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Aims and Scope

Critical Romani Studies is an international, interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journal providing a forum for activist-scholars to critically examine racial oppressions, different forms of exclusion, inequalities, and human rights abuses of Roma. Without compromising academic standards of evidence collection and analysis, the Journal seeks to create a platform to critically engage with academic knowledge production, and generate critical academic and policy knowledge targeting – amongst others – scholars, activists, and policymakers.

Scholarly expertise is a tool, rather than the end, for critical analysis of social phenomena affecting Roma, contributing to the fight for social justice. The Journal especially welcomes the cross-fertilization of Romani studies with the fields of critical race studies, gender and sexuality studies, critical policy studies, diaspora studies, colonial studies, postcolonial studies, and studies of decolonization.

The Journal actively solicits papers from critically-minded young Romani scholars who have historically experienced significant barriers in engaging with academic knowledge production. The Journal considers only previously unpublished manuscripts which present original, high-quality research. The Journal is committed to the principle of open access, so articles are available free of charge. All published articles undergo rigorous peer review, based on initial editorial screening and refereeing by at least two anonymous scholars. The Journal provides a modest but fair remuneration for authors, editors, and reviewers.

The Journal has grown out of the informal Roma Research and Empowerment Network, and it is founded by the Romani Studies Program of Central European University and the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture. The Romani Studies Program at CEU organizes conferences annually where draft papers are presented and discussed before selecting them for peer review.
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Abstract

This study conducts a framing analysis of how Spanish journalism represents “Gypsy identity” within the markers of dangerousness and criminality (in the period from 2010 to 2018). The paper aims to validate the following underpinning hypothesis: as symbolic and epistemic violence, antigypsyism legitimizes systemic racial discrimination and exclusion against Roma in Spain. The article is organized into five sections. First, an analytical framework introduces the notions of “antigypsyism,” “structural discrimination,” “social fear,” “symbolic violence,” “epistemic violence,” and “framing analysis.” Second, a case study is presented on a sample of 150 national news reports that portray Romani characters in a biased way. Third, this analysis informs an ethical and legal debate that challenges the limits of free speech and the uses of discriminatory and biased language in informative narratives. The fourth section examines and provides conclusions regarding the correlation between structural discrimination against Roma and the role of media in engendering the stigma of the “Gypsy threat.” Finally, the article includes a series of recommendations that could be used to counteract racism in news narratives.

Keywords

- Antigypsyism
- Structural discrimination
- Framing analysis
- Symbolic violence
- Epistemic violence
- Social fear
- Journalism
Introduction

The ultimate goal of this study is to orient media policies and media practices toward the promotion of nondiscrimination of ethno-racial minorities – and more concretely to the prevention of antigypsyism.

In recent years, the notion of “antigypsyism” has received increasing attention in political and scholarly fields in Europe (Agarin 2014; End and Selling 2015; European Parliament 2015; 2017; Carrera, Rostas, and Vosyljuite 2017; 2018, European Union Fundamental Rights Agency 2018; Cortés and End 2019). The following different (and complementary) definitions have been proposed at institutional and civil societal levels:

- Antigypsyism is a specific form of racism, an ideology founded on racial superiority, and a form of dehumanization and institutional racism nurtured by historical discrimination, which is expressed through, among other things, violence, hate speech, exploitation, stigmatization, and the most blatant kind of discrimination (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2011).
- Antigypsyism is a specific nature of racism directed towards Roma, on par with anti-Semitism. It is persistent both historically and geographically (permanent and not decreasing), systematic (accepted by virtually all the community), and often accompanied by acts of violence and discrimination (Council of Europe 2012).
- Antigypsyism is a historically constructed, persistent complex of customary racism against social groups identified under the stigma “Gypsy,” or other related terms and incorporates. It includes the homogenizing and essentialising perception and description of these groups, the attribution of specific characteristics to them, and discriminating social structures and violent practices that emerge against this background, and which have a degrading and ostracising effect, and reproduce structural disadvantages (Alliance against Antigypsyism 2017).

The fight against antigypsyism is part of a wider fight against racial discrimination. According to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD):

the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life (ICERD 1965).

According to the EU Race Equality Directive, racial or ethnic discrimination includes the unequal access or treatment of certain groups in areas such as employment, education, security, healthcare, housing, and the supply of goods and services (Directive 2000/43/EC). According to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the study of situations of exclusion and discrimination should not only describe a certain state of deprivation of fundamental rights, but should include an analysis of the cultural and economic processes that led to that state and sustain it (ECOSOC 2018).
Apart from the aforementioned items, urban segregation can also be considered in the fundamental matrix of racial exclusion. Picker (2017) reported that segregated Romani urban areas, which are partially or completely occupied by Romani households, can be observed across Europe. These are regularly marked by higher rates of unemployment than other areas, with few or no public services, substandard housing, low-quality education, unsuitable sanitary infrastructure, and harsh stigmatisation.\[^1\] In Spain, recent studies have reported 2,604 segregated Roma neighbourhoods or settlements corresponding to 1,069 municipalities (Laparra 2011; La Parra-Casado and Jiménez González 2016; Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad 2016).

This paper responds to recent studies that have analysed the notions of “discrimination” and “exclusion” related to antigypsyism. Ryder and Taba (2017) focused on the effect of economic intervention and redistribution on diminishing antigypsyism. They recommended active welfare state measures and special efforts for job creation. Rostas (2019) emphasised democratisation and active citizenship. He claims that the rise of Romani\[^2\] political consciousness – that is, Romani participation in public life and the representation of Romani interests in decision-making processes – may be a crucial element in bringing about systemic transformations and eliminating discrimination. On the other hand, Kóczé and Rövid (2019) and End (2019) pointed to the power of media and political discourses to challenge deep-rooted anti-Romani prejudices and deconstruct cultural mechanisms of binary othering.

This paper aims to contribute to the theoretical and political critique of antigypsyism by, on the one hand, examining the moral foundations of media representations, and on the other hand, by explaining how systemic relationships of racial discrimination and exclusion are constructed through symbolic and epistemic frameworks. This paper analyses the use of symbolism and knowledge as a core mechanism of antigypsyism. As such, the paper is based on the concepts of “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1979) and “epistemic violence” (Spivak and Guha 1988; Spivak 1994). Bourdieu’s classical definition of symbolic power is as follows:

> The power to construct reality, which tends to establish a gnoseological order, generates the consensus on the sense of a social world, which makes a fundamental contribution toward reproducing the social order; “logical” integration is the precondition of “moral” integration… The dominant culture produces its specific ideological effect by concealing

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\[^1\] See annexes for data on the situation of anti-Romani discrimination in Spain.

\[^2\] As indicated by Petrova, the term “Roma,” which is the ethnocultural self-appellation of many of those perceived by outsiders as “Gypsies,” dominates the official political discourse and has acquired the legitimacy of political correctness (Petrova 2003). As explained by Hancock (2002), the ethnonym “Gypsy” was mistakenly introduced and used in the United Kingdom between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The then non-Romani population in the UK used the term “Gypsy” based on the misinterpretation that the Romani people came from Egypt. The original endonym used in the Romani language includes “Róm” (man), “Romyj” (woman), and “Roma” (plural generic). In 2012, the European Commission began implementing the European Framework of National Roma Inclusion Strategies and provided the following definition: “the term ‘Roma’ is used here as well as by a number of international organizations and representatives of Roma groups in Europe, to refer to a number of different groups (e.g., Roma, Sinti, Kale, Gypsies, Romanichels, Boyash, Ashkali, Egyptians, Yenish, Dom, and Lom) and also includes Travellers, without denying the specificities and varieties of lifestyles and situations of these groups” (European Commission 2012).
its function of division (or distinction) under its function of communication: the culture which unites (a medium of communication), separates (an instrument of distinction) and legitimates distinctions by defining all cultures (designated as sub-cultures) in terms of their distance from the dominant culture (Bourdieu 1979, 79–80).

The original concept of epistemic violence, coined by Spivak, focuses on the colonial subject as follows:

The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine (Spivak 1994, 76)?

There have been several developments in the concept of epistemic violence (Bartels et al. 2019). In recent studies, epistemic violence has been proposed as applicable to non-colonial subjects (i.e., to any victim of a complex system of domination developed on knowledge/power relationships):

Epistemic violence, that is, violence exerted against or through knowledge, is probably one of the key elements in any process of domination. It is not only through the construction of exploitative economic links or the control of the politico-military apparatuses that domination is accomplished, but also and, I would argue, most importantly, through the construction of epistemic frameworks that legitimise and enshrine those practices of domination (Galván Alvárez 2010, 11).

The concept of “epistemic activism,” coined by Medina (2019), is also considerably relevant to our analysis. The multidimensional approach towards the study of racism, employed by Medina, embraces public and private institutions, cognitive contents, and affective engagements and disengagements:

[epistemic activism] refers to the critical activities of denouncing, contesting and resisting the cognitive–affective attitudes and sensibilities (or insensitivities) that facilitate complicity with racial oppression and with racial violence. My analysis pays particular attention to the role that affectivity plays in complicity with racial violence and how affective attitudes can be used in epistemic activism to disrupt complicity and to mobilize people in the fight against racial violence (Medina 2019, 22).

Different postcolonial authors have reported that in the post-apartheid period, and in the resulting globalisation of anti-racist laws, racial discrimination became predominantly symbolic, cultural, and epistemic, thereby (re)articulating social hierarchies, divisions, and inequalities (Bhabha 2011; Mbembe 2017; Carty and Chandra 2018). Therefore, the fight for racial justice must take new forms to (re)develop strategies of universal inclusion. In this fight for equality, new approaches to use symbolic and epistemic power are crucial for transforming unjust or discriminatory social relations.
This study conducts a framing analysis of how the mainstream media helps forge stereotypes and prejudices of society towards certain ethnic groups labelled as “Gypsies.”[3] Popular stereotypes and prejudices gain epistemic authority upon reinforcement through informative journalism. Beyond the semantic analysis, this study examines three primary effects of the misrepresentation of Roma by news narratives: (1) damaging the reputation of a collective subject, (2) creating fear-based public opinion, and (3) legitimising systemic racial discrimination. This article aims to show that these effects originate from the same anti-Romani media coverage across the ideological spectrum of editorial newspapers in Spain.

Informative narratives define the magnitude of social problems, but they also transmit moral judgements about those responsible, inducing certain sentiments and emotions regarding them. Informative narratives, therefore, serve to not only build cognitive frameworks but also construct frames of interpretation (De los Santos et al. 2019). Regarding the content of the news and the way in which it is framed, this article focuses on the social dimension of fear. In the terms analysed here, “fear” is not a feeling that affects an individual subject, at a particular moment of its existence. I study “fear” as a feeling that affects an important part of the population, in a sustained manner over time, as a result of the collective perception of a social problem. On this matter, in the American context, Hurley’s studies (2015) are of special interest. He analysed the construction of the fear of crime in television news and discovered a disproportionate coverage in relation to ethnic-racial variables, with the (over)representation of African Americans as aggressors and white Americans as victims. In the post-9/11 European context, Rane (2014; 2019) examined how media generated Islamophobia. He highlighted how, for most people, the (long-term, negative) representations of Muslims in the media serve as a primary source of information about Islam. He also suggested the need for a greater dialogue among different ethnic communities, and more educational interaction, to mitigate the prevalence of Islamophobia.

Informative journalism plays a major role in fostering associations and sentiments of social divisions and moral hierarchies; and news reporting constructs the identifying of, and assigning of blame for,

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3 As indicated by Matache and Oprea (2019), the words "Gypsy" (in English), "Tigan" (in Romanian), and its variations have been widely acknowledged as offensive, or at the very least, misnomers. The word “Gitano” (in Spanish) should also be included here. The following are definitions from the dictionary of the Real Academia Española (Royal Spanish Academy):

1) Tigan: 1. A person belonging to a group originating in India and that has now spread to almost every European country, living a seminomadic life in some parts; to drown like a Gypsy in shallow water or at shore – that is, to fail, to give up right when one is just about to succeed. 2. Epithet given to a dark-skinned person. 3. Epithet given to a person with bad habits.

2) Gypsy: 1. A member of a travelling group, traditionally living by itinerant trade and fortune telling. Gypsies speak a language (Romany) that is related to Hindi and are believed to have originated in South Asia. 2. A nomadic or free-spirited person. 3. (adjective) (of a business or business person) non-union or unlicensed.

3) Gitano (etymology from “Egyptian,” because it was believed that they came from Egypt) 1. (adjective) Referring to a people originally from India, extended by various countries, who largely maintain a nomadic lifestyle and have retained their own physical and cultural features. 2. (adjective) Belonging to or relative to the Gypsies. 3. (adjective) Belonging to the Gypsies, or similar to them. 4. (adjective) caló (belonging to dark skin people) (Romani lexicon). 5. (adjective) cheater, offensive or discriminatory. 6. (adjective) A graceful and skilled person, able to win the will of others, especially in reference to a woman. 7. (adjective) Egyptian (native of Egypt). 8. (noun) Caló (variety of Romani language) (Real Academia Española 2018, author’s translation).
social problems (D'Angelo and Kuypers 2009; Kelsey 2017; Jakobsson and Stiernstedt 2018). In the post-truth era, well-established news corporations have attempted to justify their social values and epistemic authority by making truth claims based on contrasting facts and expert opinions (Halimi and Rimbert 2019). This paper challenges the objectivity and neutrality of informative journalism when representing Romani identity within the symbolic framework of violence and criminality. Methodologically, through a framing analysis, this paper highlights the rhetorical patterns of social fear engendered by news narratives. Kuypers defined news framing as follows:

consciously or unconsciously, [news framing] acts to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner. Frames operate in four key ways: they define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. Frames are often found within a narrative account of an issue or event and are generally the central organising idea (2006, 190).

1. Case Study

My research started with 1,200 news samples from the most prominent national newspapers: El País, ABC, La Razón, and El Mundo. These samples revealed an explicit semantic association between acts of violence and Romani people. The initial sample size was then narrowed to 100 cases that were repeatedly covered by these four media sources (see annexes). Furthermore, 50 of these 100 cases were commonly reported by the five most prominent national TV news programmes: Informativos de TVE, Antena 3 Noticias, Informativos Telecinco, Noticias Cuatro, and La Sexta Noticias (see annexes).

A semantic frame comprising a repertoire of lexicon and images was then extracted. Such a frame is used to define the criminal actor, their motivations, and the context surrounding the crime. In the reported cases, linguistic representation was accompanied by a mise-en-scène aesthetic of cultural distancing comprising four elements: verbal behaviours (e.g., words and accents), personal images (e.g., clothing), social scenarios (e.g., deteriorated and noisy environments), and nonverbal behaviours (e.g., histrionic emotions and gestures). This frame has been indistinctively and repeatedly used by social, liberal, and conservative news editorials. Thus, a monolithic frame shapes public opinion in a biased direction, associating Romani identity with violence and criminality.

The symbolic construction of cultural distance/cultural proximity determines the moral sentiments of group identification. In this regard, the media analysis revealed the following effects of the misrepresentation of Romani characters: on the one hand, inhibiting attitudes of empathy, solidarity, or trust from the majority society towards Roma; and on the other hand, engendering attitudes of fear, hate, or disdain from the majority society towards Roma.
Table 1. General semantic frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Images of characters</th>
<th>Social scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder (inside the ghetto)</td>
<td>- Actor: “Gypsy” clas - Motive: Revenge</td>
<td>- Affected Romani families - Elderly women and children crying - Elderly men as mediators - Intimacy of Romani families (ordinary life) - Young Romani men and women claiming revenge</td>
<td>A slum in a segregated, urban area: noisy, dirty, and deteriorated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder (outside the ghetto)</td>
<td>- Actor: A “Gypsy” person - Motive: Crime of passion</td>
<td>- Young Romani men as criminals - A young person as victim - Police forces - Non-Roma as witnesses - Professional life of the victim - Family of the victim</td>
<td>A nightclub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed fight (inside the ghetto)</td>
<td>- Actor: “Gypsy” families - Motive: Revenge</td>
<td>- Affected Romani families - Elderly women and children crying - Elderly men as mediators - Intimacy of Romani families (ordinary life) - Young Romani men and women claiming revenge</td>
<td>A slum in a segregated, urban area: noisy, dirty, and deteriorated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Example 1 of framing analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td>A man dies shot in front of a nightclub in Torrejón (a town)</td>
<td>Revenge in the “Picar” (name of the disco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the actors and context</td>
<td>The criminal actors were “Gypsies” involved in a fight with the security guards of the disco. A man, who was not involved in the fight, died after being hit by a bullet at the exit of the disco.</td>
<td>A man was hit by a “stray” bullet from a brawl between a group of “Gypsies” and the security guards at the exit of the disco.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The same case was reported by social, liberal, and conservative news editorials (El País 2010; La Razón 2010; ABC 2010).

Table 3. Example 2 of framing analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td>Six arrested for a brawl with guns in Villena (a town)</td>
<td>Six arrested for their involvement in a brawl with guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the actors and the social scenario</td>
<td>The six arrested belong to “Gypsy” families. The altercation happened in the San Francisco neighbourhood (a popular “Gypsy ghetto” in town).</td>
<td>Six people involved in a brawl between two “Gypsy” families. The altercation happened in the San Francisco neighbourhood.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The same case was reported by social, liberal, and conservative news editorials (El País 2014; El Mundo 2014; ABC 2014).
Table 4. Example 3 of framing analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>El Mundo, 2/9/2015</th>
<th>ABC, 2/9/2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headline</strong></td>
<td>One death and five wounded in a fight between two clans of “Gypsy” ethnicity in Mazarrón (a town)</td>
<td>One death and five hospitalised in a fight between two clans of “Gypsy” ethnicity in Mazarrón.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description of the actors and the social scenario</strong></td>
<td>The police investigators declared that everything started in the morning with an argument between two adversarial families. Hours later, a car intentionally hit a person in the middle of the street. As a consequence, relatives of the victim went to the area where the alleged perpetrators lived and attacked them, resulting in a large brawl, with the death of a woman and several people injured.</td>
<td>An argument in the morning between two women caused a massive fight hours later, in which two “Gypsy” clans have been implicated. After the argument, a driver of a car intentionally injured a pedestrian. Afterward, his relatives went to look for the members of the other family and provoked a massive fight, in which one of the women died and three people were critically injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The same case was reported by liberal and conservative news editorials (El Mundo 2015; ABC 2015).*

**Social Scenarios**

The concept of a dichotomous ethnic living space – inside the ghetto (Romani space) versus outside the ghetto (non-Romani space) – is a virtual construct fixated on and promoted by the news. In real life, several non-Romani people and families live in slums in segregated areas, and Roma live all across the urban landscape. The spatial dichotomy has been artificially radicalised in news narratives. In all possible social scenarios, the news reiterates the image of Romani individuals and families living inside the ghetto and implies that young Romani men cross the ghetto to cause trouble in nightclubs.

**Images of Characters**

The repertoire of images generates an association between the array of individual crimes and a single collective subject as a virtual author of all.

The news media presented the crimes that were committed in the ghetto as if they were committed by all members of a Romani family and not by an individual or a group of individuals. The virtual construction of the Romani family establishes criminal behaviour as an inherent element of the culture and implies that these violent elements are inherited across generations. The mise-en-scène recreates the ordinary life of the ghetto and portrays violence as an embodiment of the living space of the ethnic group. Moreover, it emphasises young Romani men and women claiming revenge after a killing or a fight. This implies a vicious cycle of violence. The mise-en-scène portrays an endless state of violence: the desperate tears and screams of Romani women and children, despite the efforts of Romani elders for pacification.

For crimes committed outside the ghetto, the images focus less on the perpetrator (characterised as a young “Gypsy” man) and more on the victim, police, and non-Romani witnesses. The images focus on
non-Romani citizens and authorities, and portray their experience of criminal disruption caused by a “Gypsy agent” acting outside the ghetto. Moreover, the news narratives include testimonies from the victim’s family, who discuss their professional lives, and represent the victim as a “normal citizen,” as opposed to the “Gypsy evil.”

**Lexicon**

Apart from the images of different ethnic characters and the virtual construction of social scenarios, the use of a lexicon is crucial in establishing a group identity in the public imaginary. In this case, ethnicity is underlined as “Gypsy” (*Gitano* in Spanish).

In cases of collective armed fights in the ghetto, the collective “Gypsy” actor is labelled as a “Gypsy family,” which emphasises associations among kinship, ethnic belonging, and criminal behaviour.

In cases of murders in the ghetto, the collective “Gypsy” actor is labelled as a “clan,” with two primary connotations: (1) In mafia jargon, the word “clan” refers to a criminal group dedicated to selling illegal drugs, money laundering, and/or organised crime; (2) In cultural anthropology, the word “clan” refers to a pre-civilised social organisation – that is, a group with common ancestry, ruled by its own norms apart from the state.\(^4\)

In cases of individual murders outside the ghetto, news narratives highlight the ethnicity of the criminal actor as “Gypsy” and provide no other motivation apart from the impulse for violence against a light provocation. Moreover, the narration emphasises the type of behaviour that is apparently “instinctive” and “natural” to a certain ethnicity. In all cases, the lexicon is redundant (that is, irreconcilable) to the radical cultural distance that exists between the “Gypsy” behaviours and the higher morality of the majority society. Thus, news narratives reinforce the dichotomy between the “Gypsy savageness” and the civilisation of the majority society.

**2. Legal and Ethical Framework**

This analysis is constructed within a legal and ethical framework that regulates discriminatory language in news narratives. In a classical liberal debate on free speech, John Stuart Mill (1859) argued for the absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects. However, he introduced a limit to free speech, that is, the “harm principle.” According to this principle, a speech can be limited if it exhibits a direct and clear violation of rights. Therefore, the core liberal value – commitment to non-interference in the lives of citizens by the state or by other collectives – is sometimes overridden (Riley 2015). Among the possible types of harmful speech mentioned by Mill (1859), including libel, defamation, or insult, hate speech elicits the most concern because it can evolve to inciting violence (Bilgrami 2015).

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In the post-Second World War period, the European Convention on Human Rights restricted the use of freedom of expression in Article 10:

**Article 10: Freedom of expression**

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary (Council of Europe 1950).

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1966, expresses a stance against the use of discriminatory language and its radical expression as “hate speech,” in its Article 20:

Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law (United Nations 1966).

The rise of decolonisation and globalisation have enabled an exponential increase in the implementation of this legal concept. However, similar to the efforts to counteract “hate speech,” the concept of “freedom of expression” has been known worldwide through Article 19 of the ICCPR:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice (United Nations 1966).

Different approaches, including various ethical codes of conduct and legal measures at national and international levels, have been employed to overcome any contradiction between these two articles of the ICCPR. The international code of journalistic ethics of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (1978) presents 10 principles, and journalistic information can be produced on the basis of these principles. Principle eight of this code promotes “respect for universal values and diversity of cultures.” Moreover, the code advocates the idea of a journalist as an agent of social cohesion, pacific coexistence, and democratic values of tolerance and pluralism. However, this principle is vague and does not prevent the use of discriminatory language against vulnerable groups, including ethnic, cultural, and racial minorities.
It should be mentioned that the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), at its 57th session in 2000, recommended the application of measures in order to:

- eradicate any idea of racial or ethnic superiority, racial hatred, and incitement to discrimination and violence against Roma in the media;
- sensitize professionals from all media regarding their responsibility not to spread prejudices, and to be careful when reporting incidents involving individual members of the Roma community in order to avoid making it appear as if communities as a whole are responsible;
- develop educational and media campaigns to educate the public about Roma culture and the importance of building an inclusive society;
- promote and facilitate Roma participation in the media, including newspapers, radio and television programs, and the creation of their own media, as well as training Roma journalists; and
- promote methods of self-control by the media through a code of conduct for media organizations, with the aim of avoiding racist, discriminatory, or biased language.

In its Opinion 02/2013 on the impact of the Framework Decision on the rights of victims of hate crime, including racism and xenophobia, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) recommended a concrete measure to prevent racist discrimination in the media:

**Action 19:** EU Member States should encourage the media – while respecting freedom of the press – to take self-regulatory measures and ensure that the information and programs they publish or transmit do not contribute to the vulnerability of victims or fostering a climate of hostility towards people who share protected characteristics (Fundamental Rights Agency 2013).

In the case of Spain, the current State Council of Audiovisual Media condemns the fostering of hate, disparaging attitudes, or discrimination for reasons of birth, racial origin, race or ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, opinion, or any other personal or social circumstance. More concretely, Spain counts on two major documents aimed at orienting media practices to prevent racism. The first document is the *Code of Ethics for the Journalistic Profession of the Federation of Associations of Journalists of Spain* (FAPE 1993; 2017), which states in its Article 7:

The journalist will take extreme professional zeal to respect the rights of the weakest and most discriminated against. For this reason, it must maintain a special sensitivity in cases of information or opinions that may have discriminatory content or are likely to incite violence or inhuman or degrading practices:

a. It must, therefore, refrain from referring, in a derogatory way or with prejudice to the race, colour, religion, social origin, or sex of a person, or to any disease or disability of physical or mental suffering.

The second relevant document is the *Declaration of Principles of the Journalistic Profession* by the College of Journalists of Catalonia (Collegi de Periodistes de Catalunya 1992; 2016). It states the duty to:
Act with special responsibility and rigour in the case of information or opinions with content that may provoke discrimination based on sex, race, belief, or social and cultural extraction, as well as incite the use of violence, avoiding vexatious or harmful expressions or testimonies for the personal condition of individuals and their physical and moral integrity.

The same College of Journalists of Catalonia carried out a detailed analysis of racism in the media. It contains five recommendations:

1. Do not include ethnic group, skin colour, country of origin, religion, or culture if not strictly necessary for the global understanding of the news.
2. It is necessary to avoid generalities, Manicheism, and simplification of information.
3. Negative or sensational information should not be promoted. We must avoid creating conflicts uselessly and dramatizing them. The search for news must be promoted in a positive manner.
4. Equanimity in the sources of information. Versions need to be checked by consulting institutional sources. It is necessary to promote the characteristics of ethnic minorities and take special care in the information referring to countries of origin.
5. Journalistic militancy: towards an enriching multi-interculturality for all and the enhancement of positive information (Giró 2002).

Freedom of speech is also protected by the Spanish Constitution, in Article 20:

I. The following rights are recognised and protected:
   a. To freely express and disseminate thoughts, ideas, and opinions through words, writings, or any other means of reproduction.
   b. Literary, artistic, scientific, and technical production, and creation.
   c. Academic freedom.
   d. To communicate or freely receive accurate information by any means of dissemination.

The law will regulate the right to the protection of the clause on conscience and professional secrecy in the exercise of these freedoms.

II. The exercise of these rights cannot be restricted by any type of prior censorship (Congreso de los Diputados 1978).

And yet, freedom of speech is limited by the Spanish criminal code, which characterises several criminal offenses related to hate speech:

Article 510.1:

a.i.1. They will be punished with a prison sentence of one to four years and a fine of six to twelve months:
   a. Those who publicly encourage, promote, or directly or indirectly incite hatred, hostility, discrimination, or violence against a group, a part thereof, or against a person.
determined by reason of their membership, for racist, anti-Semitic or other reasons related to ideology, religion or beliefs, family situation, the belonging of its members to an ethnic group, race or nation, national origin, sex, or sexual orientation or identity, for reasons of gender, illness, or disability.

b. Those who produce, elaborate, possess for the purpose of distributing, provide access to third parties, distribute, disseminate, or sell written documents or any other kind of material or media that, due to their content, are suitable to encourage, promote, or incite direct or indirectly to hatred, hostility, discrimination, or violence against a group, a part of it, or against a person determined by reason of their belonging to it, for racist, anti-Semitic, or other reasons related to ideology, religion or beliefs, family situation, the belonging of its members to an ethnic group, race or nation, their national origin, sex, or sexual orientation or identity, for reasons of gender, illness, or disability (Criminal Code 2015; Barja de Quiroga 2019).

The Spanish criminal code prohibits the promotion of hatred, violence, or discrimination through any type of speech. This legal prevention was adopted avant la lettre the definition of “hate speech” approved by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in its Recommendation 15 on Combating Hate Speech:

hate speech is based on the unjustified assumption that a person or a group of persons are superior to others; it incites acts of violence or discrimination, thus undermining respect for minority groups and damaging social cohesion (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2015).

Anti-hate speech measures must be well-founded and not be misused to curb freedom of expression. In informative journalism, the concept of hate speech is an ethical red line of self-censorship. Journalists and editorial teams must understand the factual consequences of news narratives on violent or discriminatory social relations. Furthermore, free speech regulation must be aligned with Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society with pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality (European Union 2007).

Regarding the cases analysed in the previous section, I do not want to imply that any discriminatory framing of members of a certain group is equivalent to hate speech. But I do want to warn about the thin line between a biased coverage of Romani groups or individuals and the harmful effects that can result – that is, creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, and discriminatory environment for Romani people. Editors and journalists should censor output that would cross that line. On the other hand, anti-hate speech legislation is the ultimate regulation of free speech, including freedom of media.
Conclusions

The relation of systemic discrimination and exclusion with symbolic violence can be addressed here with three primary theses:

- Symbolism influences the common sense of the general population and ideologies of governance.
- A historically rooted anti-Romani ideology of governance has placed the Roma population at the bottom of the class structure. This ideology has largely caused impoverishment and declining access to economic and social rights, which is evident through the existing segregated living spaces across the urban landscape of Spain.
- This racist ideology of governance would not be morally accepted in contemporary postcolonial Europe without the social fear of the “Gypsy menace,” as manifested by the media, and particularly informative journalism.

The deep, unconscious nature of anti-Romani sentiments leads people as well as institutions (such as the media) to reproduce prejudiced attitudes towards Roma and associated groups. Thus, they follow certain inherited symbolic patterns – that is, using discriminatory language without reflecting upon their own biases. Most of the time, this happens without an intentional or strategic thinking behind it. The reproduction of symbolic violence is a response to the mechanics of social and cultural inertia. Epistemic activism, in response to this force of oppression, aims to raise awareness about the unconscious biases embodied in widely accepted demeaning narratives.

