The “Good State”: Outline of the Last Three Years of Research

Pol­gá­ri Szem­le, 13. évf., 4–6. szám, 2017, 307–317., DOI: 10.24307/psz.2017.1222

Dr Ist­ván Bu­ko­vics, DSc, Pro­fes­sor, Na­ti­o­nal Uni­ver­sity of Pub­lic Ser­vi­ce, Head of Doc­tor­al Scho­ol of Pub­lic Ad­mi­nistra­ti­on Sci­en­ces (bukovics.​istvan uni-nke.​hu).

Sum­ma­ry

The vi­si­on be­hind the re­se­arch aimed at the pa­ra­dig­ma­tic app­ro­ach of a “Good State” can be sum­med up in a sing­le sen­ten­ce as fol­lows: on the basis of the “Good State” con­cept, de­fi­ned by the Ma­gyary Prog­ramme, a the­o­re­ti­cal state model can be ela­bo­ra­ted using IT tools. The model de­ter­mi­nes cert­ain ge­ne­ric con­cepts of the state, with ma­the­ma­ti­cal and log­i­cal acc­uracy. Then they can be imp­le­men­ted in si­li­co (i.e. with di­rect IT tools ex­ce­e­ding tra­di­ti­o­nal ma­the­ma­ti­cal con­cepts) and re­la­ted fun­da­men­tal sta­te­ments can be pro­ven. Du­ring our mul­ti-year re­se­arch we so­ught, and (partly) found, con­struc­tive ans­wers to such (po­li­ti­cal and phi­lo­sophi­cal) quest­ions as how it is pos­sib­le to op­ti­mally sa­tis­fy the moral and te­le­o­log­i­cal needs of a self-re­gu­lat­ing, self-dri­ven, self-or­ga­ni­zing so­ci­ety by ra­ti­o­nal means (in a cle­arly de­fi­ned sense). This prog­ramme can­not be re­a­li­zed mer­ely on a ju­di­ci­al – ju­rispru­den­ti­al, po­li­ti­cal and sci­en­ti­fic – basis, a more exact sci­en­ti­fic est­ab­lish­ment is ne­e­ded. The app­ro­ach of po­li­ti­cal sci­en­ce is sha­ped by law, alt­ho­ugh there is an an­ta­go­nis­tic cont­ra­dic­ti­on bet­ween the app­ro­ach of ju­rispru­den­ce and that of exact sci­en­ces. We are lo­o­king for the ans­wer to this quest­ion using a com­pu­ter prog­ram. In cont­rast to the am­bit­ions of the “Good State” Re­se­arch Shop (GSR), we focus on a bet­ter un­der­stand­ing of the con­cept of a “Good State”, while its me­a­sure­ment is beyond the scope of our re­se­arch. We hope to imp­ro­ve un­der­stand­ing the con­cept of a “Good State” with the help of com­pu­ter mo­dell­ing and log­i­cal exp­li­ca­ti­on. Ac­cord­ingly, this paper is an al­ter­na­tive to the GSR app­ro­ach and the two met­hods can pro­fit from each other and the “Good State” from both. Thus, we share the goal but have dif­fe­rent met­hods.

Key­words: Good State, sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity, Ma­gyary Prog­ramme, pub­lic good, needs


Int­ro­duc­ti­on

This essay aims at sur­veying cert­ain re­se­arch re­sults con­cer­ning the co­di­fi­ca­ti­on met­hods of the “Good State” on the basis of prin­cip­les laid down in the in­terp­re­ta­ti­on fra­me­work of the Ma­gyary Prog­ramme (KIM, 2012). These met­hods are cha­rac­te­ri­zed by the fact that they rely on basic ma­the­ma­ti­cal and log­i­cal ro­u­tine, while apply­ing IT tools to imp­ro­ve un­der­stand­ing the Good State. We ex­pect bet­ter un­der­stand­ing of the con­cept of “Good State” th­ro­ugh com­pu­ter mo­dell­ing and log­i­cal exp­li­ca­ti­on.

Its aim is two­fold: On the one hand the pre­s­en­ta­ti­on and app­li­ca­ti­on of a pat­tern of think­ing based on sym­bo­lic logic that ser­ves, th­ro­ugh pro­ces­sing leg­i­sla­tive know­ledge, as a re­fe­ren­ce fra­me­work, a model, a pa­ra­digm and a de­ci­si­on-mak­ing strategy for the con­cept of the Good State and (on that basis) its sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity. Its the­o­re­ti­cal con­di­tions are inc­lu­ded in the con­cep­tu­al sys­tem of sym­bo­lic – or for­mal – logic.

Furt­her­mo­re, its aim is to pro­po­se a de­fi­ni­ti­on and to eva­lu­a­te va­lu­ab­le and in­te­rest-free in­di­ca­tors app­lic­ab­le in pub­lic ad­mi­nistra­ti­on and su­i­tab­le for the cha­rac­teri­za­ti­on of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity and more pre­ci­sely the given con­di­ti­on and sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity of the Good State. Its tech­ni­cal pre­con­di­tions are pro­vi­ded by di­rect, com­pu­ter-bas­ed model cre­a­ti­on – called in si­li­co app­ro­ach –, which also this ex­pan­ds the the­o­re­ti­cal to­ol­box.

