriage did not entail such an extension immediately, only a few years later.

Table 1 Introduction of same-sex marriage, registered partnership and adoption by same-sex couples in 23 European countries (1989–2018)

Countries	**Same-sex marriage**	**Registered partnership**	**Adoption by same-sex couples**
Austria	(2017/2019)	2010	2013
Belgium	2003	2000	2006
Croatia	–	2014	(2014 stepchildguardianship)
Czech Republic	–	2006	–
Denmark	2012	1989	2007/2009
Estonia	–	2014/2016	(2016 stepchild)
Finland	2014/2017	2002	2009/2014
France	2013	1999 (PACS)	2013
Germany	2017	2001	(2004/5 stepchild)2017
Hungary	–	2009	–
Iceland	2010	1996	2006
Ireland	2015	2010/2011	2017
Italy	–	2016	(2016 stepchild)
Luxembourg	2014/2015	2004	2014/2015
Malta	2017	2014	2014
The Netherlands	2001	1998	2001
Norway	2008/2009	1993	2009
Portugal	2010	–	2016
Slovenia	–	2005	2011
Spain	2005	–	2005
Sweden	2009	1994	2003
Switzerland	–	2007	(2016/8 stepchild)
United Kingdom	2013	2005	2002/2008

There is no legal option for same-sex marriage or joint adoption in either country of our investigation; although in Hungary same-sex couples can have their partnership registered since 2009. Looking back, during the second half of the 20th century we may observe that Hungary overtook Romania in respect of decriminalizing homosexuality and introducing legislation for same-sex registered partnerships.

In Hungary since 1961 no criminal sanction can be imposed for consensual homosexual practices between consenting adults (which previously had penalized men only). Nevertheless, the age of sexual consent remained different for heterosexual and homosexual relationships for decades. Additionally, the sanctioning of unnatural fornication 'in a scandalous manner' appeared, and the gendered discrimination of men and women was abolished. Since then, women also became punishable if their relationship with a female partner was regarded as outrageous and thus reported to the police (Takács, 2015). In 1978 the age of consent in homosexual acts was lowered to 18 years (previously it was 20), then in 2002 a unified 14 years of consent age was introduced for both hetero- and homosexual acts. In January 2004 Act CXXV of 2003 'on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities' came into effect,

where categories to be protected from discrimination included sexual orientation and gender identity, respectively. Cohabiting partnership of same-sex couples has been acknowledged by law in Hungary since 1996, after Act XLII of 1996 extended the provisions of the Civil Code on cohabiting partnerships to include same-sex couples (Farkas, 2001). Although Act CLXXXIV of 2007 institutionalized registered partnerships, it came into force only upon the introduction of Act XXIX of 2009 'on registered partnership, and on the amendment of legal acts relating thereto and needed for the facilitation of the justification of the partnership.' Today non-heteronormative reproduction is limited in several ways in Hungary (Takács, 2018): for example, lesbians are excluded from using ART, and only married couples are eligible for joint adoption. However, the regulation does not exclude the possibility of individual adoption by single lesbian or gay people, and recent research findings on Hungarian adoption practices showed that gay men and lesbians do use the opportunity for – officially – single-parent adoption in Hungary (Neményi and Takács, 2015; Háttér Társaság, 2017).

In Romania homosexual acts had been criminalized until 1996: those days consensual homosexual acts between both men and women could be penalized by imprisonment from one to five years (Carstocea, 2010). As of 1996, new legislation entered into force sanctioning homosexual acts performed in public places or in a scandalous manner; in addition, the legal regulations opposing 'homosexual propaganda' also restricted gay and lesbian people's freedom of expression and association (Long, 1999). The infamous 'section number 200' (Article 200 of the Romanian Penal Code, which was introduced in 1968, criminalizing public manifestations of homosexuality) was abolished only in 2001, although a Government Ordinance (GO 137/2000 regarding the prevention and the punishment of all forms of discrimination) entered into force already in August 2000, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of, among others, sexual orientation (EC, 2016). According to Nachescu, the reluctance to decriminalize homosexual relations in Romania derives from 'essentialist nationalist assumptions' about homosexuals being 'alien and threatening to the family- and religion-oriented Romanian way of life' (2005: 130).

Currently Romania does not acknowledge any form of same-sex partnership officially. The Romanian regulations allow adoption by single people, thus theoretically making it possible for lesbian women or gay men to adopt without revealing their sexual orientation; however, the official consequences are rather unpredictable if an adopting parent subsequently turns out to be gay or lesbian (Carstocea, 2010). In 2009 the Romanian Civil Code was amended by redefining marriage as a union of a man and a woman, and family as being founded on marriage,[3] while in 2018 the national equality body (the National Council for Combating Discrimination) introduced a bill granting legal recognition to same-sex civil partnerships (Andreescu, 2018).

[3] Similar amendments were adopted to the Fundamental Law of Hungary in 2013 (Source: http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/hungary-constitutional-amendments-adopted/, accessed 2019-02-21)

3. Data, methods and hypotheses

Our data on social attitudes towards homosexuality derive from the datasets of the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS) of 2008. Both datasets involve more than 30 European countries, but our present study focuses only on data from Hungary and Romania. Since Romania participated only in the 3rd and the 4th rounds of the ESS (in 2006 and 2008), the Romanian results from 2008 are the most recent ones.

The EVS assesses the value choices, attitudes and norms of citizens on the continent according to a standardized set of criteria every nine years since 1981. The first three rounds of EVS (1981, 1990, 1999) had two variables measuring homosexuality- and homophobia-related attitudes. One was an acceptance question to be answered on a 10-point scale asking 'Please tell me ... whether you think the following ideas can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Homosexuality.' Unfortunately the interpretation of this variable is quite problematic, as it is difficult to decide what exactly 'justification' refers to.[4] A more specific, thus more easily interpretable variable is the other EVS question on preference for neighbours, which allows us to measure how much people keep their social distance from homosexuals and other (mostly rejected) groups. The question was the following: 'On this list are various groups of people (including people with a criminal record; people of a different race;[5] left wing extremists, heavy drinkers, right wing extremists, people with large families, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, Jews, Gypsies, Christians) – could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?'

In the fourth round of EVS, conducted between 2008 and 2010, a third question was introduced concerning adoption by homosexual couples. EVS is a cross-national comparative survey planned according to rigorous standards in the frame of which each participating country must (should) list variables in exactly the same form as they appear in the master questionnaire. Despite that, instead of the original variable of the English version, which said 'Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children,' the Hungarian version of the questionnaire included a statement to the contrary saying, 'Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children.'[6] Due to the 'wording effect' (that survey participants prefer to express agreement over disagreement with statements), well-known in the literature of survey methodology (Holleman, 1999; Rugg, 1941), the data remain incomparable, even if the scale is reversed. Therefore, the Hungarian data cannot be compared to the results of the

[4] Our concerns about the wording of this variable were already pointed out in one of our previous studies: 'in present day survey research using the term "homosexuality" can be problematic for several reasons. "Homosexuality" can refer to specific forms of homosexual behaviour and identity at the same time, while there is no necessary connection between the two' (Takács and Szalma, 2011: 359).

[5] An ambiguous translation of the expression 'people of a different race' can be found in the Hungarian version of the EVS questionnaire.

[6] Source: http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/surveys/survey-2008/participatingcountries/ Q47.C, accessed: 2010-11-26. The authors have no knowledge about the reasons for changing the content of the original question in the EVS survey. There was one more country among the EVS participants in 2008, where the variable was translated with a meaning contrary to the original, namely Spain. See: http://info1.gesis.org/EVS/Translation/EVS_Table_Translation2008.html, accessed: 2013-03-05.

other countries in the survey. During data recording in Romania no such mistakes were made, thus leaving the possibility of a cross-European comparison.

Our ESS variable measured agreement with the statement 'Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish' on a five-point scale (where 1 expressed strong disagreement, i.e. reflecting low social acceptance of gay and lesbian people, while 5 expressed strong agreement, reflecting their high social acceptance).[7] This is a core variable, which was included in the ESS questionnaires in each data collection round since 2002. A major advantage of this variable lies in its clear wording and unambiguous sense; contrary to the EVS variable about the 'justification' of homosexuality for example, it clearly refers to people. However, it should be noted that we examined the effect of different measurement of homophobia in a previous study and we found that 'there is quite a high probability that the agreement level with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish and the – let's face it, not only prima facie, utterly meaningless – "justification" of homosexuality variables as well as the non-preference for homosexual neighbours indicator can be used for measuring homophobia, or indeed, genderphobia' (Takács and Szalma, 2013: 40).

Various methods were used during data analysis: first we examined descriptive statistics by comparing mean values and frequencies, then we analysed explanatory models with the help of linear and logistic regression. Our regression analyses were conducted using the STATA 13 statistical program.

Attitudes towards the 'justification' of homosexuality, the social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women and opinions about joint adoption by same-sex couples may be influenced by several factors, including the cultural and religious background of the given country, its democratic traditions and conceptions about traditional gender roles, which, however, will not be examined very closely in our present study. Instead of focusing on country-level effects, we concentrated on only individual level variables as we examined only two countries. However, we assume that the difference between the two countries that cannot be explained on the basis of individual level variables derives from the difference in their legislation (whether same-sex partnerships are recognized by law) and their religious culture (related to the dominant denomination).

During the construction of our hypotheses we relied on our earlier findings about attitude questions on homosexuality surveyed in Hungary and in Europe as well (Takács and Szalma, 2011; 2013; 2019; Takács, Szalma and Bartus, 2016). Thus, in our present study, besides basic demographic features influencing one's social background, by applying the functional theory of attitudes[8] we focus mainly on those symbolic functions of attitudes that can be associated with religious and political

[7] During our analysis we reversed and re-coded the original order of the agreement scale.

[8] According to this approach there are three major needs that could be met by individuals' attitudes towards lesbian women and gay men: (i) *experiential* attitudes are based on past interactions with gays and lesbians, and can be generalized to all gays and lesbians; (ii) *defensive* attitudes can have ego-protective functions by helping to cope with one's anxieties (for instance, about the possibility of being gay); (iii) and *symbolic* attitudes, deriving from socialization experiences, express important values in the context of developing one's concept of self and in the process of (publicly) identifying with important reference groups (Herek, 1984; 2004).

socialization processes, the operation of traditional gender roles and prejudices against various social minorities, for example, migrants.

Based on the above, we have constructed the following hypotheses:

(H1) *Women, younger people, those with higher level of education and living in more urbanized environments are 'more tolerant towards homosexuality' (whatever that means exactly), more open towards gay men, lesbian women and homosexual neighbours than men, older people, those with lower level of education and living in smaller settlements.*

(H2) *Concerning religiosity we assume that both church membership and the frequency of attending religious services can strongly – and negatively – affect attitudes towards homosexuality.*

(H3) *Concerning political views, xenophobia, acceptance of traditional female roles, satisfaction with democracy and one's own life, we formulated the following assumptions: extreme right-wing political orientation, negative attitude towards immigrants, the acceptance of the traditional role of women and dissatisfaction with democracy and with one's own life can correlate with homophobic attitudes.*

(H4) *We assume that there are greater differences between those people who belong to the Orthodox denomination and those who do not adhere to any denomination than between those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church and those who do not adhere to any denomination.*

4. Results

4.1 'Justification' of homosexuality

From the EVS data we may conclude that respondents in most European countries became more tolerant towards homosexuality between 1990 and 2008. As for the non-response rate we found it stable around 5 per cent across time in the pooled data, although it varied across countries a lot: for example, in 2008 it exceeded 10 per cent in Bulgaria, Malta, Portugal, Sweden, and Ukraine. Figure 2 also indicates that in the European field both Hungary and – in particular – Romania belong to the less tolerant countries. However, compared to 1990, the trend moved towards higher tolerance, i.e. an increasing number of societies' attitudes became less homophobic.[9] Still, in contrast with Northern European countries the social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women is considered low in both countries.

[9] According to EVS data between 1990 and 2008 the Hungarian mean value increased from 2.7 to 3.2, while the Romanian increased from 1.5 to 2.1. The Hungarian value decreased between 1990 and 1999, and then by 2008 the 'justification' of homosexuality increased to a value higher than the previous two. A phenomenon similar to the Hungarian decrease between 1990 and 1999 (from a mean value of 2.7 to 1.4) was not observed in any other country, thus we had probably better treat these Hungarian results reservedly.



Figure 2. 'Justification' of homosexuality in 26 European countries between 1990 and 2008 (1 = can never be justified; 10 = can always be justified) [10]

Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008; own calculation

When examining the role of denominations in justification of homosexuality items in Hungary and Romania over the period after the transitions (1990, 1999 and 2008),[11] we found that there are more people who belonged to a denomination in Romania than in Hungary in all of the three years. In 1990, 58 per cent of the Hungarian respondents belonged to a denomination compared to 94 per cent in Romania, by 1999 the number of people who belonged to a denomination increased in Romania (98 per cent) and it did not change in Hungary (58 per cent). The number of those who belonged to a denomination remained unchanged by 2008 in Romania (98 per cent) and slightly decreased in Hungary (54 per cent). The proportion of the dominant denomination changed just slightly during that period. In Romania the proportion of those belonging to the Orthodox Church was 93 per cent in 1990, 87 per cent in 1999, and 89 per cent in 2008, while in Hungary the proportion of those belonging to the Catholic Church was 68 per cent in 1990, 73 per cent in 1999, and 74 per cent in 2008. We also checked the change in religious attendance and found considerable difference between the two countries at all of the time points. In Romania the proportion of those who at least weekly attend religious services shows an increasing trend with 19 per cent in 1990, 25 per cent in 1999, and 30 per cent in 2008, while in Hungary the trend is the opposite with 14 per cent in 1990, 11 per cent in 1999, and 8 per cent in 2008.

[10] Countries included in the table are: LT=Lithuania, RO=Romania, EE=Estonia, LV=Latvia, BG=Bulgaria, PL=Poland, HU=Hungary, PT=Portugal, IT=Italy, MA=Malta, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovakia, CZ=The Czech Republic, IE=Ireland, UK=United Kingdom, AT=Austria, FR=France, GR=Greece, BE=Belgium, ES=Spain, FI=Finland, NO=Norway, DK=Denmark, NL=The Netherlands, SE=Sweden, IS=Iceland.

[11] Neither Hungary nor Romania participated in the first round of EVS so we are not able to measure the relationship between religiosity and acceptance of homosexuality before 1990 in the two countries. Furthermore, in the state-socialist system religiousness was oppressed, thus we can assume that those people who formed their religious beliefs during state-socialism had different values (less traditional) than their Western European religious counterparts (Roccas and Schwartz, 1997).



Figure 3. The role of belonging to a denomination regarding the 'justification' of homosexuality (1 = can never be justified; 10 = can always be justified)
Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008; own calculation

Figure 3 shows greater difference between belonging to the dominant denomination and not belonging to any religious denomination in Romania than in Hungary over the examined periods, which indicates that the Orthodox Church can generate more negative attitudes towards acceptance of homosexuality than the Catholic Church. If we consider the changes over time we can find that there is a linear trend in Romania: both those who belong to the Orthodox Church and also those who do not belong to any denomination became increasingly tolerant. At the same time we can find a drop in the Hungarian results in 1999,[12] otherwise Hungarians – both those who belong to the Catholic Church and also those who do not belong to any denomination – were more tolerant in 1990 and in 2008 than their Romanian counterparts.

Here it should be noted that our analyses focus on the dominant denomination effect. On the basis of Special Eurobarometer data collected in Romania in 2015, Andreescu (2018) found that belonging to a minority religious denomination such as the Roman Catholic Church in Romania made it more likely to express heterosexist views than belonging to the dominant, Orthodox denomination. In our analysis of ESS data we found the opposite: Roman Catholic respondents even in Romania were more tolerant than those who belonged to the Orthodox Church. This contradiction might be due to the different forms of measurement, since in the ESS and the Eurobarometer homophobia was measured with different variables. The ESS variable we used is a general acceptance variable, while the Eurobarometer variables, 'Gay, lesbian and bisexual people should have the same rights as heterosexual people' and

[12] We cannot explain this drop, which might be due to erroneous data collection.

'Same sex marriages should be allowed throughout Europe', are more related to rights issues, which might cause higher levels of disagreement on behalf of ethnic and religious minorities such as people belonging to the Roman Catholic Church in Romania.

Based on the EVS database we can compare results of not only the 'justification' of homosexuality, but also of the justification of abortion, prostitution, casual sexual relationships and extramarital relationships variables. These five variables were included in the EVS questionnaire – among twenty controversial or contestable issues such as euthanasia or tax fraud – probably in order to measure the latent concept of sexual morality. Table 2 shows that attitudes to abortion are the most permissive among the five issues in Hungary, while extramarital affairs are the least tolerated ones, especially among female respondents. This gender-specific difference is statistically significant in both countries. Women seemed to be more open-minded towards homosexuality compared to men, but remarkable differences can only be found in the Romanian data. At the same time, in comparison to men, women showed less tolerance towards prostitution, a result with statistically significant difference between genders only in Hungary.

Table 2. 'Justification' of homosexuality, abortion, prostitution, casual sexual and extramarital relationships in Hungary and Romania.
Mean values (1 = can never be justified; 10 = can always be justified)

	HUNGARY		ROMANIA	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Married men/women having an affair	**1.73**	**2.21**	**1.84**	**2.25**
Homosexuality	3.47	3.06	2	2.25
Abortion	**4.75**	**4.9**	**3.54**	**3.77**
Having casual sex	**2.93**	**4.04**	**1.94**	**2.64**
Prostitution	**2.21**	**3.14**	**1.76**	**2.13**

Source: European Values Study 2008; own calculation

As shown by the results in Table 2, among variables related to sexual morality abortion seems to be the most tolerated act in Romania, similarly to Hungary. However, while Hungarian respondents are the least liberal with adultery, Romanians regard prostitution as the least acceptable act.

4.2 (Non-)Preference for homosexual neighbours

The question about (non-)preference for neighbours is much more specific and thus easier to interpret than the 'justification' of homosexuality, allowing us to measure how much people keep their social distance from homosexuals and other (mostly rejected) groups. As for non-response rate it was lower than in the case of the 'justification' of homosexuality variable: it was under 3 per cent across time in the pooled data, and it was less varied among countries, not exceeding 6 per cent in any of the examined countries. Figure 4 illustrates that most respondents in Turkey, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland reported in 1990 and between 1999 and 2008 that they would prefer not to have homosexual neighbours. In contrast, the rejection of potential

homosexual neighbours significantly decreased (from 75.3 per cent to 29.5 per cent) in Hungary between 1990 and 2008.



Figure 4 (Non-)Preference for homosexual neighbours in Europe between 1990 and 2008: Ratio of respondents with non-preference for homosexual neighbours (%)[13]
Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008; own calculation

According to the results summarized in Table 3, showing the ratio of respondents with non-preference for homosexual neighbours, prejudices against various social groups manifestly decreased between 1990 and 2008 both in Hungary and Romania. Hungarian respondents became saliently more tolerant towards homosexuals. In Romania between 1990 and 1999 non-preference for homosexual neighbours dropped by 10 per cent (from 75.4 per cent to 65.2 per cent), further decreasing to 59.3 per cent by 2008. This way, a significant gap had emerged between the two countries by 2008: while in Romania more than half of the population still rejected the idea of homosexual neighbours, in Hungary only less than a third of the respondents reported the same. Over the almost twenty-year period drug abusers, heavy drinkers and people with a criminal record continued to be the most rejected groups in both countries: more than half of the respondents wished no such neighbours in 2008 either.

[13] Countries included in the table are: TR=Turkey, LT=Lithuania, RO=Romania, BG=Bulgaria, PL=Poland, EE=Estonia, LA=Latvia, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovakia, HU= Hungary, PT=Portugal, CZ=Czech Republic, IT=Italy, MA=Malta, IE=Ireland, DE=Germany, FI=Finland, UK=United Kingdom, NL=Netherlands, BE=Belgium, SE=Sweden, FR=France, DK=Denmark, ES=Spain, IS=Iceland.

Table 3 Non-preference for neighbours in Hungary and Romania by genders (1990 and 2008)

HUNGARY	1990			2008		
	Mean (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Mean (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)
People with a criminal record	77.3	**81.2**	**73**	50	**53.5**	**46.1**
People of a different race	22.9	22.7	23.2	9	8.1	9.9
Left-wing extremists	21	**16.9**	**25.5**	11.5	**8.4**	**14.9**
Heavy drinkers	81.5	**84.9**	**77.8**	57	**59.3**	**54.5**
Right-wing extremists	20.3	**16.3**	**24.7**	12.7	**9.1**	**16.6**
People with large families	7.4	6.5	8.3	4.7	5.8	3.4
Emotionally unstable people	23.4	23	23.9	13.8	13.1	14.7
Muslims	18.3	19.2	17.4	11	10.4	11.7
Immigrants, foreigners	22.2	23	21.3	15.2	15.1	15.4
People who have AIDS	65.9	68.9	62.6	30.6	30.1	31.2
Drug addicts	83.6	86.8	80.1	64	64.3	63.7
Homosexuals	75.3	74.1	76.6	29.5	**25.1**	**34.2**
Jews	10.3	10.8	9.8	6.4	5.2	7.7
Gypsies	-	-	-	38.7	38.6	38.8
Christians	-	-	-	2.1	2.4	1.8
ROMANIA	**1990**			**2000**		
	Mean (%)	**Women (%)**	**Men (%)**	**Mean (%)**	**Women (%)**	**Men (%)**
People with a criminal record	66.8	**71.1**	**62.3**	55.5	**54.8**	**56**
People of a different race	27.7	27.	27.7	21.1	207	21.5
Left-wing extremists	45.1	**43.3**	**46.9**	24.6	**22.8**	**26.6**
Heavy drinkers	79.1	**84**	**74.1**	62.7	**65.4**	**59.8**
Right-wing extremists	42.2	**39.6**	**45**	23	**21.5**	**24.7**
People with large families	21.6	21.7	21.5	16.5	18	15
Emotionally unstable people	64	65.6	62.5	45	44.3	45.7
Muslims	34.4	33.5	35.4	22.7	23.3	22.1
Immigrants, foreigners	30.1	29.9	30.4	20.9	20.9	20.9
People who have AIDS	65.8	68.4	63.1	39.5	39.7	39.2
Drug addicts	76	77.8	74.1	60.4	60.5	60.4
Homosexuals	75.4	77.4	73.4	54.1	53	55.3

Jews	28.1	28.5	27.8	18	17.3	18.8
Gypsies	–	–	–	43.7	42.1	45.2
Christians	–	–	–	14.2	14.4	14

Source: European Values Study 1990 and 2008; own calculation

We also investigated the role of denomination in the non-preference for neighbours items in the two examined countries over the period after the transitions (1990, 1999 and 2008). We found trends similar to those in the justification of homosexuality items (see Figure 5).



