TRANSITION

ANDRÁS BOZÓKI
Success Stories: Lessons of Democratization in Central Europe 3

IRINA CULIC
State Building and Constitution Writing in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 38

AUTONOMY: PRESENT AND PAST

GYÖRGY SCHÖPFLIN
Autonomy, Demos and Ethnos 59

STEFANO BOTTONI
The Creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romania (1952): Premises and Consequences 71

NATION AND NATIONALISM

ZSUZSA CSERGŐ
National Strategies and the Uses of Dichotomy 95

LÁSZLÓ FOSZTÓ
Diaspora and Nationalism: an Anthropological Approach to the International Romani Movement 102
MINORITIES

NÁNDOR BÁRDÍ
Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad: a Historical Outline 121

ZOLTÁN ALPÁR SZÁSZ
The Electoral Success of Dominant Parties Representing the Hungarian Minority in Romania and Slovakia 139

COMMUNISM AND AFTER

ÉVA KOVÁCS
The Cynical and the Ironical – Remembering Communism in Hungary 155

ATTILA MELEGH
From Reality to Twilight Zones. Change of Discourses and the Collapse of State Socialism 170

BARBARA BŐSZE
EU Neighborhood Policy and a New Order at the External Borders 187
The rise and fall of Communist regimes form one of the dominant political stories of the twentieth century. It started with the putsch-like revolution in Russia in 1917 and ended up with reform-like negotiated revolutions in East Central Europe in 1989. These transitions had a worldwide effect: the end of the Soviet Union and the end of the more than forty years period of the Cold War in 1991. These changes have been interpreted as the sweeping victory of the idea of democracy and the “third wave” of democratization.1

More than a decade after the historic democratic turn, all countries in Central Europe are constantly rated as “free” ones by the Freedom House.2 It seems that, in the Balkans, the problems of definition of national political community meant to be the greatest obstacle to democratization. But when it was solved, most of those countries quickly moved closer to the fully free category. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, just as in the post-Soviet republics mentioned above, this movement toward freedom will probably take more time.

In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became members of the NATO, in 2002 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia were invited by NATO as well, and joined NATO in 2004. In 2004 the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia to joined the European Union. Bulgaria and Romania (and perhaps Croatia) can receive invitation to the EU in a few years time. The integration of Central Europe into the international democratic political organizations is well on the way.

However, these countries had to combat tremendous problems to complete successfully the tasks of the double or “triple transition”3 (dictatorship to democracy, state socialism to capitalism, and in many cases, from non-states to democratic nation states). Transitions to democracy had significant social and economic costs. Table 1. summarizes the main conditions of the Central European democracies.

For Central European countries, while formal political and human development indices show remarkably good figures, it is the level of economic development (Cf. Real GDP per capita), which still pose huge problems. These democracies are relatively poor democracies by European standards. This is not to say that any serious breakdown of democracy would be probable in these countries, rather it just makes their integration to the European Union difficult. It is not so much the possibility of breakdown of democracy that deserves attention, rather the possible survival of informal, semi-corrupt structures and practices, and the conditions of “shallow democracy” (i.e. half-democratic or not-fully-democratic practices inside the formal democratic framework of rule).4

In this paper, I shall first analyze the meaning and modes of these revolutionary changes of 1989 by focusing on the nature of the roundtable talks and their impact on the subsequent democratic regime.5 Second, I will deal with the impact of communist and pre-communist legacies on the nature of postcommunist democracies. Here, I will discuss the visions of a future democracy and the historical references of the participants of the transition which were recalled to distance some points in the past while revitalizing oth-

Table 1. Central European democracies: an overview on political, social, demographic, and economic conditions (2000-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Czech Rep.</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom H. Index</td>
<td>free (1, 2)</td>
<td>free (1, 2)</td>
<td>free (1, 2)</td>
<td>free (1, 2)</td>
<td>free (1, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President elected by</td>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>the people</td>
<td>the people</td>
<td>parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-communist party</td>
<td>non-reformed</td>
<td>reformed</td>
<td>reformed</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>reformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic composition</td>
<td>homogeneous</td>
<td>homogeneous</td>
<td>homogeneous</td>
<td>divided</td>
<td>homogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (year)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Dev. Index</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In % of EU average</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation % (2001)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment %</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI per Capita (million EUR)</td>
<td>2960.5</td>
<td>2595.0</td>
<td>1642.5</td>
<td>1161.9</td>
<td>1801.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

\(^6\) Freedom House, op. cit.
\(^9\) Provided by Tamás Dávid from Budapest Economics Co.
ers. The paper will conclude with an evaluation of the effects of the “negotiated revolutions” as new beginnings.

1. THE MODES OF TRANSITION AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE NATURE OF SUBSEQUENT REGIMES

Transitions or revolutions?

Democratic transitions are some ways different from classic revolutions, and these differences effect its perception as “new beginning”. They might be revolutionary in their outcome but non-revolutionary in their process of change.

– First, while revolutions start out from below and outside the power center, transitions are more complex interplays between elites and non-elites. One peculiarity of transitions is that they start from inside and outside, and also from top and bottom at the same time.
– Second, while revolutions are mostly violent or threatening with the use of violence, transitions are non-violent changes in which participants consciously pay attention to avoid violence.
– Third, while revolutions usually polarize society between supporters of the old and new regimes, transitions offer place for different type of participants. In transition processes usually both the outgoing authoritarian bloc (reformers vs. hard-liners) and the incoming opposition bloc (moderates vs. radicals) are divided.
– Fourth, while revolutions are based on the mobilization of society (or seek to mobilize it at least), during the period of transition one can observe both mobilization and demobilization processes. Revolutions tend to increase participation, transitions tend to increase competition.
– Fifth, with regard to the composition of elites, while revolutions usually bring about elite change, transitions rather mean a fluid restructuration of elites instead of their complete replacement.

10 The notion of “new beginning” has been used to describe revolutions by Hannah Arendt: On Revolution. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963.
12 On these differences see in detail: András Bozóki: The Hungarian Transition in Comparative Perspective. In András Bozóki, András Körösényi & George Schöpflin (eds.):
All of these differences made difficult for many to see democratic transitions as processes of a historic break. Quite characteristically, people became dissatisfied with the results of the transition and claimed to make a “second” transition in order to “complete” the revolutionary change. On the other hand, despite of those differences, revolutions and transitions are similar in their result. If revolutions or transitions succeed the regime changes. Although, analytically, transitions can be placed between reforms and revolutions, in fact, they are closer to the revolutionary forms of change. In its style and processes, a transition is more similar to reforms, in while regarding its results, it gets close to the notion of revolution. While reformers want to save the existing regime, transformers want to transcend or replace it. If a reform is successful the regime does not change, if a transition proves to be successful, the regime does change.

Reforms and revolutions can, however, be separated for analytical purposes only. In reality, historical processes are complex as they are, they might stem from each other, and they might mutually reinforce each other. Revolutionary situations might open up the regime for reforms or vice versa. \(^\text{13}\) Reforms can make up the first, preparatory phase of a revolution. Failed reforms might lead to revolutions, failed revolutions might lead to reforms. Opposition strategies for a democratic transition are themselves based on experiences from previous historical processes and events.

**Non-violence and negotiations: Central European transitions from communism**

The most striking feature of Central European transitions from communist rule was the self-limiting behavior of their participants. While they were radical in their aims concerning regime change, at the same time they were sophisticated, self-limiting in their political behavior. This was a valuable knowledge learned by the democratic opposition under the decades of communist rule: radical goals and strategies should not prevent the political actors to behave in a co-ordinated, compromise-seeking, self-limiting, non-violent way. Compromises in tactics, intransigence in final goals could, indeed, go hand in hand. In order to achieve their radical goals, leaders of the opposition in Central Europe had to convince the reformist wing of the communist leadership that they would

---

not be killed or jailed during the transition. Moreover, in some countries with reformist communist tradition, they even convinced the communists that a possible peaceful transition serves their own interests as well.

Among the East Central European political transformations, it was Poland where the transition to democracy came first, therefore the Polish opposition had to behave in the most cautious manner. Accordingly, the Polish roundtable talks were not so much about paving the way to a full democracy, as about agreeing, first, on the legalization of Solidarity, and second, on holding semi-democratic, partially fixed elections. The Polish elections of June 1989 could not yet be regarded as fully democratic ones.

Historically, however, we must recognize that the Polish negotiations began as far back as August of 1980. Polish dissidents were the pioneers in initiating open negotiations with the communists in the region. The first talks between the activists of the newly formed Solidarity and the leaders of the communist party in the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk marked the beginning of the end. The self-limiting revolution of Solidarity in 1980-81 established a model for other opposition groups in East Central Europe.

Before Solidarity, people in East Central Europe had two major attempts of different type to change communist rule: a revolution (in Hungary in 1956) and a political reform (in Czechoslovakia in 1968). Although both of these changes proved to be internally successful, they both provoked Soviet military intervention and were not able to resist the external military powers. Any sort of resistance (intra-party or extra-party, violent or peaceful) seemed to be hopeless. The historic solution for this deadlock came with the idea of “new evolutionism” which was a strategy based on non-violent non-cooperation with the oppressive party-state and the revitalization of civil society. This strategy aimed to strengthen civil society to make it prepared for future negotiations on rights and freedoms. It was an intellectual break with the hypocrisy of reforms and preparation for real, meaningful talks. By refusing reforms and shallow negotiations, Solidarity was able to create a political vac-

---


uum around the communist party. It was able to make clear that there was no other solution for the crisis than entering negotiations with the Solidarity.

For Poland, 1989 was the closing chapter of a long historical process: their decade-long transition from “ideocratic” communism to an authoritarian, then to a military regime, and finally, to democracy. Strictly speaking, what the Poles accomplished between February and April 1989 was simply to close an era of military dictatorship. Their first task was to restore legality and grant legitimacy to Solidarity, a task initiated not by the opposition, but by the governing bloc after the failure of the 1988 referendum. By late 1988, even the communists had come to realize that they had no other option than negotiating a peaceful change of the regime.

While the task of the Polish and Hungarian roundtable talks was to extricate their countries from dictatorship, the German and Czechoslovakian roundtable talks occurred only after their peaceful revolutions. Therefore, in the latter cases, the goal of their negotiations was the establishment of the institutional order of the new regime, since they had already disengaged themselves from their dictatorial regimes. Poland was the first, but ended up with semi-free elections in 1989. As the second to attempt a transformation, the intention of the Hungarian negotiators was to follow the Polish path but to go further and achieve more than the Poles did.

Only in the case of Hungary did the roundtable talks have to achieve both goals simultaneously: extricating Hungary from the old regime, and creating the institutional order of a democratic regime. These talks represented not only an end of an era but the beginning of a new one. The Hungarian negotiators often referred openly to the Polish precedents. They argued that the Polish opposition could arrive at a compromise with the communists on semi-free elections in June 1989 because they were much stronger than the Hungarian opposition. The Polish opposition could afford to accept substantial compromises in the early stages, because they were strong

---

19 Both the communists and the opposition, independently from each other, sent delegates to Poland in May 1989 to learn the first hand experiences of the Polish negotiators.
enough to mobilize the masses on the streets and change the results of the roundtable talks later on. According to this argument, the Polish dissidents could accept a compromise without damaging their political credibility.

The Hungarian national roundtable negotiations of June-September 1989 benefited, in many respects, from coming after the Polish elections; it was considerably easier to run second than to be the path-breakers. As it happened, the negotiations also fell in the period of time between two significant historic events: between the suppression of the student demonstration at Tiananmen Square in China (June 1989) and the formation of the first non-communist government in Poland in four decades (September 1989). Between the Polish elections in early June and the beginning of Leipzig’s Monday demonstrations in East Germany in mid-September – Hungary alone was on the road to democratization. In Poland and Hungary, it was these talks that led to the changes, but in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, they only legitimized and institutionalized the changes after the fact. But one way or another, an essential change of regime took place in all these countries. Table 2, compiled by the author, offers an overview on the nature and significance of the roundtable talks in different countries in Central Europe.

It was only the GDR and Romania where the roundtable talks did not play any significant role in the process of transition. In East Germany, the “GDR-rev-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Country</strong></th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>GDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participants</strong></td>
<td>Communist Party (CP), Catholic Church, Solidarity, etc.</td>
<td>CP, Opposition Roundtable, Third Side</td>
<td>government, CP, Civic Forum, etc.</td>
<td>CP, New Forum, Civic orgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Issues</strong></td>
<td>legalization of Solidarity, rules of transition, elections</td>
<td>rules of transition, constitution making, elections</td>
<td>institutionalization of changes, policy issues</td>
<td>policy issues, (failed) constitution making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>pact, semi-free elections</td>
<td>pact, plebiscite, free elections</td>
<td>power-sharing free elections</td>
<td>power-sharing no impact on free elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significance</strong></td>
<td>decisive</td>
<td>decisive</td>
<td>partly-decisive</td>
<td>non-decisive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
olution” of the Fall of 1989, was quickly forgotten when the option of German reunification became available. In Romania, the parallel putsch and revolution of December 1989 brought a heterogeneous political group to power (the National Salvation Front), led by ex-communist politicians. Those were not even interested in a power-sharing formula: they used the “roundtable” as a facade of democratization only. In fact, their main concern was to prevent the emergence of democratic pluralism before the elections.

Table 3., compiled by the author, summarizes the transition paths in Central Europe.

**Table 3. Characteristics of transition from communist rule in Central European countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old regime</td>
<td>authoritarian</td>
<td>rather totalitarian</td>
<td>authoritarian transitional</td>
<td>authoritarian military</td>
<td>authoritarian transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>unified</td>
<td>unified</td>
<td>unified</td>
<td>divided</td>
<td>unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way of change</td>
<td>Mobilization (peaceful)</td>
<td>Mobilization (peaceful)</td>
<td>Negotiated (peaceful)</td>
<td>Negotiated (peaceful)</td>
<td>Negotiated + secession, war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>controlled by the state</td>
<td>controlled by the state</td>
<td>spontaneous</td>
<td>spontaneous</td>
<td>controlled by the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries of democratic community</td>
<td>created by separation</td>
<td>created by unification</td>
<td>given</td>
<td>given</td>
<td>created by secession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the most salient political values of 1989, I will discuss here the following: negative freedom, popular sovereignty, representative government, non-violence, consensual democracy, civil society, and the minimization of

---


conflicts. The prevailing vision of the framers of the new democracy was that of a democratic welfare society which would “return to Europe”, combining the features of a market economy, representative government and international military neutrality.

1. Negative freedom

Among the political values espoused by the participants of the transition the idea of freedom was primary, understood both as a liberal and a democratic value. Freedom as a liberal value meant that people could finally exercise their human rights and civil liberties. They were free to talk to one another openly, both in private and in public; there would be a free press, and the right of association and party formation would be guaranteed as inalienable rights of all citizens.

Freedom was understood in a negative rather than a positive sense, requiring the state (the Party, the police, the military, etc., the government as a whole) to allow individuals to pursue their activities free of harassment, interference or control. It was freedom from something, freedom from the intervention of the state. This was clearly the cumulative outcome of two major political influences. First, the legacy of dissent in Central Europe, which valued high human rights and equal human dignity (as expressed in the writings of Václav Benda, István Bibó, Václav Havel, György Konrád, Milan Kundera, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Jan Patocka, and others). Secondly, the impact of the then dominant Western neoliberal, neo-conservative ideologies represented by theorists such as Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, and politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan.

2. Popular sovereignty

The democratic conception of freedom was understood as popular sovereignty, reclaimed after so many decades of Soviet domination, when the pres-

---


ence of Soviet advisors and the Red Army determined political outcomes. The idea of popular sovereignty begs for the definition of political community. When the boundaries of political community (and therefore the identity of the democratic state) were questionable, newborn democracy was often distorted by ethnically defined nationalist or nationalizing policies. In many ways, nationalism and democracy are not far from each other: They both based themselves on the idea of popular will. Where the borders of the state had been clearly defined and the anti-Communist civic movements clearly demonstrated their commitment to democracy, the end of communism meant to be a beginning of a regime based on democratic citizenship. All of the countries with round table type of transition belong to this category.

Where, however, these social conditions had not existed, especially in the case of non-democratic federations, popular will was used and abused by leaders who transformed themselves from communist to nationalist politicians to maintain power. In these countries democracy was diminishing to the level of partly free and non-fair elections. It is not surprising that none of these countries were able to produce a negotiated way-out from the dictatorship.

3. Representative government

It is worthy of note that democracy was understood as a representative form of governance, wherein people exercise their constitutional powers not so much directly, as through the activity of their elected representatives. If democracy, as Robert A. Dahl and others have said, has three major components – competition, participation and civil liberties – it is significant that negotiators at the roundtable talks emphasized the first and the third components, and tended to somehow ignore the second. Because communism had based itself on the forced, involuntary participation of the masses, people grew distrustful of the value of political mobilization initiated at the top. They came to prefer, especially in Hungary, a liberal, “non-participatory” democracy. This tendency correlates with the high value of individual freedom understood mainly as “negative” freedom.

4. Non-violence

One reason the regime change was effected so smoothly, was the participants’ insistence on peaceful means. Non-violence was highly valued and taken seriously by all sides. One could venture to say that non-violence was as highly prized as freedom. The participants’ commitment to non-violence, their genuine desire to reach consensus through negotiations, is one of the legacies of 1989.27 In Poland, already in the Solidarity revolution of 1980-81, the most remarkable feature of that social movement was its complete lack of violence.

In Hungary, ordinary people had no wish whatsoever to repeat the bloody revolution of 1956, and their behavior was also influenced by the evolutionist strategy of the opposition. The communists, still in power, also wished to come through the crisis without resorting to violence. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the situation in 1989 was more dangerous and threatening with violence, each side was anxiously anticipating the need to respond to the violence of the other. Fortunately for all, no one initiated hostilities.

Non-violent conflict resolution was ensured by the then still living legacy of self-limiting political actions.28 Even the so-called radical opposition was, in fact, quite moderate by comparison with other radical democratic opposition formations in other transitions to democracy, especially in Latin America. This ideal of moderation was the result of the decade-long co-operation of the democratic opposition groups of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. (The high moral value placed on non-violence among political ideals was discussed and re-evaluated ten years after 1989 again, in connection with the NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1999, Hungarian public opinion, for instance, was seriously split over the NATO intervention following the crisis in Kosovo. One camp felt that the intervention violated the legacy of 1989, while another, the larger part of the society, felt that, in the final analysis, freedom was more important than non-violence.29 People had occasion to re-think whether non-violence should be valued as highly as freedom, and also the price to pay for freedom. This seems to remain a constant

27 See the minutes of the negotiations especially ARF, Vol. 2. op. cit.
28 For the notion of "self-limiting revolutions" see Neil Ascherson, op. cit., and Jadwiga Staniszkis, op. cit.
29 A group of anti-NATO intellectuals formed a Movement for the Peace in the Balkans (Balkán Békéjért Mozgalom), while others issued a pro-NATO declaration. These debates and manifestos can be found in the April, May, and June, 1999 issues of the weekly Élet és Irodalom.
dilemma in Europe.) In Hungary, the reason for the tremendous importance attached to non-violence lies in the violent legacy of 1956. But even in the countries of repeated mass mobilizations, none of the parties wanted to initiate violence by consciously keeping their revolution “velvet”.