Thus it at­tempts at lay­ing the sci­en­ti­fic fo­un­da­tions of all the ac­ti­vi­ti­es of the State which cha­rac­te­ri­ze the con­di­tions of a Good State (in other words, the good con­di­ti­on of a state) pre­ci­sely (in a for­mal and exact way), fa­ci­li­ta­te its evo­lu­ti­on and en­sure its sus­ten­ance. The app­li­ed met­hod is IT (com­pu­ter-bas­ed, in si­li­co) model ge­ne­ra­ti­on.

On the other hand: anot­her aim of this paper is to cont­ri­bu­te to the exact the­ory of the Good State. A cri­ti­cal eva­lu­a­ti­on is given of de­fi­ni­ti­on of the “Good State” (as given in the Ma­gyary Prog­ram), it is cla­ri­fi­ed, and the fo­un­da­tions of a the­o­re­ti­cal model for an in si­li­co sus­ta­in­ab­le state are ela­bo­ra­ted.

The Ma­gyary Prog­ramme gives the de­fi­ni­ti­on of the “Good State” as fol­lows: “A state is cons­idered to be good if it ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als, com­mu­ni­ti­es and en­ter­pri­ses in the in­te­rest and wit­hin the bo­unds of pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te man­ner.”

The de­fi­ni­ti­on of pub­lic good inc­lu­des the fol­lo­wing:

  • The state crea­tes a ba­lance bet­ween the count­less in­te­rests and needs in an equ­i­tab­le and fair way, and for this end it en­sures cla­ims en­for­ce­ment and pro­vi­des pro­tec­ti­on;
  • The state pro­ce­eds with proper res­pon­si­bi­lity to pro­tect and pass on in­he­ri­ted na­tu­ral and cul­t­u­ral goods;
  • The only self-in­te­rest of the state is to be able to en­for­ce the two pre­vi­o­us ele­ments of pub­lic good under all cir­cum­stan­ces and ef­fi­ci­ently, that is, the state crea­tes an ef­fi­ci­ent rule of law, inc­lu­ding func­tion­ing ins­ti­tu­tions, respect for the rights of in­di­vi­du­als and com­mu­ni­ti­es, and ac­coun­ta­bi­lity.

The most app­rop­ria­te man­ner may re­sult in dif­fe­rent emp­has­es on dif­fe­rent areas of state ope­ra­ti­on, since on the one hand ef­fi­ci­ency and na­ti­o­nal in­te­rest are the main catch­words in pub­lic ad­mi­nistra­ti­on, and on the other hand, in ju­ris­dic­ti­on the power of the en­for­ce­ab­le right and equ­i­tab­le­ness are the pri­ma­ry cons­ide­ra­tions, na­tu­rally, with the provi­so that these ex­pec­ta­tions are mu­tu­ally made in the other sec­tor.

In the pe­ri­od of a world eco­no­mic cris­is and mar­kedly nar­row re­sour­ces, it sho­uld be high­ligh­ted that uni­vers­al ab­so­lu­te good can hardly be achi­eved at a state level, even if the in­di­vi­du­al com­mu­nity in­te­rests are met exc­lu­si­vely, no mat­ter how emp­ha­tic they are. Most sig­ni­fi­cant fa­i­lu­res in the de­ve­lop­ment of the his­to­ri­cal Hun­ga­ri­an state hap­pe­ned be­ca­u­se the state fol­lo­wed, al­lo­wed or led mo­ve­ments de­ter­mi­ning the aim and frame of its ope­ra­ti­o­nal ob­jec­ti­ves in the wrong di­rec­ti­on or at the wrong pace. This his­to­ri­cal ex­pe­ri­en­ce, the de­moc­ra­tic el­ec­tor­al ex­pec­ta­ti­on and cons­ci­o­us self-de­ve­lop­ment of the state jus­ti­fy the need for the comp­le­te cog­ni­za­bi­lity, me­as­ura­bi­lity and eva­lu­a­ti­on of the state and its ope­ra­ti­on.

It is an evo­lu­ti­on­ary out­co­me that for the ma­jo­rity of people unk­nown things are frigh­te­ning, that is in no case ne­ces­sa­rily good. The Good State is cog­ni­zab­le, its ci­ti­zens can find their ways about it, and the­re­fo­re the step pre­ce­ding the first one is to descri­be and pre­sent what we mean by “good” and “ea­sily un­der­stan­d­ab­le”.