Figure 5. The role of belonging to a denomination regarding non-preference for neighbours in Hungary and Romania[14]
Source: European Values Study 1990, 1999, 2008; own calculation

We can see that there is a greater difference between belonging to the dominant denomination and not belonging to any denomination in Romania than in Hungary, which indicates that the Orthodox Church has more negative attitudes towards the acceptance of homosexuality than the Catholic Church in this dimension, as well.

4.3 Adoption by homosexual couples

The question about adoption by homosexual couples was first included in the last data collection round of EVS, which was completed in 2008, but as we have already mentioned, it was incorrectly formulated in the Hungarian version, thus we had to

[14] Hungarian data from 1999 are not comparable to the Master Questionnaire variable. In the Hungarian field questionnaire each item was read to the respondent, so the respondent had to decide in each case, and could not choose from a list (as was the case in the other countries).

omit the Hungarian data from the European comparison (for a more detailed discussion of European attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples see: Takács, Szalma and Bartus, 2016). This is why only one of our examined countries, Romania is included in Figure 6 illustrating the levels of agreement with the statement 'Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children' in 28 European countries.



Figure 6. Agreement with the statement 'Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children' in 28 European countries (1 – strong disagreement; 5 – strong agreement)
Source: European Values Study 2008; own calculation

For the same reason Table 4 can also illustrate only the similar ratio of respondents strongly agreeing (or disagreeing) with the statement 'Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children' in Hungary to the ratio of those in Romania rejecting (or supporting) the statement 'Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children'. The results, nevertheless, allow us to conclude that in both countries most respondents seem particularly negative about granting same-sex couples the opportunity for joint adoption. Concerning the non-response rate, this was around 6 per cent in the pooled data and it varied significantly among countries, being above 10 per cent in Bulgaria, Hungary and Ukraine.

Table 4. Attitudes to allowing homosexual couples to adopt children in Hungary and Romania

EVS – 2008	Homosexual couples should NOT be allowed to adopt children	Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children
	Hungary	Romania
Agree strongly	39.7%	5.5%
Agree	24.4%	10.6%
Neither agree nor disagree	19.1%	15.8%
Disagree	12.0%	28.8%
Disagree strongly	4.8%	39.4%
Total	100%	100%

Source: European Values Study 2008; own calculation

We also examined the relationship between adoption by same sex-couples and belonging to the dominant denomination. We should be aware that there is no point in comparing the two countries due to the differently phrased variables. However, if we compare the differences between those people who belong to the dominant denomination and those who do not belong to any denomination (see Figure 7), we can observe that there is again greater difference between religious and non-religious respondents in Romania than in Hungary. These results support our hypothesis H4 (assuming that there are greater differences between those people who belong to the Orthodox denomination and those who do not adhere to any denomination than between those who belong to the Catholic Church and those who do not adhere to any denomination).



Figure 7. The role of belonging to a denomination regarding attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples in Hungary and Romania
Source: EVS 2008; own calculation

4.4 Social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women

In addition to the available EVS data we could also use ESS data from the same year. In 2008 both Hungary and Romania participated in the ESS data collection, thus we can compare social acceptance of lesbian women and gay men in both countries. The results of the 2008 ESS variable 'Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish' are illustrated in Figure 8. Concerning the non-response rate, this was under 4 per cent in the pooled data but we could find considerable variation among countries. For example, it was above 10 per cent in the following countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

It can also be observed that the acceptance of gay men and lesbian women both in Romania and Hungary is far below the average of the examined European countries, especially if we focus on some of the North-Western European countries. In Hungary between 2002 and 2010 and in Romania between 2006 and 2008 the mean values of this variable barely changed,[15] while in most North-Western European countries the mean values show an increasing trend since 2002.



Figure 8. Mean values of the social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women in 26 European countries (1= disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly)
Source: European Social Survey 2008–2009; own calculation

[15] The evolution of the Hungarian mean values is the following: ESS round 1(2002) – 3.21; ESS round 2 – 3.17; ESS round 3 – 3.2; ESS round 4 – 3.16; ESS round 5 – 3.31; ESS round 6 – 3.16 ESS round 7 – 3.26 and ESS round 8 – 3.16 Romania took part in only two rounds, where the mean values were the following: ESS round 3 – 2.53; ESS round 4 – 2.66.

4.5 Regression results

Finally, in Tables 6 and 7 we summarized the regression coefficients analysed in the frame of linear and logistic regression models, by which we aimed to find out which factors may explain the evolution of attitudes concerning homosexuality in the two countries. Using regression models adds to the better understanding of the relationship between attitudes towards homosexuality and religion because this way we can filter out the impact of other variables, e.g. the difference in age and gender composition between those belonging to a denomination and those who do not belong to any denomination in the two examined countries.

Table 6 Social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women in Hungary and Romania: Regression coefficients derived from linear regression

		A) Dependent variable: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish	
Explanatory and control variables		A) Hungary	A) Romania
Gender (Women)		0.12	-0.01
Age		-0.01***	-0.02***
Settlement type	**Big city**	**Ref.**	**Ref.**
	Suburbs	-0.33	-0.43
	Town	-0.13	0.15
	Village	-0.9	0.03
	Farm	-0.38	0.06
Level of education	Primary	-0.14	0.02
	Secondary	Ref.	Ref.
	Tertiary	-0.17	0.11
Denomination	Roman Catholic	-0.07	-0.53**
	Protestant	-0.13	-0.64**
	Eastern Orthodox	–	-0.26*
	Others	-0.27	-0.28
	Not belonging to any	**Ref.**	**Ref.**
Attendance at religious services	More than once a week	Ref.	Ref.
	Once a week	0.54*	0.01
	At least once a month	0.74**	0.03
	Only on special holy days	0.93***	0.13
	Never	0.91***	0.18
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	Agree strongly	-0.21	-0.06
	Agree	0.21	0.14

		A) Dependent variable: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish	
Explanatory and control variables		A) Hungary	A) Romania
	Neither agree nor disagree	**Ref.**	**Ref.**
	Disagree	0.28	0.04
	Disagree strongly	0.85	0.21
Satisfaction with one's private life[16]		-0.01	-0.02
Satisfaction with democracy		0.01	-0.02
Political view[17]	Left-wing orientation	0.19	-0.02
	Moderate left-wing orientation	0.09	-0.03
	Neutral	Ref.	Ref.
	Moderate right-wing orientation	-0.12	0.12
	Right-wing orientation	-0.34**	0.14
The country's cultural life is rather enriched than undermined by people coming to live here from other countries.		0.06***	0.07***
Number of observations		1379	1880
R to the second power		0.088	0.102

*Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.00; Source: European Social Survey 2008; own calculation*

The dependent variable of model A 'Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish' shown in Table 6 comes from the ESS database of 2008. More than 10 per cent of respondents in Romania and Hungary did not give a valid answer to this question, which qualifies as a high refusal rate. Concerning less sensitive questions, the rate of invalid responses remained between 4 and 5 per cent in both countries. Regarding the demographic control variables, gender, settlement type and educational level, these did not have a significant effect anywhere, while the level of tolerance seemed to decrease with age in both examined countries. Regarding religiosity measured in two dimensions, membership of a religious denomination had a significant effect only in Romania, while the frequency of attending religious services had a significant effect only in Hungary. In Romania, compared to those not belonging to any denomination, members of the Protestant Church expressed the

[16] In the ESS the questionnaire 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?' could be answered on an eleven-point scale, where 0 meant being extremely dissatisfied and 10 meant extremely satisfied.

[17] The ESS included the following variable: 'In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right" … where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?' We have recoded the answers into five categories, where 0–2 meant left-wing orientation, 3–4 meant moderate left-wing orientation, 5 meant neutral, 6–7 meant moderate right-wing orientation and 8–10 meant right-wing orientation.

least tolerant views towards homosexuality, followed by members of the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches. Similar results were found in a previous study on predictors of heterosexism in Romania on the basis of analysing ESS data (Andreescu, 2011). At the same time in Hungary lower frequency of attending religious services correlated with a more liberal attitude towards lesbians and gays. This difference might be due to Romanian society being more traditional, implying that those who belong to a denomination are also more likely to attend religious services.

Explanatory variables related to gender roles, satisfaction with private life, and satisfaction with democracy had no significant effect in this model. As for political views we found that right-wing political orientation had a negative effect only in Hungary. However, opinions about the impact of immigrants on culture did prove to be significant in both countries: those who thought that immigrants enrich cultural life had more supportive attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women too.

Table 7 'Justification' of homosexuality and (non-)preference for homosexual neighbours in Hungary and Romania. Standardized regression coefficients derived from linear and logistic regressions

		B) Dependent variable: Homosexuality can be 'justified'		**C) Dependent variable: (Non-) Preference for homosexual neighbours**	
Explanatory and control variables		B) Hungary	B) Romania	C) Hungary	C) Romania
Gender (Women)		0.62***	-0.19	-0.52***	-0.05
Age		-0.03***	-0.01***	0.004	0.01**
Settlement type	Population below 2000	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	2000–5000	-0.21	-0.18	-0.15	-0.16
	5000–10,000	-0.51	0.4	0.2	-0.73
	10,000–20,000	-0.49	0.001	-0.82*	-0.56
	20,000–50,000	-0.03	-0.24	-0.19	-0.91*
	50,000–100,000	0.41	-0.49	-0.52*	-0.04
	100,000–500,000	0.29	-0.38	0.13	-0.66
	Population over 500,000	0.76**	-0.37	-0.76**	-0.52
Level of education	Primary	-0.34	-0.07	0.17	0.34
	Secondary	Ref.	Ref	Ref.	Ref.
	Tertiary	0.22	0.3	-0.32	-0.03
Denomination	Roman Catholic	-0.1	-0.28	0.04	-0.18
	Protestant	-0.04	-0.52	0.31	-0.55

		B) Dependent variable: Homosexuality can be 'justified'		C) Dependent variable: (Non-) Preference for homosexual neighbours	
Explanatory and control variables		B) Hungary	B) Romania	C) Hungary	C) Romania
	Eastern Orthodox	–	-0.46	–	**-0.79***
	Others	-0.7	-0.81	0.62	-0.95*
	Not belonging to any	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Attendance at religious services	More than once a week	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Once a week	0.85	0.14	0.25	-0.51
	Once a month	1.46	0.28	0.23	-0.57
	Only on special holy days	1.8*	0.08	0.29	-0.5
	Once a year	1.9*	0.26	-0.09	-0.46
	Less often than once a year or never	2.15*	0.36	-0.09	-0.38
Satisfaction with democracy	Very satisfied	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Rather satisfied	0.93	-0.71	0.51	0.85
	Not very satisfied	0.96	-0.68	0.79	1.02
	Not at all satisfied	1.08	-0.79*	0.9	1.48**
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	Agree	0.86	0.28	1.6*	-0.1
	Neither agree nor disagree	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Disagree	1.01	0.56****	1.3	-0.55**
Satisfaction with one's private life [18]		0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.06*
Political view [19]	Left-wing orientation	-0.44	-0.36	-0.56*	-0.59*

[18] In the EVS 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?' could be answered on a ten-point scale, where 1 indicated extreme dissatisfaction and 10 indicated extreme satisfaction.

[19] The EVS included the following variable: 'In political matters, people talk of "the left" and the "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking [where "1" means left and "10" means right]?' We have recoded the answers into five categories, where 1–2 meant left-wing orientation,

		B) Dependent variable: Homosexuality can be 'justified'		C) Dependent variable: (Non-) Preference for homosexual neighbours	
Explanatory and control variables		B) Hungary	B) Romania	C) Hungary	C) Romania
	Moderate left-wing orientation	0.52*	-0.05	0.02	0.06
	Neutral	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
	Moderate right-wing orientation	-0.4	0.4*	-0.11	0.09
	Right-wing orientation	1.06	-0.06	-0.41*	-0.11
The country's cultural life is not undermined by immigrants		0.21***	-0.02	-0.08***	0.01
Number of observations		1461	1400	1491	1377
R to the second power		0.159	0.076	0.08	0.057

*Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Source*: ***European Values Study 2008; own calculation***

Regarding the dependent variables of Models B and C (see Table 7), 5 per cent of the Romanian and Hungarian respondents refused to answer the question about the 'justification' of homosexuality. However, the response rate of the other question about (non-)preference for homosexual neighbours was different in the two countries: in Hungary less than 1 per cent gave no answer, while in Romania almost 8 per cent of respondents refused to answer.

In Model B among the demographic control variables gender proved to have a significant effect only in Hungary: women were more tolerant than men. Age, however, had a significant effect in both countries: liberal attitudes towards homosexuality seem to decrease with age. Educational level had no major effect, while in terms of settlement type in Hungary only respondents living in a big city with over 500 thousand residents, i.e. Budapest, were significantly more tolerant than those living in settlements of fewer than 2000 people chosen as the reference category.

Membership of a denomination again did not have a significant effect, but, just like in our previous model, the frequency of attending services did prove to be significant in Hungary. As for satisfaction with democracy only Romania showed a notable correlation: compared with those who were very much satisfied with democracy the respondents who were extremely dissatisfied were also less permissive of homosexuality. Examining satisfaction with one's private life we found contrasting correlations in the two countries. In Hungary the more satisfied respondents were with their private life, the more tolerant they were towards homosexuality, while in Romania we found exactly the opposite.

3–4 meant moderate left-wing orientation, 5–6 meant neutral, 7–8 meant moderate right-wing orientation and 9–10 meant right-wing orientation.

Regarding political views the regression results showed that people with moderate left-wing orientation were more likely to think that homosexuality can be justified among Hungarians, while people with moderate right-wing orientation seemed to be more tolerant in Romania. Positive attitudes towards immigrants also had a significant positive effect on expressing less homophobic views only in Hungary. At the same time, attitudes towards gender roles had a significant effect only in Romania: those with less traditional gender role attitudes were more likely to be more open-minded towards homosexuality and homosexual neighbours.

In Model C used for measuring social distance, gender – again – turned out to have a significant effect only in Hungary: women also proved to be more tolerant in this respect than men. Nevertheless, age had a significant effect in Romania only: as the age of respondents increased, the more likely they were not to prefer potential homosexual neighbours. According to settlement type, in Hungary respondents from larger settlements were less likely to report non-preference for homosexual neighbours than residents of the smallest settlements chosen as reference. In Romania settlements of 20 to 50 thousand people seemed to be the most tolerant. Educational level showed no significant correlation in either of the countries.

Concerning variables related to religiosity, the membership in a denomination variable had a significant effect only in Romania, where compared to Catholics, which was chosen as the reference group, members of the Orthodox Church as well as other Churches reported lower preferences for potential homosexual neighbours.

Similarly to the results of Model B those Romanian respondents who were less satisfied with democracy were also more intolerant towards homosexual neighbours. Views on gender roles also proved to be relevant only in Romania: those with less traditional views on gender roles had less negative ideas about having homosexual neighbours. Regarding political views, Hungarian respondents with pronounced left-wing orientation were less likely to prefer homosexual neighbours, while in Romania people with pronounced right-wing orientation had similar negative attitudes. At the same time, attitudes towards immigrants showed an effect only in Hungary again: respondents more open towards immigrants seemed also more supportive about the issue of homosexual neighbours.

5. Conclusion

Based on descriptive statistical results we can state that Romania and Hungary belong to the less liberal European countries regarding all of the examined EVS and ESS variables, including the 'justification' of homosexuality, non-preference for homosexual neighbours, attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples and social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women. Although on the geographical and geopolitical verge of Europe we can find countries that are even less liberal (among others for example Russia or Turkey), we can probably state that most North-Western European countries have a more open-minded atmosphere around homosexuality related issues than Hungary or Romania. Additionally, we can empirically demonstrate that at the beginning of the 21st century Hungarian respondents tend to express more open-minded views regarding the 'justification' of homosexuality, (non-) preference for homosexual neighbours and acceptance of gay men and lesbian women than Romanians. At the same time, Romanian and Hungarian respondents

seemed to manifest equally restricted levels of tolerance towards adoption by same-sex couples. It is rather difficult to draw solid conclusions on this item since the question about allowing same-sex couples to adopt children was formulated differently in the two countries: the Hungarian version of the EVS ended up including a statement contrary to the original, making any further comparative analysis impossible.

Our main focus was on the relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards homosexuality related issues in the two examined countries, and more specifically whether different religious denominations can lead to different attitudes regarding the social acceptance of gays, lesbians, and homosexuality. On the basis of our analyses as well as previous research we can certainly say that religiosity has a role in shaping homosexuality related attitudes in Romania and Hungary, two neighbouring countries with a lot of similarities but different dominant religious denominations. We have also highlighted that homosexuality-related attitudes are not in the least static or unified, as views might change both in time and depending on various social-demographic factors.

One of our main findings is that belonging to the Orthodox Church was shown to have a more negative effect on homosexuality related attitudes in Romania than belonging to the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary. However, it remains unclear whether in Romania those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church are more permissive to homosexuality-related issues or those who belong to the Orthodox Church – as we had contradictory results in the models using the EVS and the ESS datasets, which might be explained by the different focus and formulation of the dependent variables.

Furthermore, we also found somewhat unexpected differences between the two countries based on our regression models: in Romania belonging to a denomination seems to matter more, while in Hungary the frequency of attending religious services matters more. This might be due to Romanian society being more traditional than the Hungarian, with those who belong to a denomination in Romania being more likely to attend religious services than their Hungarian counterparts.

Reviewing the results of the regression models we must admit that not all of the expected results assumed in our hypotheses were verified in all three (A, B and C) models. However, from the control variables age and religiosity (more precisely, at least one of its dimensions: belonging to a denomination or the frequency of attending religious services), while from the explanatory variables questions about attitudes regarding gender roles and immigrants had significant effects in all of the models and thus were found to be the most effective during the comparison of the two countries. In addition, in Hungary, where women tended to be more open-minded than men, gender played an important role in forming attitudes towards homosexuality, at least regarding the 'justification' of homosexuality and the (non-)preference of homosexual neighbours variables, while in Romania this was not the case.

Most studies investigating homosexuality related attitudes aim at comparing several European countries based on cross-national databases (such as ESS, EVS, Eurobarometer). These comparative analyses, however, sometimes apply country-group typologies that – to a certain extent unavoidably – make the components of the specific country groups homogenous. At other times we can see that a study focuses on country characteristics based on the deep knowledge of local features. In the present study we compared two adjacent countries within the same region, which does

not happen very often in international attitude research. Our study highlighted major differences between the two countries not only in their legislative history but also concerning personal attitudes – although according to cross-national comparative results both countries are less tolerant towards homosexuality, lesbian women and gay men than the examined European average.

In our present study we had to deal with numerous restricting factors. Similarly to most large-scale surveys, one of the most important restrictions stems from the fact that the measurement tools are set, and the ready-made variables do not always measure what researchers would actually wish to examine and in a way that they would approve of. For example, the available EVS and ESS variables do not allow us to examine gender-specific attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples. In the future our aim will be (and hence, we encourage all social scientists interested in the topic) to further analyse these issues with more detailed and sensitive tools, among others by collecting and analysing qualitative data, which could contribute to a better understanding of non-heteronormative family issues in particular.

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DENISA FEDAKOVA
AND ALBERTO VEIRA RAMOS *

Job Security Across Europe: Predictors of Subjective Job Security in Northern, Southern, and Central European Countries

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* [dfedak@saske.sk] (Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences); [aveira@polsoc.uc3m.es] (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

According to OECD statistics the unemployment rate in 2011 varied across Europe 10–20 per cent. At that time, European Social Survey Round 5 data was collected which showed that job security was highest in northern country cluster, moderate in southern country cluster, and lowest in the Visegrad country cluster. Our first research question addressed whether general, aggregated social indicators (unemployment and employment rate, and social expenditure) determine perceived job security in the three country clusters. The overall sample was comprised of three southern countries, four Visegrad countries, and four northern countries and consisted of people aged 20-60 who reported to be in paid work and working more than 30 hours a week. The main aim of the current paper was to examine the predictors of job security in the context of all three country clusters. Results indicated that the proposed model of job security predictors showed the best fit for the southern country cluster, explaining over 30 per cent of the variance of perceived job security (background characteristics explained there most of the variance there). Variation in the explanatory power of the job security variable in the northern country cluster was mainly explained by both job and organizational characteristics, while in the Visegrad country cluster it was mainly explained by job characteristics. The paper is a contribution to the discussion about job security in the current period of recession in Europe.