Recent studies have revealed a disparity between the high level of “perceived criminality” and the low level of “actual criminality” in Spain. In the last 10 years, criminality has been one of the five most prominent social concerns, alongside unemployment, political corruption, the economic crisis, and terrorism (Departamento de Seguridad Nacional 2016; Caro Cabrera and Navarro Ardoy 2017). Nevertheless, according to the World Bank (2016), Spain has one of the lowest murder rates in the European Union, with Germany, France, and Portugal having higher rates than Spain. Approximately 300 people (out of a total population of 50 million) are murdered every year in Spain – that is, 0.7 out of 100,000 deaths per year.

This fact raises the following question: what provokes such a fearful perception of crime in Spain? In order to address this question, I pose the following arguments: (1) Social fear is not associated with people’s actual personal experiences with crime and is related to levels of virtual exposure to crimes reported by media. (2) Social fear is not provoked through the record of actual crimes but through the frequency and intensity of stories of crime published by mass media.

We may ask ourselves: why do Spanish media convey information on crime in this manner? There have been studies showing the low reading rate in Spain, where the purchase of newspapers has become a less popular habit. While in the countries of northern Europe three or four newspapers are sold for every ten inhabitants, in Spain it is barely one (ComScore 2019). Covering violence and criminality increases the interest of news consumers. According to recent polls, this form of content
is the most read in the written press (Statista 2020). Reporting homicides or armed fights arouses the most interest. Furthermore, these are cases that involve not only a breach of law, but a clear manifestation of antisocial behaviour, in which it is easy to make a moral judgement (Rodríguez Cárceles 2016).

Inciting social fear by associating social blame or social innocence with racial, cultural, or ethnic groups is intentionally manipulative. When crimes are committed by people other than Roma, ethnicity is not referenced in the news narratives. But as shown in the case study, Romani ethnicity is repeatedly highlighted in a pejorative manner. Ethically and legally, the responsibility of crimes should be attributed to the individuals committing these crimes and never to abstract agents, such as races, cultures, or ethnicities. By correlating cultures, races, and ethnicities with the antagonistic markers of good and evil, news narratives contribute to maintaining inherited prejudices that engender moral divisions and social inequalities.

Hiding behind claims of neutrality, objectivity, and expertise, informative journalism reproduces biases such as stereotypes and moral misjudgements. The symbolic construction of a cultural distance shapes moral sentiments of disengagement, which inhibits attitudes of empathy, solidarity, and trust, and engenders attitudes of disdain, fear, and hate. In the case of anti-Romani stigmatisation by news narratives, the dialectic of inclusion/exclusion and identity/difference is highly moralised, classifying people in hierarchies of moral worth and dividing them into different living spaces and social hierarchies.

**Recommendations**

Finally, I want to propose some recommendations that could be used to counteract racism (in general) and antigypsyism (in particular), in the field of informative journalism:

- The codes of conduct of the media should prescribe the avoidance of any semantic relationship between ethnicity and crime.
- States, in collaboration with media experts, should provide training to professional journalists on racism, and include an antiracist code of conduct in the curricula for students of journalism.
- States should introduce legislation to guarantee the participation of ethno-racial minorities in media activities at various levels, including content production, editorial decision-making, and supervisory activities. In this way, minority groups could actively contribute to their own representation.
- The media should produce narratives that reflect experiences of peaceful coexistence between different cultures or ethnicities, and success stories of prominent members belonging to minorities who have contributed significantly to the progress of society.
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Western Donors, Romani Organizations, and Uses of the Concept of Nation after 1989

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Abstract

This article discusses the relationship between Western donors and Romani and Romani-friendly organizations in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Based on literature review, interviews, reports, and websites, this paper upholds that the burst of Romani and Romani-friendly organizations in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 primarily was made possible by financial support and expertise coming from Western organizations. Together with their work methodology, so-called donors took their own framework on understanding groupings and enforced the concept of nation upon Gypsy/Romani populations. Therefore, Western donors and Romani activists and intellectuals alike essentialized (claimed) Gypsy/Romani traits in order to support a nation-building rhetoric. These Romani activists and intellectuals, in turn, are a legacy of policies from planned economies, and they actually might represent Gypsy/Romani communities from a privileged perspective – no longer fully insiders but as a vanguard.

Keywords

- Roma
- Donors
- Nationalism
- Essentialization
Introduction

As planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe crumbled after 1989, Western organizations – whether national, international, or nongovernmental – recognized an unrivalled opportunity to market both their businesses and socio-economic assistance programs. This dramatically changed the landscape for Romani and Romani-friendly organizations, which rapidly increased in number (Marushiakova and Popov 2004; Vermeersch 2006).

This article understands that when Western donors – Open Society Foundations (OSF), in particular – arrived in Central and Eastern Europe to address the so-called Roma issue, among others, they reinforced representations about Gypsy/Romani populations as one nation. In other words, they arrived in Central and Eastern Europe uncritically employing a nationalist perspective and structure in handling Gypsy/Romani populations, a policy that usually was practiced and reinforced pragmatically and – to a certain extent – inattentively. As many local activists – avid to take part in new opportunities after the fall of Iron Curtain – were trained by Western organizations, they reproduced the concept of Gypsies/Roma as a one-nation conceptual structure similar to the donors and their peers.

The practices and discourses that operate “Gypsies/Roma as one nation” conceive Roma as one population (allegedly) connected by a distant past in India, who are (usually) rejected by the existent states where they live and who – not all of them, not always, and not in the same way – are suffering from and oppressed by economic, social, and political disadvantage. For instance, Hancock (2001; 2005) reinforces a common origin for all Romani nationals, at the same time highlighting that Romani populations are treated as less than equal within majoritarian societies. McGarry (2008), Carmona (2013), and Liegeois and Gheorghe (1995) also discuss an arrival in Europe from what is today’s India, lending support to the rhetoric of a common origin for Gypsy/Romani populations. Mayall (2004) points out – under a critical note – the statement from the First World Romani Congress in 1971 about the brotherhood of all Roma throughout the world. And going further in a critical approach, Law and Kovats (2018) have proposed to understand the concept of Roma as a political phenomenon. This article suggests, however, that to

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1 The question of how to represent the populations that are known commonly as Gypsies is always a challenge in a text. In countries like Brazil, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and, to a certain extent, Bulgaria and Poland, the use of the local version of the word Gypsy generally is accepted (although not always, not everywhere, and not in the same way). However, in other European countries the use of this word in its local version can be (and usually is) understood by activists and/or intellectuals as offensive. This is especially the case in the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, and Romania. The question becomes even more complex because at the communitarian level there are groups that do not bind or accept the Roma nomenclature and continue to call themselves Gypsies, or even use Roma and Gypsy as synonyms. In this article, I decided to use the term Gypsy/Roma when referring to the general population and Roma when referring to the ethnic identity manoeuvred by the social movements from 1971 onwards. Such a decision is particularly relevant here, as the word Roma will be used less as an ethnic denomination and more as a political strategy. This is an arbitrary decision that does not comprise the entire complexity of the subject, mostly because the use of the word Gypsy (even more so when standing alone) to represent all communities seen or self-ascribed as Gypsies and/or Roma (and other denominations) glosses over social, historical, and cultural nuances of these populations.

2 The number of productions that discuss the nationhood of Roma, directly or indirectly, is enormous and growing fast. It is possible to name Marushiakova and Popov (2004; 2013), Niremberg (2009), Simhandl (2009), and Rövid (2011), among others.
understand the uses of the concept of a Roma nation in the Gypsy/Romani case, it is necessary to look holistically through a political, cultural, and social lens. That is because the notion of a Roma nation cannot be summed up as the work of one international organization, or of NGOs, and so forth. The ideal of a Roma nation might have been forged by all these aforementioned actors (and their authors), but at the same time these groups also live within this ideal, without clearly realizing its characteristics, shapes, and borders. Therefore, it might be clarifying to see the Roma nation as sets of representations. As Chartier (1990, 17) says, the representations of the social world:

[...] although aspiring to the universality of a diagnosis founded on reason, they are always determined by the interests of the group which forged them. Hence, for each case, it is mandatory to relate the speeches delivered with the position of those who profess them.

Social perceptions are by no means neutral discourses: they produce strategies (social, academic, political) that tend to impose an authority at the expense of others, whom they disdain, to legitimize a reforming project or to justify, to the individuals themselves, their choices and behaviours.\[3\]

Bringing Chartier’s idea to the Gypsy/Romani case, the concept of a Roma nation might be seen as lying on a nest of supposedly objective arguments, such as clear cultural and historical ties. Also, it presents itself as an idea disconnected from the actors who avow it, as if it was an impartial and solid idea. However, this sturdiness and neutrality are nothing but misinterpretation. The Roma nation is consistently created and re-created in the conflict and coexistence of those who enforce and those who dismiss such an ideal, in a unending game in which one group is trying to impose its view and its understanding over the other. That said, it is possible to affirm that the general understanding about nation – which smoothly flows around and within Romani and Romani-friendly organizations and among activists and is employed to claim Gypsies/Roma as a Roma nation – could be summarized as follows: a group with a nuclear, basic, and broad shared culture, a communal historical past expressed in a remote origin, though not necessarily attached to a specific clearly demarked land in current times.

Section one of this article discusses the match between Central and Eastern European Romani activism and Western donors’ set of attitudes and strategies from a socio-historical perspective. Western donors approached the region after 1989 from a point of view that placed human groupings in terms of national majority and minorities as elaborated in their own countries. Central and Eastern European Romani activists, in turn, had experienced the historical context of the planned economy which also enforced a nationalist framework. This overlapping was a fecund environment for the application of methodological nationalism, as the concept of nation found little – if any – resistance. In other words, the outcome

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3 In the original: [...] embora aspirem à universalidade de um diagnóstico fundado na razão, são sempre determinadas pelos interesses de grupo que as forjam. Daí, para cada caso, o necessário relacionamento dos discursos proferidos com a posição de quem os utiliza.

As percepções do social não são de forma alguma discursos neutros: produzem estratégias e práticas (sociais, escolares, políticas) que tendem a impor uma autoridade à custa de outros, por elas menosprezados, a legitimar um projecto reformador ou a justificar, para os próprios indivíduos, as suas escolhas e condutas (author’s translation).
of a meeting between Western donors and locally engaged people was the formation of an activist and/or intellectualized elite who enforced and applied a national framework (herein seen as representing Gypsies/Roma as one close-knit cultural and historical group) to the plural population known as Gypsies and/or Roma (and further self-identifications), even if it sometimes had to gloss over certain indications of difference (often a cultural aspect but not only). Plainly, a process of methodological nationalism was supported by sponsors, academia, and activists as there was an overall acceptance to arrange and understand groupings through the lenses of ethno-national organization.

Section two scrutinizes the example of OSF, chosen because of its long-term financial commitment to projects connected to Gypsy/Romani populations in Central and Eastern Europe that range from combating poverty and deprivation to support of a Romani Studies Program within the Central European University, itself established and sponsored by George Soros and OSF. The last section brings the concepts of nationalism and essentialism into dialogue. In order to hold up the idea of all Gypsies/Roma as one Roma nation, activists and scholars have been vocalizing some characteristics and attaching them to Gypsy/Romani populations worldwide, and this process can lead to a process of essentialiation. Such a strategy might be valid; however, this article argues that those who have taken it upon themselves to decide the (claimed) Romani traits to be emphasized are acting as an avant-garde. All in all, vanguard groups have a tendency to be detached from the population which they claim to represent; this process of essentialization to support the political strategy of being recognized as a Roma nation does not seems to result in structural changes. The last section summarizes and connects the discussions presented in the article.

Based on literature review, interviews carried out in Central and Eastern Europe, and content of reports and websites, this article discusses how Western donors, through financial sponsorship, methodological nationalism, and strategic essentialism, helped to attach the concept of nation to Gypsy/Romani communities.

1. Eastern European Activism As Fertile Ground for Western Donors

A body of published articles and reports in academia and the mass media support evidence of a significant gap in the relationship between international Romani organizations – whether the International Romani Union (IRU), Roma National Council (RNC), and/or European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF), and so on – and local Romani or Romani-friendly organizations, and an even larger gap if considering the distance between international Romani bodies and Gypsy/Romani communities. Throughout interviews gathered during field research in Central and Eastern European countries,[4] distance from and sometimes even unfamiliarity with the international bodies was recorded repeatedly. For instance, B[5] (2016), when questioned about the role of IRU in Bulgaria during the 1990s, answered “No, they were not working here.” Additionally, while discussing the process of expulsion of Gypsies/Roma from France in 2011, B (2016) affirmed:

4 During 2016, interviews were carried out in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia.

5 Bulgarian activist/academic of Gypsy/Romani background.
Even after it became clear that all these attacks [were] against us, from the government […], and the prosecutors’ offices didn’t find anything against Roma… that is illegal or something… they, the international Roma institutions didn’t say a word… our friends from the international, so-called movement. So… what I’m saying is that these organizations are, unfortunately, far from the reality! This discussion, what they have, [it] is not grounded in the real problems in the countries.

Whether it is true or not that international Romani institutions, as called by B, did or did not say a word about the situation in France is not the focus of this discussion. What is relevant is the fact that an experienced activist and scholar felt comfortable expressing his thoughts in such a way. In other words, he believes that the international bodies were not actively supporting Gypsies/Roma and, mostly, that their mind-set was not grounded in the reality of Gypsy/Romani communitarian life. Similar distance was found in discourses in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, North Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia. At the time of the interviews (2016), the IRU was still divided,[6] and none of these interviewees, who were everyday workers within Romani and Romani-friendly organizations, could answer anything about the IRU. The case in North Macedonia is illustrative when the interviewee M[7] affirmed:

For example, now, there is an IRU, International Roma Union. I mean it is an institution, organization, established from 1971… and, sincerely, I’m not familiar with what they’re doing, except annual meetings (M 2016).

This distance between local and international practices is emphasized because the interviewee had personal contact with Mr. Zoran Dimov[8] but claimed to have no information about what the IRU was planning or doing.

Such “empty” space between international and local organizations was occupied, after 1989, by Western donors that found fertile ground for their practices and strategies (Marushiakova and Popov 2004; Vermeesch 2006). That is because the international Romani organizations’ core – at least intellectually – historically was based in Central and Eastern European countries.[9] Thanks in part to

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6 From 2013 until 2018, the IRU encountered political difficulties. During these years, at least three organizations claimed to be the real IRU: one based in North Macedonia, one based in Latvia, and one based in Romania. The latter was under leadership of Dorin Cioabă; at some point in 2016, its website went offline, and I could not gather any further information. The last news concerning this IRU was when Mr. Cioabă offered Gypsy/Romani help in the construction of the promised wall between the United States and Mexico to United States President Donald Trump (Albert and Votavová 2017). Concerning the other two IRUs, in early 2018 they apparently found common ground and started to work together.

7 Macedonian activist of Gypsy/Romani background.

8 At the time of this interview in September 2016, Mr. Dimov was president of the International Romani Union based in Skopje, North Macedonia.

9 Certainly, there were activists from Western Europe. However, the great majority of these Western actors had close connections with Eastern Europe – on personal and familial levels.
(so-called) socialist policies\textsuperscript{(10)} throughout the region, the formation of groups of organized Gypsy/Romani intelligentsia was encouraged. These activists and/or intellectuals have been subject to social, economic, and political strategies that, in the great majority, followed a Stalinist approach towards Gypsies/Roma, generally labelling them as proletarians and not an ethno-national group.

As Stalin began his ascent to power in the USSR in the 1920s, a Leninist approach still was directed towards the diverse ethnicities/nationalities inhabiting Soviet territory, a legacy of the Korenizatsiya\textsuperscript{(11)} policy. In short, this was a state effort to improve the lives of all ethnicities on Soviet territory, bringing them up to the same level as ethnic Russians, who were perceived as more evolved (Liber 1991; Marushiakova and Popov 2008). Such policies affected the life of Gypsy/Romani intelligentsia and activists at the time, who managed to form Gypsy co-operative farms (Gypsy kolkhozes), Gypsy co-operative artisans’ workshops (Gypsy artels), develop Romani language and literature, textbooks, and a Romani theater called Romen – all with state aid (Martin 2001; Marushiakova and Popov 2008). Nevertheless, the landscape started to change after the mid-1930s, and although Gypsies/Roma were not specially targeted, the switch also touched upon their lives. From 1938 onwards a Stalinist approach about nation and nationalism spread throughout the Soviet republics (Marushiakova and Popov 2008) and their satellites – although not in the same way in each republic. Stalin (2012, 11) wrote:

& A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.

Stalin\textsuperscript{(12)} affirms that if one of these elements is lacking in the composition of a group, they cannot be considered a nation. From Stalin’s point of view and, by consequence, from Soviet institutions, Gypsies/Roma were not considered a nation and should not promote their cultural particularities; instead they should focus on their role as proletarians: all Gypsies/Roma should work and contribute to socialist life. To be able to work in and contribute to the industrialized state, Gypsies/Romani were made to attend school, and since racism was institutionally forbidden, they managed to thrive within the educational system, climbing to higher positions in Soviet society in comparison to Gypsy/Romani populations living in non-socialist countries at the time. These formally highly-educated people would

\textsuperscript{10} When working with the concept of socialism, I refer to a government-less, borderless, and non-wage system society, where the means of production and the land are co-managed and the products resulting from work are shared accordingly with personal needs. Mostly (if not all) countries which claimed to embrace a socialist experience during the twentieth century relied on a strong central government, often totalitarian, racist and violent, which centrally organized the means of production and distributed the wealth accordingly with the interest of those in charge of the bureaucratic system. For further discussion on the topic, read: Piotr Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (Wrocław: Johnathan-David Jackson 1892); Abdullah Öcalan Democratic Confederationalism, Translated by International Initiative. London, Cologne: Transmedia Publishing Ltd. 2011); Stephen Resnickand Richard Wolff, "Between State and Private Capitalism: What Was Soviet 'Socialism?" Rethinking Marxism 7 (1): 9–30 (1994).

\textsuperscript{11} From the early 1920s to mid-1930s, Soviet territories faced a process called Korenizatsiya (коренизация). In short, it was an attempt to enhance the non-Russian ethnic identities within the Soviet bureaucracy, theoretically raising them to the same development stage as Russian nationals (Liber 1991).

\textsuperscript{12} It might be interesting to highlight that Stalin is quoted here as an influential policymaker rather than as an intellectual.
be those who had developed socio-political skills to nurture nationalist ideas related to Gypsy/Romani populations, engaging in the nation-building process after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Although it would be misleading to believe that all Central and Eastern European countries under so-called socialist regimes treated their Gypsy/Romani populations the same way, it can be said that both state-controlled organizations and independent organizations were the bedrock for later Romani social, cultural, and political mobilization which exploded after 1989 (Barany 2000). About communist times, Barany (2000, 436) summarizes:

Aside from a few isolated examples, the Roma were not permitted to pursue mobilization activities. Thus, their political marginality in this period was rooted in exogenous political causes (e.g. obstacles posed by the state to mobilization). Nevertheless, state-controlled Gypsy organizations and the policy to integrate the Roma into state and party hierarchies served as something of an unintended training ground for the Gypsy activists of the future. As Ivan Vesely, a Slovak Rom who became a prominent Gypsy activist in the Czech Republic, asked me: “Do you think I would be sitting here arguing about Marx and Weber if it were not for the communists? I would be in the ghetto in eastern Slovakia!” Paradoxically, through their social (especially educational) policies, the socialist regimes contributed to the development of what they feared most: Romani identity formation and activism.

This ambiguity is interesting to observe: state policies striving to assimilate Gypsies/Roma within majority society were also setting the context which allowed a majority of those seen, treated, or self-ascribed as Gypsy and/or Roma to achieve higher ranks of formal education and, as a result, brought to the forefront a process of relabelling\(^{13}\) Gypsy/Romani identity during post-socialism. Therefore, the overall impression of Gypsy/Romani populations before the fall of communism was, generally speaking, of a people who had their very basic living needs fulfilled,\(^{14}\) even though they faced levels of violence in a state-led process of assimilation (Hungary and Yugoslavia each had a particular different process which, however, does not change the overall landscape). Within this context, activists and/or intellectualized groups were in the right place after 1989 to receive further training and financial support from Western donors, Romani organizations, and uses of the concept of nation after 1989

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13 In Portuguese, the verb *requalificar* (re + qualificar. The prefix “re” brings the idea that something is being made again; meanwhile the verb *’qualificar’* might be translated as “to qualify,” “to describe,” or “to designate”) is used when discussing the rethinking and rewriting of historiographic knowledge aiming to develop a different status to a given subject. In studies about cultural heritage such a concept is borrowed from architecture with current meanings related with changes in an area and/or property, giving a different status to the place, without erasing the previous diverse uses of the site. In plain words, while the idea of *renovation* brings some aesthetical understandings upon the space, *requalificar* corresponds to the political, social, and economic interests related to the whole process (Bezerra and Chaves 2014). This research understands that the better word to characterize the work on Romani culture, history, identity, and so forth would be *requalificar*, and the closest translation to English of this concept would be the word *relabel*.

14 This statement does not intend to diminish the violence, persecution, and assimilation that Gypsies/Roma faced during the planned economy experiences. Instead, I understand as basic needs access to absolute minimum living conditions, for instance, work. Even these very basic living standards deteriorated after the fall of the so-called socialist regimes.
sponsors. About the way in which these donors acted upon their arrival in Bulgaria from 1989 onwards, B (2016) says that their approach was “[…] up to bottom,\textsuperscript{15} absolutely.”

Such an approach is stressed not only by Bulgarian Roma activists but also by interviewees in Hungary and North Macedonia. The latter deserves further comment, because the interviewee affirmed relative freedom in their work, despite the capital coming from donors. However, when asked about the methodology used to work with the community in which their organization was inserted, they confirmed that it was a standard template that originated from donors’ headquarters. This is interesting given the fact that B stated several times that the problem with the Western donors’ approach was exactly their insistence on imposing methodologies which supposedly worked in different contexts around the world but which were never tested in projects related to Gypsy/Romani populations.

It is fair to assume that Western donors in Central and Eastern Europe bolstered discursive practices about Gypsy/Romani populations as one single ethnic-national group, as the donors originally arrived aiming to deal with the Roma issue and saw Gypsies/Roma as a single and clear-cut national grouping, in a similar way as national minorites were perceived in Western Europe. As observed on OSF’s website: “The Open Society Foundations have spearheaded an unprecedented effort, working with Roma communities to secure Roma’s rightful position in European society” (The Roma and Open Society 2013, author italics). Yet, for instance, the 1999 OSF annual report points out its support to a “Roma newspaper and magazine” in Bulgaria and awards to “Romani students” in the Czech Republic, among other references (Open Society Foundations Annual Report 1999, 27, 30, author italics).

When engaging with the umbrella term to represent plural Gypsy/Romani populations, OSF is enforcing sets of representations on these plural populations in a universal description of Gypsies/Roma which, in turn, supports the Roma nation ideal. In other words, a Roma nation is not seen here as a cohesive nationalist movement in the traditional frame but as a set of representations which support Gypsies/Roma as a Romani national group. Such representations are instrumentalized and reorganized daily by any international organization that addresses the so-called Roma issue. These representations have their roots in the late nineteenth century, became stronger after the internationalization of Romani organizations in the 1960s, and reached the First World Romani Congress by 1971. These nationalist representations are separated into two main topics and pointed out by Liebich (2007) as “native” and “dative.” While the first stressed the common origin of all Gypsies/Roma in today’s India, the latter stresses the social-political conditions of those seen or self-ascribed as Gypsies/Roma. Both “ethnic and social identity are not utterly incompatible” (Liebich 2007, 544) and feed one another depending on context, time, and space (Sambati 2019). Furthermore, these representations were the start point from which Western donors embarked in former (so-called) socialist countries.

Such practices find a parallel with Gellner’s (1983) theory in which nationalist discourse must be broad: a nationalist narrative is supposed to make sense to a large group and, to this end, it stresses the widespread features which encompass the said large group, while trying to relax the differences – a pattern reiterated

\textsuperscript{15} Given the context of the interview, it is secure to affirm that by using the expression “top to bottom” the interviewer intended to use the expression \textit{top-down}, i.e., that the Western donors’ approach was coming from headquarters and should be replicated locally as planned.
by nationalist movements since the mid-nineteenth century. International Romani organizations in the 1970s, and even in the twenty-first century, have followed a similar path:

As expressed in the International Romani Union’s (IRU) Declaration of a Nation, the basis of Roma nationalism is the claim that all ‘Roma’ constitute a single and distinct political community which requires its own, separate political representation. [...] This imagined community shares no common language (only a small minority speak one of the dozens of often mutually unintelligible dialects of Romani), culture, religion, identity, history or even ethnicity. Even within countries, Roma minorities are diffuse and diverse and do not function as any kind of actual community (Kovats 2003, 4).

Once landed at full speed in Central and Eastern Europe, Western donors reproduced the slow but uninterrupted understanding of Gypsy/Romani populations as one group, looking for similarities in the group and setting aside particularities – both within the Gypsies/Romani populations themselves and among different minorities with whom these Western organizations might have dealt before and Gypsies/Roma (Sambati 2019). B (2016) illustrates the case:

For example, the Dutch donors [...] I forgot the name [B mentions a particular meeting with an important person from a specific Dutch donor]... we had a few discussions with him. And he was very harsh imposing... “It works in Holland...” It was a huge discussion. And I told him, “Look, maybe it works in Holland, with the Moroccan immigrants, but first of all we are not Moroccan. We are Gypsies. Second, we are not immigrants, we have lived here for seven centuries.

The remarks illustrate the frame of mind of this Dutch organization when it came to Bulgaria. They were dealing with the named Roma issue in a national scheme, national here understood as a category of analysis, usually pragmatically enforced without much reflection. When Western donors came to the new “market” to take on the so-called Roma issue, they simply framed their approach to Gypsies/Roma with the same conceptual and lexical frameworks that they were used to. Wimmer and Schiller (2003) discuss the concept of methodological nationalism defining it as the “[...] naturalization of the nation-state by the social sciences” (Wimmer and Schiller 2003, 576). The authors divide methodological nationalism into three variants: (1) disregard of the relevance of nationalism in modern societies; (2) taking for granted the boundaries between states; and (3) confining the interpretation of a phenomenon to the borders of a country. In this article the discussion on methodological nationalism will be inspired by the ideal presented in the first variant. Specifically, Wimmer and Schiller argue that:

Ignoring is the dominant modus of methodological nationalism in grand theory; naturalization of “normal” empirical social science; territorial limitation of the study of nationalism and state building.

In the first variant of methodological nationalism, ignoring the power of nationalism and the prevalence of the nation-state model as the universal form of political organization are neither problematized nor made objects of study in their own right (2003, 578).
It is necessary to keep in mind that Wimmer and Schiller discuss the academic world; however, skipping over the strength of the nation/nation-state concept when building a worldview is not academia’s alone. Western donors have repeated this pattern, applying the same mind-set about national groups belonging to former socialist countries as well as Gypsy/Romani populations. Therefore, donors have separated populations that do not belong to majoritarian groups, setting them aside as part of a nation within a nation, an approach reflected in the actions which they believe(d) to be necessary in order to solve “problems.”

This approach appears to fit intellectually with the thinking of well-educated Gypsies/Roma who lived within the borders of so-called socialist countries. That is because a nationalist understanding of the world was also present – even at the expense of denying Gypsy/Romani nationhood. The outcome of this overlap is the formation of a single activist and/or intellectualized elite who enforce a monopoly and apply it to the plural populations known as Gypsies and/or Romani national patterns, even if it sometimes has to gloss over evidence to the contrary. In other words, methodological nationalism might have been supported by sponsors, academia, and activists due to unquestioning allegiance to the concept of nation, mostly because it seems a perfect fit for the context, given the overall acceptance to work on groupings through the lens of an ethno-national arrangement.

In a moment of self-critical introspection B explains (2016): “As I told you, we accepted them as professors in democracy. ‘They know how it is... they’re the professors, we’re the students.’ Many of us did!” The process created an environment of shared, similar understanding, where one reinforces the other during the work process as shown in Figure 1.
In plain language, local NGOs behave in a certain way not (only) because they ultimately want finances from sponsors but also because they were taught by their sponsors, and therefore their strategies and beliefs are similar. Thus, the connection among local NGOs, activists and sponsors is not only monetary. Such an interpretation can lead to a misunderstanding that local NGOs and activists behave in the way which the sponsors want – and here it is possible to highlight George Soros as the main actor – solely in order to profit financially. Expertise also exerts an influence on pragmatic local action, and together with expertise also came representations in which the characterization of groupings of people in an ethno-national fashion was (and still is) usually organically framed. In order to debate this connection in depth, the next section will analyze closely the case of one of many donors: OSF.

2. Open Society Foundations within This Process

Among Western donors, it is hardly disputable how OSF and George Soros stand in the spotlight, not only because of OSF’s unwavering financial support toward Gypsies/Roma in Central and Eastern Europe but also because it is one of the few donors that continues to this day to invest in Romani communities since the 1990s. One of the largest geographic actions connected with OSF was the Decade of the Roma Inclusion (2005–2015). According to Brüggemann and Friedman (2017, 2):

The formal decision to establish the Decade was taken at the 2003 conference “Roma in an Expanding Europe: Challenges for the Future,” which was held in Budapest. The conference was initiated by the World Bank, co-chaired by World Bank president James Wolfensohn and George Soros, the founder of the Open Society Foundations (OSF). A central motive for the Decade was the perceived need to coordinate sporadic efforts toward the integration of Roma on the part of a great diversity of international and national actors. The 2003 conference was attended by over 500 participants, including nine government leaders and many high-level government officials, as well as [political] representatives of international organizations, Roma activists and members of NGOs.

Therefore, the Decade of Roma Inclusion was an attempt to engage a coordinated international set of measures aiming to improve the social, economic, and political situation of Gypsies/Roma in countries that once had planned economies as well as in Spain. Nevertheless, Brüggemann and Friedman discussed how, in 2015, at the end of the project, there was an overall understanding that the Decade’s programs had failed to change the lives of Gypsy/Romani communities.

B (2016) has the following understanding of the Decade:

Many people don’t know what the Decade of the Roma Inclusion is about. […] It was not understood clearly by the governments, because George Soros brought […] not the European Union as a partner but the World Bank, and the World Bank means money. And Soros means money, generally. Of course, the governments expected somehow that these two financial institutions would pay them to integrate the Gypsies…. Of course, it didn’t happen. Because Soros told them, “Look, you pay for this, I give you only the
expertise. I have good expertise here, good projects. I will give you prepared people, I’ll give you expertise....”

