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EDITORIAL

This issue of the CEU Political Science Journal aims to approach, from different perspectives, relevant topics of discussion for the Central and Eastern European landscape following the fall of Communism and the transitions to capitalism and stable democracy. Thus, the authors present in this issue use a variety of theoretical frameworks, from different fields of Political Science, in order to explain the shaping of identities, the relations between minorities and majorities in post-Communist states, as well as the developments at the level of the entire region and the interactions between the democratization process taking place in post-Communist states and the desire of the West to stabilize a region which has been devastated by violent conflicts throughout history.

Steafano Braghiroli explores the democratization process in the interwar period in three Central-Eastern European states – Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia – using Rokkan’s explicative factors: economy, culture, territory, and politics. While the conclusions of the article are valid for the period under scrutiny, they prove useful in understanding the democratization process in the post-communist Europe, following the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes almost 20 years ago. The author identifies specific structural elements of the political and social systems in these states, which explain, or at least contribute, to the success of failure of democratic institutions.

Dylan Kissane analyzes the realist predictions made by John Mearsheimer, concerning the four possible scenarios of development in European political and security landscape after the end of the Cold War. The article identifies the reason why Mearsheimer’s predictions have proven to be wrong, but moves forward to explain also the developments that actually took place following the end of Communism.

Dijana Gacesa’s article approaches a compelling issue in the Eastern European social and political landscape – the role of the church in shaping identities. The particular case approached in the article is the Serbian Orthodox Church and the way it constructed the image of the “others”, as a mean to construct and maintain its identity, while facing the challenges posed by modernity and the expansion of Western values.

Also debating the issue of identity, Monica Andriescu analyzes the discourse concerning the minorities in Romania after the fall of Communism, in order to explain the legal developments regarding education and linguistic rights. Also, the author examines the willingness of both minority and majority representatives to achieve compromise on the issue of minority rights. While focusing on the behavior of internal actors, the article also places the discussion in the context
of international regulations that have constantly shaped their actions.

Costica Dumbrava debates the citizenship policies in a large sample consisting of sixteen post-communist European states and dismisses the theoretical conclusions existing so far in the literature, which claim that the policies are “illiberal” and nationalistic. The article shows that citizenship policies are rarely coherent. Post-communist states remain divided between the desire to prove themselves as pro-European and liberal and the necessity to preserve the identity of the titular nation.

**Notes for Contributors**

The formal article requirements remain the same and can be found at our web address – [www.ceu.hu/polscijournal]. Articles must consist of 4,000-6,000 words, while any appendixes should not be longer than 5 pages. These requirements apply also to the submissions qualifying as “work in progress,” while the book reviews should not be longer than 1,200 words. Exceptions from these rules might be allowed, but a good justification should be addressed to the members of the Editorial Board, who will consider it only if the reviewers believe that going over the word limit is needed with respect to the content of the article. An additional requirement, which should be met by all submissions, is that any article, work in progress or book review submitted to us for publication should not be under review at other publications or should not have been already accepted for publication elsewhere.

GEORGE JIGLAU
THE CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD: LESSONS FROM THE PAST RELEVANT TODAY. POLAND, LITHUANIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN AN EXTENDED ROKKANIAN PERSPECTIVE

Stefano Braghiroli
Ph.D. candidate in Comparative and European Politics, Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP), University of Siena, Italy
E-mail: braghiroli@unisi.it

Abstract

This article analyzes the democratization processes in interwar Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in a refined Rokkanian fashion. My work represents a preliminary effort to explain diverse democratic outcomes in Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia (CSR) through Rokkan’s explicative factors: economy, culture, territory, and politics. First, Why in Poland and Lithuania did the newly-established institutions collapse while in Czechoslovakia they did not? How does the model work with CEE cases? More functionally, is it possible to properly use this working model outside its defined boundaries? I try to answer these questions according to Rokkan’s theoretical traits which define (the timing and the strength of) democratization processes. My findings suggest that some structural characteristics of the polities powerfully impact the chances for democratic survival. In particular, 1) the continuity of representative rule, 2) the style of government of the elites vis-à-vis the counter-elites, 3) the degree of formal/informal protection for religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities, 4) the religious heritage, and 5) the geopolitical dimension of the country clearly arise as the most fundamental elements of my analysis. My work primarily looks at the interwar period, but to a certain extent calls into cause still open aspects. I assume that an in-depth analysis of the events which characterized the CEE polities in the 1920s-1930s and of their historical sources might well provide a good venture point for a more aware understanding of the recent developments and of the current dynamics in post-Communist Europe.

1. Introduction

In order to properly analyze the fate of democracy in the interwar CEE region it is important to have a preliminary look at the state of things in the area and at the dramatic developments which took place there in the early 1920s. Following the political earthquake originated by the end of WWI, a number of old and newly-established states adopted democratic constitutions. In CEE the latter represented the overwhelming majority. The new statehoods directly originated from the breakdown of the four European multinational empires (say, the German, the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires) and from the very
beginning of their independent life parliamentary regimes and democratic political systems were instituted\(^1\). During the interwar period these states shared some common institutional and political characteristics and faced a number of similar internal and external challenges. First, most of them presented a relevant degree of ethnic segmentation, thereby displaying a significant presence of religious and linguistic minorities within their boundaries. They attempted to forge a sense of common belonging and to foster loyalties towards the new statehood along ethno-territorial or functional lines. It is possible to distinguish between two patterns of nation-building process in interwar CEE. Those national leaderships which struggled to settle an ethnically homogeneous nation by excluding minorities from political life and those which attempted to establish an inclusive pluriethnical polity. Second, the national elites had to fortify the institutional basis of their political legitimacy with regard to both internal and external threats. Therefore they had to secure democratic stability to the young liberal institutions while facing internal political instability and external threats from regional powers and aggressive neighbors. From an institutional perspective, most of the new CEE democracies adopted constitutions inspired by the Third French Republic and the Weimar Republic, thereby vesting most of the authority in the legislature and introducing proportional representation (PR). Given the authoritarian past, the main constitutional aim of the elites concerned the weakening of the executive. Throughout the formative period (from the 1919 Treaty of Versailles to the 1929 World economic crisis) a deep “Weimarization” of the institutional life took place\(^2\). These political systems proved to be unstable and fragile in most of CEE states, where the democratic regimes did not survive the interwar period. The breakdown generally came in the form of a series of military takeovers\(^3\). To put it simply, all the CEE states experienced the rise of authoritarian regimes with the relevant exception of Czechoslovakia, which represented the only democratic survivor of the region. My analysis includes Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia and addresses itself to the development and the outcomes of democratic processes in interwar CEE, thereby aiming at explaining why

\(^{1}\) Albania adopted a democratic constitution in 1921, Bulgaria in 1921, Czechoslovakia in 1920, Estonia in 1920, Hungary in 1921, Latvia in 1920, Lithuania in 1922, Poland in 1921, and Romania in 1923.


\(^{3}\) In Romania and in Yugoslavia the overthrow were piloted by the Monarchy respectively in 1920 and 1929, in Poland by Marshall Józef Piłsudski in May 1926, in Lithuania by Antanas Smetona again in 1926, in Hungary by Admiral Miklós Horthy, in Estonia by PM Konstantin Päts in 1934, and in Latvia by PM Kārlis Ulmanis in 1934.
democratic institutions in Poland and Lithuania collapsed, while in Czechoslovakia they did not. To do this I rely on several analytical tools provided by Rokkan’s conceptual map of Europe, which represents an attempt to match the process of state- and nation-building with conditions for democratic survival by means of four critical barriers modeled by a peculiar mix of factors: economy (E), territory (T), culture (C), and politics (P). Rokkan developed his models with regard to Western Europe. Here I wish to functionally extend its validity beyond its original boundaries. Practically, I will try to expand some of Rokkan’s assumptions by adapting his historical and territorial dimensions in an unconventional fashion. Rokkan produced an impressive amount of contributions consistent with my analytical needs. I will therefore rely on four major sources, that is, *The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology* (Rokkan, 1968), *Nation-Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics* (Rokkan, 1970), and *Building States and Nations* (Rokkan and Eisenstadt, 1973). In addition a useful reorganization of Rokkan’s original works is provided by Peter Flora (1999) *State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan*.

My analytical aim is particularly relevant even with regard to the re-establishment of democracy in the former Soviet bloc and their recent ever-increasing participation in the European integrative experience. A similar democratic euphoria has already occurred throughout the continent in the aftermath of the WWI. However, twenty years later most of the democratic regimes had collapsed under the impact of authoritarian pressures. What went wrong? A full awareness of the past failures is a vital element for understanding contemporary Europe. In the words of Seymour Lipset

> should the western world experience a major crisis, it is likely that national politics will vary along lines that stem from the past, much as they did during the 1930s. Political scientists of the future, who seek to explain events […] will undoubtedly find important explanatory variables in earlier variations in the behavior of the major political actors.

To put it simply, a number of problems from the past still influence today’s dynamics.

Following Lipset, my core questions are therefore even more relevant when we look at the current state of CEE. The consequences of the collapse of the Soviet system and the process of democratization together with the course of European reunification under the EU umbrella made most of the hot dimensions tackled in this work extremely relevant. Although the formal

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Democratic requirements have been generally met, the degree of substantial success varies greatly from country to country. In several CEE countries the passage from theory to practice is still an open matter in terms of political inclusion of the masses, development of the civil society, and definition of minority rights. The analytical questions posed by this article might well offer a helpful interpretative lens for understanding today’s difficulties as well. As far as the establishment of inclusive liberal-democracies in CEE, several long-standing issues once again have to be mindfully tackled. They survived the Communist age and - to a certain extent - have been frozen by the authoritarian experience. Following the fall of the Soviet system, these factors found greater room. The most frequently observed seem to be the rise of ethno-nationalism, religious rebirth, extreme political polarization, lack of political accountability and low level of citizens’ civil and political awareness. Most of these ingredients conditioned the CEE democratic experiences between the mid-1920s. They seem to denote a long-lasting persistence and a somewhat strong “survival capacity”. In the words of Paul Blokker, still relevant factors from the past coupled with post-Communist widespread civic alienation generated “a link between populism as a general phenomenon in modern societies and Eastern European nationalism”. A more precise awareness of the past successes and failures might well improve our capacity of understanding the current dynamics when problems of the same nature are at stake.

Methodologically, this article represents an effort to shift Rokkan’s model of democratic development eastwards, thereby aiming at identifying the factors which impacted the outcomes of democratic attempts in CEE. Therefore my goal appears to be twofold. The functional side of the coin concerns the extension of Rokkan’s model towards CEE. This step will provide the theoretical lens to carry out the analytical side of the research, that is, the understanding of democratic successes.

The article is structured as follows. In the first part I will conceptualize the object of analysis. I will then move on to Rokkan’s geopolitical/territorial, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions together with his four critical thresholds which define the timing and the strength of democratization. A few words will be spent on the nature of democratic expansion in the interwar period with particular emphasis on the specificities

of interwar CEE. In the second part I will analyze the fate of democracy in Poland, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia, thereby trying to emphasize the intrinsic motives which determined extremely different democratic performances within slightly similar settings. In the final part, I will develop some general conclusions in this respect.

I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

1. Rokkan’s Model of Democratic Development

Rokkan’s concern with the democratization process in Western Europe mainly consists of three explicanda: 1) the institutional development of democracy; 2) the rise of authoritarian regimes; 3) the development of party systems. Provided my analytical aims, I will turn my attention to the first and the second dimensions. This implies “a parsimonious description of the critical steps in the development and structuring of competitive mass politics” in Europe. I will then attempt to match Rokkan’s theoretical concepts with actual political and socio-cultural characteristics of interwar Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland. Rokkan’s dependent variable is represented by four institutional thresholds of democratization. Four major factors (economy, territory, culture, and politics) correspond to his independent variables, thereby affecting the timing of democratization and “thresholds interlocking” in each polity. The set of variables which allegedly determine the fate of democracy consists of an economic dimension (E) that regards the timing and the strength of the capitalist rise, a territorial dimension (T) that defines the geopolitical setting, the territorial consolidation and the timing of the national unification, a cultural dimension (C) concerning the outcome of the reformation, the degree of societal differentiation, and the church-state relations, and a political dimension (P) regarding the characteristics of party systems and institutional features. According to Ersson, “among the four sets of independent variables territory and culture seem to have a greater impact on the dependent variables than economy and politics”. However,

8 Ibid., 361-448.
9 Rokkan, “The Structuring of Mass Politics,” 174
considering a number of specific remarks raised by Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, I decided not to take for granted the role of politics as such\textsuperscript{11}.

The dependent side of my relationship is defined by the course of democratization in terms of Rokkan’s thresholds of legitimation, incorporation, representation, and executive power\textsuperscript{12}. Once the first threshold is lowered, new pressures rise for changes in the others (See Appendix 1). The timing of this course differs from country to country. In the words of Sir Lewis Namier, these institutional thresholds “allow the rising socio-cultural forces to flow further through the established channels of system but also make it possible to stem the tide, to keep back the flood”\textsuperscript{13}. As far as the development of democratic institutions and the process of mass mobilization are concerned, it follows that “any rising political movement has to pass through a series of locks on its way inwards towards the core of political system, upwards towards the central arena of decision-making”\textsuperscript{14}.

The first two thresholds guarantee the minimal preconditions for democracy. The other steps do not appear to be strictly necessary, however they concur to fortify the democratic process: “in the European context the introduction of PR formulas [and parliamentary regimes] has often been one component in the battle for establishing a democratic regime”\textsuperscript{15}. Rokkan identifies two idealtypes of democratization processes: the English model of slow, incremental political enfranchisement without reversal but characterized by long periods of formal inequalities and the French model, marked by sudden universalization of rights and liberties but with frequent reversals.

2. The Democratic Wave in Interwar Central and Eastern Europe: Why Poland-Lithuania and Czechoslovakia?

A clear distinction shall be made between those European countries with a historical tradition of state building and those which originated from the process of dismantling the European empires from 1878\textsuperscript{16} to 1919\textsuperscript{17} (see

\textsuperscript{12} The first threshold defines the extension of political rights and civil liberties through the introduction of liberal reforms. The second implies the introduction of male (and female) universal suffrage in free and fair elections. The third facilitates the parliamentarization of new political interests through the introduction of PR. The fourth ties parliamentary strength and executive power, thereby formalizing parliamentary democracy.
\textsuperscript{13} …
\textsuperscript{14} Rokkan, “The Structuring of Mass Politics,” 180.
\textsuperscript{15} Ersson, “Revisiting Rokkan,” 172.
\textsuperscript{16} In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin (following the Russo-Turkish war) recognized Romania as an independent state. The same year after the Treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria became an autonomous principality.
In his original framework on 18 Western European states, Rokkan mainly considered the former. Finland, which seceded from the ashes of the Russian Empire in 1917, and the Irish Free State, which gained formal independence from the British Empire in 1922, represent the only exception. Most of the newly-established sovereign statehoods adopted democratic constitutions and parliamentary regimes. Among them eleven CEE countries: Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia (seceded from the Russian Empire), Austria, Czechoslovakia (from the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire), Poland (reunified after the 1795 partition), Romania, Greece, and Germany.

A relevant portion of the so-called “first democratic wave” lasting from 1828 to 1926 took place in CEE. According to Huntington’s *The Third Wave* (1993) a relevant number of devolved countries shifted from authoritarian to democratic regimes in the early 1920s. In that period no CEE country turned the opposite direction. Yet twenty years later almost all these new democracies collapsed following the path of the first “reverse wave”. Greater attention should therefore be paid to interwar CEE, provided the particularities of democratic attempts in that region. In this respect, Rokkan’s model of democratic development seems to offer a reliable answer.

Rokkan’s model identifies two dimensions as the analytical basis for the mapping of democratization: 1) an East-West axis based on the strength of city networks and political centre formation; and 2) a North-South axis based on church/state relationships. The E-W dimension is characterized by three types of polity: *city-belt states* in the middle, marked by commercial networks and lack of political role of the centre, surrounded by *Eastern and Western empires* with strong political centers and weak city networks. The Western Empires (Britain, France and Spain) characterize themselves as political centers of early and strong formation. But what if we move a step ahead towards CEE? According to Aarebrot and Berglund

*Figure 1 - Spheres of Influence of the Eastern Empires*

Adapted from Aarebrot and Berglund, 1995.

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18 Bulgaria represents the only exception. The democratic institutions collapsed in 1923 following a military coup led by Alexander Tsankov’s fascist Unity Party (Bulgarian: *Naroden Sgovor*).


20 Flora, *State Formation*, 205-218
a territorial classification of [the Eastern] empires must take into consideration imperial aspirations and confrontation as a primary criterion. Prussia-Germany and Austria-Hungary we will consider defense empires, built up militarily over the centuries to defend Europe against incursions from the Eurasian steppes. Nevertheless both of those defense systems went through a considerable state-building experience at least with respect to their core territories.

It follows that Russia and the Ottoman Empire characterize as external state-entities with aspirations to expand their power into Europe. From this perspective the territories seceded from Western empires and defense empires fall into the broader Charlemagne Heritage.

Rokkan defines the devolved states as those “generated through territorial separation and succession from 1814 to the early 1920s. I will however focus on those territories that gained statehood in the aftermath of WWI. Aarebrot and Berglund identify two types of CEE devolved states: 1) those generated by the collapse of the eastern defense empires after the peace treaty of Versailles (i.e. Czechoslovakia and Polish regions of Galicia and Poznan); 2) those seceded from the external empires after the Balkan wars and the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles (i.e. Lithuania and the so-called Congress Poland).

Here I focus on a limited number of cases which – taken together - seem to share many essential characteristics with most of the interwar CEE statehoods. I will say more about this specific point in the next paragraph. In particular, following the rules of the “ladder of abstraction”, I wish to keep my analysis detailed enough, while preserving the possibility of further generalization outside my analytical borders. The features of the cases taken into consideration guarantee a fairly good equilibrium between these essential analytical needs. In this respect Sartori maintains that the more cases, the fewer the properties of each that can be looked at; the fewer cases, the more properties.

The following work seems to provide an excellent trade-off between the number of cases analyzed, the speculative accuracy, and the number of attributes taken into consideration.

On the whole, my case selection process followed Rokkan’s original prescriptions accurately. Moreover,

21 Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooption,” 213.
22 According to the Charlemagne Heritage identifies those states which have been influenced by the existence of the Holy Roman Empire in the early Middle Ages (Aarebrot and Berglund, 1995).
Poland and Czechoslovakia share a number of common macrotraits which seem to characterize most of the CEE cases as well as similar (exogenous and endogenous) challenges to the young democratic regimes. They experienced long-standing national partition under the Great Powers and protracted periods of absolutism. All in all, despite a number of commonalities in the timing of the state-formation process and provided a comparable degree of ethno-cultural, religious, and political heterogeneity, in facts they adopted far different solutions which eventually produced opposite democratic outcomes. The cases analyzed in this article give the opportunity to assess how the impact of different degrees of liberalization and of political enfranchisement experienced by the area under the domination of the three major Empires determined the future developments of the newly-independent statehoods. The Austro-Russo-Prussian collage in Poland (and Lithuania) together with Austrian Czechia and Hungarian Slovakia present high degrees of structural variability which stem from the different nature of the ruling power. These subunits offer a wide range of endogenous and exogenous factors which seem to properly fit the majority of the democratic experiences in CEE. Borrowing Surazska’s arguments on Poland, the three represent “a good case to test such a theory since at the time of the watersheds in European nation building, the countries was divided between three empires of diverse political cultures: Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary.”

Before moving on, the decision to include Lithuania in my analysis deserves a few words. It originates primarily from practical reasons: Polish and Lithuanian national courses went together for a long period, initially within the common framework of the Kingdom of Poland and afterwards under the Russian domination. As a consequence, an analysis of Poland without Lithuania would have been somehow incomplete, thereby presenting a structural lack of comprehensiveness.

Yet, a question appears to be essential: does an extended Rokkan’s model of democratic development still hold? And how does it cope with CEE? Rokkan argues that “some elements [of his map] may be built into models for other regions of the world but the basic structure of the model reflects a uniquely European experience.” In facts, the effective extension of his analysis is limited by the rigidity of those cultural and religious boundaries defined by the struggles between Reformers and the Roman Church as well as the consequent strains between secular and religious power (N-S dimension). Rokkan therefore distinguishes among Protestant, counter-reformatory, mixed or secularized countries as they emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia and

Osnabruck. Czechoslovakia will be therefore considered as a fundamental part of the Charlemagne Heritage. Interwar Poland and Lithuania seem to share the Roman Catholic legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

II. THREE COUNTRIES WITHIN ROKKAN’S FRAMEWORK

1. Three Historical Paths with an Eye at Rokkan’s Factors

In the analysis which follows I am going to take into consideration two interconnected dimensions: 1) the country’s position within E-W/N-S map; 2) the interaction between ETCP-factors and the lowering of the thresholds. Following Rokkan’s categorization, all the three cases may be labeled as states of recent devolution from External or Eastern Empires. In this section I will define the peculiar traits of the Rokkanian factors which are supposed to have played an essential role in the lowering of the four thresholds and – more in general – in determining the fate of democracy in CEE.

A sense of elite-based national awareness and a territorial dimension of Polishness emerged in the early 1200s. The fundamental ethno-cultural lines of the Polish nation appeared to be already defined in the early XIII century. Both Polish and Lithuanian historical developments appear to be strongly affected by the legacy of medieval representative traditions under the Piasts and Jagiellons and of the Golden Freedom period, marked by the sovereign power of the Commonwealth Sejm (perpetrated through the procedure of unanimous consent) and by a high degree of local autonomy. The minimal efforts of centralization from the weak centre represented another typical trait of the Polish city-belt state. Everything changed after the breakdown of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under successive joint attacks from the three Eastern Empires. From 1795 onwards, the three partitioned areas faced protracted periods of absolutist rule (i.e. impact of Rokkan’s geopolitical dimension). Congress Poland (the eastern part of the country) and Lithuania – Finland - experienced weak forms of indirect estate representation and pervasive autocratic domination under the Tzarist rule and were deeply marked by Russian political and economic backwardness. Similarly, the region of Wielkopolska turned into the Prussian Duchy of Poznan and willy-nilly followed the Prussian path towards the extension of political rights from the so-

27 For that reason, I decided not to include those states seceded from Russian and Ottoman empires which appear to be strongly affected by Orthodox as well as Muslim legacy (like Ukraine and Albania) in order to keep my analysis unbiased.
called “three-class” system in 1849 to the introduction of universal, equal, and secret suffrage for all men of age in 1867. While the thresholds of legitimation and incorporation were therefore lowered in the mid-1800s, the other barriers were maintained as “the people might elect representatives to the Reichstag but the representatives had only minimal influence on the German Executive”\(^{30}\). Galicia, subject to the Austrian half of Habsburg dual monarchy, experienced a moderate degree of political enfranchisement after 1867 constitutional reform, thereby having “its own elected parliament and local government. […] Those representative institutions gave the Poles the first training in political participation”\(^{31}\) This provided the region with a relatively developed party politics. Yet the political centre slowed down a fully-fledged mass mobilization since universal democratization and federalization beyond the Ausgleich achieved in 1867 would have represented a major threat to the predominance of the German-Austrians and the Hungarians. The attempt to avoid such a threat led a series of compromises and seriously delayed the democratization process\(^{32}\).

Following Rokkan’s conjectures on the continuity of representative traditions, the legacy of the long-lasting period of absolutist rule delayed the incorporation of political opposition and undermined the civic basis of interwar Poland and Lithuania. Moreover, the high status of the dominant powers influenced the timing of the process of national enfranchisement.

After the 1795 Third partition, the counter-reformatory identity had greater room for preserving an ideal sense of bounded national belonging in opposition to Protestant Prussia in the Duchy of Poznan and Orthodox Russia in the Congress Poland and Lithuania. Polish and Baltic experiences resemble the Irish case since “in Ireland the distinctive and pervasive presence of Catholicism helped to preserve a sense of separateness, as did the burning grievances over the land ownership. These were reinforced by the nature of the central British presence, uncaring as much as repressive”\(^{33}\). Following the establishment of independent statehoods in the early 1920s, the national Churches gained a strong legitimacy due to their long-lasting role of moral (and political) authority vis-à-vis the civil elites (i.e. role of Rokkan’s religious heritage), thereby determining a “dualism between religious and secular authority”\(^{34}\). The skeptical stance of national clergy towards the new regimes undermined the basis of democracy and paved the way for the military coups of clerical tendencies in

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\(^{30}\) Rokkan, “Nation-building,” 87.

\(^{31}\) Surazska, “Central Europe,” 237.

\(^{32}\) Flora, State Formation, 26.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 189.

\(^{34}\) Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 214.
1926\textsuperscript{35}. The attitudes of the Catholic hierarchies appear to follow Rokkan’s assumptions on Austria, Italy, and Spain, which are strongly characterized by the legacy of Counter-Reformation “where the Catholic Church […] proved able to slow down the process of democratization and mass mobilization”\textsuperscript{36}.