Keywords: job security, predictors, European Social Survey Round 5.

1. Introduction

The period between 2007 and 2013 was associated with a significant economic recession worldwide. During this time, declines in economic growth and an increase in unemployment rates were observed throughout Europe. The recession could potentially have had negative consequences on perceptions of work and job security that are important for personal well-being and psychological health. The current paper examines European Social Survey Round 5 data[1] collected from 2010–2011 in 11 countries with a focus on perceived job security and other variables, including the potential predictors of subjective job security. In this paper we are concerned with the concept of job security, rather than insecurity, and attempt to focus on a positive interpretation of the labour market phenomenon. In order to achieve the aims of the study in a broader context, three country clusters representing three models of market economies across Europe were selected. These included a northern country cluster representing a coordinated market economy, a southern country cluster representing an ambiguous (neither liberal nor coordinated) market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and a central ('Visegrad') country cluster representing a so-called dependent market economy with a dependence on foreign capital (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009).

2. Job security and its predictors

According to De Witte (2005), job security is defined as the probability that individuals will keep their jobs. Objective job security is indicated by labour market conditions. In this study, however, job security is studied as individual perceptions of job continuity in the future (Sverke and Hellgren, 2002), with a focus on subjective job security. The cognitive and affective forms of job insecurity are not studied in this paper. However, it is obvious that, when considering general job security individual perceptions of the cognitive or affective context cannot be 'excluded' or filtered out. One should be aware that when individuals are asked about perceptions of general job security, they refer either to the probability of their keeping a job (the cognitive context) or about their related feelings and emotions (the affective context).

Despite the clear definitions of job security, little is known about whether the related conceptual frame is the same and even whether its content is comparable. Most employees perceive job security to be essential, particularly as it relates to their current job (Probst and Jiang, 2017). A 2010 survey confirmed that 'having job security' was rated the most important factor in the working environment, above other factors such as pay, benefits, job-skills training, and career development opportunities (Probst and Jiang, 2017). Reflecting previous findings and outcomes, Richter et al. (2010) have argued that compared to earlier times when organizations were more likely to provide secure jobs, today's employees often need to ensure their own security by staying employable (De Cuyper et al., 2009). Employees have to take greater responsibility for continually developing their human and social capital to be able to find new jobs – on which their careers and economic futures depend. It is

[1] ESS Round 5 data is available online: europeansocialsurvey.org

worth briefly considering employment security here. While job security refers to the ability to remain in a particular job, employment security refers to the likelihood of remaining in paid employment, albeit through a succession of different jobs. Berglund et al. (2014) have argued that a high degree of employment security, in terms of employability, can compensate for job insecurity.

One potential approach to better understanding the conceptual frame of job security and its perception across countries is to examine job security predictors. Of course, there is a wide range of possible predictors at both the country and individual level. Thus, in this article we deal with three groups of job security predictors: background characteristics, job characteristics, and organizational characteristics, as defined by Ištoňová and Fedáková (2015) and based on a literature review primarily on the topic of job insecurity. The background characteristics that appear to be the most relevant predictors of job (in)security are age, gender, and education, according to papers by Näswall and De Witte (2003), Munoz de Bustilloand and de Pedreza (2010), Ito and Brotheridge (2007), Låstad et al. (2014), and Kirves et al. (2011). Previous experience of unemployment is a significant predictor of perceived job security in the future workplace (De Witte, 1999). Job characteristics, such as type of contract, opportunity for advancement, irreplaceability, employability, and job complexity, have been investigated as predictors of job (in)security in papers by Kirves et al. (2011), Munoz de Bustillo and de Pedreza (2010), McGuinness and Wooden (2009), Chambel and Fontinha (2009), Houston (2011), and Aronsson et al. (2000). Finally, organizational characteristics such as number of employees and the financial situation (e.g. prosperity) of the organization were investigated in relation to job insecurity by Munoz de Bustillo and de Pedreza (2010), Ito and Brotheridge (2007), Nickell et al. (2002), and Kalleberg et al. (2000). In this study we have added organizational meetings and training to this group of characteristics as they represent the attention, care and support an organization provides to its employees, which strengthen perceptions of job security.

2.1. The country-level context

In 2011, the document *OECD Employment Outlook 2010: Moving beyond the jobs crisis* was published. At that time, a common feature of some of the northern, Visegrad, and southern countries was growing youth unemployment (especially in Spain, Slovakia, and Sweden) and a high overall unemployment rate. In 2013, according to OECD statistics, labour market insecurity was highest in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, followed by Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

The severity of the problem of insecurity has been documented in numerous published studies that discussed job security/insecurity in northern, southern, and Visegrad countries; however, the former did not examine the aggregate features of job security for country clusters. In relation to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, papers on job security focused maily on job satisfaction, type of contract, 'flexicurity,' self-rated health, and general predictors, and consequences of job (in)security (OECD, 2017; Maciejewska et al., 2016; Wilczyńska et al., 2015; Mrozowicki et al., 2013; László et al., 2010). In Spain, Greece, and Portugal, papers on job insecurity have tended to associate the phenomenon with youth unemployment and forms of employment such as temporary or flexible work, and to job-related

attitudes (Sora et al., 2009; De Cuyper et al., 2009b; Becker et al., 2010; Munoz de Bustillo and de Pedreza, 2010). In Denmark, Finland, and Sweden job insecurity has been studied widely in the context of the flexicurity model, public intervention, demographic factors, and social security (Berglund et al., 2014; Richter et al., 2010; De Cuyper et al., 2009a; Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Hellgren et al., 1999; Kinnunen et al., 1994).

2.2. Research questions:

The aim of the present study was to answer the following three research questions:

1. Does the level of reported job security reflect national social indicators, such as unemployment rate, employment rate, and social expenditure? This first research question was formulated to find out (at a descriptive level) whether the perceived job security reported by ESS respondents was affected by objective social indicators in the selected country clusters (using OECD data). We sought to compare the level of the indicators with the level of perceived job security in three country clusters.

2. What are the predictors of job security at the individual/job/organizational level in the three country clusters? The second research question was designed to enable us to describe the different effects of the relevant predictors on job security in the three country clusters using ESS data. With this question we wanted to see if the same variables had a different effect on perceived job security depending on the country cluster.

3. How do the predictors of job security differ in the three country clusters? The third research question was created to help analyse the differences in job security predictors between the three country clusters using ESS data.

3. Methodology

Data processing was more confirmatory than exploratory in nature. The aim was to confirm that the selected indicators/variables were predictors, and to reveal differences in significance across the three country clusters. We used ESS Round 5 data (2010) – specifically, data from the rotating family, work, and well-being module including respondent characteristics.

3.1. Sample

Respondents were classified into three country clusters: a southern European cluster, including Portugal, Greece and Spain (N=1806); a Visegrad cluster including Czechia, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia (N=2818); and a northern European cluster including Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden (N= 2627). The sample was restricted to those who 1) were 20–60 years old at the time of the interview, 2) reported to having been in paid work during the last seven days, and 3) reported to working more than 30 hours per week.

3.2. Measures

All the items were included in the ESS R5 questionnaire. Some of the original ESS item response scales were reversed (labeled R) so as to reflect the focus on perceived job security rather than job insecurity. All variables and corresponding response scales are presented with the values they had when entered into the statistical analysis.

Perceived job security:

In the ESS questionnaire the dependent variable is measured by a single item 'My job is secure' on a 4-point response scale ranging from 1 = 'not at all true' to 4 = 'very true.' For reasons related o statistical analysis we decided to transform this ordinal variable into a binary variable with 0 = 'not at all true' or 'somewhat true' and 1= 'quite true' or 'very true.'

Background characteristics:

Variables that reflect the effect of background characteristics were age, gender (1 = 'female'; 0 = 'male'), years of completed full-time education and previous experience of unemployment (1 = 'yes'; 0 = 'never unemployed').

Job characteristics:

The effect of job characteristics on perceived job security was captured by five variables: 1) 'Type of contract' (R), a binary variable where responses were coded 0 if limited, and 1 if unlimited; 2) 'Opportunities for advancement or promotion' (R), an ordinal variable where responses were coded 1 if the respondent disagreed strongly and 5 if the respondent agreed strongly there was a good chance of advancement or promotion; 3) 'Overall employability', an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 if the respondent considered it extremely difficult to find or get a similar or better job to 10 if the respondent thought it would be extremely easy; 4) 'Irreplaceability in current job or position' (R), an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 if the respondent believed that it would be very easy for the employer to find their replacement to 10 if it would be extremely difficult; and 5) 'Job complexity' (R), an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 if the respondent reported it was extremely easy for the employer to monitor their work to 10 if it was extremely difficult.

Organizational characteristics:

The potential predictors of perceived job security were four characteristics of the organization the respondent worked for: 1) 'Financial difficulties of the organization', with responses ranging from 1 if the respondent reported the organization had been in great financial difficulty over the last three years to 4 if the respondent reported no financial difficulty; 2) 'Hiring employees', with responses ranging from 1 if the respondent felt the organization had significantly reduced employee numbers to 4 if the organization had significantly increased employee numbers; 3) 'On the job training' (R), a binary variable coded 1 if the employer had paid for the respondent's training, and 0 'other' (no training or not paid by the employer); 4) 'Organizational meeting influence' (R), a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent thought employee participation in workplace meetings could influence working conditions and practices, and 0 otherwise.

When analyzing the ESS data estimates, the likelihood of each respondent being part of the sample also had to be considered—which means that the most accurate estimates could be obtained only once the data had been weighted. Population weights were thus applied. The population size weight represents an

adjustment to ensure that each country is represented in proportion to the size of its population (ESS, 2014).

4. Results

First, one general research question concerned whether job security was determined by the social indicators for the selected country cluster (unemployment rate, employment rate, and social expenditure). To answer this question we compared ESS and OECD data collected in 2010–2011. At the descriptive level, the ESS data showed that the level of perceived job security was highest in the northern cluster (M[2]=3.1), moderate in the southern cluster (M[2]=2.49), and lowest in the Visegrad cluster (M[2]=2.28). However, when the country clusters were ranked according to unemployment and employment rates, the southern and Visegrad country clusters ranked in a different order than they did for job security. On social spending[3], the cluster ranking was in the same order as for job security (i.e. the highest social spending in northern countries, lower in southern countries, and the lowest in Visegrad countries). The northern cluster of countries had a high level of perceived job security, the lowest unemployment rate, the highest employment rate, and the highest level of social spending (see Table 1). Thus, the finding suggests that the examined indicators did not show common pattern in determining job security across country clusters.

Table 1: Job security mean score (ESS data 2010–2011) and social indicators (OECD 2011 data).

country cluster	job security (mean)	unemployment rate	employment rate	social spending
northern	3,1	3–8%	69–75%	21–29%
southern	2,49	10–20%	55–63%	24–26%
Visegrad	2,28	7–14%	55–65%	17–22%

To answer the second research question, 'What are the predictors of perceived job security at the individual/job/organizational level in the three country clusters?' we applied a logistic regression analysis with a dichotomous variable for perceived job security. As regards the northern country cluster, the full model explained 17.2 per cent of variance of the job security variable. Previous experience of unemployment was the only background characteristic that was a significant predictor of job security; not being previously unemployed was associated with higher perceived job security. Only two of the five job characteristics – type of contract and job complexity – were significant predictors of perceived job security. More specifically, job security was predicted by having an indefinite contract and a job in which effort was easily monitored and identified. There were three significant predictors of job security in the

[2] M (mean) of perceived job security variable *'My job is secure'* with a 4-point response scale ranging from 1 not at all true, to 4 very true.

[3] OEDC definition of Social spending: Social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes (https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm).

group of organizational characteristics: organizational prosperity (no financial difficulties), a recent increase (or at least no change) in employee numbers, and influence of workplace meetings (see Table 2 in Appendix), indicating that job security was related to prosperous organizations where employee numbers had increased and employee views were taken into account at meetings. In partial models of logistic regression (using the enter method) background characteristics explained 3.3 per cent of variance of the job security variable, job characteristics explained 10.8 per cent, and organizational characteristics explained 9.5 per cent.

We then repeated the procedure for the southern country cluster. The full model explained 30.1 per cent of the variance of the dummy variable accounting for subjective job security. Of the background characteristics, age, education, and previous experience of unemployment were significant predictors of job security. It means that characteristics as being older, having completed more years of education, and not having been unemployed were all increasing job security in southern country cluster. Only two of the five job characteristics – type of contract and opportunities for advancement – were significant predictors of job security. More specifically, job security was predicted by an indefinite contract and opportunities for advancement. There were two significant predictors of job security among the organizational characteristics: organizational prosperity (no financial difficulties), and company training (see Table 3 in Appendix). Surprisingly (and unlike in the northern cluster), in partial models of logistic regression background characteristics explained 19.1 per cent of the variance of job security, job characteristics explained 17.6 per cent, and organizational characteristics 8.1 per cent.

The same analytical procedure was then applied to the Visegrad country cluster. The full model explained 19.7 per cent of the variance of job security. Previous experience of unemployment was the only background characteristic that was a significant predictor of job security, indicating that no (or little) previous unemployment experience was associated with a higher level of perceived job security. All five job characteristics – type of contract, opportunities for advancement, irreplaceability, employability, and job complexity – were confirmed as significant predictors of job securityin Visegrad country cluster. More specifically, job security was predicted by an indefinite contract, job advancement, irreplaceability in current position, employability, and by having a job where effort was easily monitored and recognized. There were three significant predictors of job security in the group of organizational characteristics: organizational prosperity (no financial difficulties), number of employees, and influence of workplace meetings (see Table 4 in Appendix). This indicates that job security was greater at organizations that were prosperous, had an increasing headcount, and took employees views into consideration at workplace meetings. In partial models of logistic regression (using the enter method) background characteristics explained 2.8 per cent of the variance of job security, job characteristics explained 13.5 per cent, and organizational characteristics explained 6.8 per cent.

Lastly, we responded to the third research question, 'How do the predictors of job security differ between the three country clusters?'. Table 5 summarizes the significant and non-significant predictors of job security across the country clusters. First, of the background characteristics, previous experience of unemployment was a significant negative predictor of job security across all three country clusters. In

southern countries, being older and having completed more years of education was a significant predictor of job security. Gender was not a significant predictor of job security in any of the country clusters. Second, of the job characteristics, having an indefinite contract was a significant predictor of job security across all three country clusters. Opportunities for advancement was confirmed as a significant predictor of job security in the southern and Visegrad country clusters, and job complexity was a significant but negative predictor of job security in the northern and Visegrad country clusters. Irreplaceability and employability were identified as job security predictors in the Visegrad country cluster only. Third, and finally, in terms of organizational characteristics, working for an organization with no financial difficulties significantly predicted job security in all three country clusters. A growing workforce in an organization and influential organizational meetings were significant predictors of job security in the northern and Visegrad country clusters. Company training and company-supported training were significant predictors of perceived job security in the southern country cluster only.

Table 5: Significant predictors of job security in full models for three country clusters

Significance of predictors in full model		Northern cluster	Southern cluster	Visegrad cluster
Background characteristics	gender	-	-	-
	age	-	.000	-
	education	-	.000	-
	unemployment experience	.010	.000	.018
Job characteristics	contract	.000	.000	.039
	advancement	-	.014	.000
	irreplaceability	-	-	.000
	employability	-	-	.002
	job complexity	.011	-	.001
Organizational characteristics	organizational meetings	.006	-	.000
	organizational education	-	.000	-
	no financial difficulties	.029	.000	.006
	hiring employees	.014	-	.001

5. Discussion

This paper sought to confirm which of the main determinants of subjective job security considered in the literature play the most significant role in the three country clusters and thereby contribute to the findings on job security. The simple design of the study does not enable us to explain the phenomenon of perceived job security in detail but it does allow us to make some preliminary points about the determinants of perceived job security. It should be noted that the findings on job security described heere relate to a period of economic recession, and that all the respondents were employed at the time of response.

In general, this study of the predictors of job security has produced several noteworthy findings. Our focus on social indicators as possible determinants of job security at the macro level suggests that a country's level of social spending is a better determinant of perceived job security than its unemployment or employment rates. The proposed model based on background, job, and organizational characteristics showed the best fit with the southern cluster of countries, and the worst fit with the northern cluster of countries. More specifically, differences in the explanatory power of the characteristics between country clusters were observed. In the northern cluster, a large amount of variability in job security was explained by job and organizational characteristics, whereas in the southern country cluster job security was better explained by background and job characteristics. Socio-demographic characteristics also explained a considerable part of the job security variance in southern countries, but not in northern and Visegrad countries. In the Visegrad country cluster, perceived job security was explained to a greater extend by job characteristics. The findings also suggest that job characteristics explained the significant variance in perceived job security across all three country clusters. The model needs to be more robust if it is to explain more about perceived job security. Moreover, an explanatory approach to creating the best model fit for each cluster or country is also required.

Focusing on the predictors separately, age and education were significant predictors of job security in the cluster of southern countries but not in the Visegrad and northern clusters. This finding could be explained by the fact that unemployment in the south affects heavily the young and less educated, which means a large section of the population (older workers) continue to have higher levels of job security than most other people in the Visegrad and northern countries. This finding is in line with what Sapir (2006, 376) has emphasized: '[...] Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) concentrate their social spending on old-age pensions and allow for a high segmentation of entitlements and status.'

Gender differences, another sociodemographic issue, were addressed in the question whether being male or female determines subjective perceptions of job security. In our study, gender was not a significant predictor of perceived job security in any country cluster. This finding supports previous research by Marini et al. (1996), but not by Clark (1997), who reported that being male was a predictor of job security. Having no or little experience of unemployment was another background characteristic that was a relevant predictor of perceived job security across all three country clusters during the economic recession.

Another predictor of job security that was significant in all three country clusters was previous experience of unemployment. Interestingly, despite the different

employment and unemployment rates and even social spending across the country clusters presented in this paper, previous experience of unemployment stood out as a significant predictor of perceived job (in)security in all three country clusters.

Unsurprisingly, having an unlimited contract was a significant predictor of job security in all three country clusters. Näswall and De Witte (2003) found that type of employment (permanent or temporary) played a role in perceptions of job insecurity. Berglund et al. (2014) stated that temporary employees are much more likely to report cognitive job insecurity than permanent employees. Apart from the association between permanent contracts and job security, Scherer (2009) found that fixed-term contracts and the associated job insecurity exacerbated work-life conflict and economic pressure and lessened life satisfaction.

The last predictor that was significant across all the country clusters was the financial stability of the employing organization. According to Sinclair et al. (2010), the fundamental problem with the loss of a job is the risk of losing a main source of income, and the associated financial worries. It may be assumed that if the organization an employee works for appears to be financially stable and has reported no financial difficulties, this prevents financial worries and strengthens feelings of job security.

This paper has some limitations and strengths that should be mentioned. Regarding the limitations first, the measure of job security was a single item which enabled us to obtain an indication of perceived job security among respondents, but did not bring us closer to understanding whether job security is understood in the same way across country clusters. It did not tell us whether the former was purely related to the current job or to financial/employment security as well. Nor could it tell us whether it involved cognitive job security or affective job security. Second, the country cluster approach made for a simple design, but it prevented us from conducting a deeper examination of country-level variation.

Regarding the strengths, the findings of the study are based on representative ESS data and are a relevant contribution to job security research. One aspect is particularly noteworthy. The job security predictors were divided into three groups of characteristics, and the findings clearly indicate that different characteristics are a significant predictor of job security across county clusters. Moreover, testing one universal model on three country clusters enabled us to point out the differences and similarities. Rather than looking at just one context, we examined three different cluster contexts based on different social politics, cultural aspects and backgrounds. This comparative approach has already proved valuable in obtaining a better understanding of the social consequences of the different institutional arrangements that govern labour markets (Soskice, 1990; 1999; Esping Andersen, 1996; 2013). Our findings suggest that in investigating perceived job security, a comparative approach that looks at country clusters that are formed according to similarities regarding certain institutional settings allows for a better interpretation of results obtained at the national level.

To conclude, the findings of this study have specified significant predictors for each country cluster which could be further analyzed in greater detail, including once the related European policies have been designed. Moreover, there is a need for a wider discussion about the social indicators and the background characteristics as part of the psychology of well-being at the individual level, and of welfare sociology at the

country and societal level. We agree with Baranowski (2017) that subjective welfare develops within a particular context and needs to be considered very carefully otherwise it could lead to more negative than positive consequences. Thus, it is essential that further research on job security and its predictors and consequences is performed within many different contexts and under various conditions.