From this excerpt it is possible to imagine the landscape of influence of Western donors bringing methodology of work and expertise – along with their own set of representations to deal with the so-called Roma issue. Moreover, it is necessary to highlight a different arm closely connected to OSF and linked to the process of representing Gypsies/Roma as one nation, the Central European University (CEU).

Soon after the fall of the Iron Curtain a group of people – intellectuals and wealthy businessmen – decided that it would be beneficial to have an academic environment to assist the transition from totalitarian regimes to (allegedly) democratic systems. George Soros was among those people, and from this effort, in 1991, the CEU was born (History 2018). Stewart (2017) attested that the CEU has been working for almost two decades, offering two postgraduate courses with Romani issues in the center of discussion. Furthermore, CEU also runs a summer school with a course dedicated to Romani studies. From 1998 till 2010 were nine annual summer courses, with over 300 participants (CEU Summer University (SUN) 2011).

The existence of the CEU raises the question whether an institution itself can serve as a source of nation-building representations of the Gypsy/Romani population. Stewart (2017) points out that intellectuals and scholars connected with CEU recently have begun to relabel the field of Romani Studies, renaming themselves as a Critical Romani Studies. The movement aims to overcome, among other things, the lack of Gypsy/Romani people in high levels of the academic sphere:

So, today, the situation we confront is that an older generation of Romani Studies researchers have provoked a wave of reaction among activist Romani intellectuals that demand ‘Roma studies’ taught by Roma, that suggests research agendas should be controlled by ‘the Roma’ or whoever claims to [politically] represent them, and PhD projects in which there is always one Romani supervisor. ‘Nothing about us, without us!’ , we hear with increasing urgency. ‘Who speaks for whom?’, the activist–intellectuals demand to know (Stewart 2017, 127).

Stewart’s discussion brings into focus a question of exactly who is *us*? It might be said that the *us* in this equation are each and every Gypsy/Roma around the world. Such an approach is an outcome and a feeder of the nationalist mind-set previously discussed. It is a methodological approach to understand the plural Gypsy/Romani populations within the framework and set of concepts attached to nationalism. In other words, even if while discussing Gypsy/Romani plurality, the very fact of having postgraduate courses, conferences, and summer courses dedicated to Roma issue serves to enforce a discursive elaboration of representations over a Roma nation.

Through its ideological, strategic, and financial sponsorship, Western donors created a possibility for both activism and academic research work with Gypsy/Romani populations via their efforts to deal with the Roma issue. Financial support from the West was channeled to a Gypsy/Romani elite (either intellectual, political, or economic) and then expected to reach the communities. In this sense, the arrival of Western support symbolically legitimated local Romani and Romani-friendly organizations to work with Gypsy/Romani populations and then enabled them to speak on behalf of these communities when
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in dialogue with donors – the entire process underlining the ideal of Gypsy/Roma as one Roma nation. Activists and intellectuals, therefore, evolved as a distinct group which, with their historically constructed privileges, managed to keep themselves at the forefront of Romani social mobilization. Imposing a Roma nation on plural Gypsy/Romani populations appears to be a valid strategy, essentializing specific traits in order to create cohesive mobilization. But it may also have led to unintended consequences like a growing distance between activists and intellectuals and their populations. In short, Roma may have been represented and encircled by a select group of activists and intellectuals without taking fully into consideration how Gypsy/Romani communities might understand themselves.

3. Essentialist and Nationalist Approaches As Strategy

At this point it is pertinent to issue a disclaimer: there is no intent here to affirm that the relationship between activists and/or intellectuals and NGOs with Western donors delegitimizes their work. This paper does not believe that this relationship per se can be a problem, although – as will be discussed below – it deserves in-depth analysis. As mentioned earlier, Gellner (1983) debates how nationalist rhetoric must be detailed enough to be connected with a given population, while also simultaneously broad enough in order to reach a large number of people. In doing so, usually some (claimed) features believed to be intrinsic to the population which forms the nation are highlighted; meanwhile, the differences do not gain as much space. Plus, these stressed characteristics are framed in a way in which they seem to congenitally belong to this population, being therefore a set of traits to differentiate this specific grouping from other groupings. This strategy usually leads to a process of essentialization. According to Eide (2010, 66):

Essentialism presupposes that a group or a category of objects/people share some defining features exclusive to the members of this particular group or category. This has been a highly contested idea throughout the social sciences and particularly in post-colonial as well as colonial discourse studies. Essentialism is often discussed together with the questioning of categories like race and nation. On the other hand, at a more pragmatic level, essentialist practices and modes of representation have been applied by groups and individuals in the promotion of certain minority rights or demands (as well as liberation struggles) [...]. Sometimes this is a conscious albeit partial appropriation of an essentialism imposed by others (the elite, the powerful) on the part of a group wanting to achieve certain goals. The group thus tries to define itself by its own criteria, but at times essentialist hegemonic representation is internalised [...]. Essentializing the self may be part of a negotiated halfway adaptation to the rules of the game set by, for example, mainstream media [...].

As Eide affirms, the process of essentialization – here understood as assigning certain characteristics to one particular category of people perceived as one single group – is the usual strategy of unrelated types of organizations, especially when paired with an elaboration of nationalist rhetoric. In Eide's ideal, the process of essentialization is either an external set of actions that have a tendency to other the essentialized group or a strategic set of discursive practices that are developed in order to strengthen the fight for the rights of a minority (both options do not necessarily exclude one another). In this sense, it might be said that the strategy of essentializing some (claimed) historical-cultural traits toward Gypsy/Romani
populations through Roma nation representations serves a purpose: to elevate the quality of life of those among these populations who have suffered any kind of economic, political, and social disadvantage, and/or antigypsyist everyday violence – either physical or psychological. Romani activists are not the first to employ such practices. The strategy to essentialize a claimed group can be seen as an attempt to standardize a public image of the collective, despite the internal plurality of the group: “[…] thus advancing their group identity in a simplified, collectivized way to achieve certain objectives” (Eide 2010, 76). Ryazanov and Christenfeld (2018), for instance, see processes of social essentialism in a positive way and bring cases which illustrate the complexity of process of essentialization and de-essentialization:

Increasingly, evidence suggested that essentialism may be a flexible conversational resource, rather than a cognitive style. […] In a sample of Dutch majority and minority participants, Verkuyten (2003) found that both ethnic minority and majority participants used essentialism flexibly when discussing multicultural issues. Dutch (majority) participants essentialized culture when discussing how different cultures coexisting is inherently problematic but used de-essentialist arguments when discussing minority groups needing to assimilate into their culture. Conversely, minority group participants essentialized culture and claimed a right to their identity when resisting assimilationism. When challenging the majority view that their group is negative and homogenous, they adopted a de-essentialist position. Such research provides initial evidence that essentialism is flexibly used to advance competing goals – essentialism can decrease responsibility for a group’s position but can be rejected to avoid being entirely defined by group membership. Because these goals appear to be traded off, rejecting the meaningfulness of group membership may come at the cost of increased responsibility for group (or individual) status (Ryazanov and Christenfeld 2018, 3–4).

If the strategy in itself seems to be justifiable, it might be interesting to raise the question: is essentialization a collective decision (collective understood to be the majority of individuals belonging to the claimed group) or is it a discursive practice developed by (claimed) members of the group who (claim to) speak on behalf of all? That is relevant to ask because, when Ryazanov and Christenfeld describe social essentialism as a viable social strategy, they are considering in-group essentialism; they are debating experiences when small groups talk among and about themselves and interchange between essentialization and de-essentialization in debates in which they are included. Therefore, it seems relevant to question whether the strategy to essentialize particular (claimed) features upon Gypsy/Romani populations is organized on a communitarian level or developed by activists and/or intellectuals from their specific perspective. The distance between Romani and Romani-friendly organizations and communities, already emphasized in this article, points to the latter. Thus, such strategies and practices can be seen as vanguardism.

When discussing strategies in which the working class could organize themselves and fight for the improvement of the quality of their working and living conditions, Chomsky (2004) uses the notion of avant-garde parties. Keeping in mind the differences between the two realities – labor unions/parties and Romani and Romani-friendly organizations – it is possible to draw here a parallel. Chomsky calls avant-garde parties those who aim to take the control of the labor class from a central committee, with promises to work on their behalf and for their benefit. Political parties might apply such a strategy to any group that claims, at any kind of level, to represent politically and/or to fight in the name of a broad population with
some goal – whether clear or otherwise. Thus, in an ideal scenario for avant-garde groups, they would be formed by elites (which can be economic, intellectual, or prestigious) within a given group. These elites have the character of being an outcome of former privileges, as well as profiting from and developing different privileges once invested within their role as representatives.

It is not being affirmed here that any organization that has a connection to Western donors and that happens to be reinforcing the use of the nation to work with Gypsy/Romani populations is operating on behalf of their own privileges, in a highly Manichean way. Nevertheless, it seems that those activists and intellectualized groups who managed to have access to training and money from Western donors already enjoyed some level of privileges historically constructed within the societies in which they lived.[16] Therefore, this position of speaking on behalf of Gypsies/Roma is sensitive, because from Chomsky’s (2004) perspective, when one puts oneself in the position of representing a group, there runs a risk of the representative eventually detaching from the group which they claim to represent, no longer observing and interpreting the (claimed) represented as fully an insider but from a privileged perspective. The essentialization of (claimed) characteristics upon Gypsies/Roma as a nation is perceived by part of the Romani intelligentsia and activists as a way to call attention to their problems, exorcize a past full of brutality, and provide a chance to envision a brighter future.

Roma characterized as a nation might be one way to fight against prejudice and exclusion, but it might also be a prolific space for the sprouting of vanguard groups, who are usually disconnected from those who might be in need, and may well lead to a vicious circle of social handouts which generally do not achieve any measurable impacts among communities. According to Liebich (2007), narratives which tend to enforce Romani identity can be both the basis for exoticizing and othering the Gypsies/Roma or the legitimization of the Romani struggle, together with the empowerment of Romani activists, but are unlikely to help to address the Roma problem in Central and Eastern Europe. Liebich’s understanding from 2007 seems to materialize in 2015, with the end of The Decade of Roma Inclusion – sponsored mostly by Western organizations like the ones discussed in this article – which did not emphatically decrease the social, political, and economic distance between Gypsy/Romani and non-Gypsy/non-Romani populations in Central and Eastern Europe (Kovats and Surdu 2015; Brüggemann and Friedman 2017). Kovats and Surdu (2015, 13) go further:

Placing all Roma into an anti-discrimination paradigm as a way of fostering their inclusion seems not to be an effective method for solving individual cases of abuse and mistreatment but has led to largely cosmetic changes to particular exclusionary mechanisms. Though repeatedly identified as a high priority, institutional anti-discrimination initiatives have been too limited to create a critical mass, producing only symbolic victories that leave unchanged the root causes of unequal treatment.

16 This affirmation cannot be misinterpreted as saying that these people did not suffer any level of antigypsyism or other type of violence. Rather, that among those seen or self-ascribed as Gypsy/Roma, they were those who had the formal skills to enter dialogue with the new group.
Final Considerations

The end of so-called socialism in Central and Eastern Europe allowed easier mobility within the European continent, not only for intellectuals and activists from the East to the West but also for finances traveling the other way. A new paradigm was installed, and Western donors became increasingly influential and affected the landscape of Romani and Romani-friendly organizations. It was no longer a question of a circumscribed group of intellectuals and activists thinking about (sometimes ungrounded) international strategies to boost the idea of Roma as a nation but local organizations that could be instrumentalized in their everyday work within Romani communities by the representations created by their predecessors. That may be attributed to Western donors that arrived in Central and Eastern Europe aiming to work on the Roma issue and to local organizations that embraced this approach, and learnt and adapted the Western point of view. The angle through which Western donors understood the Gypsy/Romani population in Eastern Europe, in turn, had a strong influence on the nationalist approach developed since the 1970s. Such a cyclical interaction trickled down into the mind-set of Eastern organizations. In their local work, NGOs ended up forging and re-forging nationalist feeling in an endless exercise of continuous mutation. Since the 1960s an international effort has sought to use the umbrella concept of Roma to gather all the different populations that were known, considered, or self-ascribed as Gypsies in Europe. This same mind-set was applied by Western donors: they also saw these plural populations as the Roma and, with their financial support, they taught people to act locally (Gypsies/Roma and non-Gypsies/non-Roma) within these same parameters. Therefore, the generalized representations of Roma grew in stature and impact, at least among activists, academia, and intelligentsia – whether Gypsy/Roma or non-Gypsy/non-Roma.

The agenda to characterize Gypsy/Romani populations as one Roma nation can be interpreted as a strategic essentialization or, in other words, as a set of actions aiming to empower Romani and Romani-friendly organizations through discursive practices that can bring different organizations together, highlighting (allegedly) similar targets. Such procedures are usually part of the nation-building process throughout history, and strategic essentialism has been used by different minorities in their struggle for life improvement. Nevertheless, it seems relevant to bring up the question of who are the people deciding which traits are acceptable to be essentialized and which ones are not. It is fair to say that activist and/or intellectualized groups, even though carrying a history of engagement, scholarship, and self-reflection, are a socially privileged grouping within their context and, furthermore, can – willingly or otherwise – reinforce such a position. Gradually, they could grow alienated from Gypsy/Romani everyday life, resulting in interpretations, representations, and essentializations from a perspective that no longer understands Gypsy/Romani challenges in-depth. Thus, there comes a great responsibility with such a position, and no one should be devoid of potential (self) criticism.
References


A Hidden Community: Justifying the Inclusion of Roma As an Ethnic Identity in the 2021 Scottish Census

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Abstract

This article investigates the invisibility of Roma communities within Scottish census ethnic monitoring categories and broader empirical data. Consistent negative stereotyping as well as systematic oppression within social policy, dominant discourses, and data collection processes excludes Roma from participatory citizenship. This article identifies precise forms of marginality and invisibility within official government data – permeated through social and education policy – that thereby limit the effective targeting of resources to marginalized communities. Specifically, the article argues that omitting Roma as an ethnic category from past data gathering processes limits understanding of the commonalities and differences within and among Scottish communities, rendering entire populations invisible within broader empirical data and therefore restricting both identification of needs and effective resource allocation. Thus, the article presents a timely argument for the inclusion of Roma as an ethnic category in the 2021 Scottish census, while addressing issues within the census approach to data collection – including the impending digitization of the process. Through discussing and advancing the case for the inclusion of Romani communities in the 2021 Scottish Census, the paper also seeks to establish the current social context by chronicling the history of Romani migration and marginalization within Europe.
Introduction

Drawing on Bassel and Emejulu’s (2017) observations regarding the invisibility of minority ethnic communities within policy, coupled with a hypervisibility in media discourse, this paper repositions the same notion to the experiences of Romani communities in Scotland, elsewhere in the United Kingdom (UK), and in Europe more generally. Lane and Smith (2019) refer to “post racial policies”, whereby specific communities are obscured within data, as well as “hyper-ethnic” approaches that aggressively target a given community in an often discriminatory manner. We argue that both approaches can be seen in Scotland with regard to Romani communities, and that this failure to provide appropriate opportunities for Romani individuals to be accounted for has resulted in a lack of adequate support for an often marginalized and stigmatized community. The current approach is also increasingly problematic given limited attention to digital literacy ahead of the implementation of the Digital First approach in future census collection processes. Understanding that this suggested binary experience of invisibility versus hypervisibility extends beyond policy and into portrayals of Romani individuals and communities in corporate media (both print and online press) and social media platforms, reference will be made to broader issues of stereotyping, discriminatory practices, and problematic representation. When addressing treatment of and discourse regarding Romani (in)visibility within academic research and government documents, a wealth of contemporary examples illustrates a lack of understanding of community-specific needs regarding, for example, language barriers, digital literacy, and internet access.

The article begins with a concise history of European Romani communities – including an acknowledgment of the contested accounts and divergent origins of Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities (see e.g. Acton 1974; Okely 1983; Clark 2001, Marcus 2016) and the persecution of these communities from the fourteenth century (Council of Europe 2012) through to the modern-day.[1] Following this, we focus on the experiences of Romani communities in the UK and especially Scotland, and argue for the inclusion of Roma as a distinct ethnicity in the 2021 Scottish Census, while equally addressing the problematics of gathering ethnic data and the exclusionary process of digitizing the 2021 Scottish Census via the National Records of Scotland (2019) Digital First approach.

1. Who are Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller People?

Despite being a vast number of heterogeneous and differing communities, Roma, Gypsy, and Travellers are often clustered or merged within data sets and policy (see Scottish Government 2018), resulting in distinctions among communities being blurred within dominant discourses and individual differences and therefore being rendered invisible. Today, Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities present Europe’s largest combined ethnic minority group with an estimated 10–12 million census sample size spread throughout the continent (Liégeois 1994; Council of Europe 2012; European Commission 2016), yet these communities are consistently one of the most socially excluded ethnic groups in Europe (Poole and Adamson 2013).

1 For example, recent hate crimes have been reported in Hungary (see e.g. Craig 2001; Koulish 2005; Halasz 2009) and Italy (see e.g. Woodcock 2010; ERRC 2019), among many other places.
Tracing the lineage of Europe's present-day Roma communities, Acton (1974, 1) highlights Roma people leaving India almost 1,000 years ago and “moving along trade routes” during subsequent centuries towards Europe. While the “out of India” migratory theory remains contested (see Okely 1983), Bánfai et al. (2018) revealed that the impact of the Caucasus region on the genetic legacy of Roma people using genome-wide data supports Acton’s (1974) claims by demonstrating Roma migration through the Caucasus region after originating from India prior to arriving in Europe just over a millennium ago.

Despite whatever similarities may exist among these communities, a nuanced understanding of the origins of each is essential. The Council of Europe (2012) contends that Travellers in Ireland and in Scotland may have ethnically distinct origins from Roma, with each considered to be indigenous communities to their respective nations. Williamson (1994) supports this, linking Traveller communities to hunter-gatherers from the Mesolithic period. However, Clark (2001, 112) points to Travellers being a nomadic group formed in the fifteenth century “from the intermarriage between local nomadic craftsmen and Romanies from France and Spain in particular”. Given the lack of consensus regarding the origins or histories of Roma and Travelling communities, van Baar (2011, 1) echoes Belton's (2005) conclusion that there is no consistent Gypsy lineage by stating that Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities are a people “without a history”. While not the focus of this article, such distinctions are important to illustrate that Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities are not homogeneous, and while communities may often share cultural practices, it must be recognized that each community is multi-layered (Mayall 2015), with unique identities, lifestyles, religions, and moral belief systems (Hamilton 2016).

2. Terminology

As with Collins’ (2017, xi) note that use of “minority women […] renders an array of non-white women simultaneously hypervisible in the media”, generic terminology pertaining to Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller people (e.g. “GRT”) has often been controversial, given that it does not refer to a single homogenous group, and thus does little to acknowledge the distinct historical and cultural trajectories of these communities (Foster and Norton 2012; Sime et al. 2014). Levinson (2015) stresses the pejorative nature of the terminology, and indeed the use of the terms “Gypsy” and “Traveller” is an area of contested space, acceptable to some communities while others may find it offensive (D’Arcy 2017). For example, some European Roma reject the term “Gypsy” and prefer to self-identify as “Roma” (Mulcahy et al. 2017). In support of this, the Council of Europe (2012) ceased using the term Gypsy in official documents in 2005 at the request of international Romani associations which, as Levinson (2015) suggested, found the term “Gypsy” to be pejorative. In contrast, English and Welsh Gypsy families are often proud to be called Romani Gypsies or just Gypsies, whereas Scottish Travellers sometimes reject the terms “Gypsy” or “Roma”, preferring to self-identify as either “Gypsy-Travellers”, “Scottish Travellers”, or “Travelling People” (Hancock 2002; Mulcahy et al. 2017).

Within the Scottish context and the use of “Traveller” within policy documents, Article 12 in Scotland (2018, 1) problematizes the nature of umbrella terminology. In the group's response to a Scottish Government (2018) consultation, they stated:
[Traveller] … brings together groups who do not identify as Traveller and/or do not have a mobile lifestyle [ie. Showpeople do not self-assign as Traveller and Roma are no longer nomadic]. Its use conflicts with other official terminology and as such could lead to a lack of understanding of different cultures and traditions.

Similarly, many Irish Travellers and Scottish Travellers reject the term Gypsy and may also reject any suggested connection to communities who identify exclusively as Roma, while Romani Gypsies in England and Wales and Scottish Travellers have fought hard to be recognized as a distinct minority community (Social Marketing Gateway 2013). Dutton (1989) notes that previously Romani Gypsies were defined as an ethnic minority group by the Race Relations Act (1976). Irish Travellers subsequently were recognized as a minority ethnic group in 2000 (O’Leary v. Allied Domecq 2000; Race Relations [Amendment] Act 2000). Scottish Travellers were recognized only more recently as having a separate ethnic status in Scotland (K. MacLennan v. GTEIP 2008), thereby being granted protection under the Race Relations Act (1976) (Scottish Government 2014).[2]

Further compounding the issue is confusion over terminology within various research and policy documents. For example, a consultation on the rights of UK Gypsies and Travellers, on the one hand, highlights the movement of Roma people into the UK from the 1990s and then, on the other hand, cited evidence that 15 per cent of Gypsy/Romani young people achieved five or more GCSE grades yet the sample consisted of only Romani Gypsy young people and not Romani young people (Craig 2001). Confusion over terminology was also found in the Social Marketing Gateway report entitled “Mapping the Roma Community in Scotland” (2013), wherein they gathered data from all 32 councils, but it became apparent that respondents worked primarily with Gypsy/Travellers and provided responses for the Travelling community as opposed to migrant Roma.

Moreover, in January 2019 the authors consulted Iulius Rostas[3] (personal communication, January 2019) on the National Records of Scotland Question Testing Survey. During this consultation with Rostas on the census testing questions concerning ethnicity, he expressed concern over how categories are created and under which heading minority ethnic communities are to be registered. For example, “Roma” has been placed under “White Other” by National Records of Scotland (2019); however, he noted that when one considers antigypsyism and the social exclusion many Roma people face, this is often “on skin colour”, suggesting instead that Roma would be better placed under “mixed race/ethnicity”, given the race-based discrimination often endured.

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2 The Race Relations Act (1976) was repealed by the Equality Act 2010 (J. Brown 2018).

3. Homogenous Persecution: A Historical Overview

While Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller histories, origins, and identities remain contested, fragmented, and difficult to unpack due to a lack of written historical records (Matthews 2012), it is widely recognized that they are heterogeneous communities (Marsh 2013). While we have seen the ebb and flow of persecution and discrimination directed toward Roma, and varying per geopolitical context, their histories have largely been marked by discrimination, ostracism, persecution, and unequal access to social justice throughout the ages (Angus 1992; Hancock 2002; Acton and Ryder 2012; James 2014).

The first written record of Roma arriving in Europe appears in the fourteenth century (Council of Europe 2012) and evidence of European “gadje” populations rejecting such communities begins shortly after their arrival (Taylor 2014) – with Berlin (2018, 184) suggesting they were considered “deviant”. Allen (2018) argues that as the European political and economic landscape became more reliant on commerce and centralized funding revenue streams, public attitudes towards Romani communities changed as they commonly became viewed as subverting social norms. For example, due to their nomadic traditions, such communities were difficult for government authorities to track down for tax collection (Hancock 2000). The stereotyping of Roma and Traveller populations as “tax-dodgers” persists today (see e.g. Denson 2011; Reid 2015; Robinson 2016).

Across Europe, an increasing number of laws were passed during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that criminalized nomadism, unlicensed trading, and being caught sleeping in tents or trailers (Houghton-Walker 2014). The consequences of these “transgressions” resulted in “offenders” being systematically arrested with punishments including execution, forced labour, and whipping being commonplace (Allen 2018). In addition, many women were subjected to forced sterilization (Rodriguez and Araújo 2017). Romani persecution continued throughout Europe into the seventeenth century as seen by the penal transportation of Romani communities from England to the “new world” (Hancock 1987). While the eighteenth century saw Romani groups established as a distinct population that needed to be “improved” through assimilatory processes of population management (van Baar 2011). The nineteenth century in Finland saw the emergence of policies that sought to eliminate Romani culture and language through the use of forced labour and the segregation of Romani children by placing them in “Gypsy schools”. Other measures included forcibly removing children from their families by placing them in state custody (Berlin 2018).

The twentieth century saw the genocide of more than 1.5 million Roma and Sinti (ERRC 2004b) during the Holocaust along with other minority groups such as Jewish people, members of the LGBTQ+ community, trade unionists, and people with disabilities (Zimmerman 1996; Aly and Heim 2003; Greenfields et al. 2018). Following the end of the Second World War and the rise of communism in many parts of Eastern Europe, the punitive and exclusionary practices towards Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller people across Europe continued and witnessed many states enforcing sterilization of women (ERRC 2004a), coerced resettlement, and segregated formal education in an attempt to convert these populations

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4 Gadje is a term used by some European Roma to refer to non-Romani people (Kuiper 2019).
in to what respective states perceive as productive workers (Guy 2009; van Baar 2011). Such persecution of Roma communities did not cease, neither with the fall of communist regimes nor with the shift to market economies and the “democratization” of Europe (Crowe 2008; Mirga 2009; Poole and Adamson 2013). Rather Roma communities continued to be vulnerable to racially motivated violence throughout Europe (see Bancroft 2001; Fekete 2014).

Consequently, it is important to acknowledge that given this sustained history of persecution, many individuals may remain cautious over identifying themselves as Roma within census data. Despite this, the inadequacy of state-funded support for self-managed projects as well as organizations working with or alongside Roma communities demonstrates the need to consider the introduction of “Roma” as a distinct ethnic category in nations where census data collects this information.

4. Arrival and Treatment of Romani Communities in the UK

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 saw a number of Romani refugees fleeing persecution in Central and Eastern Europe and seeking asylum in the UK (Brown et al. 2013). However, their asylum claims often were denied (Ryder and Cemlyn 2016). It was not until 2004, with the expansion of the European Union (EU) to include A8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and A2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania) in 2007 that not only Roma but all Central and Eastern European citizens were granted the right to free movement within European Member States including the UK. Adamson and Poole (2013, 23), however, question whether Roma migration following EU expansion was genuinely voluntary, suggesting instead that Roma are a demographic that continue to be “pushed abroad” as opposed to being “pulled toward” employment or other opportunities.

The Immigration Act (1999) led to the establishment of the dispersal system of asylum seekers across the UK, placing asylum claimants in Local Authority, Housing Associations or private sector housing in areas of multiple deprivation against their will (Poole and Adamson 2003). If the claimant refused to be rehoused this would automatically result in being excluded from any welfare assistance – further perpetuating cyclical deprivation as asylum seekers are not allowed to gain employment while their claim is being processed. Compounding the issue is that responsibilities exist on a spectrum of reserved and devolved powers between the Scottish Government (Holyrood) and the UK Government (Westminster), further complicated by the administration of policy at the local council level. For example, Section 5 of the Scotland Act (1998) reserves employment, social security, and immigration policy areas to Westminster. By contrast, healthcare, education, children’s services, housing, and policing are each devolved powers and include the provision of services to asylum seekers and A8 migrants who have no recourse to public funds.

The European Commission launched the Decade of Roma Inclusion in 2011 wherein EU member states were expected to devise “National Roma Integration Strategies” in order to address social exclusion (Rostas and Ryder 2012; Ryder and Cemlyn 2016). The European Commission (2011) also made explicit in its guidelines to member states that they ensured that a national Roma integration policy framework
was in place in line with the Common Basic Principles on Roma Inclusion (2009) in order to use the European Structural and Investments Funds for the period 2014–2020. The European Commission (2011, 8) set the following criteria:

1. Sets achievable goals for Roma Integration to bridge the gap with the general population. These targets should address, as a minimum, the four EU Roma integration goals relating to access to education, employment, healthcare and housing;
2. Identify where relevant those disadvantaged micro-regions or segregated neighbourhoods, where communities are most deprived, using already available socio-economic and territorial indicators;
3. Allocate sufficient funding from national budgets, which will be complemented, where appropriate, by international and EU funding;
4. Include strong monitoring methods to evaluate the impact of Roma integration actions and a review mechanism for the adaptation of the strategy.

The UK Department of Communities and Local Government (2012), in their Progress Report produced by the ministerial working group on tackling inequalities experienced by Gypsies and Travellers, only included Roma within their considerations of education – excluding them from discussions on health, accommodation, and employment outcomes. While the UK National Roma Integration Strategy (described by the ERPC [2012, 22] as more akin to “sets of policy measures within wider social inclusion policies”) was accepted by the European Commission, it largely ignored Romani-specific issues. Moreover, the strategy did not consider Romani communities dispersed across Scotland and failed to mention employment policies and interventions relating to recent arrivals to the UK. To date, the Scottish Government has yet to submit its own Roma Integration Strategy to the European Commission (Community InfoSource 2016). With the UK’s imminent departure from the European Union following the 2016 Referendum (colloquially, “Brexit”), the UK and devolved Scottish governments may no longer be legally obligated to share the statistical results of the 2021 Census with the European Commission (National Records of Scotland 2018).