Unlike in the Polish case, a shared sense of Czechoslovakness beyond Czech and Slovak identities had to be artificially created to provide the state with a basis for national belonging. The definition of a Czechoslovak nation was essential in order to justify the establishment of the state and its legitimation. During the Middle Ages, Moravia, Bohemia, and Slovakia (being part of the \textit{city-belt area}) were characterized by high political release coupled with low centralization and presented a strong commercial network. Since the XVII century both Hungarian Slovakia and Czechia became part of the Habsburg Empire which vigorously curtailed the powers of the local estates, thereby imposing a long-standing period of absolutist rule\textsuperscript{37} (focus on Rokkan’s \textit{geopolitical dimension}). The asymmetries between the founding entities of the CSR primarily stemmed from the dissimilar political socialization experienced by Austrian Czechia and Hungarian Slovakia. The differences between the two halves of the Empire increased after the Compromise of 1867. The Slovaks suffered a significant organizational deficit in comparison with the more favorable conditions for political development in Czechia. Consequently, Moravia and Bohemia – like Galicia - achieved a moderate degree of political involvement and a modest form of self-government with the establishment of the Bohemian Diet (1861). After the constitutional compromise they benefited from the increasing extension of political rights “in fact, imperial interests favored containing German nationalism and one way to do this […] was to tolerate other forms of national expression”\textsuperscript{38}. In the words of John Coakley “although Czechs also fought for a re-structuring of the Habsburg monarchy along federal line, they already enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia”\textsuperscript{39} experiencing a progressive extension of political rights with the adoption of male universal suffrage in 1907. All in


\textsuperscript{36} Flora, \textit{State Formation}, 27.


all, on the eve of WWI, both Czechs and Slovaks experienced at least moderate levels of self-government. These levels were higher in Moravia and Bohemia, where the thresholds of legitimation and incorporation were lowered in the early 1900s. Slovakia encountered much more political limitations, as the Hungarian nationalist elites vigorously sustained the process of Magyarization of Slovak lands. Considering Rokkan’s arguments on the status of the “mother country”, the Hungarians – once they had regained their national dignity – opposed the consolidation of rival ethnic identities both in the electoral arena and institutional life.

Despite the counter-reformatory identity of the Habsburg Empire, the new state characterized substantially as a secularized Catholic country “where the autonomy from religion has given the state an upper hand, albeit that church interests exist with a potential for independent influence an the citizens”[41]. Unlike Polish and Lithuanian cases, the Czech liberal elites were able to temper more devout Catholic Slovaks and to selectively co-opt secularized Slovak personalities[42]. This actively limited the role of religious heritage in Czechoslovak democracy. Furthermore, the clergy was perceived to be aligned with alien authorities under the Catholic Habsburg rule, and it never experienced the level of legitimacy enjoyed by Polish and Lithuanian churches[43]. Hence Czechia resembles Galicja where the local Church largely cooperated with Austrian elites.

2. Failure or Success: What Made the Difference?

From their foundation, all the three countries faced internal and external challenges and struggled to preserve their existence (albeit with different levels of intensity). The independent life of the Polish and Lithuanian states began respectively in 1921 and 1922 with the adoption of a democratic constitution patterned after the Third French Republic. Both countries vested most of the authority in an extremely fragmented parliament (Polish Sejm and Lithuanian Seimas). The process of institutional reconstruction worked similarly in Czechoslovakia following the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Czechoslovakia adopted a French-styled constitution in 1920 and instated a bicameral National Assembly government, were Protestants, although Protestants constituted only 12% of Slovak population. See also Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 292-314; and Coakley, “Political succession,” 187-206.

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[40] After 1867 Slovakia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary. The local assemblies were dissolved and the Hungarian legislation came to supersede the Austrian codes.
[42] Half of Slovak representatives in the constituent National Assembly, chosen in an arbitrary way by the provisional
(Národní shromázdení) elected on the basis of the principle of proportional representation. In the early 1920s the process of institutional “Weimarization” appeared to be fully accomplished. The principle of proportional representation was generally thought to guarantee the highest degree of equality within fragmented political systems marked by significant ethnic heterogeneity and political polarization. According to Rokkan, the greater the ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity among the citizenry, the higher the pressures for PR.

In this respect, the early years of the Polish state were mainly devoted to an arduous work of national reconstruction along ethno-cultural lines rooted on the romantic idea of Polishness. Unification of the three formerly partitioned areas represented the greatest difficulty faced by the Polish elites. In addition, the PR system represented an excellent way to overcome the high level of ethnic fragmentation, given that one-third of the Polish population was composed of minorities. Yet it “contributed to the splitting up of political life and to the multiplication of political parties and groups” and strongly increased governmental instability. When it comes to external challenges, the Second Polish Republic was engaged in a number of conflicts with its neighbors as well as with its former “mother country” while it invaded the Vilnius region from 1920 to 1939 in an attempt to re-establish the Commonwealth. John Coakley defines this threat to Lithuanian independence as a failed endeavor to recreate a reactionary state modeled after the example of Polish-Lithuanian joint statehood aimed at “preserve[ing] as much as possible the old constitutional order”. Lithuania had to fight two wars against Russian Bolsheviks and bermontians (Freedom wars) in order to preserve its fragile independence.

As in Poland, almost one third of the population of the CSR was composed of national minorities. It is no

48 During its formative years the Polish state was involved in wars against Ukraine, Soviet Russia and Lithuania. To the southwest it encountered border conflicts with CSR and Germany over the free city of Danzig.
49 Coakley, “Political succession,” 191.
50 According to the census results of 1921, the population of the CSR amounted to 13 millions, with the two statotvorné amounted
surprise, then, “the number of parties competing for votes that oscillated between 16 and 29, of which 7 to 11 were parties of Czechs and Slovaks, while the rest were German and Hungarian.” In both Poland and Czechoslovakia a formerly dominant minority remained within the national borders. Sudeten Germans and Hungarians of Slovakia were incorporated, together with Czech and Slovak constituent peoples. The greatest challenge endeavored by the Czechoslovak elites concerned the functional homogenization of the two units distinct in ethno-cultural, socioeconomic and historical development: Czechs in industrially and economically developed Bohemia and Moravia subject to the Austrian half of the Empire, and Slovaks in the poorer Hungarian half. Unlike in Poland and Lithuania, formal constitutional safeguards were granted to ethnic minorities together with the full freedom to use their language.

Moreover, notwithstanding the centralized structure of the state, local governments benefited from a moderate autonomy, thereby tempering the vigor of ethno-based claims which conveyed through the inclusion of regionalist parties in the republican system, “in the interwar republic, statewide parties competed with regionally based parties.”

Similar to the Czechoslovak experience, in 1919 the Second Polish Republic was established by merging the three territorial units which were formerly partitioned among Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia (together with Lithuania). However, a complete homogenization of the three regions could not be attained. The early years of the Polish state were therefore characterized by a continuous clash between democratic leadership mainly from Wielkopolaska and Galicia and rights whatever be their race, their language, or their religion.’ Article 128 (2) continues: ‘Difference in religion, belief, confession, or language shall […] constitute no obstacle to any citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic particularly in regard of entry into the public services and offices […] or in regard to the exercise of any trade or calling.”

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51 Taborsky, “Czechoslovakia’s experience with P.R,” 50.
54 In the Constitution of the CSR, Section VI: Protection of National, Religious, and Racial Minorities, Art. 128 (1) it is stated: “All citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic shall be in all respects equal before the law and shall enjoy equal civic and political

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the authoritarian claims from elites of the East, trained under the Russian autocracy. Needless to say, the systematic exclusion of the national minorities coupled with “the differences between political cultures of the three empires [which] seem to have frozen into the civic make-up of the respective localities” greatly affected the fate of Polish democracy.

Between 1922 and 1926 increasing parliamentary instability and polarized political milieu troubled the immature institutions of both Poland and Lithuania. In addition, the confrontation between the industrialized West and the underdeveloped East undermined a uniform economic course. A number of governmental missteps weakened efforts towards the consolidation of democratic rule and paved the way to a series of military coups. In Poland Marshall Piłsudski’s Sanation Movement (Polish: Sanacja) established a fascist-populist regime in May 1926. Two months later in Lithuania an authoritarian regime led by Smetona came to power, thereby transferring a big slice of legislative power from the Seimas to the government-oriented State Council. The timing of the democratization process in the three cases followed the French model of political enfranchisement. It was carried out in less than 20 years and the four thresholds were lowered between 1907 and 1920. In particular, Poland and Lithuania moved from absolutist rule to universal suffrage for men and women in one single step respectively in 1917 and 1918. However, unlike most of CEE interwar cases, Czechoslovakia is a valid example of democratic survival since it “remained a functioning parliamentary democracy throughout the interwar period, thus offering a sustained period of party evolution for analysis”.

Why did it occur this way? The Polish-Lithuanian case resembles both Ireland and Finland which “attained independence only after the First World War, when it was hardly possible to maintain restrictions on universal suffrage any longer”. Furthermore, all four experienced a high degree of political violence characterized by parliamentary instability and a troubled political milieu. However – unlike Finland and Ireland – Polish and Lithuanian democracy gave the way to Piłsudski and Smetona’s regimes. The heritage of the long-lasting division and the silent Church opposition to the liberal regime may be identified as major explicative factors of the democratic breakdown. All in all, in the words of Rokkan “national unification via democratization appears to require a certain degree of cultural homogeneity to be successful”. Weak

60 Flora, State Formation, 26.
61 Ibid., 26.
homogenization and the alliance between authoritarian elites and the Church represented the greatest threats to democracy. To conclude, according to Coakley

the more or less forcible seizure of power by a regional counter-elite, bent on establishing a modern, liberal democratic national state, from the rulers of pre- or partly-democratic multinational empires. In each case the new elite was constrained not merely to secure the legitimacy of a new form of government but also to establish the territorial identity of its new state.

On the other hand, the Czechoslovak success seems to stem from a mix of factors which effectively counterbalanced endogenous and exogenous negative dynamics, thereby tempering religious and ethnic disruptive tendencies. Czechoslovak political inclusiveness resembles Belgian pillarization. In both countries the democratic regimes fruitfully integrated ethno-cultural cleavages and undertook a structural cooptation of major socio-political elites. In the words of Aarebrot and Berglund “successful completion of state building and clear autonomy from religious authority were not sufficient to make a state safe for democracy in the interwar period. The survival of democracy also requires that the elites of all or most relevant cleavages be integrated into governance or into a position of strong influence upon the government” through a set of inclusive actions. In line with this point, Linz and Stepan maintain that a democratic transition is complete when a broad agreement on the rules of the game emerges and “the new democracy does not have to share power with bodies de jure.” Accordingly, the placid tradition of secularized Catholicism, the appeasement of most of the relevant cleavages through constitutional safeguards for national minorities, and their selective cooptation may be identified as the major explicative factors of the survival of Czechoslovak democracy.

More specifically, when Slovakia was artificially merged with Moravia and Bohemia in 1918, it encountered the more politically mature Czech elite trained under more inclusive electoral politics granted by Austrian rulers. The establishment of the joint state characterizes as a Czech-led operation facilitated by the Slovak fear of Hungarian revanchism that determined “an alliance of the Czech workers and bourgeoisie against the prospect of pan-German domination and an independent state embracing also the Slovaks of

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62 Coakley, “Political succession,” 203.
63 Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 220.
Hungary seemed the most viable alternative. Bohemia and Moravia provided most of Czechoslovak administrative, economic and political elites. On the other hand, loyal Slovak personalities (such as, Presidents Tomáš Masaryk, Edvard Beneš, and other “Slovaks of Prague”) were selectively co-opted. Given the high level of party fragmentation of the political system, informal cooperative tools were adopted to preserve the democratic institutions and the effectiveness of governmental authority. The Pětka (The group of five) was largely responsible for the political stability of the country. This behind-the-scenes consociative forum composed of the leaders of the five major parties constituted the informal backbone of the government and greatly contributed to the success of democracy in interwar Czechoslovakia. The most relevant asset stemmed from the strict control exerted by the group over the access to power, thereby conditioning political co-optation of junior partners to the acceptance of the new constitutional order. After 1926, German parties that organized along class lines consonant with the Czechoslovak spectrum “won inclusion in governing coalitions, thus acquiring leverage in the allocation of state budgetary resources”. By contrast, Hungarian parties influenced by irredentist propaganda from Hungary, never joined the Czechoslovak government but were not overtly hostile.

CONCLUSIONS

This article attempted an overview of democratic processes originated in the aftermath of WWI in Central and Eastern Europe, through an extended Rokkanian theoretical pattern and a functional adaptation of ETCP analysis with particular emphasis on lowering of the four thresholds. Once I presented Rokkan’s model of democratic development and the characteristics of democratization process in interwar CEE, I focused on three major catholic cases - Poland, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia – which I selected according to Rokkan’s original prescriptions. I investigated the fate of democracy in these countries, trying to highlight the determinants of far different democratic performances, given apparently similar historical traditions. I was looking for an answer to the following question: Why in Poland and Lithuania did the newly-established institutions collapse, while in Czechoslovakia they did not? Actually, they adopted different solutions for common problems. Despite a number of commonalities in the timing of the state-formation process and a comparable degree of

66 Coakley, “Political succession,” 191.
67 The Pětka included the leaders of the Social Democrats, National Socialists, National Democrats, Agrarians and Catholics.
ethno-cultural, religious, and political heterogeneity, five major factors emerged as essential for explaining survival of democracy or its failure (See Appendix 2). These may be typified as follows: The democratic attempts characterized by 1) long-standing tradition of absolutist-autocratic rule, 2) social and political exclusion of important portions of the polity representing major political, ethnic, and religious cleavages, 3) adversarial style of government, 4) strong Counter-reformatory legacy, 5) secession from external empires, appear to have very few chances to survive.

Like Poland and Lithuania, Czechoslovakia had a history of foreign domination and long-standing national divisions, but Czech liberal elites together with the “Slovaks of Prague” were successful in integrating the major societal cleavages through inclusive actions. The selective cooptation of the minorities and a cooperative national clergy did the rest. This leads to the following conclusion:

As I stressed from the beginning of this analysis, a number of current problems in several CEE countries date back to century-long dynamics inherited from the past. In this respect, most of the points summarized above still play a role in the full consolidation of liberal-democracy in post-Communist Europe. Notwithstanding the efforts undertaken throughout the last two decades by the national elites and the influence exerted – among others - by the attractive goal of the EU membership, a number of open matters knock on the doors of CEE democracies. The period of Communist rule from the end of WWII to the early 1990s profoundly weakened (and structurally modified) the structure of societal organization in the area. The civil and political life faced drastic transformations along functional lines which, on the one hand, froze many of the peculiar characteristics of the interwar statehoods, and on the other hand, jeopardized the formation of an embryonic civil society and frustrated national aspirations. The democratic revival in the early 1990s appears to be structurally influenced by both these factors. Among others, this implied the rise of widespread nationalistic sentiments, revanchist purposes towards the former dominant country, strong ethno-religious extremism coupled with populistic claims that evoke a somewhat romantic nostalgia of the past. New regimes had to face (and to

70 Frank Aarebrot and Sten Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation”, 1.

71 David J. Smith, “Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A
a certain extent are still facing) a number of problems correlated with their past history.

This study, far from being exhaustive and all-encompassing, represents only a preliminary attempt to analyze the fate of interwar democracy in CEE states within an original analytical framework. There is room for future, broader contributions that include a larger number of CEE countries.

**Bibliography**


### Appendix 1 - Dependent and independent variables in the study of democratization process

<table>
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<th>Thresholds (independent variables)</th>
<th>Related questions (timing)</th>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimation</strong></td>
<td>From which point in the history of state was there effective recognition of the right of petition, criticism, and demonstration against the regime? From which decade was there regular protection of civil rights, and within what limits?</td>
<td>Continuity of representative traditions (P)</td>
<td>1. The stronger the tradition of representative rule, the greater the chances of early legitimation of opposition and the slower and more continuous the process of enfranchisement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incorporation</strong></td>
<td>How long did it take before the potential supporters of rising movements of opposition were given formal rights of participation in the choice of representatives?</td>
<td>Timing of state formation, religious heritage &amp; Status of the “mother country” (T)</td>
<td>2. The longer the history of continuous centre-building, the slower and more continuous the process of enfranchisement. 3. The higher the status of the dominant country, the higher the barrier to legitimation in the dependent territory and the more sudden the process of enfranchisement. 4. The stronger the Counter reformatory legacy, the slower the process of democratization and mass mobilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td>How high were the original barriers against the representation of new movements and when and in what</td>
<td>Cultural heterogeneity (C)</td>
<td>5. The greater the ethnic and/or religious heterogeneity of the citizenry, the higher the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive power</td>
<td>ways were the barriers lowered?</td>
<td>pressures for proportional representation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How immune were the executive organs against legislative pressures and how long did it take before parliamentary strength could be translated into direct influence on executive decision-making?</td>
<td>Party systems (P) &amp; geopolitical position (T)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The likelihood of minority participation in the executive increases with the distance of largest party of majority point and the pressures from the international environment.

### Explicative factors

<table>
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<th>Polish Dimension</th>
<th>Cultural Dimension</th>
<th>Territorial Dimension</th>
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<td>Cultural, ethnic, religious heterogeneity</td>
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<td><strong>Czechoslovakia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Higher</strong></td>
<td><strong>Higher</strong></td>
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Explicative factor = similarity  Explicative factor = difference
OFFENSIVE REALISM AND CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Dylan Kissane
PhD Candidate, School of International Studies, University of South Australia
dylan.kissane@unisa.edu.au

Abstract

At the end of the Cold War, John Mearsheimer published the article, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”. The widely-cited piece included four predictions for the post-Cold War European geopolitical landscape founded on the theory of offensive realism, the realpolitik approach that Mearsheimer had established and developed over more than a decade of scholarship. However, the emergence of a post-Cold War and pan-continental peace suggests that something was wrong with Mearsheimer’s predictions and, by implication, the theory that informed them. This article argues that Mearsheimer’s mistake was to rely on a theory that assumed the international system is anarchic. Instead, if the international system is assumed to be chaotic then it is possible to not only offer clear explanations as to why Mearsheimer’s predictions were wrong but also to offer a justification for the order that did indeed emerge.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union came as a surprise to many international relations theorists. Realists – secure in their models of a stable, peaceful and bipolar Europe – were especially astonished by the fall of, first, the Berlin Wall and, second, the superpower that constructed it. One need only look at the academic press in the weeks and months prior to the Cold War’s end to recognize that few realists thought the end of the half-century long conflict was nigh. Major journals published dozens of articles on Soviet doctrine and nuclear balancing, yet barely a handful of these articles dared to question that the established European order may by more fallible and have less traction than common realist notions would admit. When the Wall came down and the collapse of an empire in Central and Eastern Europe
began, however, realists were among the first to make attempts to describe and then predict the new realities of post-Cold War Europe. Their predictions – rooted in a tradition that to a large extent did and does define the discipline of international relations – would turn out to be far from perfect.

This article provides an examination of these realist arguments and a review of the predictions made by offensive realists at the dawn of the post-Cold War era. Using John Mearsheimer’s classic offensive realist treatment, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, as a framework but also drawing on other realist sources, this article will outline the four potential scenarios predicted by Mearsheimer for Europe in the post-Cold War period. After demonstrating the extent to which all four of these scenarios were, in a relatively short time, shown to be wrong, this article will consider five reasons the wider literature suggests can explain why the realists may have erred. Finding each of the five explanations for predicative failure unconvincing, this article then posits an original sixth: the foundational belief by realists in an anarchical international system and the implications drawn from this base assumption. After demonstrating how this assumption of anarchy might have been responsible for realist errors at the end of the Cold War, this article suggests an alternative conception of the nature of the international system – chaos – that may well have led to better predictions as the long East-West struggle of the 20th century drew to an end. Concluding the argument, this article argues that offensive realism, realism and international relations theory in general would benefit from a reassessment of its core belief in a foundation of anarchy and be open to alternate and potentially very promising systemic conceptions.

Imaging Europe’s post-Cold War Order: A Realist Assessment

While the end of the Cold War prompted many predictions of the future for Europe – and post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe in particular – few could match the influence or provocative prescriptions for policy embodied in John Mearsheimer’s 1990 effort, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’. Mearsheimer’s article not only neatly summarized the prevailing realist opinion on the presumed future of Europe but spawned a number of follow up articles both agreeing and disagreeing with his rather pessimistic conclusions for the peoples of the continent. Written just months after the

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fall of the Berlin Wall and published only months before the Belavezha Accords effectively dissolved the Soviet Union, Mearsheimer’s article was a look towards a post-Cold War future after decades of confrontation. This was not Mearsheimer’s first foray into predicting the post-Cold War world: his ‘Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War’ had appeared in The Atlantic Monthly just prior to the release of the International Security piece. This was, though, a far more considered and Europe-centric assessment of the emerging international order and one that drew together the existing literature and worked from his realist roots to forecast possible futures for the former Cold War battleground of Central and Eastern Europe.

‘Back to the Future’ is an article in three main parts. The first is a review of what Mearsheimer calls “the long peace” in Europe following the conclusion of World War Two. In this part Mearsheimer outlines the reasons behind this long peace, all of them related to precepts of realism such as the balance of power, stable bipolarity and nuclear deterrence. The second part of Mearsheimer’s article considers four possible scenarios for a post-Cold War Europe. In turn, Mearsheimer outlines and assesses a Europe without nuclear weapons, a Europe with nuclear weapons states “on the flanks”, a poorly managed nuclear proliferation regime in Europe and, finally, a well-managed nuclear proliferation regime across the continent. Mearsheimer concludes that the first two scenarios are highly unlikely and, of the latter two, the fourth is much preferred. Finally, in the third section of his article Mearsheimer assesses the counter arguments made by those primarily of a liberal-institutionalist perspective who regarded the end of the Cold War optimistically. Specifically, Mearsheimer rejects three key arguments of the post-Cold War optimists and concludes, pessimistically, that “the stability of the past 45 years is not likely to be seen again in the coming decades”. Yet for all of his gloom, his first future scenario is remarkably hopeful.

Scenario One: A Nuclear Free Europe

Mearsheimer notes that there are some within the foreign policy elites of Europe and North America who would seek to make Europe a nuclear weapons-free zone. Such an outcome would necessarily demand not only a halt to further proliferation but also that

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the existing European nuclear powers – Britain, France and the Soviet Union – denounce and destroy their existing nuclear capacity. Mearsheimer argues that this will potentially lead to problems for the states of Europe as the “pacifying effects of nuclear weapons” – the security, caution and rough equality they impose – would be lost. Such a scenario would leave Europe in much the same way it was between the World Wars: multipolar, subject to shifting alliances and prone to violence. For Central and Eastern Europe this scenario is even grimmer, with Mearsheimer noting that a rising Germany would look jealously to the states which buffer it from the still-strong Soviet Union to its east. Nor would the Soviets do more than withdraw from Eastern Europe temporarily, he argues, as “the historical record provides abundant instances of Russian or Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe” which ebbs and surges over time. A nuclear free Europe would be more dangerous for all but particularly the post-socialist states of Eastern Europe which would once again find themselves positioned between two continental powers. Of the four scenarios he offers, Mearsheimer holds the least hope for this particular eventuality.

Scenario Two: The Cold War Nuclear Balance Continues

More plausible – but only just – for Mearsheimer is a second scenario wherein:

Britain, France and the Soviet Union keep their nuclear weapons, but no new nuclear powers emerge in Europe. This scenario sees a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, but leaves nuclear weapons on Europe’s flanks. While more likely than pan-European strategic disarmament, Mearsheimer discounts this scenario for the reason that it does not address the incentives for non-nuclear powers to establish arsenals of their own. In particular, he notes that a reunited Germany would likely be eager to develop a nuclear weapons capacity, hardly able to rely on a relatively weaker Poland or Czechoslovakia to protect it from an advancing Soviet force. Furthermore, even those smaller states in Eastern Europe would see good reason to develop their own nuclear arsenals, being unable to match the conventional forces of a reunited Germany or the bordering Soviet state. Thus, Mearsheimer argues, without the enforced stability that nuclear arms provide, Central and Eastern Europe would be a region “made safe for conventional war” – an outcome that

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, 32-33.
11 Ibid, 33.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, 35.
14 Ibid, 36.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
would lead to acute uncertainty, potential miscalculation the rise of dangerously nationalistic forces among the smaller Eastern European states. More likely than scenario one, Mearsheimer eventually dismisses this second scenario as realistically improbable bringing him to the ‘futures of proliferation’ in scenarios three and four.

Scenario Three: Poorly Managed Nuclear Proliferation

Mismanaged proliferation is one of two “most likely” scenarios for the continent post-Cold War. Assuming proliferation will occur (largely for the reasons discussed in the scenario two) a mismanaged process will involve four main dangers for Europe. First, this scenario would offer incentives for the existing nuclear powers to act with force to prevent other states from acquiring the armaments they desire. Second, it is likely the smaller Eastern European states pursuing such weapons would lack the economic resources to ensure survivability, that is, a second strike capability. Such a strategic environment would – in contrast to the Cold War – encourage a potentially devastating first strike policy to emerge in the former Soviet sphere of influence. Third, Mearsheimer assumes the doctrines of existing nuclear powers regarding the use (or non-use) of nuclear weapons may not easily emerge in Eastern Europe in an atmosphere of mismanaged nuclear proliferation. Indeed, he fears that “there will probably be voices in post-Cold War Europe arguing that limited nuclear war is feasible”. Fourth and finally, this scenario would seem to necessarily imply an increase in the “numbers of fingers on the nuclear trigger” which, according to Mearsheimer, increases the opportunity for accidental launch, accidental war and – one imagines – an accidental nuclear nightmare. In the eyes of Mearsheimer, then, although the proliferation of nuclear weapons seems likely, a mismanaged process of proliferation is the first step towards a more dangerous and unstable European state system.

