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Anglo-Russian Mechanisms for Crisis Management in the First Period of the Greek Cause (1821 – 1826)¹

The basis of the European System which was set up again in 1814-1815, was constituted by the practical application of the balance of power theory. The first serious challenges for the continental structure were indicated by the revolutions of the 1820s. The Greek Revolt, which later developed to be a war of independence fit in this sequence. The movement, unlike former revolutions set up a claim for achieving a national autonomy. The firmest part of the Congress System was the observance of the principle of legitimacy and upon which the Greek Revolt was not more than a movement against the legitimate. Russia as the member of the Holy Alliance disapproved the movement and acknowledged the Sultan's right to intervene in the events. Although England was not a member of the Alliance, it had a similar opinion. The turn concerning the Greek Cause took only in 1825 as the foreign affairs of England and Russia had changed. As a result of this the states which had been rivals in the Eastern Question brought common cooperation into prominence.

I put the cooperation of the Cabinet in London and St. Petersburg concerning the St. Petersburg Protocol (1826) in the centre of my study. Elaborating the subject I aim for throwing light on the similarities and differences in the conceptions and attitude of the two states in foreign affairs concerning the Greek Cause and the motivational factors for collective behaviour by comparing the English and Russian conceptions.

The most important principle of Great Britain's foreign affairs was the maintaining of the scheme of continental balance, so in the beginning like other Great Powers it disapproved the Greek Movement. However, the events in the Balkans gave cause to serious apprehension in the British Government which was afraid that the Greek Revolt would cause the flaring up of Russia's expanding policies towards southern territories. The probable armed intervention of St. Petersburg caused alarm about the court in Vienna. The common idea to keep the Russian Empire within bounds prompted both England and Austria to cooperate with each other more closely. Robert Castlereagh, who was the head of the Foreign

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Office, accepted the status quo policy of Metternich concerning the Eastern Question and emphasized the importance of the coordination with Vienna. In his concept the strengthening of the cooperation of European Allies played an important role. Castlereagh thought that the idea, which Alexander I also considered so important could be one of the main ideas of the reasoning scheme against Russian intervention²

After Castlereagh's tragic death in August 1822 George Canning succeeded him as Foreign Secretary. In his policy the idea of European cooperation, which was earlier urged by Castlereagh, was overshadowed and the breaking up of the Holy Alliance's coalition came into prominence. He showed a moderate stance towards the Greek War of Independence. Although he accepted the principle of non-intervention but he made more concessions for the insurgents. Before the Congress of Verona in October 1822 Canning ordered the Duke of Wellington to demand better governance and amnesty for the Greeks from the Porte.³ Not so long after this the Cabinet in London formally acknowledged the Greeks as belligerents. The amendment of the insurgents' status was basically motivated by the English commercial interests. In the region of the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea the buccaneering became more common than ever. As the Porte seemed to be unsuccessful in handling the existing issue, the English cabinet wanted to shift the solution of the problem to the Greek Government.⁴ The attitude of the English Government was not only influenced by these factors but the Philhellenic movement which was spreading all over Europe and by the public opinion put additional pressure on the Houses of Parliament.⁵ Probably London provided financial support to the Greek freedom fighters in 1824 by the means of large sums of loans owing to this fact.

At the period of consultation with the Continental Powers the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs insisted on his views on neglecting intervention from the beginning to the end. It is now worth highlighting that neither of the Concert of Europe's member countries urged on the use of armed intervention. The Court of Vienna upheld the conception of

2 Alison W Phillips, Great Britain and the Continental Alliance. In *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*. Vol. II. Eds. A. W. Ward–G. P. Gooch. Cambridge, 1923. 43.

3 Ibid. 87.

4 Mária Ormos – István Majoros, *Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtérén*. [Europe in the international struggle for power] Budapest, 2003. 48.

5 Harold Temperley, British Secret Diplomacy from Canning to Grey. = *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1938. no. 1. 4.

preserving the status quo in the Balkans, while Berlin and Paris adapted to the Austrian policy as a result of their moderate policies.⁶ In the case of St. Petersburg there were still some uncertainties.⁷ In spite of the fact that Alexander I dissociated from the alternative of intervention again and again in his declarations, the changes in the relation of Russia and the Porte and the unsolved problems between the two states included the chance of an armed conflict to break out. For this reason Canning aimed for making the system of allies, which guaranteed safety for St. Petersburg, inoperative. A new Russian initiative provided an opportunity for putting his plan into action.