One of the most important lessons of 1989 was that it was possible to complete a “double transition” (from state socialism to capitalism and from dictatorship to democracy) in a non-violent way. It is truly amazing that in most countries of Central Europe, unlike in the much-praised Spanish or Portuguese transitions, nobody died in political conflicts during the period of transition to democracy.

However, the so-called “triple transition” where the redefinition of political community and the clarification of national boundaries were also at stake, posed a more difficult task for those who favored non-violent conflict resolution. The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, occurred via civil and secessionist wars and ethnic cleansings, set up a negative example. The counter-example of the Czech and Slovak “velvet separation” shows that not only the problems to be solved matter but also the sequence of political steps. In Czechoslovakia, democracy was first established which created respected framework for conflict resolution for both Czech and Slovak political leaders. Therefore, they could negotiate the terms of the separation. In Yugoslavia, parallel processes of democratization and the redefinition of the national political community were mixed up which did not allow much room to use any mutually accepted procedural rules for peaceful separation. Rather, it helped nationalist leaders to abuse the notion of democratic political community (demos) by identifying it with “pure” ethnic community.

5. Extended consensualism

The legacy of 1980-81 was a real starting point for the negotiation process, not only in Poland but, indeed, it was significant for all over Central Europe. This peaceful, deliberative approach to building consensus and democracy through negotiations had been a long and difficult process. As a result, consensual democracy came to be seen as the ideal form of democracy. The negotiators consented to the continuation of transitional institutions beyond the period of transition, thereby allowing those institutions to become

30 Here, I refer to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.
31 Claus Offe, op. cit.
established as integral parts of the new democracy. This consensualism was later harshly criticized by the radical right, which wanted a more sweeping change in the power relations of the elite. In Hungary, the first prime minister József Antall had a pithy reply to these demands. He told the radicals, if they wanted a complete change of elites, they “should have fomented a revolution.”

I do not mean to suggest that I consider a broad consensualism to be the ideal form of democracy. A consensus should inevitably be reached on the institutional framework of the democratic system, as well as the forms of democratic procedures, but consensus on policy issues cannot be part of any definition of democracy. But this broadly defined notion of consensus was the, perhaps naïve, approach to democracy during the transition, influenced by many different thinkers in political philosophy, and some of the theorists of civil society.

6. Unified civil society

Up until 1989, the victory of democracy was envisioned as a victory of civil society over the state. A strong state was understood to be the sign of a weak democracy and vice versa. The achievement of the Hungarian Opposition Roundtable was that it transformed the dreams of a united front, and a loose umbrella organization of opposition, into the reality of a newly formed political elite. Although it can be described as internally divided and conflict-ridden, the Opposition Roundtable also succeeded as a co-operative, consensus-oriented body of the opposition. Their identity was built up around the value of consensus. Civil society was somehow identified with democratic social movements, which are the fighting for real democracy against the existing institutions. Up until 1989, many activists and some theorists believed political parties and governmental institutions are inherently non-democratic, therefore those should be substituted by the unwritten, non-institutionalized, self-evident, general consensus of civil society.

35 See for instance: Janusz Ziolkowski, op. cit.
37 See George Konrád, op.cit.
However, this self-evidently positive understanding of civil society existed until the party-state was intact. The year of 1988 was rather the period of civil society (as fluid, informal, active social movements) than of 1989, when political parties tried to form, crystallize and express themselves. At the time of the roundtable talks in 1989, the notion of civil society still had a strong rhetorical value. But it became clear soon that the old concept of a unified civil society belongs rather to the past myths of anti-totalitarian movements rather to the practice of a future democracy based on pluralism and divided interests.

7. Conflicts versus democracy

Still it was not easy to realize that democracy is about conflicts: it is about conflicting values and interests between democrats, which are openly expressed and institutionally regulated. Decisions should be made on the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal principle of equality in the free exercise of human rights and civil liberties. As Lewis A. Coser, Albert O. Hirschman and others pointed out, conflicts are not dysfunctional in a democracy, they are the very essence of it.38 For a while, democrats in Central Europe believed that they should be unified, and should have conflicts with anti-democrats only. In the roundtable-type of transitions it was not easy for them to realize that the point was not to eliminate conflicts in the name of consensual democracy, but to channel them through functioning democratic institutions.

For a while, it was difficult for the participants to distinguish between different types of conflicts (conflicting worldviews versus conflicting political interests), therefore they tended to overplay and “totalize” even minor conflicts inherent to all democracies. The participants of the roundtable talks wanted to establish a moderate, smoothly functioning democratic regime and later they tended to stamp each other as the “enemies of democracy” in case of situations with sharpening political conflicts. They were all convinced that only their interpretation of democracy was true.

8. “Back to Europe”

The political visions of the opposition were based on the idea of the Central European countries’ “return to Europe” and the new politicians of these

new democracies optimistically assumed that “the West” would be eager to welcome the newcomers into the community of European democracies. Now we can safely state that this was not exactly the case. Among the political forces in the post-communist regimes, some initially advocated the idea of a popular “third way”, small-scale ownership capitalism between global communism and global capitalism, but subsequently abandoned it in favor of Konrad Adenauer’s “social market economy” as the means to a safer, more gradual, and less painful transition. Liberal parties, on the other hand, influenced by contemporary neo-liberalism, advocated a fully liberal market economy based on a non-interventionist state. In the international arena, for a time, Finlandization served as a model for how Hungary might overcome its past, and the example of Austria’s development was repeatedly raised as well. Both cases suggested a neutral military status, which was the best relationship with the western powers that post-communist countries could hope for at the time. In Hungary, successful “Finlandization” policies of Finland and the neutral status of Austria or Sweden were highly valued and often quoted. Only after 1990 did more and more politicians begin to raise the possibility of joining NATO. At that time, the European Community (later Union) was still a far more popular option than NATO, because it was identified with social welfare, and people in the new democracies did not fear high external threat enough to be eager to join NATO. This public attitude began to change after the hard-liner coup in Moscow in August 1991, and during the war in the former Yugoslavia.

In sum, no one from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia questioned that these countries were part of Europe, both geographically and culturally. In their eyes, the return to the luckier peoples of the “European family” seemed to be a quick, self-evident, automatic process. They presupposed that western states would value their long struggle for democracy and would be ready to pay the price of their reintegration. The Central European left regarded “Europeanization” as a process: a project of political and economic modernization. The political right, on the other hand, tended to argue that the major cultural characteristic of Europe is Christianity, which was shared by these countries. Consequently, “Europe” for them was not a program but a state, a regained status after the collapse of communism.

The following table summarizes the tremendous tasks and problems faced by the transitions in Central Europe.

**Table 4. The tasks and problems of the transition in Central Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrain</th>
<th>Direction of change</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political regime</td>
<td>dictatorship to democracy</td>
<td>completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic regime</td>
<td>state socialism to capitalism</td>
<td>completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political community</td>
<td>building of the nation-state</td>
<td>completed / controversial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social transformation</td>
<td>change of elites</td>
<td>completed / controversial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic legitimacy</td>
<td>moral justice and/or rule of law</td>
<td>controversial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>reintegration to Europe</td>
<td>completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naturally, “to complete” a process does not mean that it exists without conflicts or controversies today. It means only that there was an agreement for the completion of the historic turn itself both in the politics and in the economy. At present, many social problems should be tackled, which stem from the very nature of democracy and capitalism. But these are not the problems of transition any more, rather the conflicts inherent to the new regime.

2. THE IMPACT OF COMMUNIST LEGACIES ON THE NATURE OF POSTCOMMUNIST DEMOCRACIES

The close of World War II in 1945 marked the commencement of democratic developments in Central Europe that were arrested by Stalinist sovietization initiated by the occupying powers in 1947. Between 1945 and 1947, the regimes were theoretically based on free elections but could only be called half-democratic at best as the Soviet control gave no real chance to the opposition, forced some political parties to form a coalition with the communists, and disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of citizens. At best, these regimes can be called semi-democracies, with features of an East European version of democradúra and dictablanda. Finally, the Communist Party, which was given control over all the armed forces, began to clamp down on the adherents of democratic ideals. In most countries, the Communist dictatorship exercised totalitarian control in the 1950s and most part of the 1960s, while the following period could be described as somewhat softer or, at least
different, post-totalitarian dictatorship, characterized simultaneously by a relative pragmatism to economic reforms and by the political monopoly of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the communist experience was not always the same for these countries.

Table 5. Types of Communist Dictatorships in Countries of Central Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type/ Country</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>1965-68</td>
<td>1962-87</td>
<td>1956-81</td>
<td>1953-88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military (posttotalitarian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982-87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which were the main differences in Central Europe between the early, totalitarian forms of communist rule on the one hand, and the “mature”, mostly post-totalitarian, dictatorships on the other? Table 6., compiled by the author, summarizes them in dichotomies.

The beginning of the end of the old regime had to start with the process “unmasking the hypocrisy”, since the communist system was ideologically based on promises of Enlightenment which sharply contradicted to its everyday political practice. People were aware of this discrepancy and knew that the regime based itself on a fundamental lie. Despite the widespread quasi-scientific theory of “homo sovieticus” which suggested that the communist regime had created different type of men and women, in fact, the overwhelming majority of these societies were anti- or non-communist. Communist leaders argued that history was uni-linear process of progress and one day ideal socialism (communism) would be realized. All then present miseries of the “actually existing socialism” were just downplayed as “mistakes” which were made “on the road” to a perfect society. Its leaders misrepresented existing socialism as the given stage of a historical road on which people must go through to reach happiness. People with huge skepticism, however, received this sort of argument.

Originally the regime was “legitimized” not by its achievements but by its final goal. For dissidents, initially, it was not easy to make a break with this teleological way of thinking and to form an opposition ideology. Both the Pol-
ish protest and the Hungarian revolution of 1956 were anti-Communist, but not necessarily anti-socialist. Many of the protesters and revolutionaries believed that the dictatorial socialism of Stalinism should and could be replaced by a humanitarian-cooperative, democratic socialism. \(^{40}\) In other words, they refused to believe in the centralized rule and the omnipotent state, but they still believed in the possibility of democratic market socialism of voluntary associations and co-operatives under one-party rule. They refused the practices of Stalin but still, to a certain extent, accepted the thoughts of Bukharin. It was similar ideologically in 1968 when Alexander Dubcek and his comrades refused the Muscovite way to communism in Czechoslovakia but they believed in a humanitarian, democratic, non-oppressive socialism. \(^{41}\) They still claimed that democracy and communism are compatible, therefore communism was reformable.

The ideological break became available only when dissidents in East Central Europe were able to step out from the Marxist framework of criticism. This intellectual turn occurred in the 1970s only when opponents to the regime stopped talking about the reformability of the system and started to refer to concepts as human rights and civil society. These two concepts proved to be the most powerful ideological tool in their resistance to late socialism. \(^{42}\) It was only when they started to organize civil society outside the framework of the state that they became prepared to create a different social entity to be represented in future negotiations against the leaders of the regime.

---

First, they had to realize that they had to present a fundamental ethical alternative to the corrupt regime: a need to live “within the truth”.43 Second, they had to organize themselves outside the institutionalized regime. Third, they had to be able to present themselves as representatives of the majority of people who wanted a break with the communist regime. While presenting themselves as a different body of people (the society) against the communists (the regime), they made clearly visible the dividing line between “us” and “them”. Therefore, at the end, by “unmasking the hypocrisy” they had to present a democratic political alternative to participate in the negotiations and to compete successfully in electoral politics.

The communist era represent different legacies for countries of Central Europe. It was most damaging for those, which had had democratic traditions, and flourishing market economy. Those countries had to suffer most which had inherited the most developed social structure from the pre-communist times. The damage was most clearly seen in the Czech part of the former Czechoslovakia, and also in East Germany, in other words, in the most developed parts of the region. In these countries, communism systematically destroyed the functions of civil society, social relations, and of the prospects of a rational economy. In other countries of East Central Europe its effects were a bit more mixed. Here, totalitarianism destroyed social solidarity and civil society, but also destroyed the semi-feudal structures of the pre-communist regime. There is a debate in the literature whether state socialism should be seen as a traditional or a modernizing regime. In the most modernized countries of Central Europe communism meant a sort of refudalization: the communist party hierarchy cut other previous social relations and replaced the previously existed horizontal relations with a vertical and politically dominated one. Communism also prevented people in Central and Eastern Europe to experience the emancipatory impact of the “quality of life revolution” of 1968, which occurred in many western societies and transformed fundamentally the way of thinking of young people over there. It is also important to note that Communism was not a result of an endogenous political development in Central Europe: it was forced on these societies from outside. Communism was not a home-grown system, it was implemented by the Red Army and by the Moscow-trained party-apparatchiks who followed and copied mechanically the Stalinist model. With the partial

exception of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, communist movement never had mass following in these societies.

However, in many ways, communism was still a modernizing regime—especially in the Soviet republics, but also, to some degree, in Central Europe. In the 1950s, it violently fostered urbanization and (an outdated model of) industrialization. It pushed millions of people to move from the countryside to urban centers. By opening up the labor market for women, for economic and ideological reasons, it officially pushed society towards the acknowledgement of some sort of female ‘emancipation’. Female suffrage was also generally acknowledged, although voting remained meaningless in the lack of political freedom. Finally, and most importantly, it put high emphasis on general elementary and high school education and by doing so it virtually eliminated illiteracy.

An interesting side-effect of communism was that the lack of achievement motifs in the formal economic and political spheres made many people to turn either to the private sphere or to top performances in the non-political and non-economic spheres. Sports served that goal on the popular level, but this situation also helped the survival of the traditionally high prestige of high culture (classic music, arts, literature, philosophy) in Central Europe. For a period under communism, Central Europe itself was increasingly identified with high culture in the eyes of non-communist intellectuals. As an escape from reality, these intellectuals interpreted Central Europe as the land of individual giants like Bartók, Dvorák, Freud, Haydn, Kafka, Koestler, Lukács, Mahler, Mozart, Neumann, Schiele, Wittgenstein and others. This idealized perception of the intellectuals helped to maintain their own self-esteem and distinctive identity in order to keep their relative autonomy under the communist regime.

It is not easy to summarize pros and cons of communist legacy, because the communist system, despite its generally negative uniformization effects, did not have the same impact on the countries in Central Europe. It hurt the most developed countries and regions most. In general, needless to say, it had much more and deeper negative, devastating effects, than positive ones. Even its positive effects should be seen as relatively positive ones, and only in retrospect, in the light of post-communist development. The following table, compiled by the author, summarizes these effects.
Table 7. The communist legacy: pros and cons in retrospect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supported social mobility</td>
<td>Oppressed freedom, trust, and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed equality</td>
<td>Created a culture of corruption and fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminated illiteracy</td>
<td>Double standards (formal vs informal rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>Minimized foreign travels and interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available healthcare &amp; housing</td>
<td>Dependency on the omnipotent party-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional mobility inside the country (relatively developed, available public transportation)</td>
<td>Made Central Europe as satellite of the Soviet Union (lack of sovereignty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminated semi-feudal hierarchies</td>
<td>Created rather closed societies (xenophobia, racism, prejudices, cynicism, pessimism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women to enter the labor market</td>
<td>Created new hierarchies based on loyalty and not on achievement (refeudalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisible unemployment (hidden inside the workplace)</td>
<td>Cynical attitudes to public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free (but quantitatively restricted) access to higher education</td>
<td>Oppressed or distorted national identity and citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women were ‘emancipated’ as workforce only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relativized ethical standards in society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pros and cons of the communist legacy should not be taken quantitatively only. In fact, most of the positive sides had its own negative consequences for further development. At the end of the day, it is clear that the negative effects proved to be far more important, and it would have been much better for these societies to avoid the whole communist experience as such.

There are only few peaceful and democratic periods to be found in the 20th-century history of Central Europe. Scanning the decades of the 20th century for moments of historical significance, it is beyond doubt that the 1989 change ranks as one of the most outstanding events of the century.

Most participants of the Central European transitions were eager to establish a new regime with full legitimacy. Therefore they often turned to particular historical events in the pre-communist past to justify their political actions concerning the definition of political community, elite change and moral-historical justice. Unfortunately, the pre-communist past, as it was mentioned, did not contain many democratic elements. What they wanted
was first of all to distance the communist past and “bring back” some useful or usable traditions to the then present political life. These traditions could be distinguished whether they belonged to the category of revolutions or institution-building.

DISTANCING THE PAST: HISTORICAL REFERENCES

Concerning past references, participants of the transition were trying to employ both revolutionary and non-revolutionary (reformist and nation-building) traditions to popularize and legitimize the regime change. Contradictory as it was they tried to use symbols and historical events to emphasize both continuity and change. Images of reform and revolution were utilized next to each other.

The revolutionary tradition

Most participants of the regime change in Hungary wanted to avoid repeating the model of action set by the 1956 revolution. The only exception was the radical-plebeian Hungarian October Party, which would not participate in the roundtable talks and opted for a revolutionary strategy, thereby marginalizing itself in political life. It denounced the negotiating partners as a set of elite-groups talking above the heads of the people, and implied that the parties at the roundtable talks were only pursuing their own interests and not the common good. All the other parties were determined to move from dictatorship to democracy by non-violent means, and rejected the revolutionary path.

Still, the legacy of 1956 could not be ignored in Hungary; it had to be addressed. The crushing of the revolution by the Soviets and the execution of Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of the revolutionary government, made the political position of those who supported János Kádár, and associated themselves with his policies, morally untenable. To remind the public that the Kádár regime had been born in a state of “original sin” was the best way for its opponents to de-legitimize the communist regime. 1956 was important in so far as it helped the opposition to distinguish itself from the Kádár-regime and to denounce it on moral grounds. While for some speakers at the reburial of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs Nagy was a political role model, for the young radical, Viktor

Orbán, Nagy was an honorable person only because he had renounced his communist beliefs. No groups in the opposition wanted seriously to adopt Nagy’s ideas of a “democratic socialism”, or follow the revolutionary practice of 1956. After June 16, 1989, when communism received its symbolic death sentence, the legacy of 1956, as the first anti-totalitarian, anti-communist (but not necessarily pro-capitalist) revolution faded away as well.

The participants of the roundtable talks were obliged to search for suitable historical precedents, other than 1956. This did not prove difficult, as Hungary’s long history had produced some similar patterns of change, which could offer some symbolic points of reference for the tasks of 1989. First and foremost, there was the “lawful revolution of 1848” when the strata of the lesser nobility initiated a bloodless transition, a “glorious revolution” from a more traditional to a more civic and liberal regime. In early 1849, too, it was the old parliament that passed the necessary bills for change, similar to the situation of 1989, and put in power the notable Lajos Batthyány-cabinet (which included among its ministers, some famous 19th century Hungarian politicians as Lajos Kossuth, István Széchenyi, and József Eötvös). Historians at the roundtable referred often to the example of 1848 as a model worth emulating.