Scenario Four: Well Managed Nuclear Proliferation

Mearsheimer’s fourth scenario can be considered the ‘brighter side’ of nuclear proliferation: a limited, well-managed horizontal proliferation of arms with the aim of securing Central Europe from the dangers of rampant arms races and pan-European proliferation. Mearsheimer suggests this scenario would see arms extended to a reunited Germany but no further. He argues:

17 Ibid, 35-36.
18 Ibid, 37.
19 Ibid. The historical parallel provided is Israel acting with force against Iraq to prevent that state from establishing a nuclear capacity.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, 38.
22 Ibid.
Germany will feel insecure without nuclear weapons; and Germany’s great conventional strength gives it significant capacity to disturb Europe if it feels insecure. Other states – especially in Eastern Europe – may also want nuclear weapons, but it would be best to prevent further proliferation.23

In this scenario of limited nuclear proliferation dangers would still exist. However, in comparison to the mismanaged proliferation of the previous scenario, the dangers would be much reduced. Adding only Germany to the list of nuclear states in Europe would be a necessary decision to balance the perceived threat by Western and Soviet powers in Central Europe. It would, though, require the existing nuclear states to undermine their own Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to actively support another state party to the treaty to violate its core principles.24 Even an externally-focused realist such as Mearsheimer sees the likelihood of domestic opposition to such a move by France, Britain or the Soviet Union, hence allowing him to conclude that while this is the best possible scenario for post-Cold War Europe, it is not one that can be completely controlled by the nuclear states.

In his four scenarios, then, Mearsheimer provides a realist’s take on four potential futures for post-Cold War Europe. Including the unlikely nuclear free zone and the idealistic well-managed proliferation regime alongside a status-quo and proliferation free-for-all allows Mearsheimer to cover the spectrum from the diplomatic triumph (scenario one) to the brink of a third major pan-continental war in a century (scenario three). Yet for all of what Mearsheimer admits may be considered “pessimistic analysis” by students of European politics, his predictions and scenarios were soon to be found displaced from the reality that emerged. Departing Mearsheimer’s predicative realm, an examination of what did happen demonstrates how wrong all four of Mearsheimer’s scenarios proved to be.

**The Post-Cold War Reality in Europe**

For all the near-apocalyptic scenarios that emerged in everything from Tom Clancy novels to scientific studies of ‘nuclear winter’, the Cold War ended relatively peacefully. As historian Richard Hellie notes, the final days of the Cold War and of the Soviet Union mirrored those of the Russian Empire itself in 1917: both “collapsed almost without a whimper”.25 In November 1989 as the Berlin Wall fell and Eastern European states lobbied for free and competitive elections, the Soviet Union

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23 Ibid. Mearsheimer supports this conclusion regarding the Eastern European states for the same reasons he outlines in scenario three.
24 Ibid, 40.
began a process of withdrawing from its former satellite states. 1990 saw Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declare independence from the Soviet Union. Almost a year later Germany was reunited and just months after Belarus, Ukraine and Russia signed the Belavezha Accords, effectively consigning the Soviet Union to history. Months of debate, media speculation and public discontent eventually led to a coup attempt in Moscow and the Christmas Day 1991 resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Union. The hammer and sickle banner of a twentieth century superpower would fly for the last time over the Kremlin on New Years Eve 1991. The Cold War had ended and, in doing so, provoked “the most important historical divide in half a century”. It did not, however, provoke a nuclear-free Europe, a dangerous and unstable status quo or proliferation, well managed or otherwise.

Indeed, as the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall approaches, the transition from the Cold War’s bipolar ‘balance of terror’ to entrenched, peaceful, pan-continental institutionalism has been remarkable. With the very notable exceptions of post-Cold War Yugoslav and Kosovo conflicts, the transition from a divided, Cold War Europe to a largely integrated twenty-seven state European Union has been a peaceful one. There were no nuclear exchanges and, indeed, states such as Belarus and the Ukraine were happy to relieve themselves of the nuclear arsenals the Cold War had forced upon them. Germany neither desired nor sought a nuclear weapons capacity and – less than a decade after the end of the Cold War – passed the Nuclear Exit Law to retire even its civilian nuclear power stations. In terms of nuclear proliferation, the post-Cold War strategic environment in Europe has been distinguished not by its instability and inherent dangers, as Mearsheimer imagined, but by a stability, economic growth and peace that characterises the European Union today. To be blunt, when it came to the post-Cold War reality of Central, Eastern and Western Europe, realists like John Mearsheimer got it almost completely wrong. One must wonder, then, why these experienced analysts and distinguished scholars concluded so poorly.

Five Reasons Why Mearsheimer Got It Wrong

John Mearsheimer never discounts the possibility that predicting the future of social and political systems is fraught with danger. Indeed, he acknowledges such in the opening pages of his article:

...political phenomena are highly complex; hence precise political predictions are impossible without very powerful theoretical tools, superior to those we now possess. As a result, all political

Further, Mearsheimer is keen to reproduce the existing counter-arguments to his four scenarios, listing three – Europe ‘learning from history’ to avoid war, economic integration making conflict virtually impossible and the thesis of ‘democratic peace’ – as “alternative theories that predict peace” in post-Cold War Europe.28 With hindsight we can add two others: a focus overly concentrated on nuclear weapons and a notion that the Soviet Union would not collapse in the wake of the significant changes in European politics post-1991. In these five counter-arguments we find potential explanation for the failure of Mearsheimer’s four scenarios to emerge, yet, as will become clear, we do not find that any of them can completely explain why the post-Cold War continent did not more closely resemble Mearsheimer’s precarious predictions.

In considering the first counter argument considered by Mearsheimer, it is possible to reflect on the words of Georg Hegel: what experience and history teach is this – that nations and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it. The realist, though, rightly rejects this thesis on the basis of evidence alone, Mearsheimer arguing that:

[t]here is no systematic evidence demonstrating that Europeans believe war is obsolete. However, even if it were widely believed in Europe that war is no longer thinkable, attitudes could change…Moreover, only one country need decide war is thinkable to make war possible again.29

Thus, like Hegel, Mearsheimer argues that not only is there no evidence Europeans have learnt the costs of war from history but – even if they have – it takes only one state “responsive to elite manipulation and world events” to turn the continent from a post-Cold War utopia back towards the brutal reality of the first half of the twentieth century.30 The parallels between this ‘learning from history’ notion and the prevailing attitude after the “Great War” of 1914-1918 are clear. Mearsheimer’s realist antecedent EH Carr in his canonical The Twenty Years Crisis wrote of the presumed historical education and Europe’s “common interest in peace” in the wake of World War I but, significantly, noted that such arguments “did not seem particularly convincing” to all, especially the Germans for whom the wars of 1866 and 1870 had proved greatly profitable.31 Simply put, the history of Europe pre- and post-Cold

28 Ibid, 40.
29 Ibid, 41.
30 Ibid.
War does not suggest that any learning had taken place and Mearsheimer was quite right to reject the notion as any realist, here we can also include Kenneth Waltz, would do.32

The argument that economic integration will lead to a peaceful post-Cold War Europe is also questioned by Mearsheimer – and with good cause. This objection is founded on a theory that “rejects the notion that the prospects for peace are tightly linked to calculations of military power” and instead posits that “stability is mainly a function of international economic considerations”.33 Considering the pre-World War I European order where, as James Lothian recalls, “the securities and foreign exchange markets…were among the most integrated that the world has seen”, it is easy to see why Mearsheimer and other realists might not be convinced.34 Despite the European world enjoying, for example, “a degree of internationalization…without precedent”, a devastating conflict which would become known as the War to End All Wars broke out in 1914.35

Mearsheimer suggests that this economic liberalist logic fails now as then for two primary reasons: first, it overestimates the ease of cooperation between states in an anarchic system where competition for security is rife; second, it fails to consider that interdependence is likely to lead to conflict because of the vulnerability interdependence engenders.36 Whether pre-Great War or post-Cold War, Mearsheimer argues that economic liberalism and association economic integration and interdependence did not and will not save Europe from war.

Mearsheimer’s third potential counter-argument can be described simply as the democratic peace thesis.37 This counter-argument holds that democracies are not less likely to go to war; however they do not go to war with other democracies. Thus, if all states in Europe are democratic, war between them will be a thing of history. It is history, though, that presents the biggest stumbling block for this thesis. As fellow realist Kenneth Waltz notes, despite being held as an absolute rule in international relations by some, it fails the test of history when specific cases including US interventions in the Dominican Republic, Chile and even “democratic England and France” fighting “democratic Germany” in 1914 are considered.38 Mearsheimer himself refers four clear problems with the

33 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 42.
37 Ibid, 48-51.
democratic peace thesis: first, with such a small number of democracies from which to extrapolate a theory, it is hard to find a time when democracies were actually in a position to fight each other even if they had wanted to; second, where democracies have been close to conflict there exist adequate reasons for the failure to fight that need no reference to the governance model of the states involved; third, Mearsheimer contends that where existing realist explanations do not completely explain the failure to fight, it may be down to chance alone that rival democracies did not engage each other militarily (as with Britain and France in Fashoda); fourth and finally, the thesis would seem to fail alone if Wilhelmine Germany – considered a democracy by some – is included among the democratic regimes, in which case, World War I is a stark reminder that democratic states are willing to turn to violence and war.39

To Mearsheimer’s three potential counter-arguments, this article takes advantage of all the benefits of hindsight to add a further two. First, it is clear from the four scenarios Mearsheimer presents that there is much focus on the role of nuclear weapons and their assumed capacity as the key strategic drivers on the continent post-Cold War. This seems to have been rather overestimated by Mearsheimer and critical elements of his analysis – including the continued references to a reunited Germany’s desire for nuclear arms – today seems misplaced. Indeed, considering the strict anti-nuclear laws that the German state endorses today, it is difficult to reconcile the certainty of Mearsheimer’s pronouncements on Central Europe’s great power and the move to a post-nuclear future underfoot in Germany today. Mearsheimer’s focus on nuclear arms is understandable, particularly after nearly half a century of nuclear standoff between the superpowers, where Central and Eastern Europe would have been nuclear battlegrounds. Yet at the same time this focus on nuclear strategy may have resulted in the author underestimating the influence of sub-strategic factors, including popular opinion in the post-socialist regions of the continent.

Finally, the Mearsheimer of 1991 betrays the almost paradigm-wide belief in the continued existence of the Soviet Union as a state power, if no longer a superpower with a significant Eastern European sphere of influence. Though realists had come to accept the withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe by the USSR as logical and even offered explanations for such with regards to the economic and political overreach of the Soviet regime, to argue that the Soviet Union would cease to exist in the months following the publication of Mearsheimer’s article

was far from a common realist position. Pronouncements like that of former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev who once promised the West, “whether you like it or not, history is on our side...we will live to bury you in your grave!” today exists only as the prototypical empty threat: strong words from a country that would prove to be relatively weak. The inability of realists like Mearsheimer to imagine a world where the Soviet Union no longer existed may help to explain why the scenarios that he and others put forward in 1991 and 1992 were to fail so spectacularly.

Yet a focus on the potential endurance of the Soviet state – even coupled with the other four factors – cannot really account for the magnitude of Mearsheimer’s predicative misstep. It is possible, though, to seek what underlies both Mearsheimer’s predictions and also each of the counter arguments he, others and, indeed, this article offer. In international relations terms it is a foundational assumption of realists and liberalists, a concept neatly summarised in a single word but with overwhelming implications for the assessment of states and actors in the European and wider international system: anarchy. A staple ordering principle for realists like Mearsheimer, an anarchical system underlies prototypical realist scholarship stretching from the ancient historian Thucydides through to Mearsheimer and Waltz writing in the period after the decades-long conflict. The following section will identify the strength of this notion in the realist literature – first within the classical tradition and, second, within Waltz’s structural or neorealism – before moving to a consideration of anarchy’s place in Mearsheimer’s four futures of post-Cold War Europe. This section will then suggest why the assumption of anarchy will necessarily lead to questionable conclusions should it not, in reality, be the nature of the international system and, in closing the section, an alternative conception of the ordering principle of the international system will be offered which, for this article, better accounts for the post-Cold War reality on the continent and – by implication – elsewhere in the international system.

Mearsheimer’s Wrong Turn: The Place and Nature of Anarchy in Offensive Realism and in Back to the Future

Before turning to the specifics of Mearsheimer’s predictions in Back to the Future, it is useful to first investigate the place, role and nature of anarchy in the wider paradigm of realism. Robert Powell offers a concise explanation for the term in a 1994 article where he states:

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40 Even Stanley Hoffman, who was very critical of Mearsheimer’s conclusions in the article, could only imagine a different role for the Soviet’s than a world without the Soviet Union altogether. See Hoffman, Keohane and Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future, Part II,” 191-192.

No agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviation. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.42

Anarchy in classical realism is not to be associated with principles of domestic political organization espoused by persons like Noam Chomsky or Howard Zinn; rather it a description of the international political environment which is held to be constant and – dependent on the realist – has a varying effect on the conduct of international actors. The historian Thucydides, for example, outlines the inherent threat that any state in an anarchic system presents to every other state by virtue of its existence.43 In time this recognition of the intrinsic threat offered by all states to all others would come to be a central feature of realist-described anarchy, particularly for the so-called offensive realists.44 Other classical realists would support the conclusions of Thucydides, among them the political philosophers Nicolas Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, diplomat cum scholar Edward Hallett Carr and classical realism’s most eloquent author, Hans Morgenthau – particularly in his canonical work Politics among Nations.45 All would speak to the nature of the international political environment as anarchical and,

44 Jeffrey Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no.3 (2001): 128. See also John Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations – Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I),” International Relations 20, no.1 (2006): 120: “The reason for this tragic situation is that states cannot discern the intentions of other states with a high degree of confidence. Moreover, it is almost impossible to know the future intentions of other states. Therefore, leaders have little choice but to assume worst case about other great powers’ intentions. The reason for believing the worst is that there is no higher authority that states can turn to if they guess wrong about another state’s intentions. States operate in an anarchic system, which means that they have nobody to turn to if they assume that another state has benign intentions, but that judgment proves wrong. As I said in my book, if you dial 911 in the international system, there is nobody at the other end.”
relying on this conclusion, compose theories and policy recommendations for the actions of city-states, kings and – later – states and superpowers alike.46 The commitment to anarchy across the work of classical realist scholars is absolute and in time their collected works would go on to inspire the emergence of the neorealist thesis so different in form to the classical position but with an even stronger embrace of anarchy as a founding principle.

Emerging from classical realism in the second half of the twentieth-century and largely from the work of Kenneth Waltz was structural or neoliberalism.47 Like his classical realist forebears, Waltz highlighted anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system but his emphasis was both stronger and more direct. Neoliberalism systematized anarchy, making it not only an assumption but a starting point for theorizing a system scientifically.48 From this foundational point Waltz and others were able to establish why states will attempt to balance the power in the system among themselves, why the British strategy of balancing against continental powers was more successful than Italian bandwagoning and why nuclear weapons brought a long-term peace to a system that had for centuries been one of conflict between the major state powers.49 Neorealists point to the inherent weakness of international institutions in the midst of an anarchic realm. Drawing their limited powers to arbitrate disputes from the willingness of state actors to cede minimal sovereignty to them, such institutions rely on the good will of naturally competitive and relative-gains attuned actors. This is why, in the eyes of many neorealists, international institutions remain the pipe dream of liberal institutionalists who fail to truly recognize the impact anarchic order has on states.

Mearsheimer’s article, of course, was written well after Thucydides’ Athenian histories and well after Waltz’s neoliberalism had been clearly outlined in the 1979 classic, Theory of International Politics. As a realist, his commitment to an anarchic system is fundamental to his interpretative and predicative efforts, as can be evidenced through not only his four future scenarios but also his rejection of arguments countering his conclusions. Consider, for example, his rejection of

46 Though the subjects of international affairs have changed with the evolution of world politics, for realists the nature of the international system remains the same.
47 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
48 Indeed, the funding which enabled Waltz’s Theory of International Politics was from the National Science Foundation which recognized that scientific approach that Waltz was attempting to graft to the analysis of international politics.
the democratic peace thesis which might predict a future free from conflict in Europe. Mearsheimer’s argument at its most basic is that the internal political organization of a state has no significant effect on the behavior of that state in international politics. Thus, it matters little whether one speaks of pre-World War II Germany or post-Cold War Germany, the essential goals and conditions facing German foreign policymakers remain – like its geography, relative size and relative access to human resources – unchanged under anarchy. No matter that the manner of government has moved from dictatorship through decades of division and then on to democracy, the underlying reality of the German state in anarchy remains the same: to the East and West are threats to Germany that no political system can overcome through the goodwill of voters in that or other states alone. The assumption of anarchy as the systems organizing principle exists also in his rejection of economic interdependence as the harbinger of peace. He also turns to history as proof positive that the anarchy existing in nineteenth century Europe led to instability and conflict and did not dissipate with time. Indeed, even the counter arguments he presents are founded on that same anarchical assumption, economic liberalism and interdependence, for example, being presented as a way to overcome international anarchy. Like these counter arguments and like Morgenthau and Waltz before him, Mearsheimer had embraced anarchy as the base reality in international relations and – upon this base – had constructed a future that would surely see war return to the great powers of Europe.

Yet what if the system is not anarchic? That is, what if the ordering principle – and the foundational principle of the paradigm of realism – is not what realists and others assume it to be? Could this not be the reason, as opposed to the liberal institutionalist counter arguments outlined above, that the realist predictions for post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe such as Mearsheimer’s proved so wrong? As the axiomatic principle professed jointly by classical and structural realists alike, if it is proved to be incorrect then it follows that there exists a significant possibility that predictions based on such an axiom are also wrong. In analogical terms, if one states that in mathematics $2 + 2 = 2 \times 2$ are both equal to four and, therefore, $2x = x^2$ in every situation will surely make errors as integers other then 2 are tested. An error in calculation does not necessarily imply an error in a foundational axiom; however, where there is an error in a foundational axiom errors in predictions based upon this axiom are sure to emerge. In the case of

50 See discussion of states as “like units” in Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 93-97.

51 Mearsheimer, “Conversation,” 121: “In brief, the two key factors that underpin the tragic nature of international politics are anarchy and uncertainty about the intentions of other states” (emphasis added).
the pessimistic predictions of realists for post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe, this is exactly what this article holds to have occurred. An error as basic as the arithmetic allegory offered herein is to blame for Mearsheimer’s errors, the error being, specifically, presenting the international system as anarchic.

The international system, though, must be able to be described in some way. That is to say, the nature of the system – as opposed to its polarity, alliances between states or balance of power – must be described in some way. Building on previous work by the author of this article, as well as emerging scholarship in international relations meta-theory, the alternate ordering principle is suggested here to be a complexly interdependent chaotic system. The following section will first describe such a system in relation to international affairs, outline the significant elements of such a system and contrast them to the assumptions of anarchy before suggesting how such an assumption could have helped in predicting the post-Cold War continent. Finally, it will suggest that this alternate conception of the international system shows particular promise for theorizing international relations. In short, this section will announce and outline not only the potential utility of the assumption of a complexly interdependent international system but suggest that this is indeed the direction international relations theory should be and is taking.

A Complexly Interdependent and Chaotic System

Despite the emergence of chaos in the scientific literature only in the latter half of the twentieth century it has, in some senses, been recognized by humanity for far longer than this. James Gleick, citing George Herbert and Norman Wiener, recalls the quotation:

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;  
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost;  
For want of a horse, the rider was lost;  
For want of a rider, the battle was lost;  
For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost!52

As the author of the verse recognizes, small events can have a large impact on affairs of much greater importance. This speaks to one of the core distinctions between an anarchic and a chaotic system: whereas the anarchic system compels realists to identify the largest and most powerful elements (states and great powers) and consider the role they play in shaping the world, a chaotic system demands that the smaller and seemingly insignificant elements of the system are assessed for the potential impact they may have on the wider systemic environment.53

Thus, analysis of a chaotic system that relies only on significant realist elements (states, nuclear weapons and grand strategy) will fail to comprehend the complexity that permits even small events to have a significant, system-wide impact.\textsuperscript{54}

Such small events have been suggested to have had wider impacts in my 2006 article, ‘The Balkan Bullet with Butterfly Wings’.\textsuperscript{55} This article suggested that by reconsidering the events leading up to the outbreak of World War I as taking place in a chaotic, rather than anarchic, system, alternate explanations for the outbreak of war in Europe emerge, explanations previously ignored in the realist and wider disciplinary literature.\textsuperscript{56} Where the standard realist analysis of the events surrounding the outbreak of war in the Balkans focused almost entirely on the actions of states and their entangling alliances, I offered an individual and unit level assessment of the pre-war environment which takes into account significant enabling factors including Serbian nationalism and imperial politics under the Austro-Hungarian regime to explain the origins of World War One. My conclusions – which are impossible to reach with the assumption of an anarchic international political system and the associated assessment of major powers that such an assumption implies – indicated the potential utility of examining international politics through a chaotic prism.

As in that article, the important elements of a chaotic system spawning such explanations are described as relating to three key points: first, the complex and time-sensitive dependence of the system; second, the aforementioned potential importance of minor permutations on the wider system; and third, the impossibility of long term prediction.\textsuperscript{57} The first point suggests that chaotic systems are fundamentally sensitive to when events occur and that even a seemingly unimportant delay in action by an actor in the system – a period that might be measured in days, hours or even minutes – can have significant effect on the shape and nature of the system in the period that follows. The second point is key to understanding chaotic systems and, in doing so, rejecting the notion that big events (for example wars, alliances and treaties) are caused by big actors and big actions. It is here that the analogy of the butterfly whose short flight can be responsible for causing a hurricane on the other side of the world – the so-called “butterfly effect” – emerges. With regards to the international political system, the “butterfly” might be a local warlord in Afghanistan, a banking executive in Singapore or any one of the other billions of people whose actions and interactions combine


\textsuperscript{55} Kissane. “Balkan Bullet”.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, 98-99.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 94.
to form humanity’s system. Finally, understanding that long term prediction is impossible under chaos – the third point listed above – suggests that predictions like Mearsheimer’s should not be made at all. Indeed, while it is common for theorists to make predictions about the future of state relations under international anarchy, theorists working from a chaotic perspective have to accept that predictions of the long term shape of international politics are little better than the weather forecaster who proclaims that tomorrow will be warm because yesterday and today were warm, too. 

These basic elements combine to describe a system far removed from realist anarchy, particularly in regard to the actors assessed and the long-term rationality that realism assumes for those actors. Significantly, they do not rule out domestic factors contributing to international events nor international acts impacting upon domestic political organization. In the case of the post-Cold War landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, such a difference is significant, opening up the possibility for local events to take on regional significance and for international expectations to shape domestic agendas.

Had Mearsheimer assumed a chaotic system rather than an anarchic one, he may well have noted the strong local pressure in European states against further proliferation of nuclear weapons and taken into account the wishes of newly-independent populations alongside his amoral assessments of nuclear strategy in Eastern Europe. Had Mearsheimer assumed a chaotic system rather than an anarchic one, he may well have noted the strong local pressure in European states against further proliferation of nuclear weapons and taken into account the wishes of newly-independent populations alongside his amoral assessments of nuclear strategy in Eastern Europe.60

Further, he could have considered the movements for democratic change in the Soviet Union not as mere domestic squabbles but as the harbingers of the collapse of a superpower, the small, localized uprisings in the Baltic States foreshadowing a more radical change in the global balance of power.61 He might have noted the individual-level ‘pull’ factor of free market capitalism and the associated availability of consumer

60 Consider the Robin Wood group in Germany, the Romanian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Ukrainian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War or IPPNW Georgia – all of who protest against nuclear proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War period.
goods in Western Europe as potential peace builders, not so quickly rejecting the counter-argument of economic liberalism. Indeed, that counter-argument does not need to be held true in a chaotic system either for assessing one factor – economic liberalism and interdependence – alone is contrary to the implied importance of all factors in a truly complexly interdependent chaotic environment.

Mearsheimer might have considered the sub-national independence groups pushing for democratic changes and closer ties to the West as more significant that his state-based, anarchical reality would allow. Where he and other realists concentrated on the proliferation of nuclear arms and the logic of strategic nuclear balancing it would have been possible – assuming a chaotic system – to assess the growing popularity of these sub-national groups and their ability to force change in former Soviet republics. Furthermore, while the logic of anarchy which forced Mearsheimer to label as ‘impossible’ a scenario which included a disarming European continent, chaos urges the theorist to consider the likelihood of large and small actions promoting the disarming of Eastern European states

62 Indeed, one report on news site EurActive went so far as to describe the post-Cold War landscape as Central and Eastern Europe “queuing to join and an internal market in goods and services which cements European peace with the glue of economic interdependence”. EurActive, European Peace and European Union. [9 May 2005] http://tinyurl.com/2z5qn2.