Guide­li­nes

This paper is based on the fol­lo­wing guide­li­nes:

  • All the rules have to be in har­mony with the sys­tem of cri­te­ria for a Good State, as it is laid down in the Ma­gyary Prog­ramme. This is why it is – di­rectly or in­di­rectly (in the fi­gu­ra­tive and col­lo­qu­i­al sense of the words) – inc­lu­ded in the com­mon part of all laws.
  • The con­cept of the Good State, as laid down in the 2012 Ma­gyary Prog­ramme, can be exp­li­ca­ted. This means that it is de­fi­ni­tely de­ci­dab­le by means of exact ma­the­ma­ti­cal and log­i­cal means whet­her the joint exis­ten­ce or ab­sen­ce of the risk fac­tors wit­hin the scope of law en­for­ce­ment 1 is a ne­ces­sary and suf­fi­ci­ent con­di­ti­on of the achi­eve­ment of the Good State.
  • The analy­sis of the eco­no­mic, fi­nan­cial and po­li­ti­cal ef­fects of any log­i­cally pos­sib­le tigh­te­ning and lo­o­s­ening (as de­fi­ned exactly below) of the exp­li­ca­ted ju­ri­di­cal rep­re­s­en­ta­ti­on of the Good State (un­ders­to­od in the abo­ve-spe­ci­fi­ed way) can be the­o­re­ti­cally descri­bed.

The first level ver­bal exp­li­ca­ti­on (“pro­fes­si­o­nal dec­la­ra­ti­on”, “fault tree”, “exp­li­ca­tive read­ing”) of the sup­po­s­ed ju­ri­di­cal rep­re­s­en­ta­ti­on of the Good State on the basis of the con­cept of the Ma­gyary Prog­ramme, ac­cord­ing to the pa­ra­digm of the log­i­cal risk the­ory, see (Bu­ko­vics, 2007) is, in my view, as fol­lows: Any state is good if, and only if, the fol­lo­wing con­di­tions are sa­tis­fi­ed:

(1) It ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als in the in­te­rest of the pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

(2) It ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als in the frame of the pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

(3) It ser­ves the needs of com­mu­ni­ti­es in the in­te­rest of the pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

(4) It ser­ves the needs of com­mu­ni­ti­es in the frame of the pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

(5) It ser­ves the needs of en­ter­pri­ses in the in­te­rest of the pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

(6) It ser­ves the needs of en­ter­pri­ses in the frame of the pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

The quest­ion is: How is a Good State crea­ted (at least in prin­cip­le, as a log­i­cal con­se­qu­en­ce of som­eth­ing that we do not know but want to know) mer­ely by the sa­tis­fac­ti­on of needs (in the in­te­rest and in the frame of the pub­lic good)? The Ma­gyary Prog­ramme gives the cle­ve­rest pos­sib­le ans­wer to this quest­ion. The Good State is by de­fi­ni­ti­on the state sa­tis­fying needs. (The state, ac­cord­ing to the Ma­gyary Prog­ramme, “be­co­mes good if” its ope­ra­ti­on sa­tis­fi­es needs.). As for me, I cons­ider this ans­wer as mere de­ma­gogy. Fol­lo­wing a proper de­fi­ni­ti­on of the con­cept of the “pub­lic good”, I prove that the sa­tis­fac­ti­on of needs log­i­cally en­ta­ils pub­lic good.

Basic de­fi­ni­tions and as­sumpt­ions

On the de­fi­ni­ti­on of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity: Sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity and sus­ta­in­ab­le de­ve­lop­ment are very trendy, fre­qu­ently used, partly disc­re­di­ted con­cepts. Their es­sen­ce is the am­bit­ion to per­ma­nently fol­low a de­ve­lop­ment traj­ec­to­ry wit­ho­ut ex­haust­ing the re­ser­ves and op­por­tuni­ti­es of sub­se­qu­ent modes of exis­ten­ce. The prin­ci­pal prob­lem with the in­terp­re­ta­ti­on of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity is that cur­rently de­ci­si­on-ma­kers wi­dely use the term for simply fol­lo­wing the traj­ec­to­ry mar­ked out by them and eli­mi­nat­ing any obsta­c­les that get in their way. This is how the con­cepts of “sus­ta­in­ab­le de­ve­lop­ment” or “sus­ta­in­ab­le mo­bi­lity” are made, in Hun­gary and ab­road, with cont­ent that has litt­le to do with the ori­gi­nal con­cept of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity. In cont­rast to this, sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity is meant to exp­ress that ob­jec­ti­ves must not be fre­ely cho­s­en in any di­men­si­on or sec­tor, rat­her – due to comp­li­ca­ted sys­tem cor­re­la­tions – they sho­uld re­ma­in wit­hin cert­ain bo­un­da­ri­es.

In ad­di­ti­on to the above, re­cent de­ba­tes have con­cer­ned the con­cepts of de­ve­lop­ment and growth. The term “sci­en­ce of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity” was co­ined to re­li­eve ten­si­on. In es­sen­ce, its mes­sage is for the poor is to let every­bo­dy share at least as much as ne­e­ded for basic human needs, while for the rich the imp­li­ca­ti­on is to adopt more mo­dest and more eco­no­mi­cal li­festy­les and con­sumpt­ion ha­bits.

If we are to analy­se the con­cept of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity in the con­text la­un­ched in the book The Li­mits to Growth, pub­lis­hed on the ini­ti­a­ti­ves of the Club of Rome and expla­ined in the Brund­land Re­port en­tit­led Our Com­mon Fu­tu­re, then out of the two fun­da­men­tal se­man­tic cont­ents of the word “sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity”, we have to re­ject “sus­ta­in­ab­le de­ve­lop­ment” to the be­ne­fit of “sus­ta­in­ab­le func­ti­on” (man­ner of ope­ra­ti­on, man­ner of exis­ten­ce, qu­a­lity of life). As an examp­le let us high­light the state and its ope­ra­tive sys­tem, pub­lic ad­mi­nistra­ti­on, since sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity pro­ces­ses are imp­le­men­ted pri­ma­rily th­ro­ugh the lat­ter.