Before the transition in Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and Slovaks often referred to Gorbachev as “late Dubcek”, that is, a communist politician who started glasnost and perestroika following the Prague Spring model of 1968. The old Alexander Dubcek himself was present at the Wenceslas Square in November 1989, together with Václav Havel, to cheer the masses and to symbolize continuity between 1968 and 1989. The presence of both leaders, the representative of reform-oriented communists (Dubcek), and the moral hero of the democratic opposition (Havel), gave a clear sign to the protesters to accept both legacies. However, the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia occurred very quickly for the participants of the December 1989 negotiations to set up a revolutionary legacy. The anniversaries of the crush of the Prague Spring by the Red Army in August 21, 1968, and the creation of independent Czechoslovakia in October 1918, served as occasions to speed up unrest in an increasingly revolutionary situation.

46 The notion of “glorious revolution” stems from the English “transition” of 1688. For the application of this term to 1989 see Ferenc Fehér & Ágnes Heller: Kelet–Európa ‘dicsőséges forradalmai’. [Eastern Europe’s ‘Glorious Revolutions’] Budapest: T-Twins, 1992.
The tradition of institution-building

Since the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was crushed by Soviet troops no long-lasting institutional achievements could be used in 1989 from that revolution. The original institutions of the revolutions, the worker’s councils and co-operatives, were regarded as somehow naïve, romantic efforts for better socialism, but also as outdated attempts for making democracy. One of the slogans of the time stated that there was no economic democracy without political democracy. (The decline of Tito’s “self-organizing” worker’s co-operatives in Yugoslavia just reinforced this conviction.) Countries of Central Europe had to reinvent and reconstruct examples of successful non-communist institution-building from their history.

The rebirth of political life after World War II offered a good reference point. In Hungary, bill 1946:I. on the legal status of the President of the Republic has frequently been quoted as a “little constitution” of those times. This legislation detailed the procedure to be followed in the election of the President, and by adopting that bill, the opposition aligned itself with the parliamentary traditions of Hungarian politics over any other presidential system or the tradition of monarchy. Metaphorically, the post-WWII rebuilding of the country was often quoted to compare it to the enormous task of the near future. Communism was frequently compared to the destruction of war. Democratic politicians sometimes remarked bitterly that post-communist society lacked the enthusiasm and optimism of the post-WWII generation. In Hungary, the period of 1945-46 was clearly seen as a new beginning, even if it had been halted by the communist coup. 1945 also offered the legacy of a peacefully established democratic regime, based on a non-communist center-right umbrella party (which was the Independent Smallholders’ Party at the time). That did not work that much in Poland and Slovenia since for them communist takeover took place with extreme speed after the second World War.

Further back to history, 1848, the “Springtime of the Peoples” provided the idea of national liberalism (which demonstrated that the more traditional values of “homeland” can be brought into harmony with the ideal of “progress”). In Central Europe, 19th century represented the beginning of the era of nation-states, which linked inseparably to institution-building. There-

fore, interestingly, 1848 was more important historical reference as peaceful institutional change than a revolution and nationwide fight for freedom and independence. Both legacies were seen as favoring institutional rearrangement rather than revolutionary upheaval.

It was an important achievement of the Hungarian Opposition Roundtable to establish the historic continuity of 1848-1945-1989, and thus to present itself as the proper heir of all the peaceful, yet radical, democratic traditions of the history of Hungary.49 Poland rediscovered the legacy of General Józef Piłsudski,50 which was an argument to introduce a semi-presidential democracy later on. In Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, the newly elected president referred often to an early “founding father”, Tomáš G. Masaryk.51 However, the Slovaks later made clear that for them the tradition of Czechoslovakia did not represent any attractive alternative to independence. While the democratic opposition led by Havel was relatively influential in Bohemia, its activities were far less known in the Slovak part of the country. Havel was not a “moral hero” for most Slovaks who were searching for an alternative historical legacy to represent both democracy and independence. (That search proved to be problematic since the only independent Slovak state existed in modern history had been, in fact, a puppet state of the Nazis.)

Other countries, liberated from the Soviet Union in 1990-91, tried to dig deeper to reconstruct national, liberal, and/or democratic traditions from their pre-Soviet past, back to the early 20th century. Latvia, for instance, reinstalled its 1922 constitution. In Hungary, despite some right-wing governmental efforts to revitalize the Horthy era (1919-44) and to make it somehow more respected, past nostalgia embraced rather pre-World War I Austria-Hungary, and the progressive legacies of the dualist Monarchy (as the era of economic development, constitutional liberalism, early federalism). These elements gave the idea for Jürgen Habermas to claim that these transitions were, in fact, “rectifying revolutions” (Nachholende Revolution), which tried to recover continuities and to reconnect present societies to the broken, pre-communist past.

The idea of Central Europe itself had different meanings in the 1980s. First, and foremost, it was the legacy of dissent and the recurrent fights for freedom in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Second, by the revitalization of Central Europe, most people thought a project to recreate historical similarities between cities like Cracow, Prague, Dresden, Vienna, Bratislava, Kosice, Budapest, Cluj, Braşov, Timișoara, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Trieste. Third, it had some historical resonance to the Habsburg Europe as a reference in the post-Iron Curtain period. Fourth, and finally, some people revived the pre-WWI German concept of Mitteleuropa advocated by Friedrich Naumann and other German national liberals at the beginning of the 20th century. These thoughts, however, have been partly swept away by the attractiveness of a larger unit, the European Union. The idea of Central Europe, however, has not been forgotten, rather it contributed to the formation of the so-called Visegrád-countries, a co-operation between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary after 1991.

SMOOTH TRANSITION VS. NEW BEGINNING?

The negotiations of 1989 created an unprecedented historical situation in some Central European countries in which a political elite was able to draft a constitution and create the institutional frameworks of a democracy without bloodshed. Was it, after all, a clear break the old regime and a “new beginning” of a democratic one?

In the categories of Hannah Arendt a revolution has two sides: 1. an extrication from the old regime and 2. the beginning of the construction of a new institutional order.

In Hungary, the break with the past occurred rather symbolically on June 16, 1989, when the Prime Minister of the 1956 revolution, Imre Nagy, and his fellow-martyrs were reburied officially. Kádár, himself, died three weeks later, while rule of law was introduced with the ratification of the new

---


55 Hannah Arendt, op. cit.
constitution on the 33rd anniversary of the revolution, in October 1989. This moment in June made clear that 1989 fulfilled many claims of the revolution without replaying it or implementing all of its visions, many of them burdened with illusions) for the future. After the reburial of Imre Nagy, the second phase of the revolutionary process began. The phase of reconstruction occurred at the negotiating table during the trilateral negotiations between June and September 1989. These negotiations could be interpreted both in the framework of the old and new regimes. On the one hand, it was a “social debate”, characteristic element of the communist legislative process. On the other hand, it was a functional equivalent of a “constitutional assembly” an emblematic feature of all major revolutions. Participants of this constitutional revolution acted without popular legitimacy but they presupposed the existence of popular support.

Since nobody elected the participants of the roundtable talks, so they were eager and worked hard to get some positive feedback from the society. During the course of the roundtable talks, the establishment of the institutional order of the new regime preceded the popular legitimacy of the “founding fathers”. And that made a difference, because usually the logic of revolutionary action is the following: 1. the destruction of the old regime; 2. the revolutionary/popular legitimacy of the “founding fathers”; and finally, 3. the creation of the new institutions of the new regime. In Hungary, however, after the first step came the third, and then the second one. The institutional order and its creators were legitimized in March 1990 only, at the first free elections.

Perhaps, that is exactly the reason why the roundtable talks mean a mixed tradition and became somehow ambivalent legacies in the past ten years, especially in Poland and Hungary. Those were not seen as a “clean” process. The negotiations of 1989 were tainted by the inclusion of the former communists: their leaders also had their say in the creation of the new democracy. Although they were sitting on the other side of the table, they were undeniably there. Some think it corrupted the genesis of the new democracy, because it meant negotiations, i.e. talks, communications, compromises, interactions, personal contacts between the outgoing and incoming elite. It was represented by the collaboration of democratic and non-democratic elite groups, instead of a clear-cut revolutionary change. Therefore, the legacy of 1989, the “negotiated revolution” became an increasingly uneasy tradition for those who would have preferred to repaint themselves as uncompromising revolutionaries. The popularly recognized moral break of June 16, 1989
was not followed by a widely perceived revolutionary-political break later on. A picture was somehow created that people of continuity are stronger than are people of the break.\textsuperscript{56} Popular dissatisfaction with the regime change also fueled this perception of the negotiations: as a secret, non-democratic, conspiratorial, well-designed elite-game over or against, the masses. The revolutionary process, in the Arendtian sense, was completed but, ironically, not fully recognized.

\textit{Elite change and democratic transition: the price to pay}

As it was demonstrated in Table 4, the tasks of transitions from communist rule were the following ones: 1. political regime change to democracy, 2. transition to capitalism in the economy, 3. defining the boundaries of political community (nation-state)\textsuperscript{57}, 4. to complete the elite change\textsuperscript{58}, 5. to initiate change in the moral-normative standards of society by doing some sort of “historical justice”, and finally, 6. to change the focus of foreign policy to return to “Europe”.\textsuperscript{59}

While participants of the transition in 1989-90 were mainly concerned with tasks 1 and 2, and they also had to face, in some countries, with task 3, later on, it became clear that people of these societies felt these changes incomplete. It was the right wing political forces, which aimed accelerating the process of elite change and historical justice. This created a clash between left and right in which the left preferred to stick to the norms of rule of law, while the right wanted to suspend rule of law for a while, until historical justice is completed. The idea of democratic society then confronted with the idea of just society. While for the left fair procedures were seen as the soul of rule of law, for the right, democracy was understood as the realization of just society.

\textsuperscript{56} This is certainly not a unique phenomenon in post-revolutionary situations. Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic, \textit{The Old Regime and the French Revolution}.
The uneasiness of the former opposition forces with this beginning was evident in a statement by the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, in 1999, ten years after the regime change. Although he had been an active, and even enthusiastic participant of the 1989 negotiations, he subsequently expressed the opinion that the costs of the negotiations were considerably higher than their benefits. In a June, 1999 speech in Vienna, at a conference on the roundtable talks, he said:

“I ask myself, is there anything of lasting value we can hold onto from 1989? Many people think that was our first year of liberty. Others, including myself, believe that 1989 was the last year of dictatorship. I think the less we hold onto from 1989, the better off we are.”

This is the typical case of the bottle, which can be half-full or half-empty. Of course, 1989 was the last year of the dictatorship, because it was also the year of the collapse of the dictatorship. Orbán’s statement served political purposes: He felt the need to sharpen the discontinuity, to distinguish between the movers and shakers of 1989 and those of 1990. He dubbed the 1989 negotiators the “people of political continuity” because they were willing to sit and negotiate with the communists. On the top of that, he further claimed, the negotiators of 1989 were only interested in partial changes and in slowing the pace of change. They favored changes in the institutional order, but not changes of personnel in the media; moreover, they did not support measures to ensure fair and equitable privatization or a just economic transformation.

By contrast with the negotiators of 1989, the political actors of 1990 represented a radical break, according to Orbán; they were responsible for free elections and they were not willing to fudge differences as the 1989 group was all too willing to do.

Among the costs, Orbán pointed out the fact that former communists dominated the public and commercial media, and the privatization processes, through which they could transfer public moneys into (their) private hands. This was an arresting thought: to picture the roundtable talks as the safety-net whereby communists could preserve themselves for the future. Polish President Lech Walesa also used similar arguments many times between 1990 and 1995 to undermine the credentials of the roundtable elites. This line of argument often targeted the intellectuals who played a vital role in the process of non-violent transition. No wonder that both Walesa and

60 See prime minister Viktor Orbán’s speech in a conference entitled “Ten Years After” in Vienna, Austria, on 26 June 1999.
Orbán found themselves in the battleground to fight against the politically engaged intellectuals.\textsuperscript{61}

If we study the transition process in the light of this criticism, we can readily see that the talks were structured to address, at least theoretically, both political and economic issues. And the political negotiations proved to be far more important than the talks about the economy. Why was this the case? Because, in Hungary, the Opposition Roundtable, which favored a negotiated settlement, insisted that they were there to legislate new bills. For the members of the Opposition Roundtable, the major goal was to legitimize popular sovereignty (pluralistic democracy), and they fiercely opposed any alliances between organizations, which would result in a power-monopoly. They were interested, first and foremost, in bringing about the fundamental institutional changes necessary for a new democracy. They did not enter into extensive discussions about privatization and issues of economic transformation. Why did not they? Were they completely uninterested in these matters? It was not the case. Rather, they simply did not feel entitled or empowered by the people to discuss issues of economic policy. At the very beginning of the talks, the Opposition Roundtable resisted re-writing the constitution. They argued that this is something that should be done in the future: by the freely elected parliament and the new government.

Economic change was to prove more challenging than political change. One can set up a new institutional-administrative order in a matter of months, but controlling the processes of privatization, and putting into practice the plans of economic transformation, is far more difficult. Especially, given that the negotiators of the opposition were not at all certain whether they should control privatization at all. In Hungary, non-communist participants of the transition finally acceded to spontaneous transformation, although they had always spoken against it. They thought the best way to arrive at capitalism would be to start with socialist/market societies. But, if they were in favor of capitalism, they could not credibly oppose spontaneous privatization. They interpreted this spontaneous privatization as a form of original capital accumulation, the “hardware” of capitalism. They opposed heavy elite change in order not to lose experts.

Their logic went something like this: From a historical perspective, it does not matter much who will be the new propertied classes. The most im-

The important thing was not whether ethical or reliable elements became the new owners, but to effect fundamental changes in economic and political relationships. They thought this way, perhaps because of their ideological foundations, or perhaps because they faced a fait accompli: the outgoing communist technocratic elite had already secured their role in the economic transformation, they had already enacted privatization legislation prior to the trilateral talks in June 1989. New laws dealing with the future of state-owned enterprises and with economic transformation had been already been passed in 1988 or early 1989. Therefore, these topics were not at issue at the roundtable talks. The economic committees found themselves in a vacuum at the negotiations. The members of these committees discussed possible approaches to privatization, new agrarian policies (etc.), but they did not come to any agreements. In the end, it was left to some ad hoc expert committees to come up with concrete recommendations.

While political and constitutional transformation came under close public scrutiny and so was subject to greater accountability, the games of economic transformation were beyond social control. The early legislation of the outgoing government and its installation of expert committees to determine the strategy of economic transformation fit the model of top-down elite reform much more closely than the case of the political negotiations.

The anger expressed by those who arrived too late, in the post-privatization phase, is certainly understandable, but it does not appear likely that a “second revolution” is in the wings to correct what, in the final analysis, is simply their misfortune. Those radicals, who would like to re-stage the revolution or re-enact the 1989 changes, cannot win elections. Revolutionary rhetoric is not currently a winning strategy. The regime change has been accomplished, and another democratic regime change is not on the agenda of the majority of society. Radical elements may wished to expand the idea of transition from the strictly political-institutional sense to a much broader social transformation encompassing cultural and economic, as well as political change, but post-1989 radicalism had its democratic limits.

In a “cost/benefit” analysis of the outcome of the roundtable-type revolutions,62 we would have to say that the benefits were far more significant than the costs. The costs have been mainly psychological, observable in pub-

---

lic morale: People feel that something was done without their participation, that the economic transformation and the redistribution of wealth were effected without democratic controls. They feel the emerging Big Business interests have somehow robbed them. The managers, the technocratic elite – all those who were already co-opted by the Kádárist elite in the 1980s – are viewed as the ultimate winners of the transformation. Ordinary people tend to think that they were the victims of communism before the regime change, only to become the victims of globalization after the regime change.

In the narrower arena of political transformation, there was a clear case of _elite settlement_: a rapid re-negotiation of the political and legal-institutional situation by internal elites to get out of the crisis. The transformation of the economic sphere, however, was effected through a more complex mix of elite settlement, elite co-optation and convergence. These were parallel processes. The new technocracy had no competitors among the elite. Being still close to the circles of power, the economic elite of the late Kádár era could not be excluded from the benefits of economic transformation. Like it or not, they were part of the game. This was the price to be paid for a bloodless revolution and a peaceful transition to democracy.

The old regime had collapsed and the institutions, created in the negotiations of 1989, firmly survived. Groups of the elite, people, mentalities, practices, and the popular perceptions of change – all of these changed much more slowly. The “End” was clear, while the “Beginning” remained much more complex, multifaceted, controversial, partly done, and endlessly debated.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The fact that countries of Central Europe became new democracies, is not attributable to a single factor only. There are numerous internal and external causes that brought about the collapse of the old regime in this particular way, in this particular time.

---


As far as the *internal* causes are concerned, one must stress 1. the impact of previous revolutions and reform attempts, 2. the diminishing performance of the economy, 3. the exhaustion of the social reserves of the regime, 4. the disintegration of the ideology, and 5. the willingness to compromise on the part of the new and the old elite.

Among the most important *external* factors, one must number 1. the defeat in the Cold War, 2. the crippling consequences of the arms race, 3. the social and ethnic conflicts that made the Eastern Bloc bursting at the seams, 4. the coordinated, evolutionist strategies of the democratic opposition in a number of these countries, 5. the corresponding, human rights-based foreign policies of the Western countries initiated by US President Carter in the 1970s, and finally, 6. the rise to the top of the Soviet party hierarchy of First Secretary Gorbachev who introduced a style of politics open to compromise. Taken by them, any of these causes constitute an important and integral part in the process, but the fact that they occurred more or less simultaneously created highly favorable circumstances for the democratic turn.

Educated people compose the societies of Central Europe. Despite the economic and social grievances – the poor salaries in the public sector, the comparatively low level of living standard,65 and the growing gap between rich and poor, between urban centers and the countryside, and between different regions of the country – the social structures of these countries do not resemble to those in Latin America or Southeast Asia. Knowledge, high culture, and human capital in general, enjoys high respect, while democratization and economic transformation were based on the patience of the deprived.66

The largely successful transitions to democracy in Central Europe resulted in a longer process of consolidation. Although consolidation has its own special problems, which might be independent even from the transition itself, the prospects of consolidation look promising too. In the transition period the popular wish to get rid of the old regime helped to overcome the social costs of economic transformation. In the period of democratic consolidation the very chance to join the European Union contributed largely to main-

---

65 It is important to note that Central Europeans always compare themselves to citizens of Western European societies, and never to the peoples of Asia, Africa, or Latin America. The meaning of their relatively low living standard should also be understood accordingly.

tain efforts in deepening and extending democracy. While Central European countries received no aid comparable to Marshall Plan in post-World War II western Europe, and therefore they had to make painful efforts themselves for catching up, external influences worked in favor of success in consolidating democracy.
The dismantling of the communist system and the collapse of the supranational authority of Moscow in 1989 initiated a complex process of state building. States like Romania and Poland were forced to re-constitute themselves as non-communist, democratic states; depositories of human and political values, rights and guarantees. The others—former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—regained their independence or, as in the case of Moldova or Macedonia, became independent states for the first time in modern history. The political elites of these newly formed states faced the task of formulating the philosophical foundation of their state: to decide upon the fundamental values on which the political, economic and social activities were to be grounded, the people, nation or political community in which the legitimacy of the ruling act was to be rooted, and the character of the state.

The main aims of political elites in state building were three-fold. First, political elites had to establish state authority internally and legitimize its placement through organized, free and competitive elections. Hence they were also compelled to produce new Constitutions placing establishing the full control of military and other security forces in the hands of central, domestic, political authorities.