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APPENDIX

Table 2: Logistic regression results for northern cluster: partial and full models (Enter method)

northern country cluster dependent variable: job security		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	gender	-.121	.177	.466	1	.495	.886
	age	-.002	.009	.049	1	.824	.998
	education	.022	.024	.824	1	.364	1.022
Partial model:	unemployment experience	-1.089	.270	16.242	1	***.000***	.337
background	constant	1.214	.520	5.459	1	***.019***	3.367
characteristics	Nagelkerke R^2=0,033						
	contract	1.407	.283	24.693	1	***.000***	.245
	advancement	.264	.091	8.422	1	***.004***	1.303
	irreplaceability	-.042	.036	1.401	1	.237	.959
	employability	.077	.036	4.734	1	***.030***	1.080
Partial model:	job complexity	-.110	.038	8.547	1	***.003***	.896
job	constant	.841	.418	4.052	1	***.044***	2.319
characteristics	Nagelkerke R^2=0,108						
	organizational meetings	.258	.075	11.910	1	***.001***	1.295
	organizational education	.496	.191	6.726	1	***.009***	1.641
	no financial difficulties	.285	.097	8.612	1	***.003***	1.329
Partial model:	hiring employees	.224	.096	5.490	1	***.019***	1.251
organizational	constant	-.820	.324	6.384	1	***.012***	.441
characteristics	Nagelkerke R^2=0,095						
	gender	-.087	.198	.191	1	.662	.917
	age	-.004	.010	.167	1	.683	.996
	education	.010	.026	.146	1	.702	1.010
	unemployment experience	-.825	.319	6.687	1	***.010***	.438
	contract	1.199	.317	14.342	1	***.000***	.301
	advancement	.149	.099	2.232	1	.135	1.160
	irreplaceability	-.032	.038	.725	1	.395	.968
	employability	.067	.038	3.054	1	.081	1.069
	job complexity	-.100	.039	6.408	1	***.011***	.905
	organizational meetings	.220	.081	7.436	1	***.006***	1.246
	organizational education	.370	.205	3.258	1	.071	1.448
	no financial difficulties	.223	.103	4.742	1	***.029***	1.250
	hiring employees	.249	.101	6.097	1	***.014***	1.283
	constant	-.594	.806	.542	1	.461	.552
Full model	Nagelkerke R^2=0,172						

Table 3: Logistic regression results for southern cluster: partial and full models (Enter method)

southern country cluster dependent variable: job security		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Partial model: background characteristics	gender	-.101	.112	.813	1	.367	.904
	age	.040	.006	44.855	1	*.000*	1.041
	education	.087	.012	51.825	1	*.000*	1.091
	unemployment experience	-1.662	.160	107.372	1	*.000*	.190
	constant	-2.148	.328	42.832	1	*.000*	.117
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,191						
Partial model: job characteristics	contract	1.943	.163	142.295	1	*.000*	.143
	advancement	.217	.058	13.863	1	*.000*	1.242
	irreplaceability	-.042	.025	2.943	1	.086	.958
	employability	-.021	.023	.869	1	.351	.979
	job complexity	-.014	.028	.244	1	.622	.986
	constant	.482	.305	2.500	1	.114	1.619
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,176						
Partial model: organizational characteristics	organizational meetings	.130	.048	7.274	1	*.007*	1.139
	organizational education	.762	.130	34.490	1	*.000*	2.143
	no financial difficulties	.255	.062	16.899	1	*.000*	1.291
	hiring employees	.226	.072	9.676	1	*.002*	1.253
	constant	-1.152	.209	30.458	1	*.000*	.316
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,081						
Full model	gender	-.037	.131	.081	1	.775	.963
	age	.041	.007	32.121	1	*.000*	1.041
	education	.061	.015	17.276	1	*.000*	1.063
	unemployment experience	-1.162	.203	32.662	1	*.000*	.313
	contract	1.414	.201	49.493	1	*.000*	.243
	advancement	.165	.067	6.072	1	*.014*	1.180
	irreplaceability	-.038	.028	1.771	1	.183	.963
	employability	-.036	.026	1.951	1	.162	.964
	job complexity	-.034	.032	1.117	1	.291	.967
	organizational meetings	.074	.058	1.632	1	.201	1.077
	organizational education	.703	.160	19.400	1	*.000*	2.019
	no financial difficulties	.276	.072	14.695	1	*.000*	1.318
	hiring employees	.133	.084	2.502	1	.114	1.142
	constant	-2.937	.602	23.806	1	*.000*	.053
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,301						

Table 4: Logistic regression results for Visegrad cluster: partial and full models (Enter method)

Visegrad country cluster dependent variable: job security		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Partial model: background characteristics	gender	-.193	.097	3.931	1	***.047***	.824
	age	.002	.004	.231	1	.631	1.002
	education	.057	.017	11.366	1	***.001***	1.058
	unemployment experience	-.567	.132	18.553	1	***.000***	.567
	constant	-.556	.318	3.055	1	.080	.574
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,028						
Partial model: job characteristics	contract	.512	.127	16.241	1	***.000***	.599
	advancement	.369	.055	45.059	1	***.000***	1.447
	irreplaceability	.126	.022	33.841	1	***.000***	.882
	employability	.086	.021	16.312	1	***.000***	1.089
	job complexity	-.088	.023	13.911	1	***.000***	.916
	constant	-.098	.243	.162	1	.687	.907
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,135						
Partial model: organizational characteristics	organizational meetings	.217	.040	29.473	1	***.000***	1.242
	organizational education	.039	.128	.091	1	.763	1.039
	no financial difficulties	.206	.057	13.044	1	***.000***	1.229
	hiring employees	.251	.063	15.857	1	***.000***	1.286
	constant	-1.411	.214	43.644	1	***.000***	.244
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,068						
Full model	gender	-.042	.123	.115	1	.735	.959
	age	.010	.006	2.960	1	.085	1.010
	education	.030	.023	1.818	1	.178	1.031
	unemployment experience	-.409	.174	5.551	1	***.018***	.664
	contract	.335	.163	4.245	1	***.039***	.715
	advancement	.372	.064	33.580	1	***.000***	1.451
	no replacement	.115	.025	22.063	1	***.000***	.891
	employability	.074	.024	9.238	1	***.002***	1.077
	job complexity	-.085	.026	10.297	1	***.001***	.919
	organizational meetings	.211	.046	20.955	1	***.000***	1.235
	organizational education	-.157	.148	1.124	1	.289	.855
	no financial difficulties	.182	.066	7.638	1	***.006***	1.200
	hiring employees	.238	.072	11.010	1	***.001***	1.268
	constant	-2.259	.569	15.756	1	***.000***	.104
	Nagelkerke R^2=0,197						

ISTVÁN GRAJCZJÁR, ZSÓFIA NAGY AND ANTAL ÖRKÉNY *

Different Types of Solidarity in Times of Crises: A Changing European Landscape

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* [istvan.grajczjar@univie.ac.at] (Milton Friedman University, Budapest);
[zsofia.nagy@tatk.elte.hu] (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest);
[orkeny@tatk.elte.hu] (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to map and contrast recent developments in attitudes towards different types of solidarity in Austria and Hungary. The context of the paper is that the economic and the so-called 'refugee' crisis and its social and political consequences have fundamentally affected European attitudes towards solidarity. Such times of crisis are often seen as providing ample opportunities for the populist radical right to prosper. Nevertheless, the above developments do not necessarily mean a weakening of solidarity as its forms may change and its meanings become contested.

Based on a comparison of Austrian and Hungarian results of the ESS round 8 (2016) the article – with the help of k-means cluster and multinomial logistic regression analyses – examines what solidarity positions can be observed and contrasted and how they may be linked step-by-step to 1) objective socio-demographic variables, 2) subjective perceptions at the micro-level (like social trust, well-being, and feelings of insecurity), 3) subjective perceptions at the macro-level (like institutional and political trust, attachment to country and the EU), moreover 4) to different values and attitudes like xenophobia, homophobia, conformism or statism on the one hand, and, 5) to political orientations and voting intentions on the other.

Keywords: solidarity, ESS, crisis, Austria, Hungary, political attitudes.

1. Introduction

The countries of Europe in the past decade have been hit by a succession of crises that potentially altered the political and value landscapes of the affected societies. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and afterwards led to policy measures in the EU such as strict austerity measures that prompted commentators to propose that international solidarity was dead (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018; Habermas, 2017; Balibar, 2010). The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 and the contradictory reactions of the EU as a whole and its Member States have raised similar questions. Solidarity, defined as a situation in which the well-being of one person or group is positively related to that of others (Oorschot, 1991), therefore appears to be central to understanding both crises.

In the rich social scientific literature that discusses the consequences of the social, economic and political crises that have affected Europe over the past decade, there is often a taken-for-granted presumption regarding the relationship between socioeconomic changes of such scale and diminishing solidarity in the affected societies on the one hand and the rise of right-wing extremist political powers on the other. In the present paper, our aim is to provide a nuanced understanding of solidarity that encompasses both its inclusive and exclusive forms and its micro-, meso-, and macro dimensions. This distinction allows for an operationalized concept of solidarity that forms the basis of our cluster analysis. Furthermore, the creation of these clusters allows for the examination of a number of propositions regarding the relationship between solidarity and socio-demographic variables, personal values, attitudes and political behaviour. Such an analysis of the relationship between solidarity clusters in the two countries allows us to address the similarities and differences between the two countries and to investigate the explanations that may potentially underlie them. Our research questions are as follows:

RQ1. What type of clusters are identifiable in the two countries, taking into account different formations of solidarity?

RQ2. What is similar and what is country-specific about these clusters and their sizes?

RQ3. What are the similarities and differences in structural and cognitive explanations between these clusters and in the countries under investigation?

RQ4. How far is the distribution of the various clusters attributable to far-right political radicalism?

2. The concept of solidarity in the theoretical literature

The relationship between crisis and attitudes towards solidarity has gained renewed attention in the scholarly literature, partly as a consequence of the succession of crises that hit the Western world. Here, we only point to three such important works. De Beer and Koster (2009) examine the impact of developments such as globalization and individualization on social solidarity, relying on international comparative data, including EVS and WVS. They find that, contrary to popular claims, there is no general tendency towards declining solidarity. This work is followed up by their research (2017) on the relationship between ethnic diversity and solidarity,

again relying on international comparison, where the findings are inconclusive in terms of whether increasing ethnic diversity results in less solidarity.

The work of Lahusen and Grasso (2018) more specifically looks at solidarity in Europe, relying on survey data collected in 2016/2017 in eight countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK). On the level of interpersonal forms of solidarity, they find that practiced solidarity is lowest towards fellow Europeans, higher towards people outside the EU, and highest at the national level. Regarding support for redistribution policies they find considerable differences between countries, with Mediterranean countries finding the elimination of inequalities to be most important. Regarding solidarity with people from outside the EU, respondents show strong conditionality.

Regarding the relationship between solidarity and crisis, however, very little is known about the Central European countries that have been affected by –and reacted to –the developments of the past decade in a particular way. A comparison of Austria and Hungary provides useful ground for research for a number of reasons. Theoretically, it rests on considerations about most different conceptions of systems design (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe, 2009: 570), where the compared cases are different in relation to most variables but the variable of interest. Other than being geographically close and experiencing a similar succession of crises, the countries differ with regard to political, economic and social structure. This allows for the type of exploratory research design which is necessary for uncovering the dynamics that produce different attitudes towards solidarity. Practically, our focus on the two countries is founded on our research aim of validating the models and findings of independent research (SOCRIS, see later) that was carried out in the two countries.

Solidarity is defined in the paper as a 'situation in which the well-being of one person or group is positively related to that of others' (De Beer and Koster, 2009, 12; Oorschot, 1991). This includes individual willingness to contribute to the welfare of others and also attitudes to institutional contributions to others' welfare. We measure these attitudes at three levels: the micro-, meso-, and macro level. The micro-level refers to individualistic perceptions of deservingness of solidarity, the meso-level captures welfare chauvinist attitudes and welfare statism, while the macro-level refers to generally inclusive attitudes and attitudes towards migration.

Inherent to the issue of solidarity is its scope – defining who belongs to the circle of solidarity. Arendt therefore makes a distinction between *exclusive solidarity* based on a commonality of interest and the 'commonness' of situation within a group of people, and *inclusive solidarity* which exists between those who suffer and those who make common cause with them (Bernstein, 1985). Such distinctions appear at all three of the above-described levels. Thus, lower degrees of conditionality for solidarity at all three (micro-, meso-, and macro-) levels correspond to more inclusive-, while higher levels correspond to more exclusive forms of solidarity (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Formations of solidarity according to level and scope

Before we move on to describe in detail the operationalization of solidarity formations on the one hand and the examined explanatory variables on the other, a few words about the research rationale of the present project are necessary.

3. Research rationale

The research rationale for the present paper originates in the ongoing SOCRIS project,[1] an Austrian–Hungarian research project that addresses the consequences of the crises with a focus on solidarity. In order to obtain a better understanding of this context, we provide a short description of the project below. The research carried out between 2016–2019 consisted of a quantitative phase in which a survey (N=2500) was conducted in both countries where the population was restricted to active-aged respondents.

Regarding solidarity, support for state help for disadvantaged social groups (pensioners, parents with many children and the unemployed) is significantly higher in Hungary. Support for state help for disadvantaged cultural minorities (refugees, the Roma) is stronger among respondents in Austria, but strongly correlates with higher social status in both countries. Analysing political attitudes, we found that in Austria right-wing extremism is closely connected to authoritarian, xenophobic, welfare chauvinistic and ethnocentric attitudes. Moreover, among FPÖ voters we found political alienation, mistrust of the state, rejection of state redistribution, and a lack of macro-solidarity. In the case of Hungary, we found a correlation between right-wing extremism and welfare chauvinism, authoritarianism and political disappointment; however, neither micro- nor macro-solidarity nor ethnocentrism played a role. To sum up, the social environment of right-wing extremist attitudes is much more defined in Austria and more diffuse in Hungary.

An important analytical tool for grasping the complexities of solidarity was the application of cluster analysis to our data to identify different patterns of solidarity in the two countries. The four clusters identifiable in both countries were: *full inclusive*,

[1] Funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF, I 2698-G27) and National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NKFIA, ANN_2016/1, 120360). For more details, see: https://www.socris-project.com/

inclusive inactive, *national exclusives*, and *non-solidarians*. The largest group in Austria is that of the fully exclusive (19 per cent), while in Hungary it is the national exclusive (24 per cent). Non-solidarians, the smallest group, are practically the winners of recent ruling regimes in both countries. Feelings of meritocracy, appreciation, and strong social ties are more widespread in Austria, while feelings of injustice and poorer social attachments are more widespread in Hungary and also appear in explanations both of inclusive and exclusive types of solidarity. In Austria, inclusivism was found to correlate with attitudes of tolerance, having strong social ties and the rejection of right-wing extremist political views. Exclusivism, on the other hand, is closely connected to authoritarianism and right-wing extremist attitudes. In Hungary, non-solidarians feel the most appreciated, can be described as xenophobic, have a social dominance orientation, and welfare chauvinistic attitudes. While full inclusives in Hungary have more social ties and are more tolerant than others, they also experience collective relative deprivation.

While both SOCRIS and ESS round 8 (2016) were carried out roughly at the same time, SOCRIS had a research-problem-focused population that included active-aged respondents, therefore the representative samples of ESS allow us to validate the models and findings of SOCRIS, and to obtain further analytical insight given the rich collection of variables of the ESS.

In order to address these questions, cluster analysis was carried out on the Austrian and Hungarian database of ESS round 8 (2016), supplemented by multinomial logistic regression analysis. This paper is accordingly structured as follows: In the first section of the paper we provide a theoretical introduction to the concept of solidarity and clarify a number of distinctions significant for our purposes. Our focus here is limited to issues central to the present paper and we by no means claim to cover the theoretical complexities in their entirety. Then we move on to a discussion of theories regarding the determinants of solidarity, with an emphasis on socio-demographic variables, the role of the personal micro-world, macro-level trust, personal values, receptiveness attitudes, and political orientation. Afterwards, we present the findings of our empirical analysis and discuss our answers to the above-listed research questions.

4. The operationalization of formations of solidarity

According to Zulehner, Denz, Pelinka and Tálos (1997: 54), solidarity is a central concept of social justice which can be distinguished at three main levels: micro, meso, and macro. We operationalized the different solidarity levels based on the literature and the opportunities offered by ESS Round 8,[2] as follows:

[2] Since further on we seek to construct a comparative longitudinal analysis of the period before and after the financial and so-called refugee crises, we have only picked out those variables in this report which also can be analysed in ESS Round 4 (where the rotating module is more or less identical with the recent one). Unfortunately, in this paper—because of limits on the scope—this comparative analysis-in-time is impossible.

4.1 Micro-level

Understanding individualistic explanations of poverty has been at the forefront of research on perceptions of deservingness (Coughlin, 1980; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Oorschot, 2000). As we will see later on, at this individual level the criteria of blame and blamelessness is a crucial factor. It could be argued that the rise of individualistic explanations of poverty should also be understood in the broader social context – namely, as a consequence of the 'commodification of protection' (Hadis, 2015: 4).

Thus, micro-solidary attitudes are central to understanding broader societal shifts. The literature is consistent in finding that in their solidary attitudes most respondents in Western welfare states rank social groups by levels of deservingness, whereby old people deserve the most, the sick and the disabled less, needy families even less, and the unemployed the least (Oorschot, 2008: 269). Studies that add immigrants to this list find that the latter group is considered the least deserving. While numerous explanations exist to interpret these highly consistent findings, what is certain is that they do coincide with the chronological order in which state-funded social protection was introduced to support the respective groups.

Another strand of research does not focus on ranking but the foundations of micro-solidarity. This approach examines whether people utilize individualistic explanations as foundations for their attitudes towards social inequality. It has been shown repeatedly that respondents who rely on such explanations tend to be less solidary; that is, less supportive of welfare spending and the social protection of the poor (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Oorschot, 2000). This heuristic is a close relative of the 'culture of poverty' concept born in the 1970s that claims that the value system of the poor contributes to the reproduction of poverty (Lewis, 1969). It is clear that in this formulation research situates respondents on an individualistic-societal dimension in terms of their understanding of deservingness. It should be noted however, that Oorschot and Halman also claim that a further, crosscutting dimension – that of blame-fate – also exists (2000: 5).

Generally, regarding individual perceptions of recipients, deservingness is understood as a calculation of whether the target group has taken any steps to avoid their position or should be blamed for their neediness (Cavaillé, 2015). In Oorschot's (2000) approach, deservingness is based on five principles: need (Are you needy?), control (Is your neediness your own fault?), identity/solidarity (Are you one of us?), attitude (Are you docile and compliant?), and reciprocity (What have you done, or can you do for us?).

Micro-solidarity here measures whether people blame a 'too generous social system' and others who are in a disadvantaged position for exonerating themselves from responsibility (Oorschot, 2000). Values that correspond to lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity.

Table 1. Micro-solidarity (principal components in Austria and Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (61%*	Hungary (50%)*	Austria and Hungary together (56%)*
Social benefits/services make people less willing to care for one another	0.81	0.73	0.77
Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job	0.76	0.74	0.75
Many manage to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to	0.68	0.52	0.63
Social benefits/services make people lazy	0.86	0.81	0.83

* total variance defined in brackets

4.2 Meso-level

The meso-level of solidarity is understood here as a societal but nevertheless locally bounded dimension. The meso-level is the level of welfare expenditure, the scene of social policy measures. The latter is based on the principle of collective interdependence, trust and assistance, on the grounds of the principle of resource allocation (Beecher, 1986; Stjernø, 2005).

On this meso-level, empirical research has found that one important European development is the strengthening of welfare chauvinism (Hentges and Flecker, 2006: 140). Scholars trace the origins of this to Scandinavia, where its representatives started out opposing high taxation and bureaucracy. Eventually, these issues were supplemented with conflicts about socio-cultural and immigration-related issues (Rydgren, 2006: 165). The narrative blames migrants, leftists, and civil society for social problems that the former frame as having an ethnic nature (Rydgren, 2006: 168–172), but blame can also be extended to the disabled, the unemployed and other inactives (Kaindl, 2006: 72).

We conceptualize the meso-level within the boundaries of the state but based on the above considerations we also distinguish between two problems that belong here and that often appear as distinguishing features of inclusive and exclusive solidarity attitudes. The first concerns state help for disadvantaged *social minorities;* that is, solidarity within the community. The second concerns state help for disadvantaged *cultural minorities* (e.g. immigrants or refugees), where the issue concerns state help offered outside the bounds of the (national-social-political) community.

Meso-solidarity can be measured by two different variable sets in ESS Round 8: the first one refers to welfare chauvinistic attitudes – that is, strong support for economic redistribution with opposition to welfare for immigrants (Hentges and Flecker, 2006: 140) – ,while the second one refers to welfare statism (Beecher, 1986; Stjernø, 2005); that is, support for strong state schemes that provide for 'needy' groups such as pensioners, the unemployed, and working parents. Values that correspond to

lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity.

Meso-solidarity 1 – welfare chauvinism (standardized index in Austria, only the first question was used in Hungary and on the merged file):

- When do you think immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?
    - Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring in their close family members.

Table 2. Meso-solidarity 2 – welfare statism (principal components in Austria and Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (72%)*	Hungary (58%)*	Austria and Hungary together (67%)*
Standard of living for the old is government's responsibility	0.87	0.82	0.85
Standard of living for the unemployed is government's responsibility	0.83	0.73	0.80
Child-care services for working parents is government's responsibility	0.85	0.73	0.80

* total variance defined in brackets

4.3 Macro-level

Macro-solidarity refers to support for the welfare state as a system as an institutionalized form of solidarity. In this case, society acts as a community that shares certain risks (Bayertz, 1998: 37). The question of how different goods and risks are shared and distributed amongst its members (through taxation, social services, etc.) is subject to political struggles. Societal solidarity or 'society-wide' solidarity (Laitinen and Pessi, 2015: 9) could therefore be considered a special form of group solidarity.