As a start­ing point we ac­cept the fact that analy­sing sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity in this sense means to exa­mi­ne the ne­ces­sary and suf­fi­ci­ent con­di­tions of sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity. It is in­suf­fi­ci­ent to exa­mi­ne sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity itself. So­ci­al ex­pec­ta­tions re­qu­i­re fea­sib­le and prac­ti­cal met­hods (pro­ce­du­res, tech­ni­ques, laws, strate­gi­es) for the ma­in­ten­ance of glo­bal func­tions. How ma­in­tain­ing the func­tions of a sys­tem can be tech­ni­cally gra­sped (inc­lu­ding the en­ti­re human so­ci­ety and all its es­sen­ti­al con­cerns)? In our opin­ion th­ro­ugh su­i­tab­le ins­ti­tu­tions and ac­tions.

The con­cepts “ins­ti­tu­ti­on” and “ac­ti­on” are not exact eno­ugh to allow treat­ment by strictly the­o­re­ti­cal means (espe­ci­ally by ma­the­ma­ti­cal logic and in­for­ma­ti­on tech­no­logy). Col­lo­qu­i­al lan­gu­age is comp­let­ely un­su­i­tab­le for this pur­po­se, and even the tech­ni­cal lin­gos of pub­lic ad­mi­nistra­ti­on or ju­ris­dic­ti­on are inap­prop­ria­te.

Thus a sa­tis­fac­to­ry ans­wer to the ge­ne­ral quest­ion of how to ma­in­ta­in sys­tem ope­ra­ti­on can only be given if it also inc­lu­des in­for­ma­ti­on on the ope­ra­ti­on of the ins­ti­tu­ti­on and the way of the me­a­sure­ment. In this re­gard we can hardly say more than the sys­tem (that must be func­ti­o­nally ma­in­ta­ined) sho­uld work well to en­sure that su­i­tab­le me­a­sures serve the eli­mi­na­ti­on of un­de­si­rab­le events con­cer­ning the sys­tem. In this con­text we may rep­lace the term “well-func­tion­ing” by “ac­cept­ab­le”. A sys­tem is ac­cept­ab­le if its un­de­si­ra­bi­lity can be re­fu­ted. When can a sys­tem be cons­idered to work well? In our opin­ion, not in a fa­ult­less con­di­ti­on (alt­ho­ugh log­i­cally fa­ult­less func­ti­on is of co­ur­se a suf­fi­ci­ent con­di­ti­on of well-func­tion­ing). Since, howe­ver, such sys­tems do not exist (and ac­cord­ing to cert­ain app­ro­a­ches it is pro­ven that they can­not exist), for a substan­tive ans­wer to this quest­ion only one pos­si­bi­lity is left: ins­ti­tu­tions sho­uld be est­ab­lis­hed and ac­tions sho­uld be taken for the per­ma­nent hand­ling of sys­tem dys­func­tions. Dys­func­ti­on ma­nag­ement means pre­vent­ion and/or avers­ion of un­de­si­rab­le events (Bu­ko­vics, 2013).

It fol­lows from the above that the the­o­re­ti­cal fo­un­da­ti­on of func­ti­o­nal sus­ta­i­na­bi­lity re­qu­i­res the ela­bo­ra­ti­on of a the­ory that does not pro­ce­ed from descri­bing pro­ces­ses (whet­her na­tu­ral or ar­ti­fi­ci­al) but de­fi­nes rules and ac­tions which must be ob­ser­ved and imp­le­men­ted under given cir­cum­stan­ces to achi­eve the ob­jec­tive set. In other words, a nor­ma­tive rat­her than a descrip­tive the­ory is ex­pe­di­ent. For mer­ely tech­ni­cal pur­pos­es I call the model used for this the­ory a “game model” and descri­be it as fol­lows.

The game model

State and Mar­ket

The model cons­iders the leg­i­sla­tive pro­cess as a game bet­ween the “State” and the “Mar­ket”. The State is a risk sys­tem. Risk sys­tems can­not exist wit­ho­ut risk fac­tors. The “Mar­ket” is the IT rep­re­s­en­ta­ti­on of the risks of the state.

The game is mo­del­led as a se­qu­en­ce of steps made al­ter­na­tely by the two players. A step is a se­qu­en­ce of ac­tions per­for­med by one of the par­ti­es and made bet­ween two con­se­cu­tive ac­tions of the other party.