In order to settle the Greek Question Alexander I suggested convening a conference of the Great Powers in his circular of January 12, 1824.⁸ The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs interpreted the meeting of allied states as an attempt to revive the Congress System, of which implementation would have been contrary to the interests of London. Although the weakness of the European system of alliance provided favourable conditions for achieving Canning's aims, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had to take the possible problems of enforcing his conception into consideration. In his letter addressed to Robert Liverpool, Prime Minister he indited as follows: „*The Greek Question is full of peril and plague [...] France and Prussia have signified their complete adhesion to the Russian plan [...] Austria pretends to Russia a similar acquiescence, but confides to us her perfect conviction that the whole project will come to nothing. We who cannot take either of these courses are placed in great embarrassment. If we refuse our cooperation, France and Prussia, and Austria too, will lay the failure upon us; if we engage in the discussion, they will endeavour to make us responsible for its success.*”⁹

In order to solve the impasse the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs found middle ground: he did not refuse to reconcile with the Great Powers

6 J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question. A Historical Study in European Diplomacy*. Oxford, 1917. 185.

7 Erzsébet Bodnár, Orosz-osztrák együttműködés és vetélkedés a keleti kérdésben a 18. században és a 19. század első felében [Russian-Austrian co-operation and rivalry in the Eastern Question in 18th and early 19th c.]. In: Eadem (ed.), *A keleti kérdés és a Balkán az orosz külpolitikában a 19. század első felében*. Budapest, 2008. 69.

8 Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820–1827*. In: Ward–Gooch, *The Cambridge History*, 87.

9 Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool, Gloucester Lodge, October 17, 1824. In: *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*. Vol. I. Ed. Edward J. Stapleton. London, 1887. 177.

concerning the Greek Cause, however he subjected the participation of London in the St. Petersburg Conference to strict conditions. Canning demanded the fulfilment of two criteria: the restoration of the diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, and these states' renouncement of using armed forces.¹⁰ He entrusted Stratford Canning with the settlement of the preliminary negotiations.¹¹ As a part of his embassy, the British ambassador first paid a visit to Vienna, where he strived for reconciling the Anglo-Austrian viewpoints through negotiations with Metternich. However, London's attempts for rapprochement did not live up to the expectations. At that time the Chancellor had already supported the arrangement of the conference in the frame of the solidarity of the allies.¹² It soon became quite clear for Stratford Canning that he would not be able to fulfil his duty. The unsuccessful mission of the British diplomacy, however, had a prompting effect on George Canning. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs thought his conception was right by means of the Austrian attitude. The strenuous opposition of the Greek Government also asserted his point of view, which was expressed in connection with the proposal of Alexander I and K. R. Nesselrode, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs that was put forward in order to pacify Greece.¹³ The declaration of the Greek Government created a fundamentally new situation. Besides giving a handle for staying away from the St. Petersburg Conference, it clearly precluded the possibility of the consensus between the Russian Cabinet and the Greeks.

In an early stage of Canning being a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the principles of crisis management of the English diplomacy were made up by the alignment with the isolation policy. However, Great Britain's division from the continental matters did not result in staying away from the Eastern Question completely. The moderate policy of the British Cabinet showed itself in solving the Greek problem on a European scale. Besides declining the Concert of the Great Powers, the Liverpool Administration strove to have an influence on the development of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in compliance with the British interest and keeping the country's economic and political position in

10 Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 88.

11 C. W. Crawley, *Anglo-Russian Relations 1815–1840*. = *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1929. no. 1. 53.

12 Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of The Right Honourable Stratford Canning Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*. Vol. I. London, 1888. 347–348.

13 The Russian draft was revealed prior to the conference for which—according to some assumptions—George Canning was responsible. See Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 88–89.

view. Canning framed his characteristic conception, which emphasized Great Britain's independent power of disposal, by taking these ambitions into consideration and which proved to be successful on the whole. England's isolation and the passive attitude of the Great Powers resulted in the failure of Alexander I's initiative and the increase of distrust felt towards its allies.¹⁴ In consequence of the unsolved nature of the Greek Cause and the lack of European co-operation the British Cabinet could shape its policy connected with the Eastern Question without undertaking any obligation towards the Great Powers from the turn of 1824 – 1825.