Belarus and the Ukraine. In short, by limiting analysis to state actors, to nuclear strategy, to great powers and by assuming that states would choose the ‘rational’ path – all of which are demanded by a realism founded upon anarchy – the smaller, sub-national but significantly influential events that would result in all of Mearsheimer’s scenarios failing to eventuate are effectively ignored. What chaos opens the theorist’s eyes to is blocked out by founding a thesis and predictions on anarchy, a starker example of which cannot be found than Mearsheimer’s post-Cold War futures for Central and Eastern Europe.

It is, however, one thing to suggest that chaos is a legitimate ordering principle to assume for the international system and to intimate that the conclusions of realists are wrong because the chaos of the system is ignored. It is quite another entirely to construct an alternate theory of the detail and richness of the realism of John Mearsheimer. Indeed, as it stands, there is no fully outlined theory of international politics based upon the assumption of a chaotic system. There are, though, movements in that direction within the literature. Besides the ‘Balkan Bullet’ article referenced above, I have outlined in a second paper – ‘Beyond Anarchy and Interdependence’ – various objections

63 See Christopher Fettweis, Dividing the Empire: Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Collapse of the Red Army. Program on General Disarmament Issue Brief 1, University of Maryland (2000).
to assumptions of anarchy in international relations theory and outlined some assumptions about what a possible chaotic theory might entail. As well – and significantly, considering the direction that such a theory would take – I outlined the specific problems that such a shift from anarchy to chaos would entail. The problems I outlined were later considered independently and in more detail by another researcher, Shu-Yun Ma. Ma highlighted the same sticking points on the way to a new understanding of the international system, adding two others to the list I had produced. Thus, while a chaotic theory of international relations cannot be held to exist or to have been sketched completely, the discipline is seeing the beginnings of a turn from anarchy to other systemic ordering principles, including chaos, in the theoretical literature.

Conclusion

On the edge of the post-Cold War world realists – like liberalists, journalists and interested individuals worldwide – were keen to make predictions about the future to come. Some were optimistic while others, like John Mearsheimer’s, were admittedly pessimistic. A European continent divided between nuclear powers in the West and East, tracts of Eastern Europe ripe for conventional wars between a re-united Germany and a still-powerful Soviet Union, an impossible peace and a Europe less stable than it had been for any time since the end of World War II.

also suggests that this new research program could include elements and assumptions common to post-internationalist thought. In particular, the work of James Rosenau – with his assessment of state and non-state actors in a time of changing world orders – is especially illuminating on the construction of a new prism through which the international system might be viewed. Key texts by Rosenau would include James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). An overview and critique of Rosenau’s post-internationalist paradigm is found in Heidi Hobbs, Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century? (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000). I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their suggestion to more closely examine Rosenau and his post-internationalist position.

67 As well as the fundamental theoretical implications I addressed and the challenges presented to existing understandings of the international system by historical institutionalist positions considered by Ma, the assumption of a non-anarchic system
With hindsight it is easy to conclude that Mearsheimer got it wrong but explaining why he was wrong is not easily achieved with the standard counter-realist arguments. Indeed, Mearsheimer is right to reject them in his article and his charges against them remain valid a decade and a half later. Yet when both realist scenarios and the arguments against them are founded on the same assumption – anarchy – it should be clear why the latter cannot explain the mistakes in the former. What can assist here is a new assumption, a new founding point; in short, assessing the argument of Mearsheimer on its own incorrect terms is no way to discover the truth about why post-Cold War Europe appears the way it does – what is needed is a new perspective.

Assuming a chaotic system is just the sort of assumption that can assist in explaining the realist errors and the world that emerged after a long, cold European conflict. Better able to recognize the importance of subnational and individual level motivations and their implications for the system as a whole, less bound to great powers and grand strategy as the basic tools of analysis, less constrained by anarchic logic and less likely to overestimate the influence of nuclear weapons on states in a post-Cold War world, this single changed assumption allows for explanations that anarchy-based theories simply cannot. While no thesis, no theory in total is outlined herein, reference to the literature indicates the door is beginning to open to such alternate explanations and theories. The limitations of theories based on anarchy are clearly shown in the failure of realists like Mearsheimer to predict the future in a chaotic system. While it is clear that realism, liberalism and even constructivism are not likely to be moved from their popular status as ‘theories of choice’ for international relations scholars, the end of the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe at least provides an opportunity to consider other approaches and to catch a glimpse of the potential of an alternate paradigm in this discipline of truly international importance.

**Bibliography**


“OTHERING” OF EAST AND WEST: (ANTI)ECUMENICAL VIEWS OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Dijana Gacesa
MA in Religion and Modernity
Queen’s University, Canada.
dijana979@yahoo.com

Abstract

Contemporary religious traditions are challenged by the concepts of “modernity” and “otherness”; at the same time, they pose various challenges to the “modernity” itself and significantly contribute to the general process of ideological “othering”. This article will explore how present-day Serbian Orthodox Christianity perceives and deals with various categories of “others”. Whether in secular or religious terms, the “other” has always been a source of deep internal controversies for the Serbian Orthodoxy. The spectrum of alleged opponents has been broad and has referred to the nonorthodox world in general, including modern Western concepts of capitalism and globalization, other Balkan faiths, as well as the liberal trends within Serbian Orthodoxy itself. On the other hand, the ecumenical orientation romantically expressed in the idea of Serbian Orthodox Christianity’s playing the role of the “golden bridge” between East and West continues to be an integral and important part of the historical and theological background of Serbian Orthodoxy. The article will conclude by suggesting that Serbian Orthodox Christianity significantly contributes to the process of mutual ideological mirroring between “East” and “West” by making the incomprehensible Eastern-European “other” more renderable for the Western mind.

Introduction

In the contemporary world of multiple choices and opportunities, of sophisticated politics and armed conflicts, of general concerns for human and environmental rights, religions face a whole spectrum of new challenges. The urgent challenge for global pluralistic society is probably the imperative of the appreciation of “otherness,” and its close corollary, the imperative of tolerance. Dialogue becomes the preferable option of communicating with the “other”, despite the possible differences, antagonisms or conflicts. Religions are urged to step out of their spiritual enclaves and to take an active role not just in global conversation but also in resolving the broad scope of problems of the “secular” world. The questions of general interconnectedness and particular responsibility of religious traditions poses a dilemma to them: should they strive to reconsider their long-established standpoints and “update” their perspectives in order to meet the challenges of the modern world, or should they stay entrenched in their theologies rejecting the innovative social currents? The actual outcomes...
depend on complex historical, cultural and political circumstances outlining each religious tradition in particular.

From another perspective, contemporary social sciences are grounded in the Western modernization paradigm; accordingly, they usually operate within the commonly accepted pattern of social development that suggests the tradition-change-transition-modernization model. Nevertheless, although convincing and coherent in theory, this model sometimes fails in practice for not being able to comprehend the significant differences between developments of the Eastern and the Western societies. The case of Serbian Orthodoxy Christianity at the turn of the 21st century can illustrate this thesis. This religion’s stances on the local political situation and the global requirements of modern world often appear as perplexing and incomprehensible to the external, non-Serbian or non-Orthodox observers. As a result, the entire phenomenon of contemporary Serbian Orthodoxy poses a challenge to understanding to the Western scholarship.

This article will analyze the position of Serbian Orthodox Christianity, one rather unknown religious tradition deeply rooted in local culture, history and politics, within the modern secular and religious world. More precisely, it will explore how the contemporary Serbian Orthodox Church (hereafter “the SOC” or “the Church,” with an upper case C) perceives and deals with various categories of “others”, from other Christian and nonchristian religious groups and faiths, to abstract categories of “others” such as “the West” or ”modernity.” It will do so in order to highlight the general theoretical problems faced by particular religious traditions in contemporary pluralist global society. The article will not defend a certain theoretical position or propose a particular solution for this problematique. Rather it aims to articulate a critical analysis and understanding of a relatively unfamiliar religious tradition and its attempts to encounter the challenges of modernity.

The contemporary Serbian Orthodox Church appears as the focus of this article for two reasons. First, as it will be presented, the SOC reflects a perplexing ambiguity regarding the popular issues of religious dialogue, ecumenical cooperation, reconciliation and responsibility, on the contrary to some other Orthodox Churches which seem to have instantly recognizable standpoints and policies on these issues (e.g., the Russian Orthodox Church, appearing to be the most traditional one in the East, or the Romanian Orthodox Church which is more opened to ecumenism). This is certainly not to say that some kind of a comparative study of all these religious traditions would not cast brighter light upon the Eastern Orthodoxy in general and its position in the modern world; it should be welcomed in the future research. On the other hand, the article considers Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and accordingly Serbian Orthodoxy, as an important factor in the process of
“othering” that traditionally shapes the global East-West discourse. The interchange of ideological constructions between West and East also produces a specific backlash effect to the local religions: in order to adjust to popular political and cultural narratives, religions begin to, consciously or not, adopt the external discourses of “otherness” and to consider themselves in terms of received projections thus generating a phenomenon of mutual ideological mirroring. The analysis will be concluded by suggesting that without being able to understand Serbian Orthodox tradition in its own terms, it is impossible to properly understand the complex social and political reality of the contemporary Balkan region and Eastern Europe.

Methodological and Theoretical Framework

Serbian Orthodox Christianity has recently become the object of numerous academic and non-academic studies conducted by both local and foreign analysts. There are two common discourses framing these studies in the second half of the 20th century. The first discourse, related to the period before the 1990s, outlines the position of Serbian Orthodoxy within communist Yugoslavia; its central themes and concepts include the secularization, atheization and privatization of religion, the antagonism between the Church and the communist regime, and the concealed potential of the SOC as a catalyst of Serbian nationalism. The second discourse, which contextualizes Serbian Orthodoxy in Balkan affairs of the 1990s, is conceptualized around the desecularization and resurgence of religion, the politicization of the Church, anti-communism and ethno-clericalism. In both cases, profound and insightful analytical studies have been produced together with superficial and biased studies loaded with value judgments of either Eurocentric or Orthodox-centric character.

A number of extensive and credible studies have already been undertaken, attempting to clarify the vast social implications this religious tradition has had on the cultural and political situation in the Balkan region. Each of these studies emphasizes a specific issue or problematique, such as the relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state (Alexander 1979; Ilić 2005; Radić 2000), the role of the SOC in Balkan conflicts (Popov 2000; Velikonja 2001; Johnson and Eastwood 2004), fundamentalist tendencies within the SOC (Mylonas 2003; Perica 2002), or the SOC’s standpoints on the issues of human rights, religious freedoms and ecumenical dialogue (Vukomanović 1999, 2001; Clapsis 2000). However, no particular study approaches the outlined problem from the perspective suggested above, namely, concentrating on contemporary Serbian Orthodoxy within the discourse of “otherness”. The reality of contemporary Serbian Orthodox Christianity cannot be exclusively studied from either the perspective of an insider or the perspective of an external analyst. Seemingly clearly positioned by their
personal engagement or physical and epistemological distance, both of them are actually exposed to the subtle but immense influence of a process of ideological “othering” that traditionally takes place on the relation between what is called “East” and “West”. Vague constructions themselves, “East” and “West” come to be actualized through the process of constructing each other as irredeemable “others” in historical, cultural and cognitive ways.

Without the intention of becoming an overambitious study, this article hopes to bring some fragmented academic viewpoints together and to offer one more possible perspective for approaching the issue of religion and modernity. In order to achieve that goal, the article will combine research from primary and secondary sources. This material will be analyzed within the theoretical framework of general concepts like “modernity” and “otherness”. A brief theorizing on the role of religion in defining boundaries as well as the major religious strategies of dealing with the “others” will also include a special remark on two particular strategies that Serbian Orthodoxy employs in dealing with the “others”: “phyletism”, a tendency of the Orthodox churches to get involved in nationalist politics, and “ecumenism”, also a distinctive feature of Serbian Orthodoxy. These operative concepts will be applied to analyze Serbian Orthodoxy in the contemporary socio-political situation.

From Phyletism to Ecumenism: Religious Responses to “Others”

The philosophical issues of “others” and “otherness” are essentially related to various identity polarizations and actual struggles. In his article “A Preliminary Challenge: Borders or Frontiers?,” Srđan Vrcan explores the potential for national, ethnic and religious identities to act as key ideological carriers of “otherness”. He argues that contemporary boundaries between ethnoreligious groups often lose their geographical character; on the contrary, by becoming a matter of ideological distinction and territorialization, they attain the character of symbolic frontiers. The role of these frontiers is not just to separate groups of people of different origin, language or culture but to separate entirely different worlds: a world of order from a world of disorder; a world inhabited by superior beings from a world of the inferior; a civilized world from a non-civilized (or barbarian) one.1 Although in this process boundary lines become less visible in a physical geographical sense, the “other” on the other side of the line never loses its character of absolute “otherness”. A stranger on the other side of the frontier is still an enemy, although sometimes he is difficult to pinpoint: the Other can be “everywhere and nowhere, internal as well as external, highly visible and

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barely discernible, to be defeated here and now as well as in the distant future—but invariably suitable for extermination”.2

Religion is one of the major factors in defining and maintaining ideological boundary lines: by means of what Vrcan calls “symbolic occupation” and “symbolic de-contamination”, religions contest ideological territory. Serbian Orthodox Christianity can serve as an example of how religion contributes to creating and reinforcing boundaries and frontiers and how this symbolic battle might have real consequences. Being seen itself as either a distant or familiar “other”, Serbian Orthodoxy has responded with its own understanding of the issue of “otherness”: its small enclave has been seen as both symbolically and actually isolated from the rest of the religious and secular world. The internal conviction in its absolute “otherness” is expressed through the idea of Serbian Orthodoxy situated on the western frontiers of the entire world of Eastern Christianity. The frontier quality of boundaries is achieved, as Vrcan asserts, by raising the existing cultural differences to ontologico-anthropological or “Grand history” level. Serbian Orthodoxy has contributed to this fact in two ways: by insisting on the distinction between two genuinely different worlds; and by emphasizing its divine mission and eschatological goal.3 While the rhetoric of divine legitimation has provided an unimpeachable credibility for this concept, the interpretation of historical and political circumstances has provided a guideline for its realization by fashioning the actual relationships with various “others”.

Although religions traditionally depict “others” as “schismatics, infidels or as uncivilized”4, their actual responses vary from elimination, through assimilation, to toleration and cooperation with others. Ivan Cvitković, a sociologist of religion, presents three sociological models of interreligious and interconfessional relations: (1) exclusivism, a model based on a sharp distinction between one’s own religion that is “right” and “true”, and all the others, that are “false”, a model which “fortifies religious boundaries and possibly leads to deterioration of other religious groups”; (2) inclusion, a model that refers to an idea of a “single world religion [that] ignores differences in the interest of a general sense of community”; and (3) pluralism, a model that emphasizes a full respect and understanding for beliefs of “others”, the attitude which is promoted by the World Council of Churches, World Religions for Peace, and various Interreligious Councils.5

2 Ibid., 217.
3 Ibid., 219-220.

4 Ibid, 221.
The concept of ecclesiastical racism or ethnophyletism is related to the first model of interreligious relations. The term “phyletism” (Gr. phulē: race, tribe) was coined by the Holy pan-Orthodox Synod of Constantinople in 1872. The Synod condemned the establishment of a separate Bulgarian diocese that was primarily based on ethnic identity instead of the principles of Orthodoxy. The Bulgarians were excommunicated for the newly defined heresy of “phyletism”.

The national or ethnic principle, present in the organization of the Eastern Orthodox churches, manifests itself in a tendency of the Orthodox churches to get involved in nationalist politics. This kind of religious nationalism, which Vjekoslav Perica names ethnoclericalism, is grounded in the idea of an “ethnically based nationhood and a ‘national church’ with its clergy entitled to national leadership but never accountable for political blunders as are secular leaders”. Both antiliberal and antisecular, ethnoclericalist religious institutions appear as opponents of the principle of separation between church and state. They consider the concepts of religious liberty, equality, and secularization as “alien” and “unnational”, while the clergy, as well as the chief saints and cults, are seen as naturally belonging to the dominating ethnic group. On the level of the state, ethnoclericalism is not only concerned about local politics; it also insists on involvement in foreign political affairs. Ideally, the symbiotic coalition of clerical and non-clerical elites is meant to maintain a country’s foreign policy by seeking to build a sort of “Huntingtonian cultural alliance”; from the perspective of ethnoclericalists, concludes Perica, the “clash of civilizations” is the inevitable outcome of ethnic and religious diversity.

Acting as both an ecclesiastical concept and political ideology, ethnoclericalism produces a mutual dependence of an ethnic church and an ethnic state, and, in the final instance, contributes to the transformation of an ethnic community into a nation. A strong homogenous church and a strong homogenous state are both seen as necessary to protect the ethnic or national community from the alleged external threat. As the threat is identified as permanent and general, protection also needs to be resolute and explicit, which basically means the

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ethnic or national church attains the role of a “guardian” of the community. Due to their “survivor nature”, notes Perica, these churches do not act as liberal but as “authoritarian-minded and centralized organizations capable of organizing resistance against an outside threat and maintaining stability inside the community”. The community itself, under the great manipulative power of such politics, adopts anticipated animosities and defines a whole spectrum of alleged enemies, whether symbolic or real.

On the other hand, as a common strategy of the pluralist model of interreligious relations, the ecumenical movement appears as an antithesis to the model of phyletism or ethnoclericalism. The ecumenical movement originates in Christianity as an attempt at overcoming and healing the Christian schisms that historically divided this religion along various doctrinal and political lines. Georges Florovsky, a prominent Orthodox theologian, points out that the so-called “ecumenical problem”, the pursuit of interchristian reconciliation and reunification, is essentially related to the task Christianity has to perform in the modern times, that is, rediscovering the sense of Christian responsibility and taking an active role in addressing social justice issues. In other words, this idea implies that Christianity needs to be “put into action” here and now, in any time and any situation. It should not be just an observer or commentator on human history and world problems; it needs to “unify, to speak with one voice to the present political, social or international situation”.

This sort of socially aware and practically oriented ecumenical movement faces various obstacles and doubts. Although the 20th century is broadly called the “century of ecumenism”, the sole term “ecumenism”, as with all the other “isms”, gives way to an easy generalization; it often indicates a trendy rhetoric that actually lacks the real intention of “walking the talk”. On the other side, traditional differences between particular Christian denominations are not easily overcome. First, although most agree that “reunion, even in the realm of ‘practical Christianity’ is an ultimate goal”, it is very likely that deep theological consensus cannot be achieved immediately. And second, Florovsky questions, is it possible for “true Christian unity [to] be restored by agreement on secular issues?”.


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8 Perica, Balkan Idols, 215.
It is important to distinguish between two types of ecumenism that both strive to regulate interdenominational competition: these are “moderate” and “radical” (i.e. “pure”) ecumenism. As Newman notes, the major aim of “radical” ecumenism is not to eliminate competition between separate denominations by unifying them together into a single denomination, “the Christian Church”, but to eliminate interdenominational competition by replacing it with something of a “different order”. To be more precise, he asserts that “churches cannot unite [in finding a doctrinal consensus] because they would die”; the solution is to find a new, secular line of collaboration and unification. On the other hand, “moderate” ecumenists suggest that kind of “friendly competition” between denominations should be established in order to achieve a common doctrinal minimum for cooperation. In that voice, the first assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948 acknowledged the need of each religious denomination “to find the right relations between confessional and ecumenical loyalties”. However, in spite of good prospects, an open disagreement between the Orthodox and the Protestant understanding of the ecumenical problem took a place at the WCC in New Delhi in 1961, when the Orthodox declared they didn’t want to discuss the prospect of reunion “on Protestant terms”.

The sharp distinction that exists today between Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox ecumenisms can be better understood after presenting some major Eastern Orthodox perspectives on this issue. By participating in the Pan-Orthodox Conferences since the 1960s, Orthodox Churches entered into official theological dialogue with several churches and denominations “in order to create better mutual understanding between the churches, gradually to remove past condemnations and achieve visible unity in one faith”. However, a problem arose with the assertion of some Orthodox theologians that the Orthodox Church is “the Church” and “only true Church”; following this line of thought, Christian reunion can be acceptable only as a “universal conversion to Orthodoxy”. On the other hand, they admit that “the true Church is not yet the perfect Church”. Finally, the Third Pan-Orthodox Conference in 1986 came up with a moderate and inclusive policy: “Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement does not run counter to the nature and history of the Orthodox Church. It constitutes the consistent expression of the apostolic

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13 Ibid., 35.  
14 Florovsky, Ecumenism I, 153.  
16 Florovsky, Ecumenism I, 134.
Permanent Orthodox dilemmas regarding the doctrinal legitimacy of ecumenism and the role of Orthodoxy in interreligious and ecumenical dialogue are reflected in the case of Serbian Orthodox Christianity to a great extent; yet, there are some significant distinctions related to its specific historical, cultural and political background that need to be more precisely addressed.

The SOC’s Construction of the Other: “Ex Oriente Lux!”

The involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church in various forms of interreligious cooperation, especially in global ecumenical projects, has been generally fashioned by two key factors: first, by Eastern or Serbian Orthodox perceptions of abstract “others” such as the “West” and “Europe”, and second, by its historically-established conviction in the existence of eternal “friends and foes”, such as particular ethnoreligious groups and nation-states. Relationships between Serbian Orthodoxy and particular religious and secular groups have always been fashioned by the Church’s perception of the Serbian mytho-historical past and her relations with the nation state. The SOC has employed a dramatic interpretation of Serbian national history in order to define its imagined sphere of influence and reinforce its boundaries. In this interpretation of Serbian history, the Church identifies victimhood and martyrdom as distinctive qualities of the Serbian national ‘Being’, even divinizing them as celestial values. This section will analyze the ideological predispositions, actual responses and future prospects for ecumenical dialogue as seen and performed from the perspective of the contemporary Serbian Orthodox Church.

The boundaries of Serbian Orthodoxy have been largely shaped by the epochal schism of the two Christian churches, Eastern and Western. Serbian Orthodoxy responded to this religious (and consequently political and cultural) division by choosing epithets such as atheistic, nihilistic, antinational, foreign, modernist, prowestern, liberal, left-wing, etc, to describe the antithesis of the typical Serbian Orthodox Christian, a description that is best summarized in

the concept of “anti-nature”: According to this rhetoric, blurring “natural” boundary-lines by mixing “our blood and alien blood”, that is, by incorporating the “anti-nature” into the “nature” through ethnically mixed marriages, is to blame for increased animosity in the Balkans.  

Within the discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the “West” and “Europe” are usually associated if not completely equated. Although both categories have been traditionally seen through the skeptical lens of Serbian religious nationalism, new criticisms have emerged from the pen of radical Serbian theologians Justin Popović and Nikolaj Velimirović. In his book *Orthodoxy as a Philosophy of Life* (1993), Archimandrite Justin sees Western or European culture as a “Faustian culture” and accuses it of being entrenched in human instead of divine values. European man became the “measure of all things, both visible and invisible” and while man thus declared himself God, humanism, the “architect of modern society”, turned Europe into the “factory of idols”. “Europe”, says Popović, “doesn’t suffer from atheism, but from polytheism”; it is the embodiment of “resurrected fetishism” and “cultural cannibalism”.  

Contemporary right-wing Serbian Orthodox theologians have embraced Popović’s criticism of Western culture. Their rhetoric cynically plays on modern discourse by stripping popular phrases out of their broader contexts, overturning their meaning or giving them new connotations. In this manner, “freedom of choice” becomes the freedom of choice between “bad and worse”; the “new world order” becomes the “pact with devil” that unites public and secret power structures such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the Red Cross and NGOs; the “international community” is ruled by freemasons; “general conflicts, wars, hunger, revolutions, epidemics” are “benefits of modern times”, and people with “jungle-law ethics” and “ultramodern technology” will continue to come as God’s punishment of Western Europe which has “abandoned the path of Christ”. References to alleged Machiavellian amorality, Orwellian dystopia and Nietzschean nihilism are almost unavoidable in recent theological texts.  