In 2011, the then Minister for Housing and Local Government, Grant Shapps, MP, provided evidence to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee arguing that a Roma strategy would impose unhelpful targets and add unnecessary reporting requirements (European Scrutiny Committee 2011). This came despite the European Commission (2011) making it explicit that targeted actions and sufficient funding were necessary as traditional social inclusion measures were failing to meet Romani-specific needs. Policy, however, continues to marginalize Roma from A8 and A2 countries. For example, there were transitional employment restrictions for newly arrived Romani and non-Romani migrants from A8 countries and, consequently, they had “no recourse to public funds” (Paterson et al. 2011). In 2011 when restrictions for A8 nationals were lifted, giving individuals the right to work and access welfare in the UK, restrictions still applied to A2 nationals (Social Marketing Gateway 2013).
5. The Census

The ethnic group question was added to the UK census monitoring data in 1981, enabling local authorities to develop effective social policies to address inequality and measure the impact of various policies (Finney and Simpson 2009). In a report by Hills et al. (2010), entitled An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK, the authors found that Gypsy and Traveller communities were absent from ethnic monitoring categories on surveys, resulting in a paucity of knowledge on the inequality that these communities face. The inclusion of Gypsies and Travellers in the 2011 census gathering process was therefore an important first step in addressing the inequality that these groups experience. However, different ethnic classifications were used on census questionnaires in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In England and Wales, participants could self-ascribe as “Gypsy or Irish Traveller”; whereas in Scotland the response category included “Gypsy/Traveller” and the equivalent category in Northern Ireland was “Irish Traveller” (Parliament and House of Commons 2017). These inconsistencies continue to permeate through policy in England, Wales, and Scotland. For example, in a recent House of Commons Library (2017) briefing paper the terms “Gypsy and Travellers” were used to capture Roma, Romani Gypsies, Irish Travellers, Scottish Gypsies/Travellers, and Welsh Gypsies/Travellers, as well as cultural Traveller identities. In a recent Scottish Government consultation, the term “Traveller” is used to describe Gypsy/Travellers, Roma, and Showpeople (Scottish Government 2017).

The 2011 combined UK census data sets identified circa 63,000 Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller people living in the UK with roughly 58,000 people in England and Wales self-ascribed as “Gypsy or Irish Traveller”, around 4,000 people living in Scotland self-ascribed as “Gypsy/Traveller”, and close to 1,000 people living in Northern Ireland identified as “Irish Traveller” (ONS 2013). However, this count is considered to be a gross underestimate as the Council of Europe (2013) has estimated a combined population total of between 150,000 and 300,000 Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller people currently living in the UK. Elsewhere, Brown et al. (2013) suggested that indigenous Romani Gypsy and Traveller population sizes match that of the Romani population (roughly 200,000); speculated that there may be combined numbers of indigenous groups and newly arrived Roma of between 400,000 and 500,000 in the UK; and emphasised the need for resources to support community members.

Matras (2015, 29), however, problematizes the estimations put forward by Brown et al. (2013), describing them as “abstract projections” and a methodology that not only lacked transparency but failed to engage directly with Romani communities. Matras also raised concerns regarding the criteria respondents utilized to identify Roma, which is significant due to confusion over terminology within the UK context, as the terms Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller often are conflated and treated as synonyms, while “Roma” often is conflated with “Romanian”. Matras further criticized the authors very public dissemination of data on national television, which fuelled xenophobia. To this end, population figures for the most deprived ethnic minority community groups remain contested and underestimation persists.

Mulcahy et al. (2017) cite three factors to explain this underestimation: fear of racial prejudice and discrimination; low literacy rates; and institutional failure to include those in mobile housing. A further contribution to the low estimate is that the census excluded Roma as a response category,
with census officials advising participants who would self-identify as “Roma” to select “White Other” (Mulcahy et al. 2017). Pertaining to Romani populations, Brown and Scullion (2014) estimate approximately 197,705 Roma living in the UK, with England suggested to have a Romani population of around 193,297; around 3,030 Romani migrants reside in Scotland, and circa 500 in Northern Ireland. Brown, Martin, and Scullion (2014, 23) cite a number of reasons for the gross underestimate including “collection instruments often recording nationality rather than ethnicity”. Is it possible instead that the underestimate may be due to a lack of state will to engage all communities or on failure by the state to provide the option for Roma to identify? The Irish Traveller Movement in Britain (2013) argues precisely this, suggesting that the underestimate was due to the failure of the Office of National Statistics (ONS) to engage with marginalized communities.

The lack of census data presents serious challenges in developing effective policies and targeted services for Romani communities living in Scotland. According to the European Commission (2010, 24), the data deficit is “one of the biggest obstacles to the development, implementation, assessment and transferability of evidence based policies whose impact can be effectively evaluated”. Indeed, without ethnically disaggregated data, policymakers will be unable to develop policies that promote equality of access and measure participation outcomes in the areas of health, education, housing and employment. When considering that the underestimate may be due to community members reluctance to self-identify (see e.g. Ofsted 2014; Mulcahy 2017; Scottish Government 2018), the current authors encourage policymakers and researchers not to hide behind the oft-quoted but unsubstantiated *moot* that Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities “do not want to engage” or “self-identify”. This serves only to further pathologize Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller cultures and is an example of what Acton (2016, 4) terms “prejudiced neglect”.

6. The Need to Measure Population Sizes?

The importance of measuring population sizes has long been recognized. The UK census, for example, allows the government to determine the resources needed in relation to education, employment, health, accommodation, transport, and social services based on the population size. Reliable and comparable data is vital in order to design effective legislation and policies across multiple indicators so as to put in place effective solutions to address social inequalities. The National Records of Scotland (2018) examined the effect of the census not being carried out on the misallocation of funds. An examination of the effects of the 2011 census not having taken place and instead using the results of 2001 census figures on NHS Health Board funding allocations estimated a misallocation of GBP 30–40 million in 2014–15 alone.

Equally, ethnic categorization and monitoring are contested ideas and processes, given that the relationships between ethnic categorization, public policy, and the behaviour of a given society are contextual, mutually constructive, and consistently in flux. The use of ethnic categories thus carries much social and political significance, which both can reflect and cause problems and inequalities between groups and actors (Simon, Piche, and Gagnon 2015). The socio-political context behind ethnonyms – how and by whom ethnic and racial categories are set, and how they are officially presented as fixed and mutually exclusive when they are not, raises questions about both their usefulness and their intent (Safran 2008). Simon, Piche, and Gagnon (2015) discuss and compare six types of “data collection
regimes” that can be observed in the collection of official diversity data. Two of the six regime-types observed are those that do not gather data on ethnicity in official statistical production, either for the purpose of national integration (erasing difference) or, conversely, in the name of multiculturalism. The four remaining regime-types do gather data on ethnicity – the authors define these four regimes as (1) counting to dominate, (2) counting in the name of multiculturalism, (3) counting for survival, and (4) counting to justify positive action (ibid., 3). These regimes are not necessarily mutually exclusive – they can overlap and coincide, and importantly, they can be performing more than the function that is being claimed. In other words, intent does not equate to outcome, so data collection to ensure multiculturalism or positive action in actuality has the potential to contribute to domination, exasperate societal rifts, and produce policy with negative impacts.

We take these problems into account and acknowledge that the process of defining and collecting information about ethnicity and race is complex and messy, and not to be taken for granted. However, given the fact that Scotland and the UK do politically operate in such a manner where official data on ethnicity is gathered and then used to inform policy and funding decisions, we believe that the need for recognition, policy change, and funding when it comes to Scotland’s Roma communities does involve a need to officially recognize Roma as an ethnic group, separate to Gypsies and Travellers. The Open Society Foundations has also emphasised the need to measure Romani population size in order to adequately allocate resources to Europe’s most marginalized ethnic minority group:

> The official invisibility of Roma people negatively affects public funding that help Roma communities with healthcare, education, employment, and housing. This invisibility also undermines the potential for Roma political participation and Roma led social change (2013, 1).

Looking particularly at education, January 2003 saw the Department for Education and Skills (DfES, 2003) in England and Wales revise ethnic monitoring categories, and young Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller people were categorized under “Traveller of an Irish Heritage” or “Gypsy/Roma” (DfES 2003). Such categories also appear in the Pupil Level Annual School Census Data (PLASC 2003–2008), now known as the School Census, thereby allowing the DfES to monitor and analyse the performance of young Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller people. In comparison, ethnic minority categorization in the Scottish Government’s (2016) attainment data, wherein “Occupational Gypsy and Other Travellers” is included under “All other categories” makes no mention of Roma communities. This is problematic, for if we do not know how many Romani young people are attending schools in Scotland then we cannot bridge the education gap through targeted interventions and the provision of resources such as language support of dedicated staff members. The NRS (2018) emphasises the importance of data on proficiency in relation to planning educational and translation services. However, ethnic monitoring categories in Scotland do not include Roma as a response category, making it difficult to measure language support needs, exclusion, and attainment, rendering young Romani people invisible when considering destination data. Accounting for low written and therein digital literacies among Romani communities as observed by Mulcahy et al. (2017), barriers to inclusion within future census data sets are likely to worsen as the process shifts online.
7. UK Romani Population Estimates

While Roma have been excluded from Census 2011, there have been several notable attempts to estimate the size of the UK Romani population. In 2009, the European Dialogue conducted a mapping exercise of A2 and A8 Romani communities in England (European Dialogue 2009). A mixed methods approach was utilized and involved interviews and focus groups with Romani and non-Romani stakeholders as well as a nationwide survey sent to 151 Local Authorities in England. Statistical data derived from School Census figures in 53 Local Authority areas estimated there to be 24,101 Romani young people in England. The data gathered, however, from 103 Romani interviewees indicated that figure to be much higher, placing the estimate at 111,002. Due to the glaring inconsistencies, the authors proposed a minimum estimate of 50,000 Roma living in the England. Moreover, the mapping exercise found inefficient data collection across Local Authorities, and where Local Authorities had a good estimate of their Romani population, they were more readily able to respond to community members’ needs. The research, however, was English specific.

When investigating the population size of Roma in the UK, Brown et al. (2014) distributed a self-completion questionnaire to all 406 Local Authorities in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland – the results of which estimate a Romani population of 193,297. However, only eight Scottish Local Authorities responded to the consultation resulting in an estimate of 3,030 Roma living in Scotland (see Table 1). The methodology adopted by the researchers coupled with the relatively low response rate meant that aggregation was not possible. However, Brown et al’s (2014) estimated population of 3,030 is supported by a mapping exercise of the Roma in Scotland during which the Social Marketing Gateway (2013) conducted an online consultation involving 31 Scottish Local Authorities (Argyll and Bute did not respond) in order to estimate the minimum and maximum size of the Romani population within their Local Authority.

Table 1. Romani Population by Council Area in Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council Area</th>
<th>Minimum number of Roma</th>
<th>Maximum number of Roma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lanarkshire</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen City</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falkirk</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 26 council areas</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,804</td>
<td>4,946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Social Marketing Gateway (2013).

This research, entitled Mapping the Roma Community in Scotland, indicated that the Local Authority areas of Fife (N=60) and Falkirk (N=20) estimated a maximum of 80 Romani individuals living in their
localities. However, forthcoming research conducted with Fife Migrants Forum and Fife City Council’s Education Department places the number of Roma in Fife and Falkirk to be between 2,000 and 3,000 (Hay, forthcoming). The disparity in numbers is problematic as research suggests councillors will not support the cost of additional services for a seemingly small amount of people – despite evidence that services are struggling to deal with the complex needs of Romani communities (Social Marketing Gateway 2013). In this sense, Roma become further marginalized as these seemingly small numbers rarely support prioritization of vital support and resources. The Social Marketing Gateway (2013, 34) argued that “it is unrealistic to develop new Roma-specific services”, stating that “the objective should be to create bridges and pathways that can link Roma people into existing mainstream provisions”. However, the disparity in population estimates demonstrates that such a stance is founded on inaccurate population figures and fails to consult with the targeted demographic.


The work of Pavee Point Traveller and Roma Centre in the Republic of Ireland has been instructive as they have been comprehensively and strongly advocating for the inclusion of Roma in Ireland’s census (see Pavee Point 2017a, 2017b). Pavee Point’s role in engaging and increasing RGT communities’ participation in Census 2016 was essential as it indicated an increase in Travellers self-identifying from 5.1 per cent in 2006 to a 37 per cent (circa 30,987) increase in participation in Census 2016 (Pavee Point 2016). The group provided information and knowledge to community members through information-sharing sessions, DVDs explaining the purpose and benefit of the census, a dedicated website on census fieldwork, and awareness-raising educational sessions among local Traveller organizations, identifying these challenges as an additional resource requirement by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The group are currently involved in proposing a separate Romani category in Ireland’s 2021 Census. In their submission to the CSO, entitled *Towards an Ethnic Equality Question in Census 2021* (2017b, 17), Pavee Point draw attention to the continued omission and “statistical invisibility” of Roma in Ireland. Within their recommendations, Pavee Point call for the inclusion of Roma as a disaggregated category within Census 2021, as well as recognition that Roma are a community that continues to experience the highest levels of inequality across Europe and that gathering reliable statistics are a key step in being able to tackle these inequalities. The published minutes of the CSO’s first Census 2021 Advisory Group meeting, held in 2017, show that there were several suggestions and strong support to add Roma as a separate option on the 2021 Census, and that it was under consideration and a subgroup has been set up to frame a revised question (CSO 2017). There has been no official announcement of the addition of the category, however.

In June 2015, the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) launched a public consultation asking census users to share their views on a range of topics including ethnic identity classifications. In response a number of organizations such as Sheffield City Council, the Coordinator for UK Race and Europe Network, and the Discrimination Law Association put in a request for specific information on Romani communities. An ethnic group stakeholder follow-up survey was subsequently undertaken in November 2016 in order to further explore more specific ethnic group information. The survey yielded further requests
for information on Roma from the National Federation of Gypsy Liaison Groups, Cornwall Council, Manchester City Council, Oldham Council, Tai Pawb, and London Borough of Redbridge citing that the additional data was needed for resource allocation, service planning and delivery, equality monitoring, and policy development (ONS 2018). There was a significant demand for a consistent and standardized approach to data collection across the UK so as to equip policymakers with essential information in order to make strategic and evidence-based decisions (Pavee Point 2017b).

Following this public consultation and research in December 2018, the UK Government released a Census 2021 White Paper setting out a clear proposal to include Roma as an ethnic category on the 2021 Census in England and Wales. The ONS plans to “work with the Roma population, assisting Roma organisations to provide support for local communities and raising awareness of the Roma response option” (UK Statistics Authority 2018b, 48). The White Paper outlines evidence-based justification for this inclusion, stating that:

There is evidence that Roma are a group of particular policy interest for stakeholders to help ensure, when developing local lettings policies, that their needs are met without unintentional discrimination. There is also evidence that data on Roma are needed in planning services, for example to help plan school places, understand language (UK Statistics Authority 2018b, 49).

Research conducted by the ONS, including user focus groups, indicated that while some Roma would tick the “Gypsy or Irish Traveller” box, there was disagreement and uncertainty about this option, in terms of identification as well as variance in whether participants considered “Gypsy” a derogatory term. Overall it was found that the “Gypsy/Irish Traveller” option does not meet user requirements and reduces the “quality and utility of the data”, and that users identify with the Romani option with significantly more ease. The document also states that “locating the specific response option within the White category caused least confusion” (ibid.).

This recognition of the need for a separate Romani option on the 2021 Census in England and Wales has been welcomed positively by organizations working with Roma across the UK and Ireland (Travellers Times 2019), as well as by the authors of this article. However, we would assert that the inclusion of the Roma tick-box under the “White” or “White Other” category is problematic. In the Equality Impact Assessment for the 2021 Census, published in tandem with the previously mentioned White Paper, the ONS repeats its recommendation to include a Roma response option, stating that “gathering details on ethnic group and national identity are crucial to understanding inequality associated with race in the UK” (UK Statistics Authority 2018a, 12). We agree with this statement, and consequently express concerns that locating a Romani option under “White” or “White Other” will not meet this demand.

9. Census 2021 Developments in Scotland

Echoing Pavee Point’s (2017b) recommendations, the Scotland’s Ethnic Group Question format should be compatible with the UK Census format. Scotland’s census is conducted in-line with the Census Act 1920 (UK Parliament 1920), with the 2001 Scottish census the first undertaken post-devolution. The NRS, in their report entitled Plans for Scotland’s Census 2021 (2018), indicated that the main ethnicity
classification changes being considered for further testing at the time of writing was the inclusion of response options for Scottish Showpeople, Roma, Sikh, Jew, and an open text response box under the African category. While these developments are welcome in principle, there are concerns over digital inclusion. Scotland’s 2021 Census will be Digital First and the census will be conducted primarily online and a paper questionnaire where online completion is not possible (NRS 2018). While the NRS states within their report that it is essential that all households complete their census return, no consideration is given to language support needs in completing the census. This is problematic due to the high levels of illiteracy among Romani populations who are unable to read and write in their own language, let alone English, indicating the need for language support resources so that Romani communities can participate in Census 2021 (see e.g. Mulcahy et al. 2017).

Evidence was submitted by the current authors to the NRS consultation in December 2018 which provided support from individuals and groups within the following organizations for the inclusion of Roma as an ethnic monitoring category:

Petition respondents included: University of Dundee, University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, University of the West of Scotland, Glasgow Caledonian University, GMB Union, Unite the Union, Unison, Glasgow City Council Education Services, the Scottish Nationalist Party, the Scottish Greens, Glasgow City Council Social Work Services, and Friends of Romano Lav.

10. (In)Visibility of Romani Communities and the Digital First Approach

Collins (2017, xi) suggests “Western democracies have long expressed a fascination with and disdain for the designated minority ... in their midst”. She hypothesises that the term “minority’ [...] renders an array of non-white [people] simultaneously hypervisible in the media”, yet simultaneously blurs diverse cultural, religious, or ethnic backgrounds, therein erasing subtlety from political discourse and policy debate. Bassel and Emejulu (2017, 13) further suggest that “under austerity, minorit[ies] are disproportionately disadvantaged due to their already existing precarity”. Focused efforts therefore are required from authorities to achieve best practice when conducting population-centred research to account for the additional barriers faced by particular communities. Common barriers can include command of the dominant language (see Bloch 2007; Worth et al. 2008; Netto et al. 2010; Tang 2016), and broader social marginalization (see Frazer 2005; Ravensbergen and VanderPlaat 2010). This can be applied to the experiences of Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities across the UK and across Europe more generally, and this paper specifically investigates this notion with regards to Romani communities in Scotland. The Digital First approach set to be utilized by the National Records of Scotland in conducting the 2021 Scottish Census, this article argues, fails to address several such barriers.

These communities and the structural disadvantages they face remain invisible within policy, statistics, resource allocation, and equality discourse (Morris 1999). Yet at the same time, Roma, Gypsies, and Travellers are hypervisible in the media, with negative stereotypes and representations permeating through media
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reports which then leads to the entrenchment of discriminations in public discourses and institutions (Morris 2000). For example, the Govanhill area in Glasgow, which is the home to the highest concentration of Romani families in Scotland, is often the focus point of negative media attention, characterized as “reeling from claims of child trafficking, muggings and decay” (The Scottish Sun 2018), with “crime” and “horror” being linked implicitly or explicitly to Romani communities residing in the area. In late 2017 a number of UK media outlets such as The Times (November 2017) and The Scottish Sun (November 2017) made unsubstantiated claims of Romani families in Govanhill selling their children into prostitution (Aitchison 2017; McKenna 2017). In summary, “hyper-visibility fosters hyper-surveillance and discrimination” (Collins 2017, xi).

Collins (ibid.) adds that such representations position particular minority communities as “either incapable of assimilation [...] or as unwilling to assimilate”. Specifically applying similar notions to the experiences of Romani communities in Scotland, Marcus (2016) cites Trepagnier (2006) in acknowledging “well-meaning White people who consider themselves as non-racist and who work with minority ethnic groups” who through failure to recognize their position of privilege or recognize the significance of poverty and sustained oppression in countries of origin (see Ringold et al. 2004), and whose emphasis on assimilation rather than integration can in fact recycle racialized motifs to broader society – therein denying political agency to individuals with expert knowledge through lived experience.

Illustrating this point, in 2018 the Scottish Government (2018) adopted the term “Traveller” to refer to all Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller groups within their publication Improving Educational Outcomes for Children and Young People from Travelling Cultures. However, “Traveller” itself remains a contested term, with Simandl (2006) suggesting that it ascribes a Traveller lifestyle to those who may no longer travel either voluntarily or due to forced settlement as a result of exclusionary policies such as the (1994) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (Greenfields and Smith 2019). For example, while some Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller people continue to travel, the majority of Roma (circa 80–85 per cent) in Europe and Irish Travellers in Ireland (circa 80 per cent) are largely sedentary (Council of Europe 2012), as living a nomadic lifestyle has become far too difficult due to wider socio-economic changes (Allen 2018). Levine-Rasky (2018, 314) further contends that Roma are “a group unjustly regarded as inherently mobile”.

Less is known of Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller communities “inherent mobility” within the Scottish context. The Scottish Government’s (2015, 37) comprehensive analysis of the 2011 Census identified that 33 per cent of “Gypsy/Travellers” owned their own homes, 40 per cent lived in social housing, and 14 per cent lived in a “caravan or other mobile temporary structure”, therefore problematizing any allusions of mobility. Due to lack of census data pertaining to the Romani population, however, less is known about their living conditions. In their report “Where Gypsy/Travellers Lived” the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee (2013, 2) briefly touches on Romani accommodation. The report did not cover Roma due to the paucity of evidence relating to this migrant community. The report did refer to a dire account of living conditions on arrival in Scotland wherein Roma are living in “privately rented accommodation, and although they pay taxes, and very high rents, they are suffering from appalling conditions of overcrowding”.

In contrast, the Scottish Government (2018) cited research by Scottish Traveller Education Programme (STEP 2016, 4) entitled Mobile Children, Young People and Technology Project, which used the terms
“mobile family” and “mobile communities” to describe various Roma, Gypsy, Traveller, and Showpeople identities despite evidence to suggest that many communities are now largely sedentary (Council of Europe 2012). In exploring young people’s use of technology, the researchers recruited 19 young people in primary schools who identified as Slovak Roma (N=6) in Glasgow and Gypsy/Traveller (N=13) in Edinburgh, the Highlands, and Ayrshire. Acknowledging low literacy rates, the authors explicitly state within their methodologies section that the research design “reflected anticipated low written literacy and communication levels and placed emphasis on oral and visual forms of participation and expression” (STEP 2016, 15). Digital technology use was ubiquitous amongst all young people within the aforementioned study; however, the authors noted that there may be variability in access to the internet. The small sample size raises concerns over generalizability, parental literacy, digital literacy rates, and finally parental language barriers, data that would be relevant in the design and planning of Census 2021 and the Digital First approach in particular. Despite these limitations, the Scottish Government (2018) chose to emphasise the use of digital technology in education and largely overlook more pressing accessibility and language support needs.

Within their Digital First approach toward improving the educational outcomes of “Traveller” children, The Scottish Government (2018) also ignored Article 12 in Scotland’s response to the pre-publication consultation. Article 12 in Scotland, comprised of Traveller and gadje team members, with strong links to Traveller communities in Scotland, voiced several recommendations concerning literacy support and digital access. In response to the inaccessibility of the consultation process itself the organization advised that while “responses are welcomed from members of communities who may have literacy/language issues, the document in its current format could prove inaccessible [suggesting that] an ‘easy read’ or audio version would have ensured wider engagement” (Article 12 in Scotland 2018). The organization proceeded to critique the Scottish Government’s heavy reliance on technology for support in working with Roma, Gypsy, and Traveller young people due to issues around internet accessibility, stating that “internet access [phone and broadband] is patchy at best in much of rural Scotland [thereby] impact[ing] on young people’s ability to engage”. The organization further advised that a number of parents and guardians may have low level literacy and may consequently be unable to support young people in the use of technology.

Not only did the Scottish Government (2018) omit the response submitted by Article 12 in Scotland, but they also failed to look further afield at research by Scadding and Sweeney (2019) exploring digital access among Gypsy and Traveller communities in the UK. Sweeney et al’s, sample (N=50) consisted of 17 Romani Gypsies, 15 Irish Travellers, 1 Welsh Traveller, 8 New Travellers, 8 Travellers and 1 English Traveller. The research revealed high rates of digital exclusion, with a mere 38 per cent of Gypsies and Travellers having access to a household internet connection, if housed. Moreover, Scadding and Sweeney (2019, 5) found that 36 per cent of Gypsy and Traveller people “[could not] use technology” and 52 per cent of participants “did not feel confident using technology”.

Despite the impending digitalization of the census process, to date no research has been conducted on Romani adults’ access to the internet. Though National Records of Scotland (2018b) state that hard copies of the census form will be available during the 2021 collection process, no indication has been made on how paper surveys will be distributed nor has any advice been given regarding language
support for census participants. While the number of Romani community members who are able to speak, read, and write English in the UK remains unknown, fieldwork by Brown and colleagues (2016) in six locations across the UK allows for further evidence on language needs. In their research using focus groups with 159 self-identified Romani individuals across Glasgow, Leicester, London, Oldham, Salford, and Sheffield the authors found universal consensus among participants for access to English language classes and, for many, access to English language courses was restricted. With participants also identifying barriers related to online job applications and a widespread inability to use computers. Due to lack of language acquisition support needs, Romani community members may not have digital literacy in any language – preventing the use of online translation software such as Google Translate. Language support therefore will be crucial in enabling many individuals from Romani communities to complete the census form during the 2021 Scottish Census process.

Conclusion

This article was inspired, in part, by Bassel and Emejulu’s (2017) volume Minority Women and Austerity, and in much the same way as Collins (2017, xiv) praised the authors, this paper “refus[es] to collapse minority [communities] into an undifferentiated mass in which one group’s experiences can easily be substituted for those of another”. Similarly, as Collins (2017, xiii) advocates, the authors believe that the communities pushing for their inclusion within the Scottish 2021 Census “do not need others to explain their situations to them”, rather as witnessed in current movements from the Scottish Showmen’s Guild the communities pushing for inclusion as distinct ethnic categories are “agents in their own lives” and thus best placed to problematize current inclusion practice. Consequently, the co-authoring team is formed by a range of individuals from within and external to the Scottish or UK Romani populations, yet in much the same way bell hooks (1984) proposes, we work towards the “multi-dimensional gathering” of community members, educators, activists, policymakers, and academics towards greater inclusion in the Scottish political context and beyond. Therefore, to conclude, we stress that omission of Roma as an ethnic category from data gathering processes limits understanding of the commonalities and differences within Scottish communities and renders entire populations invisible within broader empirical data and policy interventions. Such invisibility restricts both identification of needs and effective resource allocation. We argue that Scotland should follow England and Wales by including Roma as an ethnic identity in the 2021 Census. However, rather than including this option as a subcategory of “White Other”, as has occurred in the English and Welsh census, any Romani option should be included under the category of “Mixed Race/Ethnicity” in order to acknowledge the racialized aspects of antigypsyism and broader racism that affect communities and individuals based on their often non-white racial heritage.
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Roma Health Mediators: A Neocolonial Tool for the Reinforcement of Epistemic Violence?

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Abstract

Scientific articles in medical journals regarding Roma have produced a type of problematic consensus narrative that is reinforced through its formulaic repetition. Roma health mediator (RHM) programs seem to have evolved from and currently be part of this consensus narrative. In this article I examine the potential use of RHMs, even if unintended, as a neocolonial tool for the reinforcement of epistemic violence against Roma, using a critical analysis of four empirical stories from the field. I explore the above hypothesis through critical reflexive anthropology, and postcolonial and intersectional studies, as well as by using elements of the self-ethnographic approach. I argue that the epistemic violence can be seen as resulting from the interplay between the Subject (i.e., health professional or researcher), the Object (i.e., Roma as “Other”), and the practices that result (i.e., discourse or consensus narrative production through the interpretation of the scientific data). I conclude with tools that could help reduce the epistemic violence against Roma within the health sector, such as cross-disciplinary collaboration, participatory action research (PAR), (self-)reflection, critical theory, and the dialogic creation of scientific knowledge.

Keywords

- Roma health mediators
- Reflexive anthropology
- Critical and postcolonial theory
- Epistemic violence
- Governmentality
Introduction

Roma are among the socially vulnerable population groups that have suffered many years of discrimination. This has resulted in isolation, poverty, and social exclusion from goods such as education, health, work, and housing. In addition, despite all the programs that have been implemented and the policies that have been applied, the situation is not improving.

The above paragraph, variations of which I have used several times in my writings (Petraki 2014a; 2014b), could, according to Surdu (2016, 188), be the image of Roma resulting from the aggregation of scientific and expert practices, which aligns as well with the more general societal expectations for categorization. More specifically, this paragraph could be an example of what Kühlbrandt (2017, 17–18), who draws on Surdu, considers a brief “consensus narrative,” found in the introductory part of articles regarding the health of Roma, published in scientific journals.

This consensus narrative is reinforced through the formulaic repetition of basic concepts that abound in the academic literature regarding Roma: a large and distinct population size, general poverty and social exclusion, a sense of identity, strong traditions and history, the political inadequacy of addressing their inequalities, suffering from discrimination, suffering from poor health, and so on (ibid., 17–18). However, as Kühlbrandt argues (ibid., 27–8), the absence of critical engagement, the process of knowledge production, and the politics of knowledge about Roma health within this consensus narrative are very problematic.

In this paper, I focus on Roma health mediators (RHMs), who are considered to be a bridge between Roma communities, health personnel, and local authorities, and whose aim is to improve access to health care for Roma. More specifically, I explore the possibility that they may be used as a neocolonial tool in the hands of health professionals and researchers who might reinforce, even if unintentionally, the epistemic violence produced through the consensus narrative or discourse regarding Roma health.

In the first section, I briefly refer to the epistemic violence, as an act of interpreting scientific data by problematizing the Other, and the problematic consensus narrative regarding Roma that has been produced by the health sector. Also, I explain the way that RHMs may have become a part of a mechanism for epistemic violence against Roma. In the second section, I provide and comment on four relevant empirical anecdotes from the field. More specifically, based on the work of critical scholars, I examine the roles that can be attributed to the RHMs within the long-established public health research context, their “use” as valuable tools within the process of reinforcing the Roma problematic consensus narrative, and the way they can be seen by their communities. Finally, based on remarks in these anecdotes, I suggest a mechanism for countering epistemic violence against Roma in the field of health.

1 Due to a word limit, I chose to omit the general historical and conceptual background of mediation in Romani communities, as well as their successes and challenges. For those who would like to gain more information, please refer to the educational program “Young Roma Health Mediators Trainers and Presenters’ Manual” (Petraki 2014a).
1. Positionality in the Field

As a brief disclosure of my positionality in the field, my first collaboration with Roma cultural mediators was in 2011, as a coordinator of the “Health promotion of Roma children” component within an EU operational program, run by the Centre for Intercultural Education at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (NKUA). Almost two years later, through my participation at a one-year training program of the Council of Europe (CoE), I designed the first pilot program for RHMs in Greece. The program was completed successfully in 2014 with the support of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) PRAKSIS and the contribution of several volunteers. The following two years, I continued collaborating with Roma cultural and health mediators within the first national health examination survey of Greece, “Hprolipsis,” run by the Medical School of Athens.