The Greek Question had a significant role in Russia's foreign policy from the very outset. The negative attitude of St. Petersburg in the early stage of the uprising changed in the turn of 1821 – 1822. From this point on the ambition for enforcing the imperial interests of the empire was linked with the idea of protecting the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire, for this the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji provided an opportunity which was signed on July 21, 1774.¹⁵ From this moment Alexander I strived for consolidating the Eastern Crisis together with the European Great Powers whereby an opportunity presented itself for the conflicting parties to come to an agreement. This was the purpose of the St. Petersburg conference, which was announced in 1824 and where the Russian idea developed to settle the Greek Question was also discussed.¹⁶

Nesselrode's memorandum was essentially a plan for division, which provided an opportunity for establishing independent Greek nation-state/

14 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I. Political Attitudes and The Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801–1825*. Berkeley, 1969. 284.

15 The full text of the Treaty can be found in Friede von Kutschuk Kaïnardji (10/21. Juli 1774). In: *Ausgewählte diplomatische Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage*. Hrsg. Karl Strupp. Gotha, 1916. 18–24. Concerning the circumstances of signing the Russian-Turkish peace treaty please see, Erzsébet Bodnár, Oroszország déli törekvései és a fekete-tengeri szorosok problémája (1700–1774) [Russia's southern ambitions and the problem of the Black Sea Straits]. In: *Két világ kutatója. Urbán Aladár 80 éves*. Eds. Béla Háda – István Majoros – Zoltán Maruzsa – Margit Petneházi. Budapest, 2009. 44–45.; Roderick H. Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility". *The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered*. = *Slavic Review*, 1976. no. 3., 463–483; Marriott, *The Eastern*, 1917. 133–135; E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks. From the Beginning of Their Empire to the Present Time*. Vol. II. London, 1856. 257–263.

16 Erzsébet Bodnár, Oroszország keleti törekvései, 1792–1830. [Russia's eastern ambitions] In: *A keleti kérdés és a Balkán az orosz külpolitikában a 19. század első felében. Tanulmányok*. Ed. Eadem. Budapest, 2008. 125.

states besides preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire apparently.¹⁷ However, the alternative offered by the St. Petersburg Government was rejected by both the negotiators and the belligerents. It is important to note that the draft itself, more specifically its details were revealed even before the real negotiations could have begun and it caused the objection of the parties concerned. The Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs accounted this for the reason of failure of the Russian plan for peace. As he wrote in his letter a few months later: „[...] *revealing our draft served a malicious intent, it falsified our ideas, suppressed most of them, and the rest was represented in a false perspective [...]*.”¹⁸ The St. Petersburg Conference meant not only the failure of the cooperation of the Great Powers but the Nesselrode idea as well.

The realization that the system of the allies was disfunctional implicated the modification of the Russian crisis management. The moderate nature of Alexander I's foreign policy started to become more explicit and dynamic. One of the key results of changing the order was the appreciation of the Anglo-Russian relations. After considering the potentials of the St. Petersburg diplomacy the Tsar urged on closer cooperation with London. Besides the passivity of the Great Powers, which was present during the negotiations two other factors played an important role in the background of his decision. The first one was the worsening of the Danubian Principalities' problem. Moldova and Wallachia were occupied by Turkish troops after the Greek Revolt had broken out. The aim of the occupation was to prevent them from supporting the revolutionists. The armed presence of the Constantinople Government in the Principalities though meant the violation of the points of the Treaty of Bucharest, which had been officially valid between Russia and the Porte since 1812. The suspension of Moldavia and Wallachia's autonomy and the limitation of Serbia's rights were the neuralgic points of the Russian-Turkish relations. The constant pressure of St. Petersburg

17 Originally the draft suggested setting up three principalities which would have been under the authority of the Porte nominally. On this topic see, *Внешняя политика России 19 и начало 20 века, (ВПР) Документы Российского Министерства Иностранных дел. Сер. II. т. 5 (13). Москва, 1982. Док. 122. Записка российского правительства правительствам Австрии, Великобритании, Пруссии и Франции.* стр. 308–314.