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23 For example, according to archimandrite Justin Popović (1993), after going through the stages of atheism and anarchism, the Western civilization is condemned to end up in nihilism.
Serbian Orthodox theologians offer elaborate interpretations of the opposition of the “Orthodox East” to the “European West”. As Srdan Vrcan notes, there are two supposed reasons for this: first, the European West had never understood the genuine meaning of Christianity; and second, the European West had distanced itself from Christ through its rationalism and humanism “in a Godless manner”.24 Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović expressed this standpoint in a nutshell: “The West is preoccupied and besieged by the Earth. That is why it does not think of Heaven. And that is why it is such an enemy to us today. There is no God among them. There is no heavenly kingdom there”.25 Today’s Serbia, a thorn in the side of the “extortionist-atheistic and demonic international community, which is driving peoples into the New World Order”26, needs to cautiously reconsider its contemporary position and future directions. Radović laments Serbian destiny27 but he also calls for a national uprising and the defence of “genuine Jerusalem-Mediterranean Europeanness” whose representatives and guardians are the Serbs:

The Serbs are today also the guardians of the rarest and most important civilizational values, the values of the heart and spirit. In the soulless world of modern materialism and rationalism, in a civilization of false material well-being and cowardly pacifism, they prevail in the struggle for the ideals of the fighter, simultaneously dear to nature and sacred. In that struggle they do not fear death, for without death there is no national resurrection.28

While Radović’s view of Serbian Orthodox boundaries goes beyond the question of geography and engages the dimensions of history and culture, Nikolaj Velimirović’s vision enters the realm of metaphysics. The romantic perception of the Balkans as the border area between East and West and as the historical “guardian of the gate” is, in Velimirović’s understanding, an oversimplification. The Balkans are only physically between East and West; they can be seen as a “healthy man between two sick ones”, both of which are “cursed” and “bedeviled”. However, from a transcendentental perspective, asserts Velimirović, the Balkans are neither “East or West”, nor are they “between East and West”; they are above both of them.29

26 Ibid., 9.
27 “Anyways, at this historical moment we are in Europe and there is no other place to go. We’ve been shaped by Europe, even by its plague of Marxism and communism. We were the guinea pigs of Western European ideologies. When we embraced the Western European ideas – everything turned wrong”, says Metropolitan Radovic, in Radovic. Vraćanje duše u čistotu, 2001.
28 As quoted in Čolović, The Politics of Symbol in Serbia, 8.
29 Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, Iznad Istoka i Zapada, Separat iz sabranih dela episkopa ohridskog i žičkog Nikolaja Velimirovića.
Whether between, above, or beneath East and West, there is no doubt that the Balkans have been an area of unceasing turmoil. Attempts by the three largest religious populations (the Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims) to define and stabilize their mutual relationships are centuries old, and, over time the concepts of “natural friends and foes”, or “eternal allies” versus “eternal enemies”, became spontaneously entrenched in common public mentality as well as in official state and ecclesiastical politics. All sides searched for the help of their coreligionists, who suddenly became “ancient” if not “eternal allies”. As Velikonja notes, the Orthodox Serbs were dreaming of a so-called Orthodox Circle (a union of all countries with Orthodox majority), the Bosnian Muslims discovered a “long-lasting friendship” with Muslim (Arab) countries, while the Catholic Croats turned to the Vatican and Western (Catholic) countries.30

These mythical religious alliances came as a product of similar kinds of mythical religious conspiracies. As for Serbian religious nationalists, a world conspiracy plotted by Germany, the Vatican and the Jewish-controlled Western media31 was responsible for most of the problems Serbia has had with its neighbors or with the international community. Aside from facing the “Pope's servants” (Italy, Austria and Germany) and the conspiracy of “Western Powers”, Orthodox Serbia has had to deal with another threat: the so-called Green Transversal (Ankara-Tirana-Sarajevo) which refers to the conspiracies of Islamic fundamentalists and alleged plans of Islamist control over the Balkans. Particularly in the early 1990s, the Bosnian Muslims were often labelled as “jihad fighters, mujahidins, janissaries, brothers in fez”, whose “final ambition was to turn Bosnia into a state modelled on the Qur'an, an Islamic fundamentalist state, or a Libyan-style Jamahiriyah in which non-Muslims would become slaves”.32

The support of the rest of the Orthodox world appeared to be a crucial counterbalance to all these alleged enmities. Although the separation of the American and Macedonian Orthodox churches from the SOC came as a shock in the 1960s, cooperation with sister Orthodox Churches (primarily the Greek, Russian, and Romanian Church) commenced around the same time with the Pan-Orthodox Conference held on the island of Rhodes in 1961. This conference gathered all Orthodox churches for the first time since the Council of Nicea in 787 CE and diplomatically presented Orthodoxy as a “bridge between Rome and the Protestant Churches”. At approximately the same time, the traditional Serbo-Russian friendship was restored by the first visit of the Serbian Patriarch to Moscow in 1956. In the words of Serbian Orthodox delegation members, they felt “not like guests, but at home, brothers of one blood, one faith and one spirit”. The Russian Patriarch soon visited the Serbian holy land of Kosovo and was spectacularly welcomed. Some time later, Serbian Patriarch Germanus pointed out that he and Russian Patriarch Pimen shared similar views about “the need for a mutual defence of Orthodox peoples against the West and other threats such as Islam and communism”. Since the 1970s, Russia has emerged as Serbia's principal ally, and the Russian Church has been taken to be a major supporter of the SOC’s foreign and national policy.

(Anti)Ecumenical Preferences of the SOC

In 1968, the SOC decided to join the World Council of Churches, which seemed to be one of the most significant decisions the Serbian Orthodox Church has ever made. Even communist President Tito approved the Patriarch’s attempts to “strengthen friendship with other countries” through that participation. However, the general participation of the Orthodox Churches in the WCC has been questioned ever since. Constantine D. Mouratides, a

34 Ibid, 256.
35 Ibid., 159.
prominent Greek theologian, characterized the WCC as “grotesque, preposterous, and destructive of Orthodox canonical order and Holy Tradition”, as “an admixture of things that cannot be mixed” and “a grotesque monstrosity which constitutes the greatest snare of the Enemy in the history of the Church Militant of Christ”. The antiecumencial voices rose immediately in the SOC. The influential archimandrite Justin Popović soon published in Greece a radical antiecumencial book, *An Orthodox Appraisal and Testimony* (1974) in which he condemned every kind of global ecumenical movement, whether from Geneva or Rome. He emphasized that the SOC is “the only true and credible spiritual force capable of accomplishing the ideal of Christian unity”. For Popovic, the joint prayers and ecumenical meetings between “the Orthodox and the heterodox” are simply impossible because the heretics (i.e. Roman Catholic bishops and priests, Protestant pastors, and “even women”) give blessings. The decision of the Fifth Pan-Orthodox Consultation in Geneva (1968) that the Orthodox Church should consider itself as “an organic member of the WCC” caused even bitterer resentment. In this way, almost before it even started its real ecumenical engagement, Serbian Orthodoxy semi-officially declared ecumenism to be a dark power, and the World Council of Churches “the world hodgepodge of the heresies and heretics that is endeavoring to divert the Holy Ark of the Orthodox Church from her redemptive mission”.

The last decade of 20th century also saw a significant uprising against the ecumenical movement in Serbian Orthodoxy. There were two particular but related motives for this. First, traditional Orthodox animosity towards Catholicism embodied in the idea of a global “Vatican Conspiracy” against Serbs was revived and strengthened by the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Consequently, the 1991 Pan-Orthodox symposium in Kiev, named “Roman Catholicism and the Orthodox World” sent the following message to the pope: “Your Holiness, the Orthodox peoples will not be intimidated by the alliance between you and the powerful international forces. Amen”.

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41 “We reject thereby the Orthodox Theanthropic Faith, this organic bond with the Lord Jesus, the God-man, and His all-immaculate Body; [we reject] to become “organic members” of a heretical, humanistic, man-made and man-worshipping assembly, which is composed of 263 heresies, each one of them spiritual death! As Orthodox, we are “members of Christ.” Our “organic” connection with the World Council of Churches, is nothing other than a revival of the atheistic worship of man and idols,” said Justin Popović (ibid, 7).
42 Ibid, 2.
43 As quoted in Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 159.
Secondly, the antieccumenical movement developed a theological critique of the concept of “common minimum for unification”. Eventually, in 1997, 280 monks and 40 priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church released an “Appeal against Ecumenism”. Largely based on statements from Archimandrite Justin’s 1974 antieccumenical study, this appeal argued that interfaith ecumenical dialogue was a “weapon of Western missionaries’ proselytism”. The Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church suggested that the other Orthodox Churches consider withdrawal from the WCC. Reasons for this included: 1) the unacceptable “unity in faith as a prerequisite for the general Church unity”; 2) the increasing influence of secularism; 3) the majority of Protestant communities in WCC and the majority voting system; 4) the enforcement of religious syncretism over Orthodoxy; 5) the introduction of nontraditional ministries; 6) the affirmation of the “so-called rights of the sexual minorities and the legalization of homosexual relationships in matrimony by the Church” etc.46

Today, although the Serbian Orthodox Church is still present in WCC, there is nothing close to official consensus regarding its future. Indeed, skepticism about interreligious cooperation surprisingly affects the Pan-Orthodox as well as global Christian ecumenical projects. Elaborating on his fear that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is developing a hidden agenda for becoming the “Mother Church” or the “Orthodox Vatican”, Bishop Srboljub Miletić reverts to the old conspiracy theories: “There is no doubt that these tendencies will be backed up by the global international powers”, says Miletić.47 As proof he points out that even so-called “conferences” and “congresses” are an “artificial form of gathering”, they are Western products completely alien to the Orthodox tradition. Under the disguise of popular concepts such as “partnership” and “equal participation”, globalists strive to annihilate distinctions and “put everything into the same sack”.48 Accordingly, in constant oscillation between its ostensible ecumenical, antiwar position, and its true support of the ethnonationalist political powers, the pendulum of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s official policy apparently inclines towards the radical nationalist pole.

It would be difficult to pinpoint the particular external causes for this model of Serbian Orthodox exclusivism. The five-century Ottoman oppression

45 As quoted in Perica, Balkan Idols, 181.
46 Vukasnovic, “Towards New Ecumenism”.
47 Miletić, “Dijaspora, međucrveni odnosi”
48 Ibid.
certainly contributed to the lack of some key concepts of modernity, such as the Protestant Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment, or the principle of church and state separation. In addition, as Daniel Payne assumes, the lack of understanding of concepts of individual faith, personal autonomy and individual human rights is the hallmark of the ethos of Eastern Orthodox political culture in general.49 From the internal perspective, the SOC’s responses to the various issues of modern and everyday life are deeply rooted in the philosophy of universal struggle and the omnipresent enemy. A general fear that the Serbian nation can be “diluted” by the increase of the level of ethnic diversity results in the sense of threat; accordingly, the concept of Serbian Orthodoxy as an endangered enclave appears as a consequence of a constant need to defend its imagined borders.

Finally, what can one conclude about Serbian Orthodox (anti)ecumenical preferences? On the one hand, new challenges posed to the Serbian Orthodox religious institutions (issues such as democracy, pluralism, tolerance, protection of ethnic and religious minorities), are unavoidable demands of the modern world. Although the countermodern orientation of the SOC is deeply rooted in what Peter Berger calls a “nostalgic desire to restore structures of premodern world of order, meaning and solidarity”,50 referring to the traditionalist societies in general, the modern imperatives of socially engaged humanism, such as global responsibility, dialogue and reconciliation, simply cannot be ignored any more. On the other hand, there is a certain ecumenical tendency: as Metropolitan Artemije of Raška-Prizren laconically observes, “the Serbian Church is certainly up for a dialogue; however, the scope of that dialogue is not defined”.51 Unfortunately, the “undefined scope of the dialogue” basically means that not much progress has been made since the mutual condemnation between the Catholic and Orthodox churches in 1054. Metropolitan Artemije explicitly admits that the removal of anathemas between the Catholic and Orthodox churches in 1965 was just an “individual move of both Ecumenical Patriarch Atanagora and Pope Paul VI that was primarily supposed to bring them a personal prestige and the image of peace-promoters”.52 For certain officials of the SOC, this historic ecumenical event seems to be irrelevant: the Great Schism is still valid and it will remain


51 “Srbija je procrđala ceeo XX vek,” Intervju sa episkopom raško-prizrens kim Artemijem, [“Serbia Wasted the Whole 20th Century”, An interview with Metropolitan of Raska-Prizren, Artemije]. Danas (6-7 Jan 2004), translation mine.
52 Ibid.
valid until the “heretical Churches” fully embrace the Eastern light. Also, the Serbian Orthodox Church has been mostly passive either in attempts to seriously contribute to the development of the human and religious rights in Serbia, or in willingness to accept any kind of responsibility for the local and global social conditions. Although that situation has recently started to change on the level of the Church’s rhetoric, awareness of the principles and imperatives of modern times does not on its own mean that they can be easily put in practice. Some concrete programs and actions whose goals are the protection of democracy, human rights, minorities’ rights and respect for religious pluralism need to be started, according to Milan Vukomanović, “on the local, grassroots level”. It is usually more significant and much easier to attain some concrete and more visible results in this way than on the level of the national or international institutions, commissions and bodies. At the same time, the question of responsibility should not be linked only to the participation in a concrete wrongdoing, “but also to indifference, silence and closing one’s eyes to the moments when a moral person should condemn a misdeed or crime”. The recent positive moves of the SOC towards the new understanding of “others” seem to overcome the old “friends/foes” concepts; having in mind that the actual power of the SOC to contribute to war, or peace, should never be underestimated, such recent moves can hopefully redirect the future politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church into a direction of a more inclusive politics.

Conclusion: In the Funfair House of Mirrors

At the end, it seems essential to revise again the discourse of “otherness” that actually outlines this case-study and provides us with a tool of comprehending the SOC within a more general picture, the one of ideological and culture perceptions interrelating what is called “East” and “West”. In the Western perspective, the Eastern-European “other” carries particular ambiguity. As Andrew Hammond notes, after the Eastern European revolutions of 1989, Eastern Europe actually ceased to exist as a geopolitical unit and cultural concept; nevertheless, it remained as an imagined space not yet completely detached from the old Cold War discourse. Today, Eastern Europe is conceptualized around notions of “violence, cruelty, irrationality, backwardness, clannishness, mafia-style criminality, [and] mass migration westwards” that can be summed up in a single term:

54 Ibid., 26-27.
“balkanism”.56 Apparently, Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, does not carry romantic connotations usually present in the Western perception of an “exotic other.” On the contrary, instead of being described as the “lost paradise,” the Balkans are seen as the “black hole of modern Europe” which is yet to be enlightened and civilized.57

As it is simultaneously perceived as both a familiar and a distant “other”, a “strange neighbor” and an “absolute stranger”, the Eastern-European or the Balkan “other” is hardly renderable into the modern Western political, academic and popular discourses. Referring to the Balkan states, John B. Allcock notes that “even though it has by now become obvious that there is no possibility that the Humpty Dumpty of Yugoslavia can ever be put together again, it is still something of a challenge to know how to refer to that space” (2000: xiv).58

Indeed, “that space”, with its troubled past and troubling present, poses a great conundrum to the social analysts today; it also opens Pandora’s box of misreadings and generalizations.

Back to the issue of religion, Eastern Orthodox culture is, beside feudalism, Communism, authoritative power systems and limited modernization, one of the major factors that actually fashion the concept of “that space”. As one of the most influential organized religions in the Eastern European region, Serbian Orthodoxy plays a great role in the process of mutual “othering” of East and West. Being amidst the continuous interchange of Western and Eastern European discourses, it contributes to that process in three ways. First, by traditionally insisting on the ultimacy of an alleged civilizational and spiritual gap between the East and the West, Serbian Orthodoxy strengthens the existing polarizations and keeps “that space” as an isolated enclave: by perceiving the West as the absolute other, it ascribes to itself the character of absolute otherness. Second, being itself frequently seen in negative light, Serbian Orthodoxy responds with an unconscious adoption of these external projections; reinterpreted on the local level, these projections create a powerful negative discourse of what one is not, becoming in that way an essential part of the Serbian contemporary ethnoreligious identity. And third, the process of the East-West “othering” seems to situate Serbian Orthodoxy in a sort of ideological funfair house of mirrors. On the one hand, this Eastern Orthodox religious

56 Ibid., xiii.
58 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, xiv.
tradition appears today as not exclusively “Eastern” any more; by being constantly present in both the Western space and the Western mind, Serbian Orthodoxy becomes an integral part of a Western cultural, historical and intellectual context. On the other hand, in responding to the Western conceptualizations, Serbian Orthodoxy reflects those constructions back to the West. By indicating and criticizing their misconceptions, it possibly contributes, intentionally or not, to the Western’s comprehension of what Allcock names “that space”.

Finally, this article suggests that the better understanding of “that space” should not be seen as significant just for the future of “that space” itself; in some further instance, it could improve the understanding of complex patterns of identification, representation and global power relations. These patterns can be identified not only in the sphere of the global politics but in the academic world too. The Balkans are just one of “those spaces” that do not easily fit the grand theoretical schemes of the Western scholarship. Lucid and coherent in their abstract speculations, modern social sciences often fail to fully comprehend the actual diversity of social phenomena; instead, they strive to adjust reality to ideal models. It can be suggested at the end that, by being more self-critical and “other”-sensitive, the Western scholarship could develop more productive understanding of the non-Western phenomena.

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Monica Andrieescu
MA, Central European University
Nationalism Studies Department
monica_andrieescu@yahoo.com

Abstract

This article critically analyzes minority and majority rhetoric in post-communist Romania with the purpose of uncovering the key factors that have shaped discourse and practice on minority language and education rights toward relatively accommodating stances. A second level of research examines the limits in the majority’s willingness to compromise on the extension the legal-institutional minority rights framework beyond the “autonomy threshold”.

Introduction

Across the previous decades, theoretical and political debates have been targeted at identifying the appropriate legal-institutional channels to accommodate interethnic reconciliation. Various and often contending approaches have emphasized why and how ethnicity has been politicized and instrumentalized for legitimacy-gaining purposes.¹


Within this framework, the interrelatedness between minority and majority standpoints has led to an increased salience of the discourse of minority rights. On account of its relevance and dynamics, it is this field that this article addresses.

Contending approaches to the individual and collective dimensions of minority rights have structured the liberal-communitarian debate on minority rights.² Relevant scholarship in the field of minority rights has revealed that the immensely complex ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic mosaic present in Europe (as well as elsewhere) precludes across-the-board solutions to accommodating diversity.³


* This is a revised version of the author’s MA thesis, defended at the Central European University, June 2007.
One of the case studies that may yield significant findings is the evolution of the process of interethnic accommodation in post-communist Romania. Noteworthy studies have explored the wide range of difficulties posed by the attempts at accommodation of diversity and the evolution of interethnic reconciliation.¹

Notwithstanding their valuable findings, the studies of state-minority groups relations in post-1989 Romania have neglected a structured and thorough analysis of the key factors that have shaped and shifted minority and majority political discourse on minority rights. It is this gap in existing research that this article attempts to fill.

Throughout the ongoing process of ethnocultural accommodation, language and education rights have been two of the major bones of contention. Only recently has comprehensive research addressing linguistic diversity begun to emerge.⁵ In Romania, theoretical or empirical studies on the impact of this form of diversity on interethnic accommodation have been little researched.⁶ This appears to conflict with the importance that the ethnic Hungarian elites have persistently attached to language and education claims as a core identity-profiler for the Hungarian minority. Minority and majority discourses on language and education rights have interlocked to form a nexus that has shaped the process of interethnic reconciliation in post-communist Romania. On account of that, I deal with language and education rights as two of the key variables that explain the advancement

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¹ Gabriel Andreescu, Nandor Bardi, G. Bădescu, Martin Brusis, Marian Chiriac, Smaranda Enache, Zoltán Kántor, Dragoș Petrescu, Monica Robotin, Levente Salat, Balázs Trencsényi and Renate Weber are among the most prominent authors of such studies.


of the interethnic accommodation process. The *indicators* by which this evolution can be measured consist of the legal-institutional expansion of minority rights protection. The primary concern of this article is not the exhaustive study of legislation regulating the two aforementioned categories of rights, but rather the thorough investigation of how minority-majority bargaining resulted in the laws that presently regulate the minority protection framework in Romania.

The aim of this research is twofold: firstly, to identify the main *factors* that have positively shaped and shifted majority and minority rhetoric on minority rights (language and education rights in particular) in post-1996 Romania; and secondly, to detect the *limits* of the relatively accommodating majority stances on minority rights. I comparatively analyze these interlocking aspects by deconstructing majority and minority rhetoric into several key patterns.

Puzzled by what explains the positive development of interethnic relations in a country that initially had a high potential for violent conflict, this article focuses on three main *questions*: *why* the conversion toward a more accommodating majority stance on minority rights occurred after the change of government in 1996; *how* these factors have been reflected in majority and minority rhetoric; and, *what* have been the limits of this process. Such an endeavor is important because it assesses the development of the *opening* of Romanian politics and society to their inbuilt ethnocultural diversity, one which has been utterly rejected by Romania’s sequence of non-democratic nation-building regimes for decades.

The main reason prompting this research lies with the impact of ethnonational discourse on popular mobilization. Such an undertaking is relevant for the Romanian case (with potentially wide-ranging results) when attempting to assess why the initial conflictual interethnic relations between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians did not result in violent conflict, but have instead developed into a negotiated framework for minority rights.

To clearly define the terms that I work with, by “minority” rhetoric I mean that of the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania (UDMR – the major representative party of the Hungarian minority). My reason for singling out the Hungarian community (from the 20 legally-recognized national minorities) is a result of the fact that, through its party, it has had the most articulated minority political voice. UDMR has been the key

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7 UDMR was established in December 1989, immediately after the fall of the communist regime.
8 According to the 2002 census, Romania’s two largest national minorities are the Hungarian (6.6%) and the Roma communities (2.5%). According to unofficial estimations, however, the Roma minority is considerably larger than the 2002 census reports. Also, the German and
minority party with whom Romanian majority parties have negotiated the granting of minority rights.

By “majority”, this article refers to the main Romanian political parties, which it divides into three categories: the radical nationalistic parties - PRM ("Greater Romania" Party) and PUNR (National Unity Party of Romanians); the “moderately” nationalistic parties - PDSR/PSD (Romanian Social Democrat Party – today’s Social Democratic Party); and the moderate supporters of minority rights - PNŢCD (Christian-Democratic National Peasants’ Party), PNL (National Liberal Party), and PD (Democratic Party).

Methodology and Conceptual Framework

In order to answer the aforementioned questions, I investigate the research problem through a methodological combination of critical analysis of minority and majority discourses, interviews, domestic and international legislation, and strategies aimed at minority rights protection. I also use the following theoretical tools that make up the article’s foundation and support its arguments.

Norman Fairclough has expanded the so-called “second generation” of discourse theory. Following his line of argument, I propose to employ Critical Discourse Analysis as the key methodological tool, by surpassing the traditional ways of interpreting a text only through a mere language analysis and recognizing that discourse is context-dependent.9 By extending this statement, one may perceive political discourse as a reflection and catalyst of the political, social, cultural transformations that a society constantly undergoes.

The second conceptual tool that lies at the basis of my research: Kymlicka and Alan Patten have codified language rights/policies under the following four general patterns: 1. “tolerance vs. promotion-oriented rights”; 2. “norm-and-accommodation vs. official-languages rights regimes”; 3. “personality vs. territoriality rights regimes”; and 4. “individual vs. collective rights.”10 Drawing from this

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10 See Will Kymlicka, Alan Patten (eds.), Language Rights and Political Theory, p. 26. According to the authors:

1. “tolerance rights are protections individuals have against government interference with their private language choices”; “promotion-oriented rights involve the use of a particular language by public institutions”;

2. “norm-and-accommodation approach[…] could take a variety of forms” and it means that “special accommodations are […] made for people who lack sufficient
taxonomy, I argue that the Romanian state has aimed at institutionalizing an assorted type of language policy that can be classified as a “personality - individual rights regime”. Conversely, the Hungarian party has rhetorically argued for a “territoriality - collective rights regime”. Once the majority - minority negotiation process emerged (in 1996), the result was the gradual implementation of a regime that can best be defined as a “norm-and-accommodation rights regime”. As follows, in the Romanian framework, this ideal-type of regime has taken the form of a single official language (Romanian) that is used predominantly in the public sphere. Nevertheless, the official language is complemented under certain specific circumstances by the public use of minority languages.

The third conceptual tool that I use is the taxonomy set forth by Stephen Deets and Sherrill Stroschein, who argue that while language rights are “a means to integrate members of minorities more fully into the polity”, education rights “can be a way of separating minorities from the majority and to replicate minority culture”. As this article will subsequently show, a logical inference of this conceptual division – exemplified by the Romanian case – is that majority elites are considerably more reluctant in granting education rights (especially those that regard higher education in minority languages) than language rights.

Finally, the empirical methodological part of the present article is composed of two semi-structured interviews with Attila Szász, UDMR member and State Counselor for the Coordination of the Cultural, Educational and European Integration Activities in Romania’s Government. Although the interview

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3. “the personality principle is the principle that citizens should enjoy the same set of official language rights no matter where they are in the country; the “territoriality principle” means “that language rights should vary from region to region according to local conditions”;

4. “individual language rights is one that an individual can claim irrespective of the number of co-linguists residing in the state or jurisdiction that is relevant to the exercise of the right”; “a collective language right […] is one that is triggered only when some threshold level of demand for the service or accommodation is reached”.


12 It is noteworthy to add that both language and education rights are labeled as “assistance rights”, which are “claimed to help in overcoming obstacles to engaging in common practices” (According to Jacob Levy, “Classifying Cultural Rights”, in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 29).

13 The interviews unfolded in April and July 2007.
questions and answers addressed a wider spectrum of issues, I have included in this analysis only the answers that are most relevant for the purposes of this stage of analysis.

Sections 1 and 2 analyze minority and majority discourse on language and education rights by looking at the parliamentary debates that have structured the relevant provisions in Romania’s Constitution and legal framework. The concluding section summarizes the main findings, while pointing to their relevance for the broader research field of politicized ethnicity and its effects on state-minority groups relations.