The clas­si­cal met­hod of a “pro­ba­bi­lis­tic risk analy­sis” has been mo­di­fi­ed and given the name “log­i­cal risk analy­sis” (Bu­ko­vics, 2007). The ne­ga­ti­on of Good State is cons­idered as the core (un­de­si­rab­le) event. This means that the non-sa­tis­fac­ti­on of the sys­tem of ne­ces­sary and suf­fi­ci­ent as­sumpt­ions must be analy­sed, i.e. the non-sa­tis­fac­ti­on of any of the as­sumpt­ions leads to non-ac­comp­lish­ment of the Good State (more pre­ci­sely, of the good con­di­ti­on of the state). Ne­ga­ti­on of the as­sumpt­ions ap­pe­ars in the ju­ri­di­cal rep­re­s­en­ta­ti­on of the Good State in an or form, i.e. in a dis­junc­tive re­la­ti­on.

An adap­tive co­di­fi­ca­ti­on is pos­sib­le be­ca­u­se con­junc­tive and dis­junc­tive re­la­tions equ­ally occur in the co­ur­se of the ite­ra­tive exp­li­ca­ti­on of the sys­tem of as­sumpt­ions. From the point of view of ju­ris­dic­ti­on, trans­form­ing a con­junc­tive group of as­sumpt­ions into a dis­junc­tive one means tigh­te­ning, while trans­form­ing a dis­junc­tive group of as­sumpt­ions into a con­junc­tive one means lo­o­s­ening (Bu­ko­vics, 2007; 2015).

Strate­gi­es and tac­tics

The di­rect aim of the “State” (of co­ur­se mer­ely in the model) in all cases is to pas­si­vi­ze the ac­tive fault tree (core event). The exp­r­es­si­on “ac­tive fault tree” is a tech­ni­cal term which means that the sys­tem is in a mic­ro-sta­te con­di­ti­on, with the log­i­cal con­se­qu­en­ce that the “Not a Good State” sta­te­ment pro­ves to be ma­the­ma­ti­cally true.

The State (due to the basic hy­pot­he­ses of the model) does not have the opt­ion to chan­ge the mic­ro-sta­te, be­ca­u­se it de­pends on the be­ha­vi­o­ur of the “Mar­ket”. Due to the un­derly­ing hy­pot­he­sis of the model, the State does not in­ter­ve­ne into the pro­ces­ses of the mar­ket.

One of the va­ri­ants of the exp­li­ca­te of the basic legal rule may be as fol­lows:

The State is not in a good sta­tus if and only if

(1) It ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als in the in­te­rest of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(2) It ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als in the frame of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(3) It ser­ves the needs of com­mu­ni­ti­es in the in­te­rest of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(4) It ser­ves the needs of com­mu­ni­ti­es in the frame of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(5) It ser­ves the needs of en­ter­pri­ses in the in­te­rest of pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(6) It ser­ves the needs of en­ter­pri­ses in the frame of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

A log­i­cal mo­di­fi­ca­ti­on of this exp­li­ca­te may be the fol­lo­wing:

The State (is) not in (a) good (sta­tus) if and only if

(1) It ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als in the in­te­rest of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(2) It ser­ves the needs of in­di­vi­du­als in the frame of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(3) It ser­ves the needs of com­mu­ni­ti­es in the in­te­rest of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, and

(4) It ser­ves the needs of com­mu­ni­ti­es in the frame of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(5) It ser­ves the needs of en­ter­pri­ses in the in­te­rest of pub­lic good in the most app­rop­ria­te way, or

(6) It ser­ves the needs of en­ter­pri­ses in the frame of pub­lic good not in the most app­rop­ria­te way.

“Log­i­cal mo­di­fi­ca­ti­on” means that the log­i­cal type of an exp­li­ca­te /in this pre­sent case under sec­ti­on (3)/ is chang­ed, so the dis­junc­ti­on (in­di­ca­ted by the word “or”) is chang­ed to a con­junc­ti­on (in­di­ca­ted by the word “and”). The sy­no­nym of “log­i­cal mo­di­fi­ca­ti­on” is “ope­ra­ti­on chang­ing step”.

The prov­ab­le con­se­qu­en­ce of the model is that in the ge­ne­ral case one sing­le ope­ra­ti­on chang­ing step may not re­sult in the head event be­com­ing pas­sive (pas­si­vat­ing). It is espe­ci­ally stri­king when – as in the paper (Bu­ko­vics, 2013) – if the ori­gi­nal (ope­ra­ti­on) chain OA­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­A­AA (that is, in which the one sing­le com­po­nent is dis­junc­tive) is ef­fec­tive. Since it can­not be un­mit­iga­ted, be­ca­u­se its only pos­sib­le mit­iga­ti­on is the clear AAAAA...A, it leads to a chain which is jus­ti­fi­ab­le by cal­cu­la­ti­on: qu­o­rum-free, so it is not app­lic­ab­le for le­gi­ti­ma­ti­on by vo­ting.