18 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 84. Циркулярная депеша управляющего Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде дипломатическим представителям за границей 4 (16) сентября 1825 г. стр. 262–263.

and the intermediary activity of the Russian chargé d'affaires proved to be effectless. „[...] *Minciaky's representation [...] did not meet our expectations. Neither Russia's moderate policy, nor its persistent patience, nor the explicitness of its rights [...] changed the policy of the Porte.*”¹⁹

The other factor was the uncertainty detected concerning the attitude of the London Cabinet in the Greek Cause. In his letter to Nesselrode on 16 October 1825 the Russian ambassador in Vienna referred to the fact that in the opinion of the Emperor of Austria „[...] *it has no probability that the British Government will contribute to the need of (Greek) protectorate but it is absolutely likely that England will take advantage of the situation that arose and it will intervene in the conflict between Greece and the Porte [...].*”²⁰ And in case if it happened, the Ottoman Empire would certainly „[...] *resort to the interposition of the four continental Great Powers since it can rely more on the sincerity of their goodwill in the relation between them than England's.*”²¹ It seemed quite clear that London's scope for action was significantly enlarged by the changing of the power relations of the coalition forces. It was beyond question that the British Government took the opportunity of the new situation to solve the Greek Cause.

So George Canning's confident policy in the Eastern Question accomplished his purpose on the whole: the chance of collective intervention in the war conflict had gone by 1825, the consensus of the Holy Alliance states was beginning to break, and in the St. Petersburg Government a kind of distrust started to develop towards its former partners. In the meantime the military success of the Porte continued to endanger Russia's influence in the Balkans. As a result of a common campaign of the Ottoman Empire and its vassal, the Egyptian Governor most of Morea was under Turkish jurisdiction.²² After seizing the territory, the Constantinople Government wanted to strengthen its influence in this region by drastically changing the ethnic relations. The extirpation of the Greek population regardless of age and sex was started by involving Egyptian forces, and in parallel with this the resettlement of the Arabians

19 Ibid. стр. 259–264.

20 Ibid. Док. 92. Д. П. Татищев управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде, Вена, 4 (16) октября 1825 г. стр. 276.

21 Ibid.

22 M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923*. London, 1966. 63.

to Morea was taking place.²³ The danger of establishing a new Ottoman satellite state hurt not only the Russian but the essential British interests as well. For this reason in his letter George Canning told his ambassador in Constantinople to demand the immediate reducing of Ibrahim Pasha to obedience from the Turkish Government.²⁴

The revival of the English diplomacy implied automatically the rapprochement to Russia. Although London insisted on its intermediate part further on, it was more obvious to them that without the approval of St. Petersburg taking considerable steps will not be possible. A change in the relation between the two powers took place in the autumn of 1825. As Canning wrote in his letter to Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister: „*I begin to think that the time approaches when something must be done; but not till Austria as well as France has put into our hands the dealing, first with Russia, and then with the parties to the war.*”²⁵ Canning did not have to wait for long. In the autumn of 1825 Alexander I had an attempt to urge the cooperation between the powers for the last time. George Canning reported on the Russian diplomatic attempt in his memorandum of October 25. The interesting thing about that was Count K. A. Lieven forwarded information confidentially concerning the cause without the authorization of the Russian Government to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. According to the report of the Russian ambassador to Great Britain, Canning was informed of the fact that the St. Petersburg Court sent a note to the Russian Embassies of the three Continental Powers not so long ago. According to the supposed content of the document, the Russian party wanted to solve the disputes between the allies and come to a decision concerning the Greek Cause in a conference in the following year. The report mentioned in detail the exposition of the allies' policy applied towards Russia and the reasons for the conflicts between them.²⁶

23 Memorandum on the Conditions on which the Duke of Wellington is to Allow His Majesty's Ambassador to go to a Conference on Greek and Turkish Affairs, and of his View of the Intentions of the Cabinet; also Queries Regarding the Wishes of the Government on Certain Points. London, January 26, 1826. In *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*. Vol. III. Ed. The Duke of Wellington. London, 1871. 75.; Paul Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*. Oxford, 1994. 642.

24 Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 91–92.

25 Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool, Seaford, October 25, 1825. Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence*, 317.

26 Memorandum of Mr. Canning, Seaford, October 25, 1825. *Ibid.* 313–315.

The new initiative though proved to be unsuccessful again. The idea of armed intervention in Alexander I's policy came into prominence at this point. Based on the original ideas the Russian troops would have forced the Porte to review its policy towards St. Petersburg and the Greeks by occupying the Danubian Principalities. In order to take the preliminary steps for the spring campaign Alexander I travelled to Taganrog in November 1825 and died a few weeks later.²⁷ His successor, Nicholas I as a really resolute and firm emperor committed himself to a more intense policy in foreign affairs. The Eastern Question and the changing of the tendencies which can be observed concerning European causes, though did not mean a total separation from Alexander I's policies. Actually, in some ways Nicholas I had a strict adherence to the ideas of his predecessor. By way of example we can mention the cause of the Danubian Principalities, the need for normalizing the relation with the Porte and the assuring of the penetrability of the narrows.²⁸ In connection of these questions we cannot speak about political order change. The Tsar had a similar point of view in the matter of intervention. He insisted on maintaining the possibility of an armed intervention. Unlike Alexander I's conception Nicholas considered war not only as a method of crisis management or a temporary solution in the case of Eastern Crisis, but a means of forming international relations.