Macro-solidarity is also a form of solidarity that is based on the interests of others, such as social redistribution on an international level – for example, between countries in the EU, or supporting the struggles of minorities in other countries. Accordingly, *macro-solidarity* is solidarity with strangers and foreigners (Denz, 2003). Therefore, it covers burden-sharing between different regions and actions regarding migration and refugee issues. This is the level of collective interdependence, trust and assistance, and the redistribution of sources based on need (Stjernø, 2005: 28).

Macro-solidarity (or 'altruistic solidarity' by Voland, 1999: 158) is aimed at 'improving the situation of people who exist outside the horizon of personal interests' (Bierhoff, 2002: 295) and is motivated by values, norms and the creation of feelings of moral obligations to others. Altruistic solidarity is linked to values connected to self-transcendence, such as 'helpfulness, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, social justice, a world at peace, inner harmony, equality, and unity with nature' (Bierhoff, 2002: 285).

Macro-solidarity as an abstract dimension can be measured by two different variable sets: the first refers to general inclusive values concerning equality and altruism (Alexander, 2014; Voland 1999: 158), while the second one to migration-related issues (Stjernø, 2005: 28; Denz, 2003). Values that correspond to lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity.

Table 3. Macro-solidarity 1 – equality and altruism (principal component in Austria and on the merged file, a standardized index in Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (52%)*	Hungary (standardized index)	Austria and Hungary together (49%)*
For a fair society, differences in standards of living should be small	0.54	–	0.55
Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities	0.80	–	0.81
Important to help people and care for others' well-being	0.79	–	0.79

* total variance defined in brackets

Table 4. Macro-solidarity 2 – tolerance (principal components in Austria and Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (81%)*	Hungary (62%)*	Austria and Hungary together (75%)*
Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	0.87	0.69	0.78
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	0.93	0.87	0.92
Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.91	0.79	0.89

* total variance defined in brackets

5. Determinants of solidarity background variables

Beginning with *socio-demographic factors*, we investigate social status,[3] gender, age, settlement size[4] and migrant background.[5] Status, work and income are all important

[3] Social status aggregated from education, occupational position, and income per capita.

[4] 1=big cities; 5=farms.

[5] A variable aggregated from items such as where the respondents and their parents were born, and whether they are citizens of the country.

values in modern Western societies (Ester et al., 1994). There is consensus in the literature that those at the lower end of the income and education ladder are less likely to show solidarity (Eurobarometer, 2011). Rydgren (2007) and Golder (2016) emphasize that those with lower status are mostly over-represented among voters of the new radical right and so also among supporters of exclusivist forms of solidarity.

Radicalization and affinity with right-wing extremism, however, takes place not only among 'losers' but among winners of socioeconomic change as well (De Weerdt et al., 2007; Flecker, 2007). These winners hold attitudes such as a social dominance orientation, expressed chauvinism, prejudice against immigrants and authoritarian attitudes, and ultimately favour right-wing parties and exclusive types of solidarity.

Moving on to our second group of factors – namely, the personal micro-world – we investigate the relationship between solidarity on the one hand and social trust,[6] social attachment,[7] (personal network), and subjective well-being[8] on the other.

Social trust is an important basis for social relations and cooperative action and for solidarity (Schweer, 1997: 10). According to Frings, co-operation – extorted not by rules but by social bonds based on interpersonal trust – greatly increases the effectiveness of actors' action (Frings, 2010: 15). Putnam supports the idea that solidarity and tolerance can only be effectively organized through well-functioning, mainly horizontal social networks; the norm of reciprocity can be established through these (Putnam, 2000: 134). Scholarly work on right-wing extremism stresses the importance of 'individualisation,' that is, the breaking up of traditional social institutions and norms that might lead to feelings of disorientation and insecurity, which are in turn capitalized on by right-wing extremist political actors (Heitmeyer, 1992; Endrikat et al., 2002). Nationalism – for example – as an imaginary bond is offered by right-wing extremism as a substitute for a traditional collective identity considered as threatened or destroyed by modernization and the market (Gundelach, 2001). According to Flodell, individual satisfaction and a lack of deprivation are important influential factors in the development of solidarity, too (Flodell, 1989: 108). Deprived persons, namely, are more likely to have unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups (Kriesi et al., 1998; Vester, 2001: 299).

Our third focus is the potential relationship between trust on a macro level (institutional trust,[9] satisfaction with functioning of the country,[10] EU/UN-related trust[11]) and solidarity. Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger (1994: 16) emphasize institutional trust

[6] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'most people can be trusted' or you 'can't be too careful'; 'most people try to take advantage of you', or 'try to be fair'; 'most of the time people are helpful or mostly look out for themselves.'

[7] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how often do you socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues'; 'how many people are there with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters'; 'do you take part in social activities compared to others of same age.'

[8] An aggregated variable made up of items like subjective general health; 'how happy are you'; subjective income.

[9] An aggregated variable made up of items like trust in a country's parliament; trust in the legal system; trust in the police; trust in politicians; trust in political parties.

[10] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how satisfied are you with the present state of economy in [country]'; 'how satisfied with the national government'; 'how satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]'; state of education in [country] nowadays'; 'state of health services in [country] nowadays.'

[11] An aggregated variable made up of items like trust in the European Parliament and trust in the United Nations.

and institutionalized solidarity with various organizations and the protection of the commons against external threat (ecological, political, etc.) as a precondition for solidarity. Schweer believes that trust in politics and democratic institutions creates macro-solidarity by supporting the redistribution of wealth, whether at a regional, national, or even EU level (Schweer, 1997: 221).

Regarding the relationship between *personal values and solidarity*, we examine the values of individualism[12] and conformism.[13] Thome sees in solidarity action a subjectively accepted obligation and a varied value system. However, belonging to a given group may not only strengthen, but by strong group-binding that leads to conformity also weaken inclusive dynamics (Thome, cited by Kraxberger, 2010: 6). So, non-conformism and, according to Winkler (2010), individualism, may strengthen inclusive forms of solidarity.

A second group of personal values we investigate are norms related to equality,[14] statism[15] and meritocracy.[16] Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger also mention inclusive justice principles as prerequisites of solidarity (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger, 1994). Ressler (2002) stresses the importance of a welfare state, the original aim of which was to protect the weak and create equal opportunities, as opposed to the competitive nature of neoliberalism. According to Ullrich (2005: 237), statism is a standpoint that opposes a liberal or corporatist position and sees the state as a player responsible for resolving social problems, which also supports an inclusive-emancipatory conception.

An important aspect of our research is an analysis of the relationship between *receptiveness attitudes* (xenophobic attitudes vs. tolerance,[17] homophobic attitudes, and male-chauvinism– see Footnote 13 – and political powerlessness[18]) and solidarity. According to Zulehner et al. (1997), solidarity is based on diversity, acceptance and tolerance. That is, solidarity is a binding link that exists despite (accepted and tolerated) differences and inequalities.

Intolerant behaviour is primarily manifested against people perceived as being non-equivalent or negatively assessed groups (Forst, 2000: 74). However, tolerance—as well as solidarity—always has a limit (Klein and Zick, 2013). Zick et al. (2011) ask the question which groups are accepted as part of society, and the extent to which social diversity and heterogeneity are desired (p. 18). They argue that intolerance poses a threat to democratically functioning societies because perceived differences can lead to the abolition of equalization, and discrimination (p. 11).

[12] An aggregated variable made up of items like it is 'important to think new ideas and be creative'; 'important to show abilities and be admired'; 'important to make own decisions and be free.'

[13] An aggregated variable made up of items like it is 'important to do what is told and follow rules'; 'important to be humble and modest, not draw attention'; 'important that government is strong and ensures safety'; 'important to behave properly'; 'important to follow traditions and customs.'

[14] Such as gender equality: 'men should have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce,' or LMBTQ equality: 'gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish.'

[15] 'Government should reduce differences in income levels.'

[16] 'Large differences in income are acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.'

[17] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'immigration bad or good for [country]'s economy'; '[country]'s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants'; 'immigrants make [country] worse or better place to live.'

[18] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'political system allows people to have a say in what government does'; 'able to take active role in political group'; 'political system allows people to have influence on politics.'

The theory of political dissatisfaction and protest voting claims that those affected negatively by socioeconomic changes may become dissatisfied and feel they have no influence on political processes (Van den Burg et al., 2000). Exclusive attention to protest voting, however, is problematic, as large parts of the electorate demonstrate an affinity with right-wing extremism itself as well (Falter and Klein, 1994; Scheepers et al., 1995).

Finally, our paper investigates the relationship between *political orientation and solidarity*. Ressler emphasizes that supporters of leftist parties are more inclined to support inclusive-emancipatory-universalist ideas, while right-wingers prefer exclusive forms of solidarity based on certain criteria (Ressler, 2002: 211). This is in line with Lefkofridi and Michel's thesis (2014) which defines left-wing social democratic attitudes as addenda to the services of welfare states, and right-wing ideologies as incentives for supporting exclusive solidarity.

6. Empirical tests of different solidarity levels in Austria and Hungary

To answer our question what coherent patterns of solidarity can be identified in the two countries and whether these are rather analogous dynamics or country-specific; moreover, whether the proportions of the former patterns within the countries are similar, we stratified groups of respondents based on the above-mentioned micro-, meso-, and macro-solidary dimensions (see the structure of the aggregated variables in Section 4 above). First, we used k-means cluster analyses in both countries, separately.[19]

In both countries we were able to identify five more-or-less identical clusters with rather small differences: we named these 'self-lifting,' 'national exclusive,' 'anti-solidarian,' 'inclusive solidarian' and 'neoliberal-tolerant.'

Table 5. Austrian clusters (pairwise model, 47 iterations)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neo-liberal tolerant
micro-solidarity	-.89677	.37405	-.49598	.80919	.27068
welfare chauvinism – meso	.24683	1.07333	.80159	-.93217	-.59731
welfare statism – meso	.24108	.66359	-1.37703	.45777	-.82045
inequality – macro	-.41509	.12892	1.02557	-.69350	.83353
intolerance	.17990	1.05288	.88909	-.88571	-.58136

[19] All the scores in the cells of the tables show differences from the means (zero) of a standardized scale (indices or principal components). The higher the (positive) values, the stronger the influence of the given attitude variable on the characterization of the cluster, and the lower (negative) values, the greater the absence of the given attitude.

– macro					
Total (N=2009)	28% (N=564)	17% (N=353)	11% (N=220)	25% (N=499)	19% (N=373)

Table 6. Hungarian clusters (pairwise model, 29 iterations)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neo-liberal (rather) tolerant
micro-solidarity	-.93184	.95738	-.11369	.53439	-.35853
welfare chauvinism – meso	-.02710	.74746	.98368	-.75330	-.58496
welfare statism – meso	.70049	.79521	-.97442	-.04330	-.62631
inequality – macro	-.54593	-.16198	-.16398	-.31001	1.26950
intolerance – macro	.11513	.62830	.78858	-1.14104	-.02882
Total (N=1610)	22% (N=350)	18% (N=291)	17% (N=274)	24% (N=381)	19% (N=312)

Individuals in the cluster we called *self-liftings* blame the social system and people in need in both countries, are welfare chauvinistic (but only at an average level in Hungary[20]) and are also welfare statist at the meso-level. They support equality but are intolerant towards immigrants on a macro-level. Seemingly, they are sectarian equalitarian, so they only support equality and state-subsidies for the (merited) in-group but dislike supporting out-groups. Their proportion is somewhat higher in Austria (28 per cent) than in Hungary (22 per cent).

National exclusives show solidarity on a micro-level; they also support welfare statism (meso-level), but at the same time they are also welfare chauvinists (meso-level) and non-solidarians on the macro-level. Seemingly, they only favour those who belong to the political or cultural nation and would support them through welfare measures. Here we find one notable difference between the countries: respondents in Hungary in this cluster are rather egalitarian, while Austrians rather support inequality. This small difference may be explained by the different value orientations of citizens in these countries: namely, that Austria is rather an achievement-centered society, while Hungary is rather a statist one. The proportions of these clusters are 17–18 per cent in both countries.

The members of the *anti-solidary* cluster are welfare chauvinistic and refuse all forms and levels of solidarity with one exception in Hungary: again, Hungarian respondents tend to support equality, but the difference from the average is rather

[20] Here we had to measure welfare chauvinism using only one variable in Hungary.

small. This cluster is somewhat greater as a proportion of the total in Hungary (17 per cent) than in Austria (11 per cent).

Inclusive solidarians show solidarity attitudes at all levels in both countries; however, they only support welfare statism on an average level in Hungary. This is probably due to the merger of leftist and (neo)liberal values after the system change of 1989. The proportion of these clusters is around 24–25 per cent in both countries, thus this is one of the largest clusters among the solidary groups.

The last cluster includes the so-called *neo-liberal-tolerant*. Respondents who belong here strongly support inequality and reject welfare statism, but also welfare chauvinism in both countries. Hungarian respondents demonstrate no micro-solidarity, and their tolerance level is only average in this cluster. On the contrary, Austrian neo-liberals are clearly tolerant towards immigrants and do not blame the social system and people in need (micro-solidarity). So, those Austrians who belong to this cluster seem to understand that the functioning of the capitalist system and its dynamics unavoidably creates winners and losers within societies (and no one is to blame for this), while we find a rather social-Darwinistic version of neo-liberalism in Hungary. The proportion of these clusters is around 19 per cent in both countries.

In summarizing our most important results here, we can state that the cognitive and structural dynamics that produce different types of solidarity are rather similar in Austria and Hungary. However, some important questions arise, such as:

- first, whether the dynamics of cognitive structures and the relative weights/proportions of each cluster are also akin in international comparison; that is, can we declare that the two countries are not only similar related to their own average solidarity levels, but also that the absolute level of each type of solidarity is alike, or clearer and easier to identify: additionally, in which country do respondents demonstrate more inclusive or exclusive patterns of solidarity in statistical comparison?
- second, whether similar cognitive structures may be explained by similar variables; i.e., are the cognitive and structural reasons for the different types of solidarity in the two countries analogous?
- third, how much is the distribution of the various clusters attributable to far-right political radicalism?

6.1 Comparison of means of cluster-forming variables

First, we compared the cluster-forming variables and the averages of the aggregated variables (on different micro-, meso-, and macro levels) in a merged data file (i.e., the Austrian-Hungarian population was treated as one unit). According to all variables and aggregate dimensions, we found that respondents living in Austria demonstrated more inclusivity concerning solidarity (the only exception was the level of micro-solidarity, where we did not find significant differences between countries). The largest differences appeared between levels of tolerance and welfare chauvinism; that is, Hungarian respondents show more intolerance and welfare chauvinism.

6.2 Common clustering

The cluster structure we created using the merged file was practically identical with those created using the separate files, with small differences such as: the self-liftings cluster appeared more tolerant, and non-solidarians supported equality at an average level, just as was the case with neoliberal-tolerants' level of micro-solidarity (the appearances of these average values are due to the fact that these values had different – positive/negative – directions in the two countries in the separate files).

Table 7. Shared patterns (pairwise model, 45 iterations)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neo-liberal (rather) tolerant
micro-solidarity	-.82092	.75008	-.65344	.88737	.03157
welfare chauvinism – meso	-.15045	.65306	1.09143	-1.08181	-.38129
welfare statism – meso	.40098	.70576	-.66303	.32579	-.87428
inequality – macro	-.43176	-.11825	.02052	-.57498	1.15366
intolerance – macro	-.15417	.66146	.96473	-1.25327	-.11146
Total (N=3619)	25% (N=892)	19% (N=691)	18% (N=628)	18% (N=666)	20% (N=740)

We found important differences concerning proportions of inclusive-, national exclusive-, and non-solidarian patterns, however. Compared to Austrian respondents, there were twice as many Hungarian exclusivists (non-solidarians and national exclusivists), and four times as many Austrian inclusive solidarians as their Hungarian counterparts when the two countries were treated as one common European region (see Table 4.). It is worth noting that the cluster sizes hardly changed in Austria in the shared file compared to the country file, while radical changes were observed in the case of Hungary. This means that, compared to Austria, in Hungary the inclusive-solidarity cluster was not the biggest but the smallest one, while exclusivism clearly dominated the thinking of Hungarian respondents.

Table 8. Comparison of cluster sizes (proportions) created using different data files (as %)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neoliberal tolerant
HU merged data file	22%	24%	24%	7%	23%
HU separate data file	22%	18%	17%	24%	19%
AUT merged data file	27%	15%	12%	28%	18%
AUT separate data file	28%	17%	11%	25%	19%

7. Explaining solidarity according to background variables

To explain the memberships of respondents in different clusters we used step-by-step multinomial logistic regressions in both countries. Reference clusters were groups of non-solidarians both in Austria and Hungary. In the first models we only involved the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender, social status, settlement type, and migration background (the second variable only in Austria). In the second step, we complemented the models with variables that belonged to the micro-world of individuals, such as religiousness,[21] personal network, subjective well-being, feelings of personal security,[22] and social trust. Next, we complemented the models with variables related to individuals' macro-world such as institutional trust, satisfaction with the functioning of the state, trust in international organizations, feeling of attachment to the country and the EU,[23] political activity,[24] political powerlessness, and feelings of discrimination.[25] In the last models we complemented the independent variable set with values and attitudes such as conformism, individualism, homophobia, xenophobia (intolerance), male-chauvinism, statism, and meritocracy.

In the first model we found that, compared to the non-solidarian cluster, major demographic and social status indicators did not strongly explain the differences between the different solidarity clusters and the reference cluster. In Austria, members

[21] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how religious are you'; 'how often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions'; 'how often do you pray apart from at religious services.'

[22] 'Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark.'

[23] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how emotionally attached are you to [country]'; 'how emotionally attached to Europe.'

[24] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'contacted politician or government official in last 12 months'; 'worked in political party or action group last 12 months'; 'worked in another organisation or association last 12 month's; 'worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months'; 'signed petition last 12 months'; 'taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months'; 'boycotted certain products last 12 months'; 'posted or shared anything about politics online last 12 months.'

[25] 'Member of a group discriminated against in this country.'

of the neoliberal-tolerant cluster have relatively higher status and are more likely to have a migrant background. Similarly, inclusive solidarians are more likely to have higher status and a migrant background compared to the reference cluster. In Hungary, higher social status only correlates with membership in the inclusive cluster. In the case of the other solidarity clusters there is no status effect. Overall, in both countries the demographic characteristics of respondents and differences in status did not have a strong influence on the formation of solidarity clusters.

In the second model we tested the effects of people's subjective well-being and micro-world interpersonal cognitive attitudes. In this case, explanatory potential increased significantly in both countries, but there were also some differences between them. In Austria, members of the *inclusive cluster* were more likely to have a migrant background, higher levels of social trust, and personal feelings of security, with more women belonging to this group. In Hungary, members have more social trust, higher social status, and stronger social networks, but less religiousness and higher levels of feelings of deprivation (less subjective well-being). Members of the *neoliberal-tolerant* cluster are more likely to come from a migrant background, have higher levels of social trust and feelings of personal security, with more women belonging to this group in Austria, while in Hungary they have more social trust, are less religious and more deprived (less subjective well-being). Among *self-liftings* in Austria there are more women, members live in smaller settlements, have a higher level of subjective well-being and social trust, but are less religious, while in Hungary they are less religious and more deprived (less subjective well-being). Finally, in the case of national exclusives in Austria we find more women, less feelings of insecurity, and more people living in smaller settlements, while in Hungary there are more deprived individuals who live in bigger settlements.

However, the biggest differences between Austria and Hungary were found in the third and fourth[26] models among the different solidarity clusters compared to the non-solidarity cluster (for the most significant results, see appendix). In these models, we tested the effects of macro-level attitudinal variables and values. In the case of Austria, behind the different solidarity clusters we identified a wide variety of cognitive setups. Members of the neoliberal-tolerant cluster show less meritocratic affiliation (more egalitarianism), less homophobia and xenophobia (more tolerance), less trust in supranational organizations, and lower attachment both to the EU and Austria. Moreover, members live in smaller settlements than the reference group. Among the self-liftings cluster, we found stronger feelings of being discriminated against, less religiousness, stronger attachment both to the EU and Austria, less meritocratic affiliation, more statism, less xenophobia (more tolerance), more individualism (more affinity to the free market), but also more conformism (stronger feelings of inferiority compared to political power), and more political powerlessness. In the case of the inclusive cluster there is less meritocracy, more statism and egalitarianism (concerning LMBTQ and women), more individualism, less religiousness and less xenophobia (more tolerance). Members come more often from migrant families and feel attached either both to Austria and the EU or to neither of them. Finally, in the case of the national exclusive cluster we found less meritocracy, more conformism, more political

[26] Explanatory powers of the fourth models – Hungary: McFadden R2 =.296; Cox and Snell R2 =.605 Austria: McFadden R^2=.270; Cox and Snell R^2=.558.

powerlessness, less EU/UN trust, more institutional trust, and less feelings of insecurity.

For Austrian respondents, it can be assumed that the macro-level attitudes and ideologies behind the individual solidarity clusters are not necessarily always coherent, but the value profiles of the groups are markedly different. From this we can conclude that solidarity cluster membership may be differentiated according to ideological and general macro-level – ideological and general – value choices.

In the case of Hungarian respondents, we could not find such coherence. Hungarian solidarity clusters rarely differ according to macro-level values. For example, self liftings and inclusives are more tolerant, while neoliberals and national exclusives show more trust towards the EU and UN compared to the anti-solidary group. But when thinking of social solidarity, people are rather driven by their individual problems, subjective positions, emotions and sentiments, rather than values, ideas or principles.