The state subst­ra­tum model

The State Subst­ra­tum model is a model con­struc­ti­on (a com­pu­ter prog­ram), which al­lows the study of so­ci­ety and the most ele­men­tary ma­ni­fe­sta­tions of the state in a trustwor­thy (ve­ri­fi­ab­le) way. The State Subst­ra­tum is for­mally a cel­lu­lar au­to­ma­ti­on model (Wolf­ram, 2002). The State Subst­ra­tum model is a ne­igh­bou­ring cell au­to­ma­ti­on (Ri­gu­et, 1976). The num­ber of ele­ments is (cells) N=216 (=65 736). The num­ber of sta­ges is n=16. Each ele­ment has four ne­igh­bours. The tran­sit­i­on func­ti­on is “ma-jor­ant co­pying”2. Its pre­ci­se ma­the­ma­ti­cal de­fi­ni­ti­on has been given in hund­reds of pub­li­ca­tions since Neu­mann (Neu­mann, 1966). In this case the emp­ha­sis is not on the the­o­re­ti­cal con­struc­ti­on, but on its in­terp­re­ta­ti­on, on the study and int­ro­duc­ti­on of the emer­gent (“emer­ging from noth­ing”) struc­tu­res and func­tions fa­ci­li­tat­ing the bet­ter un­der­stand­ing of the cre­a­ti­on of the state con­cept model (mo­re­o­ver, even its mo­di­fi­a­bi­lity, see Ko­ron­váry, 2009:30, 58, 64).

The State Subst­ra­tum model is a struc­tu­re in which an op­por­tunity (but not a nec-es­sary ful­fil­ment) is pro­vi­ded for each agent, wit­ho­ut an ex­cept­ion, that make the state (in­di­vi­du­als, ins­ti­tu­tions, or­ga­ni­za­tions) to sa­tis­fy their needs. The quest­ion– and in this study a fun­da­men­tal quest­ion – is whet­her such a sys­tem is cap­ab­le of self-or­ga­ni­za­ti­on, espe­ci­ally of a be­ne­fi­cent, imp­ro­ving, self-de­ve­lop­ing and self-per­fec­ting de­ve­lop­ment. If yes, it sho­uld rea­son­ably be taken into cons­ide­ra­ti­on in the the­ory and prac­ti­ce of the state.

In the State Subst­ra­tum model, the state (its subst­ra­tum) con­sists of the po­pu­la­ti­on of in­di­vi­du­als (agents) and cells, respec­ti­vely, in – at the mo­ment – in­terc­han­geab­le roles. Sa­tis­fac­ti­on of the needs of each sing­le in­di­vi­du­al (cell) is ma­ni­fest in the fact that if in its ne­igh­bour­ho­od there is anot­her in­di­vi­du­al that ex­ce­eds its con­di­ti­on by at least a mi­ni­mum, then (and only then) the in­di­vi­du­al takes (co­pi­es, rep­li­ca­tes) this stage. In short, the in­di­vi­du­al “con­ver­ges” or clos­es the gap.

This is to model – in the first app­ro­ach – the sa­tis­fac­ti­on of a need.

Chaos (in this case the ran­dom po­pu­la­ti­on) is cap­ab­le of a very in­ten­sive self-or­ga­ni­za­ti­on. The les­son is that dis­or­der – which seems to be most un­ma­na­ge­ab­le and the­re­fo­re most un­re­li­ab­le con­cept – can form the log­i­cal basis of the most exact con­cepts. To this end, it is suf­fi­ci­ent to force chaos (by a simp­le ite­ra­ti­on) to fol­low only one rule: the ma­jor­ant rule. Its ap­pa­rent cont­ent is: the job of the state is – above all and pre-emi­nently – to sa­tis­fy the de­mands (jus­ti­fi­ed needs) of its ci­ti­zens and to en­sure the sa­tis­fi­a­bi­lity of these de­mands.

The need for pa­ra­digm chan­ge

The aim of the State Subst­ra­tum model is to de­monst­ra­te how the model the­o­re­ti­cally res­ponds to ran­dom ef­fects. In this model the “State” and the “Mar­ket” are ab­st­rac­tions. The „Mar­ket” is the set of risk fac­tors dis­tur­bing the ope­ra­ti­on of the „State” as a risk-as­sum­ing agent. The model descri­bes the in­ter­ac­ti­on of these two ab­st­ract en­ti­ti­es. Its in­terp­re­ta­ti­on is the be­ha­vi­o­ur of the State rep­re­sen­ted in the model by a ran­dom num­ber ge­ne­ra­tor. The pre­sum­ed de­ci­sions of the State is mo­del­led by the log­i­cal types of the va­ri­ants of stat­uto­ry re­gu­la­tions.

The model app­li­ca­ti­on cons­ti­tu­ting an in­se­pa­rab­le part of the model (soft­ware pac­kage3 ) de­ter­mi­nes the coun­te­rac­ti­on of the “State” in res­pon­se to each d-step of the “Mar­ket”, i.e. to each mic­ro-sta­te which is at a d-dis­tance from the dang­erous mic­ro-zo­ne. The aim of the coun­te­rac­ti­on is al­ways the de­sig­na­ti­on of a pas­sive (mac­ro-sta­te) Prin­ci­pal Chain.