Second, in accordance with the present international system of states, they were required to gain recognition as a political unit of international law and assert the sovereignty of their state. In order to do so, a definition of the political community of the state establishing a clearly demarcated territory, and a relational network with other states was necessary. In this respect most CEE states followed a maximal territorial and national state project, negotiat-
ing the maximum territory possible in accordance with historical-national, demographic or legal-constitutive principles. They shaped their states as national-states, of and for a titular/dominant nation, and introduced remedial policies that promoted and enhanced the language and culture of the titular nation.¹

Third, endeavoring to insure national security and stability, as well as security within the region, these states struggled to advance in the process of economic, political and military integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.

In what follows I will concentrate on only one element of this complex process of state building – Constitution writing. The crucial importance of the Constitution lies in the character of its *founding act*. The constitution establishes a foundation in all senses of the word – as document (law, covenant), as deed (action, event), and as performance (instituting act performed through referendum). The Constitution alone sets the foundation and hence the institutions of the state. The adoption of the Constitution is virtually equal to the birth of the state as an internally and externally legitimate, recognized, and functioning state.

Constitution writing requires a vivid process of deliberation, discussion and consultation. During this process, which takes place both within the Constituent Assembly and throughout the public sphere, state institutions are devised as well as the principles and values that will guide their activity. The process itself bears the power to render legitimacy to the Constitution and to the institutions established through it.

*The Context*

Most of the states which declared their independence after the fall of the communist regime, and/or engaged in a democratic transition, defined themselves as both *democratic (nation) states* vesting power in all the people (citizens), as well as national states (*Nation states*) created of and for the protection and enhancement of one definite nation. Though not wholly contradictory as the concept of the modern (nation) state as a participatory state implies homogeneity of the population, an inherent tension exists between the two principles of nation and of democracy. The conflict is moreover augmented by the incongruity between nationalizing state policies carried out in view of the legitimate aim of strengthening the state, which favor the language and

cultural symbols of the dominant nation, and the democratic policies of state-making, wherein all citizens are accorded equal individual rights. The conflict is carried on mainly within the national (internal) realm of states, where a particular type of national(ist) sentiment, bred in uncertainty, existential insecurity, poverty, fast changes and polyphonic political discourses, is played against the concrete idea (objectified in a normative standard of Western democracy and free market, observance of human rights and international legislation) of integration into European and larger structures.

Communist regimes in Eastern Europe fell as a direct result of the loss of their leadership’s legitimacy, coupled with the ideological and economic bankruptcy of the multiple variants of these political systems in the context of Gorbachev’s economic reforms and transparency doctrine. In an effort to reestablish the grounds of these states, new political elites attempted to dissociate themselves from the former communist leadership, ideology and political structures, while struggling to preserve and selectively emphasize those elements of national history that supported an independent and democratic existence. For the newly independent states the latter comprised any endeavor to recover historical episodes of national statehood, which might demonstrate the legal continuity of their states. It also meant the promotion of those elements of nationhood which the nation had been deprived of, or which had been altered and neglected during the communist regime – language, territory, resources, and citizenship.

As concerns the former, the main strategy utilizes scapegoats, appealing to a rhetoric that radicalized an interpretation of the communist takeover in national terms. Thus communism comes to light as a foreign invasion imposed on the nation, carried out by local communists recruited massively from the national minorities. The nation thus appears victimized and absolved of any responsibility or guilt.

**The Newly Independent States**

One must make an analytical distinction between states which were part of the external Soviet empire but existed legally as sovereign states, and the newly independent states emerging from the fall of communist multinational federations. In the first group I consider Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The second group comprises Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Ukraine.

---

2 E.g. the case of Jews and Hungarians in Romania, alongside the foreign Russians.
and Russia, and respectively Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). While the first group faced the difficult transformations demanded by the transition to democracy and market economy, the latter met with a different, more complex, agenda. These states confronted tasks whose urgency (real or perceived) exceeded that of establishing democratic institutional arrangements and the framework for an economic reform leading to a free, competitive market.

First, these states needed to find grounds to assert and support their independence. Second, most cited historic possession and demographic or legal arguments in order to achieve maximal, territorial statehood. And third, in defining their citizenry – those entitled to membership in the polity, these newly, independent states wagered the sheer definition of the nation in whose names they were (re)set.

Perhaps a brief note concerning nationality policies in the Soviet Union would prove enlightening to this argument. All students of post-communist nationalism acknowledge that the legacy of the communist institutions and policies, alongside several other factors, was an important catalyst in the upsurge of nationalist sentiment and action after 1989. The federal form imagined by Lenin, in opposition to Stalin’s idea of a union of autonomous republics under Russian domination, was that of a union of republics equal in status within a Soviet federation which would allow the right to secession and would give the major nationalities considerable cultural and administrative autonomy. Thus, the titular nationalities were collectively enshrined in their own geographically defined union republics. After an initial move towards “nativization” made by Lenin who feared the “Great Russian chauvinism“, a process of Russification began in the mid-1930’s. Rebuking Stalin’s policies at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev committed the Party to the flourishing of nations. He also envisaged, however, a policy of their “coming together” until a final “merger” was achieved. These policies went on unchanged for the next 25 years and favored the “creation” or institutionalization of nations (nationalities).3

The titular nationalities were collectively enshrined in their own geographically defined union republics. Thus nationalities such as the

---

Belarusians or the Moldovans, which did not have any experience of modern independent statehood, were “granted” union republics of somewhat arbitrarily drawn borders, as a result of particular political interests. The Belarusians could not unambiguously claim a certain territory as their nation’s homeland, nor a Golden Era in history. And, the Moldovan conception of statehood was made problematic by the existence of a Romanian “homeland” state, of which Moldova had belonged between the two world wars and with whom it had organic historical relations. The framework of these republics constituted the arena where, in a more or less controversial manner, Belarusian and Moldovan nations were (re)created.

During this time, the nationality of persons did not depend on the place of residence, but was allocated according to cultural/ethnic principles. Thus, a significant ethnic/national personal awareness became institutionalized through passports, identity documents, and various other bureaucratic forms asserting the nationality of a person. “The Soviet institutions of territorial nationhood and personal nationality comprised a pervasive system of social accounting, an organizing scheme of social accounting, an interpretative grid for public discussion, a set of boundary-markers, a legitimate form for public and private identities, and, when political space expanded under Gorbachev, a ready-made template for claims to sovereignty.”4 The Soviet regime institutionalized both a territorial-political and a personal-ethnocultural model of nationhood, resulting in expectations of “ownership” on the part of the successor states. The argument can be reproduced in a similar manner for the federal republics of the former Yugoslavia.

As political analysts note, the rules of sovereignty, defined as a set of principles by which the international community recognizes the legitimacy of authoritative control over a specified population and territory, are neither fixed nor constant, but subject to changing interpretations.5 A historical tension persists between two differing conceptions and practices of sovereignty: state sovereignty, which stresses the link between sovereign authority and a defined territory, and national sovereignty, which emphasizes a link between sovereign authority and a defined population. These two types of sovereignty correspond to two different principles of legitimacy of states as independent entities. State sovereignty emphasizes the integrity of borders, while national sov-

4 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 204.

ereignty is grounded on the claim (right) of nations to self-determination, and on the belief that national solidarity (national sentiment) serves as valid (and sole) criterion in defining the nation.

The international context in which the states of Central and Eastern Europe emerged at the beginning of the 1990s was characterized by an ideological convergence wherein democratic ideas faced no competition. Moreover, it provided a normative standard for whose realization the West offered several examples of institutional arrangements. The international community – its dominant players – also accepted national sovereignty as the source of legitimacy for state authority. In my opinion, this is a very problematic combination which raises many problems for the ruling elites of newly independent states as well as their populations.

Constitution Writing: State-Building Qua Nation-Building

Each of the former communist bloc countries adopted a new Constitution, except for Hungary who retained the 1949 Constitution, while significantly amending it in both 1989 and 1997, and Latvia who readopted the 1922 Constitution through the independence referendum and likewise amended it in 1998.

Like any political outcome, the Constitution is mainly the result of a struggle among the forces dominant in a political field – the more so in former authoritarian or totalitarian countries where actors from the civil society are often absent, weak or ignored. If theirs or the population’s voice is to be heard, this is through the referendum.

Independence is usually a factor of convergence of sentiment and opinion, and it is symptomatic in rapid constitution adoption, high voter turnout rates and high approval percentages.6 Thus, Croatia adopted its constitution as early as December 1990, Slovenia in December 1991, Estonia in June 1992, Latvia through the independence referendum in 1990, and Lithuania in October 1992. The Czech Republic and Slovakia both voted for the constitution in 1992; the Czech Republic in December and Slovakia in September. Comparatively, countries where state independence had not been an issue,

---

6 There are of course other important factors which influenced the level of consent over the Constitution, as measured through speed of adoption, turnout and approval: the national issue in countries with significant Russian populations and the way these populations were conceived within the public sphere, economic and social development and homogeneity of the country, degree of stateness – level of central state authorities control over the territory, military or civil conflicts, and capacity of population mobilization.
adopted new constitutions in: November 1998 (Albania), July 1991 (Bulgaria), April 1997 (Poland), December 1991 (Romania, amended in 2003), and December 1993 (Russia). 92.5% of voters turned out in Slovenia and 95.7% voted for the constitution. Estonia saw a 66.8% with 91.3% of voters favorable to the constitution. 74.9% turned out in Lithuania, of which 75.8% voted “yes” for the constitution. In Baltic countries, the Russian minority became one of the crucial elements structuring politics, and decisions regarding their citizenship and legal status affected election results in subsequent elections. 77.3% of the 69.2% of Romania’s turnout voted in favor of the constitution. Poland had less than half of the population turn out at Constitution referendum in May 1997, 42.9%, of which 53.5% expressed approval. This new constitution came to replace the “Little Constitution” which had been in function since 1992 and which both Catholic groups and Solidarity strongly rejected.7

The processes of constitution writing set the legal and symbolic grounds of the newly, independent states democratization for the region. It defined the organization and character of the state, which in most cases was explicitly and adamantly declared as unitary, indivisible, independent and sovereign.

**Albania:** Art. 1 (2) The Republic of Albania is a unitary and indivisible state.

**Belarus:** Art. 1 (1) The Republic of Belarus shall be a unitary, democratic, social state based on the rule of law. The Republic of Belarus shall have supreme control and absolute authority in its territory and shall implement domestic and foreign policy independently.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** Art. 1 (1) Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which shall henceforth be “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” shall continue its legal existence under international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein and with its present internationally recognized borders. It shall remain a Member State of the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply for membership in organizations within the United Nations system and other international organizations. (3) Composition. Bosnia and

---

7 The data are taken from Richard Rose, Neil Munro & Tom Mackie: Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. WP#300 of Studies in Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1998. 49, 66, 75, 95, 107, and official data released by the Electoral Bureaus in the respective countries.
Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter “the Entities”).

**Bulgaria:** Art. 2 (1) The Republic of Bulgaria is an integral state with local self-government. No autonomous territorial formations shall exist. Art. 2 (2) The territorial integrity of the Republic of Bulgaria is inviolable.

**Croatia:** Art. 1 (1) The Republic of Croatia is a unitary and indivisible democratic and social state. Art. 2 (1) The sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia is inalienable, indivisible and untransferable.

**Czech Republic:** Art. 1. The Czech Republic is a sovereign, unified, and democratic law-observing state, based on the respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen.

**Estonia:** Art. 1 (2) Estonian independence and sovereignty is interminable and inalienable. Art.2 (1) The land area, territorial waters and airspace of Estonia are an inseparable and indivisible whole. (2) Estonia is politically a unitary state […].

**Hungary** does not hold similar provisions.

**Latvia:** Art.1. Latvia is an independent democratic republic. Art. 3. The territory of the State of Latvia, within the borders established by international agreements, consists of Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale.

**Lithuania:** Art. 1. The State of Lithuania shall be an independent and democratic republic. Art. 3 (1) No one may limit or restrict the sovereignty of the People or make claims to the sovereign powers of the People. (2) The People and each citizen shall have the right to oppose anyone who encroaches on the independence, territorial integrity, or constitutional order of the State of Lithuania by force.

**Macedonia:** Art. 1 (1) The Republic of Macedonia is a sovereign, independent, democratic and social state. Art. 2 (2) The sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible, inalienable, and nontransferable. Art. 3 (1) The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inviolable. (2) The existing borders of the Republic of Macedonia are inviolable. (3) The borders of the Republic of Macedonia can only be changed in accordance with the Constitution and on the principle of free will, as well in accordance with generally accepted international norms. (4) The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any neighboring state.

**Moldova:** Art.1 (1) Republic of Moldova is a sovereign and independent state, unitary and indivisible. Art. 3 (1) The territory of the Republic of Moldova is inalienable.
Poland: Art. 3. The Republic of Poland shall be a unitary State. Art. 4 (1) Supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation. (2) The Nation shall exercise such power directly or through their representatives. Art. 5. The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development.

Romania: Art. 1. (1) Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary, and indivisible Nation State. Art. 3 (1) The territory of Romania is inalienable. (2) The frontiers of the Country are sanctioned by an organic law, under observance of the principles and other generally recognized regulations of international law. (4) No foreign populations may be displaced or colonized in the territory of the Romanian State. Art. 4 (1) The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people. (2) Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property, or social origin.

Russia: Art. 1. The Russian Federation – Russia is a democratic federal rule-of-law state with the republican form of government. The names “Russian Federation” and “Russia” are equivalent. Art. 3 (1) The multinational people of the Russian Federation is the vehicle of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation. Art. 4 (1) The sovereignty of the Russian Federation applies to its entire territory. (2) The Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws have supremacy throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation. (3) The Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory.

Slovakia: Art. 1. The Slovak Republic is a sovereign, democratic, and law-governed state. It is not linked to any ideology or religious belief. Art. 3 (1) The territory of the Slovak Republic is united and indivisible. (2) The borders of the Slovak Republic can be changed only by a constitutional law. Art. 4. Natural wealth, underground water, natural medicinal springs, and waterways are in the ownership of the Slovak Republic.

Slovenia: Art. 1. Slovenia is a democratic republic. Art. 2. Slovenia is a state governed by the rule of law and is a social state. Art. 3 (1) Slovenia is a state of all its citizens and is based on the permanent and inalienable right of the Slovenian people to self-determination. Art. 4. Slovenia is a territorially indivisible state. Art. 5 (State Objectives) (1) Within its own territory,
Slovenia shall protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall uphold and guarantee the right of the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities. It shall attend to the welfare of the Slovenian minorities in neighboring countries and of Slovenian emigrants and migrant workers abroad and shall promote their contacts with their homeland. It shall assist the preservation of the natural and cultural heritage of Slovenia in harmony with the creation of opportunities for the development of civilized society and cultural life in Slovenia. (2) Slovenians not holding Slovenian citizenship shall enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia. The nature and extent of those rights and privileges shall be determined by statute.

Ukraine: Art. 1. Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state. Art. 2 (1) The sovereignty of Ukraine extends throughout its entire territory. (2) Ukraine is a unitary state. (3) The territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable.

Yugoslavia: Art. 1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be a sovereign federal state, founded on the equality of citizens and the equality of its member republics. Art. 3 (1) The territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be a single entity comprising the territories of the member republics. (2) The frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be inviolable. (3) The boundaries between member republics may be changed only subject to their agreement, in accordance with the constitutions of the member republics.

The preambles of the constitutions (and the declarations of independence) are informative of the salience and urgency to assert valid grounds for the existence and sovereignty of the newly independent states. Nation is constitutive to, and the result of the existence of, the state. History and historiography constitute, as expected, the symbolic battleground of/for the state.

In the preambles of the constitutions, as well as public, political, and cultural discourses and in the substance of other state policies, the most salient and powerful arguments are the evidence and elements of the historical existence and continuity of a Nation state and the need to emphasize its nationhood by promoting its language, traditions, cultural inheritance, heroic history and territory.

The constitution of Belarus talks of the “centuries-long history of development of Belarusian statehood”, the Czech constitution of “ancient statehood of Czech Crown’s Lands and the Czechoslovak State”, Estonia of a “state which is established on the inextinguishable right of the Estonian people to national self-determination and which was proclaimed on February 24, 1918”. The Lithuanian Nation declares the approval of the constitution
in its preamble “having established the State of Lithuania many centuries ago, [...] having for centuries defended its freedom and independence, having preserved its spirit, native language, writing, customs.”. The Macedonian preamble to the constitution talks of “the traditions of statehood and legality of the Krushevo Republic and the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People’s Liberation of Macedonia in the referendum of 8 September 1991, as well as the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people” after mentioning “their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom as well as the creation of their own state”. The Moldovan constitution says that “while growing into a nation the Moldovan people has given strong evidence of historical and ethnic continuity in its statehood”. The Polish constitution recalls the “best traditions of the First and the Second Republic”. The Slovak constitution of the “political and cultural heritage of our forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for national existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire”. And the Ukrainian constitution speaks of the “centuries-old history of Ukrainian state-building and on the right to self-determination realized by the Ukrainian nation”.

Some of these accounts are arguably quasi-fictions – as is Macedonian people’s struggle over centuries for national freedom and a state of their own, or Moldovan’s historical and ethnic continuity in its statehood.8 As founding acts however, the constitutions, especially through their preambles, need to legitimize and prove the existence, independence, sovereignty and particular outlook of their states. This, as the following case study of Estonia will show, has complex stakes and implications.

Estonia’s road to independence started with public protests around an ecological issue: the intention of the Soviet central government to start a phosphorus-mining project. This developed into pressure for economic reform that took the shape of a plan for economic autonomy for Estonia proposed by a group of four Estonian liberals. The set up of the Estonian Popular

Front was the first institutional form of the mobilization started by the idea of economic autonomy for the republic and was effective in opposing Gorbachev’s attempt to change the Soviet Union’s Constitution. The Estonian Supreme Soviet declared the republic’s right to sovereignty (November 16, 1988) and called for a new union treaty. This was the beginning of a struggle for political sovereignty and economic autonomy with the authorities in Moscow.

Estonia, in alliance with the other Baltic republics, played the card of history as the main means of political struggle. They invoked the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, and were helped with the results of a commission charged with the study of its provisions, which revealed the existence of secret protocols dividing up Poland and the Baltic states. The struggle radicalized after the organization of the human-chain from Tallinn to Vilnius as protest, with the establishment of Estonian Citizens Committees, which maintained that the country had been illegally occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union. By this they asserted that Estonia’s statehood never ceased during the Soviet period, and because the Estonian republic, established in 1918 (independent in 1920), still held international recognition, it would only legitimate Soviet authority by entering into negotiations about her secession. Estonia went on with the concept of continuing legal authority of the prewar republic, appealing to international law in order to secure her against any attempt to be kept in the union.