1. The Post-1996 Rhetoric Shift: The Hungarian Party’s Claims for Language and Education Rights

The aim of this section is twofold: first, it examines the legal provisions that are relevant to minority language and education rights in post-communist Romania; second, it surveys the parliamentary debates concerning the Law on Education and the Local Public Administration Law to analyze the key minority rhetorical patterns on language and education rights.

The first six post-communist years displayed a clear line of continuity both in terms of nationalist discourse and in the presence of recycled second-rank communists on the political arena: ethnicity continued to be a key identity-marker used for power-preservation purposes. Throughout the 1996-2000 electoral cycle, the Hungarian party formed a political partnership with the alliance that won the 1996 parliamentary and presidential elections: the Democratic Convention of Romania (hereafter CDR) was a coalition between PNȚCD (Christian-Democratic National Peasants’ Party), PD (Democratic Party) and PNL (National Liberal Party). During 2000-2004, although not in government, UDMR formed a parliamentary coalition with PDSR (Romanian Social Democrat Party). It is important to note that as a result of the “political weakness” of the 1996-2000 government, UDMR’s political actions were more successful during 2000-2004, when “UDMR provided political stability in exchange for some concessions regarding minority rights from PDSR”.

It is important to note that after 2004, UDMR rhetoric has taken a swerve toward claims of internal self-determination of the Hungarian community and has triggered concurrent retrenchment of majority conceding will. UDMR has prioritized claims for cultural autonomy, a principle taking the form of an

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14 PDSR won the 2000 elections.
15 Author’s interview with Attila Szász, State Counselor for the Coordination of the Cultural, Educational and European Integration Activities in Romania’s Government, July 2007, Bucharest.
16 Ibid.
17 Various tiers of autonomy are prioritized by the eighth UDMR Party Congress from March 2007, at www.rmdsz.ro.
institutional arrangement that would result in the establishment of a consultative body with decision-making power: “in the case of the cultural institutions that unfold their activity in Hungarian, autonomy councils are to be appointed by the civil society, the political representatives and the Church; their role would be to express their agreement or disagreement with state official decisions that regard the Hungarian community”.18

The subsequent pages assess the progress of ethnocultural accommodation by outlining the major steps that have shaped this process. For purposes that regard structure and conciseness, I have drawn on a selective method of organizing the discourses that I critically analyze in Sections 1 and 2.19 The generalizations that emerge from the subsequent analysis portray the patterns of ‘mainstream’ minority and majority rhetoric. I acknowledge that intra-party contending voices have emerged, as well as debates about how representative of the Hungarian minority’s claims UDMR actually is. However, since they have not significantly impacted the decision-making process, I do not focus on analyzing these “dissenting” opinions.

The Legal Framework on Language and Education Rights

This sub-section briefly outlines the three key legal items that include relevant provisions for minorities in terms of language and education rights: Romania’s Constitution, the Education Law and the Local Public Administration Law. The first marker of interethnic relations in post-communist Romania was the adoption of the 1991 Constitution. The definition of the Romanian nation that is constitutionally enshrined and the minority-relevant provisions (even after the 2003 revision) fall under the scope of what Robert M. Hayden has termed constitutional nationalism20 a constitutional and legal framework that offers more privileges to the members

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18 Author’s interview with Attila Szász, July 2007, Bucharest. Cultural autonomy has been regarded by UDMR as the “common denominator” between the different needs and demands of the members of the Hungarian minority, an institutional solution which would serve both the interests of ethnic Hungarians that make up the local majority and of those that are a local minority.


of the ethnic nation rather than placing all the state’s citizens on an equal level.\textsuperscript{21}

The use of minority language has four levels of concretization and implementation in Romania: education, public administration, the judiciary and the media. Although UDMR rhetoric has argued for the granting of language rights in all these four areas of public life, education and public administration have been its two landmarks throughout the post-communist period. For this reason, these two dimensions are also the ones that this article centers on.

The \textit{Law on Education} was initially passed in 1995 (Law No. 84/1995) and amended in 1997\textsuperscript{22} and 1999.\textsuperscript{23} Initially restrictive of language and education rights for minorities, the Education law presently guarantees recognition for Romania’s national minority languages. Moreover, the recently approved law for the ratification of the \textit{European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages} by the Romanian Parliament (Law No. 282/2007) states that the provisions of the Second Part of the

\textsuperscript{21} The minority-relevant articles in Romania’s Constitution are Article 1.1, 2.1., 4.1., 13, 32.3., 58, 120, 152.
\textsuperscript{22} Government Decree No. 36/1997 for the Modification and Completion of the Law on Education No. 84/1995.

Charter apply to the following 10 minority or regional languages in Romania: Albanian, Armenian, Greek, Italian, Yiddish, Macedonian, Polish, Romani, Ruthenian and Tartar.

Articles 118 and 119 stipulate that the “persons belonging to national minorities have the right to study and be taught in their mother tongue at all levels and forms of education, under the terms of the law, without obstructing the study of and teaching in the official language of the state”. Also, “depending on local necessities, classes, units or schools with tuition in minority languages can be organized \textit{at request}”. Article 120 has been one of the main burning questions, as it stipulates that history and geography are to be taught in Romanian, and so has been the issue concerning state higher education in minority languages. Debates on these provisions, quite permissive under the letter of the law and still with a significant potential for discrimination in practice have been very heated.

The 1991 \textit{Local Public Administration Law}\textsuperscript{24} also prompted stern criticism on the part of the Hungarian party. The key dispute revolved around Article 54, whose provisions introduced the Romanian language as the sole official language in local administrative proceedings. The revised form of the

law was passed in 2001 (Law No. 215/2001). Articles 17 and 90.2 specify that in the case of the administrative-territorial units in which the members of national minorities exceed 20% of the total population, they are entitled to use their own language in dealings with administrative authorities.

Minority Rhetorical Patterns: Language and Education Claims

Analyzing the parliamentary debates on the Education Law and the Local Public Administration Law, this sub-section extracts the Hungarian party’s rhetorical patterns on minority language and education rights. UDMR mainstream discourse has been concise, structured and consistent in its references to minority language rights. The party’s claims for language and education rights (cultural autonomy) have shown remarkable constancy throughout the post-communist period, although other key demands (e.g. territorial autonomy) have been selectively emphasized depending on short-term political aims and political alliances. Regardless of variations in tone and format, the core part of their assertions has been persistent.

After an initial period when UDMR structured its rhetoric around the concept of autonomy (1990-1996), it persistently and effectively prioritized the claims for minority linguistic and educational rights as the strategic means of integration of the Hungarian minority in Romanian society (1996 onwards). This rhetoric shift signaled a change of perspective which aimed at the gradual extension of Romania’s minority rights framework (the so-called “small steps strategy”). UDMR strategy during 1996-2004 aimed at enlarging the framework for individual rights granted to members of national minorities; as such, autonomy-talk was temporarily sidelined. It is, however, important to note that the party’s shift in rhetoric on minority rights has been strongly interlinked with the change of government that occurred in Romania after the 1996 elections, which brought to power more accommodating majority elites.

Education is one of the most sensitive and significant areas of minority and majority nation-building, especially as minority demands for language and education rights are not self-contained, but interlock with requests for more comprehensive autonomy-granting institutional arrangements. The establishment of state education institutions with tuition exclusively in

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26 UDMR has constantly been present in the Romanian Parliament throughout the post-communist period and has formed governmental and parliamentary alliances with both the center-left and center-right majority parties.

27 Author’s interview with Attila Szász, July 2007, Bucharest.
Hungarian (at all levels) has continuously been a key point on the political agenda of the Hungarian ethnic party. The UDMR aim to set up a state-financed Hungarian University is one of the means for cultural and elite reproduction, and for equal opportunities. This aim – a recurrent theme of UDMR rhetoric - is therefore a mechanism that conveys the nationalizing stance of the Hungarian ethnic party. The claim for the establishment of an autonomous university is thus a “key institution of nation-building”. As such, “the struggle for the university went far beyond educational issues”, in that language and education rights became the showground from which initially antagonistic minority and majority rhetoric subsequently emerged as more cooperative. The following three captions analyze what I identify as being the key UDMR rhetorical patterns.

Minority Claims for Substantial Equality

UDMR discourse has constantly identified the values that the Hungarian ethnic party associates with the accommodation of ethnocultural diversity in Romania, as well as with Romania’s integration in the EU: equality, tolerance, multiculturalism, ethnic pluralism and solidarity. This is the first key rhetorical pattern.

The rhetorical patterns of majority and minority political actors show a conflicting approach to equality. While the Hungarian ethnic party elites understand equality to mean equal de facto opportunities, majority political elites generally interpret this principle as de jure indiscriminative stipulations. This interpretation of equality is also constitutionally rooted. As will be detailed in Section 2, majority political actors have often translated minority definition of interethnic equality as

28 The Hungarian Bolyai University in Cluj was a separate institution until 1959, when following a decision of the Romanian Communist Party, the institution merged with the Romanian Babeș University. This was a landmark in the curtailment of the language and education rights of the Hungarian minority under communist rule. The prior existence of a state-financed separate Hungarian-language higher-education institution provides additional legitimation for UDMR claims for minority education rights.


31 Art. 32 of Romania’s 1991 Constitution stipulated that the preservation of minority identity should be conducted in agreement with the principles of equality and non-discrimination in relation to the other Romanian citizens. Note must be made of the fact that the 2003 revised form of the Constitution contained the same stipulation – Art. 6.
positive discrimination, which in turn does not fit their own static definition of the principle of equality.

In the interpretation of Péter Eckstein-Kovács (UDMR president until 1993), equality means that national minority pupils [h]ave the right to study [Romania’s history and geography] in their own language and […] a history that also reflects their past and which is not in an antagonistic stance with the majority […]32

In Senator Béla Markó’s reading, the preservation of Hungarian cultural and language identity is also inherently linked with the integration of the Hungarian community into Romanian society and also with their status as equal (not “second-rank”33) Romanian citizens. In other words, UDMR’s interpretation is that equality comes from state recognition, protection and promotion of the cultural heritage of national minorities. To summarize, UDMR conception of equality is of a substantial kind: it deems that the appropriate means to prevent discrimination is to establish rights that – although to some extent different on article - are targeted at creating de facto equal conditions. Repeated references to multiculturalism and ethnic solidarity are rhetorically used to reject the “ideal that a nation state ought to be ethnically homogeneous”.34 UDMR generally displays a discourse with cooperative and amiable overtones, while its arguments are largely of a legal and/or moral nature, and are poised at specific demands.

Coupled with references to interethnic tolerance and dialogue, UDMR rhetoric has constantly referred to the gap between the legal framework and the actual implementation. A demand for de facto equality is thus recurrently made, an argument that strikes against the majority’s will to formally comply with EU conditionality, but to defer the implementation level of its commitments.

Minority Claims for Integration

A second key rhetorical pattern has been the integration of the Hungarian community into Romanian society. Ethnic Hungarian elites generally justify their allegations on the basis of two main elements: the minority-relevant articles in Romania’s Constitution and the provisions of international conventions and treaties

that Romania has signed and/or ratified. To offer just one example, Senator Eckstein-Kovács substantiates his claim to education in minority languages by referring to Article 16 in the Romanian 1991 Constitution, which prescribes equality of rights for all Romania’s citizens. This type of rhetoric reflects a will to integrate into the larger Romanian society, but also to preserve the language and cultural Hungarian specificity.

It is interesting to note that integration has generally been used as a term that challenges the assimilationist view argued by UDMR to shape the mainstream approach of majority parties:

Integration (as opposed to assimilation) cannot occur through the isolation that is apparent if the Romanian language isn’t handled well by ethnic Hungarians.

Moreover, indications of the will of the Hungarian community to integrate into Romanian society is often coupled with references to the UDMR demand for the right to use the Hungarian language as a “factor of the right to preserve identity”, which “appears as a constitutional right and denotes a means against assimilation.” This line of argumentation is linear and enduring in UDMR rhetoric regardless of the context, as it generally leads to

[t]he vital interest of the Hungarians in Romania is to have their own, independent education system in the end, which includes the entire network of higher education institutions.

As for linguistic integration, UDMR has repeatedly argued that

[g]ranting rights to minorities, especially linguistic rights, can be beneficial not simply to that respective community, but on the society as a whole.

UDMR discourse often draws attention to the idea of the party’s involvement in issues other than those concerning the community it represents, which is depicted as a course of action that confirms the will of the Hungarian minority to integrate into Romanian society. Minority rhetoric has

35 Art. 16.1 (1991): “Citizens are equal in front of the law and public authorities, without privileges and discriminations”. After the 2003 Constitutional revision, this article has identical provisions.
37 Ibid, p. 2.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 9.
40 Author’s interview with Attila Szász, State Counselor, April 2007.
41 This line of argument is also explored by Dan Chiribucă and Tivadar Magyari, “Impact of Minority Participation in Romanian Government”, in Monica Robotin, Levente Salat (eds.), A New Balance: Democracy and Minorities in
emphasized that the preservation of Hungarian cultural and language identity runs counter neither to the community’s integration into Romanian society nor to the due respect for Romania’s official language. UDMR has repeatedly argued the claims for Hungarian language education do not exclude the study of the Romanian language, whose “mandatory status” the party sustains.

UDMR representatives’ demand that Romania’s history and geography be taught in Hungarian within the Hungarian-language education institutions has stirred heated parliamentary debates. A key UDMR argument has been that the study of the Romanian language should not be done through learning history and geography, but through the study of Romanian language and literature. UDMR has repeatedly quoted Article 120 of the Government Decree 36/1997, which relates precisely with the aforementioned contentious issue. The prevailing minority argument refers to the purpose of those two subject matters, which would be modified by being taught in the Romanian language. The purpose would no longer be that of teaching Romania’s history and geography, but of teaching Romanian.

Senator Markó has also repeatedly underlined that UDMR’s demand for language rights is twofold: full rights for minorities to study in their mother tongue, coupled by the need for members of ethnic communities to acquire extensive knowledge of the Romanian language. UDMR has constantly acknowledged that the isolation of the Hungarian community is not desirable, and that integration and full equality of rights are dependent on knowledge of the Romanian language.

Minority Claims for Partnership with the Majority

As Romania drew closer to EU accession, UDMR rhetoric was shaped by new and significant discursive elements. Hence, the call for “cooperation” and “dialogue” began to be correlated with an appeal that all political forces in Romania ought to make a “common effort towards Romania’s integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures”. The idea of a minority - majority partnership became recurrent starting with the change of regime in 1996.

Post-Communist Europe (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2003), pp. 69-91.
UDMR leaders emphasized the necessity for EU integration:

We need to get to a united Europe, where there is no discrimination between majority and minority […] where the existence of minorities is not a problem, but a chance, where equality of chances is real […] where subsidiarity and different forms of autonomy find their natural place and strengthen democracy.46

It is surprising to see that the European Union is seen in a unified manner and countries with known contentious minority issues are entirely overlooked. Moreover, UDMR rhetoric neglected the existence of double standards for minority rights, as the EU does not have a common coherent legal framework for minority rights.47 References to international norms and standards for minority protection48 and to Romania’s Constitution have been a legitimizing rhetorical device for the party’s claims and also an indictment tool for Romania’s non-compliance or deficient implementation of existing laws. Along these lines, Senator Markó has been one leading UDMR figure to point out the dual dimension of minority protection in Romania: formal compliance with international stipulations and endless protraction on the implementation level.49

Overall, Section 1 has shown that minority claims during 1996-2004 were articulated by calling upon equality and integration as key principles. These findings describe UDMR demands for language and education rights as being of a substantial type (equality of chances). Integration has had a twofold target: a national level – integration into Romanian society – and an international level – Romania’s integration into the EU. UDMR’s option for a discourse debates. Until 2001, the right of the minorities to use their respective mother tongue in judicial dealings and administration was disregarded from a legal viewpoint. This came into contradiction with the commitments that Romania made when signing FCNM, ECRML and Recommendation 1201 issued by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It is important to observe that Article 20 in Romania’s Constitution (2003) stipulates that international law and treaties take precedence over Romanian legislation in human rights related issues.

48 International documents are often mentioned by UDMR during parliamentary
that promotes the integration of minorities has significantly contributed to the progress of ethnocultural accommodation in Romania and has resulted in “power-sharing” arrangements throughout 1996-2004.

The Post-1996 Rhetoric Shift: Majority “Concessions” on Minority Claims for Language and Education Rights

Following the 1996 elections, Romania’s governing elites have opted for Euro-Atlantic integration. The state’s compliance with the 1993 Copenhagen political criteria is to be explained by “the logic of consequentiality”.50

The present section outlines and analyzes the key rhetorical reactions of the main majority political parties to minority claims for language and education rights. Parliamentary debates on the proposed amendments to the 1995 Education Law (1997, 1999) and the Local Public Administration Law (2001) represent the framework for the ensuing categorization of rhetorical patterns.

Radical Opposition to Language and Education Minority Rights: PRM and PUNR Rhetorical Patterns

The two majority parties that have exhibited fairly homogenous and constant rhetorical patterns across 1990-2007 are PRM (“Greater Romania” Party) and PUNR (National Unity Party of Romanians). The shifts that did occur in PRM and PUNR rhetoric were triggered by the political coalitions that these parties formed. The gap between reality and these parties’ rhetoric is remarkable; what also strikes one is the salience with which certain anti-Hungarian (not necessarily anti-minority) rhetorical patterns have kept their intensity throughout the post-communist period (differences in tone, style and form are easily detectable, but there is no genuine shift in substance).

The first PRM and PUNR rhetorical pattern that can be extracted from the debates on the amendments to the Law on Education and the Local Public Administration Law is the historicization of UDMR’s claims for language and education rights. Past events or perceived threats have been persistently brought into play and have been framed in a line of continuity with present events – often by the use of an unruly and offensive tone. The intended purpose was to divert the focus to contentious historical topics and to

increase popular support for their parties.

The second key rhetorical theme expounded by PRM and PUNR has warned against the alleged irredentist claims of Hungary over Transylvania. Such calamitous warnings have usually been coupled with suspected conspiracy theories concerning “external interference” in Romania’s domestic affairs. UDMR supposedly endorsed these actions, through allegedly “unconstitutional” claims that posed threats to Romania’s territorial integrity and national unity.

Language rights as those claimed by UDMR were, however, represented by PRM rhetoric as structuring “university education on ethnic criteria” and respectively as promoting “segregation on racial criteria [...]”51. The debates on language and education rights have not only centered on the right to use minority languages in public, but also for the status of majority languages. PRM and PUNR rhetoric has always projected a negative image on UDMR claims of territorial and language autonomy and depicted them as immediate threats for Romanian identity and state integrity. There have been constant references to the “obscure interests”52 of “external” actors that aim at breaking Romania’s national unity and territorial integrity; there have also been concerted attacks against the political establishment, which is accused of having granted “privileges” to minorities as a consequence of yielding to UDMR “blackmail” and “aberrant demands”.53

Moderate Opposition against Language and Education Rights: PDSR Rhetorical Patterns

This sub-section proposes an analysis of PDSR rhetoric (PDSR became the Social Democratic Party - PSD - in 2001). Throughout 1996-2004, PDSR’s rhetoric can be split into two stages, which overlap with the party’s time in opposition and in governance respectively. PDSR has constantly tried to juggle with its discursive trends depending on the context. As opposed to PRM and PUNR, the fact that its rhetoric has been more restrained regarding minorities has allowed it to afford a balancing act between its political alliances with ultranationalist parties and its coalitions with the UDMR (2000-2004), as well as boding well to EU monitoring eyes.

During the 1996-2000 period, PDSR’s anti-Hungarian rhetoric was strongly interlocked with its status as a party in opposition and was marked by anti-governing coalition overtones. The 2000-2004 period saw PDSR’s comeback in power, when due to the positive shift in the approach to Euro-Atlantic integration, the party’s rhetoric

51 Anghel Stanciu (PRM), transcript of discourse in Romania’s Official Journal, 2nd Part, Parliamentary Debates in the Chamber of Deputies, Year, No. 121, 24 June 1999, p. 31.
52 Ibid, p. 7.
53 Ibid.
(under a new name – PSD - and slightly reformed leadership, but a similar political doctrine) displayed a significant change in what regards minority rights.

In opposition, PDSR has often combined tirades against the UDMR with outbursts against the “political transactions” of the governing coalition. Party representatives rhetorically created a frame that depicted the Romanian parties as accomplices of UDMR. Concerted political attacks were frequent: the governing coalition allegedly “takes on a great historical responsibility by systematically conceding to the autonomist claims of the UDMR”, which are “irredeemable mistakes, whose future consequences could threaten the spiritual identity of the Romanian people”. Concerted rhetoric attacks against the governmental coalition warned against the dangers posed by extensive minority rights; the discourse had as its main target actions supporting “collective rights” resulting in “territorial autonomy on ethnic grounds” were allegedly perilous for the “unity and territorial integrity of the state”.

Although not in government during 2000-2004, UDMR supported PDSR in Parliament, on the basis of four yearly protocols that the two parties signed. During this period, PDSR adopted a discourse that favored language rights. That period marks the PDSR rhetoric shift from warning against the dangers posed by minority rights to acknowledging that “multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are not attempts to dynamite national states”.

Whereas PDSR often argued that “additional” minority rights are “privileges”, the shift in argument marks a 180 degree turn: Năstase (Romania’s Prime Minister at the time) argued that if language rights were granted, then the Romanian state would gain considerable leverage in “requiring that the Romanian language be learnt by all its citizens”. The newly acquired Euro-conformity of PDSR rhetoric is in line with the fact that the adoption of the Local Public Administration law had a strategic importance for Romania’s EU accession process.

PDSR’s change of rhetorical tactics finds its explanation in a context that was markedly different in 2001 than in 1991 (and even 1996). The pay-off of employing the theme of EU integration for political and electoral purposes

55 Ibid.
57 Adrian Năstase (PSD), transcript of discourse in Romania’s Official Journal, 2nd Part, Parliamentary Debates in the Senate, Year XII, No. 25, 2 March 2001, p. 22.
58 Ibid.
became considerably higher than that of using overt anti-Hungarian nationalistic slogans. The fine-tuning of PDSR discourse occurred in such a way that “group rights” were no longer overtly disavowed as threats to Romania’s national security. Key words such as “equality” or “non-discrimination” were included to indicate that the party supported such values.

2.3. Moderate Supporters of Language and Education Rights: Rhetorical Patterns of PNȚCD, PD and PNL

Interventions of other majority parties in the debates concerning minority language use in education and public administration have been considerably more reduced in numbers. The following paragraphs analyze the rhetorical patterns of PNȚCD (Christian-Democratic National Peasants’ Party), PD (Democratic Party) and PNL (National Liberal Party); these have been the main political parties making up the Democratic Convention (CDR) coalition that governed Romania during 1996-2000. CDR enlisted UDMR as a governing coalition partner.

The Christian-Democratic National Peasants’ Party (PNȚCD) rhetoric generally exhibits a reconciliatory tone, by arguing for the need to establish a permanent dialogue between majority and minority that enables the “preservation of culture and of the mother tongue”. PNȚCD has argued for the need to overhaul interethnic relations based on mutual “suspicion” and “mistrust”, in what on the whole represented a multiculturalism-prone discourse. PNȚCD supported the need to recognize that minority languages are part of the specific cultural traditions of minority communities. The party displayed a balanced type of rhetoric, which sets minority languages in the same framework as the majority official state language, while being considered as complementary, not mutually exclusive.

PNȚCD rhetorical arguments were also motivated by its political alliance with the UDMR and were meant to show the political support for the political measures mutually agreed on as part of the 1996-2000 Governing Program. “Multiculturalism is the technical solution that we need and is recommended by our history”: this phrase is consequential in that it epitomizes PNȚCD response to UDMR claims for the (re)establishment of the separate state Hungarian University. Multiculturalism instead of biculturalism has been the preferred option for minority education rights. It

needs to be emphasized that the coalition partners’ rhetoric did not favor the establishment of a separate Hungarian state university.61

What this stance proves, however, is that the Romanian political spectrum has largely been unified in the reluctance to grant extensive education rights in the mother tongue at all levels. The establishment of a state-financed Hungarian university has been the epitome of UDMR claims of cultural autonomy and, as such, has been continuously rejected by majority parties, regardless of the domestic or international context.

The rhetoric of the Democratic Party (PD) has been less minority accommodating than that of PNȚCD. PD representatives have argued that “democracy is inconceivable outside the state identity of the nation, while democratic life has at its basis national cohesion”.62 The right of minorities to preserve their cultural, ethnic and language identity is rhetorically acknowledged by PD, as are political pluralism and cultural diversity. However, PD rhetoric also exhibits a retrenching from these general statements on a subsequent level of rhetoric, one that strongly emphasizes the “unitary and national character of the Romanian state”.63 This dimension limits the previous statement and draws clear boundaries within which minority rights can be exercised—below the autonomy threshold.