The idea of Anglo-Russian cooperation had been an integral part of St. Petersburg's diplomacy but this could have been interpreted in the frames of the general European cooperation. But now after the continental relations had changed Alexander I thought that the only way of solving the problem of Russian isolation and the Eastern Crisis was to cooperate with the British Cabinet. His circular written to the Russian ambassadors in Vienna, Berlin and Paris in August 1825 foreshadowed this guideline and in which he informed them about the impasse which emerged after the St. Petersburg Conference and gave instructions which should be applied to their attitudes in the future. He instructed his delegates to represent a neutral attitude concerning both the Eastern Question and the proposals of

27 Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *Alexander I's Death and Destiny*. = *American Slavic and East European Review*, 1945. no. 1/2. 33–50.; Princess Lieven to Earl Grey, Brighton, December 27th, 1825. In *Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey*. Vol. I. 1824 to 1830. Ed. Guy Le Strange. London, 1890. 17–19; Princess Lieven to Metternich, London, January 6, 1826. In *The Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich*. Ed. Peter Quennell. New York, 1938. 356.

28 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126.

the above mentioned Governments in connection with European Causes.²⁹ The moderate attitude formed the basis of the conception prepared by the Tsar. While he urged to cooperate with the Liverpool Administration, he thought it was important that the official initiative should arrive from London. Although the St. Petersburg Cabinet has to show its openness towards British proposals, it should be presented as moderate as possible.

The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs was in possession of thorough information about the viewpoint of St. Petersburg concerning the Eastern Question. The primary source was K. A. Lieven, ambassador of Russia in London, who gave a detailed account of the information to the head of the Foreign Office on 25 October 1825. It is found out from Canning's note that it was the first time when he got knowledge of that an agreement between Mohamed Ali and Mahmud II had been established. „*The court of Russia has positive information that before Ibrahim Pacha's army was put in motion, an agreement was entered into by the Porte with the Pacha of Egypt, that whatever part of Greece Ibrahim Pacha might conquer should be at his disposal [...]*.”³⁰ The main point of the plans to manage the seized territories was „*to remove the whole Greek population, carrying them off into slavery in Egypt or elsewhere, and to repeople the country with Egyptians and others of the Mohammedan religion.*”³¹

The report of the ambassador of Russia to Great Britain must have influenced Canning's foreign policy concerning the Eastern Question. The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs considered the Turkish aspirations relating Greece as a serious circumstance, the most obvious result of this was that he asked for complete information from Admiral Sir George Cockburn on the number of the fleet which was stationed in the Mediterranean.³² The first, and few days later on 30 October the second meeting of Count Lieven and Canning in Seaford created an

29 Temperley, Princess Lieven and the Protocol of 4 April 1826. = *The English Historical Review*, 1924. no. 153. 59.; ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Управляющий Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде Д. П. Тагищеву посланнику в Берлине Д. М. Алопеусу послу в Париже К. О. Поццо-ди-Борго 6 (18) августа 1825 г. стр. 237. The full text of the source can be found In. Copie d'une dépêche réservée aux Représentants de l'Empereur près les Cours de Vienne, de Paris et de Berlin. St. Petersburg, le 6 Août 1825. In. Theodor Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I.* Bd. I. Berlin, 1904. 608–610.