Estonia’s strategy to assert the country’s legal continuity as a state was also reflected in her subsequent citizenship policies. The prewar state’s citizens and their descendants were granted Estonian citizenship, while the Soviet immigrants living in Estonia and their descendants were not automatically made citizens of the restored state, because they were settled or born in Estonia under Soviet rule. They would have to undergo a process of naturalization, on the basis of language and residence criteria. The conditions set in the naturalization law, including a one-year waiting period after application, had important political consequences, as these non-citizens, about 500,000 of a 1.4 million population, could not vote in the 1992 general elections. This was followed by the 1993 Law on Aliens meant to regulate the status of non-citizens, and required that these persons obtain a residence permit which needed to be renewed annually and was not warranted. Thus people who were born or have lived for most of their lives on the territory of Estonia suddenly found themselves aliens (non-citizens) with a very insecure situation in what they used to consider their country. In the fear that chances to obtain residence permits and subsequent citizenship would
be affected, many did not apply for Russian citizenship either, even though this was offered to all former citizens of the USSR. The law raised objections from key international supporters of Estonia, including the US, the Scandinavian states and the EU.

Estonia’s emphasis on the legal continuity of the prewar Estonian state also complicated the process whereby she negotiated the bilateral treaty with Russia (a basic requirement for EU accession), settling the agreement on land and sea borders. The negotiations started in April 1992 and revealed conflicting positions with regard to the Tartu Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920. Estonia wanted full recognition of the treaty, as a valid and constitutive document in her relations with Russia, while Russia considered it dated. After two years of stalemate, the Estonian Prime Minister Tarand agreed to give up the Estonian territorial claims based on the Tartu Treaty borders in favor of the Soviet settled borders, whereby Estonia lost a territory representing about 5% of her size. This territory comprised areas around the city of Ivangoord, east of Narva and Pechory, cutting in two the territory of the kindred Setu people. In exchange, he requested the recognition of the Tartu treaty as a basic document of continuity of the Estonian state and the Russian agreement with the corresponding formulation in the text of the border treaty. After another few years during which the Estonia tried to assess what was more important - the recognition of the treaty or to achieve a border treaty, respectively whether Russia’s non-recognition of the treaty affected Estonia’s legal continuity as a state whatsoever – Estonia and Russia came to an agreement in 1999.

The greater the emphasis on national, independent unitary and sovereign nature of the state in the declarations of the constitution’s preambles, the stronger the feelings of unfair treatment, domination or exploitation were within multinational states.

In what concerns the last federation of Central and Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia, the velvet separation between the Czech Republic and Slovakia came about as a result of conflicting national conceptions and aspirations within the federation. The two national and statehood projects led to conflicts over the nature of their political relationship and identity; the institutions (forms of autonomy) defining this relationship, the future of the common state, and other political and economic issues.

---

As the Second World War German protectorate could not work as the basis for the foundation of a new Slovak state, elites devised the 1992 statehood project, based on the Slovak conception of nationhood worked out on ethno-linguistic bases within the Hungarian kingdom, without a clear popular mandate. It included a historical appeal to the Great Moravian state in the 9th century and the Cyril and Methodius mission to Great Moravia. The Czech statehood project was founded on the traditions of the Kingdom of Bohemia transferred to the whole territory of Czechoslovakia. When the Slovak National Council declared sovereignty in July 1992, it referred to the millennial struggle for Slovak identity. The draft constitution presented in August 1992 declared the natural rights of a people to self-determination and the principles embedded in the idea of citizenship the foundation of statehood, so that Slovakia was conceived as a republic of free and equal citizens. When adopting the constitution, however, the Slovak National Council amended the opening phrase of its preamble from “We, the citizens of the Slovak Republic” to “We, the Slovak nation”. The whole text contained in the preamble follows:

We, the Slovak nation, mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for national existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire, proceeding from the natural right of nations to self-determination, together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic, in the interest of lasting peaceful cooperation with other democratic states, seeking the application of the democratic form of government and the guarantees of a free life and the development of spiritual culture and economic prosperity, that is, we, citizens of the Slovak Republic, adopt through our representatives the following constitution.

The preamble of the Croatian constitution is an extreme example of this trend, as it comprises a national history in short for Croatia. This narrative denies the only period of independent statehood during the Ustasha Independent State of Croatia founded in 1941. Through Article 11, however, its symbols are adopted. The entire preamble of the constitution of Croatia more than speaks for itself.

10 They did not organize a referendum to approve the split of Czechoslovakia.
11 Whose existence pre-dated the arrival of Hungarians in the region.
The millennial national identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire historical experience in various political forms and by the perpetuation and growth of state-building ideas based on the historical right to full sovereignty of the Croatian nation, manifested itself:

- in the formation of Croatian principalities in the 7th century;
- in the formation of the independent medieval state of Croatia founded in the 9th century;
- in the Kingdom of Croats established in the 10th century;
- in the preservation of the subjectivity of the Croatian state in the Croatian-Hungarian personal union;
- in the autonomous and sovereign decision of the Croatian Parliament of 1527 to elect a king from the Habsburg dynasty;
- in the autonomous and sovereign decision for the Croatian Parliament to sign the Pragmatic Sanction of 1712;
- in the conclusions of the Croatian Parliament of 1848 regarding the restoration of the integrity of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia under the power of the Vice-Roy (Ban) on the basis of the historical state and natural right of the Croatian nation;
- in the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868 regulating the relations between the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia and the Kingdom of Hungary, on the basis of the legal traditions of both states and the Pragmatic Sanction of 1712;
- in the decision of the Croatian Parliament of 29 Oct 1918, to dissolve state relations between Croatia and Austria-Hungary, and the simultaneous affiliation of independent Croatia, invoking its historical and natural right as a nation, with the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, proclaimed in the former territory of the Habsburg Empire;
- in the fact that the Croatian Parliament never sanctioned the decision passed by the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1 Dec 1918), subsequently proclaimed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (3 Oct 1929);
- in the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939 by which Croatian state identity was restored in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia;
- in laying the foundations of state sovereignty during World War Two, through decisions of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (1943), to oppose the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (1941), and subsequently in the Constitution of the People's Republic
of Croatia (1947), and several subsequent constitutions of the Socialist Repub-

At the historic turning-point marked by the rejection of the communist sys-
tem and changes in the international order in Europe, the Croatian nation reaffirmed, in the first democratic elections (1990), by its freely expressed will, its millennial statehood and its resolution to establish the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign state.

Proceeding from the above presented historical facts and from the generally ac-
cepted principles in the modern world and the inalienable, indivisible, nontransferable and inexpendable right of the Croatian nation to self-determi-
nation and state sovereignty, including the inviolable right to secession and as-

association, as the basic preconditions for peace and stability of the international order, the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national state of the Croatian people and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungari-
ans, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian na-
tionality and the realization of ethnic rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and countries of free world.

Respecting the will of the Croatian nation and all citizens, resolutely expressed at free elections, the Republic of Croatia is organized and shall develop as a sov-
ereign and democratic state in which the equality of citizens and human free-
doms and rights are guaranteed and ensured, and their economic and cultural progress and social welfare are promoted.

Most former communist bloc countries followed nationalist politics in the construction and consolidation of their (national) states. The national-
ism of the post-communist, newly independent states took the form of reme-
dial political action; a polity-based, nation-shaping (or nation-promoting) na-
tionalism, that aims to nationalize an existing polity. The majority of their new, political elites denounced the organization and policies within the multi-national federations as some sort of national and political domination, colonialism or, as in the case of Estonia, pure foreign occupation.

The main elements of this form of nationalism are (1) the “existence” of a core nation/ nationality defined in ethno-cultural terms and distinct from the citizenry/ population/ permanent residents, (2) the idea that the core na-
tion legitimately “owns” the polity, which exists of and for the core nation,

(3) the perception that the core nation is not flourishing, that its specific interests are not adequately realized or expressed, and that specific action is required in a variety of settings and domains to promote its language, traditions, cultural inheritance, demographic dominance, economic welfare and political hegemony, (4) justification of such policies based on the need to remedy or compensate for previous discrimination against the nation before it disposed of its own state to safeguard and promote its interests, (5) mobilization on the basis of these ideas in various settings, in an effort to shape the policies and practices of the state and other organizations, and the adoption of such policies according to these lines.13

Such efforts at state-building via nation-building or nationalizing of the state are objectified in a particular body of legislation including linguistic policies, local administration, citizenship and immigration policies, kin-state legislation, and education. Of course, the constitution, the principal piece of this body of legislation, embodies the constitutive law of the state, defining both the character and nature of the state and the citizenry.

Romania is one of the most outspoken countries in this respect, as Article 1 of her constitution states that “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State.”14 Romania in fact, is the only state that asserts the national character of the state in her constitution. According to Art. 2 (1), “National sovereignty resides with the Romanian people”, thus making Romanians the constitutive people of the state, while leaving out persons of other ethnic belonging.

The national character of the state is (indirectly) reinforced in subsequent articles. Thus, according to Art. 3 (4) “No foreign populations may be displaced or colonized in the territory of the Romanian State.” Concerning the conception of the Romanian political community, Art. 4 (1) says: “The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people”. This asserts the historiographic theme of a unified origin for all inhabitants of the three Romanian principalities, the source of Romanian nationhood endeavors, which were finalized, with the Great Union of 1918. Formally, this paragraph, alongside the one which states the unitary and national character of the Romanian state, restrains the legal possibilities of national minority (Hungarian) self-government (forms of cultural or political autonomy) required to accommodate the needs and demands for national identity preser-

14 The following excerpts come from the official translation of the Romanian Constitution as provided by the Romanian government.
vation and cultural development. Symbolically, it excludes groups of people from the intrinsic link between the state and its political community, if the latter is defined in cultural terms.

These provisions have more than symbolic meaning, as the results of a survey regarding intolerance and authoritarianism in Romania indicates.\textsuperscript{15} When asked if in their opinion the Hungarians who live in Romania are part of the Romanian Nation or not, 67\% of those surveyed said “yes”, 23\% said “no”, and 10\% declined to answer or said that they did not know.

The dominant nation is also privileged with regard to symbolic elements defining the state. According to Art. 12, (2) “The National Day of Romania is the 1\textsuperscript{st} of December.” and “The national anthem of Romania is ‘Awake, Romanians.’” Both represent the struggle of national emancipation from Hungarian domination, and hence bear quite an emotional load. The former, marking the union of Transylvania with Romania in 1918 represents the greatest tragedy in the history of the Hungarian nation, the dismantling of the country at Trianon. The latter symbolizes the 1848 national revolution in Transylvania carried out against Hungarian domination. Furthermore, the constitution favors the language of the “titular” nation. According to Art.13, “In Romania, the official language is Romanian.”\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, Art. 148 of the constitution states that the constitutional provisions regarding the national, independent, unitary and indivisible character of the state, the republican form of government, the integrity of the territory, and the official language can not be subjected to revision.\textsuperscript{17}

Romania amended her constitution in 2003. The provision concerning the national character of the state was challenged by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which proposed its removal.\textsuperscript{18} The Al-


\textsuperscript{16} Subsequent events and legislation adopted by Romania, however, changed the status of minority languages which now can be used in local administration if the minority population represents more than 20\% of the total population, and in the courts of law.

\textsuperscript{17} The Romanian Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to preserve, develop and express ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities for non-Romanian ethnic groups, under the condition that principles of equality and non-discrimination of other Romanian citizens are held (Art. 6). Together with Art. 16, it excludes any form of positive discrimination towards ethnic/national minorities. The right to minority language education is expressly mentioned in the Constitution (Art. 32). Political participation and representation of national minorities are permissively insured.

\textsuperscript{18} The Alliance was part of the government coalition between 1996–2000 and collaborates with the present government party, the Social Democrat Party (PSD), according to a signed protocol.
liance’s proposal was rejected with a majority of 238 against 23 (the latter representing UDMR representatives in Parliament).

The importance which legislators give to nation-building (or even national building) as part of state-building, and for the accepted boundaries of the citizenry and nation can be seen in the wording of the constitution. Perhaps its roots go even deeper to cultural features of the ethnic nation. Thus, the Polish Parliament hosted a debate regarding the religious nature of Polish nationals, arriving to the bizarre formulation:

We, the Polish Nation – all citizens of the Republic,

Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty,

As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources [...].

Most of these countries vest sovereignty in the people, in many cases implicitly conceived of as an ethnic nation. There are, however, countries that are careful to employ more objective and technical terms, in that they pronounce as the source of state power and repository of sovereignty “the citizens of the republic” (the Czech Republic), “the People (people) of the republic” (Albania, Belarus, Hungary, Moldova, Ukraine), and the “multinational people of the Russian Federation”. Generally, only those states secure in either their nationhood or tradition of statehood (Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia) or those displaying a dubious and contested definition of nationhood (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) use these formulae. All other countries assert their statehood by massively employing elements of nationhood.

Conclusion. State Building in Eastern Europe: Struggling Behind and Ahead

Most countries of the former communist bloc wrote a new constitution as a result of major changes in 1989 and 1991. The revolutions that led to the dismantling of the communist system were seen as more than the termination of an illegitimate, violent, repressing, and economically bankrupt regime. For the newly independent states they were also liberating movements, as they were for the satellite states as well. Moreover, this liberation was seen as the final episode of a century long struggle for national self-determination, statehood and independence.

The political context of the time, shaped by the interpretations and interests of major powers, favored the flourishing of nations and acceptance of na-
tional independent statehood. The principles of state legitimacy, either internal or international, as previously set by the United Nations Charter were not apparent throughout the Cold War. The Charter asserted the right to self-determination of peoples (in the sense that everyone as an individual has a right to his own government and to participate in that government), but not of nations, and established the priority of the integrity of established state borders over the integrity of national groups. The Cold War carried on in order to legitimize specific political and economic ideologies. It allowed the expansion of the Soviet state at the price of several nationalities’ statehood, as well as domination by force over its external empire (best objectified on the Brezhnev doctrine). Discontent with the Realpolitik (inviolability of states) and its consequences: abuses of populations by their governments, and internal colonialism/imperialism, brought about the end of the Cold War. Border changes and concessions towards greater autonomy to domestic ethnic groups became acceptable, normal, and even desirable. The changed security environment accounts as much for this, as the loss of the (perceived) legitimacy of the respective states (to their populations, and to the international community).

Thus post-communist state-building took place within a modern framework of statehood and international relations, according to the modern principles of territoriality and sovereignty. Moreover, new states were set as states of and for a nation, and thus state building was conceived as vigorous nation building. Constitutions and citizenship policies – which have a constitutive worth as acts whereby the body politic of the state is set and which are expressive of the nature of the state, followed the national principle. All related legislation was shaped according to remedial and assertive nationalism.

Constitutions provide the main sources of data in investigations of state-building. In order to grasp the bigger picture, however, one has to analyze all related legislation. Thus, one can note that, while the states of Central and East European reinforced the modern principles of statehood in their endeavors to obtain recognition and integration within Western security, economic and political structures, they also attempted to go beyond these principles. The unique chance to reformulate the nature and worth of their nation and state was seized by most post-communist elites who sought maximal territorial and national projects. This approach modeled political processes such as border settling and citizenship legislation. If in their claims of historical, territorial restoration, states of Central and Eastern European seemed to lag behind the ideology of the time, they were, however, ahead of the West-
ern states in terms of institutional and political arrangements linked with their national policies. The liberal and all inclusive citizenship laws of e.g. Romania towards her co-ethnics living in other countries clearly went beyond the principles of territorial borders and the sovereignty of states principles. The Hungarian kin-state law also advanced the concepts of shared sovereignty, community of communities versus union of sovereign states, and infringed on neighboring states’ sovereignty with provisions to be applied on their territory. State building and nation building in CEE Europe are also part of a larger process re-institutionalizing and re-organizing political space and political phenomena. Both their innovative concepts and legislation are constitutive to these processes.

19 Here I refer to their position and policies towards their co-national (co-ethnics) abroad, the so-called kin-state legislation.
AUTONOMY: PRESENT AND PAST

GYÖRGY SCHÖPFLIN

Autonomy, Demos and Ethnos

There are various perspectives from which one can argue a claim for ethnic autonomy. These include regionalism, local government, community and communitarianism, subsidiarity and human rights. In this paper, however, the starting point will be the polarity of demos and ethnos, demos being the foundation of citizenship in modern democratic systems. At first sight, this may sound paradoxical, given that current theory strongly stigmatises ethnos and argues that it has nothing whatever to do with democracy. In sociological reality, however, ethnos exists but is screened out – the consent to be governed is culturally coded and that cultural coding maps onto ethnicity.

Citizenship theory begins from the proposition that all members of a political community or polity have equal rights and equal access to political power. Hence the rulers are under an obligation to promote such access, without which the continuous inputs of consent needed for democratic government do not take place. In practice, much of this consent is assumed or attributed, but neither the assumption nor the attribution is necessarily robust. The attribution owes its origins to one of the most deeply held beliefs of our time, namely the sacrosanct nature of the state. Those who are citizens of a state are automatically assumed to have consented to this status, whether that consent is there or not. There is the deepest possible reluctance to question this proposition. The consequence is that the state, which is a product of history and power like any other political formation, is invested with transcendental, supra-temporal qualities which allow it to evade questions about state legitimacy. States as they exist are assumed to have reached their final form. Yet from the perspective of citizenship, the questioning is valid; it is

* The article is based on a paper presented at the Minority Self-governance in Europe – Autonomies: Challenges and Experiences conference, organized by the Pro Minoritate Foundation and Budapest Analyses, Budapest, 4–5 December, 2003.
equally valid, incidentally, from the perspective of the Enlightenment legacy, which denies the existence of privileged knowledge.¹

**Interrogating the modern state**

Thus questioning—interrogating—the modern democratic state should be the proper starting point for all analyses of minority regulation and the nature of autonomy. In effect, the purpose of minority regulation is to ensure that the members of a minority enjoy the same civic rights as members of the majority; above all that they are secure in their cultural reproduction on terms that are equal to those of majority and, at the same time, that they have equal access to the material and symbolic goods of the state. This applies only to the modern democratic state; non-democratic states are something else.

The core of the problem is that observing minority rights on these terms necessarily means that the minority will demand certain cultural goods that the majority will regard as undesirable or offensive or deviant or excessive, but under the norms of self-limitation it must accede to those demands, meaning that majority-minority relations become a matter of both democratic theory and of state design. While minority demands cannot go beyond the limits of citizenship, those limits must be designed with inputs from both majority and minority. In other words the very definition of citizenship must be reached in such a way as to satisfy the minority as well as the majority. That is a minimum requirement of democratic consent. However, very few majorities see it that way and consciously and even more unconsciously they will impose their own majority perspectives and declare them to be those of citizenship.

At the heart of this problematic, therefore, is the difficulty that the discourses of ethnos and demos are in conflict. For most, the discourse of demos has been sacralised around the state and the state is perceived as the repository of values that are morally superior to those of ethnos. What is heavily screened out in this process, on the other hand, is that these discourses are every bit as contingent as any other and that far from demos, as defined by the majority, being the sole possible repository of civic norms, it readily defaults into ethnic hegemony veiled as civic discourse. From this point of view, the minority loses on both the swings and the roundabouts. Indeed, given that the definitions of civic norms have become the preserve of the majority, it finds that its very discourses of self and identity come to be de-

fined by the majority in the name of a non-existent civic neutrality. The outcome is a homogenisation that presses heavily on minorities.