What is arresting is that PD regards local autonomy as “outside the legal international standards, and can lead to the serious undermining of state sovereignty”.64 The issue of “collective rights” was very contentious for PD and was rhetorically transposed by arguments which have emphasized that “human rights, among which minority rights, address individuals, not collectivities”.65 PD continuously rejected the granting of “privileges” to minorities as harmful for Romania’s democratic consolidation. PD rhetoric has integrated direct references to minority language issues. The party’s arguments were also generally based on the principle of equality. PD interpretation of this concept is that it disallows any type of discriminations (including the positive type). PD rhetoric showed support for “private” education institutions for minorities, thereby implicitly rejecting the establishment of a state Hungarian higher education institution that would

61 It is also noteworthy to add that teaching is done in Hungarian in the Hungarian-language track in the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj, the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Târgu Mureș and in the Reformat Theology Institute in Cluj.


63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.
result in education autonomy for the Hungarian minority.

The rhetoric of the National Liberal Party (PNL) during the debates on the amendments to the Education Law supported the amendments as a whole and those relevant for minorities in particular. PNL also attempted to reduce the influence of claims that advocated the alleged danger that the extensive use of minority languages would pose for the integrity of Romanian as the official state language.

“Institutional, structural and mentality reform” were deemed as necessary by PNL rhetoric, a stand that had implicit pro-EU undertones. PNL justified the proposed amendments to the Education Law and the Local Public Administration Law through references to relevant articles in Romania’s Constitution and provisions of the Romania-Hungary Bilateral Treaty. The party rejected claims that the underlying connotation of Art. 17 of the Local Public Administration Law was that of introducing another official language: “There is no element that questions the sacred duty of every Romanian citizen to learn the Romanian language, in the spirit of Article 13 of the Constitution”.

Throughout their time in opposition (2000-2004), the Liberals (in coalition with the Democrats) reacted against UDMR claims and political stances (e.g. the Status Law debates, the 2004 Draft Bill for the Autonomy of the Székler Land submitted by the Székler National Council). These reactions have generally interlocked with negative assessments of the PSD – UDMR parliamentary coalition. Notwithstanding, PNL and PD won the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections and enlisted UDMR as a governing partner.

On the whole, PNL rhetoric has been balanced and quite consistent during 1996-2004 with respect to language and education rights. However, the party has supported the recognition and promotion of such rights only up to a certain level. Despite the fact that between 1996-2000, it was part of the governing coalition together with UDMR, its support for UDMR’s claims narrowed during the debates on the establishment of the state-financed Hungarian university. PNL has viewed the Romanian nation in civic terms and disavowed group rights as obstructing the voluntary adhesion of individuals to several identity groups. Hence,

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citizenship rather than ethnic belonging inform the Liberals’ standpoint.69

On the whole, Section 2 has shown that majority rhetoric concerning minority rights has been framed by two key variables during the 1996-2000 and 2000-2004 electoral cycles: the common will to integrate in Euro-Atlantic structures and domestic electoral politics aimed at preservation of political power. My analysis has also shown that there have been limits to the shift from conflictual to accommodating rhetoric on minority rights. Neither the external nor the internal factors have decreased the majority elites’ staunch opposition to granting rights that would result in various forms of autonomy for minority communities.

Although both minority and majority political actors have articulated their stances while appealing to the principles of equality and integration, their views have often been on contending paths. As the analysis of minority rhetorical patterns has shown, the Hungarian party has argued for a substantial type of equality. Conversely, Section 2 suggests that majority rhetoric has opted for a procedural type of equality, which restricts state affirmative action precisely on the grounds of equality.

Conclusions

Attempting to answer the initial research questions, my analysis has shown that the shifts in both minority and majority rhetoric have been context-dependent: EU conditionality and majority-minority political alliances (aimed at preservation of political power) have triggered significant fluctuations in rhetoric, and they have also been two of the key factors that led to a positive development of interethnic relations in post-communist Romania. The article does not claim these to be the only relevant factors, but minority and majority discourse have indeed most visibly reflected these rather than others.

While reacting to the aforementioned factors, as well as to each other’s rhetoric, minority and majority political parties have engaged in a “power-sharing” arrangement. Rhetorical stances on both sides have been more accommodating and the minority-majority political partnership resulted in the adoption of several laws that have led to a certain level of institutionalization of national minority protection in Romania. By minority standards, this level is still quite moderate. By majority standards, however, it has reached a significant peak, as majority parties continue to oppose forms of cultural/territorial autonomy as cogently as at the beginning of the 1990s.

Since Romania has acceded to the EU, a challenging research path that presents itself is the identification of other factors that will be prominent indicators of shifting discourse. Moreover, once coupled with an analysis of the mechanisms through which discourse leads to and is altered by the process of political action, such an undertaking (together with the one this article has carried out) would uncover valuable findings, and ought to be developed into tools for policy-making strategies aimed at encouraging ethnocultural dialogue in Romania.

By way of concluding, this article’s findings suggest that political elites have targeted the rhetoric manipulation of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic layers of identity as a foremost political resource. Rhetoric has been used to rally the Romanian majority and respectively the Hungarian minority around party goals. It is therefore a core ingredient in explaining the evolution of the interethnic process of accommodation in post-communist Romania. Since rhetoric epitomizes the political actors’ stances as marked by certain contextual factors, it is useful for both academic and policy-making purposes to analyze the role of discourse in the political compromises that have led to the expansion of minority rights’ framework in Romania.

The article has clearly indicated the inbuilt tension between the politics of equality and the recognition of difference, between securing and undercutting identity boundaries. Provided that the normative and pragmatic content of minority rights comes to be perceived as a means to serve larger purposes – unlocking new avenues for democratic participation and representation – then it seems likely that this sphere shall be less riven by contradictions and radical stances and more prone toward committed dialogue.

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CITIZENSHIP REGULATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP AT BIRTH AND THROUGH REGULAR NATURALIZATION IN SIXTEEN POSTCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Costică Dumbravă
MA European Union Studies
Leiden University, the Netherlands
costicadumbrava@gmail.com

Abstract

The article brings a contribution to the comparative study of citizenship policies. Little systematic research in the area has been centered on Eastern Europe and the few references in the literature emphasize the illiberal, nationalistic or ethnic character of citizenship regimes in the region. After criticizing Howard’s account on the liberalization of citizenship regimes in Europe, an extensive analysis of citizenship regulations in sixteen postcommunist countries from Eastern Europe is employed in order to emphasize the heterogeneous character of citizenship regimes and the main trends. Rather than “illiberal”, citizenship rules in postcommunist Eastern Europe are divergent and arrested by different if not antagonistic tendencies, as regarding to open-ness and restrictive-ness.

Introduction

Citizenship is a multilayered normative concept and an intricate political and legal instrument. The interest in citizenship has grown in the last decades due to genuine transformations at different levels: global (increased economic interdependence, human rights revolution), regional (regional integration, fall of communism in Eastern Europe) and domestic (welfare, migration and minority issues). The existing literature in the area of citizenship is primarily focused on normative aspects (ideological ingredients, normative strata, models and challenges).

Rather than assessing or adjusting the available normative framework on citizenship, this article deals with empirical configuration of citizenship regimes, namely the formal regulations enforced by certain states in order to control the access to and the exit from the polity. There is limited research on empirical citizenship and the existing works are most often non-systematic or case-based while their focal point rarely goes beyond the Western world (West/non-communist Europe and North America)\textsuperscript{268}. When not simply

\textsuperscript{268}Marc M. Howard, “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-
ignored, the citizenship regimes in Eastern Europe are featured as illiberal, nationalistic or ethnic. Are citizenship regimes in Eastern Europe illiberal? Is there such a homogenous Eastern citizenship regime to be identified throughout the region?

This article challenges the liberal-illiberal dichotomy in the area of citizenship by suggesting an alternative analytical framework based on the less ideological concepts of open-ness and restrictive-ness. Although it does not engage into a comparative analysis between East and West, the study makes use of a particular theoretical model, Howard’s citizenship index, in order to show how Western-tailored scheme fail to address the assortment of citizenship regimes in Eastern Europe, but contribute to the continuation of the East/West dichotomist thinking, mainly by i-liberalizing the East.

Finally, the study unfolds an extensive survey on citizenship rules with regard to birth rights and un-facilitated naturalization in sixteen postcommunist countries. From the outset, it aims at shooting the general picture and the main trends in the field during the first decade after the collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe. It may serve as a basis for further investigations to explain the structural and contingent factors of change, but it does not provide such explanations. Its less ambitious aim is to dismiss the dichotomist approaches and to suggest a better theoretical tool of classifying citizenship regimes in order to avoid reductionism and ideological labeling.

**Liberal West v. Restrictive East**

One of the main theses in the field of citizenship is that citizenship rules become more liberal, liberalization being understood mainly as relaxation of the rules of access. Based on Western experiences and designed to capture relevant Western phenomena, (mainly related to past and present immigration) most of the theoretical tools dealing with liberalization of citizenship, are likely to unfold a distorted picture when applied outside the Western world.

In the early 2000s, Patrick Weil challenged Brubaker’s account on the nature of the transformation in citizenship rules by rejecting his cultural determinism (conception of nationhood) and linking the transformation/liberalization of citizenship policies with: a certain configuration of legal tradition, a significant pressure coming from immigration, and a general framework of democracy and stable
According to Joppke, liberalization of citizenship covers three dimensions: conditional ius soli for second- and third-generation migrants, facilitated naturalization rules (lower residence time requirements, lower degrees of cultural assimilation and more friendly administrative procedures) and greater toleration of dual citizenship (as following the 1997 European Convention of Nationality).

The liberalization thesis is validated by Marc Howard with respect to the states of EU 15 (and additionally to other 10 countries from Eastern Europe) after having analyzed three main elements of citizenship regulations: citizenship right at birth (ius soli for second generation immigrants), residence requirements (minimum period of residence before submitting an application for naturalization) and dual citizenship (if allowed for naturalized persons). Using a numeric scale (Citizenship Policy Index- CPI), Howard compares and classifies the citizenship policies in two different moments (1980s-2000s). His conclusions indicate that ten out of fifteen EU countries have changed their citizenship policies in a liberal direction while all ten Eastern European countries have remained relatively restrictive.

Having extended the number of Eastern European countries and having changed the period of the survey (1990-2000s), I updated CPI in an attempt to catch the evolution of citizenship policies in the region during the controversial period that followed the fall of communism. As presented in Table 1, Howard’s aggregate scheme brakes the cases into two large categories: “restrictive” (five in 1990s and four in 2000s) and “medium” (eleven in 1990s and twelve in 2000s).


### Table 1: Howard’s Citizenship Policy Index- (extended and updated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Codification</th>
<th>Ius soli for sec. generation No/ 0p; Yes/2p</th>
<th>Residence &gt;10 years/ 0p; 6-9 years / 1p &lt;5 years/ 2p</th>
<th>Renunciation- of former citizenship No/ 0p; Yes/2p</th>
<th>Scores 0/6 0-1= restrictive (R) 2-4= medium (M) 5-6= liberal (L)</th>
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*(Restrictive (4): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovenia; Medium (12): Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FRY/Serbia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia; Liberal (0).)*
The initial problem of Howard’s scheme lays in its normative assumptions. What is liberal or illiberal with concern to citizenship regimes? If liberalization is understood as relaxation of rules, then any reform that introduces additional requirements is inexorably illiberal. The recent introduction of civic integration tests for newcomers in certain Western countries (Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germany) was indeed seen as an illiberal venture, promoting a “repressive” form of liberalism - liberal aims pursued by illiberal means. But what kind of liberalism is referred to? Normatively, liberals have been committed to design and promote a fair organization of the state based on a rightful relationship between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves. The liberal norms cannot help with deciding the legitimate boundaries of the polity more than, maybe, requiring clear or transparent rules of access. Most of the liberal works, including Rawl’s, take for granted the existence of the established national states and their legitimate control over their territorial and human borders.

Historically, all the states have been organized like selective clubs, making clear distinction between citizens and foreigners and deciding autonomously, and sometimes arbitrarily, which of the foreigners and under what circumstances are they to become citizens. It is dubious to label “liberal” a state that does not require anything from foreigner in change of citizenship status and “illiberal” a state that imposes numerous conditions. In this regard, the international norm on citizenship talks about a “genuine link” between citizens and the state, a requirement that would appear superfluous, therefore disregarded, by a “true” liberal state.

Beyond the problematic association between “liberal” and “non-restrictive”, Howard’s scheme does not clearly differentiate between various categories of applicants: ius soli for which category of applicants (stateless children, foundlings, children of foreign citizens)? Whose naturalization (of simply foreigners, spouses of citizens, co-ethnics)? Furthermore, the scale itself is very narrow because it does not include important requirements and possible burdens for applicants, such as language tests, criminal records or legal proof of income. Howard’s findings are at least puzzling since the key factors that he takes into account need to be rethought.

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consideration may not be sufficient to depict the real character of the reforms. CPI does not take into account important policy changes, among which the introduction of integration tests in some Northern European countries. Finally, the liberal/restrictive scheme is constructed to deal with western cases (therefore, the weight put on ius soli) and, when applied in other contexts, it leads to artificial convergence by omission.

Since this article is mainly constructed as a critique of Howard’s scheme when applied to Eastern Europe it is worth mentioning that I understand that CPI was not especially designed for the measurement of citizenship in Eastern Europe and that the inclusion of the ten cases was rather subsidiary. However, its reductionism is to be shown bellow, while the scheme itself is to serve as a starting point for elaborating new analytical instruments.

The survey. Methodological aspects


Despite the fact that the time span is vaguely defined (1990s-2000s) and rather short, the survey is relevant due to the major and dense transformations occurred in the region (related to state and national reconstruction, political reconfiguration, economic transition, regional integration etc.). In the 1990s all states from Eastern Europe, except Poland (that added a piece of legislation regarding the expatriates in 2000) adopted new citizenship laws (some earlier-Romania, successor states; some later-Albania, Bulgaria). Some of the states did not change their citizenship regulations in the first postcommunist decade or changed them superficially (Croatia, Hungary, and Macedonia), others did modify them repeatedly or significantly (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania).
The survey focuses on the regulations regarding the acquisition of citizenship-at birth (ius soli, *ius sanguinis* and overlapping) and through regular naturalization (without facilitations). In discussing the naturalization rules, a numeric scale has been designed to measure the “restrictive”-ness of citizenship rules (0-20). The divide open/restrictive does not reiterate a substantive distinction such as: good/bad, liberal/illiberal, lawful/unlawful. The measurement does not follow any thick normative line; it starts from the intuitive perception that the most “open” state will grant citizenship automatically to anybody (non-residents, not proficient in the language or knowledgeable of the political or societal culture, possessing other or no citizenship and not willing to take any oath of allegiance, poor and maybe gravely ill and with criminal record) and the most ‘restrictive’ will grant citizenship only after satisfying a great number of conditions or it will not grant citizenship at all.

States have almost unrestricted powers to decide who their citizens are. In determining or preserving their human lot, states use certain techniques that may or may not be the object of frequent restructuring. Citizenship status is basically granted by birth right- ius soli (birth in the territory), *ius sanguinis* (descent from citizen/s) or combinations- and naturalization (normal or facilitated- marriage, statelessness, second generation residents, co-ethnics etc.). Auxiliary roads to citizenship are: marriage (in recent times marriage does not lead to automatic admission but only to facilitated naturalization), adoption, option (in special cases, such as secession, succession, repatriation).

The distinction between ius soli and *ius sanguinis* has been often used to back up the dichotomy between civic and ethnic. The rule of membership based on place (soli) corresponds to a civic conception of the nation and the rule based on blood (sanguinis) corresponds to an ethnic model of nationhood. However, the said principles alone cannot indicate the character of nationhood; they are different techniques to forge and reproduce a political community to be used in a non-exclusive and contextual way. Basically, ius soli has been used by settling societies (i.e. USA, Canada, and Australia) in order to integrate automatically second generation of immigrants, while *ius sanguinis* has been privileged by sending communities in order to maintain a link with their emigrants. While ius soli alone is rather an exception in Europe (Ireland removed it in 2005, 274 An emergent international norm regarding nationality is limited to issues such as statelessness, non-discrimination, citizenship in successor states.

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274 An emergent international norm regarding nationality is limited to issues such as statelessness, non-discrimination, citizenship in successor states.
France saved it in a modified form, and *ius sanguinis* is most frequently used, the common strategy is to utilize them in combination and tied to certain conditions (*ius soli* for stateless children, *ius sanguinis* for repatriates etc.).

For the purpose of this study, “single” *ius sanguinis* stands for the cases where only one parent is citizen and “double” *ius sanguinis* for the situation where both parents are citizens. Also, “exceptional” *ius soli* is used whenever the right is granted exceptionally, in situations independent of the actions/options of the child or his/her parents (statelessness, foundlings) and “conditional” *ius soli* for the cases where certain conditions need to be satisfied (registration, consent, residence, etc.).

Naturalization is the policy area where the greatest variety rests: some countries would require the minimum- limited time of residence and thin proofs of loyalty or integration, some others the maximum- long residence, thick proofs of cultural integration, criminal, political and moral record, undivided loyalty (renunciation of other citizenship), evidence of legal income and even health check.

In order to measure the restrictiveness of the naturalization regulations, the present codification took into consideration five categories of requirements: residence (4 points), integration-language and society/constitution (2+2 points), personal record-criminal and political (2+2 points), loyalty- dual citizenship and oath of allegiance (3+1 points) and welfare-income and medical situation (2+2 points).

**Citizenship at birth (1990s- 2000s)**

The main legal technique to “produce” citizens is granting citizenship through birth right. Theoretically, a state may choose to grant citizenship to any child born to one or both parents who were citizens at the moment of the child’s birth (*ius sanguinis*) or to all children born in its territory (*ius soli*), regardless of their parental status. Practically, states use the two principles in combination, solely or together with additional conditions (the status of parents, whether the child is found or stateless, whether other procedural steps are undertaken etc.).

Most postcommunist states from Eastern Europe reformed their citizenship rules in the early 1990s- with few exceptions: Poland preserved its citizenship law of 1962, Albania did not operate any change before 1998 and FRY and Bosnia Herzegovina introduced new laws in 1996, 1997 respectively. All sixteen countries included in the survey provided for unconditional
double ius soli and, (with the exception of Macedonia that made it conditional upon the parental consent) and automatic single *ius sanguinis* in correlation with ius soli. Eight of the countries opted for unconditional single *ius sanguinis* not associated with ius soli, and all others required additional conditions: parental consent (Albania, Latvia, and Lithuania), registration with the competent authority *(see Table 2)*.

A decade after and in spite of the adoption of new regulations, little changes have been effected the rules regarding the acquisition of citizenship through birth right. Double *ius sanguinis* has not been challenged while single *ius sanguinis* in association with ius soli remained automatic with the exception of the Macedonian case (where the parental consent is required). According to our findings, a relative opening of the citizenship policies may be traced down in the area of acquisition of citizenship at birth *(see Table 2)*. One more citizenship law provided for unconditional ius soli (Moldova, 2004) while in other three cases the situation of the stateless minors have been regularized (ius soli for stateless minors of resident parents-Macedonia, 2004, and special naturalization procedure for stateless minors of resident parents- Latvia, 1998; Estonia, 1998). Moreover, there are still two countries that do not have provisions for integration of the stateless children (Bulgaria, 2001 and Romania, 2003).
Table 2: Citizenship at birth 1990s-2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codification: 0p/automatic</th>
<th>Descendents of citizens</th>
<th>Non descendents</th>
<th>Scores 0/10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Born in</td>
<td>Born out</td>
<td>Born in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One parent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Both parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>citizen</td>
<td></td>
<td>citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| '90s | '00s | '90s | '00s | '90s | '00s | '90s | '00s | '90s | '00s | +/-
| Albania | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | / |
| Bosnia H. | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | / |
| Bulgaria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | / |
| Croatia | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | / |
| Czech Rep. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | / |
| Estonia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | -1 |
| FRY/Serbia | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | / |
| Hungary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | / |
| Latvia | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 4 | -1 |
| Lithuania | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | / |
| Macedonia | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 4 | -2 |
| Moldova | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | -4 |
| Poland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | / |
| Romania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | / |
| Slovakia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | / |
| Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | / |
Citizenship through regular naturalization (1990s-2000s)

Another legal way to create citizens is to grant citizenship to foreigners (foreign citizens or stateless) through naturalization. Unlike the first technique, citizenship acquired through naturalization is not based on a “right” but depends on certain procedural arrangements. The great diversity in the area of acquisition of citizenship lies with the rules of naturalization. The case of postcommunist Eastern Europe in the early 1990s does not represent an exception: countries like Bulgaria and Poland- with minimum requirement- share the floor with countries like Lithuania and Latvia- with numerous conditions and constraints (see Table 3).

A usual requirement for naturalization is having completed a minimum period of residence within the territory of the state, either as simple resident or as permanent resident (some countries do not specify). Except FRY (no past residence), all the other states required a minimum residence ranging from 5 (the most common-ten countries) to 15 years (the extreme case- Macedonia).

Another common prerequisite for naturalization is the knowledge of the official language of the state (or at least one of the official languages) to be proved through formal or informal evaluation. The great majority of the countries in the survey provided for such a proof of socio-cultural integration- with the exception of Bulgaria, FRY and Poland. In half of the cases, the knowledge of the Constitution or the history of the country has been enlisted among the requirements.

A special preoccupation with the personal quality of the would-be citizens have driven most of the states to ask for the criminal record of the applicants, either from within the country where the application is submitted or more extensive- from previous countries of residence. In exceptional cases (Moldova and Latvia) the present or past political activity or status of the applicant could lead to the rejection of the application for citizenship. In even more exceptional cases (Lithuania) the medical situation of the applicant- serious illness, could constitute a legitimate grant to decline the application. The feasibility check was also made by requiring proof of personal income (ten of the cases) in order to avoid any additional burden on the national social security system (major argument in the West).

Provisions regarding dual or multiple-citizenship are an alternative field of discordance in citizenship policies all over the world. The recent tendency to tolerate dual allegiance has limited
impact in postcommunist Eastern Europe where five of the states clearly rejected dual citizenship (Czech R., Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland) while other nine made the acquisition of citizenship conditional upon the renunciation of any other citizenship. However, many exceptions and uncertainties have been related to the situation of double citizenship. In some cases, individuals may not obtain a proof of release from the original state which is unwilling or unable to produce it, and in some others, states cannot easily verify the provided data in the absence of a coherent framework of international cooperation.

Political and constitutional reforms in Eastern Europe were not frozen with the turmoil of the early 1990s; on the contrary, domestic factors (economic transition, democratization, political shifts etc.) and external factors (bi- and multinational agreements, membership conditionality of the Council of Europe, the European Union etc.) determined a series of legislative re-adjustments that affected also the field of citizenship. Indeed, two of the countries in our survey modified their citizenship rules in the late 1990s (Albania and Latvia) and others in the early 2000s (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Estonia, Serbia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland and Romania).

A tendency towards moderation can be identified in the evolution of the citizenship policies with regard to naturalization (see Table 3). There is no country without specific requirement related to past residence (in the 1990s, there were two) and the most encountered minimum period is five years. Two countries have significantly changed their naturalization rules- Bulgaria and Romania- and they did so mainly by upgrading their requirements related to residence and socio-cultural integration. Extreme requirements such as lengthy residence (15 years in Macedonia) and absence of severe illness (Lithuania) have been withdrawn. The reform of the Moldovan citizenship law is not totally shown in the codification due the fact that significant changes in the direction of open-ness (reduction of residence requirement and toleration of dual citizenship although the condition of renunciation remained in place) are counterbalanced by the introduction of the oath.
Table 3: Acquisition of citizenship through regular naturalization (1990s/2000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Codification</th>
<th>Past Residence</th>
<th>Proof of integration</th>
<th>Personal records</th>
<th>Proof of loyalty</th>
<th>Well-being</th>
<th>Country Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lang.</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>Politic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No/ 0p 0-3/ 1p</td>
<td>No/ 0p Test/ 2p 4-5/ 2p</td>
<td>No/ 0p Test/ 2p 6-9/ 3p</td>
<td>No/ 0p Yes/ 2p</td>
<td>Unconditional allowed/ 0p Renunciation required/ 2p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia H.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY/Serbia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Citizenship Regimes in Eastern Europe: how Different?

Unlike in the Western Europe, states in the Eastern Europe do not face significant challenges related to labor migration. The main issue associated with integration through citizenship is the presence of a great number of stateless persons and refugees throughout the area. Before commenting on the citizenship rules in Eastern Europe it is necessary to notice that soon after the fall of communism most of the states in the area confronted a great deal of salient problems ranging from civil war to economic and political struggles, in the shade of which citizenship issues were easily overlooked. The modest public pressure put on issues of citizenship had also to do with the long history of the authoritarian regimes in which “citizenship was devoid of most rights normally attached to it and, as a consequence, largely irrelevant as a ‘political’ good in the eyes of citizens”.

It is obvious that the citizenship rules in Eastern Europe were not convergent in 1990s and continued not to be so in 2000s. As I have shown in the first section, Howard’s aggregate scheme cannot capture the heterogeneous character of the citizenship regulations in postcommunist Eastern Europe. It is reductionist by throwing the cases in only two categories and then suggesting the illiberal character of the regulations throughout the region. It also fails to grasp some aspects of policy evolution; for example, it overrates the changes in Moldovan law, but it overlooks the amendments of the Bulgarian and Romanian regulations.