8. Party affinity

As a last step in our analysis, we looked at how much the various clusters were divided in relation to far-right political radicalism. In the past, in both in Hungary and Austria, we have witnessed the emergence of the political far right and populism, and we assumed that these political movements in terms of their social base would appear distinctly in the value profiles we revealed.

In Austria, the situation is very divided. For three value profiles (anti-solidarity cluster 40 per cent, national exclusive cluster 33 per cent, self-lifting cluster 24 per cent), the group of far-right FPÖ and earlier (though politically ideologically related) BZÖ party supporters is relatively large and clearly over-represented. By contrast, the popularity of extreme right-wing parties is barely detectable in inclusive (3 per cent) and neoliberal-tolerant (9 per cent) clusters. If we look at our 2016 research results from the point of view of the electoral base of the current extremist and populist right-wing coalition government, the polarization of respondents is observable, albeit to a lesser extent.

71 per cent of the members of the anti-solidarity cluster, 59 per cent of the members of the national exclusive cluster, and 54 per cent of the self-lifting cluster members supported the coalition, compared to 20 per cent of the inclusive and 37 per cent of the neoliberal-tolerant clusters. From these results we can conclude that in Austria different values and ideological preferences are behind the rise of the extreme right-wing populism that seriously divides Austrian society.

In the case of Hungarian society, the situation is different. Support for the extreme right party Jobbik is slightly different for each value cluster and ranges between 10 and 11 per cent. Only one group represents an exception, namely the anti-solidarity cluster, where the proportion of supporters is higher at 17 per cent. From this we can conclude that while Jobbik has basically based its political strategy on a strong process of ideological identity-building, voters do not support or reject Jobbik according to value profiles.

This becomes more noticeable if we look at not only Jobbik but also at Jobbik and Fidesz voter preferences together. In this case, the proportion of potential supporters is very high as the governing party is included here too. Moreover,

although there are significant differences between the proportions of the clusters, support for the Fidesz–Jobbik political group is very high in all clusters (anti-solidarity cluster 92 per cent, national exclusive cluster 80 per cent, self-lifting cluster 79 per cent, inclusive cluster 63 per cent, neoliberal-tolerant 73 per cent). Thus attraction to a far-right ideology, independent of value segments and profiles, is widespread in Hungarian society: there was no single value cluster where the majority did not support the right-wing populist Fidesz-Jobbik political camp in 2016.

9. Conclusions

In our paper we have shown that the cognitive and structural dynamics of solidarity patterns in both Austria and Hungary are very similar. Based on its scope and foundations, the most exclusive cluster is the non-solidarian one in both countries. People who belong here are intolerant, blame people in need, and also support inequality in Austria, while they are slightly egalitarian in Hungary. This group is followed in size – based on its level of exclusivity – by the self-lifting cluster, which group supports only the nationally-merited. The next exclusive cluster is a nationally-based one (national-exclusives) whose members favour supporting all nationals but not foreigners. Neoliberals are rather tolerant, but reject micro-solidarity in Hungary, while in Austria they seem to understand the need to support people in disadvantaged situations. Finally, inclusive solidarians show solidarity at each level we investigated.

Comparing the relative weights of these clusters in the two countries separately, we observe huge similarities between the proportions of the clusters. The picture becomes more sophisticated if we compare the sizes of clusters with the help of a merged data file, however. The relative weight of the inclusive cluster decreases, while the relative proportions of non-solidarian and national-exclusive groups increase drastically in Hungary, which result confirms our findings from the SOCRIS project (with the exception of the rising proportion of non-solidarians). This means that although the dynamics and structures of different solidarity patterns are similar in the two countries, Hungary generally shows a significant shift in the level of solidarity compared to Austria.

Explanations for the cluster memberships and party affinities are also different in the two countries but are similar to SOCRIS findings. While in Austria we find that mostly ideology- and value-based reasons circumscribe different choices related to different types of solidarity and party affinity, in Hungary, instead of coherent values and principles we find that individual problems and subjective perceptions explain solidarity patterns and a general tendency to right-wing radicalization, independent of the value profiles and solidarity cluster memberships.

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Appendix

Comparison of logit model results created using different data files

REFERENCE CATEGORY: ANTI-SOLIDARY GROUP	**Independent variables (final model, only significant variables reported)**	**Austria Exp(B)**	**Austria significance ('–'=not significant)**	**Hungary Exp(B)**	**Hungary significance ('–'=not significant)**
SELF-LIFTINGS	Religious Not powerless politically Not discriminatory Tolerant[27] Non-conformist Non-individualist Anti-statist[28] Non-meritocratic[29] Attachment to EU and the home country[30]	0,69 0,67 0,22 1,50 0,52 0,62 0,63 1,75 3,59	0,016 0,017 0,034 0,014 0,000 0,004 0,001 0,000 0,000	0,53 --2,02 – – – – –	0,004 – – 0,002 – – – – –
NATIONAL EXCLUSIVES	Gender Status Fear[31] Institutional trust Trust in EU and UN Not powerless politically Non-conformist Non-meritocratic[32]	– – 0,64 1,89 0,55 0,54 0,51 2,24	– – 0,019 0,008 0,007 0,001 0,000 0,000	0,37 1,73 – – 2,00 – – –	0,020 0,025 – – 0,008 – – –
INCLUSIVE SOLIDARY GROUP	Status Migration background Trust in EU	– 2,56 – 6,94	– 0,021 – 0,000	1,73 – 2,65 4,67	0,024 – 0,000 0,000

[27] Towards immigrants.
[28] Government should NOT reduce differences in income levels.
[29] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.
[30] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.
[31] Personal unsafeness: feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark
[32] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable to reward talents and efforts

	and UN	1,39	0,041	1,68	0,024
	Tolerant	0,66	0,013	–	–
	Gender-	0,69	0,048	–	–
	egalitarian[33]	0,44	0,000	–	–
	Religious	0,55	0,000	–	–
	Non-	2,74	0,000	–	–
	individualist	2,93	0,012	–	–
	Homophobic[34]				
	Anti-statist[35]	4,15	0,013	–	–
	Non-meritocratic[36]				
	Attachment to EU and the home country[37]				
	No attachment either to EU or to home country[38]				
NEOLIBERAL TOLERANT GROUP	Gender	–	–	0,42	0,037
	Age	–	–	1,03	0,035
	Settlement size	1,36	0,013	–	–
	Trust in EU	0,58	0,028	2,20	0,003
	and UN	4,13	0,000	–	–
	Tolerant	0,59	0,003	–	–
	Homophobic[39]	1,74	0,001	–	–
	Non-meritocratic[40]	–	–	0,46	0,025
	Institutional trust	3,05	0,045	–	–
	No attachment either to EU or to the home country[41]				

[33] Men should NOT have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce.
[34] Gays and lesbians should NOT be free to live life as they wish.
[35] Government should NOT reduce differences in income levels.
[36] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.
[37] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.
[38] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.
[39] Gays and lesbians should NOT be free to live life as they wish.
[40] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talents and efforts.
[41] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.

IVANA PITEROVÁ AND JOZEF VÝROST *

Welfare Attitudes over time of V4-, Northern- and Western European countries in ESS Round 4 and Round 8 data

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* [piterova@saske.sk] (Institute of Social Sciences, CSPS SAS); [vyrost@saske.sk] (Institute of Social Sciences, CSPS SAS)

Abstract

Welfare attitudes are a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Social solidarity in the sense of interdependence is understood as the first dimension of welfare attitudes, while differentiation – in terms of how people usually make a distinction between groups that results in their attitude about whom to support – is understood as the second dimension. According to their preferred level of social solidarity and social differentiation, four clusters of people can be identified which represent four distinct types of welfare attitudes: social democratic, liberal, conservative, and radical. The aim of this paper is to analyse ESS fourth- (2008) and eighth-round data (2016) to compare three groups of countries: the Visegrad Group, represented by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; Northern Europe, represented by Norway, Sweden and Finland; and Western Europe, represented by Germany, France, and the UK, in terms of the level of social solidarity and social differentiation. Based on ESS data we outline that the differences in the welfare attitudes of V4, Western-, and Northern European countries are not so obvious. However, the analysis of the four types of welfare attitudes reveals some significant differences in interpersonal and institutional trust and basic human values, the description of which falls within the scope of this paper.

Keywords: welfare attitudes, social solidarity, social differentiation, Visegrad Group, Western Europe, Northern Europe.

1. Introduction

Welfare states vary regarding their level of solidarity, range of government responsibilities, universality of benefits, etc. It seems reasonable to expect that welfare attitudes of people will reflect the main concepts of the social policy emphasized in any particular welfare state. Gryaznova (2013), for example, highlights how the welfare state regime explains 60 per cent of the variability of attitudes. If an analysis of welfare attitudes is conducted in the form of a comparison of similar groups of countries, differences might not be easy to distinguish due to difficulties with categorization. On the one hand, comparing individual countries could make the differences more robust, but on the other hand there certainly exists some heterogeneity within countries that could be overlooked.

In this paper we address a different perspective represented by types of attitude to welfare, which are to a certain extent influenced by welfare regimes. Analyses provided by Svallfors (1997) and Výrost (2010) have shown the existence of group patterns that are very similar between countries, despite the fact that people within such countries are influenced by their own culture, history, and actual political situation, etc. In other words, four different types of attitude may be identified within each country regardless of welfare regime. Furthermore, the former have something in common with representatives of the same attitudinal types in other countries.

The main aim of this paper is to investigate potential changes over time in welfare attitudes across Europe. Specifically, it focuses on the level of social solidarity and social differentiation in three groups of countries: the V4 region, Northern-, and Western European countries. The study is built upon European Social Survey (ESS) fourth- (2008) and eighth- (2016) round data. The analysis begins with a hypothesis about potentially significant differences in the level of social solidarity and social differentiation among the three different regions of Europe. Rejection of this hypothesis leads to the second goal of this contribution – an analysis of the common characteristics as well as disparities among four types of attitude to welfare that are present in Europe. For this purpose, four clusters of participants were defined on the basis of the average mean of social solidarity and social differentiation scales.

The interrelation between values and welfare attitudes has been widely discussed and proved by studies such as those of Gryaznova and Magun (2012), Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom (2013), Gryaznova (2013), and Kulin and Meuleman (2015). In contrast, in research by Svallfors, Kullin and Schnabel (2012) the relationship was not evident. However, the connection of values with social solidarity and social differentiation is not well known. According to Piterová (2018), there is a connection between the level of social solidarity, social differentiation and some of the self-transcendence-, self-enhancement-, and conversation-related values. The first partial goal of this paper is to verify the hypothesis that there exist significant differences in value preferences among four types of welfare attitude.

The second partial goal is to study the hypothesized differences in the level of trust among four attitudinal types. There are two essential assumptions. First, that trust is the foundation of a welfare state. For example, Daniele and Geys (2015) confirm that people who trust others are more willing to pay higher taxes as well as increase state social spending. Second, the positive effect of interpersonal trust depends on the

perceived quality of institutions, thus institutional trust has been included into the analysis.

2. How many welfare regimes actually exist?

The number of welfare regimes that exist has become the focus of various reconsiderations and modifications of typologies over the past decades. Criticism began with Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of the 'three worlds of welfare capitalism.' This typology was based upon the operationalization of three principles: decommodification (which examined the extent to which an individual's welfare is reliant on the market), levels of social stratification (which examined the role of welfare states in maintaining or breaking down social stratification), and the private-public mix (which focused on the relative roles of the state, the family and the market in welfare provision). The application of these principles in 18 OECD countries resulted in the division of welfare states into three regime types: social democratic (e.g. Norway), corporatist (e.g. Germany), and liberal welfare regimes (e.g. the USA, and Australia).

The threefold typology was criticized for not taking into account Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asian characteristics, which led to the distinction between the basic model (Leibfried, 1992) and the southern model (Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997), which was later incorporated by Esping-Andersen (1998) as the Mediterranean model. Additionally, there is a familiaristic type of model whereby people rely more on their families and less on the government for social protection (Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008).

The second type, which was added later, is the aforementioned regime of 'Down Under' (Australia and New Zealand) which combines the elements of the liberal and social democratic system in which there are low income differences and high social benefits, paid mostly to the middle classes.

The third type that was added is the East-Asian one, which combines elements of the previous regimes, particularly the liberal and conservative ones, and in which the state does not provide a high level of social benefits because the employer or the family are instead assumed to take responsibility for care. Therefore, a person who does not work for a corporation that partially replaces state care is disadvantaged (Esping-Andersen, 1998).

Since the fall of communism the former socialist countries have been classified together because they have been influenced in the same way by the earlier authoritarian regime and its high level of egalitarianism (Kulin and Meuleman, 2015). Even since joining the European Union these countries are still included in analyses as post-socialist countries. After the transition of post-socialist countries and the noticeable influence of international organizations and of EU membership, questions still remain about the division of welfare states or, more specifically, about the necessity of a new categorization for European countries. Exploring this debate, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

The last point in relation to the categorization and selection of countries for comparative analysis is that some countries are always included in such analyses as they represent the ideal- or a clear type of welfare regime. For example, Sweden and Norway represent clear social democratic types, while Austria, Belgium and the

Netherlands represent a hybrid mix of conservative regime with clear social democratic and liberal traits (Arts and Gellisen, 2001), but are included only rarely. The Slovak Republic and other post-socialist countries with characteristics of both a liberal and conservative type echo this categorization issue in any comparison.

The mixed results of studies conducted thus far may have been caused by relying on a general typology of welfare states and indicators that fails to capture the complexity of institutional establishments and individual views (Jordan, 2013). The comparative study of welfare states faces a selection problem. Reliance on such empirical categorizations and the lack of a match between descriptions and welfare states are becoming a greater problem in welfare-regime- and welfare attitude research.

3. Types of attitude to welfare as another option

While there might be more than four types of welfare regimes in the world, the most commonly used classification includes four clear types, notwithstanding with the many countries that have adopted mixed or hybrid types. In any country, the majority of people probably have attitudes that reflect the welfare state regime, while there are also people whose attitudes are more or less consensual, along with those who are undecided and those who score on the middle of the scale. The direction of social policy is typically indicated by individual preferences and the majority decides, but a country as a whole is rarely homogeneous in this respect.

Some research has already examined this hypothesis. Svallfors (1997) analysed attitudes to redistribution and to income differences in eight western nations based on International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data (1992) about social inequality. The four welfare regime types appeared as four distinct types of attitudes to redistribution: the social democratic type included countries that supported welfare state intervention with an egalitarian view of income distribution, including Sweden and Norway. Conservative countries combined strong support for welfare state intervention with a preference for high income differences, including Germany and Austria. Liberal types of country showed a low level of support for government redistribution and an egalitarian view of income distribution; examples include the United States and Canada. The radical type was defined by low support for welfare state intervention and egalitarianism regarding income differences. Such countries include Australia and New Zealand. However, 'analysis showed that while the level of attitudes regarding redistribution and income differences clearly is affected by regime types, group patterns are very similar between the countries' (Svalffors, 1997: 283).

Výrost (2010) applied a similar approach to ESS fourth-round data (2008). From 54,988 people from 28 countries, 42,794 people answered questions that were used in the creation of a social solidarity and social differentiation scale. Based on the average mean for those scales, Výrost classified people as having one of four types of attitude to welfare, as follows.

The social democratic type: high solidarity and low levels of differentiation. This type prefers to provide benefits to a wide range of people on the basis of simple rules, so benefits are more universal. Such attitudes were dominant in countries such as Denmark (51.16 per cent), Estonia (36.87 per cent), Finland (46.63 per cent), Greece (42.28 per cent), Switzerland (38.63 per cent), the Netherlands (42.36 per cent), Norway (45.95 per cent), and Sweden (54.15 per cent).

The conservative type: high levels of social solidarity and also high levels of differentiation. Such attitudes involve solidarity but adhere to objective criteria (defined by the state) when differentiating and deciding whether people should receive benefits, and how much they actually need and get. A prevalence of this conservative type was found in Belgium (48.43 per cent), Cyprus (42.20 per cent), Germany (35.75 per cent), Spain (34.46 per cent), France (44.35 per cent), the United Kingdom (45.29 per cent), Croatia (34.86 per cent), Israel (35.93 per cent), Portugal (38.41 per cent), Romania (37.47 per cent), Slovenia (37.38 per cent), Slovakia (34.5 per cent), and Turkey (40.48 per cent).

The liberal type: low levels of solidarity and high levels of differentiation. Such individuals prefer to provide benefits of a minimal kind to motivate people to take care of themselves. This type was dominant in Poland (33.36 per cent), Hungary (59.93 per cent), and the Czech Republic (29.72 per cent).

The radical type: low levels of solidarity and low levels of differentiation. Such individuals believe that the provision of benefits should be limited to particular situations. This type was most prevalent in Bulgaria (36.57 per cent), Latvia (49.45 per cent), the Russian Federation (51.52 per cent), and Ukraine (39.55 per cent).

Further analysis of the Slovak sample indicated that the four types of attitude to welfare assessed the government's responsibility for social security issues, the current state of social security, and prospects for the future differently. The results of a comparative analysis showed how the attitudes of respondents in different countries can converge. Additionally, the influence of culture and historically conditioned beliefs about the 'right' form of welfare state is undoubtedly present.

4. Two elements of welfare attitudes: social solidarity and social differentiation

Social solidarity has received a greater amount of attention since the various economic and financial crises which have affected the European Union following 2008. Similarly, recent migrant-related issues also cast light on the principle of solidarity and raise the question whether this will lead to a crisis of European solidarity. One hypothesis claims that in times of difficulty solidarity is oriented more strongly towards one's family or nation, while solidarity with Europe, the European Union, or with the rest of the world and humankind in general is weaker, according to perceived social proximity (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018).

As solidarity is a complex phenomenon, it requires precise operationalization. There is more than one understanding of this concept because solidarity has become the focus of interest for sociology, economics and psychology, as well as political sciences. In general, social solidarity is understood as shared responsibility between members of society. It is based upon the subsidization principle, which means that the wealth of certain members of society is given to public institutions to satisfy social needs and provide support for people facing hardship. Furthermore, the welfare state should be responsible and provide support in cases when individuals, family or charities are unable to help their members. According to this perspective, a distinction is made between the horizontal and the vertical organization of solidarity: the former involves individuals bearing social risks by providing support to others, and the latter

involves responsibility being placed on the state (i.e. the government). Stjerno (2012: 2) defined indirect solidarity (vertical) as 'supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute some of the funds gathered through taxes or contributions.' It appears from this perspective that there is a difference in the commitment of citizens (Van Vugt and Peet, 2012).

Another clarification should be made about the level of solidarity. 'It is possible to study local (such as regional or communal support for others); functional (in which social support is provided to employees and employers), inter-generational (such as pension systems whereby workers contribute to the state to provide welfare for the retired) and also supranational (such as the Union system providing support to member states) solidarity' (Dougan and Spaventa, 2005: 298). In other words, if we focus on boundaries of solidarity we may debate the degree of inclusiveness or the limitation of solidarity. In addition, social security systems in Europe support different groups of people; for example, those facing hardship, the disabled, the retired, the unemployed, or single parents. Therefore, attitudes to welfare can be defined as a multidimensional phenomenon. Providing welfare benefits to the old, disabled, or sick can be perceived as functional and beneficial when compared to supporting the unemployed and poor, which sector of the population is more heterogeneous across individuals and nations (Van Oorschot, 2006; Jaeger, 2007).

Despite the fact that solidarity is tied to specific groups and depends on social proximity, deservingness or targeted recipients (Van Oorschot, 2006), and in many cases there is not adequate to measure general solidarity, we have focused on the solidarity of people in need who receive benefits and services from the welfare state. In particular, we understood and defined social solidarity in terms of vertical solidarity within the nation whereby people support the idea (or do not) of social benefits and services being provided by the state to people facing hardship.

Welfare states have also created social stratification to reduce equality: 'People tend to differentiate between people to decide whom to support' (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018: 253), thus the second dimension of welfare attitudes in our paper is the preferred level of social differentiation which is defined as the distinction made between people or groups that results in the assignment of benefits and services within society. As can be seen, social differentiation is linked to social solidarity, and both are significant elements of welfare attitudes.

5. Welfare attitudes, trust, and values

The relationship of political and interpersonal trust to welfare attitudes has been widely discussed for decades. On one side, there are those studies that confirm this relationship, such as that of Svallfors (2012). On the other hand, in some studies like those of Svallfors (1999) and Edlund (2006) the relationship is not proved. In addition, the concept of the quality of government instead of political trust was examined. For example, Svallfors (2013) confirmed that the perceived quality of government and egalitarianism have an effect on attitudes to social spending and taxes. Similarly, Daniele and Geys (2015) proved that interpersonal trust has a positive relationship with welfare state support. Moreover, the effect of interpersonal trust is conditional on the perceived quality of institutions.

In general, the link between values and welfare attitudes is well known. Some authors have confirmed that conversation and self-transcendence values increase the level of support for the welfare state, while the values of openness to change and self-enhancement have a negative effect (Gryaznova and Magun, 2012; Gryaznova, 2013). Furthermore, analyses of values at the national level have confirmed that conversation is a stronger predictor in East Europe (Kulin and Meuleman, 2015; Gryaznova, 2013), while self-transcendence was proved to be a stronger predictor in Western Europe. In a study by Piterová (2018), the values of tradition and benevolence had an effect on the level of social solidarity, although the values of power and security were associated with a social differentiation.