The matter is further exacerbated by the continued role of class, albeit it is much less salient now than before 1989. This tacitly assumes a single, transcendental concept of equality in terms of class and expects minorities to conform to this vision, though without having made a significant input itself. In this context, the European left logically finds itself unable to accept any serious ethnic division within the demos, when that cleavage has political power attached to it. It argues in favour of equality, hides that this equality is solely to do with class and prefers to eliminate ethnic inequality by a civic integration that is hard to distinguish from assimilation.

**Multi-culturalism**

The multi-culturalism favoured by the Anglo-Saxon mainstream is very largely folkloric and decorative; it does not tolerate genuine cultural diversity if that means living with differences of language and culture. The French Jacobin tradition ends up in the same position, but does so more openly. In effect it argues that in exchange for access to the full civic rights provided by the French state, all must accept the normativity of French cultural discourses, because these are in no way ethnic but civic, civic by the definitions given it by the French majority that has constructed its identity into a self-attributed citizenship. In sociological reality it is as ethnic as any other ethnic collectivity. It is an ethnicity with an army, a navy and a state.

Inter-ethnic relations are generally characterised by far-reaching mutual ignorance – at best, there are recognisable instruments for dealing with the ethnic other, but there is no depth of knowledge of the complex cultural norms of the other group. This has all sorts of consequences. We spend a good deal of our time trying to understand the motivations of others within our group, and these change anyway over time. It is immeasurably more difficult to read these motivations when we are dealing with groups that we know only superficially. The outcome is that majorities will impose a reading on the motivations of the minority and anchor it, because there are always limits to fluidity. At worst, the majority will create its own cognitive model of the minority and constrain it to live by it, regardless of its own aspirations. Further, members of a majority who celebrate the “richness” of multi-cultural

---

life, tend to do so without understanding the damage they may be doing, through ignorance, to the cultural norms of the minority.

Those who preach the virtues of multi-culturalism have probably never actually had to live with the daily complexity of being in a multi-cultural situation, with the sheer stress of constant negotiation, especially when they are the minority, of having forever to adjust to the implicit demands of the majority.

**Deconstructing demos**

Demos, therefore, must be fully deconstructed if we are to make sense of minority regulation and claims for autonomy. In its essence, demos is a mythic narrative, the master narrative of the democratic state. The demos, then, is the agent and bearer of the democratic values that define democracy – the narrative of popular sovereignty is about this – and, by and large, the current, contingent definitions of demos may not be questioned. In sociological reality this narrative assumes a strong correspondence of state, society and culture, one that is homogeneous and divided primarily by “interests” that are preferably economic – preferably because these are much easier to negotiate and satisfy.

The definitions of demos are firmly structured by the proposition that it automatically and necessarily excludes anything to do with ethnos. Indeed, the two are seen as mutually exclusive, if anything, as two wholly antagonistic concepts, one of them invested with virtue and the other with vice. It constitutes a classic polarity of good and evil, and it is mythicised so that the polarity is understood as self-evident. Why this antagonism to ethnicity, which after all is seen as positive in certain circumstances, like the ethnicity of immigrant groups?

Basically, ethnicity and ethnos are demonised because they accept the legitimacy of particularism and thereby fly in the face of the universalism that the hegemonic cultural powers project to the rest of the world. While ethnos as the constitutive web of meanings of the “civic” majority is screened out as long as it is confined to one state, an ethnic minority with its own claim to political power and cultural reproduction makes this screening out evident and thereby erodes the mythic narrative.

What these narratives ignore, however, are the real-time and real-world ethnic divisions within demos-driven definitions of democracy in the West. The ethnicity of immigrant groups is marginal, because the hegemonic majority seeks to define and redefine these identities on its own terms, make them folkloric, temporary and thereby open to being absorbed. Once the
proposition of the autonomy of cultural reproduction is accepted, however, these ethnoi must be dealt with as collective political actors and producers of moral worth.

Another approach favoured by the protagonists of civic discursivity is to begin from the stability of the modern state as the sole or overriding condition for democracy, as the guarantee of civil society. This approach cannot conceive of cultural, let alone territorial, autonomy at all. Citizenship is again equated with cultural homogeneity and the idea that some citizens may seek to underpin their cultural difference by demanding the political power that is attributed to autonomy is deemed unacceptable. The mythic narrative of the civic contract effectively excludes cultural autonomy.

The civic contract

Let it be added here that the civic contract, for all its virtues, is nothing more, nothing less than a mythic narrative. It is the ruling metaphor of the relationship between the individual and the state and implies a reciprocal relationship, one in which the individual is free within the law to acquire and practise agency. The reality is quite different, as anyone who looks at a modern society knows full well. The modern state has created and sustains a wide range of dependencies, excludes much of the population from access to discourse creation, relies on the impersonal and authoritative language of the modern bureaucracy for example, and bases its stability on the passivity of public opinion. Thus the civic contract is a convenient metaphor, but it is not a contract between two equal negotiating partners as defined by jurisprudence.

The pure demos model, which does not of course exist in the real world and exists only as a theoretical proposition, regards ethnicity as something akin to religion, a matter of individual conscience and the practice of the private sphere, with very few or no consequences for the public sphere and thus political power. The existence of provision for minority languages (if there must be such provision), in this purist view, is of no consequence for the theory and cannot have a wider significance. Not least, it is tacitly understood as of passing value, a concession that may be withdrawn by the majority, although we know that this is politically an impossibility. In this one respect, the pure demos model resembles Lenin’s “national in form, socialist in content”, basically implying that all cultures are alike, that some passing provision may be made for them, but are a transient phenomenon, because there exists a superior transcendental rationality that will eventually bring about a single universal world.
The pure demos model, then, assumes a world where all individual members of the demos are politically, and thus in all other respects equal and are without different cultural norms. This is the classic liberal and for that matter Marxist position, represented by both Mill and Marx. What this classic position could never cope with intellectually is what happens when a group of individual citizens combines voluntarily and insists that their association be recognised by the majority membership of the demos as having political consequences. The combination of individuals in trade unions was originally dealt with as a restraint in trade and punished, but where economic association is concerned, this is accepted, though such combinations are extensively regulated. The rights attaching to gender identity notionally contradict liberal individualism, but the contradiction is screened out and gender identity, together with the perpetual collective association that this generates, is thereby integrated into liberal democracy.

In this context, however, there is an argument to be made that members of ethnic minorities are in a real sociological sense making a voluntary choice in maintaining their ethnic identities. Historic minorities in Europe, with only one or two exceptions like the Roma, have very little difficulty in opting for assimilation – indeed, this is generally what the majority would prefer. In the event that they do not, they are for all practical purposes participating in a daily plebiscite, a la Renan, by effectively affirming their continued membership of the minority. From this perspective, ethnic minority membership has all the qualities attributed to voluntary associations and should logically be treated in the same fashion for citizenship purposes. This possibility of assimilation is what makes historic minorities different in quality from Third World immigrants, who – set apart as they generally are by phenotypical difference – lack the option to assimilate.

**Ethnos and state design**

If we look again at this set of interlocking problems of demos and ethnos, of equality and citizenship, of majority and minority from a different perspective, we can see that the dominant demos-driven Western position is contingent, is as much the product of historical conditions as any other and can then be properly contextualised. The supporters of the Western position naturally include those in the post-communist world who accept the currently fashionable discourses of the West without further questioning. The new perspective suggested here is that of sociological reality, a category that is readily taken from Durkheim's social fact, viz. a set of propositions that a particular
group accepts as real, lives as its everyday experience and makes it its lifeworld.³

The significance of this starting point is that it accepts cultural coding, and therefore, also accepts cultural differentiation as a normal part of human existence and does not impel one towards the major social engineering projects needed to make people conform to universalistic ideals. The second significance of accepting cultural coding is that it allows one to make a methodological leap, one that will certainly be regarded as scandalous by universalists, namely to approach the entire problematic from the opposite polarity, that of ethnos.

Hence if we make ethnos and the imperative of cultural reproduction, the base-line, the entire question of state design and minority rights looks different. If ethnos has equality with demos, let alone primacy over demos, the state must function in such a way as to secure equal access by all individuals to power and recognise simultaneously that individuals are not culturally naked, but belong to collectivities that they wish to preserve, maintain and foster. Hence, further, such groups will make demands on the democratic state as its citizens to provide sufficient access to the material and symbolic goods of the state to ensure that cultural equality is recognised and promoted.

The implications for state design are that the state must encode a cultural neutrality in its working and, second, that there must a redistribution, almost certainly a continuous redistribution, of cultural goods by the majority to the minority and, presumably, from the minority to the majority where appropriate. The proposition of neutrality means that the state must accept that all cultural coding of the various ethnic groups in the state has equal status and parity of esteem. This obviously means equality of all languages, at the symbolic as well as the practical level.

However, the importance of self-limitation on the part of all groups is vital here and it is possible to envisage practices by a minority that the majority finds intolerable – polygamy or polyandry would be an example. The negotiation of difference, however, is best attained through political representation, implying that a minority has to have a political, as well as a cultural, profile and institutions. Without institutions, the minority will basically be in a permanent downstream position and reliant on majority goodwill. This can never be guaranteed; hence the pursuit of minority objectives is necessarily the outcome of a political contest. The abstract rules of citizenship are not

a substitute, for they are – as we have seen – permeated by the cultural norms of the majority.

So, let us suppose that in designing the state and citizenship, we make ethnos the starting point. Logically, then, the state must function in such a way as to secure the cultural reproduction of all the ethnoi who have citizenship, rather than try to homogenise them into a majority-driven set of civic norms that claim (falsely) that these norms are the universal norms of humanity etc. The universalists, who deny that their norms are contingent, basically insist that a design of this kind undermines civic equality.

What they cannot deal with, however, is the problem – already mentioned – of groups of individuals who claim metaphorically that their ethnic identity is the result of a voluntary association. This proposition is simply denied or shouted down by the liberal universalists, who cannot believe, and this is a matter of faith not of reasoning, that individuals could associate voluntarily in this way. They counter-argue that minority ethnic identity is some kind of a cage that denies individual choice, refusing to accept that it may actually be the basis of agency.

There is, all the same, a further complication in all this, one that erodes the claims of the universalists even further – the dilemma of what to do with the identities of Third World migrants in Europe. Whereas the classical model was more or less overtly assimilationist, Third World migrants would not be or should not be or could not be put into this category. This is where the current model of multi-culturalism had its origins, in answer to the question, why not? The conventional answer is something along the lines of respect for the human rights of the immigrants and the need to promote superior routes to integration by allowing them to retain their cultures of origin. That, in pure form, is rubbish, indeed specious and hypocritical rubbish. The countries receiving Third World migrants would under no circumstances let them retain and reproduce their original cultures in toto (i.e. including their languages and ways of life), but only selected, politically not very sensitive parts of their cultures. But, and this has been the hypocrisy, it would be the majority that would choose what parts of the original cultures could be retained, not the immigrants themselves. Equally, they had to retain some of it; they did not have the choice over whether they might assimilate or not.

The escape hatch used by multi-culturalists, therefore, has been to muddy the pure ethnos model when dealing with Third World immigrants and to permit some derogation from homogeneity, while pretending that citi-
zenship remained unaffected. On the other hand, this has left them open to a charge of inconsistency, which they have simply shrugged off as immaterial. So what we are left with is an uneasy compromise, with some recognition of cultural difference for some, but not others and a firm rejection of political power derived from and based on cultural difference, i.e. collective rights, as that would threaten the privileged cultural primacy of those whose norms dominate the civic state.

Two models of autonomy

Against this background, we can identify two models of autonomy, though only one is regarded as suitable for export to the post-communist world (are we seeing a kind of cultural Cocom list here?). The hegemonic model emphasises civic homogeneity dressed up as civic equality, based on the idea of a single demos (one state, one demos), with individual rights enjoying primacy, but no collective political rights. In this model, ethnic minority rights are left to the goodwill, democratic conscience and commitment to self-limitation on the part of the majority, unless, that is, violence erupts. In essence, the West has taken the view as far as ethnic minorities in the post-communist world are concerned, that the full implementation of civic norms will provide any minority with the resources that it needs. Multi-ethnic, multi-lingual solutions with political power attached are frowned on. If they are linked to territory, they are prohibited.

In effect, the proposition is that there must be no linkage between culture and political power. Finally, in this context, where there solutions to ethnic question based on the granting of political autonomy, like Catalonia, Wales, the Aalands or South Tyrol, these are absolutely not for export and may not even be used as a basis of demands for autonomy. They are veiled as ad hoc solutions and not a part of the universal norms that the West is exporting to post-communist Europe. A final piece in the mosaic is the assumption that post-communist states, above all those of Central Europe which are accepted as potential members of the EU, already fulfil the necessary civic duty of making provision for their ethnic minorities. This assumption may not be probed; attempts to do so are dismissed as ethnic agitation and thus as illegitimate. It is worth noting the static quality of this assumption-set. Ethnic rights, where granted, are tacitly interpreted as a single event, that once established, minorities should be satisfied with what they gained. There is no sense of a dynamic here, of change or that the modern democratic state requires growing inputs of consent by minorities.
Hence in looking for strategies to found demands for autonomy for ethnic minorities, we can identify two models – one that begins from demos and the other from ethnos. Prima facie, starting from demos appears to deny any claim to ethnic minority rights, given that it seeks to deny and minimise ethnic difference and that it insists on equal access by all to the goods of the state. But one can take the logic of demos a stage further and argue that if all citizens should enjoy access to the goods of the state, then that state must accede to the demands of all those who constitute themselves into a voluntary association.

The implication of this is that civic multi-culturalism requires a multi-cultural presence throughout the territory of the state, seeing that territorially separate sub-state units are prohibited. The consequences of this would be wholly unacceptable to post-communist ethnic majorities, implying as it does that ethnic minority rights could be exercised everywhere within the boundaries of the state. This is politically inconceivable currently, but is the logical consequence of the demos route. Once the logic of the demos position is made clear, however, it becomes possible to transform it into a political programme.

The second option, the ethnos model with different demoi, is completely off the agenda at this time. No state will introduce this model voluntarily and there will be no Western pressure in that direction. The best use that can be made of it in the post-communist world is to use it as a point of reference, to demonstrate that there are in reality two broad Western models, each with its own legitimacy and validity. The Anglo-Saxon argument that the recognition of ethnic difference results in “divisiveness” is, therefore, shown to be motivated by an attempt to entrench the privileged position of English narratives. An ethnos-driven state design is perfectly viable if the conditions of consociationalism are present and respected.

Hungarian dilemmas

Clarification of these models does, however, have a direct political consequence. By demonstrating the only options open to a democratic state that has assumed the full set of civic obligations, it can be used as the starting for a new strategy towards kin groups, obviously with Hungary as a principal actor. The strategy embodied in the Status Law has been effectively declared a failure. By incorporating a measure of extraterritoriality into its foreign policy strategy and basing this on ethnic rights, the Hungarian state forced the West to confront
its own ethnic quality, but rather than do so, it preferred to hide behind a civic veil and supported a far-reaching dilution of the Status law.

The strategy need not end there, however. In effect, the Hungarian state should take the obligations of citizenship and civic norms at face value and should hold the states where Hungarian minority societies live responsible for the fulfilment of these obligations. Complete civic rights in which all individuals enjoy full equality regardless of their ethnicity necessarily requires the states in question both to make full and equal provision for the ethnic Hungarian minorities, living as Hungarians of their own free will, that is, they must be able to live on exactly the same terms as members of ethnic majorities and at the same time to enjoy the material and symbolic goods of the state in exactly the same way as the majority. This means providing full language and cultural rights wherever the state is active, which is pretty much everywhere within the state territory. Only in this way can members of the minority have the capacity to participate as fully equal members of the demos. In effect, demos no longer has to mean homogenisation, but can be argued in such a way as to provide for co-equality.

There is a further dimension to the kin state-kin minority relationship of which the former tends to be unaware. In a very real sense the kin majority tends to be quite unaware of the real-time sociological and cultural problems faced by the kin minority. At the heart of this is that kin minorities, unlike minorities without a kin state, are in a twofold minority status. They are treated as a minority by the home state majority and in parallel though with different repercussions by the home state majority. The home state majority has interests and perspectives of its own, often at considerable variance from those of the minority. Crucially, for the minority its cultural reproduction must be its primary, overriding concern, something that kin state majorities seldom face. Because kin states possess considerable cultural and political prestige, they are inclined to see kin state minorities as an extension of themselves, as having similar or identical interests, though maybe in microcosm.

Majorities, it cannot be stressed too often, can never fully read the entire range of minority issues and inadvertently, not consciously will treat the kin minority as just that, as a minority. Note too that in English the word “minority” and the French “minorité” have two meanings – a group of people smaller in number in relation to another and, simultaneously, a child, someone who has not yet attained to adult status. The danger is that kin majorities unwittingly reproduce this adult-child relationship when dealing with kin minorities and infantilise them.
If the kin majority’s involvement with a kin minority has any legitimacy, it is to do with the proposition that the majority acts to make provision for the agency that the kin minority would not otherwise have. Furthermore, the kin state should assume some of the burdens that result from minority status, above all that because the first priority of the minority must be self-reproduction, it finds that articulating its complexity, its own diversity is doubly if not actually triply hampered. It is impeded by its dependence on the will of the ethnic majority the narratives of which leave little room for minority interests; by the interests of the kin state majority; and by the consequent narrow spectrum of options that the political representation of the minority finds itself with. All three cases can be understood as forms of dependence and if autonomy is about anything, it is about finding the institutional and cultural framework that allows those affected the optimum choice and agency.
STEFANO BOTTONI

The creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romania (1952): Premises and Consequences

This essay focuses on an interesting and still unexplored case of nationality policy in communist Eastern Europe: the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romania. The creation of this region, along with the Yugoslav experiment, was the only example of integrative minority policy in the post-war Eastern Europe, and represented the attempt to solve a deeply rooted national question by giving administrative “autonomy” to Szeklerland, the predominantly Hungarian region of Transylvania. The ideological premises of the region, imposed on the Romanian Party by Soviet leadership in 1952, followed the Bolshevik pattern of territorial autonomy elaborated by Lenin and Stalin in the early 1920s.1 The Hungarians of Szeklerland became a “titular nationality” provided with extensive cultural rights. Yet, on the other hand, the Romanian central power used the region as an instrument of political and social integration for the Hungarian minority into the communist state. The history of the Hungarian Autonomous Region (HAR) was also influenced by changes in the Soviet concept of the nation, which occurred in the latter period of Stalin’s rule2. As the ongoing ethnicization of Soviet social identity also meant re-emergence of traditional, Russian dominance the HAR could never become a strong counter-power in front of the Romanian Stalinist elite lead by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

On the basis of newly released Russian and Romanian sources, I analyze the genesis of this region between 1950 and 1952, focusing on the political

2 E.g. the debate held in the Spring issue of Slavic Review 2002 (the articles of Eric Weitz and Peter Blinstein).
and psychological impact of the HAR as concerns interethnic relations in Transylvania. The internationalist, ideological framework in which the communist regime tried to place the creation of HAR could not put an end to the persistence of both the Romanian and the Hungarian heritage of national symbols and mutual resentments, which could have easily been mobilized by the party. In the context of Transylvania, an area extremely receptive to nationalism, the mere appearance in the official public discourse of the term “autonomy” brought about an unexpected wave of ethnic tension.