In order to avoid such shortcomings, a more neutral codification needs to be devised, eventually replacing the term “liberal” with “open”. The fact that some states are not “open” (according to the scores) does not necessarily mean that they are not liberal- exclusion and national privilege comes together with many practices of any liberal state. In any case, the question of open-ness and restrictive-ness is relevant most of all with regard to issues of naturalization. Little variance may be encountered in the regulations regarding acquisition of birth. Privileging one principle (soli or sanguinis) to the detriment or disregard of the other does not say much about the open-ness or restrictive-ness of the policy. Important questions arise in relation to the justifications and the normative and practical consequences of the state’s choices in this regard, but they all fall beyond the purpose of this study.

Naturalization rules constitute the privileged scene for diversity in citizenship policies. In order to measure the open-ness, and restrictive-ness of a citizenship regime, I designed a new

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scale that aggregates the scores registered in the codification (see Table 4). When analyzing the scale, one can easily notice that in the 1990s countries spread along the last five categories of the scale, with no case on the extreme openness and one case of the extreme restrictive-ness with the majority of the cases concentrated in the middle (with a slight bias towards the restrictive-ness side).

For the period of 2000s (when ten of the countries operated changes in their citizenship rules) the naturalization scale indicates five shifts in the positioning of the countries: three upwards (Serbia, Lithuania, and Moldova) and two downwards (Bulgaria- the most spectacular, and Romania). Despite the fact that no case is to be found at the restrictive end of the scale, and that more countries moved upwards than downwards, the whole scale moved in a restrictive direction with an accumulation of cases (eight) on the moderate-restrictive level. The two countries that significantly changed their naturalization rules, Bulgaria and Romania, moved both towards more restrictive policies (residence, socio-cultural integration). However, extreme requirements such as minimum residence of 15 years (Macedonia) and the discriminatory reference to medical status of the applicant (Lithuania) have been removed.
Table 4: Naturalization scale 1990s- 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Very open</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate (open)</td>
<td>8 - 10</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FRY, Romania, Slovakia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate (restrictive)</td>
<td>11 - 13</td>
<td>Albania, Czech R., Hungary, Macedonia, Slovakia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>14 - 16</td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, Moldova</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very restrictive</td>
<td>17- 20</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2000s</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Very open</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
<td><em>Serbia</em> (↑), Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate (open)</td>
<td>8 - 10</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovakia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate (restrictive)</td>
<td>11 - 13</td>
<td>Albania, <em>Bulgaria</em> (↓↓), Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, <em>Romania</em> (↓), <em>Moldova</em> (↑), Slovenia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>14 - 16</td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, <em>Lithuania</em> (↑)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very restrictive</td>
<td>17- 20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The first aim of this article was to test the feasibility of Western-based, theoretical instruments dealing with citizenship to grab the complex picture of citizenship regimes in the Eastern Europe. In this respect, the employment of the Howard’s scheme shed little light over the configuration and dynamics of citizenship rules in the sixteen countries from the survey. It only helped proving the overall restrictive character of the citizenship regimes in Eastern Europe by means of oversimplification and reductionism.

The second and the third aim of the study were to present a consistent picture of the recent developments in the citizenship rules of sixteen postcommunist countries and to provide an alternative method to rescue the complexity of the citizenship rules. During the last decades citizenship policies have been reformed in almost all countries from Eastern Europe. The analysis provided that citizenship policies in the region were divergent in the 1990s and remained divergent enough one decade after (although many of them have been reformed). In order to avoid normative ambiguity and technical imprecision (convergence by omission) the liberal/restrictive-type scheme (Howard’s style) was replaced with an open/restrictive scale. When measuring the character of change the conclusion was that citizenship regulations in Eastern Europe have not been altered substantially in the past years. Limited changes were related to a relative general open-ing of the regulations regarding acquisition of citizenship at birth (integration of stateless persons in Estonia, Latvia and Macedonia) and a relative restrict-ing of the regulations regarding naturalization (with Bulgaria and Romania in the first line). There is little evidence for arguing in favor of the convergence either through opening up, or through closing up of citizenship regimes.

As declared in the beginning, the article represents only a starting point for further investigation in the area and it offers little explanations of the scrutinized facts and trends. Although complex and diverse, citizenship rules cannot be isolated from the political and socio-economic background in which they are employed. Much work has to be done to capture the significance of the policy change in the region but also to bridge the outcomes of various researches focused on different parts of the world and also on different periods of time.

Moreover, only reading the citizenship regulations is not enough for understanding the substance of the policies. The administrative and political discretion that rests with the application of the rules may lead to completely different results than those envisaged in the text of the laws. In this direction, further research has to be done to assess the reality of the citizenship regulations and the inevitable practical shortcomings attached to them (complicated, opaque...
administrative procedures, high fees, arbitrariness, political bias).

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Bosnia Herzegovina


Bulgaria


Croatia

Czech Republic


Estonia


Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ Serbia


Hungary

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Slovenia


BOOK REVIEWS


Author: Sergiu Gherghina
MPhil Student, Political Science Department, Leiden University
sergiulor@yahoo.com

If we resume the European history of the last two centuries, we chronologically have to emphasize the roles played by empires, revolutions, and nation-building. The remnants of the first two made the accomplishment of the former more difficult, but it also provides particular identities and specificities. Central Europe and the Balkans (CEB) are spaces that perfectly fit this description with a history marked by territorial claims (i.e. result of their independence from empires), ethnic and religious diversity, political oscillations, and identity struggles. Josette Baer’s book catches the complexities of these social realities in six CEB states through the eyes and minds of six 19th century representative thinkers and statesmen.

By analyzing the political ideas, values, and beliefs displayed by the 19th and early 20th centuries’ elite, the author’s goal implies academic and societal relevance for contemporary politics. Through process tracing, she aims to connect the intellectual history and the post-Communist evolutions of Czech Republic (Thomas Masaryk), Slovakia (Ludovic Štúr), Bulgaria (Stefan Stambolov), Macedonia (Krste Petkov Misirkov), Serbia (Ilija Garašanin), and Croatia (Ante Starčević). The analysis rests on four key categories, present at all but Misirkov, used to identify traits and specificities for each thinker and to allow comparisons: nation, region, history, and law. The results of the analysis refute the Huntingtonian hypothesis according to which religion plays a major role in the democratization process and provide support for the geographical proximity and political culture hypothesis advanced by Baer. The closer a state is to the Western world, the higher the interaction with the democratic and intellectual values and the more increased chances to democratize.

Structured in eight chapters, with individual emphasis on each thinker, the book not only describes intellectual ideas and contexts, but also identifies shortcomings and explains why specific political thoughts could not be translated into policies. The critical presentation of all thinkers, in a comparative manner that allows the summarization of their thoughts (p. 190), represents one strength of the volume. The philosophical complexities are interpreted and displayed in an easy-to-grasp language. This approach is possible by combining theoretical Western literature, historical and democratization literature from secondary sources with primary
documents that allow access to knowledge of country’s evolutions and thinkers texts. Regarding the latter, the author has the advantage to master the languages of all states under observation.

Another merit of the book is the methodological rigor and transparency. As an example of good practice, Baer starts by explaining the puzzle, asking a feasible research question, issues definition and conceptualization, and then setting the research design to solve the puzzle. The general theoretical framework is complemented by particular theories that accompany the textual analysis of every thinker. What results from each chapter is an informative and analytical output of the less explored CEB intellectuals. The process tracing qualitative method, specific to historical institutionalists, reveals important patterns of thought that are elaborated in the conclusive chapter of the book. Similarities in terms of rationalism; philosophical eclecticism; approaches to citizens, minorities and nationhood; and foreign policy are nuanced according to the agenda priorities and period when each of the thinkers lived. Interesting enough, thinkers of the countries that today have issues with minorities (Croatia and Serbia) did not emphasize this aspect in their discourses.

The contextual analyses that allow the comparability of observations represent further merits of this book. Every idea is embedded in its contemporary historical and political framework, the explanations being clear and persuasive to all readers. The author’s expertise allows her to address both the non-experts and the knowledgeable people in the field. Moreover, the multitude of analyzed topics attracts the interest of scholars in political philosophy, nationalism, democratization studies, and domestic and foreign policy. In this respect, the observations are made comparable by using similar reference points (e.g. the importance of Russia for foreign policy) and by adjusting the contextual differences (e.g. mid-19th century as opposed to early 20th century).

Despite these considerable merits, such a challenging book cannot avoid shortcomings that mainly arise from a methodological perspective. Its focus on qualitative techniques is appreciated through the necessary insight that it provides to the CEB intellectual tradition. However, the use of “correlation” (p. 198) in such a research design is misleading. Even a student in social science would expect to see quantitative techniques whenever this concept is used. Instead of figures and rough tables with numbers and correlation coefficients, Baer underlines a deeper mechanism that does not allow religion and democratization to go hand in hand. The reader should notice that the relationship is not present in the examined states, when the procedure for detecting it is closer to pattern matching or association (i.e. we can easily draw cross-tabs with categories for variables). At the same time, many might ask what are the bases for case
selection. Baer explicitly mentions that these are not representative cases of their areas, mainly selecting on the bases of language mastery (aware of access to primary sources) and on the dependent variables (i.e. democratization). The latter often produces selection bias, but as the purpose of this study is to provide particular conclusions for the observed states, the shortcoming is reduced.

Two final criticisms target the conceptual and analytical results. The conceptual emphasis put forth by Baer on the political culture comes to replace the vague concept of post-Communism that might not catch differences among states. The definition of political culture she advances does not include one element that might be crucial in understanding democratization – people’s attitudes. As the latter are considered a component of democratization, both rulers and governed perceive institutions’ roles and functions, and form expectations. The operationalization of political culture and the formulated hypothesis (p. 13) appear to leave aside this aspect. Finally, the shortcoming that weakens the argument of the paper resides in connecting 19th century thoughts and acts with post-1989 period. The process tracing method does not take into account almost a century out of which half was dominated by Communism in each of those states. The inter-war period might have shaped differently the political culture and intellectual ideas in all these states, whereas the red era that followed did it with a few generations. In 1989, all these states were gathered in two republics, and the vast majority of them had reduced intellectual activities during Communism. Institutions, foreign politics, ideas, and attitude were heavily affected by the various types of Communism and their influence should not be neglected. Even if Huntington’s religious thesis can be rejected and Baer’s vicinity hypothesis finds support even in the broader context of post-Communist Europe, this study ignores some major events that happened between the analyzed period and contemporary realities.

The significant amount of work, elaborated analytical framework, theoretical underpinnings, and critical approach make of Baer’s book a major contribution to the literature dealing with thinkers from transition states. The in-depth analysis of six Central European and Balkan states provides valuable evidence of intellectual activity during the nation building period in the region. Consequently, the book represents a point of departure in understanding contemporary approaches in these states.


Author: Ann von Below
BA in Politics and East European Studies, UCL, London
belows_brev@hotmail.com
Walter Enders’ and Todd Sandler’s study *The Political Economy of Terrorism* is, to the authors’ own knowledge, the first contribution to approach the study of terrorism from a theoretical and statistical viewpoint. Written, not in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 but certainly under its influence, the book deals with terrorism as a practical and logical occurrence. The statistical approach reduces terrorism itself to mathematics and rationale within the grasp of intelligent prediction. Terrorists are rational both in terms of how they respond to counter-measures and attack strategies. Terrorism itself is rational, cost-effective, usually generates a fairly predictable result and, especially in liberal democracies, is relatively easy to keep it clandestine. And as the defender of the weak against the strong, it will always be a winning concept: “terrorism”, the authors state in their concluding remarks, “is here to stay.”(p.257)

The study begins with an introduction of terrorism and its obvious compatibility with liberal democracy. It continues with a presentation of a statistical analysis of terrorist behavior and goes on to offer a mathematical illustration of the dilemmas and inefficiencies associated with counterterrorism and international cooperation. Chapters eight to ten deal more specifically with the practical impact of terrorism, with particular reference to 9/11 and its aftermath. The last chapter discusses the future of terrorism and makes some predictions based on the arguments throughout the book.

The strengths of the book lie primarily in the way it presents terrorism. First, the statistical analysis of terrorist behavior in chapter three is a good illustration of the calculability of terrorism, in part, simply because the analysis produces a cyclical pattern with peaks and lulls throughout the years, similar to a statistical analysis of the annual number of sunspots. Moreover, it clearly shows that the terrorist series has no sign of the upward trend that is not only often implied by the media, but which is probably also a feeling that many people harbors. The illustration stands in sharp contrast to the notion of terrorism as a dark and mysterious evil force.

Second, reducing terrorism to logics and statistics opens up the possibility of presenting countering terrorism in an equally concrete manner. Chapter five deals with the dilemma of “transference”, meaning that as soon as one target becomes too risky, too cost-ineffective etc, the terrorist shifts his/her focus to a different practical target, but with the same intended effect. One good example from the book is the 2004 Madrid train bombings. The argument is that the reason why they were indeed train bombings and not skyjackings was because of the enhanced security associated with everything related to flying after 9/11. Chapters four and six
deal with the dilemmas of countering terrorism on a domestic as well as international level. They elaborate on the problem of “geographical transference”, meaning, for example, that enhanced security in the US results in attacks on US embassies in poorer countries. In chapter six the authors use the theory behind Nash equilibrium to show the cost of ineffective or insufficient transnational effort, for example, considering one country taking defensive action, which inevitably increases the risk of a future attack for all other relevant countries. They argue that combating transnational terrorism requires transnational commitment and vigor. And that is a frustrating insight, given that countries nurture different degrees of commitment to fighting terrorism. Conclusively, Sandler and Enders state, “as long as the terrorists do not pose a threat to all countries, international cooperation will remain partial and of limited effectiveness.”(p.159)

Another useful aspect of the book is its account for the economic results of terrorism, which is well illustrated in chapter 9. Knowing the cost of terrorism is a crucial prerequisite for making well-informed decisions on how to allocate resources and how much money to spend on counter-terrorist actions.

Once established that the main strength of the book is its specific approach to terrorism, the same could be argued with respect to weaknesses. The math and the statistics appear sometimes to hang in the air. An equation illustrating how skyjackings have become a less popular option for terrorists after the introduction of metal detectors certainly makes sense, but given that no one can tell what the next best option to skyjacking would be, the calculation seems superfluous. Moreover, illustrating terrorism through a statistical cycle-pattern is illuminating, but the absence of explanation as to why the lulls and peaks respectively occur renders the statistics unsatisfying. Sandler and Enders themselves state that “if any theory of terrorism is to be successful, it must capture the reasons why incidents tend to cluster”(p.61), while they provide little clarification on how this could be achieved.

Moreover, the fact that terrorism is rational seems unimportant when the two main reasons as to why it is so effective are brought into the discussion. Terrorism, however rational, thrives on fear and a reputation of unpredictability, and, despite governments being a lot more logistically and economically powerful than any terrorist group, terrorists hide, run and are fanatically committed to what they have set out to achieve. This way, they are really the ones playing in a completely different league. Governments are clumsy compared to terrorists. When the latter jumps through a gap in the wall, the government has to stay behind; it couldn’t get through anyway. The fact that theorists conclude, as Sandler and Enders do at the end of the book, that “bombs will remain the terrorists’
favorite mode of attack” (p.257), couldn’t that in itself urge terrorists not to use bombs? Wouldn’t that also be rational?

However, this book was not written to save the world. The conclusions drawn in the study sometimes appear simplistic or self-evident. But the purpose of the book seems to lie more in the presentation of the facts than the humble predictions. The study highlights and emphasises a specific approach to terrorism, which in certain cases, and when elaborated may enable counter-terrorist actors to make better, and more calculated, practical and logistical decisions. Thus, it can be argued that what is presented here as a fundamental weakness of the book, is more a limitation of its approach. That does not however, render the book itself anything less than a highly recommended read.


Author: Andrea Petres
MA Student in Sociology
Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
andreapetres@yahoo.com

Processes and changes resulting from the establishment of the European Community/Union as a supranational organization have preoccupied both those working in the field of politics and researchers for a long time. Lately, as the “common European governance” has become increasingly institutionalized, attention has shifted back to the national level to find out the impact of the EU on member states. Europeanization: New Research Agendas attempts to summarize existing research on Europeanization, to discuss the key problems that have appeared and to set the direction for future research. The editors involved more than 20 scholars and defined Europeanization broadly (i.e. “the domestic adaptation to European regional integration”), in order to allow contributors to discuss relevant issues concerning their specific fields of study, be it analyzing policies or studying political processes.

Issues concerning conceptualization and research methodology of Europeanization are raised throughout the volume, and they can be considered basic problems of the field. Problematic aspects of the operationalization, such as how to distinguish the impact of the EU from other impacts, how to determine dependent and independent variables in research, and how to analyze the side effects of the EU are also raised. The authors use a critical perspective, and even question concepts commonly used in Europeanization literature, partly undermining the theoretical bases of many previously written studies. The popular concept of goodness of fit is no exception, criticized by Sandra Lavenex, who states that it misses important aspects of the explanation, such as the “contextual
impact of Europeanization, and looks over the strategic games in which sections of national administrations make use of the EU arena in order to change the policy debate at the national level”. In other words, goodness of fit concentrates only on legal issues, whereas even problem structures may differ from country to country.

The complexity of the conceptual-methodological problem is adequately rendered by the studies about polity, politics and policies. The chapters included in parts 3 and 4 contribute to a better understanding of the big picture of Europeanization. Policies being the ones extensively analyzed in the literature (Sverdrup argues that European integration can still mainly be interpreted as integration through law), it is argued by many that leaving politics and polity out of the analysis makes studies overlook important influence-factors. Factors such as the indirect effects of Europeanization on the domestic level, vertical and horizontal influences among member and non-member states (voluntary adaptation, policy transfer, etc.), the ideational dimension of integration, and institutional aspects are able to explain “the absence of far-reaching convergence”. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the institutional approaches (whether historical, sociological, rational-choice or any of these mixed) the authors use throughout the volume – and that is characteristic of the literature on the topic of Europeanization in general – help to account for the differential impact of the EU on the domestic level.

Confronting these problems, the contributors demand for more comparative studies. Haverland suggests using multiple research designs in order to examine not only how, but also whether and to what extent the EU matters. At the same time, Bulmer argues in favor of a more circular understanding of the processes of Europeanization, for being able to eliminate effects not explicitly attributable to EU influence. Perhaps his suggestion (based on other studies) that Europeanization is rather “a phenomenon that needs to be explained, not a theory” is the key to understanding Europeanization.

One of the timely issues the book touches upon is the impact the EU is able to exert on its member states. Conditionality (dealt with in the chapter by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier) as a method of influencing the state-level was so far thought to be one used towards countries awaiting accession. But, as Romania and Bulgaria – who have both joined the EU at the beginning of 2007 – have recently shown, the EU has institutionalized conditionality in the form of transitional measures/safeguard measures even within the EU. The growth in regulation can be best understood the way Levi-Faur put it in his chapter about regulatory governance, quoting a study of Jordana and himself: “growing expectations of a «riskless society» on the one hand and a shrinking
willingness to trust political authorities on the other contribute to increasing reliance on regulation that reduces risks and replace some trust relations by others” (pp. 103). The distrust towards these two new-member states led to the increased control above them, and, at the same time, the EU has adopted a structure where some countries are “more equal than others”.

Interest groups constitute another important element of the European political arena. From the point of view of the large number of national/ethnic minorities that live within the borders of the EU, it is necessary to examine the power of specific interest groups and social movements. In this regard it is worth noting the role financial/network capital plays in their success. As discussed in the chapter by Rainer Eising, integration has not changed the lobby-practices used at the domestic level, but has “reaffirmed the power of those organizations that had already built up capacities to articulate, aggregate, and represent the interests of their constituencies”. Groups that are persuasive on a domestic level and embedded into the national system are the ones succeeding at the supranational level. Thus, the interests of national/ethnic minorities living in EU member-states may not always be reflected by their country-representatives at the EU level, and would need special attention in order to correct for this effect.

Considering the extensive literature and the above-mentioned conceptual-methodological problems, the editors’ attempt to summarize all findings seems to be a large undertaking. Nevertheless, Europeanization: New Research Agendas can be considered a valuable handbook in that it presents the actual stage of Europeanization research. The authors try to both raise questions about problematic issues and set directions for future research, doing this in a very concise manner. The book may be especially useful for students (also by providing a comprehensive bibliography on Europeanization), or those aiming to gain a quick overview of the field, while being informed critically about the shortcomings of the work that has been done so far.


Author: Alma Vardari-Kesler
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
vardari@bgu.ac.il

Throughout The study of post-communist transitions and the related issues of reconstruction and development have drawn, for more than a decade now, a great deal of academic attention. Within this vast field, particular thought has been dedicated to the study of post-communist politics in Europe. This book is a good example of this tendency, since its main goal is to
explore the development of governance in Central East Europe (CEE), namely by investigating the processes of institutions building and policymaking in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, between the late 1980 and the early twenty-first century.

The logic behind this selection lies in the diverse nature revealed by each transition along with the "two critical junctures" the four chosen countries share: the fall of communism and the fiscal crises in the mid-1990, even though experienced differently in each setting. Former communist governments in CEE had persistently adhered to Politburo's policymaking and coordination. The myriad of the fragmented ministries and cabinets were merely engaged in administrative responsibilities, as zealously dictated by the communist leadership. With the demise of communism in CEE, the executive institutions were in limbo, leading thus to an immediate need to restore the executive and coordinating capacities of the communist government, which were already turned into a "hollow crown" (Goetz & Wollmann, 2001).

In order to map the governance's capacity in post-communist settings, the authors focus on the concept of the "core executive" as defined by Rhodes and Dunleavy (1995): "all those organizations and procedures which coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of conflict between parts of the government machine." Furthermore, they present eight dimensions of post-communist core executives: 1) the location of the executive in the political system, 2) an outline of the executive terrain, 3) the powers of the Prime Minister, 4) the powers of the Financial Minister, 5) patterns of cabinet decision-making, 6) party based political coordination devices, 7) the powers and organization of the center of government and 8) the politics-administration nexus: professionalization of the civil service, hence constructing a rigorous and comprehensive framework of analysis, yet sufficiently sensitive to the analytical and empirical nuances.

The book is divided in three parts. The first one introduces the theoretical fundamentals of the framework of analysis used for this comparative study (chap. 2), while the second one offers a presentation of the empirical evidences from the four investigated countries (chap. 3 – Hungary, chap. 4 – Poland, chap. 5 – Czech Republic, chap. 6 – Bulgaria) which share a common outline as based on the analytical identification of eight dimensions of core executives. The last part summarizes and evaluates the empirical evidences (chap. 7), assesses institutional effects on budgetary policymaking (chap. 8) and finally contextualizes the empirical findings within the debate on European governance (chap. 9).

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the volume owes its existence to the approach of the study, which is process-oriented as opposed to
a method that favors specific identifiable changes. In other words, this comparative research project seeks to trace, explore and grasp the trajectories of the core executives as influenced in the course of action, by historical, political and economic context of each country. This way the reader not only is introduced to two neglected aspects of executive evolution in post-communist settings: a typology of core executives as well as one of centers of governments, but is also being compensated by a rigorous account of both.

The main argument of the collection is that certain developmental trends are common to all CEE countries, for example: a) the formal and informal strengthening of the prime minister (be that office or person) within the executive system, b) the strengthening of finance ministries as core executive's crucial function, and c) the apparent failure to promote significant reforms aimed at the depoliticization of the public service system (namely civil senior servants).

However, there are some issues that either lack clarity or are left unanswered, in both cases pointing to the need for deeper analysis. The first subject relates to the impact the party leader has on the core executive and its functions. In the case of the Czech Republic, the reader learns about the strong leader Vaclav Klaus (of ODS party) whose political dominance over the ministers assured a solid center of government (p. 146). Another example of a tough prime minister is that of the UDF party leader in Bulgaria, Ivan Kostov, who played an important role in strengthening the government (p. 175). Both leaders were crucial in consolidating strong executive institutions and, of course, their future development, but it is not clear to what extent one can discern the blurred boundaries between the prime minister's identity as a person and as an organization. What would be then, the theoretical and/or methodological tools that could help in defining and recognizing one from the other?

The second issue not fully answered brings in the debate on EU integration and Europeanization. The last chapter of the book (chap. 9) tries to explore how the findings presented in each case collide with the arguments made about CEE countries "readiness for Europe" and Europeanization of institutions. In terms of "readiness for Europe", the authors state that improvement of executive and administrative performance was perceived as the main key precondition for accession by the EU institutions. As such, in addition to summarizing the literature on the subject, they should have referred to some mandatory inquiry rising from their case studies, such as the following: considering the different post-communist settings, what were the leading institutions or personalities in charge of the implementations of EU's requirements? How did these processes affect the executive institutions in each investigated case? Furthermore, while stating the "…’usage’ of EU integration
by domestic factors for their own purposes" (p. 256), the authors have once again missed an opportunity for comparative institutional analyses, which could have shed light on the practices employed by each country and its impact on the executive core.

Nevertheless, the authors and contributors of *Governing after Communism* are to be commended for their efforts to broaden the theoretical and empirical range of analysis of institutions and policymaking on various post-communist settings, making this collection an important source for present and future generations of students, researchers and policymakers, involved in the study of post-communist politics.