30 Memorandum of Mr. Canning, Seaford, October 25, 1825. Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence*, 315.

31 Ibid.

32 Mr. Canning to Sir Georg Cockburn [S. d.]. Ibid. 321.

ideal atmosphere for outlining the policy which aimed at the Anglo-Russian cooperation to which the declaration of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs was added with a reference to the cooperation of the two states. Nesselrode found it important to emphasize that „*The work of restoring peace in the Levant depended on the establishment of a perfect understanding between Russia and England.*”³³

Under these circumstances a consultation took place on 16 December where an alternative for creating an Anglo-Russian alliance was definitely outlined. During the consultation between Lieven and Canning a consensus was made in that regard that „*The agreement should be made mainly between Russia and England.*”³⁴ The need and necessity of the exclusive partnership of the two states was explained by the policy of Vienna, Berlin and Paris in the Greek Cause.³⁵ The Russian Cabinet had been confirmed by the letter of the ambassador of Russia that there was a common intent to align the English and Russian interests. It had a far-reaching importance as in the meantime there had been significant changes in St. Petersburg. After Nicholas I came to the throne a possible armed intervention against the Porte was more presumable.³⁶ The English diplomacy must have assumed a more determined point of view given the circumstances.

The next step of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement was the delegacy of the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg. Lieven informed Nesselrode on his appointment to ambassador in a letter of 21 January 1826.³⁷ The Count thought it was important to emphasize that Canning himself insisted on the person of Wellington. The scepticism he felt concerning the work of the Britain's ambassador to Russia played an important role in the decision of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Lieven emphasized that „*in regard to the special circumstances the British Government must receive reliable proofs on the direction the new Russian Emperor would like to give to his policy. The Government cannot rely on Lord Strangford's untrustworthy truth in this highly responsible matter because we need someone whose*

33 Quoted: Ibid. 348.

34 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 103. Личное письмо посла в Лондоне Х. А. Ливена управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде 4 (16) декабря 1825 г. стр. 302.

35 Ibid.

36 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 125–126.

37 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 120. Личное письмо посла в Лондоне Х. А. Ливена управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде 9 (21) января 1826 г. стр. 334–337.

prestige absolutely inspires confidence."³⁸ The source indicates clearly that the relations had been quite strained between Canning and Britain's ambassador to St. Petersburg since December 1825. The reason of the disagreement was Percy Smythe Strangford's irresponsible behaviour. During the preliminary negotiations with the Russian Cabinet the British ambassador had informal reconciliations with the representatives of the Continental Powers. By the terms of his conception the states concerned published a statement to the Porte. In the event that Constantinople refuses to intermeditate between the Great Powers in the Greek Cause, the allied powers will recognize Russia's right to an armed intervention. So St. Petersburg can declare war on the Ottoman Empire without a word of protest.³⁹ The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs was informed of the developments from a report that Nesselrode forwarded to Count Lieven. Thereafter Canning started to distrust Lord Strangford. He also expressed his doubts in his letter written to Lord Granville, Britain's ambassador to France.⁴⁰ The replacement of Lord Strangford seemed reasonable in respects of successful negotiations.

During the precursory negotiations in Seaford the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs assured Count Lieven, reacting to the temporary standstill as a result of the demise of the throne, that the character of the relations between London and St. Petersburg were unchanged. Nevertheless he emphasized that „[...] *England strives to strengthen the friendship and the faith that bonds both countries [...]*."⁴¹ The rhetoric of the English Cabinet and the delegation of Duke Wellington to the enthronement of Nicholas I were gestures that clearly traced a path towards rapprochement. The previous consultations and the positive reactions of both parties set the stage for substantive negotiations on the whole.

To start the Anglo-Russian negotiations Canning required the preliminary fulfilment of three conditions. Relying on the first criterion „[...] *all the Powers parties to the conference declare beforehand their determination not to go to war, whatever may be the result of the*

38 Ibid. стр. 336.

39 Temperley, Princess Lieven, 68.

40 Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville, F. O., December 26, 1825. Stapleton, Some Official Correspondence, 347–348.

41 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 120. Личное письмо посла в Лондоне Х. А. Ливена управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде 9 (21) января 1826 г. стр. 337.

effort to produce peace between Turks and Greeks."⁴² The question of the avoidance of the armed intervention was the neuralgic point of the English diplomacy. As a second criterion Canning laid down that Russia and the Ottoman Empire should establish an official contact and the Russian Embassy in Constantinople should be established again. And finally according to the third criterion „[...] *That each of the Powers parties to the conference shall declare the determination of its government not to use the influence which it may possess over the councils of the belligerents, for its own aggrandizement or advantage.*”⁴³ In spite of the fact that Russia did not accept the conditions laid down in the memorandum, through the preliminary intervention of Count Lieven the Anglo-Russian reconciliations could have started. As a result of this the Duke of Wellington arrived to St. Petersburg in February 1826 as an official delegate of the Cabinet in London. Following George Canning's instructions of 10 February the British ambassador strived to assure the Tsar on the sincerity of Great Britain's desire to „[...] *come to the aid of Russia [...]*” in settling the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece.⁴⁴