Due to the plu­ra­lity of in­terp­re­ta­ti­on in­he­rent in the na­tu­re of the sub­ject, there may be pa­ral­lel pa­ra­digms in so­ci­al sci­en­ces. It fol­lows from this, that the prob­lem of the Good State de­mands a pa­ra­digm shift.4

The catch­words Chan­ge–Ef­fect–Res­pon­se pave the way to the au­to­ma­ti­on the­ory, which – com­bi­ned with the in si­li­co in­for­ma­ti­on tech­no­logy – of­fers the new pa­ra­digm. Dis­re­gard­ing a nar­row, spe­ci­fic in­terp­re­ta­ti­on of the Chan­ge–Ef­fect–Res­pon­se pro­ject (en­vi­ron­ment pro­tec­ti­on, cli­ma­te-strategic, cli­ma­te po­li­ti­cal etc.), it is promptly clear that the Chan­ge–Ef­fect–Res­pon­se con­cept ea­sily trans­la­tes into mo­dell­ing the ope­ra­ti­on of the State.

Chan­ge

In this model, the con­cept of chan­ge is in­terp­re­ted as chan­ge in the mic­ro-sta­te of a sys­tem, and the mic­ro-sta­te of a sys­tem is de­fi­ned as the total of the ac­tive prime events in the fault tree of the sys­tem.

If the state is in a pas­sive mac­ro-sta­te and there is no chan­ge in the mic­ro-sta­te (out­put of prime events) then the State does not chan­ge its mac­ro-sta­te, the­re­fo­re no new leg­i­sla­tive pro­pos­al of the State will rep­lace the ac­tu­al law.

A chan­ge in the mic­ro-sta­te has a sig­ni­fi­cant and ex­cept­io­nally comp­li­ca­ted, often, coun­ter-in­tu­i­tive ef­fect. The the­ory can and wis­hes to give a fair re­cons­ide­ra­ti­on of this phe­no­me­non.

Ef­fect

An ef­fect analy­sis is con­duc­ted if the mic­ro-sta­te changes. As a first step, this inc­lu­des the ca­re­ful dif­fe­ren­ti­ati­on of four fun­da­men­tal con­cepts, and de­ci­des which of the fol­lo­wing (2.1–2.4) dis­jo­int cases comes true:

  • Par­ti­al mac­ro-sta­te de­te­ri­or­a­ti­on: Due to the ef­fect of the mic­ro-sta­te chan­ge, the (un­de­si­rab­le) core event (of the fault tree) of the sys­tem turns from pas­sive into ac­tive and cert­ain in­di­ca­tors of the state de­te­ri­or­a­te while ot­hers imp­ro­ve.
  • Par­ti­al mac­ro-sta­te imp­ro­ve­ment: Due to the ef­fect of the mic­ro-sta­te chan­ge, the (un­de­si­rab­le) core event (of the fault tree) of the sys­tem turns from ac­tive into pas­sive and cert­ain in­di­ca­tors of the state imp­ro­ve while ot­hers de­te­ri­or­a­te cert­ain in­di­ca­tors of the state imp­ro­ve, ot­hers de­te­ri­or­a­te.
  • Total mac­ro-sta­te imp­ro­ve­ment: Due to the ef­fect of mic­ro-sta­te chan­ge, the (un­de­si­rab­le) core event (of the fault tree) of the sys­tem turns from ac­tive into pas­sive and each in­di­ca­tor imp­ro­ves or at least does not de­te­ri­or­a­te.
  • Total mac­ro-sta­te de­te­ri­or­a­ti­on: Due to the ef­fect of mic­ro-sta­te chan­ge, the (un­de-si­rab­le) core event (of the fault tree) of the sys­tem turns from pas­sive into ac­tive and each in­di­ca­tor de­te­ri­or­a­tes or at least does not imp­ro­ve.

Res­pon­se

The res­pon­se given to the ef­fect of a mic­ro-sta­te chan­ge is al­ways the re­sult of some kind of a de­ci­si­on. A ra­ti­o­nal de­ci­si­on is made if, due to a mic­ro-sta­te chan­ge, the mul­ti-op­ti­mal pas­sive mac­ro-sta­te is in place. This means a pas­sive mac­ro-sta­te, which is the sup­r­emum of itself. Ve­ri­fi­ably there are al­ways mic­ro-sta­tes for which, in prin­cip­le, it is im­pos­sib­le to res­pond with a pas­sive legal mac­ro-sta­te.

At this point a po­li­ti­cal de­ci­si­on is made. This means that the al­go­rith­mic the­ory of leg­i­sla­ti­on does not make the po­li­ti­cal de­ci­si­on un­ne­ces­sary, but pro­ves exactly its ne­ces­sity, helps the de­ci­si­on maker to at­ta­in the lear­ned in­tu­i­tive level, where the li­mits of const­ra­ined ra­ti­o­na­lity can be trea­ted. It pro­ves furt­her­mo­re the im­por­tance and place of ma­nu­al cont­rol aga­inst that in po­li­ti­cal rhe­to­ric the ph­ra­se “ma­nu­al cont­rol” is ge­ne­rally burd­e­ned with a ne­ga­tive con­no­ta­ti­on.

This the­ory gives a kind of met­hod to re­ve­al the cor­rect re­la­ti­on of ma­nu­al and me­cha­ni­cal cont­rol, so the comp­le­ment­ing re­la­ti­on of ob­jec­tive and sub­jec­tive de­ci­si­on.