**Shaping the soviet model: the 1950 territorial reform**

One cannot definitely answer the question when and by whom the idea was raised of establishing the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romania. The Central Leadership (CL) of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP)\(^3\) had proclaimed the solution of the nationality question in Romania on the basis of Lenin’s principles with a resolution passed in December 1948. However, the integral adoption of the Soviet model would have meant defining the nationality question in terms of administrative and territorial autonomy. The uncertain territorial “status” of the predominantly Hungarian Transylvanian counties, however, was raised following the radical administrative reform of September 1950, which reshaped the internal boundaries of the whole territory of Romania.\(^4\) The twin-layered system of the inter-war period, (commune-county), was replaced by a territorial division organized entirely on the Soviet pattern (region-district-municipality-village).\(^5\) The Soviet Union played a decisive role in working out the reform, just as with every other political decision in early 1950s’ Romania, and even the documents inspiring the administrative reform arrived from Moscow already translated into Romanian. The territory of Romania was divided into 28 regions (11 of which were in Transylvania) and 117 districts, officially named *raions* to follow the Soviet terminology. Economic considerations played the main role in determining the new administrative borders and identifying the new regional

---

\(^3\) The Central Leadership was established after the “union” of the two workers’ parties (1948), and it was officially renamed Central Committee only after Ceaușescu’s seizure of power.


centers. Many of the newly appointed regional and district centers later became important industrial centers.

Furthermore, the borders of the territory historically named Szeklerland (Székelyföld), which had longtime belonged to Hungary until 1918 and between 1940 and 1944, were radically altered. The entire area was divided into two regions instead of the former four Szekler counties: the Brașov (renamed Stalin in 1950) region and the Mureș region, with its center Târgu-Mureș (Marosvásárhely), a town which had at that time a population of about 47,000 (35,000 Hungarians, 11,000 Romanians and about 1,000 Jews). The Mureș region had a Hungarian majority (52%), though it also included Romanian districts such as Târnăveni and Luduș.

The party Commission led by the minister of interior Teohari Georgescu economically motivated the partition of the Szekler territory. According to a document issued by this body, Szeklerland’s deep-rooted backwardness was mainly due to the lack of a modern industrial network. The party seemingly aimed at intensifying the economic relations between the more developed city of Brașov and its countryside.

The party nomenklatura of the Mureș region was predominantly made up of Hungarians. In October 1950, the one hundred, most influential positions within the local apparatus were occupied by: 63 Hungarians, 28 Romanians and 6 Jews. Even the first party secretary of the province was a Hungarian, Mihály Nagy who, due to his over-zealous and brutal attitude during the first wave of collectivization, was later replaced by a Romanian, Nicolae Bota. The three secretaries were of Romanian nationality. And finally, there were 4 Hungarians and 4 Romanians out of the 8 members of the region’s political committee.

Although the ethnic balance in the Hungarian-inhabited region reflected Moscow’s desires, it was from Moscow – and not from Transylvania –
that dissatisfied voices were heard as early as 1951 concerning the execution of administrative reform, including the position of the Hungarian minority in Szeklerland. That is confirmed by a newly released Russian document on a discussion between Spandarian, the councilor of the Soviet embassy in Bucharest, and Teohari Georgescu on 14 May 1951.9 After announcing that two Soviet experts were to arrive in order to supervise the people’s councils’ work and the process of “raionization”, Spandarian reported to Moscow that, according to Georgescu himself, a communication breakdown had occurred between center and periphery in the period following the establishment of new local people’s councils (1949–50). Thousands of orders and circulars were sent from Bucharest, which, however, were often contradictory and did not contain clear instructions. The Romanian Central Leadership even discussed whether it was more useful to send, in advance, pre-filled forms concerning the meeting agendas to the people’s councils, or “authorize” the local leaders to fill in the forms by themselves. The two experts sent from Moscow asked Georgescu if the national minorities had been taken into account when appointing the new regional borders. This intentional question apparently surprised the minister, who replied very ambiguously: “We took this point of view into account. For example Mureș and Stalin regions were appointed so that they would cover most Hungarians. But practically it is a very complex matter because nationalities do not live in a compact block [my emphasis – S.B.] but are scattered and mixed with the Romanian majority. Therefore it is very difficult to appoint autonomous regions. We have examined the possibility of establishing them, but no concrete decisions have been made yet.”10

Preparing a new constitution (1950–52)

The formation of the HAR was also connected to the preparation and adoption of a new Romanian constitution. During the months of administrative reform the Central Leadership began “modernizing” the text of the 1948 constitution. The new text had to reflect the achievements made in building


10 Ibid. 532.
socialism, including the nationalization of enterprises in 1948 and the collectivization of agriculture, which had begun in 1949.

In the meeting of Secretariat held on 28 June 1950 the general secretary of the RWP Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej said that the 1948 constitution had been worked out with the bourgeois elements of the formally existent Liberal Party, and therefore did not reflect the “dictatorship of the proletariat” but rather a “people’s democracy.” 11 So the new constitution, which was slated for adoption in 1951, was completely fashioned after the Soviet constitution of 1936, although it was obvious, as Miron Constantinescu pointed it out, that Romania still had a long way to reach the Soviet Union’s level of “socialism”.

At the end of the meeting a decision was made to set up an internal commission within the political committee, and that the commission’s work should not receive any publicity. The commission’s task was to prepare the draft constitution, which was then to be dealt with by the council of ministers. Legislation required the formal approval of the council of ministers. Nobody mentioned the nationality issue.

The matter, however, proceeded much more slowly than originally planned. Strong opposition in the country against the forcible collection of agricultural products may have been in the background. In some regions bloody peasant riots broke out. Only a year after the aforementioned secretarial meeting, in the summer of 1951, did the general secretary of the RWP turn to Stalin in a telegram to ask for help in the wording of the new constitution. 12 On 4 August 1951 Stalin sent a positive reply to the request from Bucharest, but suggested that the draft worked out by the commission appointed by the Central Leadership of the RWP should be presented to Soviet experts. 13 Accordingly, a commission within the party leadership was established to re-draft the new constitution between August and September 1951. There are some unanswered questions concerning the preparation of the new constitution, as very little information exists at our disposal concerning the period

---

11 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 48/1950, 3–9, f.
12 There is no trace of Gheorghiu-Dej’s request in the documents of the Central Leadership of the RWP, which I had the opportunity to look through in the National Romanian Archives. A footnote to document 208 in the volume of Vostochnaya Evropa is the source of information, 582.
13 Vostochnaya Evropa, op. cit. 582.
between 10 October 1951\textsuperscript{14} and 14 May 1952.\textsuperscript{15} On the basis of available sources from 1951 and 1952, I present here an outline of the events.

In the fall of 1951, the 20 members commission led by Gheorghiu-Dej worked according to the timetable. In October, the Secretariat approved the formation of sub-commissions charged with the wording of different chapters: one of these collectives, charged with the study of “the national question in the Constitution” was to be led by Miron Constantinescu and the Hungarian intellectual László Bánya. At the same meeting, Iosif Chișinevschi admitted, “the chapters are modeled on the Stalinist Constitution, with some modifications”.\textsuperscript{16}

On 22 November 1951 the commission met and fixed a two-week term for the preparation of the first draft\textsuperscript{17}, and later in the same year,\textsuperscript{18} the document entitled \textit{Draft of a new constitution} was finally issued.\textsuperscript{19} The draft proposal, enriched by hand-written annotations by Gheorghiu-Dej, must be regarded as a key-document. Taking into account that one cannot find any reference to HAR nor to the need to “emphasize” the solution to the national question, one can conclude that it was neither the Romanian nor the Hungarian communists who brought on the idea of an autonomous territory for the largest minority living in Romania.

In the following months the economic crisis was exacerbated by the surplus of money in circulation and oversized investments in heavy industry, especially in the military sector. Gheorghiu-Dej and his faction, who enjoyed the full support of Stalin at that time, were already preparing the launch of the campaign against the so-called “Muscovites”.\textsuperscript{20} Taking into account the lack of documentation for the period comprised between December 1951 and March 1952, the preparation of the new constitution seems to have been interrupted. The explanation could be that the draft was sent to Moscow, and the Soviets’ objections (probably on the treatment of the national question) forced

---

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Procesul-verbal și stenograma ședinței Secretariatului Comitetului Central}, 10 octombrie 1951. ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 41/1951. The party secretariat gathered on that day to discuss the preparation of the material necessary for the committee which had been asked to work out the new constitution.

\textsuperscript{15} When Gheorghiu-Dej sent Stalin the “finalised” draft.

\textsuperscript{16} ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 41/1951, 3 ff.

\textsuperscript{17} ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 53/1951, 3–4 ff.

\textsuperscript{18} The draft issued by the commission in 1951 was without date.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Proiectul Constituției RPR} (without date). ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 88/1951.

Romanians to reformulate or to introduce new chapters. The whole question reappeared – as a secondary matter – only at the meeting of the Political Committee on 25 March 1952 in which Gheorghiu-Dej made the first public accusations against Vasile Luca. The minutes of this meeting contain a statement by Gheorghiu-Dej on the necessity of appointing another commission made up not of party officials but of fellow travelers, intellectuals and politicians like Petru Groza. Like its predecessor, this commission also worked out some “Guidelines for the issuing of the draft of the new Constitution”. The 8th point read, “The draft of the new constitution shall concretely define the national moments (sic),” but it did not enter into detail.

The turning-point had to come some weeks later, in mid-April, when Gheorghiu-Dej – along with his supporters (Apostol, Costantinescu and Chișinevschi) – was convoqued to Moscow by Stalin, who gave him the guidelines for the settlement of the Luca-Pauker-Georgescu affair. During that meeting, the last one Gheorghiu-Dej had with Stalin, the Soviet leaders (Stalin himself, Molotov, Beria and Mikojan) may have raised the issue of HAR too, even if recent historiography does not make any mention of it.

On 14 May 1952 Gheorghiu-Dej sent a text to Stalin, which contained the second version of the draft. The deputy foreign minister, Vishinsky made the first remarks and the following day forwarded the material to the Central Leadership, to Grigorian personally, who made his proposals together with an expert named Gorshenin, and then forwarded the text to Molotov. Molotov handed the “reply draft” containing the proposals for modification addressed to Bucharest over to Stalin. According to the referenced Russian documentary collection, Stalin did not approve the document but personally amended it, and that was how he gave it back to Molotov. The Soviet Central Committee sent

---

21 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 25/1952, 17–19 f.
22 Ibidem, 18. f.
23 Ibidem, 33. f.
25 Vishinsky’s remarks: Sovietskij factor, 632–635 (Document 243, not later than 25 May 1952. Vishinsky’s comments in connection with the draft constitution of the Romanian People’s Republic.)
26 Grigorian was in charge of the committee responsible for international relations (especially with communist parties) in the CC of the CPSU from 1949. Information on the decision-making process is from a footnote to document 277. Commentary by Molotov to Stalin concerning the draft constitution of RPR and Stalin’s comments on the document (6 July 1952), see Vostochnaya Evropa, op. cit. 769–771.
this version to communist leadership in Bucharest on 6 July 1952. What happened between Bucharest and Moscow in the spring of 1952, and how and whom raised the question of setting up the HAR? The sources are rather contradictory. A Romanian document allows us to conclude that during May and June a quiet struggle was going on over the formation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region between the two central committees.

On 12 June, when the draft constitution was being studied in Moscow, the Political Committee was having a meeting in Bucharest. The committee led by the Hungarian top-rank apparatchik Alexandru Moghioroș (Mogyorós Sándor) submitted a report called 'Etapa I-a', which dealt with administrative issues but made no mention about the possible formation of an autonomous region. A few days later the same committee issued another report with the title 'Etapa II-a' about the correction of administrative-territorial district making in the Romanian People’s Republic. “The principles and directives of the government and the party [concerning the establishment of districts and regions – S.B.] were not fully respected, because the majority of the regions were not strong enough to fulfill the tasks set by the Central Leadership of the Romanian Workers’ Party. On the other hand, the text of the draft of the new constitution contains the establishment of a Hungarian Autonomous Region which is to be formed in the area where Hungarian and Szeklers live in a compact block [my emphasis – S.B.].” The HAR will include Cău, Târgu-Secuiesc, Sfântu-Gheorghe and Odorhei districts and also the eastern part of Răcoș district from Stalin region. From the present Mureș region the district of Luduș and a few villages from the western parts of Reghin and Târgu-Mureș districts will be joined to Cluj region. This province will have a population of 656,000 inhabitants with 526,000 Hungarians and 123,000 Romanians. The area of the province is 1,419,000 hectares [14,190 square km – S.B.], of which 294,000 hectares is arable land.

While there was no reference made to the HAR in the first report, in the second of a few days later the borders of the future region were described relatively precisely and also contained statistical data. All this leads us to believe

27 Vostochnaja Evropa, op. cit. 583.
28 CC al PCR, Cancelarie, ANIC, dos. 49/1952, 3. f.
29 Certainly before 1 July, as according to the minutes of the Political Committee, it finished its work on that day.
30 Ibid. 84–105.
31 Ibid. 84.
32 Ibid. 85.
33 Ibid. 93.
that the political game of the two party leadership was conducted behind the scenes: the Soviets, led by Molotov and Stalin, not only “polished” the text of the draft constitution, but made several essential changes primarily with regard to the establishment of the autonomous region, which was not liked in Bucharest. However, other documents in our possession contradict the above. The previously mentioned Vishinsky letter of May thoroughly criticized the draft handed in by the Romanian leadership and clearly mentioned the HAR, as if it had already been included in the draft sent by Bucharest.34 Hungarian sources also indicate this. According to the records made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Budapest at the end of the year, Gheorghiu-Dej already said in his speech held at the Great National Assembly meeting on 26–27 March 1952 that the directives of the new draft constitution included the establishment of the HAR.35 The author of the quoted diplomatic report may, however, have mixed up the chronology of events.

The original draft Gheorghiu-Dej sent to Moscow in May 1952 unfortunately is not included in the researchable documents of the Romanian Archives, thus we do not know what exactly the Soviets modified. What is sure is that Article 19 was reworded by Molotov and Stalin in the following way: “The Hungarian Autonomous Region comprises the area inhabited by the Hungarian and Szekler populations in a compact block and has an independent administrative leadership elected by the residents of the HAR”.36

The role in modifying the Romanian constitution played by the Soviets and personally by Stalin is in no way unique in the last years of Stalinism. Krzysztof Persak mentions with regard to the Polish constitution also rewritten in 1952 that Stalin himself “re-edited” the text already approved by the Central Committee of the Soviet Party.37 Among other matters, the Soviet leader considered it important to include a paragraph, which talked about “Polish national culture” and “Polish national revival” (my emphasis– S.B.). This confirms the view expressed by some researchers that Stalin validated an ethnicized con-

34 Sovetskij factor, op. cit. 634.
36 Vostochnaya Evropa, 771.
cept of nation in his own empire in the last years of his power. Consequently, the respect for national forms (in that case, of minority national forms) also promoted the formation of the HAR in 1952.

The dispute at the Romanian Workers’ Party Political Committee’s meeting on 10 July 1952 shows, however, that several Romanian leaders, primarily the first secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, received the establishment of the HAR with reservation.

“Let us go no further” – Gheorghiu-Dej’s advice

After Gheorghiu-Dej had received from Moscow the “modifications” to the draft constitution put forward in May, he summoned the Political Committee on 10 July to discuss the corrected text. The section of minutes recorded at the meeting relating to the role and status of the would-be HAR gives an excellent example of the “passive resistance” against Soviet pressure represented by Gheorghiu-Dej, who emerged strengthened from the political battles putting down the internal resistance in the spring of 1952. Emil Bodnáraș raised the question of linguistic rights to be granted to the new region: “It seems to be necessary to regulate the population’s use of language at court proceedings (...) If a person who does not speak Romanian is elected how will the proceedings be held?” Miron Constantinescu added: “According to the Soviet constitution court proceedings are held in the mother tongue of the accused in every autonomous region. We can only gain from this in a political sense. Taking Azerbaijan’s constitution as an example we may word it like this: The language of court proceedings is Hungarian in the Hungarian Autonomous Region, but in districts where the population is Romanian or of other nationality it is the language of that nationality”. Then Gheorghiu-Dej replied: “Let us go no further. It is not by chance that the comrades have not made any more comments. Let us leave it so. Court proceedings are held in Romanian, ensuring the use of mother tongue. It is enough with our level of development.”

The Central Leadership’s plenum called for the following day and providing information for a broader party membership, set aims concerning the work

80 STEFANO BOTTONI


39 Gheorghiu-Dej referred to chapter 68 of the draft, which said: “In the Romanian People’s Republic court procedures are held in Romanian, in the regions and districts where there is a non-Romanian population the use of the population’s mother tongue must be ensured.”

40 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 61/1952, 8–9. f.
process and the publicity campaign. At this meeting Liuba Chișinevschi brought up the issue of the autonomous region in a rather half-hearted speech, on the one hand showing that even in party leadership the establishment of the HAR was shrouded in secrecy, and on the other, reflecting the ambiguity concerning the status of the region, which was “like the others, yet different”.

“The autonomous region is not clear to me. I don’t know, but perhaps we would rather stipulate more precisely what this autonomous region means, what rights it has, because as we have put it, i.e. that every region has a people’s council and so does the HAR, so we should declare that it is not simply a region like the others.”

Those present did not react to the proposal and immediately passed over to discussing the organizational issues regarding the propaganda campaign in connection with the constitution, which, as Gheorghiu-Dej had stipulated on 10 July, they intended to conduct on the Polish model, i.e. agitators trained especially for this purpose would lead meetings at all the forums (in workshops, collective farms, community centers, schools and residential blocks). Curiously enough, the Romanian party leadership was not at all enthusiastic about the task of holding the text up for discussion. At the Political Committee meeting of 14 July Gheorghiu-Dej himself expressed concern for the popular reaction to setting up the HAR: “Our enemies will try to carry out diversions, especially on the national question”. In order to prevent any disorder, the campaign attained massive proportions. In the only HAR territory between 20 July and 10 August about 17,000 agitators were mobilized, who held 3,200 meetings at 320 different “agitatory scenes” with the presence of 66,700 people (nearly 10% of the HAR’s whole population). Special attention was paid to the region’s center, Târgu-Mureș, where, according to the report on the campaign, the whole intelligentsia of the town managed to be included in the discussions. The center instructed the regional agit-prop departments to stand up against any manifestation of chauvinism and at the same time to fight against the “reactionary tendencies” of the Catholic Church, which was still under the influence of the Alba Iulia Bishop Áron Márton, who had been imprisoned in 1949 and was venerated by many followers for his consistent anti-communism and his stand for Hungarian national rights.

41 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 62/1952, 4. f.
42 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 62/1952, 10. f.
43 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 65/1952, 26. f.
A Russian historian recently spoke of the “games of Stalinist democracy” referring to the analysis of ideological and scientific debates which emerged in the Soviet Union during full-blown Stalinism. The debate on the new constitution, encouraged by the Romanian party, looked quite similar to Soviet model. And, like in the Soviet Union during the first years of Stalin’s rule, the main problem for those in power was avoiding the potential danger hidden in the “flowering of ethnicity” generated by the public announcement of the creation of the HAR.