The restoration of the influence in the Balkans and the normalization of the relation with the Porte belonged to the basic aspirations of the Russian diplomacy. In order to reach these aims Nesselrode proposed a new foreign affairs policy programme in February 1826. The settling of the situation of the Danubian Principalities and the assuring of the penetrability of the narrows had a distinguished role in his draft. In the case of the Greek War of Independence he emphasized that the conflict between the Porte and the insurgents must be solved as a result of the Russian and British cooperation.⁴⁵ Taking the Russian opportunities into consideration the Secretary for Foreign Affairs outlined two alternatives: settling the existing situation in a peaceful way and a possible war against the Constantinople Government.⁴⁶ One of the central elements

42 Memorandum on the Conditions on which the Duke of Wellington is to Allow His Majesty's Ambassador to go to a Conference on Greek and Turkish Affairs, and of his View of the Intentions of the Cabinet; also Queries Regarding the Wishes of the Government on Certain Points. London, 26 January, 1826. *Despatches, Correspondence...* Vol. III. 74.

43 Ibid.

44 The Right Hon. Canning to the Field Marshal Duke of Wellington, 10 February, 1826. *Despatches, Correspondence...* Vol. III. 87.

45 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126.

46 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 142. Управляющий Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде поверенному в делах в Константинополе М.

of his memorandum was the establishment of a close cooperation with Great Britain.

The Russian diplomacy strove to reach an agreement with the Ottoman Empire in parallel with the consultation with the British. As there were no changes in the cause of the Danubian Principalities, in March 1826 the Tsar decided to show determination and he demanded the implementation of the points of the Treaty of Bucharest. In his letter to M. Ja. Minciaky Nesselrode gave detailed instructions on the attitude towards the Turkish Government.⁴⁷ The most important instruction that was sent to the Russian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople was the consequent insistence on the Russian claims. The cabinet wanted to come to an agreement with the Porte in three major questions. The first one was the cause of the Danubian Principalities. St. Petersburg urged on the reconstruction of the status quo of Moldavia and Wallachia before 1821 and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the area. In accordance with the second point the Russian Government made a proposal that the relation of the Porte and Belgrade must be settled, which included the assurance of Serbia's autonomy and the privileges that were laid down in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). Finally, the Porte should delegate ambassadors to the Russian border in order to reach an agreement with the delegates of the St. Petersburg Cabinet on the conflict between the two states.⁴⁸ Nesselrode emphasized that the Russian needs are „*ultimatum like claim*” so if the conditions set in the list are rejected, St. Petersburg will apply sanctions.⁴⁹

The Russian attitude towards the Porte was probably mainly influenced by the strengthening of the Anglo-Russian relations. On the whole, St. Petersburg thought that by the means of an outlining coalition of the Great Powers it would be able to put pressure on the Constantinople Government which would be inclined to adapt to the claims Russia had made. Nesselrode's tactic was successful. In May the Porte accepted the conditions and a few months later it initiated an agreement with St. Petersburg.⁵⁰ The difference between the dynamism of the Russian diplomacy and the controlling nature of the British foreign affairs broke

Я. Минчаки 5 (17) марта 1826 г. стр. 411–421.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid. стр. 419.

49 Ibid.

50 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126–127.; Ormos – Majoros, Európa a nemzetközi, 50.; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801–1917*. Oxford, 1967. 298.

the tie in the favour of the Russian Empire in March 1826. The decided manner of Nicholas I could pursue the goals of his empire despite the pressure of the London cabinet.

As a result of the Anglo-Russian negotiations the two powers signed the Protocol of St. Petersburg on April 4, 1826, which declared the intermediate part of the contracting states in the Turkish-Greek conflict.⁵¹ In accordance with the recommendations of the protocol „*Greece should be a dependency of that (Ottoman) empire [...]*”, which meant that „*[...] the Greeks should pay to the Porte an annual tribute, the amount of which should be permanently fixed by common consent.*” Furthermore „*In order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions [...]*” the Great Powers made a propose concerning the removal of the Turkish population living in Greece and the Greek islands and the buying up their properties by the Greeks.⁵² Under the third provision the peacemaking negotiations between the belligerents should be made through the British ambassador to Constantinople and with the full support of the Tsar. In case if the Porte does not accept the principles of the Protocol, „*[...] his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will still consider the terms of the arrangement specified in No. 1 of this protocol [...] and they will avail themselves of every favourable opportunity to exert their influence with both parties in order to effect this reconciliation on the above mentioned basis.*”⁵³