A couple of years later, as a PhD student focusing on the health of Romani populations, as well as a master’s student of social and cultural anthropology, I felt the need to revert to my past experiences regarding cultural and health mediation in Romani communities. The aim was to review my previously “established” perceptions on that subject in the light of social anthropology and reflexive ethnography, whereby the ethnographer becomes part of the inquiry. Would I approach Romani communities in a different way as a postgraduate student of social anthropology? Would I change the way I had designed and implemented the programs I took part in? To what extent had I realized at that time the power of my identity as a young, white, non-Romani and educated woman with links to university institutions, hospitals, and NGOs? Was there a chance that I, as a health professional and researcher who had been involved in Romani public health projects, had produced epistemic violence?

Having come from the field of health sciences, including nutrition, public health, international medicine, health crisis management, and epidemiology, and having absolutely no relation with social sciences, the majority of Romani literature that I had studied in the past could not help me in finding the answers to the above questions. On the contrary, it seemed it had masked rather than challenged any motive for reflection. My critical thinking was leaning on quantitative studies, biochemical and biological processes, economic theories, program evaluations, and strictly structured texts written in passive voice.

Most of the relevant literature I had read in the past were mainly produced by state bodies (e.g., the Hellenic General Secretariat for Population Education, USAID), European Union bodies (e.g., the European Commission, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), United Nations agencies (e.g., the United Nations Development Program, UNICEF, the World Health Organization), international organizations (e.g., the CoE), charity organizations (e.g., Open Society Foundations), and NGOs (e.g., Romani CRISS, Fundación Secretariado Gitano). These publications had provided me with quantitative results about the health status of Roma, possible correlations between the health of Roma and causal socio-political factors, Roma health policy reports, and reports about the successes and the challenges of Roma health mediation programs.

However, when I started searching the literature by adding the keyword “ethnography,” I began to discover what to me was a new field, one of reflection and critical theory in the science of anthropology.
Thus, I began to identify a new wave of critical approaches to the narratives concerning Roma, as expressed through the work of Charlotte Kühlbrandt (2017), Angéla Kóczé (2011), Huub van Baar (2011), Joanna Kostka (2015a; 2015b), Adina Schneeweis (2009; 2013; 2015), Mihai Surdu (2016), Nidhi Trehan (2001; 2009), and others, most of whom also referred to theories of postcolonialism (e.g., Foucault 1972; 1973; Spivak 1988, Said 1993; Spivak 1999) and intersectionality (e.g., Davis 1981; Abu-Lughod 1991; 1998).

This new wave of critical scholars worked in several areas, scrutinizing the political shift towards Roma after the fall of communism and the rendering of Roma as a “problem” and as “the largest minority in Europe” (van Baar 2011; Vermeersch and van Baar 2017); the deeply rooted scientific practices that have made an ethnic group a measurable and objectifiable entity through the process of essentialization, the narratives that homogenize them, and the role that the media play in reinforcing stereotypes (Schneeweis 2009; Surdu and Kovats 2015; Surdu 2016; Kühlbrandt 2017); the need for intersectional analysis, such as the limited references to the social struggle of Romani women and to the narrative used by NGOs to promote their rights and empowerment (Kóczé 2011); and the neoliberal policy that lay behind developmental programs and integration policies, and the neocolonialism of the hegemony of academic disciplines and foundations (Trehan 2009; Trehan and Kóczé 2009; Kóczé 2011; Kostka 2015a; 2015b).

Through my engagement with these scholars, I began to focus on their critical approach, which, to a certain extent, captured my own perception of the “Roma issue” – a perception I had yet to articulate. At that time, I realized that I would have to revisit the assumptions – personal, political, academic, and professional – that informed my approach to Roma and especially to Roma mediators.

Methodology

For the purpose of this article, I chose to focus on critical reflexive anthropology, postcolonial studies, and interdisciplinary studies. This approach would help me to critically examine the cultural identity attributed to Roma through the exploration of political, social, and economic issues that focus on oppression, conflict, struggle, power, and practice (Schwandt 1997, 22; Marcus and Fischer 2016). Moreover, elements of the self-ethnographic approach would allow me to highlight the personal shift in my critical perception regarding Roma health promotion and RHMs. At the same time these elements would help me avoid thinking in deeply rooted binaries, such as researcher and researched, objectivity and subjectivity, self and others (Ellingson and Ellis 2008, 450–9; Méndez 2013, 281; Adams 2015, 1–2).

Through using these approaches, I could offer critical reflection (Kennedy and Mayhew 2004) not as a distant researcher but as a person who had trained RHMs and collaborated with them for more than five years. Also, I could further contribute to lessening the gap in the literature on how mediation works in practice (Kühlbrandt 2017, 44).

The data I used, consisting of four short empirical stories from the field, come from notes I kept in my personal diary and video footage that was produced while I was involved in the “Young Roma Health Mediators” and “Hprolipsis” programs. These stories were selected based on the relevance of their content to the aim of this article, as explained above. The main people in these stories are aware of and agree with the use of this material.
2. The Production of Epistemic Violence through the Roma Health Discourse/Consensus Narrative

Spivak, in her famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak” (1988), was the first to develop the term “epistemic violence,” which refers to the colonial knowledge practices that have been applied in “third world” countries. More specifically, Spivak uses the term “epistemic violence” in regard to the discourses of knowledge that have been produced by various projects in literature, history, and culture, through which the colonial subjects have been constituted as “Other.”

The health sector plays an important role regarding the epistemic violence that has been practiced and continues to be practiced towards Roma, as a governmentality field that includes a wide range of control techniques, such as biopolitics (Foucault 2008, 317). The following are a few examples from this field: its central role regarding the biopolitical methods of eugenics and techniques of population control, for instance the sterilization of Romani women without their consent (Zampas and Lampačková 2011; Albert and Szilvasi 2017); attributing responsibility regarding health status to Romani cultural characteristics, thus perceiving culture as static and ignoring at the same time the social, political, and economic dimensions associated with this issue (e.g., Roman et al. 2013, 850; Bobakova et al. 2015; Council of Europe 2016, 46); the linking of Roma with the concepts of risk and threat through the emphasis in the literature on communicable diseases and Roma – an emphasis that tends to reflect a concern for the needs of the general population rather than for the needs of Roma (Hajioff and McKee 2000, 868); the projection of Roma as a “problem,” which necessitates targeted intervention (Matras 2015, 30); and the production of knowledge through studies that contribute to the homogenization and reinforcement of stereotypes under the umbrella term “Roma,” often not taking into account differences in nationality, social class, educational level, and living conditions (Surdu and Kovats 2015; Surdu 2016, 250; for examples of the above approaches, see Kalaydjieva, Gresham, and Calafell 2001; Zeman, Depken, and Senchina 2003; and Vivian and Dundes 2004).

Kühlbrandt developed the term “consensus narrative” (2017, 17) in relation to the Romani narrative produced through the health sector in particular, as has already been mentioned in the introduction. According to Kühlbrandt, given the limitation in the number of words in many academic journals, authors have limited space to refer to the environment, background, and modern complexities of their subject matter, prior to focusing on their research questions. As a result, they end up using common descriptions – not just in the health sector but also in other disciplines such as education, housing, and work. Moreover, not only is this narrative reproduced in scientific journals, it is similar to that used in Roma policymaking (e.g., in World Bank reports), with the same language and stories being used. Academic and policy literature cross-reference each other, and as a result this consensus narrative is further entrenched.

Furthermore, Kühlbrandt (2017, 29–30) argues that RHMs programs have evolved from and are currently part of this consensus narrative. For example, according to van Baar (2018, 7), the narrative regarding metaphors of gaps, traps, vicious circles, and bridges has become an integral
part of the developmental discourses of international governmental organizations. This has led to the institutionalization of bridging “mediators” in the domains of healthcare, schooling, policing, and community or labour-market interventions. This in turn was epitomized by the 2011 EU/CoE-funded ROMED\(^2\) initiative.

In addition, over the last few years, more and more critical scholars have problematized the institution of Roma mediators. More specifically, Kóczé (2019, 202), commenting on the ROMED project, argues that even though it aims to empower Romani community members and create inclusive public institutions, the program’s design, ideology, and rationale are based on prevalent discourses about Roma as “underdeveloped” and culturally “Other.” Thus, it failed to highlight the deep structural, socio-racial, and spatial inequalities. Also, the framing of the program in terms of individual communication and behavioural matters seems to ignore power relations and required structural changes (ibid., 197).

Moreover, according to Clark, within health promotion as well as in improving access to educational opportunities, the “gains” acknowledged by Roma mediators through their work:

> are illustrative of a gadzhe “social inclusion” model that still views Roma communities as largely dependent and lacking in both agency and ability to articulate need and represent collective, democratic thinking and governance. This is a redundant, neocolonial model in the 21st Century and one that needs to be stripped of power, control and influence (2018, 195–6).

The concept of epistemological violence in empirical social sciences, according to Teo (2010), has a Subject, which is the researcher, an Object, which is the Other, and an action, which is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Borrowing this idea and focusing on the public health sciences, I will argue that the epistemic violence against Roma comes out of the long-established interplay between the Subjects, which are the health professionals and researchers; the Object, which is Roma as “Other”, and the ensuing practices, which produce the discourse/consensus narrative through the interpretation of the scientific data. Also, I will try to show that in recent years, RHMs may have been used as a new neocolonial tool for the reinforcement of epistemic violence against Roma by the Subjects, that is, health professionals and researchers, along with the scientific practices they have already been using, such as counting, classifying, mapping, sampling, predicting, photographing, and DNA profiling (Surdu 2016, 247. For a depiction of this mechanism, see Figure 1).

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2 The European Training Programme for Roma Mediators (ROMED) aims to reinforce mediators’ skills to facilitate communication and cooperation between Roma and public institutions, especially schools, health services, and employment offices. For more information, see http://coe-romed.org.
3. Empirical Case Studies

‘Young Roma Health Mediators’

The training course “Young Roma Health Mediators” was implemented in Greece in 2014 by PRAKSIS and was cofunded by the European Youth Foundation. The aim of this pilot project was to raise awareness concerning the fundamental human right to medical care in selected Romani settlements of the Attica region, by improving health literacy. One of the main objectives of the program was to train 20 young Roma from the Attica region as mediators on health issues (for more information on the project, see Petraki 2014a).

Below, I provide and comment on two anecdotes. The first is an excerpt from video footage taken during the theoretical part of the training course. The second, notes of which were kept in my diary, took place about one year after the end of the project.

What Is a Mediator?

The following discussion took place during the training module “What Is the Role of the Mediator?” Roma trainees were asked to share their opinion on this question.

Trainee A: I believe a mediator is the human link that will mediate for a community of people who are weak.
Trainee B: What I have understood is that it is the bridge between logic and absurdity, for people who are illiterate, have anger, are abusing drugs, are sick and do not have the courage to reclaim and process things. I believe that I will be a model, a peculiarity for my race. I have made a picture in my mind that all these social actors who are shutting the door to us, either because my race is to blame or because we did not move forward, will allow me in… I can be the link that connects people with needs, but not someone who goes wherever he wants. It’s not possible to be an employee and suddenly to go to the manager; there has to be a path, and that, I think, we are going to learn through experiences, such as the ones you have. You should have well-established arguments, you have to claim, not to demand… just like my mother says, “The sleep you will get depends on the way you will make your bed.”
Trainee C: I believe that the mediator’s role is for some people who do not have knowledge, for people that cannot follow some other people… we will go and open the doors to mediate and do what we have to do.
Trainee D: Provide information on rights and what we have to get. In addition to this, mediators, and especially young people, can exchange opinions among us and give solutions. I would say that we are a software in society that can bring a proper outcome to problems and racism… to be able to fight racism and thus to move forward, to have a better life and to evolve.

Schneeweis (2015, 88), using concepts from Foucault (1973) and Lefebvre (1991), argues that “perceptions of the mediators’ power roles change between institutional landscapes (spaces of hegemonic directives),
Romani communities (conceived space where the women have symbolic control), and the lived space of resistance and internalized discrimination.” In the above dialogue, the distinction between these three different spaces appears once again, as trainees try to explain how they imagine their role as mediators.

Regarding the institutional landscape, the trainees seem to identify the area of “logic,” in which there are “directors” and “actors who shut the doors,” “knowledge,” people who are ahead of others and “racism.” When referring to the place where mediators have symbolic control, they refer to the “bridge between logic and absurdity” and the people who can open the intermediate doors separating the different spaces. Their perceptions change once more as their thoughts go to places of resistance and internal discrimination, in which the community is “weak,” “illiterate,” “has anger,” “is abusing drugs,” “is sick,” does not have the required courage, and is suffering from racism, and in which some members of the community “cannot follow some other people.”

They also imagine themselves as community mediators, in which they will have symbolic control – a role that, on the one hand, will improve their own social and cultural capital by becoming a “model” and, on the other hand, will serve their “race,” which they perceive as not having advanced, and which must acquire “a better life” and “evolve.”

According to van Baar (2018, 7), this postcolonial, developmentalist logic is based on the discourses produced by several of the main developmental programs of the EU, the World Bank, and the Open Society Institute. These programs include the “Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015” and the “EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020,” both of which suggest that, after passing through various stages on a continuum, the currently “underdeveloped” Roma will gradually join in with the “developed” majorities.

Adding to what van Baar claims, the Roma mediator programs seem to be built on exactly this logic, by using the mediators as the “human link,” and the “bridge” between these two worlds. As a result, this imagined role by the trainees seems to rely on the power given to them by the intermediary space created by these programs and the mainstream racist consensus narratives[3] that they have internalized regarding Roma, who have “remained back,” and non-Roma, who are ahead and have a better life and greater knowledge.

The internalization of these racist discourses and consensus narratives by Roma themselves, which, as mentioned above, creates the power of the intermediary space occupied by mediators, ties in with Bourdieu’s concept of “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), which has central importance in understanding the reproduction of inequalities between the social classes. For Bourdieu, “symbolic violence” represents the way in which people play a role in reproducing their own subjugation through the gradual internalization and acceptance of those ideas and structures that tend to subdue them. It is an act of violence precisely because it leads to the limitation and subordination of people, but at the same time it is symbolic, in the sense that this is achieved indirectly and without obvious and explicit acts of violence or coercion (Connolly and Healy 2004, 15).

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[3] For relevant references that reproduce such narratives, see Zagora 2015; European Western Balkans 2016; United Nations Human Rights 2018.
Similarly, the trainees seek to improve their economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital by helping their communities, but at the same time they seem to ignore the fact that their role is based on the consensus narratives of the ideas and structures that subordinate them.

However, it is noteworthy that one of the four trainees (trainee D), provided a slightly different perspective on what a mediator is. More specifically, she imagined her role to be related with the “information on rights,” the “solutions,” and the “software” of society that will fight racism. Thus, as opposed to the rest of the trainees, who mainly reinforced the consensus narrative of the weak Roma, as well as the trainers who failed to highlight this trap, she managed to provide another perspective. Her words about the importance of fighting racism and the need to provide information to people about their rights added a totally different dynamic to the perceived intermediary space where the mediators have symbolic control. Today, as I reflect on these moments, I become aware of the huge gap left by the absence of critical approach theories during this training. Theories of critical Romani scholars would have probably allowed us to question these consensus narratives and, consequently, to cause a rift within the vicious cycle of the mechanism of epistemic violence against Roma.

The ‘Trojan Horse’ Mediator in Practice

More than a year after the training ended, I received a phone call from one of the trainees. He needed my support on a personal issue and he also told me that he was trying to find a job. An approximation of the conversation that took place follows (notes were kept in my diary):

Me: Have you started working on this program? Is it over?
RHM: Uh, it’s been a long time since we finished. It took only two to three weeks.
Me: Ah, that short? Well, what did you do?
RHM: We went from the one neighborhood to the other… [named neighborhoods], and we “gave in the air” [spread the idea around] that measles are “decimating” children. So, we were informed after about one or two weeks that there was an outbreak in Greece and told them that we would return in a couple of days to do the vaccines.
Me: And how was it? Everything went well?
RHM: Yes, we informed a lot of people and we managed to vaccinate many kids. The adults also wanted to get vaccinated, but they told us that there are not enough vaccines.
Me: And what about your payment? Did you get paid well?
RHM: Money? Haha. Just a few. I do not remember well… wait, I can ask my wife… yes, I was given 180 euros. But, you know, I would do this even without money, for our children’s health.
Me: And what would you say in general about this experience?
RHM: Do you know what came to my mind? I remembered what you told us at the training regarding the mediators who get turned into Trojan Horses. It seems that they [meaning key people from the ministry of health] remember us only in cases of an epidemic outbreak… when we become a front-page story on the newspaper and “their ass catches fire,”[4] only

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4 Greek idiomatic expression that means that there is a state of emergency.
They come for a while, they use us to do their job, and then they forget us until the next time. How is it possible to change things like that? Not to mention about the “leadership” that exists in these programs… How can you find the way out? Do you know how much money is there? Do you know how many have gone into these jobs without being trained?

A few days ago, “my people” called me on the phone to ask me to attend this meeting. I told them I had a job to do and that I could not go. I do not want troubles with this kind of job.

Based on the above anecdote, it seems that even though trainees are taught to avoid the “Trojan Horse” mediation model – an instrument of the institutions, which aim to reach out to the community in order to change the attitudes and behaviors of its members (Rus, Raykova, and Leucht 2016, 11) – in practice this is not very easy to do.

According to the literature, “Trojan Horse” mediation is applied when mediators are employed by the authorities in an attempt to “buy” peace in the community, defuse potentially explosive situations, and shift responsibility away from the very people whose autonomy they are supposed to be fostering (Liégeois 2013, 7). Also, it is used as an excuse to avoid direct contact with the community, when community members are expected to shoulder full responsibility for solving problems (Kyuchukov 2012, 375), and as a “shield” or “buffer zone” between often intransigent public authorities and Romani communities, which may resent such “forced” interventions on their behalf (Clark 2018, 192) within health promotion as well as in improving access to educational opportunities. The reasons why mediators eventually end up acting in some cases as “Trojan Horses” include their low social status, their precarious employment conditions (low paid, temporary, and uninsured jobs), and their dependency on their employer (Open Society Foundations 2011, 37; Kyuchukov 2012, 375–6).

Likely, the fact that we had the chance to discuss the “Trojan Horse” mediation model during the training helped the trainee to critically approach the terms under which he had to provide his services during that project. As he mentioned, he realized that key people remember them only in emergencies, that they use them only when needed, and that afterwards they forget about them until the next time. I remember that during the conversation I felt glad that this trainee had questioned this project. Thinking about this conversation now, Spivak’s question “Can the subaltern speak?” comes to my mind (1988). In the context of this anecdote, it seems that the trainee, even as a “subaltern” RHM himself next to those who made the decisions on the project, remained aware of the traps. Probably this is why he made the decision to “speak” – that is, to resist – by not attending the meeting with “his people” about “this kind of job.”

‘Hprolipsis’

A few months before the RHM training course was completed, I was invited to participate in the Hprolipsis survey – a Design and Development of Viral Hepatitis and HIV Infection Screening Program in the General Population, in Greek Roma and migrants. Among the study’s aims was to estimate the prevalence and the determinants of hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV infections in the three target populations. The survey was coordinated by the Department of Hygiene, Epidemiology and Medical Statistics of the Medical School of the NKUA and conducted in cooperation with several other actors. Hprolipsis was initiated in May 2013 and completed in June 2016 (for more information on the survey, see Touloumi et al. 2020).
Anecdotes from two events that took place during the survey follow. The first concerns the disclosure of the program to Roma mediators and the request for their support in implementing it. The second has to do with a challenge we had to face during the implementation of the survey. The dialogue that appears with both anecdotes comes from notes I kept in my personal diary.

**Under the Microscope of Science and Media**

Following the briefing I received regarding the survey and its aims, I turned to some Roma mediators, including those who had just completed the health mediation training program, to ask for their support on design and implementation. The following is an approximation of a conversation that took place:

Mediator A: What did you just say? We are going to the camps to tell people that we are here to test you for AIDS? They will start pelting us with stones, and they will be right!
Me: Oh, no, obviously we will not explain it that way. Besides, this study is not just an AIDS test. We will inform the habitants about how hepatitis A and B, and the HIV virus are transmitted so they can avoid infections – and, in addition, we will offer individual counselling and referral to the health care system for all positive individuals.
Mediator A: Once more, what are you saying? People do not have food to eat and we are supposed to approach them and discuss hepatitis? They do not care, no matter if they are infected or not. They do not have a job, they do not have homes, they live with mice, and you are talking to me about something they don’t even know exists.
Me: I understand your frustration and I accept your objections. But on the other hand, why do you underestimate the impact of an infectious disease? You think this is not an important issue? Moreover, at the meeting we discussed the researchers’ common practice, the one in which they go to the camps, get the data they want, take some photos, and then leave. And we set as a precondition that we are going to help them in any way we can, such as food, clothes, health services in the field, for as long as we are conducting the study, and not just get what we want.
Mediator B: And what about the tumult that the results of the study may cause? What is going to happen if the percentages are too high? We will be once more in the front pages, in the news. They will burn us alive. No! That’s all we bloody need: to provide proof that we may transmit diseases. No, no way. Forget it!
Me: But this study is not only for Roma. It is also for the general population and the migrant population. This is not made to stigmatize you.
Mediator A: That’s what you say. How do you know what is going to come next? And what will happen if the Golden Dawn[^5] get to us? And us, who will have supported you – who is going to save us from our people?

[^5]: Ultranationalist, far-right political party in Greece (in Greek, “Chrysí Avgi”), which is regularly described as neo-Nazi by media and academic sources. Members of Golden Dawn have been accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities.
In this particular anecdote, the first thing I would like to highlight is the eventual involvement of the RHMs in implementing this particular survey. This happened despite the fact that neither they nor the members of their communities participated in its initial planning – and also despite their disagreements and the fears the RHMs had for themselves. Therefore, it seemed that the pressure we imposed on them resulted in the loss of their “neutral, objective, and impartial role,” which, according to the relevant manuals, they are supposed to have (Plopper and Iancu 2005, 77; Rus, Raykova, and Leucht 2016, 14).

Today, when I recall the above dialogue, I wonder about several things. How has science contributed to “not fitting” Roma and migrants into the “general population” category? What consequences might such a disassociation entail? Who selects the types of programs implemented for Roma and based on what parameters? Why don't members of the communities take part in the design of the projects that are implemented for them? What kind of narrative do the media use when announcing the results of such programs?

According to Hajoiff and McKee (2000), genetic disorders, reproductive health, and communicable diseases seem to be the main health topics investigated in the literature regarding Roma. This makes Kühlbrandt wonder:

Who prioritizes these topics, and according to what rationale? Is the focus a result of previous research that has shown these areas as particularly important (and if so, in what way), or are they based on vague or stereotypical ideas of Roma as having a limited gene pool (based on endogamy and/or their common Indian origins), as particularly prone to bearing children, or as a threat to the health of others (as sources of infectious disease) (2017, 29)?

According to the scholar, there are two important points to raise here (ibid.). The first is that the literature on Romani health yields unsatisfactory answers to the above questions. The second, which is the most worrying, is that the gaze offered by the academic literature on Romani health tends to reinforce its own assumptions. As Kühlbrandt explains, this happens because, when a large part of the literature focuses on the above-mentioned health topics, they are likely to be seen as “objective” problems in Roma communities. Furthermore, she notes, nobody seems to be asking Roma communities what they consider to be their own health priorities.

Likewise, Trehan (2009, 63–4) notes that the statistics, reports, and various forms of literature on policy regarding Roma, most of them produced by academic, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations external to Romani communities, tend to cause asymmetries of knowledge-power (Foucault 1973, 2008) to (re-)emerge and (re-)consolidate. Also, this increases the chances for the perpetuation of epistemic violence, thus having profound implications on the autonomy and future of the “Roma rights” movement (Trehan 2009, 63–4).

In the anecdote described above, Romani community members are once more mainly treated as Objects of a project and not as equal Subjects and equal participants in discussions about the design and implementation of a program designed for them. This prevailing approach in public health programs
underestimates the knowledge and opinions of “subordinate” Roma and distorts the perception of non-Roma regarding the daily problems faced by Roma. Moreover, it minimizes the opportunities for Romani community members to influence the discourse produced for them.

Things appear even more alarming when media also get involved (Friedman and Friedman 2015), as they tend to reproduce racist narratives regarding “Gypsy” stereotypes (Csepeli and Simon 2004; Okely 2014) and the “Gypsy threat” (Loveland and Popescu 2015). In fact, these racist narratives create what Goldberg (2008) has called “racial neoliberalism,” which is the discursive boundaries created through these narratives to distinguish between “worthy citizens” and those lacking neoliberal market potential, and who, as a result, are treated as being “less worthy,” “dangerous,” and “criminal” subjects.

Kóczé and Rövid (2017), who studied the case of the so-called child theft of “little Maria” from Greece, and in building on the notion of “racist neoliberalism,” refer to the politics of “double discourse,” which is built around Roma and which is the product of a neoliberal approach. As they argue, a “double discourse” is structured by two contradictory discourses addressed to different audiences (ibid., 695). One discourse makes limited references to integration, human rights, and equal opportunities, and the other, through mainstream media, depicts Roma as internal and subordinated “Others.”

The mediators in the above anecdote, who have been working for several years in relevant projects, seem to be very aware of how the politics of “double discourse” is applied in practice and therefore of the possible risks related to this survey. Unfortunately, their initial resistance towards the idea of this survey did not prevent its implementation, but it at least planted, at that time, some seeds for self-reflection among the members of our research group.

**The Native Informant**

One of the biggest challenges we faced in Hprolipsis project was that its design did not include mobile units, which could be used to conduct interviews and take blood samples. Thus, when a public space was not available, such as a school near the settlements we visited, the RHMs had to search for families that would loan us their house during our visits. One day, I received a phone call regarding this (an approximation of the conversation that took place follows):

RHM: We have a problem. We cannot go back to [area and family name]. They are asking for money.
Me: What are you saying? This is not possible. We have to return in order to reach the sample we need. Also, we have to go back again some weeks later to give the results of the blood tests.
RHM: I am afraid you don't really understand. This man is looking for me – [man who owns the house] – to beat me up!
Me: But how did this happen? Did you tell him that we would give them money for their house?
RHM: No, I did not tell him anything about money, but now he says that we are making money out of his home and that we are giving him nothing. And it's not just him. Some people in
the neighborhood are circulating rumours that for every vaccination we do, we get money. The more people we vaccinate, the more money we earn. Also, that once again, money that should be spent on Gypsies are taken by Balamos [non-Roma], who are implementing programs, and by us who support you. What's more, I am constantly scared – if there are any side-effects from the vaccines, no one is going to save me. They will hold me responsible.

The above anecdote verifies once more the claims that Roma mediators have to do tasks that are not included in their job description (assigning additional minor tasks, providing day care, doing secretarial work, and so on) (Open Society Foundations 2011, 35; Kyuchukov 2012, 375; Wamsiedel, Vincze, and Ionescu 2012, 12; Schneeweis 2015, 95). In addition, it shows that the RHM is somehow obliged to put himself at risk, as he will be held accountable to the members of his community if something goes wrong.

Furthermore, this anecdote also reveals the differentiated ways that the role of mediator is perceived, by those who invented the institution of Roma mediators and by the Romani community members themselves. For example, according to Kühlbrandt (2019, 2), during her fieldwork there was little to suggest that community members perceived the mediator as their ally; on the contrary, they seemed to associate her with town hall bureaucracy. In this case, the suspicions of some of the community members regarding the RHM’s role are obvious, as they believe it allows him to “[make] money out of” the exploitation of the community (“The more people we vaccinate, the more money we earn”). In fact, community members associate RHMs with the people who take the money from programs implemented for Roma.

The suspicions brought to light in this anecdote, namely regarding the “profit” the mediator seems to seek through the risk that he puts himself in and the way in which his “traitorous” role is perceived by members of the community, remind me of Said’s (1993) and Spivak’s (1999) postcolonial concept of the “native informant.” More specifically, the “native informant” is transformed into an “unreliable figure,” (Ramone 2011, 140) as he is suspect of providing information and thus “betraying” his community. Spivak (1999, 6), in reviewing this concept, differentiates the native informant, who wears the costume of the “servant of colonial ethnography,” from his modern incarnation, who, she claims, is masquerading as a native informant but is in fact a “self-marginalizing” or “self-consolidating” postcolonial figure. Thus, the native informant, either as an ethnographic tool, or as a literal figure of masquerade, remains needed and, at the same time, “foreclosed” (ibid.).

Today, I am wondering how different the design, the implementation, and the impact of this project would have been if we had replaced the colonialist logic of the expert researchers and their “native informants” with an approach that would transform the Object of the research into a Subject? Would there be a need for gatekeepers/cultural mediators who would have to walk a tightrope, balancing between “keeping faith” with their own ethnic group and facilitating access for the researchers (Condon et al. 2019, 7–8)? Would we have managed to earn the trust and support of the community members on our own merit? Would this have helped us, as researchers, to overcome the medical gaze and to deconstruct the consensus narrative on Romani health, through sharing the actual experiences of the community members (Wallengren and Mellgren 2015)? How could self-reflection have affected the whole project cycle management? What value could have been added by using a cross-disciplinary research committee?
While trying to answer these questions, I tried to imagine an opposite mechanism of epistemic violence to the one I described in the beginning, based on the work of other scholars and lessons learned through my own process of reflection.

Figure 1. The Mechanism of Epistemic Violence against Roma in the Field of Health

As a result, I started exploring participatory action research (PAR) methods, which can be considered as a social process that aims to transform both theory and practice. It can be depicted as a spiral of cycles of self-reflection (planning, acting and observing, reflecting, replanning, and so on), which has the following key features: it is participatory, emancipatory, critical, reflexive, practical, and collaborative (Kemmis and McTaggart 2005).