Mul­ti-op­ti­ma­lity

In the game model the re­a­li­za­ti­on of “Good State” al­ways means the pas­si­va­ti­on of the core event of the fault tree cor­res­pond­ing to the ac­tu­al law va­ri­ant. This hap­pens th­ro­ugh the pas­si­va­ti­on of one of the strong points (more exactly: of all prime events of the given strong point). Each prime pas­si­va­ti­on ob­vi­o­usly has an ex­pen­se and time need. Since these chan­ge from prime to prime, it does mat­ter, whet­her the che­a­pest (which is the one with the smal­l­est cost), the fa­stest (which is the one with the smal­l­est time need), or the shor­test (which con­ta­ins the fe­west prime events) strong point is pas­si­vat­ed.

The fun­da­men­tal quest­ion ari­ses: the quest­ion of mul­ti-op­ti­ma­lity. In order to for­mu­la­te the quest­ion we have to int­ro­du­ce a new term, the con­cept of Frank­lin in­di­ca­tors. “Frank­lin in­di­ca­tors” is the coll­ec­tive name for the pas­si­va­ti­on costs and time of the che­a­pest, fa­stest and shor­test strong points, respec­ti­vely.

The fun­da­men­tal quest­ion of the mul­ti-op­ti­ma­lity of Frank­lin in­di­ca­tors is, whet­her there exists a law va­ri­ant whose all Frank­lin in­di­ca­tors be­long­ing to its ope­ra­ti­on chain are mi­ni­mal.

The game model and its the­ory re­sults in the main sta­te­ment that the ans­wer is “yes”.

Out­lo­ok

In this model the spe­ci­fic property of the prob­lem – as aga­inst the ge­ne­ral prac­ti­ce of fault tree met­hod – is that here prime events can­not be con­nec­ted to events, ac­ti­vi­ti­es fal­ling wit­hin our com­pe­ten­ce (so wit­hin the com­pe­ten­ce of the state). In this case the out­co­me of the prime event de­pends on an ab­st­ract “Mar­ket” en­tity sup­po­s­ed to be rat­her ideal ty­pi­cal. Con­cer­ning this we sup­po­s­ed only that the events of the Mar­ket, as risk fac­tors of the ope­ra­ti­on of the State, are func­tion­ing as fa­i­lu­re sour­ces.

At the mo­ment we have no ope­rab­le expla­na­ti­on re­lat­ing to how we could at­tach cost and dura­ti­on to the prime events of the Mar­ket in a rea­son­ab­le and me­as­urab­le way.

Notes

  • 1. The de­fin­ion of a risk fac­tor fal­ling wit­hin the scope the law en­for­ce­ment sho­uld not be con­fu­s­ed with the con­cept of a risk fac­tor be­long­ing to the com­pe­tency of law en­for­ce­ment.
  • 2. AIM-SORS mo­dell, lásd Bu­ko­vics, 2007.
  • 3. More de­ta­ils are ava­i­lab­le on the app­li­ca­ti­on on the fol­lo­wing mail add­ress: bukovics.​istvan@​uni-nke.​hu. The user guide of the app­li­ca­ti­on inc­lu­des the ne­ces­sary the­o­re­ti­cal base.
  • 4. The con­cept of ”pa­ra­digm” is used in such a me­aning how I exp­res­sed it in my the­sis (Bu­ko­vics, 2007, Sec­ti­on 1.5, 19).

Re­fe­ren­ces

Bu­ko­vics, Ist­ván (2007): A ter­mé­sze­ti és ci­vi­li­zá­ci­ós ka­taszt­ró­fák pa­ra­dig­ma­ti­kus el­mé­le­te. MTA-dok­to­ri ér­te­ke­zés, Bu­da­pest.
Bu­ko­vics, Ist­ván (2013): A fenn­tart­ha­tó köz­igaz­ga­tás el­mé­le­te. Pol­gá­ri Szem­le, Vol. 9, No. 3-6.
Bu­ko­vics, Ist­ván (2015): A „jó állam” al­go­rit­mi­kus el­mé­le­te. Pol­gá­ri Szem­le, Vol. 11, No. 1-3.
KIM (2012): Ma­gyary Zol­tán Köz­igaz­ga­tás-fej­lesz­té­si Prog­ram (MP 12.0). Köz­igaz­ga­tá­si és Igaz­ság­ügyi Mi­nisz­té­ri­um, Bu­da­pest.
Ko­ron­váry Péter (2009): Rend­szer­tan. ZMNE, Bu­da­pest.
Neu­mann, John von (1966): The The­ory of Au­to­ma­ta. In: The­ory of Self-Re­pro­du­cing Au­to­ma­ta. Ed. Arhur W. Burks, Uni­ver­sity of Il­li­no­is Press, Ur­ba­na–Lon­don.
Ri­gu­et, Jac­ques (1976): Au­to­ma­tes cel­lu­lai­res a bord et au­to­ma­tes Codd-IC­RA. Comp­tes Ren­dus de l’Aca­de­mie les Sci­en­ces de Paris. Ma­gya­rul: Sejt­au­to­ma­ták. Szerk. D. Ta­kács Viola, Gon­do­lat Kiadó, Bu­da­pest, 1978.
Wolf­ram, Step­hen (2002): A New Kind of Sci­en­ce. Wolf­ram Media, Cham­pa­ign.