The contracting parties emphasized that „*[...] his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty being desirous that their Allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this Protocol contains [...]*.”⁵⁴ They forwarded this wish to the Continental Powers in a confidential manner. The most interesting thing about the protocol is that in case the Anglo-Russian initiation towards the Porte fails it guarantees the right to St. Petersburg to implement the proposals concerning the Greek Cause, either on their own or together with Great Britain. The protocol did not have any facts concerning the questions of territory.⁵⁵ Although it is worth emphasizing that concerning the area of the new

51 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126.; Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Washington, 1977. 48.

52 Protocol of St. Petersburg, 23rd March (4th April), 1826. In. *Despatches, Correspondence....* Vol. IV. 59.

53 Ibid. 60.

54 Ibid. 61.

55 Schroeder, *Transformation*, 646.

state both the British and the Russian had totally dissimilar conceptions.⁵⁶

When considering the importance of the Protocol of St. Petersburg more factors must be taken into account. First, the reality of the implementation of the goals established in the document must be kept to the fore, on the other hand the effect of the Anglo-Russian agreement on international relations must be examined. Considering the first question, Great Britain's involvement played a determining role. The agreement between London and St. Petersburg was the alliance of two leading European Powers (considering both political and a military factors) which had a satisfactory influence and tools for forming European Causes and the events of the Eastern Question. In the protocol the conditions needed for given intentions were to be found still it was not carried out. The British Government insisted on its own isolation policy parallel with the cooperation with St. Petersburg. The duality of English foreign policy was revealed by the fact that the British Government isolated itself from the undertaking of the obligation concerning the absolving of the points of agreement. In this aspect the protocol of 1826 did not contain any elements that would assure the observance of its provisions besides the determining of the principles.

On the other hand it can be a plus of the Anglo-Russian agreement that it drew the passive Continental Powers' attention to the Greek Question. Although Austria and Prussia further on insisted on neutral policy, France was keenly interested in the coalition of the Great Powers. The French Government thought that the Anglo-Russian initiative could provide a real chance to resolve the Eastern Crisis, on the other hand taking part in the pacification of Greece could be a great opportunity to increase the prestige of France. However, Paris expected that as a result of the territorial changes in the Balkans Russia would be inclined to support the French revision aspirations aimed at the Rhineland.⁵⁷

After long reconciliations with Paris, Russia, England and France signed the Treaty of London on July 6, 1827, which based on the Protocol of St. Petersburg again declared the claims toward the Porte.⁵⁸ In the provisions of the agreement, the three allied powers laid down the establishment of commercial and diplomatic connections and they

56 The London Conference of 1830 brought change concerning the territorial questions. On the European Powers' conceptions of the settlement of frontier see, Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 103.; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 658.

57 Schroeder, *Transformation*, 1994. 650.

58 Ormos – Majoros, *Európa a nemzetközi*, 50–51.

specified the deadline for the Ottoman Empire to fulfil its obligations.⁵⁹ The secret clause of the contract laid down that all the three parties have the right for an armed intervention. On the whole, the importance of the St. Petersburg agreement should be emphasized in the establishment of an extensive and in the first place fit to act coalition of the Great Powers.

The changes in the international relations and the political consolidation going on in Greece created the internal and external conditions of executing an armed intervention. In case the deadline laid down in the London agreement was over, the three powers would wish to enforce their claims against Constantinople. The allied forces achieved the victory over the Porte on 20 October 1827, in Navarino. The military success though resulted in the weakening of the relation between the coalition partners. The situation emerged from the intervention of the Great Powers allowed Russia to strengthen in the Balkans. The distrust felt towards St. Petersburg London modified its foreign policy. The Anglo-Russian cooperation temporarily disintegrated and the Greek Cause entered a new phase concerning both the diplomacy and crisis management methods.

59 Treaty of the Settlement of Greece, 6th July, 1827. In. Despatches, Correspondence... Vol. IV. 61–62. The full text of the Conference in London can be found In. Protocol of the Conference held at the Foreign Office, the 12th of July, 1827. In. *Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece*. London, 1830. 177–180.