Despite the fact that the research into types of welfare attitudes is still at the beginning, the aforementioned studies gave strong support for our hypothesis about the existence of differences in interpersonal and institutional trust and values among clusters that are based upon the preferred level of social solidarity and social differentiation.

6. Method

As the welfare attitudes module was repeated after eight years, the database of the European Social Survey provides an excellent opportunity to compare welfare attitudes across Europe over a specific time period. The module contains a set of questions about the effect of social benefits and services in different areas of life. There are two scales with five-point response scales ranging from 1 = 'Agree strongly' to 5= 'Disagree strongly,' which were constructed from items of the rotating module about welfare: the Social Solidarity Scale and Social Differentiation Scale. The former consists of two items with a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .641. It includes the items 'Social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty' and 'Social benefits and services lead to more equal society.' The latter consists of six items with a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .758, such as: 'Social benefits and services in a country place a great strain on the economy,' 'Social benefits and services make people lazy,' and 'Social benefits and services cost businesses too much in taxes and charges.' Scaling for social solidarity and social differentiation was reversed to make interpretation much easier, so 1 represents a low level of solidarity and differentiation and 5 means a high level of solidarity and differentiation.

Thanks to low intercorrelation between scales (r= -.126**) we assume the presence of two uncorrelated and orthogonal factors. The intersection of scales in their mean value of 3 creates four different clusters. Based on the average score of each respondent on the social solidarity and social differentiation scale, we were able to classify people in the dataset into four distinct clusters (the four types of attitude to welfare): social democratic, conservative, liberal, and radical – as described in the previous section, and depicted in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Four distinct groups of attitudes to welfare

Two scales were constructed from items of the core module with an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'low trust' and 10 means 'high trust.' The first scale, the Interpersonal Trust Scale, consists of three items with a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .773, and includes specifically the questions 'Would you say that most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' 'Would most people try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?' and 'Would you say that most of time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?' The second scale, the Institutional Trust Scale, consists of seven items asking people how much they personally trust a number of institutions, including the (national) parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, political parties, the European parliament and the United Nations; this has a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .905.

Data from the modified version of Shalom Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire, which is part of a core section of the ESS questionnaire, was used to analyse the values. The questionnaire consists of 21 items that capture ten motivational types of value: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security.

Respondents stated to what extent they resemble the person described in the items on a six-point scale, whereby 1 means 'very much like me' and 6 means 'not like me at all.' The determined reliability of the value types was Cronbach α= .31 – .7. Examples of items for the ten motivationally distinct types of values are:

- Power: 'It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.'
- Achievement: 'It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.'
- Hedonism: 'Having a good time is important to him. He likes to "spoil" himself.'
- Stimulation: 'He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.'
- Self-Direction: 'Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way.'
- Universalism: 'He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.'
- Benevolence: 'It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care of their well-being.'
- Tradition: 'Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.'
- Conformity: 'He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.'
- Security: 'It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.'

7. Sample

From the 35,441 citizens from nine countries (the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Sweden) that participated in the ESS fourth- (n1= 17,931) and eighth round (n2= 17,510), 26,680 respondents who answered all the questions on social solidarity and social differentiation scales were included in the analysis. They were divided into three groups: The Visegrad group (7,106 respondents), was represented by the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (the fourth member, the Slovak Republic, was not included in the analysis because the country did not participate in the eighth round, and thus we could not examine changes between rounds). Western Europe (10,863 respondents), represented by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and Northern Europe (8,711 respondents), represented by Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

The most common type of attitude to welfare in our sample was social democratic (30.3 per cent), followed by conservative (28.2 per cent), liberal (23.7 per cent) and, last, the radical type (17.8 per cent). Looking at the differences in types of welfare attitudes among the three groups of countries, we see (in Table 1) how the welfare regime is reflected in welfare attitudes. The greatest proportion of people in the V4 region are liberal, Western Europe is mostly conservative, and Northern Europe is predominantly represented by the social democratic type. Nevertheless, all countries include a certain number of people from each category.

Table 1 Frequencies of types of attitudes to welfare in three groups of countries

		Types of attitudes to welfare				Total
		Conservative	Social democratic	Liberal	Radical	N(%)
Group of countries	V4	1795 (25.3)	1126 (15.8)	2518 (35.4)	1667 (23.5)	7106 (100)
	Western Europe	3724 (34.3)	2803 (25.8)	2726 (25.1)	1610 (14.8)	10863 (100)
	Northern Europe	2004 (23)	4157 (47.7)	1070 (12.3)	1480 (17)	8711 (100)
Total	N(%)	7523 (28.2)	8086 (30.3)	6314 (23.7)	4757 (17.8)	26680 (100)

8. Results

8.1 Differences in preferred level of social solidarity and social differentiation among V4-, Western-, and Northern European countries in the ESS fourth and eighth round.

First, we were interested in possible changes in the level of social solidarity and social differentiation in the three groups of countries over time, or more precisely, between rounds. According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, the assumption of normal distribution failed. In such a robust sample, tests of normality are overly conservative and the assumption of normality can be rejected too easily. Nevertheless, plotting the histograms and normal Q-Q plots of variables indicated that our data is approximately normally distributed without skewness and kurtosis. With group size approximately equal (largest/smallest≤1.5) (Stevens, 1996: 249), it is possible to use parametric statistics, even if a Levene test rejects the hypothesis of equal variances.

Two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of rounds four and eight on the levels of social solidarity in the different countries. Participants were categorized into three groups of countries: the V4 region, Western-, and Northern European countries. The interaction effect between groups of countries and rounds ($F(2) = 35.28$, $p < .001$), the main effect on groups of countries ($F(2) = 1082.75$, $p < .001$) and of rounds ($F(1) = 38.09$, $p < .001$) were statistically significant.

Follow-up tests were conducted to explore this relationship further. We looked at the results for each of the subgroups separately. First, we split up the file by round, and repeated the analysis separately for the fourth and eighth round. Statistically significant differences were present among all three groups but the effect sizes suggest that it is not valid to speak about such differences. Second, we split up the file by

country group and repeated the analysis separately for the V4, Western-, and Northern European countries. A statistically significant difference in level of social solidarity between the fourth and eighth round was shown only in the V4 region (F (1) = 63.951, p<.001) with a small effect size. In the graph below (Figure 2) the level of social solidarity for three groups of countries in both rounds can be seen. On a five-point scale, where 5 represents the highest level of solidarity and 1 stands for the lowest level of solidarity, all groups of countries scored in the top half of the scale. Differences between groups of countries and rounds are quite small, as the lowest measured value 3.04 is for V4 in the fourth round and the highest measured value of 3.61 is for Northern Europe in the eighth round.



Figure 2. Level of social solidarity for three groups of countries in the fourth and eighth round of the ESS

The same analysis was carried out for the second variable, social differentiation. The results of ANOVA showed a statistically significant main effect for groups of countries (F (2) = 1127.85, p<.001); round (F (1) =83.469, p<.001), and also for the interaction of groups of countries and round (F (2) = 10.05, p<.001).

To examine potential differences, we split up the file by round. Analysis of the fourth round (F (1) =726.22, p<.001), and eighth round (F (1) =435.58, p<.001) suggests that V4 and Western European countries differ from Northern Europe in their level of differentiation but the effect sizes are quite small. Next, we split up the file by country group. Differences in level of social differentiation between the fourth and eighth round showed up in the V4 region (F (1) =30.17, p<.001); Western European countries (F (1) = 73.242, p<.001), and Northern European countries (F (1) = 4.184, p=.041) with small effect sizes. In other words, differences are too small to speak about any practical significance. The graph below (Figure 3) depicts the level of social differentiation for the V4, Northern-, and Western European countries in the fourth and eighth round. On a five-point scale, where 5 means the highest level of differentiation and 1 is the lowest level, all groups of countries scored in upper half of the scale. Differences among countries are quite low, as the lowest measured value (of 3) is for Northern Europe in the eighth round and the highest measured value 3.47 is for V4 in the fourth round.



Figure 3. Level of social differentiation for three groups of countries in the fourth and eighth round of the ESS

The first part of the analysis revealed no great differences in the preferred level of social solidarity and social differentiation across Europe, and over time. The average score on both scales and small effect sizes of differences between groups and rounds

suggest that European countries have similar welfare attitudes when analysed according to regime type. These results actually lead us to the second part of the analysis; as we can identify four distinct types of attitudes to welfare in every country, we hypothesize that there should be some differences between them. We already know that the former differ in terms of levels of social solidarity and social differentiation. As social and institutional trust is often linked to welfare attitudes, and individual attitudes are formed in consensus with values, we decided to analyse those two variables to identify potential differences.

8.2 Differences in interpersonal and institutional trust among types of attitude to welfare

As welfare benefits and services are provided by the welfare state to citizens, we assume that the four types of welfare attitude would differ in relation to trust in people and institutions. First, we checked the assumptions using ANOVA. Due to the fact that the homogeneity of variances between groups is violated, we used non-parametric statistical tests. A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed statistically significant differences in interpersonal trust ($\chi 2$ (3, n= 26 555) = 1610.09, $p < .001$) and institutional trust ($\chi 2$ (3, n= 24557) = 2059.67, $p < .001$) among the four types of attitudes to welfare.

To explore possible differences, we conducted a Mann-Whitney U test. The test revealed significant differences in interpersonal and institutional trust among all groups. To find out the effect sizes of differences, we calculated an approximate value of r = z / square root of N, where N = total number of cases. According to Cohen's criterion, differences appeared to range from small to almost medium size in significance. Moreover, the biggest difference was measured between the social democratic and the liberal type (0.3 and 0.4) and the social democratic and conservative type (0.2) for both types of trust.

To sum up, the results of the analysis are quite similar for interpersonal and institutional trust. There are statistically significant differences in both types of trust among four attitudinal types with small- to medium effect sizes. The level of both types of trust for groups of attitude to welfare are depicted in Figure 4. As can be seen, the social democratic type has the highest level of trust, while the liberal type is the least trusting of both people and institutions.



Figure 4. Level of interpersonal and institutional trust of four welfare attitude groups

8.3 Value profile of four types of welfare attitudes

It seems reasonable to expect that people with different welfare attitudes will also differ in terms of value preferences. In Figure 5, the mean values of four groups are presented. Here, it would probably be useful to mention again that lower values in Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire express the higher personal importance of the former values. Because the PVQ data we obtained did not fit the requirements of normal distribution, for the purposes of statistical analysis the nonparametric Jonckheere-Terpstra test was used. For four of the ten values in Schwartz's circular model, statistically significant differences were not confirmed; namely *Power, Achievement, Stimulation, and Benevolence*. For the other six values the results of statistical tests confirmed the presence of differences at less than the conventional level of probability ($p<0.010$). *Hedonism* (which in Schwartz's [2012] theory of basic values is expressed by striving for pleasure and/or sensuous personal gratification), *Self-direction* (characterized by independent thought and action), *Tradition* (described by respect and commitment), *Conformity* (expressed by self-restraint and obedience), and *Security* (connected with a desire for stability, harmony, and safety) unite two groups with a stress on social differentiation (Liberal and Conservative) whose preferences for these values are higher than in the groups Social democratic or Radical. Only in the case of *Universalism* (expressed by understanding, tolerance, and a desire for the protection of welfare of nature and people) is the social solidarity parameter of welfare attitudes shared by the Conservative and Social democratic groups, whose preference for these values was higher than in the other two groups.



Figure 5. Value profile of four welfare attitude groups

9. Discussion

The main aim of this article was to examine the actual state and potential changes in the welfare attitudes of nine countries that participated in the fourth (2008) and eighth (2016) round of the European Social Survey. We were interested in two aspects of welfare attitudes: First, social solidarity that was operationalized as support for providing benefits and services to people who are in need of the welfare state. This is understood as indirect solidarity at a national level. Despite the fact that people contribute to welfare systems by paying taxes, the former kind of support requires a different level of commitment compared to the support offered by charities or other direct help. Second, when it comes to the limits of solidarity, we can talk about a second aspect of welfare attitudes; namely, social differentiation. This concept was operationalized as a belief in the negative consequences of providing benefits and services, thus agreement with the former opinion represents a demand for greater differentiation in society.

Three groups of countries as representatives of different welfare regimes were compared: The V4 region (as liberal), Western European countries (as conservative), and Northern European countries (as social democratic). The selection of three countries per group (instead of comparing all countries) was used as the method for presenting the stability and similarity of welfare attitudes in Europe. Moreover, the influence of the welfare regime on distribution of types of attitude to welfare was shown. Although the selected countries did not represent ideal-type welfare regimes,

we may talk about them as about three different geographical regions of Europe which are historically and culturally close, with similar value orientations.

The usual perspective in the attitude–value relations literature involves expectations of strong mutual ties, with a possible impact of situational factors (Maio and Olson, 1995). This is the case in the relationship between social values and welfare attitudes. Pearce and Taylor (2013), after analyzing British Social Attitude survey data related to three decades of development of welfare attitudes, concluded that while attitudes to income inequality and redistribution remained relatively stable, attitudes towards welfare provision for the unemployed behaved in a cyclical way independent of the actual economic situation. Despite this, empirical evidence (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013) of strong mutual ties has been derived not only from the ESS (comprising a large pool of European nations), but also from ISSP data (comprising a more diverse pool of industrialized and developing countries). Our analysis also supports the assumption that people with different welfare attitudes have specific value preferences. This result should not be seen as surprising – the assumption that welfare attitudes depend on welfare regimes such as those defined by Esping-Andersen is supported by an analysis of ISSP data (Jæger, 2009). Kulin and Svalffors (2013: 155), in an article based on ESS data, confirmed the close link between values and attitudes towards redistribution, which is 'generally stronger in more materially secure classes.' Our finding is that the social differentiation dimension of welfare attitudes had more impact on the value-attitude link than the social solidarity dimension.

In the literature (Rothstein et al., 2010; Daniele and Geys, 2015) there are assumptions that universal welfare states generate trustworthiness in their citizens, but also some speculation about the opposite direction of causality; i.e., that societies with a higher level of trust are more disposed to the successful creation of a universal welfare state with high taxation and high social benefits (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011; Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013). A causal relationship between trust and welfare support was confirmed by Daniele and Geys (2015) as well. Moreover, a stronger effect was found to be present in countries where institutions are perceived as fair. The results of our analysis support this claim about differences in welfare attitudes according to level of trust. When people believe that those who receive money actually need it, their social trust is stronger. In our sample of four types of attitude to welfare, the situation was the same for those social democrats who live in Northern- as well as Western Europe and V4 countries. However, individuals who distrust people are liable to feel that others are receiving money they are not entitled to, and this belief is more typical of people with liberal and conservative welfare attitudes.

10. Conclusion

The above analysis has shown that the three groups of countries differ in terms of welfare attitudes (more specifically, as regards the level of social solidarity and social differentiation) to a minimal extent. In reference to social solidarity, only the average score of Northern Europeans is positive, while individuals from Western European countries and the V4 region on average scored negatively. Despite the fact that the level of social solidarity has slightly increased in the V4 region in the period 2008–2016, this group of countries still shows the least solidarity. Regarding social differentiation, all three groups of countries scored in the upper part of the scale; in other words, they demonstrated a preference for a stratified society.

The minimal changes that occurred between 2008 and 2016 can possibly be explained by the re-emergence of the financial crisis which increased uncertainty and concern about daily life. Data collection from the fourth round (2008) of ESS was conducted during the economic and financial crisis in Europe but started at different times in participating countries. While the financial crisis had ended, and the level of unemployment had returned to pre-crisis levels by 2016 when the eighth round was conducted, people could have been influenced by the migrant crisis. We can assume that because social benefits and services are allocated to people regardless of nationality, in the case of asylum-seekers people could be concerned about the perceived misuse of money. Furthermore, as the level of trust in people and institutions is mostly negatively oriented, further research about the level of perceived procedural justice is suggested. The question we are not currently able to answer is if and to what extent welfare attitudes in European countries were affected by contextual factors such as the presence of the crisis.

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Book Review

Europe Looks into the Mirror

Breen, Michael J. (ed.) (2017): *Values and identities in Europe: Evidence from the European Social Survey.* London and New York: Routledge. 314 pages.

The year 2002 is a turning point in the almost fifty-year-long history of international comparative surveys. After years of preparation this was the first time that 22 European countries participated in the data collection of the European Social Survey (ESS). Naturally, there have been other surveys before with several countries participating: the Eurobarometer surveys that covered all the member states at that time started in 1973, the World Values Survey in 1981, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in 1984 – just to name a few. As social sciences became more and more international, several similar initiatives were started in the past one or two decades that mainly covered larger cultural-political regions or aimed at a wider focus in the world (e.g. European Values Study, Latinobarómetro, Afrobarometer, Asian Barometer, Pew Global Attitudes Project, etc.).

The ESS stands out from several aspects. First of all, it has become one of the official research infrastructures of the European Union (European Research Infrastructure Consortium – ERIC), with a background of governmental support of the participating countries, and a professional central management consisting of members of acknowledged universities and research institutions. This exceptional organizational background assures that the biannual data collection is implemented with extraordinary precision and continuous quality assurance. As the Hungarian co-ordinator of ESS, I have first-hand experience and can safely state that from a methodological point of view, there is no better source of survey data suitable for international comparison at present. The international conferences and the number of publications that are based on its data prove that ESS has become a first-class brand in the field of international comparative social research.

In 2015 there was an ESS conference at the Mary Immaculate College of Ireland. The presentations were edited by Michael J. Breen and published by Routledge under the title *Values and Identities in Europe: Evidence from the European Social Survey* in 2017. Naturally, the contents of this book do not cover the entirety of the topics surveyed in ESS, but the contributions give a fair overview of the most important fields and results. Generally speaking, the writings of the book follow the same characteristic strategies most studies on international surveys do. The first group contains analyses that confine themselves to one country (despite the possibilities of international comparison). Writings in the second group compare all the available data (for example all the data of the European countries available in ESS) or a selection of the data of several countries. The third group has studies that use

several sources of data, either by including macrodata of countries or bigger regions in their models for a multilevel analysis, or by using the results of more than one survey (in this case the ESS and some other surveys).

Anyone interested in the history, significance, or scientometric indicators of the ESS can learn a lot from the introductory study of the editor, Michael J. Breen. For example, that Hungary is one of the few 'elite' countries where all the ESS data collection rounds have been implemented so far. By the time the work on Round 8 was finished in the autumn of 2017, almost 15 000 Hungarians, the population of a small town had participated with their answers to the success of the ESS. Another important detail is that the full, unrestricted databases of the ESS are used by 60 000 students and 18 000 researchers all over the world and have been instrumental in more than 7000 PhD dissertations.

Following the introductory study there are five more or less consistent chapters that contain 15 further studies. The first chapter contains papers related to religion. 'The Declining Significance of Religion: Secularization in Ireland' by Ryan T. Cragun outlines the secularizing trends, mainly focusing on Ireland. Anna Kulkova's writing ('Religiosity and Political Participation across Europe') offers a wider perspective on the topic by examining the connection between political participation and religiousness in the European countries. Her contribution is an excellent example for a quantitative study that tries to find a causal link between two social phenomena using the widest level of analysis (in this case, among countries). The usual challenge of such research is whether these (mostly weak) statistical connections exist in reality. One wonders what the intermediate factors (variables) are that should also be taken into account, but either we do not have data for them, or if we do, we do not consider these for some reason. And the most exciting question: can we determine the direction of the casual link; can we be sure which social phenomenon is the cause and which is the effect? As for Kulkova's study, what can we do with the result that Protestants are somewhat more active politically than Catholics, but this connection is only true in some of the countries, and countries that have an orthodox religious majority are prone to have a lower level of political activity? One does not need to have a keen sense of research and analysis to know that this population mostly overlaps with the population of the countries with one-party domination, which has determined their political socialization.

Thus, it would seem logical to say that first-hand political experience is more relevant in this case than religious traditions. (It is a different question whether the social values determined – partly – by religion played a role in the long rule of despotic regimes.) In these cases, the phenomena are obviously more complex and we cannot draw a straight line from religiousness to political activism. It is important to mention that the author is also aware of these limitations, but it is an excellent example of the problems for anybody who would try to study such a complex question based on empirical data in just ten pages. The last study of the first chapter ('Religion and Values in the ESS' by Caillin Reynolds) examines the correlations of religiousness and value systems with the help of multi-level regression analysis. One of the most important statements of the study is that religion in itself strongly affects one's value system, and the wider social climate of the country also has a similar effect. The latter is one of the most important determining factors of basic cultural norms.

The analysis uses items of the Human Values Inventory, which has been part of the ESS standard questionnaire from the beginning and is thus the most extensive 'quality' source for data on human values.

The second chapter is about social identity. One of the rarities of the book is that four Hungarian authors (Dániel Oross, Andrea Szabó, Ivett Szalma and Judit Takács) contributed in three studies. This shows that even though the number of Hungarian researchers who use ESS data is not very high when compared to other European countries, those that do are very active in publication. The first Hungarian contribution is a piece by Michael Ochsner and Ivett Szalma ('Work-Life Conflict of Working Couples Before and During the Crisis in 18 European Countries'), that deals with the change of gender roles, the division of labour at home, and the conflict of work and private life. The analysis uses a massive statistical apparatus and answers several research questions of the topic, but its most interesting result is that the increase in work-related stress affected even those who managed to keep their jobs despite the crisis, and this correlation was present even in countries that were much less affected by economic recession.