PAR seems to offer a promising framework within which to break down the objectification of the people being studied, and to involve those with whom the research is being conducted (Baum 2016). More specifically, according to Miranda et al. (2019), the PAR approach can instigate new alliances between and collaboration among multiple community stakeholders in spaces for equal collaboration, and thus to negotiate priorities and resources to be shared towards a collective goal. Also, according to Orton et al. (2019), although it is challenging, when done well, such an approach could contest and challenge definitions and lines of action decided by the researchers, thus leading to more courses of action and dialogical and reflexive knowledge production.
Based on the above, today I can clearly see the need for more competence development training on empowerment and participatory approaches for health professionals and researchers, as well as other scientists, policymakers, and decision-making bodies, as this would better facilitate our potential contribution in transformative processes and social change for all (Eklund Karlsson, Ringsberg, and Crondahl 2017).

Therefore, the use of PAR approaches (Greenfields and Ryder 2012; Bogdan et al. 2015; Eklund Karlsson, Ringsberg, and Crondahl 2017) as the furore surrounding the eviction has died down, the very pressing issues of accommodation need, inequality of access to education, healthcare and employment, and exclusion from British (and European research along with cross-disciplinary collaboration among those involved in different branches of science (Knapp et al. 2015), such as health researchers, cultural anthropologists, and policy makers, may reshape the idea of the Subject (to include professionals and researchers with different academic backgrounds, as well as Romani community members). This new form of Subject may put an end to treating Roma as an Object and RHMs as a neocolonial tool. Instead, the tools that may be used by the Subject are (self-)reflexivity and critical theory (e.g., Bogdan et al. 2015; Ford and Airhihenbuwa 2010; 2018) we issued a similar call to the multidisciplinary field of public health. Public health touts its progressive roots and focus on equity, but do those efforts draw on CRT? To answer this question, we define CRT, describe its origin in the field of law, and review the ways its use has grown in the field of public health. Public health interventions and policies rely heavily on evidence; therefore, we re-introduce the semi-structured research method we developed to facilitate empirical application of CRT, i.e., the Public Health Critical Race Praxis (PHCRP). Finally, the dialogic creation of scientific knowledge (Renedo, Komporozos-Athanasiou, and Marston 2017) through a critical communicative perspective may also help in further curtailing the production of the dominant discourse/consensus narrative regarding Roma. The depiction of such a “counter mechanism” to epistemic violence in the field of Roma health is presented below (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The ‘Counter Mechanism’ to Epistemic Violence against Roma in the Field of Health
4. Concluding Remarks

In this article I critically approached the health sector as a field of governmentality that enacts epistemic violence against Roma. Also, I explored the potential, even if unintended, use of RHMs by health professionals and researchers as a neocolonial tool for the reinforcement of this epistemic violence against Roma. In particular, I argue that the epistemic violence against Roma stemming from the health sector is produced by the long-established interplay between the Subjects, which are the health professionals and researchers, the Object, which is Roma as “Other,” and the ensuing practices, which consist of the production of discourse and consensus narratives through the interpretation of the scientific data. Based on the analysis of four empirical anecdotes, the potential is high for the use of RHMs as a neocolonial tool in the hands of the health professionals and researchers.

Specifically, this happens because their role may rest upon the consensus narratives of the ideas and structures that subjugate them. Furthermore, neither the context of traditional public health research within which RHMs usually work, nor the lack of competency in cultural and critical approaches by health professionals and researchers, provide enough space for RHM voices to be heard. Lastly, RHMs can be used as “Trojan Horse” mediators or even as “native informants,” in this way re-establishing an “us versus them” mentality.

The countering by RHMs of the (most likely) unintended attempt by Subjects to use them for neocolonial instrumentalization is hindered by several factors. These include financial dependency; the desire to improve their social and economic capital; the fact that they are not members of the research team but rather follow instructions; and, finally, the limited power they have opposite the racialized dominant systems of power.

RHMs might also contribute to the neoliberal politics of “double discourse.” The one discourse presents RHMs as an institution that supports integration. The second, contradicting discourse, through the use of RHMs in public health studies that do not really serve the needs of their communities and that disguise the structural oppression that Roma face, serves to “prove” that Roma are “dangerous” and “subordinated Others.”

Even though top-down research, in which the researcher analyses, gathers data, and interviews the “Objects” of the research, is still dominant in the field of Romani studies, the emergence and dynamic development of Romani scholars, and their increasing use of critical approaches and theories, is gradually challenging the legacy of Romani studies and providing an entryway into new avenues of research (Dunajeva 2018, 125; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2018, 21). Therefore, towards this direction, and as an obligation that we must all try to minimize as much as possible the epistemic violence within the health sector enacted against Roma, I suggest that cross-disciplinary collaboration, PAR, (self-)reflection, critical theory, and the dialogic creation of scientific knowledge are essential elements.
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Book review by

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Introduction

Throughout reading The Roma in European Higher Education: Recasting Identities, Re-Imagining Futures, one thought kept reoccurring: this book is a warning – a warning directed at institutions that have influence over Roma higher education (HE) participation and knowledge production to tread carefully, with care, and expert understanding of their tangible and implicit impacts on Romani individuals and communities. The message is that the goal of HE as a means for the social mobility, internationalization, and social inclusion of Roma is not equally shared throughout policies and among institutions. Additionally, the authors warn that the goal of increased social justice cannot be achieved through supporting HE alone. Between discussions in the book, I reflect on and evaluate the need for academia and NGOs to focus their efforts on the agency of Romani students in their HE aspirations and development of an HE identity. These dynamics should be the driving force behind how these institutions operate. Additionally, this focus and re-evaluation is needed to better understand the larger racial and economic structural mechanisms that influence the pressures of responsibility, individuality, and personal mobility within these institutions. Ultimately, agency is needed in order to identify the paradoxes that tug at the psyche and soul of the individual and awaken the desire to challenge the exclusionary forces, first within their HE experiences and then within their communities.

The Roma in European Higher Education consists of two parts: “Theories, Resources, Policy and Professional Interventions for Challenging Roma Exclusion from Higher Education,” and “Focus on Europe Examples of What Is Going on in Greece, the Nordic Countries, Serbia and Spain.” However, I suggest a reading that divides the content along the following themes: context and information on Romani students’ participation in HE, neoliberal influences in HE identity and responsibility, the importance and challenges of knowledge production, and national policy analysis and community experiences.

1. Context and Information

The first two chapters, by Louise Morley, Andrzej Mirga, and Nadir Redzepi, provide information and perspectives on Roma participation in HE that frame the following chapters. Morley’s analysis in the first chapter is that HE is perceived as a luxury for Roma due to a social cognition dominated by a racialized and objectified perception of the community. In turn, higher education institutions and policy exclude Roma participation in HE and knowledge production. Mirga and Redzepi are established scholars and organizers of Roma participation in HE through their former roles as chair of the board and executive director of the Roma Education Fund, respectively. Their chapter provides detailed information and data on Roma participation in HE and contextualizes it through James S. Coleman’s concept of social capital. The authors examine racialized social exclusion and deep-seated antigypsyism in the distancing of Romani students from resources and social networks, and point out racialized disbelief in the ability of Romani students to seek and obtain HE.
2. Neoliberalism Influences in HE Identity and Responsibility

In chapters 3 and 4, the authors critique neoliberalism and its role in the individualization of access to and motivation for HE, in turn shifting the responsibility to resolve Romani exclusion and injustice from state institutions and placing it on Romani HE graduates. Daniel Leyton uses Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics as a lens through which to discuss neoliberal influences on the valuation and management of Romani lives by governments, universities, and NGOs, as well as the racialization and problematization of Romani communities. The chapter further develops the concept of the “responsibilization” of the Romani community’s own exclusion from accessing higher education, through “tropes of the exceptional self: aspirations, motivation, interior strength and empowerment.” Leyton ties concepts in the chapter to the pressure placed on Romani HE graduates to solve Romani exclusion and social injustice instead of institutions addressing structural and institutional racism. Spyros Themelis adds to the discussion from the perspective of evaluating globalization as an “intrinsic function of neoliberalism” that has thereby indoctrinated institutions of HE through the concepts of competition and individualization. With acumen, the author illuminates the collective view that HE is a “win-win,” leading to both economic competitiveness and the enhancement of social inclusion. Themelis scrutinizes the concept by arguing that the economic incentives of competition and individualism undermine contributions to inclusion and justice.

3. Importance and Challenges in Knowledge Production

In his chapter, Paul Roberts discusses the meritocratic principles embodied in HE systems as being rooted in neoliberalism. Generating a knowledge production culture of competition, narcissism, and individualism instigates the exclusion of Romani students and researchers under the concealment of equal opportunity. Through interviews with early-stage researchers who participated as secondments to the EU Horizon 2020 Higher Education Internationalisation and Mobility (HEIM) project, Roberts exposes a hidden cost to upward mobility through HE. Romani HE students and researchers are burdened, internally and externally, with the responsibility for their community’s social improvement. Simultaneously, they have to manage stress, identity, mental well-being, and striving for individual success and mobility. Iulius Rostas and Simona Torotcoi, in chapter 6, delineate the historical and contemporary role of academia in manufacturing prejudicial and stereotypical representations of Roma via knowledge production. The authors argue that knowledge production of Roma is dominated by bias, oversimplifications, and stereotypification, along with the silencing and exclusion of researchers of Roma ethnicity from academia. Through their analysis of the body of research on Roma in HE, the authors expose knowledge production related to Roma culture and identity as being rooted in and dominated by societal stereotypes and misconceptions. Further, the authors critique the failures in the literature to consider the root causes of educational aspirations.
4. National Policy Analysis and Community Experiences

The last chapters provide concrete evidence contributing to the discussions found in the previous chapters. In chapter 7, Teresa Padilla-Carmona, José González-Monteagudo, and Sandra Heredia-Fernández evaluate Spanish HE policies, while the authors of chapter 8 use Carol Bacchi’s poststructural concepts on policy discourse in evaluating the political and social discourses related to Roma participation in HE in Nordic countries. Overall, the two chapters confirm the broad absence of Roma-specific HE policies. When Roma are mentioned, they are problematized through discourses suggesting that Roma lack academic capacities and expectations, and promoting expectations of post-primary education at merely the vocational level. Tanja Jovanovic, in chapter 9, specifies the internalized racism that Serbian Romani HE students experience. The main finding of the chapter points to Romani-specific racism among faculty members and peers, and Romani students’ apprehensions in confronting the racism based on fear of retaliation. In chapter 10, Panagiota Gkofa uses Bourdieu’s concepts of social capital and habitus in an analysis of the factors of educational success. Gkofa conducts 20 interviews with Greek Roma who have completed HE, presenting five key factors of students’ educational trajectories: family and home, teachers, community, locality, and individual qualities and circumstances.

5. Recasting Identities

The book title suggests a contribution to discussions about identity in HE. However, the discussions of identity are not focused on the individual. Instead, the book outlines the identities of academia, NGOs, and political and economic structures, and their influence in the promotion of Roma HE participation, individual mobility, and responsibility to resolve social exclusion and injustice.

A common link among the authors is how the structural economic and social environments have developed an individual rationality in the decision to enter or aspire for higher education. This individualization places the burden and blame on the individual and on Romani communities if Romani students do not achieve HE. The argument which resonates throughout the book is that while HE is depicted as a miraculous cure to Romani exclusion, HE students are entrenched in a cycle of the neoliberal mechanisms of individualization, competition, and elitism, which reinforce social and economic exclusion. Additionally, their newly found HE identities are grounded in the neoliberal identity.

The authors further highlight that organizations promoting Romani inclusion and HE attainment fall into the same neoliberal mechanism of exclusion. The book outlines how intergovernmental, international and local NGOs, and universities follow a biopolitics and governmentality of neoliberalism through a performative veil engrained in the concepts of inclusion, empowerment, and equality. The salience of a HE identity facilitates the formation of a Romani political elite promoting an ideology of effecting change over Romani communities, which mirrors in its very structures and institutions the problematization and exclusion of Roma.

The book’s argument appears to me to be the continuation of racialized definitions of social citizenship. The state has responsibilities to citizens in supporting their social welfare, HE, and inclusion, based on
cultural and national membership. Racial and ethnic boundaries of who has the right to national and social citizenship have declined (Bloemraad et al. 2019). However, the books findings present HE institutions as being ingrained with racialized social attitudes that have distanced Roma from social membership and state responsibility. Discussions on responsibility and the burden to succeed in their individual mobility, coupled with a desire to be active in community emancipation, highlight the multiplicity of identities, and salience of – at times – conflicting identities. The promotion of individualism and elitism by both neoliberalism and NGOs creates a “minority space sustaining its identity and structural solidarity on class-patterned reproduction, shared interests and spaces, no matter how multifarious it may be inside.” The HE identity is a marker of status, and its salience creates a divide across educational categories (Spruyt 2020). Consequently, the highly educated have access and a willingness to participate in the political sphere, while those without HE feel that political participation is a space reserved for the highly educated elite.

Concluding Remarks

The reader of the book will gain an understanding of how structural and institutional environments form incentives for elite formation, individualization, and competition of success, while placing the burden of the social exclusion and community injustices on the shoulders of the individual, all while levying Romani individuals with immense pressure in a pursuit for mobility through HE. The individual will have to sacrifice, overwork, internalize the gravity of their identities, and face racialized experiences.

A common issue throughout the chapters is a heavy focus on presenting secondary information and theoretical discussion, which stands in the way of producing more concrete arguments. The critical analysis within the chapters is short and at times disconnected from the theoretical frameworks. This leads to the individual sections of the chapters feeling dislocated from a coherent point of inquiry. The focal point that brings the chapters together is the critique of neoliberalism and its influences in HE and its goal of aiding social inclusion. Consequently, the theoretical and analytical approach is unimodal. This is a missed opportunity to incorporate a multi-perspective approach by including concepts that bridge the analysis for more encompassing insights that would create applicable knowledge on HE participation, HE identity, and the relationship between HE and social inclusion.

In all, The Roma in European Higher Education is not only relevant to academic and applied knowledge on Roma HE participation; it is also a good initial starting point for the future body of knowledge on Roma in HE. Scholars and practitioners across many fields will find that the discussions in the book challenge the status quo and their perceptions. Future knowledge producers will be able to build upon these discussions from alternative or complementary perspectives.
References


Public Statues and Second-Class Citizens: The Spatial Politics of Romani Visibility in Interwar Budapest

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Abstract

In what might be called an extreme form of tokenism, memory sites devoted to the figures of outstanding Romani musicians, including public statues, began to appear in public urban spaces in *fin-de-siècle* and interwar Hungary amid the growing oppression of Roma by authorities. This article investigates, by focusing on case studies from Budapest in the interwar period, how public representations of Roma in the cultural spaces of dominant society, though apparently inscribing diversity in the national narrative, were involved in the hegemonic practices of the time. The complexities of the interplay between inclusion in the symbolic realm and oppression in the social one are best illuminated when looking at the social and political uses of these urban landmarks.

Keywords

- Cultural oppression
- Memory sites
- Public statues
- Romani movement
- Interwar period
- Hungary
Introduction: A Dual Heritage of Policed Boundaries and Hegemonic Inclusion

In contrast to legal and public discourse that criminalized itinerant Roma in early twentieth-century and interwar Hungary – alongside the oppression of increasingly broad segments of Romani society – the figure of the Romani bandleader (prímás) was often celebrated,\(^1\) in part driven by the appropriation of “Hungarian-Gypsy music”\(^2\) by Hungarian nationalism in these periods. Yet Romani musicians were also subject to a number of hegemonic practices by dominant society, thus it can be claimed that the experience of this professional group was shaped by a form of discrimination that advocated an intraethnic hierarchy among Roma. This externally imposed stratification divided the Romani community into two major parts, based on whether their members or ancestors thereof arrived to Hungary with the first wave of Romani migration within Europe in the Middle Ages or with the second wave in the nineteenth century after the abolition of Romani slavery in the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The separate paths of the histories of these groups were reflected in differences in domains such as lifestyle, language use, traditional occupations or relations with dominant society.

Hungary’s community of Romani musicians formed mostly within the first, settled group of Roma. Unlike in the cases of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the figure of the Romani musician came to be included among the symbols of Hungarian national culture in the nineteenth-century

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1 This celebration extended to both official and popular forms of recognition in the examined period. Examples for the former include Romani bandleaders Béla Radics (1867–1930), Imre Magyari Sr. (1864–1929), and Imre Magyari Jr. (1894–1940) receiving the award of the Hungarian governor, the Signum Laudis, in 1926, 1927, and in 1935, respectively (Nyírvidék 1927; Újság 1927c; Sz. N. 1935). The capital city also granted honorary graves in Kerepesi Road Cemetery to Kálmán Balázs (1835–1900) (Pesti Napló 1900), Béla Radics (Magyar Országos Tudósító 1930d), Imre Magyari Jr. (Népszava 1940), and Laci Rácz the 36th (1867–1943) (Újság 1943), building on precedents in the nineteenth century (Fővárosi Lapok 1895). The celebrity status of the Romani bandleader in society is reflected, among others, in crowds of thousands – in Radics’s case one of 100,000 – attending these musicians’ funerals (Budapesti Hirlap 1885b; Az Est 1926; Magyarország 1926; Magyar Országos Tudósító 1930c; Pesti Napló 1934), the often illustrated press coverage (Tolnai Világlapja 1925; Az Est 1926; Pesti Napló 1926; Az Est 1930; Pesti Napló 1934; Farkas 1940; Pesti Hirlap 1943) and cinematic reportage (Magyar Film Iroda Rt. 1930) of these events, or of the jubilees of these figures (T. 1924; Magyar Film Iroda Rt. 1926; Gy. S. 1930), and interviews with them in the press (Az Újság 1910; Ormos 1925; Lázár 1926; Nyírvidék 1927; Lakács 1929; Újság 1929c; B. L. 1930; K. K. 1934; Gosztonyi 1935; Sz. N. 1935; Újság 1937a). In an obituary written for Antal Kóczé (1872–1926), Gyula Krúdy notes: “the public opinion, busy with tale-telling, legends, knows almost more about Gypsy bandleaders [cigányprímás] famous enough than even about our notable statesmen” ([1926] 1971, 95). The information regarding the governor’s award is credited to personal communication with Csaba Csapó on 28 July 2018.

2 Following Lynn M. Hooker’s terminology, by “Hungarian-Gypsy music” this paper refers to early forms of popular music in Hungary that were typically performed by Romani musicians from the late eighteenth century onward, such as verbunkos, csárdás and, as a nineteenth-century addition, magyar nóta ( Hungarian song). These genres are thought to have been derived from local non-Romani folk music traditions, adapted partly by Romani musicians themselves for their non-Romani audiences. Romani musicians also authored several new music pieces in these styles, and this music tradition also became a key influence for the development of a national school of art music by nineteenth-century Hungarian non-Romani composers such as Franz Liszt, Ferenc Erkel, and Mihály Mosonyi (Loya 2011, 64). “Hungarian-Gypsy music,” often called “Gypsy music” (cigányzene) in common language, is differentiated from Romani folk music, which was practiced within Romani communities and developed independently from the former music tradition (Sárosi 1971, 20–30).
popular imagination, both domestically and internationally (cf. Piotrowska 2013, 13–53), as performer of a folk-derived instrumental dance music, with a political subtext for local audiences. While its Western consumers were fascinated by “Hungarian-Gypsy music” for its exoticism (Hungarian “Gypsy bands” toured Western Europe from the second half of the nineteenth century [Sárosi 1971, 122]), partly defined by the unique performance style of the “Gypsy band” (Loya 2011, 61), domestically it formed part of a patriotic tradition in the arts, associated with the memory of anti-Habsburg wars in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.\[3\] The musical and poetic heritage that emerged in the wake of these early, nobility-led independence struggles of the (still nascent) nation, especially the war of independence led by Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II (1703–1711), remained an important reference point for subsequent nationalist movements. As a consequence, a representational tradition in Hungary came to regard Romani musicians – who had a fundamental role in maintaining the musical part of this heritage since the late eighteenth century (Sárosi 1971, 59) – as custodians of the national spirit, often contrasted in public discourse with nonindigenous, itinerant Roma from Moldavia and Wallachia, who were labeled as outsiders.\[4\]

However, pieces of legislation that were passed to forcibly settle itinerant Roma – and to relegate them to the status of second-class citizens – included measures that could be applied to any Roma in some contexts. For example, a 1916 decree of the interior minister (15.000/1916. B.M. eln.) on “wandering (tent-dwelling) Gypsies” [kóbor (sátoros) cigányok],\[5\] ordered law enforcement agencies, among other stipulations, to send or force any Roma home who happened to be away from their place of residence “without sufficient justification” (15.000/1916. B.M. eln., 440; see also Bársony [2004] 2007, 29–30), leaving what counts as justified up to the judgment of those applying the decree.

3 For discussions of how internal and external constructions of Hungarian national culture made use of “Hungarian-Gypsy music” and the figure of the Romani musician in the nineteenth century, see: Jonathan Bellman, The Style Hongrois in the Music of Western Europe (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1993); Lynn M. Hooker, Redefining Hungarian Music from Liszt to Bartók (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Shay Loya, Liszt’s Transcultural Modernism and the Hungarian-Gypsy Tradition (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011); Anna G. Piotrowska, Gypsy Music in European Culture: From the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013).

4 For example, in an opinion piece in the 6 August 1907 issue of the daily Pesti Hírlap, Kálmán Porzsolt, former director of People’s Theater (Népszínház), Budapest, went as far as calling for the extermination of “the wandering Vlach Gypsy” (vándor oláh cigány) (10), citing the crimes committed against indigenous societies outside Europe by Western colonizing powers as a model to follow, while he simultaneously praised “the Hungarian Gypsy [magyar cigány], who often make brilliant Gypsy musicians [cigány zenészek]” and thus need to be “patronized and educated” (ibid.). He also credits the latter group, a “half-blood Hungarian tribe” (félvér magyar néptörzs) (ibid.), for its service in preserving the national musical heritage: “If Hungarian musician Gypsies [magyar muzsikus cigányok] hadn’t sustained, with their geniality and national sentiment, Hungarian musical motifs, the Hungarian sentiment in song and music, from where would we collect that together now?” (ibid.).

5 The regulation mandated to settle and register itinerant Roma and called for seizing their belongings, issuing a “Gypsy identification card” (cigányigazolvány) (15.000/1916. B.M. eln., 443) for them, marking their skins with specially arranged vaccine scars as a proof of having been registered, obligating them to compensate for their accommodation and sustenance costs by public work, banning them from keeping harness animals or from leaving their village of residence without police permission and made it possible to send those resisting to state-run labor camps (439–447). The decree defined itinerant Roma rather broadly, including in this category any Roma who could not prove to have a permanent address, regardless whether they had the means to sustain themselves (439–440). These measures stayed in effect during the interwar period.
Some measures against Roma in the interwar period were open about including, under some conditions, Romani musicians among their target groups. In April 1939, deputy-lieutenant of Pest County László Endre, notorious for his racial preservationist views and later activities as a Nazi collaborator, ordered the registration, in his jurisdiction, of “all settled Vlach (traveling) Gypsies [oláh (vándor) cigányok] and those musician Gypsies [zenész cigányok] who reside in Gypsy quarters [cigány rész] and who cannot support themselves from their music” (quoted by Purcsi Barna [2004] 2007, 72) as additional provisions to the measures of the decree of the interior minister 257.000/1928. B.M., which introduced annual roundups and population counts of itinerant Roma (1026–1027), implemented in the form of “Gypsy raids” (cigányrazzia) (Purcsi Barna [2004] 2007, 50–51, 69–83). Endre’s 1939 order to double the number of these raids in his area of control (70) and to take action against the most vulnerable, financially troubled Romani musicians came at a time when the livelihood of this profession was severely compromised by the growing popularity of jazz, as widely discussed in the press of the time.

Not only unemployed Romani musicians could become objects of discrimination by authorities, but sometimes any member of this professional group. At an August 1939 meeting of the public administration committee of Budapest, Béla Usetty, MP of the right-wing United Municipal Civic Party (Egységes Közszégi Polgári Párt), urged police measures to preclude Romani musicians from having evening discussions on benches along the Danube Promenade, a pedestrian area on the riverbank. Usetty claimed that “guests [of the nearby Grand Hotel Hungária] often complain and, moreover, leave the hotel” (Magyar Országos Tudósító 1939, 109) because of the Romani presence, among other reasons. Invoking a common trope of antigypsyism of the time, Usetty argued that such a forced ethnic homogenization of the area was necessary on economic grounds, to protect the local tourism industry. Paradoxically, the same economic interests led Budapest restaurants to provide “Hungarian-Gypsy music” to their guests and also led the state to include this form of music in international promotions of the country during the ultranationalist Horthy regime (1920–1944), such as a campaign reportedly advertising Budapest as the “city of love and Gypsy music” (Kolcov 1928; see also Vari 2012, 728).

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6 As chief magistrate of the Gödöllő district (1923–1937) and deputy lieutenant of Pest County (1938–1944), he voluntarily introduced measures against the Jewish and Romani communities, alongside his involvement in a number of far-right political organizations and parties (Purcsi Barna [2004] 2007, 63–84). Later, in various roles (state secretary, government commissioner) in two of the successive puppet governments during the occupation of Hungary by Nazi Germany (1944–1945), he played an active role in the ghettoization and deportation of Jewish Hungarians (84–85).

7 The Hungarian translations in square brackets are taken from the original, Hungarian version of the text (quoted in Purcsi Barna 2004, 49).

8 Between the 1920s and the mid-1930s the dominant discourse on “Gypsy music” in the mainstream press in Hungary focused on the harsh social realities of Romani musicians created by the new public acclaim for jazz, especially as made visible by the activities of the National Association of Hungarian Gypsy Musicians (Magyar Cigányzenészek Országos Egyesülete, MCOE), cf. Pesti Hírlap 1922; Stób 1926; Újság 1927d, 1927e; D. I. 1928; Esti Kurir 1928; Magyarország 1928; Sági 1928; Somogyi 1928; 8 Órai Újság 1934; Esti Kurir 1934; Budapesti Hírlap 1936; Magyarság 1936b.

9 Upon Romani bandleader Imre Magyari’s death in 1940, the daily Pesti Hírlap wrote: “Magyari played at [the Grand Hotel] Hungária, and if there were a great award for advancing tourism, it could have ornamented his wide chest” (Farkas 1940, 12).

10 Furthermore, both the 1936 and 1943 statutes of MCOE list among the aims of the organization “the more efficient advancement of the tourism interests related to the fame of Hungarian Gypsy musicians [cigányzenészség]” (MCOSz 1936, 1; MCOE 1943, 3).
Despite the high level of public recognition of Romani musicians in the interwar period, many other cases attest that they were also subject to legal, institutional, and social discrimination, both in Hungary and abroad. The period saw oppressive pieces of legislation and actions against multiple segments of the Romani community, extending far beyond the forced abolishment of itinerancy and well before the German occupation of the country in March 1944. A comprehensive summary of these actions is beyond the scope of this article.\textsuperscript{11} A striking example, however, is that the central investigative agency of the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie started to build a countrywide “Gypsy registry” [cigány nyilvántartás] in 1940, with the purpose of collecting the personal data of “all Gypsies [cigányok] living in Hungary […] whether they have committed a crime or not,” as Pál Kaposi, sergeant-major of the authority, disclosed in the biweekly \textit{Csendőrségi Lapok} (1941, 327), “because,” he added, “they can commit one at any time” (ibid.). In a further overt display of antigypsyist prejudices, Kaposi also asserted that “at the moment of identity check, the Gypsy [cigány] may be the most innocent, they may be working peacefully, like hundreds of other decent people who earn a living through work, but it does not warrant that they have not committed many and serious crimes before” (327), urging all local units of the gendarmerie in the country to automatically treat all Roma residing in or passing through their district as suspects of crime and take their fingerprints, a practice that Kaposi claimed was already followed by many units (326).

Even if, simultaneously, the figure of the Romani bandleader earned the status of celebrity in this period, yielding a proliferation of celebrating representations, these eulogizing gestures went hand in hand with antigypsyist stereotypes in the press and the cultural production of the time, often also projected on the figure of the Romani musician (see, e.g., Kellér 1926). The National Association of Hungarian Gypsy Musicians (Magyar Cigányzenészek Országos Egyesülete, MCOE), or its officials, responded to some of these offensive portrayals in the form of opinion pieces (cf. Járosi 1930; \textit{Magyar Cigányzenészek Lapja}, 1927, 1930) and, in one occasion, by filing a libel case against music critic Margit Prahács for her racist insults against Roma in the journal \textit{Napkelet}, in which she urged the purification of Hungarian music culture from Romani influences (\textit{Magyar Országos Tudósító} 1930a). With a clear awareness of this hostile administrative, ideological, and legal environment for Roma, including Romani musicians, in the interwar period, this article aims to address the alliance of nationalism and the cult of “Hungarian-Gypsy music” in the country at the time, focusing on the effects of this conjuncture on the urban heritage environment. Despite a shift to an ethnic concept of the nation after the First World War (Trencsényi 2012, 87–90), with antecedents going back to the 1890s (85–86),

\textsuperscript{11} For more detailed surveys of legislations related to Roma in pre- and interwar Hungary, see: János Bársony and Ágnes Daróczi, eds., \textit{Pharrajimos: The Fate of the Roma During the Holocaust}, Translated by Gábor Komáromy (New York: International Debate Education Association, [2004] 2007); László Karsai, \textit{A cigánykérdés Magyarországon 1919–1945: út a cigány Holocausthoz} (The Gypsy question in Hungary 1919–1945: The path to the Gypsy Holocaust) (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1992); Barna Mezey and István Tauber, “A magyarországi cigányáság helyzetének rendezését célzó jogi szabályozás egyes kérdéseiről” (On certain questions of the legal regulation aiming to settle the condition of Gypsy people in Hungary) \textit{Acta Facultatis Politico-Juridicae Universitas Scientiarum Budapestensis de L. Eötvös Nominate} No 23: 211–233 (1980); László Pomogyi, \textit{Cigánykérdés és cigányügyi igazgatás a polgári Magyarországon} (The Gypsy question and the administration of Gypsy issues in bourgeois Hungary) (Budapest: Osiris-Százdé, 1995). The author of this article finds it unfortunate that some of these works use the term \textit{cigánykérdés} (Gypsy question) in their titles, uncritically reproducing the vocabulary of oppressive administrative regimes.
“Hungarian-Gypsy music,” as a form of popular music, remained a symbol for nationalism after the war, serving as a source of nostalgia for the prewar Kingdom of Hungary, an empire with hegemony over large parts of the region. This newly assumed cultural meaning of the music style warranted its continued appropriation by nationalist politics, simultaneously defined in the period by the contradictory ambitions of irredentism, on the one hand, and the creation of a homogeneous nation state, on the other (cf. Barany 1969, 283–299; Trencsényi 2012, 88–120). Additionally, “Hungarian-Gypsy music” continued to enjoy political support in the entertainment industry during the Horthy regime as a cultural protectionist strategy against the influence of jazz (Hajnáczky 2019, 24–38).12

The emergence of the figure of the Romani musician as an “Orientalist-cum-nationalist icon” (Hooker 2013, 16) also inaugurated a minor tendency in sculpture in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Hungary that defied, in some respects at least, former traditions of representing Roma. As part of this phenomenon, a series of four public statues made between 1889 and 193213 marked a turn in representational practices not only by being among the firsts in this branch of art to identify their Romani objects as individuals,14 but also by being located in urban environments that had a significance in the national imagination. The present article looks at the social and political history of four memory sites from interwar Budapest, including two such sculptural items (the public statues of Romani bandleaders János Bihari [László Vaszary, 1928, Figure 1] and Béla Radics [Lőrinc Siklódy, 1932, Figure 2]), a memorial plaque devoted to Bihari (1928, Figures 3–4), and a street named after Romani songwriter Pista Dankó, with the purpose of showing how these seemingly celebratory landmarks were implicated in the exclusionary and oppressive practices of their time.