The analysis of Amy Erbe Healy and Seán Ó Riain with the long title 'A Tale of Two Surveys: Using European Social Survey and European Working Conditions Survey to Predict Welfare Attitudes by Work Regime' follows the strategy mentioned above. It uses two independent sources of data to predict welfare attitudes in various work organizational regimes. The method is basically a comparison of the results of the two data sources.

Marguerite Beattie's study 'Societal-Level Equality and Well-Being' seeks for a correlation between social equality and welfare and includes variables like justice and trust. The author uses the ESS data from between 2002 and 2012 and the Gini coefficient from the OECD, but the results are not very exciting, the applied method and the conclusions could be questioned from various points of view.

The third chapter of the book also includes three writings on political identity and safety. Krystina Chabova's highly promising study, 'Corruption in European Countries: A Cross-National Comparison' adopts a macro perspective to examine the topic. The author is interested in the correlations of income inequality, economic development, the ratio of members of Protestant churches, the quantity of general trust, and the level of corruption in the given country. Corruption is an extremely complex social phenomenon and the means of quantifying it and compressing it into a simple index or explaining it by a causal link has long been the aim of social sciences and policy type research. Even though there is no perfect solution for the task, all experiments are interesting and edifying. Chabova does not examine very complex questions; she merely tests the well-known hypotheses using the data of ESS. The analysis is unique because at the level of statistics models and interpretation it separates European countries into post-Communist and non-post-Communist groups and thus reveals differences that would have stayed in the dark with an overall European approach. The results show that the (mainly 'Western') hypotheses proved to be true in the countries without a Communist past, but the correlations are not that clear in the Eastern part of Europe. For example, the higher amount of trust or the lower levels of income inequality do not decrease corruption in these countries.

Two Hungarian authors, Dániel Oross and Andrea Szabó examine the political participation of the youth of four countries: Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Hungary in their study 'Changing Tendencies of Youth Political Participation in Europe: Evidence from Four Different Cases'. Each of these countries represent a unique model: voting has been obligatory in Belgium since 1892, Austria decreased the age of voting to 16 in 2007, Switzerland is unique in its traditions of direct democracy, and Hungary is an interesting case because the socialisation of political processes is still strongly determined by the post-Communist heritage. The authors used the participation in elections and the forms of voicing and acting out their political opinions as independent variables in their analysis. The results show that the political participation of the youth of these four countries follows different patterns. In Belgium and Austria, the participation of the youth is almost as high, or even higher than that of adults. In Switzerland and Hungary non-electoral participation is lower among the young. This is mainly true for Hungary, where it is so low that it can hardly be measured among the young. One of the main statements of the study is that non-electoral participation can mainly be explained by individual variables, whereas participation in elections is more determined by wider social and political factors.

The study of Aoife Prendergast ('Untangling our Attitudes Towards Irish Citizen Involvement and Democracy') focuses on the Irish case. Based on ESS data it shows how democracy (democracy-related attitudes) correlates with higher education (the content of the training). The main message of the author is that education (in social sciences) is essential if we aim to have citizens who are capable of implementing democracy. Obviously, this statement could or should be heard by several other countries, as well.

The studies of the fourth chapter on family also discuss various topics. Alexandra Lipasova's piece deals with Russia ('Fatherhood in Russia: Fertility Decisions and Ideational Factors'). It focuses on the 'masculinity crisis' of Russian men that is brought about by changing gender roles. While women can apply for traditionally male roles (career, business success, etc.), males who would undertake female roles (staying home with the children, taking up traditionally female jobs, etc.) are still strongly stigmatized.

In Mare Ainsaar's analysis ('Well-Being in Married and Cohabiting Families with Children and Social Support during Economic Recession in Europe') the author is treading on thin ice when trying to find a clear causal link between marriage, cohabitation, having children, and life satisfaction. The author states that couples with children have an advantage in life satisfaction and well-being, but its extent is strongly determined by the economic and social support they receive from their country. Another statement of the study is that marriage can be the source of a higher amount of satisfaction than other forms of cohabitation. As before, the problem with such statements is that they do not seem to be able to differentiate which factor is the cause and which is the effect. Reality tends to be more complex than the scope of a narrow statistical analysis.

The last study of the chapter is the work of Hungarian authors ('How to Measure Fathering Practices in a European Comparison?'). Ivett Szalma and Judit Takács examined the change of male and female roles in Europe. The analysis is unique because it is based on both ESS and EVS (European Value Study) data, so it is

remarkable from the aspect of international comparative research methodology. Although there is no exact correspondence between the two datasets, the results show the same trends. Among others, gender-related attitudes and expectations have changed significantly in Europe – and Hungary is no exception.

The last chapter of the book contains writings on ESS methodology. Helge Baumann examines the most significant challenge of questionnaire surveys: non-response. The analysis narrows down the question to just one variable ('How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the government protects all citizens against poverty?') and two countries (Germany and Ireland). The main dilemma of such research is whether the attitude and socio-demographic profile of those who refused to answer is significantly different from that of the other interviewees.

Brendan Halpin and Michael J. Breen write about the possibilities of combining datasets ('Combining Multiple Datasets for Simultaneous Analysis on the Basis of Common Identifiers'). Using various imputation models, their analysis examines opportunities for merging ESS and EVS datasets that were applied together in several other studies. It is beyond the scope of this review to discuss their results in detail, but it is definitely an exciting and unavoidable possibility of the future.

Finally, Ana Villar and Rory Fitzgerald, members of the central management team of ESS, report on the experience of mixed data collection. It is important to mention that ESS has been very active in experimenting and at the same time canonizing, as the crisis of the traditional ways of data collection is more and more evident. A legitimate methodology of data collection must be found that can react to the changes of technology and the growing demotivation of the interviewees. Meanwhile, it guarantees a high standard collection of (nearly) identical quality data in very heterogeneous cultural, social and economic environments.

All in all*, Values and Identities in Europe* is an exciting intellectual adventure in the world of international comparative research that reveals some of the most current ideas and trends in social sciences and the methodological challenges of research.

BENCE SÁGVÁRI (sagvari.bence@tk.mta.hu)
Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Book Review

Social aspects of uncertainty

Sztabiński, Franciszek, Domański, Henryk and Sztabiński, Paweł (eds.) (2018) *New Uncertainties and Anxieties in Europe.* Berlin: Peter Lang. 285 pages.

This book is part of a series of volumes that aim to give insight into selected findings from the European Social Survey. In frame of the ESS research every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples and a huge emphasis is put on the dissemination of the results. A great merit of the book is that it includes all countries participating in the research between 2002 and 2014. As it is an edited volume it contains several different topics with special emphasis on the consequences of sweeping changes in social relations with respect to uncertainty that is related to globalization of labour markets, intensified competition and the accelerated spread of networks and new technologies.

The first part of the book consists of studies concerning migration, xenophobia, and ethnic discrimination.

Authors Jaak Billiet, Bart Meuleman and Eldad Davidov study the relation between ethnic threat and economic insecurity in times of economic crisis. They distinguish five study designs that are used to analyse the topic and offer a detailed overview of them. The chapter not only summarizes results of recent studies based on the given design but also presents figures and tables to enable readers to make an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of each design. Their analysis is based on Group Conflict Theory: according to this perspective, negative outgroup sentiments are seen as defensive reactions to perceived intergroup competition for scarce goods. Their findings provide clear evidence for the existence of longitudinal effects of economic conditions on economic threat perceptions: growing unemployment as well as decreasing rates of economic growth strengthen feelings of economic threat.

The second chapter focuses on Poland and Germany in a comparative perspective to explain what drives attitudes towards migrants and identification with populist parties. Peter Schmidt, Lucyna Darowska and Daniel Georg test 21 hypotheses and run three structural equation models separately for Poland as well as Eastern and Western Germany in order to find out whether deprivation, values or racism are the driving factors. A main finding of the chapter is that group related deprivation is strongly connected with economic threat in all three regions. However, the effect is the strongest in Eastern Germany and the weakest in Poland. The group-related deprivation is associated with cultural threat, which has the strongest effect of all measured factors on the rejection of migration. Biological racism has little indirect effect on migration, whereas values have a strong effect. Education plays a decisive

role in Germany and Poland in relation to universalism, having negative mediatory effects on economic threat, fraternal deprivation and cultural threat.

In order to detect to what extent attitudes to migrants depend on economic and cultural threats, the chapter written by Zbigniew Karpiński and Kinga Wysieńska-Di Carlo analyse attitudes towards immigration in Europe. The authors do not formulate any new hypotheses, instead they test predictions stemming from existing theories regarding the sources of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration and aim to detect the attitudinal effects of changing contexts and macro-level/structural characteristics in a comparative perspective. Firstly, they present the theory of self-interest and economic threat: as people compete for scarce resources, they exhibit negative attitudes towards any person or group that is perceived as threatening their status or position. Secondly, they mention values and symbolic threat as a set of explanations claiming that people's attitudes are also shaped by their values and social identities. People hold on to certain ideals, which they internalized early in life or during their education, and which foster support for or rejection of certain ideals of equality and diversity. These values, according to this viewpoint, are driving attitudes, independently of individual or group economic interests. The theory of ethnic competition and related contextual variables explains that both economic and symbolic threats are assumed to respond to the same conditions. Therefore, the social identity and group conflict theories have been treated as complementary rather than competing and have been combined and jointly referred to as ethnic competition theory. Finally, they mention the theory that focuses on integration policies and attitudes suggesting that different national-level migration and integration policies may mediate between the size of immigrant inflow, economic conditions, and attitudes towards immigration. Their results using data from Rounds 1 through 7 of the European Social Survey challenge predictions of the competitive threat hypothesis and are more consistent with the normative theory of group relations, with its focus on integration policies. Authors show that native members of the societies studied were more likely to experience threat and exhibit anti-immigration attitudes if they were members of vulnerable groups: the unemployed, retired, permanently sick or disabled, women and ageing cohorts. Educated people and students feel less threatened and more open towards immigration in general. The pattern of findings from their model challenges the competitive threat theory and their findings provide an interesting overview of the attitudinal effects of contextual factors. The authors found consistent support for the normative theory of group relations, with its focus on integration policies.

Perception and openness towards migrants are the topic of the third chapter written by Katarzyna Andrejuk. Comparison of ESS data from 2002 and 2014 shows that respondents from many European countries have become less restrictive in their requirements towards potential immigrants. Members of host societies accept more and more multiculturalism and have a growing level of tolerance for different lifestyles. Openness to multiculturalism is also affected by age and the level of education: younger and more educated respondents are more apt to accept immigrants, but the strength of this correlation varies depending on the country. The results also reveal that respondents from the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe are less likely to praise multiculturalism. In their ethnically

homogeneous states, cultural differences have rarely been part of their everyday experience. However, both in Western Europe and the countries of the post-Soviet bloc, inhabitants manifest similar patterns of acceptance of and preferences for certain groups of migrants.

Chapter five deals with group differences concerning trust in democratic institutions, participation in conventional political protests and cooperation with political parties and associations. Based on data from two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS, Rounds 6 and 7) Irina Tomescu-Dubrow and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski contrast the political engagement of two groups: people who experience discrimination because of their broadly understood ethnicity and those with xenophobic attitudes, who create an environment that is actually hostile towards 'the others' defined through different ethnicity. The authors find that the impact of belonging to the extreme groups on trust in democratic institutions is relatively strong and negative. In comparison with the majority of society, people who feel discriminated against on grounds of ethnic origin tend to protest more whereas xenophobes are inclined to protest less. Belonging to a group of people discriminated against on grounds of ethnicity has a significant and positive impact on volunteering in civil society organizations.

The second part of the volume deals with legitimization, stratification and health.

In chapter six Andrzej Rychard points out the specificity of trust and legitimization in Poland. Compared to other chapters of the book there is much less empirical analysis in this part (only a table about the dynamic of the index of trust between 2002 and 2014) and the main arguments of the author are mostly theoretical and descriptive. While readers can learn a lot about the political situation in Poland from the democratic transition of the country until the politics of the Tusk government, it is quite surprising to find this chapter in the middle of a book that deals with seven rounds of ESS data.

Henryk Domański, Dariusz Przybysz and Artur Pokropek deal with the question of marital choices in European countries. The authors apply both cross-national and temporal analytical designs to discover differences between countries. As the most important selection criterion is the similarity of the social position between the future husband and wife, the chapter shows changes in time in the association between education and socio-occupational positions of spouses. The increase in international mobility, linked to the expansion of the European Union; the economic and financial crisis of 2008 and the influence of the expansion of higher education in the post-communist countries are three factors considered as reasons for significant changes. According to the results university graduates are much more likely to marry people with a similar status than someone with a lower level of education. This regularity is reflected in the higher likelihood of marriage between the categories at the top of the professional hierarchy while labourers and farmers have fewer such opportunities. These patterns turned out to be very stable. A clear gradation of barriers in marital choices was detected as common to all countries, with senior executives and professionals forming one end of this hierarchy and people with lower social status the other.

Chapter seven deals with the topic of sleep disorders, an illness that affects a growing number of people. The study of Antonina Ostrowska and Teresa Żmijewska-Jędrzejczyk highlights the social context in which sleep disorders appear. The authors observed the greatest differences over time in Germany and Poland. They found that sleeplessness increases generally with age. Women sleep less well in countries where women and the elderly have relatively lower status. Physical and mental health variables, to a sense of loneliness, and to perception of financial conditions and living conditions in general, also have visible explanatory power according to the findings of the chapter.

The last part of the book contains a chapter devoted to methodological approaches applied in the ESS. The methodological part of the volume is represented by an article written by Paweł B. Sztabiński about the use of mixed mode research design to improve the response rate in face-to-face surveys. The chapter demonstrates results obtained by employing a mixed mode design with the face-to-face mode used alongside self-administered modes. The results of the analyses suggest that the use of the mixed mode in the experiment presented by the article does not lead to surveying additional categories of respondents distinct with respect to the social demographic. Considering that socially isolated people are generally underrepresented in face-to-face surveys, this result may suggest that the application of a mixed mode design with a self-administered questionnaire makes it easier to reach such respondents.

Weaknesses of the volume follow from the heterogeneity of its chapters: diversity in terms of the topics that it deals with, but also in terms of the number of countries involved in comparison (from a single country to all countries that took part in the ESS). As *New Uncertainties and Anxieties in Europe* is an edited volume there is not much that binds the chapters of the volume together beyond the fact that all authors use the data of the European Social Survey.

The volume is a valuable source of inspiration for researchers using ESS data, members of the academic community and students interested in methodological concerns and solutions for challenges of linking theoretical concepts to the variables of the ESS dataset.

DÁNIEL OROSS (oross.daniel@tk.mta.hu)
Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Authors' Biographies

Ildikó Barna is an associate professor of sociology at ELTE University, Faculty of Social Sciences in Budapest, where she also serves as head of the Department for Social Research Methodology. Her research interest includes quantitative social research, Holocaust and post-Holocaust Studies, anti-Semitism, hate crimes and hate speech, and quantitative research on historical data.
Piotr Cichocki is an assistant professor at Adam Mickiewicz University, Institute of Sociology, Poznań, Poland.

Denisa Fedakova is a researcher at CSPS SAS. She does the research in social and work psychology focusing on perception of job (in)security and work-family(life) balance. She has been working on several international projects and coordinating European Social Survey in Slovakia.

István Grajczjár is a college professor at Milton Friedman University in Budapest, Hungary and since 2012 a guest professor at the University of Vienna, Austria. His main professional research fields are the impacts of socio-economic and political crises and changes on the labour market and on social inequalities in European societies, as well as the research of reasons of the appeal and rising of right-wing populist and extremist parties in Europe. He collaborated with Jörg Flecker and Ulrike Papouschek in the European SIREN project and is an expert in quantitative methods having acted as analyst of different rounds of ESS and ISSP databases. He is the project leader of the Hungarian SOCRIS team.

Piotr Jabkowski is an assistant professor at Adam Mickiewicz University, Institute of Sociology, Poznań, Poland.

Julia Koltai is a research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences; also an assistant professor at the Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Social Sciences. She obtained her PhD in sociology in 2013. Her main research focus is on quantitative methodology and statistics.

Vera Messing, PhD is a senior research associate of the Institute of Sociology at the HAS since 2004 and a research fellow at the Center for Policy Studies since 2008. Her research includes a wide range of topics, such as social science methods, ethnic and racial minorities, migration, social exclusion, media representation of vulnerable groups and ethnic conflicts. Her work focuses on comparative understanding of different forms and intersections of social inequalities and ethnicity and their consequences. She is also interested in social science methods, validity of cross-country comparative data. She is a lead researcher of the Hungarian team of the European Social Survey and has has been involved in the coordination of several comparative European research project (FP7, H2020). She has published in academic journals such as Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power; Ethnicities; Ethnic and Racial Studies; European Education, Intercultural Education.

Authors' Biographies

Zsófia Nagy holds degrees in sociology and social anthropology, and is an assistant professor at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest Department of Social Psychology, Faculty of Social Sciences. In the recent years, her main research field concerns social movements, with a dual focus: the relationship between social movements and solidarity (movements that emerged as a response to the so-called 'refugee crisis') and the mediatized nature of social movements (their position in a mediatized opportunity structure). She is presently carrying out fieldwork in Hungary and Greece. In the past, her research fields included the sociology of death and grief, with a special focus on obituaries and their relationship to social memory; social trust and its evolution in Hungary. She is currently a doctoral candidate at the Doctoral School of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences.

Daniel Oross is a political scientist. He received his PhD in political sciences from the Corvinus University of Budapest in 2015. Since 2011 he is junior research fellow of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Political Science. His research interests are political participation, youth policy, political socialization, democratic innovations.

Antal Örkény is professor of sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest. From 2011 he is heading the Post Graduate (PhD) Program in social sciences at ELTE, and a visiting Professor at the CEU. As civic engagement, he is the president of the Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants. His major research fields are cross-national surveys method, popular perceptions of social justice, national identity and national stereotypes, Roma minority and prejudice against Roma, border identity, inter-ethnic relations in the Carpathian Basin, international migration and xenophobia, integration strategies in different migrant groups. He is a senior researcher in the SOCRIS project team.

Ivana Piterová is a PhD student in the Social and Occupational Psychology at the Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences of Slovak Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include attitudes towards welfare, attitudes towards immigrants, value orientations, preventive behaviour, and safety perception. She is a member of National coordinating team for European Social Survey, member of the research team for VEGA 2/0068/19 - Attitudes towards immigrants in socio-psychological contexts, and also collaborator on Towards Gender Harmony Project.

Bence Ságvári is a senior research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Research, and national coordinator for the European Social Survey (ESS). He is also a research fellow at the International Business School (IBS). In 2014/15, he was a Visiting Fulbright Professor at Indiana University Bloomington in the US. Currently he is the principal investigator of the project 'Uncovering patterns of social inequalities and imbalances in large-scale networks' (Grant No. OTKA K129124). His research interests include values and attitudes, social networks, Big Data in social sciences, and social aspects of ICT use.

Authors' Biographies

David Simon, is a lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University, and also a research fellow of Kopint Foundation for Economic Reseach. He participated in external quality control of the 6th European Working Condition Survey as senior researcher. He also paticipated as advisor in EURA-NET (Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People) funded by 7th Framework Programme. Currently he is coresearcher in the project: 'Migration – approaching the reality with innovative methodology' (Grant No. OTKA K120711). His research interests includes ethnic minorites, migration, and sociolgy of education apart from methodological issues.

Ivett Szalma is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, an Assistant Professor at the Public Policies and Management Department of the Corvinus University of Budapest, and the Head of the Family Sociology Section of the Hungarian Sociological Association. Her research topics include the effects of economic crises on work-life conflicts, post-separation fertility, childlessness, measurement of homophobia and adoption by same-sex couples. Her main publications in English are the following: 'Democracy deficit and homophobic divergence in 21st century Europe' (co-authored with J. Takács), published in *Gender, Place & Culture* (forthcoming); 'Is There Voluntary Childlessness At All in Hungary' (co-authored with J. Takács, in the volume *Voluntary and Involuntary Childlessness: The Joys of Otherhood?*) and 'Work-life conflict of working couples before and during the crisis in 20 European countries' (co-authored with M. Oshsner, in the volume *Values and Identities in Europe: Evidence from the European Social Survey*).

Judit Takács is a Research Chair at the Institute of Sociology, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, responsible for leading research teams and conducting independent research on the social history of homosexuality, social exclusion/inclusion of LGBTQ+ people, HIV/AIDS prevention as well as family practices, work-life balance issues and childlessness. Her recent publications include 'How involved are involved fathers in Hungary? Exploring caring masculinities in a post-socialist context' (in *Families, Relationships, and Societies*); 'Trans* Citizenship in Post-socialist Societies' (co-authored with R. Kuhar and S. Monro, in *Critical Social Policy*) and 'Social Attitudes toward Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in Europe' (co-authored with I. Szalma and T. Bartus, in *Archives of Sexual Behavior*). A list of her publications can be found at http://www.policy.hu/takacs/publications.php.

Alberto Veira Ramos is a professor of Demographic analysis and Population Theory at the Carlos III University of Madrid. He worked as visiting researcher at the INED of Paris and was collaborator of the flexCareer research project at Göttingen University. His research focuses on demography of the labour market in European societies and the occupational distribution of immigrant population in Spain.

Jozef Výrost is senior researcher at the Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences of Slovak Academy of Sciences and professor of social psychology at the Faculty of Arts of P. J. Šafárik University. From 2004 to 2018 he took part in the European Social Survey project as Slovakian national coordinator. He is leading editor of several social psychology textbooks and publications written by teams of Czech and Slovak authors.