When merely looking at their material configurations, these pieces of urban heritage can be deceptive, because they might evoke the type of inclusive heritage initiatives in late modern plural societies that Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge call “bridging heritage” (2000, 113) and describe as having “a bridging cultural relevance for both immigrant and host societies” (ibid.), thus requiring a “minimum amount of dissonance management” (ibid.). This article, however, claims that the examined memory sites and art objects are better comparable to public statuary in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Latin

12 Opposite was the case of Hungarian art music from the 1910s. Marking a break with the first national school of classical music, a new generation of modernist composers, headed by Béla Bartók, propagated a turn to local folk music traditions for artistic inspiration in their “pure,” unmediated forms (Hooker 2013, 95–153).
13 Antal Szécsi, Hungarian Music (János Bihari), 1889/1890; Ede Margó, Pista Dankó, 1912; László Vaszary, János Bihari, 1928 (Figure 1); Lőrinc Siklódy, Béla Radics, 1932 (Figure 2).
14 In Hungary, the first sculpture known to represent a specific Romani musician is Miklós Izsó’s 1869 small-scale terracotta study of Romani bandleader Ferkó Patikárus (1827–1870), who performed music in the Hungarian pavilion of the 1867 Paris World Fair (Goda 1993, 50). Adolf Huszár is also known to have made a bust of Romani bandleader Pali Rácz (1815–1885) (Budapesti Hírlap 1885a, 4; Nagy 1990, 2), while Alajos Stróbl devoted one to actress Aranka Hegyi (1855–1906) – sometimes claimed to be of Romani origin by the press in her time (Sólymossy 1880, n.p.; Magyarország 1897, 7), on which she did not comment publicly (see Hegyi 1905) – in the 1880s (Cserem 1998, 2327), besides also using Hegyi as a model for an allegorical statue, embodying the Spanish dance fandango (Nagy 2004, 349). As these art objects are not known to have been permanently placed in public spaces (except for Stróbl’s allegorical work, installed in Vigadó Concert Hall, Budapest in 1901 [Nagy 2004, 349–350]), they are considered here to be forerunners to the abovementioned tendency in sculpture.
America, which also gave official recognition to ethnic and cultural pluralism in prominent urban spaces, but to a form of pluralism that was appropriated by nationalist projects led by dominant society.\[15\]

The statues of Bihari and Radics, though also located in urban spaces associated with national self-representation, similarly failed to take on the abovementioned bridging function. To support this claim, this article demonstrates that the history of the social and political uses of these art objects uncover unequal power relations in society. In a contemporary context, commodified appropriations of multiculturalism in late capitalism offer an analogy, as such strategies of urban development produce urban centers that “[do] not require the physical presence of cultural ‘others’ – just that of their commodified symbols” (de Oliver 2001, 244), although the motivation behind the heritage additions examined in this article was not related to the development of the tourism industry.

Though largely outside the scope of this analysis, the formal qualities of Bihari’s and Radics’s statues also betray oppressive social hierarchies. In this respect, a conspicuous feature of the abovementioned group of statues in fin-de-siècle and interwar Hungary is that all hold a violin in their hands, as also noted by some commentators of their time (Móra [1912a] 1964, 76–78; Móra 1912b, n.p.; Szegedi Napló 1912, 3; Tinódi 1928, 252). Amid calls in the public and administrative discourses of the Horthy regime to remove Romani musicians from public spaces if they were not performing music, this musical instrument easily turns into a sign of othering and subordination, marking the precondition for the represented figure to temporarily enter the spaces of dominant society. Not surprisingly, it was also in such a disempowered role that Roma could participate in the inauguration ceremonies and subsequent uses of urban memory sites related to Romani musicians in the examined period in Hungary.

### Muted Presences and Selective Narrative Framings

A series of commemorative acts in Budapest in 1927 and 1928 to mark the centenary of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Hungarian Romani composer and bandleader János Bihari’s death, a grassroots initiative driven mostly by the nationalist appropriation of Bihari’s figure,\[16\] came after a lengthy neglect of his memory, including the failure to erect a tomb monument for the internationally acclaimed musician.\[17\] However, members of the Romani community, to which he belonged, including

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15 Examples in Latin American urban heritage environments include Allegory of the Brazilian Empire, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Francisco Manuel Chaves Pinheiro, 1872), Monument to Cuauhtémoc, Mexico City, Mexico (Francisco Jiménez and Miguel Noreña, 1887), and Monument to Antonio Maceo, Havana, Cuba (Doménico Boni, 1916). For a discussion of how the Latin American ethos of diversity has been put to use for oppressive ends, see Marilyn Grace Miller, *Rise and Fall of the Cosmic Race: The Cult of Mestizaje in Latin America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004).

16 From among Romani bandleaders, Bihari’s figure was especially prone to be appropriated by dominant society, due to his status as a Hungarian composer known outside the country and to the military aspects of his career (to be discussed below in more details).

17 He was buried in the cemetery of Ferencváros (then an outer district of the city of Pest), which was closed down and razed in the second half of the nineteenth century and the fate of his grave is unknown (Tóth 1999, 9). It is known, however, that in 1862, 35 years after his death, he still did not have a tomb memorial (Balla 1862).
representatives of the organization of Romani musicians (MCOE), remained marginalized participants in planning and implementing these acts of commemoration, mostly confined to voiceless, subordinate roles at inauguration events. From the numerous programs of the 1927–1928 Bihari centennial, this section of the article focuses on those that involved interventions in the urban heritage landscape of Budapest, inscribing Bihari’s memory into public spaces. The centenary entailed two such additions to the cultural map of the capital city, both of them near the historical center: on 13 October 1928, a memorial plaque (Figures 3–4) was placed on an apartment building in the ninth district (also known as Ferencváros) to mark the location of the composer’s former home, to be followed a day later by the inauguration of his half-body bronze bust on Margaret Island, a park island on the Danube River.

The silencing of the Romani community in relation to these events began with “writing out” Roma from among the initiators of the effort to dedicate a plaque to Bihari in inner Ferencváros. On 22 April 1927, some leading dailies, running the same news agency item, claimed that “the Association of Gypsy Musicians” planned to install a memorial sign on the venue of Bihari’s onetime residence the following month, and, as a preparatory measure, Romani bandleader Laci Rácz had already notified the mayor’s office of a joint performance of 50 Romani musicians at the inauguration event (Friss Újság 1927, Újság 1927b). An article in the May 1927 issue of the association’s newspaper, after discussing the failure to raise funds for the plaque, advocated for further efforts to establish a memory site for Bihari (Kun 1927, 1). However, in 1927 most press reports on the initiative – and in 1928 all of them – attributed the intention to install the plaque for Bihari simply to the “citizenry” (Tinódi 1928, 250), “society” (Budapesti Hírlap 1927b), or “social associations” (Budapesti Hírlap 1927b; Újság 1927a; Pesti Napló 1927) of Ferencváros, usually associated in these texts with the names of Dezső Buday, MP of the radical right-wing Christian Municipal Party (Keresztnégy Községi Párt), and poorhouse director Ödön Pálos, neither of them known to be of Romani background.[18] A news item in the 7 December 1927 issue of the weekly Független Budapest gave account of a visit by a committee, led by vice-mayor János Buzáth, to the future location of the memorial plaque, to discuss the details of its installation. This brief piece of news presented the city municipality to be the originator of the initiative and attributed an active role only to the authority regarding decisions on the implementation. One such decision, the choice of the location of the commemorative sign on the building facade, has recently met criticism from the Romani community: at a 2019 workshop on the representation of Roma in urban spaces in Budapest,[19] Romani rights activist Jenő Setét noted that the plaque – due to its out-of-sight position, mounted on a wall above the ground floor – is hardly visible to passersby and, as a consequence, has faded into oblivion by now.

The text on the plaque, which refers to Bihari as “the prominent pioneer of national music,” does not mention that he belonged to the Romani community and that his home in the district was located in

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[18] The first piece of news mentioning the plans to install a memorial plaque for Bihari in Ferencváros, published on 3 April 1927, attributed the initiative to Buday and Pálos (Budapesti Hírlap 1927a). Their related activities were discussed in the article alongside parallel efforts by others to commemorate the composer at a national level, too, led by József Zseny, president of the National Rákóczi Association.

[19] “Roma reprezentáció a főváros közterein” (Romani representation in the public spaces of the capital city), organized by the Tom Lantos Institute at Rácz Gyöngyi Community Center, Budapest, 10 December 2019.
a neighborhood described in some early twentieth-century accounts as the “Gypsy row” (cigányzsor) of nineteenth-century Pest (see Bevilaqua-Borsody 1928), an aspect of the district’s history little remembered subsequently. Furthermore, breaking with the standard spelling of his surname, it is engraved on the stone slab in the archaized form “Bihary,” in line with Pálós’s attempts to obscure the memory of Bihari’s Romani background. Pálós, commissioned by a local committee led by Buday (Nemzeti Ujság 1927), made biographical research on Bihari in 1927 and came up with the claim, not supported by any references to primary sources, that Bihari was the grandson of a Hungarian anti-Habsburg rebel, who found refuge in a rural Romani community, which he eventually joined (Pálós 1927, 3). Pálós spelled Bihari’s name with a “y” ending,[20] but this practice was not followed by other biographers of the composer, either before or after him (see Szemere 1824; Mátray [1854] 1984; Major 1928; Sárosi 2002), none of whom made any mention of a putative non-Romani ancestor.

This “de-Romafying” of Bihari’s memory at the local level was also manifested in the sidelining of the Romani community at the inauguration event. No representative of MCOE was included among the speakers, and contrary to the plans announced in the press in April 1927, it was the orchestra of the police that performed some of Bihari’s pieces (Tinódi 1928, 250), instead of Romani musicians (cf. Friss Ujság 1927).

A possible intention to suppress the neighborhood’s Romani heritage by local non-Roma, an objective surmisable from the above, coincided with the apparent priorities of contemporaneous urban development policy. As some events discussed below indicate, these priorities aimed to concentrate the Romani residents of the city in an outer part of the neighboring eighth district, a neighborhood represented in the press from the 1920s onward as the (new) “Gypsy row” of Budapest (see Malonyai 1921; Pogány 1934; Budapesti Hirlap 1936).

By the late twentieth century it was largely forgotten that the inner part of the ninth district of Budapest was still home to a number of Romani bandleaders – a social elite among Romani musicians (Hajnáczky 2019, 56–58) – in the pre-First World War and interwar periods (see Magyar Csigányzenészek Lapja 1909; BFL IV.1407.b. 21063/925; Krúdy [1930] 1971, 143),[21] that it had a high proportion of Romani residents in the nineteenth century (see S. A. 1903, 10; Bevilaqua-Borsody 1928; Berkes 1943, 14), and that it was also the site of the early efforts of Romani musicians to self-organize, with the first office and community

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20 The 1898 handbook of the Central Society for Name Magyarization (Központi Névmagyarosító Társaság) recommended avoiding the use of historical spelling when changing foreign surnames to domestic ones (Telkes 1898, 10) and cautioned that the arbitrary use of such forms, by those bearing names with a modern spelling, had legal consequences (22), while a 1933 decree (40.200/1933. B. M.) explicitly forbade, “for reasons of principle” (2315), to change foreign surnames to “names spelled archaically (e.g. with th, gh, čo, ss), or ending in ‘y’” (ibid.). That is, the archaic orthography of Hungarian surnames was a tacit means to express an identity grounded in an ethnic notion of Hungarianness.

21 MCOE, founded in 1908, was originally registered under the address 15 Ráday Street (Magyar Czigányzenészek Lapja 1908c), and so was the club of the association, named Magyar Cигányzenészek Otthona (Home of Hungarian Gypsy Musicians) (Pesti Napló 1908a, Pesti Napló 1908c). Decades before MCOE was founded, a café in nearby Kálvin Square, named Café Ringer, informally functioned as a club and employment agency for Romani musicians and played an important role in the early development of the self-organization of this professional community (Budapesti Hirlap 1897, Pesti Napló 1912).
space of MCOE set up there in 1908 (Magyar Czigányzenészek Lapja 1908b; Pesti Napló 1908a; Pesti Napló 1908c). Lending official recognition to this local heritage was possibly seen by decision-makers to have a potential to contain Romani residents in the district or even attract MCOE – which moved to the eighth district in the meantime – back, an outcome authorities and dominant society likely wanted to avoid.\[22\]

In contrast, in 1934 the Board of Public Works of the Capital City (Fővárosi Közmunkák Tanácsa, FKT) renamed a street in the outer eighth district – regarded the new “Gypsy row” – after late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Romani songwriter Pista Dankó (HU BFL II.1.a. Vol. 63 [1934], 523–524), to the protest of non-Romani locals.\[23\]

An interest group led by local landlords claimed in a petition, signed by 387 supporters, that the name choice had caused them damage because “better tenants” were unwilling to live in a street with such a name (F. B. 1935). “We acknowledge that Pista Dankó has merits in composing Hungarian folk songs, but after all he was only a Gypsy [cigány] and thus we hold that it would not be advantageous, either locally or internationally, if the street bore [his] name,” reads the petition (ibid.), which also disclosed that its drafters intended to erase the – as they phrased – “Gypsy character” (cigányjelleg) of the street (ibid.). After FKT refused the petition, leaders of the campaign attempted to eradicate the racialized image of the place themselves by expelling Romani tenants from two blocks of flats in 1938, solely based on their ethnicity (Magyarország 1938a). Eventually, FKT yielded to a compromised version of the campaign and shortened the name to Dankó Street, referring to the “unanimous request of the residents of the street” (HU BFL II. 1.a. Vol. 68. [1939], 25).

FKT’s initial refusal to rename Dankó Pista Street, as demanded by the petitioners, suggests that the authority had an intention to keep the community of Romani musicians in this remote part of the city, while the opposite seems to have been the purpose in the case of inner Ferencváros, a neighborhood adjacent to the city center, where the acknowledgment of Bihari’s Romani background remained a suppressed part of his locally revived memory.

22 The five-floor building on the corner of Kinizsi and Lónyay streets (Figure 3), which bears the memorial plaque (Figure 4), would have been an ideal home for MCOE, as the key activities of the organization included providing a community space for Romani musicians in a café associated with the organization, usually in the block of flats hosting the office. The ground floor of this building on Lónyay Street was designed to function as a café (HU BFL XV.17.d. 329–36961), and it was indeed used as a restaurant at the time of the plaque’s inauguration (HU BFL IV.1478.a. 10441/922.). MCOE was in a constant search for a long-term venue for its office since its establishment in 1908, gradually shifting its headquarters from the inner part of the ninth district to the outer part of the eighth district. In 1928 the office of MCOE and the editorial office of its newspaper, both located in the outer eighth district at that time, moved back to the inner ninth district – to an address (16 Kinizsi Street) only a few blocks away from the plaque – for a short period, as contact details in the 1928/6-12 (November–December) issue of the newspaper reveal (see also Ujság 1929a). It is unknown whether this brief return of MCOE’s activities to Ferencváros was in a casual relationship with the installation of the plaque.

23 The street, located in the outer part of the district, was previously named after nineteenth-century Hungarian dramatist Imre Madách and the reason for the reconsideration of this decision was the plan to name a new avenue in another district, near the historical center of the city, after Madách (HU BFL II. 1.a., Vol. 63 [1934], 523). The notes of the 6 November 1934 meeting of FKT, announcing the proposal, refers to Dankó as “the renowned Hungarian song and music poet” (524) and does not offer an explanation for the name choice. The street and neighboring Mátyás Square were identified in the popular imagination of the period as home to many Romani musicians (cf. Malonyai 1921; Pogány 1934; Budapesti Hirlap 1936). It is known that Dankó spent his late years in Budapest around the turn of the century, but in the volumes of the Budapest Address and Apartment Index (Budapesti Czim- és Lakásjegyzék) between the year of its first edition (1880) and his death (1903), there are no traces of him among the residents of this street.
Bihari’s belonging to the Romani community was recognized on the pedestal of his bust on Margaret Island, inaugurated a day after the plaque was installed in the ninth district. But this recognition was confined to a small and rather cryptic emblem, invisible on surviving photographs, and this aspect of his identity received marginal attention in the speeches at the inauguration of the sculptural work. The sizable, head-high wooden pedestal, with Transylvanian-style carvings conjuring up associations of irredentism, was by far the most visible extrasculptural element of the structure. In defiance of Bartók’s disavowal of the “Hungarian-Gypsy tradition” in art music, some talks at the inauguration on Margaret Island conceptualized Bihari as the first great national composer, who developed a national tradition of authorial music that is rooted in folk music, saving the latter from neglect and oblivion (Tinódi 1928, 251–252). As mentioned above, in the interwar period cultural politics in Hungary embraced this folk-rooted tradition in popular music – primarily cultivated by Roma – to offset the impact of international culture in the country, especially seen to manifest itself in the increasingly cosmopolitan character of the capital city. Margaret Island became a symbolic space in public discourse on this issue, after a former MP complained in an opinion piece in early 1928 that no restaurants on the island contracted “Gypsy bands” the previous summer (Magyar Cigányzenészek Lapja 1928; Urmánczy 1928). As the coverage of the inauguration event of Bihari’s bust in the weekly Ország-Világ testifies, speakers – representatives of public authorities and civil society – did not spare racist turns to degrade jazz, such as “whining Negro dance music” (Tinódi 1928, 251) or the “inchoate, earsplitting disharmonies of wild peoples” (252), also evoking the trope of the Guilty City (252), then popular among nationalists (Vari 2012, 715).

Bihari’s association with the military ethos in early nineteenth-century Hungary was also an important point of reference in the speeches and the visual setting of the event (Tinódi 1928, 251–252), conforming to the strong irredentist spirit of the time. Besides the fact that the verbunkos style, a hallmark of Bihari’s oeuvre, was developed from music used for military recruitment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Sárosi 1971, 80–81), this association in part relied on the composer’s own participation in recruitment campaigns for the army of the Hungarian nobility at the time of Habsburg involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, and on his possible yet never-confirmed authorship of the “Rákóczi March,” a nineteenth-century patriotic piece of music. For the National Rákóczi Association (Országos Rákóczi Szövetség), one of the original advocates for the bust (Tinódi 1928, 250), it was the context of Hungarian irredentism in which the cult of Rákóczi was reinterpreted (Kovács 2005). Bihari’s figure, as a part of this cult, was likely hoped by the organization to contribute to the revival of a martial ideal, and it was only

24 Bihari’s Romani identity was acknowledged in the form of “the coat of arms of the Gypsy people [cigányzság], a hedgehog” (Tinódi 1928, 251) etched on the bronze plaque mounted to the pedestal of the bust. An image of this animal was also used as an alleged symbol for Roma on the cover of a biographical encyclopedia of Hungarian Romani musicians, edited by journalist Miklós Markó – one of the initiators of the bust (Tinódi 1928, 252) – published in 1896, and, before that, on the title page of the archduke Joseph Karl of Austria’s Romani grammar book (Czigány nyelvtan: Románo csíbakero sziklaribe. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1888).

25 The president of the association, József Zseny, established a committee to initiate a national-level commemoration of Bihari in the form of a memorial year, the aims of which included the creation of a public statue for the composer (Tinódi 1927, 250). Other known proponents of the bust were journalist Miklós Markó and writer Gyula Pekár, the latter of whom headed the advocacy body (associated with Zseny’s committee) campaigning for the sculptural monument (251–252). As in the case of Buday and Pálos in the ninth district, none of these leaders of these initiatives were known to be of Romani background.
at the price of militarizing the concept of the nation that a Roma, portrayed in hussar uniform and with a musical instrument in hand, received a temporary invitation inside the boundaries of this national community in interwar Hungary.

This tradition of representing Bihari’s figure, rooted in János Donát’s 1820 oil portrait of the composer, has rarely been paired with discussions about how dominant society exploited Roma in wartime. This exploitation is revealed, among others, by an exchange of letters between authorities regarding an 1814 request by Bihari himself to exempt members of his band from conscription (Isoz 1928, 122–123; see also Sárosi 1971, 73), first discussed by music historian Kálmán Isoz in 1928, in a short text exceptional among writings on Bihari in its sensitivity to racialized power relations. In its resolution on the issue, recommending the refusal of the request, the city council of Pest argued that Roma (zingaros) can be made better use of in wartime than in peace (Isoz 1928, 123),[26] that is, as Isoz concluded, “the [authority] did not consider Gypsy musicians [cigányzenészek] to be fellow citizens of equal rank with other residents” (123). A poem by nineteenth-century Hungarian poet Mihály Tompa also refers to the exploitation of the Romani community for military purposes, which took advantage of the socioeconomic disempowerment of this group (Tompa [1849] 2003, 581), well before better-known manifestations of this practice during the two world wars.[27]

Due to a road accident that severely injured his left arm in 1824, Bihari spent the end of his life in poverty in Ferencváros (Mátray [1854] 1984, 295), and he received a rather modest funeral, with low interest from dominant society (Balla 1862). However, in the inauguration speeches of his bust in 1928, he was not contrasted in terms of social rank to the environment of the bronze figure, Margaret Island being an urban recreation area then mostly associated with upper classes (Fővárosi Közlöny 1928, 1771–1773; Magyar 2004, 157–160). This selective rendering of Bihari’s biography is suited to the appropriation of his figure by aristocratic nationalism, an identity discourse that made “Hungarian-Gypsy music” a symbol of the culture of the social elite.[28] Bihari’s abandonment in old age was not an

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26 Acknowledgments are due here to Julianna Orsós and András Kállai for the translation of a sentence from Latin to Hungarian from the city council’s letter to the palatine of Hungary, quoted in Isoz’s article.

27 Tompa’s poem ”Más a császár katonája, más a haza katonája” [The emperor’s soldier and the homeland’s soldier are not alike] addresses a situation in which a draftee is exempted from military service by the arrangement for a paid Romani surrogate to replace him (“The lady hired a Gypsy [cigány] in place of his son for a high price” [Tompa (1849) 2003, 581]), which implies that the paid redemption of the privileged from conscription was a known practice at that time. In the early twentieth century, it was in reference to war needs that the 15.000/1916 circular decree, which ordered the forced settlement of itinerant Roma, also called for the confiscation of their horses and conceding these animals to the army (15.000/1916. B.M. eln., 440). For a survey of the military labor service of Roma during the Second World War, see Bársorny ([2004] 2007, 36–37) and Karsai (1991).

28 In Bihari’s life, Margaret Island was owned by the palatine of Hungary (the representative of the Habsburg monarch in the country), who maintained a summer residence on this island of the Danube (Magyar 2004, 149–151). In 1815 Bihari gave an open-air concert on the island on the occasion of the grand duchess Catherine Pavlovna of Russia’s visit to the incumbent palatine, the archduke Joseph Anton Johann of Austria (Mátray [1854] 1984, 293; Major 1928, 18). Although the building of the former palatial residence, in the middle of the island, was still standing in 1928, Vaszary’s work of art was installed instead near a restaurant (built in 1869) on the southern part of the island, due to the fact that in this location the sculptural item was exposed to the sounds of live “Gypsy music” when it was performed in the restaurant (Budapesti Hirlap 1928b, but see also Magyar Cigányzenészek Lapja 1928). As it likely happened in the case of the memorial plaque in the ninth district, MCOE was also not represented in the committee that chose the location for the bust on Margaret Island (Budapesti Hirlap 1928b).
infrequent phenomenon among Romani musicians even over a century after his death, as revealed by a 1937 article in *Budapesti Hirlap* that reported on the sight of “onetime celebrity bandleader[s], who once made Gypsy people [cigányság] proud” begging in cafés in Budapest from the earnings of their younger colleagues (*Budapesti Hirlap* 1937c). MCOE already declared a plan to establish a pension fund for its members upon the foundation of the organization in 1908 (*Magyar Czigányzenészek Lapja* 1908a, 1908c) and, after repeated statements of this intent in the 1920s and 1930s, made attempts to introduce some welfare services for its members in the late 1930s. Despite the fact that MCOE was officially represented at the inauguration of Bihari’s bust, even if only in a voiceless role by its non-Romani honorary president, the parallel between the prospects of Romani musicians for old age then and a century before, and the recent self-reliant efforts of the Romani community to advance their situation, remained unspoken at the event.

Members of the Romani community participated in the ceremony only by supplying music: a joint performance of 47 Romani musicians was a program element that received much attention in the press. This placement of Roma outside the intellectual sphere, a frequent manifestation of antigypsyism, was notably challenged only in the speech of Iván Rakovszky, president of FKT. Speaking in the name of the public body that took charge of the bust after its inauguration, Rakovszky compared, at some length, the significance of Bihari’s legacy to that of nineteenth-century poet of national epics János Arany, whose stone bust (Alajos Stróbl, 1912) was an iconic sight on the opposite, northern part of the island, and continues to be part of that environment today. This comparison of the two figures projected a future for the two sculptural works with equal importance in the heritage landscape of the capital city’s popular outdoor site. However, this pledge could not be met for long, only until the emerging movement of Romani empowerment in Hungary laid claim on Bihari’s figure in the ensuing decade and, as a corollary, on the use of the bust as a *lieu de mémoire*.

**An Incomplete History of a Sidelining**

It was apparently inspired by the installation of the composer’s bust on Margaret Island that MCOE attempted to make Bihari’s figure an icon of the community of Romani musicians in Hungary in the increasingly hostile ideological and political environment of the 1930s. On the domestic front, “Hungarian-Gypsy music” continued to face ideological attacks from ethnomusicology, while in Germany Romani

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29 The 1923 statutes of the organization – which existed intermittently between 1908 and 1944 – also include the plan of a pension fund (MCOE 1923, 2, 7–8), while the 1936 statutes mention aims to launch a “home for Gypsy musicians” (*cigányzenész otthon*) and to provide financial aid to members of the organization in extraordinary cases (MCOSz 1936, 2).

30 For example, in July 1937 the organization started to develop a registry of disabled, unemployed, and elderly Romani musicians and announced plans to open a club for unemployed Roma in the eighth district of Budapest (*Budapesti Hirlap* 1937d).

31 János Ilovszky laid a wreath on the bust but did not deliver a speech at the event (Tinódi 1928, 252).

32 József Zseny, one of the four speakers of the event, briefly also drew parallels between Bihari and poet Dániel Berzenyi (Tinódi 1928, 251), each other’s contemporaries, but this one-sentence remark was dwarfed in significance by Rakovszky’s more systematic comparison of the composer and Arany.
musicians from Hungary met political obstacles to practice their profession, as they became open targets of racial harassment and persecution. With all this exacerbated by the increase of antigypsyist measures of authorities in Hungary and the existential crisis of the profession, MCOE made efforts to improve the social acceptance of “Hungarian-Gypsy music” through campaign events that often involved the use of public urban spaces.

After the 1928 inauguration of Bihari’s bust on Margaret Island, the composer’s figure came to the fore in the organization’s public image. This included the launch of a music school by MCOE in 1929, named after Bihari (Ujság 1929b), the adoption of a new logo with a schematic drawing of Vaszary’s sculptural piece (HU BFL IV.1409.c. 134.790/1930-IV), as shown in Figure 5, the use of the bust’s original plaster version on the stage of a fundraising music event organized by MCOE in 1930 (Figure 6; see also Tolnai Világlapja 1930), the use of an etching of Bihari’s portrait on the cover of the organization’s 1936 statutes, and an attempt by MCOE to establish a prize named after him (Friss Ujság 1937).

As a further step to reappropriate Bihari’s figure, in April 1937 the association organized a public commemoration of the 110th anniversary of the composer’s death. This event, as its scant documentation suggests, took place on Margaret Island, at the clearing around the bust, as the launch-event of a five-month series of events organized by MCOE – apart from this kickoff ceremony, outside the island – to celebrate the fifth centennial of the presence of “Gypsy music” in Hungary (Városok Lapja 1937). The tentative program of this jubilee year received significant preliminary exposure in the press in March; therefore, the sculptural piece on the island could become connected in public consciousness with a planned Roma-organized event, which – as will be shown below – possibly also had its consequences on the future of the bust.

Another much-publicized event on the island that year was the reopening of a restaurant, located just next to the green area surrounding the bust, in May, after a substantial reconstruction of the building by the establishment’s new operator (Budai Napló 1937). It was also around this time that the history of Vaszary’s art piece took a new direction, becoming the object of sidelining (in both physical and symbolic senses), well before it was destroyed in the Second World War. As the newspaper Ujság exposed in July 1937, some months earlier FKT relocated the sculptural item from its highly visible position along the main road of the island to a remote place on its eastern shore, largely hiding it from public view (Kenyeres 1937). Upon the newspaper’s inquiry, the authority explained the move by claiming that there had been a scarcity of space around the bust, which, according to FKT, became evident during that year’s Bihari commemoration in April (the authority attributed the National Rákóczi Association to be the organizer

33 In 1930 a group of 30 Nazi sympathizers in uniforms protested in Café Luitpold, Münich, against the performance of Romani musicians from Hungary at the venue, calling for their banishment on the pretext of unemployment in the country (Budapesti Hirlap 1930), while in 1936 a Romani youth orchestra from Hungary was expelled from Nazi Germany by state authorities on grounds of its members not being Aryan (Gál 1936).

34 The presumably original position of the bust is highlighted on tourist maps of Budapest published around 1930 (Klösz György és Fia 1930?, Lloyd Könyvek Kiadóvállalat 1930?), revealing that Vaszary’s work was placed on a patch of land to the west of the restaurant on the southern or “lower” part of the island, popularly known then as “lower restaurant” (alsó vendéglő) or, from the late 1930s, as Casino.
of the event). FKT also referred to plans for a “Gypsy congress” (cigánykongresszus) to be held later that year in Budapest, which was discussed earlier in the press as a future event of MCOE (Budapesti Hirlap 1937c; Pesti Hirlap 1937a; Pesti Napló 1937a, 1937c). The authority presumed that the participants of this scholarly event would visit the bust on the island and contended that its former location, by the restaurant, “would be even less sufficiently spacious for such a purpose” (Kenyerés 1937) than it was for the April commemoration.

The 1936 and 1937 meeting notes of FKT (HU BFL II.1.a. Vols. 65–66) contain no reference to the relocation of the bust, as neither does any other official record or publication of the authority consulted as part of this research, including the registries and general administrative documents of Margaret Island for those years or a monograph by FKT-member Ferenc Harrer summarizing the activities of the authority between 1930 and 1940, with a chapter devoted to development activities on the island.\[35\] Since there seems to be no official documentation of the relocation, a range of possible explanations can be considered for the move. An attempt to outline one such hypothetical scenario follows in the remainder of this section and in the next one, inspired in part by the concept of the “duality of heritage” (Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge 2000, 22), which reckons with the simultaneous embeddedness of heritage in the cultural and economic realms.

The investigative article in Ujság seemed to be satisfied with the reply of FKT, though the argument of the authority would sound plausible only if the green area around the bust – “a clearing surrounded by weeping willows” (Tinódi 1928, 251) – were known to have been reduced in size since the installation of the art piece in late 1928. Up to the submission of this paper, no site plan of the original surroundings of the bust was found. The first maps showing Vaszary’s work known to the author of this article date from around 1930 (Klősz György és Fia 1930?; Lloyd Könyvek Kiadóvállalat 1930?) and they locate it on a green patch of land, a sizable traffic island between the main road and the restaurant, an area that survived in an unchanged form up to 2018. A 1926 site plan (HU BFL XV.17.d.322.a./57.b.) still showed a larger green area in that location, with a different shape. But a major reconstruction of the main road of the island (Budapesti Hirlap 1928a), the plans of which involved transformations of that land piece (HU BFL XV.17.d.322a./57.c.), was started in early 1928, that is, approximately half a year before the bust was installed.\[36\] Therefore, it can be assumed that by late 1928 the green area had taken the size and the shape that are seen on later maps, and that Bihari’s two commemorations on the island, in 1928 and 1937, thus happened in identical environments.

35 In relation to the displacement of Bihari’s bust on Margaret Island in 1937, this research included studying resources in the following sections of the Budapest Capital City Archives (Budapest Főváros Levéltára, BFL): the Records of the Board of Public Works of the Capital City (HU BFL II.1.), the Central Archive of the Mayor’s Departments of the Royal Seat and Capital City of Budapest (HU BFL IV.1409.c.), the Records of the Magistrate’s Office of the Third District of the Royal Seat and Capital City of Budapest (HU BFL IV.1472.a.), and the Plan Collection of the Royal Seat and Capital City of Budapest (HU BFL XV.17.d.).

36 Between 1930 and 1940 Harrer mentions only one intervention that could have possibly affected the landscape around the monument – in 1937 a second driveway was built between the main road and the restaurant (1941, 208) – but a map (BFL 1937) and an aerial photograph (Fortepan/MKHL 1944) suggests that this transformation procedure did not involve any changes to the green area that supposedly hosted the bronze bust of Bihari.
In the ample press coverage of the 1928 inauguration ceremony, there were still no complaints about a lack of space around the bust, though, as seen before, that event included a large-scale music performance, with an orchestra-size casual ensemble of Romani musicians. In a contradictory manner, FKT, in motivating the relocation of the bust in 1937, referred to a scarcity of space in the context of a presumably smaller-scale commemorative event at the same venue that year (i.e., 1937).

The article in Ujság – apparently the only press discussion of the relocation – did not mention whether the new site of the sculptural work, a shore protrusion along a walkway on the eastern shoreline, was better suited for public events than the original. However, the author of that article complained that he found the spot only with some difficulty, it being outside the main routes of pedestrian traffic (Kenyeres 1937).

This physical sidelining of the bust was soon followed by its partial erasure from the public image of Margaret Island. In a richly illustrated 1940 monograph on the island, written by archivist Dezső Rexa (who personally represented Pest County in the 1928 inauguration of Vaszary’s work of art [Tinódi 1928, 252]), Bihari’s bust is the only sculptural item on the island that is not photographed, even if its presence is briefly acknowledged in the text (Rexa 1940, 36–37, 38). Rexa’s notable disregard for Vaszary’s artwork is in stark contrast with deputy mayor Endre Liber’s earlier, 1934 book on the public statues and monuments of Budapest, in which, out of the five discussed sculptural objects on the island, more space is devoted to the composer’s bronze figure (346–349) than to the remaining four art pieces together (299–300, 370–372).

The large volume of Liber’s treatment of Bihari’s bust is largely due to his detailed summary of the grand inauguration ceremony, the magnitude of which remained unmatched on the island until 1940 and which invested Bihari’s bust with the function of a memory site from the beginning.

37 The music program of the 1937 Bihari anniversary on Margaret Island included open-air concerts by Imre Magyari’s “Gypsy band” and the Turkish pipe band (tárogatózenekar) of the National Rákóczi Association (Pesti Hirlap 1937b). No detailed press reportage on this commemoration has been found during this research, only a brief, two-sentence news piece, which – though published two days after the event – seems only to summarize the content of the preliminary press announcements of the event’s program, in a rather telegraphic manner (Kis Ujság 1937b). A notable tendency in these brief news pieces is that, while those published in mid-March still attributed MCOE to be the organizer of the event (Pesti Hirlap 1937a; Pesti Napló 1937b), those published in late April, just before the event (Kis Ujság 1937a; Pesti Hirlap 1937b; Pesti Napló 1937d) or – in the abovementioned single case – after it (Kis Ujság 1937b), replaced the name of the organization with that of the National Rákóczi Association and spelled Bihari’s name in the historicizing form “Bihary.” FKT also attributed the commemorative event to this (not Roma-focused) association instead of MCOE in its response given to Ujság in May 1937 regarding the relocation of Bihari’s bust (Kenyeres 1937). As compared to the amount of press interest on some later events of the five-month program series by MCOE in 1937, none of which took place on Margaret Island, the lack of in-depth coverage on the 1937 Bihari anniversary is remarkable, just as the absence of MCOE’s name from some of the news items related to this commemoration of the composer.

38 Liber, who represented the mayor’s office of the capital city at the inaugurations of both the plaque and the bust dedicated to Bihari in 1928 (Tinódi 1928, 251), had already passed away by the time when the bust was relocated in 1937. Similarly, a number of those who were actively involved in its creation or installation were already not alive, like Miklós Markó and József Zseny, or did not hold their former position, such as Iván Rakovszky.

39 The inauguration ceremony in 1928 was not only large-scale but also well-documented and highly-publicized, with examples such as a nearly three-page reportage in the broadsheet weekly newspaper Ország-Világ, which included the transcripts of all the speeches (see Tinódi 1928, 250–252), or a cinematic newsreel by the state-sponsored Magyar Film Iroda Rt. (1928). The latter piece of information is owed by the author of this article to Zoltán Vaszary.

40 Up to the mid-twentieth century, only Mihály Tompa’s stone bust on Margaret Island (János Pásztor, 1940) had an inauguration ceremony that was comparable in terms of scale and publicity to Bihari’s (Magyar Országos Tudósító 1940).
If looking for possible reasons for the eventual marginalization of this bronze figure in the physical and symbolic realms of the island, one can only rely on considering a range of contextual factors. One possible area of inquiry is the increased visibility of Roma in urban spaces across Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period, which was partly the result of the emergence of Romani empowerment movements in the region at the time, as some examples highlight below. In Hungary, this development coincided with the fact that Budapest became a target of mass international tourism from the 1920s (Sipos 2005, 157; Vari 2012, 278), which not only opened new economic opportunities for Romani musicians but also posed new limits to their freedom.

Places of Consumption and Racialized Urban Spaces

The founding meeting of MCOE in a café in the inner part of the seventh district of Budapest in 1908, attended by about 150 Romani musicians (Pesti Hírlap 1908, Pesti Napló 1908b), foreshadowed activities by the organization that involved new uses of public urban spaces by this professional group, including general assemblies, strikes, and campaign events, which never failed to raise press interest and gain wider public visibility. From the 1930s, the press in Hungary also regularly covered events related to Romani self-organization in other countries, such as a congress in 1933 in Bucharest, Romania, reportedly with 10,000 participants (Népszava 1933). Of these events, the Romani pilgrimage to Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer, France, has a special relevance to the phenomenon addressed in this section, as at the center of this tradition is the cult of a statue in the Romani community, which periodically involves the communal use of public urban spaces in connection with an art object. In 1934 the daily Magyarság published a series of photographs of the annual event in southern France, commenting in the caption that “the otherwise quiet settlement turns into an endless nomad camp within hours” (Magyarság 1934, 8).

As it was already shown through an example, the mere use of public spaces by Romani musicians for purposes other than providing entertainment was at times claimed in administrative and public discourse in Hungary to conflict with the purported interests of the tourism industry, with fears being voiced that the sight of Roma in central Budapest, without playing music, would deter tourists. A similar concern was raised in an article in an April 1937 issue of the daily Az Est, discussing the recent urban development

41 Additionally, the presence of large numbers of unemployed Romani musicians gathering in public spaces of Budapest in the 1930s, such as Grand Boulevard (Nagykörút) (8 Örai Újság 1934) and Mátyás Square (Budapesti Hírlap 1936) was also highlighted in some pieces of reportage on the existential crisis of the profession, a commonly discussed topic in relation to Romani musicians in the press of the period.

42 The September 16, 1934 issue of the daily newspaper Népszava illustrated a news piece on a similar “Gypsy congress” (cigánykongresszus) in Romania with a photograph showing audience members of the event (10).

43 Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer on the southern coast of France is a place of pilgrimage for many Roma, from inside and outside the country, due to the supposed historical connection of this locality with the person of Sara e Kali (Sara the Black), the unofficial patron saint of Roma. At the center of this pilgrimage, first recorded in the mid-nineteenth century, is a wooden statue of Sara in a basement shrine of a church, an art object which, since 1935, is carried to the sea amid a procession of veneration annually on 24 May (Wiley 2005, 135–136).
activities of FKT to boost international tourism in Budapest. After a lengthy praise of these efforts, citing Margaret Island among the examples, the article – published weeks before the Bihari commemoration on the island, planned by MCOE, was due – concludes, with a sudden change of topic, by targeting Roma: “And let there be rest in this country and peace. The Gypsy [cigány] should make noise only when they are playing czardas...” (Az Est 1937).

Against such a background, it might be asked whether the new operator of the restaurant on the lower part of Margaret Island, renamed as Casino Caffe-Restaurant after the 1937 refurbishing, could assume that the recent interest in the bronze figure by MCOE could make this location on the island associated in the public imagination with Romani presence, an image possibly already projected on that place by advance press discussions of MCOE’s locally planned event. If the leaders of the company running the restaurant, Palatinus Park Rt., had such concerns, they might also have perceived this space of possible power inversions, a special zone in the “purified environment” (Sibley 1995, 78) of the island, to pose a risk for nearby “spaces of consumption” (xii). As discussed above, in 1934 it was also on the pretext of an alleged economic necessity that property owners in the eighth district of Budapest (unrelated to Margaret Island) launched a campaign against the recent decision by FKT to name a street in the outer part of that district after Pista Dankó, a Romani songwriter, followed by their (local landlords’) attempts to purge the street of its “Gypsy character,” both in a symbolic and social sense.

If the management of Palatinus Park Rt. was afraid that the Bihari bust, as a place of possible future memory practices by the Romani community – that is, a place of regular Romani presence – could also give such a “Gypsy character” to the patch of land right next to the restaurant on Margaret Island, it apparently had some means to take action against it. The company held much power over the island, having long-term concessions to run most of its business establishments, and was also a major investor in its infrastructural development (8 Órai Ujság 1933), while its founder, Mihály Gellér, was appointed senior government counselor in 1936 (Magyar Közgazdaság 1936). Furthermore, Miklós Horthy Jr., the son of the governor of Hungary, was also a member of the board of directors of Palatinus Park Rt. (Kallós 1937, 536).

Without suggesting to cast other explanations for the sidelining of Bihari’s bust aside, this article proposes the possibility that the news coverage of MCOE’s planned event near this art object made the place in the perception of the public similar to what Giovanni Picker calls “Gypsy urban areas” (2017, 2), and that the removal of Vaszary’s work of art by FKT might have served to prevent a periodic presence of the Romani

44 Another possible motivation for the removal of the bust is hinted in the minutes of the 13 April 1937 meeting of FKT. The event was opened with an off-agenda announcement by FKT president Zénó Bessenyey, in which he informed the participants that a spa fountain to be inaugurated on the southern part of the island would be named after the governor of Hungary Miklós Horthy’s wife (HU BFL II. I.a. Vol. 66 [1937], 225). The spa fountain with a nearby drinking pavilion was opened in July 1937 (Ujság 1937b), the latter on the eastern side of the restaurant Casino (Harrer 1941, 210), adding the place to the locations of the personality cult of Horthy (already present on the upper part island [Harrer 1941, 197]), whose cult also exerted an enormous impact on the cultural geography of interwar Budapest. A potential heritage conflict to emerge from the situation is reminiscent of a case in Szeged, a city in southeast Hungary, where in 1912 authorities objected against placing Romani songwriter Pista Dankó’s statue in the park of Stefánia Promenade, near the statue of the empress consort Elisabeth of Austria, in fear of offending the Habsburg royal family (Móra [1922] 1964, 188).
community to develop near the adjacent restaurant. In its already quoted argument to *Ujság*, giving an explanation for the relocation of the bust, FKT anticipated that the art object would draw visits to the island by participants of an international “Gypsyology” congress to be hosted in Budapest by MCOE in September 1937, although the preliminary details of its program in the press (*Magyarság* 1936a) did not indicate that it would include any events on Margaret Island. Eventually, the congress (an out-of-house meeting of the Liverpool-based Gypsy Lore Society) was canceled weeks before it was due, on the decision of Gypsy Lore Society, citing “obstructions” faced by some of the presenters as the reason (*Budapesti Hirlap* 1937a).45

**Distancing from the Center**

The (partly hypothesized) story of Bihari’s bust showed how a strategy of “marginalizing within centrality” might have been used by authorities in interwar Budapest to prevent the public statue of a Romani musician from becoming a site of memory practices by the Romani community in a central zone of the city, rooted in the capacity of *lieux de mémoire* “for metamorphosis, an endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation of their ramifications” (Nora 1989, 19). Late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century Romani bandleader Béla Radics’s statue in Kerepesi Road Cemetery, Budapest, which is at the focus of the present section, sheds light on how only an off-center and functionally also irregular, heterotopic urban area provided the Romani community with an opportunity for active social participation in a public space in the same period.

Bihari’s bust on Margaret Island was destroyed in the Second World War (Berza 1982, 840), just like his full-body plaster statue (Antal Szécsi, 1889) in Vigadó Concert Hall, Budapest (Nagy 2004, 353). Of the public statues of Romani musicians erected in Hungary before the war, it was only those of Pista Dankó in Szeged and Béla Radics in Budapest that survived the events of 1944–45. Radics’s full-body, near life-size bronze statue on his tomb in Kerepesi Road Cemetery, a memorial park-type cemetery outside the central zone of the city,46 was created as a result of a fundraising campaign by MCOE in 1930 (*Magyar Országos Tudósító* 1930b). Such campaigns by then had a tradition within the community of Romani musicians in Hungary, an early example of which is a series of fundraising concerts organized by this community between 1885 and 1890 for the benefit of a tomb monument to bandleader Pali Rácz (*Vasárnapi Ujság* 1885; *Fővárosi Lapok* 1889; *Budapesti Hirlap* 1890a), which was inaugurated in 1890 in the same cemetery (*Budapesti Hirlap* 1890b). Radics’s memorial brought a new turn in this representational tradition by incorporating a free-standing statue of the commemorated individual.

Unlike the 1930 fundraising concert of MCOE, a mega-sized open-air music event in a football stadium, the inauguration of Radics’s bronze statue two years later was left mostly unnoticed by the press and

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45 News reports claimed the event was only to be postponed for a year (*Budapesti Hirlap* 1937a), and the congress indeed took place in 1938, but in Liverpool instead of Budapest (*Magyarság* 1938b).

46 Kerepesi Road Cemetery was opened just outside the city of Pest in 1849 (Tóth 1999, 6), along the outer border of the district of Józsefváros (today also known as the eighth district of Budapest). It was classified as an honorary cemetery in 1885 by the general assembly of the capital city (28), and in 1956 it was granted the status of a national pantheon (93).
the media, apart from a few brief mentions (e.g., *Pesti Hirlap* 1932). Standing on a stone pedestal in a cemetery block that lies along the main road of the cemetery, Lőrinc Siklódy’s work of art shows the musician in a dignified standing pose, with his violin under his arm, looking into the distance.\(^\text{47}\) Its three-piece suit, with a cutaway coat, has no nationalist associations, unlike many tomb monuments erected in the cemetery in the period,\(^\text{48}\) making it also an exception in Siklódy’s oeuvre. Lacking any references to the cult of Rákóczi, it is a counterpoint to Bihari’s bronze bust on Margaret Island, inviting comparison instead with Dankó’s pensive figure in Szeged.

Dankó’s and Radics’s statues offer Roma entry to the conceptual space of the nation under different conditions than Bihari’s 1889 and 1928 sculptural figures did. Despite its survival of the war’s events, Siklódy’s work of art has apparently not become an object of memory practices, but it has neither been relegated to complete oblivion. The cemetery block that includes Radics’s grave grew to be an area within the cemetery that is partly identified as a final resting place for Romani bandleaders (Tóth 1999, 116; Csapó 2018).\(^\text{49}\) Up to the 1940s, the funerals of the Romani musicians buried in this block were spectacular mass events, with grand music performances, attended by thousands and highly publicized in the press. As a 1934 press photograph of Romani bandleader Károly Bura’s funeral testifies (*Pesti Napló* 1934), with a caption also reflecting on the presence of Radics’s statue in the background, the bronze figure came to be an emblematic part of this venue, which became a site for displaying and negotiating Romani identities in the interwar period.

In addition to the fact that erecting tomb monuments were privately funded efforts, the peripheral location of the cemetery perhaps also allowed more freedom in self-representation practices through such sculptural commissions. Similarly, probably because of the off-center status of the location, funeral ceremonies in this venue seemingly offered more opportunities for the inclusion of the voices of Roma than did public events in the city center. In the interwar press sources consulted as part of this research, the only mention of a Romani musician giving a speech at a public event was the funeral of bandleader Gábor Kozák in 1926 in Kerepesi Road Cemetery, in which his colleague Béla Radics said farewell to Kozák at his grave, before performing music in his honor (*Újság* 1926).

\(^\text{47}\) The presence of an audience is also implied by the statue (Sturcz 1983, 190), but the performer’s status here is not subordinate to it as in the case of Szécsi’s Bihari statue in Vigadó Concert Hall. In Sturcz’s description, Siklódy’s Radics appears “after the performance of a song, receiving applause from the audience, in the moment of success” (*ibid*.).

\(^\text{48}\) According to Vilmos Tóth, “extreme forms of militarism, which would have seemed grotesque under other circumstances, gained a foothold” (1999, 77) in the heritage environment of the cemetery in the interwar period, manifesting themselves even in epitaphs of private graves. A manifestation of similar tendencies at the level of local politics is that the road along the front wall of the cemetery was renamed Fiume Road in 1923 (*Fővárosi Közlöny* 1923, 1350; Tóth 1999, 77) in an irredentist spirit after the Hungarian-preferred (Italian) name of the Croatian town of Rijeka, which was under Hungarian jurisdiction within the former Kingdom of Hungary. The largest memorials installed in the cemetery around the examined period included a First World War memorial in 1918 (Tóth 1999, 77) and an equestrian statue on the tomb of the radical right-wing prime minister Gyula Gömbös (1941), “representing an ancient Hungarian leader on horseback” (83).

But while in mere spatial terms Radics’s statue was on the margins of the city, hidden behind the high brick walls of the cemetery, these walls hosted a space with functional features that relate it to the center, as a space of national self-representation. However, unlike major nineteenth-century garden cemeteries in Europe such as Père Lachaise in Paris or the Glasgow Necropolis, Kerepesi Road Cemetery remains a largely invisible part of the city, “almost fully missing from public consciousness” (Tóth 1999, 5). This marginal character of the site might partly explain why the relatively prominent location of Radics’s statue in the (often-transformed) topography of the cemetery has not been challenged in the same way as the presence of Bihari’s bust along the main road of Margaret Island has been.50

As city authorities shifted the spatial focus of their memory politics regarding Roma away from the center from 1929, when a street was named after eighteenth-century female Romani bandleader Panna Cinka in what is today the 14th district of Budapest (HU BFL II. 1.a. Vol. 60 [1929–1930], 418–419), MCOE turned its attention back to central areas of the city in the 1930s. The last highly visible activity of the organization was a commemoration day of the fifth centennial of “Gypsy music” in Hungary in May 1937, with open-air concerts simultaneously held in city centers all over the country. If the choice of its site in Budapest, the irredentist monument in Liberty Square (Szabadság tér),51 was a statement by MCOE of its willingness to cooperate with the ultranationalist regime, the international “Gypsyology” congress planned by the organization for the autumn of the same year expressed its concern over the domestic influence of Nazi ideologies of race. A preliminary announcement of the scholarly event in the daily Pesti Napló summarized that the primary aims of the congress were clarifying the origins of Roma, making a case for the Aryan progeny of this community, and advocating the idea that, as secretary general Béla Mázor put it, “the Gypsy issue [cigányügy] cannot be only a question of public order and public health” (Pesti Napló 1937a).

However, such open forms of political criticism remained exceptions in the history of the organization, which hoped that the Horthy regime would continue to perceive Romani musicians as proponents of Hungary’s national music heritage and partners in the past independence struggles of the nation. Arguably, the public events of MCOE served to keep these topics on the agenda of the nationalist discourse in interwar Hungary. Yet the expansion of measures targeting Roma in Hungary in the period was indicative of how readily the state apparatus would soon cooperate with Nazi Germany in the racial persecution and extermination of Roma. In a few years’ time, history was to prove that “[w]hen violence erupts, the historical signs of hybridity,” in our case, memory sites of Romani musicians, “offer little resistance” (Papastergiadis 2005, 62).

50 In Kerepesi Road Cemetery, the main road gained a new prominence in the interwar period (Tóth 1999, 62), especially due to the 1936 burial of Gömbös near its end and the inauguration of the abovementioned equestrian statue on his tomb five years later, to be removed after 1945 (83–85).

51 The performance of the Romani musicians was incorporated in a changing of the guard ceremony by a radical right-wing organization at the monument (Budapesti Hirlap 1937b). Besides the character of Liberty Square being defined at that time by this 20-meter tall object, called the Reliquary Flagpole of the Land (Ereklyés Országzászlótartó), the square also came to be a site for a number of additional similarly themed statues in the period (Vári 2012, 722–723).
Conclusion

As nineteenth-century nationalism, grounded in the political concept of the nation in Hungary, gave way to ethnic nationalism after the First World War, the figure of the Romani musician remained an exception from a wholesale othering of Roma by dominant society only in limited cases. In such cases, remnants of the nationalism of the previous century were reconfigured to match the new and sometimes conflicting priorities of the interwar period. In relation to Romani musicians, this earlier form of national thought allowed room for the pre-twentieth-century development of a hierarchical and oppressive version of what Ashworth et al. call the core+ model of plural societies, in which a core culture is supplemented by “minority add-ons” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007, 79).

Building on the distinction Ashworth et al. made between inclusive and exclusive versions of the core+ model in long-established societies (144–152), this article proposes to further differentiate in this context between hegemonic and non-hegemonic forms of inclusion. In the former, hegemonic form, dominant society incorporates the heritages of minority groups on its own terms, denying equal participation from the other in the process. In Hungary, the “Hungarian-Gypsy style” in music and the figure of the Romani musician entered the national imaginary under such unequal terms, failing to disrupt power relations. Thus, while Shay Loya – examining the “Hungarian-Gypsy tradition” in an earlier historical setting – holds that “one should not underestimate the power of transculturation to subvert cultural-political structures in nineteenth-century Central Europe” (2011, 13), this article instead assumed an analogy between the uses of “Hungarian-Gypsy music” by dominant society in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Hungary and appropriations of the Latin American discourse of mestizaje/mestiçagem for oppressive political practices in these periods (see Martínez-Echazábal 1998, 37–38).

The above analysis attempted to support this argument by a discussion of urban memory sites related to Romani musicians, created in the interwar period, by primarily addressing the history of their social and political uses and their relation to transformations of the social and cultural geography of Budapest at the time. A noticeable formal feature of the two public statues examined – similarly to earlier sculptural representations of Romani musicians in Hungary – is a violin in their hands, which marks the precondition of their presence in the spaces of dominant society, exposing their subordinate role in these spaces. The inauguration ceremonies of János Bihari’s bust and memorial plaque near the historical center of the city offered Roma only voiceless forms of participation, while the possibility for this community to have more active involvement in shaping the discourses on and representations of Roma opened up only behind the walls of a cemetery in an outer district.

Attempts by the community of Romani musicians to include Bihari’s bust in its memory practices is a possible reason for the secretive relocation of this art piece by authorities to the spatial margins of Margaret Island. In this hypothesized scenario, the statue was seen by dominant society not merely as an object with a signifying value but also one with a potential to draw events organized and attended by Roma to its location on the island. To use Picker’s terms for mechanisms of segregating Roma in Europe, the memory communities the bust implied became subject to displacement, which involves relocating Romani communities from city centers, often to remote and underdeveloped areas. In this
case, a foreseen Romani presence was first banished to the margins of a central urban area (Margaret Island), before the sculptural object was, to a large degree, also expelled from the island’s public image. By contrast, Béla Radics’s bronze statue was endowed with a relatively central location in a marginal urban zone (Kerepesi Road Cemetery), and its position near the main road of the cemetery was not challenged during the Horthy regime or thereafter. Similarly to the decisions of FKT to name two streets outside the city center after Romani musicians between the late 1920s and the mid-1930s, this political endorsement of Radics’s “centrality within marginality” can be related to what Picker calls the strategy of containment, which aims to keep racialized communities on urban peripheries (84–106).

Picker emphasized mainly in the context of displacement that this segregating mechanism – though the same can be argued for other forms of spatial peripheralization that he discusses – “may occur at a symbolic level, too” (48), inferring the “(re)location beyond the ethno-moral boundaries of the nation” (ibid.). As seen above, in interwar Hungary these exclusionary practices, driven by the ideological developments of the period, coincided with the fact that Romani communities in Hungary and abroad started to engage in self-organization, which yielded new types of public visibility for these communities and claims by them for active roles in using, interpreting and shaping urban heritage environments.

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Figure 1. László Vaszary. János Bihari. 1928. Bronze. Margaret Island, Budapest (1928–1944/45). In Budapest szobrai és emléktáblái (The sculptures and memorial plaques of Budapest) by Endre Liber (Budapest: Budapest Székesfőváros Statisztikai Kiadóhivatala, 1934), 347. Reproduced with the permission of the Metropolitan Ervin Szabó Library, Budapest Collection.

Figure 2. Lőrinc Siklódy. Béla Radics. 1932. Bronze. Kerepesi Road Cemetery, Budapest. Reproduced with the permission of the Hungarian Museum of Trade and Tourism.

Figure 3. Memorial plaque to János Bihari. 34 Lónyay Street, Budapest, 1928. Photo by the author.

Figure 4. Memorial plaque to János Bihari. 34 Lónyay Street, Budapest, 1928. Photo by the author. Text of inscription: “Here stood the house in which János Bihary, the outstanding pioneer of national music, closed his eyes on 27 April 1827. In memory of the centenary of his death installed by the public of the Royal Seat and Capital City of Budapest.”
Figure 5. Letter from Marci Banda, the president of the National Association of Hungarian Gypsy Musicians, to the mayor of Budapest, 25 August 1930. Reproduced with the permission of the Budapest City Archives.

Figure 6. A fundraising concert for Béla Radics’s tomb monument, organized by the National Association of Hungarian Gypsy Musicians in a football stadium on Üllői Road, Budapest, on 29 May 1930. Still from newsreel footage (Magyar Hiradó [Hungarian News], episode 328, June 1930, Budapest: Magyar Filmiroda Rt.). Reproduced with the permission of the National Film Institute Hungary – Film Archive.
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Public Statues and Second-Class Citizens: The Spatial Politics of Romani Visibility in Interwar Budapest


——. 1890b. “Rácz Pali siremlékét …” [Pali Rácz’s tomb monument …]. Untitled news item. 31 October 1890, 6.


——. 1928a. “Autóutat építenek a Margitszigeten a régi lóvasút helyén” [Road for car traffic to replace old horse tram line on Margaret Island]. 11 April 1928, 9.


——. 1930. “Egy müncheni kávéházban inzultálták a magyar zenekart” [Hungarian band insulted at a Münich café]. 4 December 1930, 9.


——. 1937c. “Gipsy-ológiai világkongresszus lesz Budapesten” [Gipsy-ology world congress to be held in Budapest]. 7 July 1937, 2.

——. 1937d. “Szegénykataszter állítanak fel a budapesti cigányok munkanélküli kollégáikról” [Budapest Gypsies set up a poor registry of their unemployed colleagues]. 27 July 1937, 2.


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