The new draft constitution in the socialist public sphere

The establishment of the HAR remained secret until the last minute. Even the regional first secretaries were informed only on 12 July, when Moghioros sent them a copy of the definitive “draft”. The following day they were called together to Bucharest, along with Propaganda cadres, to be provided by Moghioros and Chisineschi with instructions for the campaign.

Due to the lack of any information concerning the nature of the HAR, when on 18 July 1952 newspapers published, on a full page, the new Draft Constitution and “held it up for discussion”, the Romanian public showed nothing less than utter shock. Three entire Articles (19–21) of the text dealt with the HAR.

The campaign had to clarify the party’s indefinite standpoint on two key issues: 1) what justified the establishment of the region nearly four years after the nationality question had been officially solved; 2) what role did the expect for it to play within the framework of the Romanian state. The first commentaries appeared in press on 19 July. Yet, from the first days they followed line with the party’s official paper, Scântea, which was mediated by two articles signed with the names of Chisineschi and László Bányai. According to both authors, the establishment of the HAR “raised” the resolution of the Romanian nationality issue “on a higher level” on the basis of the Leninist-Stalinist directive. On the same day, the Bucharest-based, national Hungarian daily proudly empha-

sized in its editorial that the new Romanian constitution was based on the Soviet constitution of 1936.47

The article published on the following day is more noteworthy as it was the first manifestation of a discursive paradigm, largely exploited in the following years. It underlined the opposition between the old “feudal-bourgeois”, pre-1918 Hungarian discriminative nationality policy and the also oppressive, Romanian nationality policy in the interwar period, with the “democratic” policies of the post-1945 system, which resulted in a broad application of minority rights.48

The range of issues discussed in the press in the following weeks grew significantly wider.49 Special emphasis was laid on celebrating the unprecedented harmony formed among nationalities due to the new system50 and on another theme which the Szekler minority was especially sensitive to: the autonomous region from the perspective of cultural and social-economic development.

Along with rigid and mechanical explanations, the official propaganda also tried to use a more human tone by putting socialist poetry to the service of the cause:

S hol a völgyeket a / Maros szeli át,
dolgozó magyar nyer / autonómiát,
közös birtokunkban / tágabb térre lép.
Így főr jobban öszze / Az ország s a nép. 51
(And where valleys are cut / through by the Maros / the working Hungarian becomes / autonomous / in our common land / his steps become wide / thus do the country and / the people reunite)

47 Az új Alkotmánytervezet szentesíti a nemzeti kisebbségek egyenjogúságát [The new Constitution project guarantees equal rights to national minorities]. Romániai Magyar Szó, 19 July 1952.
48 A RNK nemzeti kisebbségi teljesen egyenjogúak a román néppel [The national minorities in the RPR have equal rights to the Romanian people]. Romániai Magyar Szó, 20 July 1952.
49 This is clear from the quantity of articles published in the local press. Only between 20 July and 10 August, 79 commentaries and reports concerning the reasons for and practical consequences of establishing HAR were published in Vörös Zászló, which were coordinated by the agit-prop department of the CC. ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 43/1952, 189. f.
50 Cf. report about Aita Seacă/Szárazajta. According to the writer severe riots of an ethnic nature took place in this village in 1940 when Hungarian forces moved in northern Transylvania and introduced a Hungarian administration, and then in 1944 when the so-called Maniu guards, i.e. Romanian para-military units moved in to prepare the Transylvanian area, which had been reconquered from the Hungarians by the Soviet and Romanian units, for Romanian administration. Hazánk nemzeti kisebbségeinek virágzó élete [The flourishing life of our national minorities]. Romániai Magyar Szó, 11 December 1952.
51 Imre Horváth’s poem Törünk egyre feljebb [Going further and further] written in honour of HAR. Romániai Magyar Szó, 6 August 1952.
The area of the HAR was more or less industrially undeveloped, economically backward, cold, mountainous, historical Szeklerland far from any transport junctions. The population was promised such prosperity as would end massive migration to more developed parts of Transylvania and to Bucharest. The comparison between the situation of national minorities in capitalist countries (including Yugoslavia) and that of socialist countries was another reoccurring theme of propaganda. In the light of Stalinist culture, Bucharest had good reason to send clear warnings to the Hungarians. The most direct message was published in Scânteia on 30 July. The effusive and doctrinaire article was written for party activists. It attempted to convince the majority about the establishment of the HAR “corresponding to the fundamental interests of the working Romanian people”, and went on to warn Hungarians that comrade Stalin also said “autonomy does not mean independence”, on the contrary, regional autonomy is “the most concrete form of unity”.52 The Romániai Magyar Szó delivered a similar message some time later.53

Official propaganda did not consciously describe the region as an exclusively Hungarian region but as an integrative structure, where every nationality can feel at home. The message intended for Jewish readers was solemn: “József Frankel, a 19-year-old worker has achieved equality in this system for the first time, because while the old system built gas chambers for the likes of him this system has provided equality for all, independently whether they were born Romanian, Hungarian or Jewish”.54

The establishment of the new local power and the “side effects” of the HAR

The establishment of the HAR seemingly did not evoke much enthusiasm in the party’s local apparatus. On 18 July 1952, when the new draft constitution was officially announced, the regional Political Committee held an extraordinary meeting in Târgu-Mureș, where Nicolae Bota, the outgoing Romanian first secretary, suddenly announced at the end of the meeting that in the framework of the new constitution the party was also planning to establish a Hungarian autonomous region, which was “the correct way of resolv-

53 Az Alkotmánytervezettel kapcsolatban válaszolunk olvasóink kérdéseire [We answer to our readers for what concern the new Constitution project]. Romániai Magyar Szó, 9 August 1952.
The creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romania

Only Alexandru Cârdan, the outgoing Romanian president of the regional people’s council asked – without receiving any explanation – in which language would the minutes of meetings be recorded. He tried to ascertain who would occupy the leading positions. Local officials, for a good part Romanians before 1952, were obviously concerned about receiving the ideological directives from the center while meanwhile executing the necessary “ethnic” change in the *nomenklatura* of the new, massively Hungarian region.

Looking at the list of names of the new *nomenklatura* dictated by the deputy minister of interior, the Hungarian-born János Vincze, it can be clearly seen that with the establishment of the HAR there was primarily a *symbolic* change among party officials on an ethnic basis. The new first secretary of the region, Lajos Csupor, and the president of the regional people’s council, Pál Bugyi, and their deputies were mostly Hungarians. Lajos Csupor’s career was a good example of the unprecedented social mobility the communist regime offered to loyal minorities: he came from a poor family living in a suburb of Târgu-Mureș, had worked there as a tailor and joined the Federation of Young Workers at the age of 18, in the early 1930s. After 1944 he played an important role in organizing the Communist party in Szeklerland, and in 1950 was appointed as first secretary of the Brașov region and also took part in the military repression of peasant riots in the former Trei Scaune county, a largely Hungarian-inhabited territory. After 1952, thanks to his complete loyalty to the Stalinist structure he called to lead, Csupor could remain party leader in the HAR for 9 years, a remarkable feat for a first-generation official.

Fulfilling Moscow’s expectations, Hungarian officials had to play a key role in the local apparatus; their proportion shows a growing trend in the last months of 1952. At the opening of the first regional Party conference (January 1953) the composition of the Party and the people’s council leaderships showed 17,583 Hungarians (81.4%) and 3,880 Romanians (18%) of...
the 21,598 registered party members (2.9% of the HAR's population). Thus, Hungarians were somewhat over-represented as compared to the ethnic composition of the region. There were even larger differences at the January 1953 conference, where, of the elected Regional Committee, 41 out of 50 and 10 of the 11-member Political Committee were Hungarians.

With regard to the Party's social influence, data at our disposal reveal an elusive picture. The widespread assertion that the Party encompassed the whole country tightly seems to be contradicted by the fact that in 1952, of the HAR's 428 villages, 77 had no Party organization, especially in the Romanian settlements of districts Reghin and Târgu-Mureș. In other villages the Party organizations had to be closed as a result of the national purification campaign started in 1949. Thus, it is true that the Party became more rooted in areas with a Hungarian majority, but the penetration of the revered party-state into the local social sphere must be treated in a different manner.

The next important question is what was really meant by administrative/territorial autonomy. Can we talk about the Hungarian party apparatus’s autonomy to any extent following the establishment of the HAR? In fact, the establishment of HAR provoked quite a paradoxical situation. On the one hand the center kept political and repressive power and control in its hands. On the other hand, the Party itself was aware of the fact that the word ‘autonomy’ had not lost its meaning for the Transylvanian Hungarians, neither as a consequence of the trauma of World War II nor resulting from the internationalist rhetoric of communism. In view of the fact that officially taboo subjects such as nationality rights and autonomy were publicly raised, the propaganda campaign involuntarily became a catalyst of national conflicts in an area where rivalry between Romanians and Hungarians – more exactly a mutually exclusive nation-building – had deep, historical traditions.

The reaction of local Party sections to the formation of the HAR, which had been kept secret until the last minute, was of great surprise. Although internal debates and meetings were often held during mess time on Sundays,

---

59 The number of party members as compared to the population did not differ from the nationality ratio (there were about 600,000 party members out of a population of about 18 million), although it was rather low as compared to the social composition of HAR: the number of industrial workers alone amounted to more than 33,000 in 1952. ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 1952/43. 227. f.
60 ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 1952/195, 1–10. f. (Tâbella statistice lunare cu privire la membrii și conducerea de partid.)
61 ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 1953/64.
62 ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 1952/51.
giving many inhabitants – including Party members – a good occasion to not take part in it, the participants, especially the Hungarians, sharpened the debate with “tendentious questions” about the use of Hungarian national symbols, especially that of the flag, and the use of language in army units stationed in the territory of the HAR. Some asked what money would be issued in the region.63 There were rumors at many meetings of a Romanian and Hungarian population exchange in the near future with the clear intent of creating an ethnically homogenous Hungarian region.64 Although the authorities immediately denied such unfounded talks (zvonuri), still the meetings involuntarily became the starting point for “false news” which spread verbally among the population.

The word “autonomy” seems to have produced a conditioned reflex in some Hungarians who thought it was a move towards reannexation by Hungary. Just like the reannexation of Szeklerland by Hungary in 1940, the memory of which was very much alive in the collective consciousness, the Romanian population (whether they were born there or settlers) again became “aliens”. And, there were some cases where the local Hungarian majority publicly threatened or insulted the Romanians.65 In the district of Reghin, with its Romanian majority, panic broke out with people bitterly whispering that “the Hungarians will again be at the helm”.66

The “1940 syndrome” was not limited to Romanians and Hungarians. Many ministry and Bucharest Party officials spent their 1952, summer holiday at Băile Tușnad (Tușnad spa) in the heart of the HAR. According to a local legend, upon hearing the news of the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous Region, many cut short their holiday and returned to the capital on the first available train.67 Even if the story is entirely a product of Szekler folklore (although it seems more than that), letters to the editor published in Scânteia, a source above any suspicion with regard to ideological loyalty, showed what shock and deeply rooted fears of the Romanian population evoked by the establishment of the HAR.

Between 18 July and the middle of September two organs with close ties to the Party, Scânteia’s readers’ page (Secția scriitori) and the Legal Committee

---

63 ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 43/1952, 185. f. (Raport informativ, 10 August 1952)
64 Ibid.
65 The report of the regional council contains several concrete cases of verbal aggression: Nota informativă, 10 August 1952. ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 43/1952, 190–191. f.
66 Ibid. 191. f.
of the National Council of the Democratic People’s Front\textsuperscript{68} scrupulously collected everything that emerged from the ‘filter’ of several thousand meetings held in every corner of the country. The letters sent to \textit{Scânteia}, including more than 5,000 proposals for constitutional modification (with full name and address), well demonstrate (with less manipulation than might be assumed) “society’s” response to the proposal of “power”.\textsuperscript{69} In this case the large number of opinions and proposals in connection with the HAR allows us to conclude that the autonomous region was the most questionable and dispute-raising issue in the whole propaganda campaign. The opinions expressed reflect the ethnic tension between Hungarians and Romanians, which rarely filtered into official public opinion during the Gheorghiu-Dej era.

The opinions of Hungarians appeared less frequently in the columns of \textit{Scânteia} as they could not express their views properly in written Romanian. Nevertheless, they aired their opinions with regard to the modification of the constitution. The majority of proposals referred to broadening the linguistic rights of the minority, with many proposing full bilingualism of geographical names, administration (including the railways) and the legal system.\textsuperscript{70} Dominic (Domokos) Horváth suggested that conscripts of Hungarian nationality in the army should have the opportunity to use their mother tongue in training.\textsuperscript{71}

More specific, and likewise, significant requests were made by Party members, moreover, by the members of local Party leaderships. Dezideriu (Dezso) Klein would have liked the Transylvanian unit of the \textit{Editura de Stat}’s (State Publisher) Hungarian section to move from Cluj to Târgu-Mureș, and a weekly in Hungarian to be published for the Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute. Ioan (János) Bolyai, a member of the people’s council of the town of Odorhei Secuiesc in the heart of the HAR, proposed that “the defense of

\textsuperscript{68} Comisia juridicã consiliului central – FDP. The People’s Front in communist countries was a mass organisation under the Party’s direction, which was mobilised at general and local elections and, here, on the occasion of adopting the new constitution.

\textsuperscript{69} According to his cabinet chief, Gheorghiu-Dej attributed great significance to readers’ letters sent to the press as they helped him to assess the general atmosphere in the country. Paul Sfetcu: \textit{13 ani în antecamera lui Dej}, București: Ed. Fundației Culturale Române, 2000, 83.

\textsuperscript{70} Answering Gheorghiu-Dej a certain Iosif Condes, for example, suggested that paragraph 69 on the language used in courts should be modified so that proceedings “should be held half in Romanian and half in Hungarian in order to avoid the need for interpreting”. ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 143/1952, 70. f.

\textsuperscript{71} ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 142/1952, 204. f.
the Romanian people’s independence” in paragraph 17 be amended by “(the Romanian people’s) and the national minorities’ independence”. 72

Other national minorities and ethnic groups living in the country also showed interest in an autonomous administrative region – Germans73 living in the Arad region asked for an autonomous region, as did Jews from Iași.74

The Romanian majority was surprised and uncomprehending in its response to such a “flourishing” of minorities, which questioned with the party’s approval one of the unwritten principles of the modern Romanian national identity, i.e. territorial homogeneity as the guarantee of a unitary and national-type state. “The constitution proclaimed the HAR, though it can be found in our territory. We are not a federal republic but a people’s republic.”75

Other letters blamed the Party for not defending Romanian interests: “Why was the HAR needed? Why are the borders of the Romanian People’s Republic not defined in the Constitution? Is HAR under the Romanian People’s Republic (RPR) or Hungary’s jurisdiction? If it is under the RPR’s jurisdiction, why an autonomous region? Is the autonomous region a state within a state?”76

Other people, such as Teodora Popescu from Târgu-Mureș, wrote to Scânteia about the rumors all over town that Romanian classes would be closed-down and that Romanian pupils’ catchment area would be moved to other regions.77 From among proposals for “concrete” although radical solutions, the idea of a Party member from the Bacău region, which was next to the HAR, excels – the issue could be solved by a population exchange between Romanians and Hungarians.78

Propaganda and everyday life in the HAR

How did the more or less official accounts and the party propaganda relate to everyday life in the Szeklerland after the building-up of the HAR? Let me take the case of the Medical Faculty in Târgu-Mureș, the only institution of higher education in the HAR along with the small College of dramatic art. The proletarian and “national”, that is to say Hungarian character attributed to the Medical faculty demonstrates how complicated the situation really

72 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 143/1952, 58. f.
73 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 142/1952, 12–29. f. (Buletin n. 14.)
74 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 142/19526.f. (Sectia scrisori, bulletin de sinteza 25 iulie 1952.)
75 ANIC, CC al PCR, Cancelarie, dos. 142/1952, 4. f.
76 Ibid. 5–6. f.
77 Ibid. 10. f.
was. According to propaganda, the Party recruited the new urban elite at this university from the ethnic Hungarian worker class. But the gap between myth and reality emerged in May 1953, when the first Party secretary Lajos Csupor had to inform the Soviet consul in Cluj visiting Târgu-Mureș about the university’s difficulties and primarily the inter-ethnic conflict, which was still on the agenda.\textsuperscript{79} The regional Party committee, which had examined the operation of the university in the previous months, stated no less than three different nationalist groups, “the anti-Romanian Hungarian chauvinists”, “the nationalist Jewish Zionists” and the “anti-Semites”, active in the institution of barely 1000 students. The authorities were disturbed by “the many open and disguised enemies of the system” among students and lecturers. In addition, 54% of students came from families considered lower and middle bourgeois, who were allowed to finish their studies even after the exposure of right-wing deviations.\textsuperscript{80} Csupor also disapproved of the fact that many of the lecturers were Hungarian citizens and some had supported the Arrow Cross party or the Horthy system. Professor Putnoky was a member of the Arrow Cross until 1944, while another noted lecturer from Hungary, Professor Dezsõ Miskolczy “received sums of money from Áron Márton in 1945–46”. In tune with the paranoid spirit of the time, Csupor also blamed Putnoky for “not following Soviet science in his work and looking down on Pavlov”. 

These undesirable persons, added Csupor, think they are indispensable due to their professional knowledge.\textsuperscript{81} He also accused them of having “secretly sabotaged equipment” since 1945, i.e. they had been allegedly hiding important equipment for years. He mentioned Professor Pál Pete as an example, who “appointed kulaks to the clinics”. The nurses’ behavior was also worrying; the majority were nuns and it also happened that they refused to give blood to help North Korea. Assessing the results of the class struggle, Csupor gave Akulov important data; in May 1952 eight Zionist and 163 students of
kulak family background “were thrown out” [sic!], however they still had 300 students of bourgeois origin.  

Another ideological front was represented by the offensive carried out against the social influence of churches and neo-protestant sects. The arrest of Bishop Aron Márton in 1949 and the launch of the movement of peace priests did not lead to breaking down the Catholic Church, yet the Sumuleu/Csíksomlyó Fair held on Whit Sunday every year remained a severe problem for the authorities. In 1953, for example, the regional Party leadership, having discussed actions against the planned fair, ordered the mobilization of all Hungarian theatres (including the Hungarian theatre in Cluj which was outside the region) and six mobile cinemas with the aim of keeping the masses away from the church function, which was regarded as hostile. As in the Soviet Union, the spread of religious sects and chiliastic movements was an instinctive and irrational response by society to the cultural crisis determined by pressure of totalitarian ideology.

Examining archive documents with regard to exclusions from the Party in 1952–53 gives us an informative picture about the spread of religious sects in the HAR. At every weekly politburo meeting tens of people were excluded from the Party up to the first half of 1953. The reasons were varied, but charges of corruption, sexual immorality or belonging to one of the forbidden sects (Sabbatarian, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals) were the most frequent. The activity of the sects and their social radicalism (for example, the refusal to carry arms and to take part in the collectivization of agriculture) puzzled representatives of local power. It is worth noting that Stalin’s death (5 March 1953) catapulted the spread of anti-system rumors in Romania. Lajos Csupor characterized the situation at the beginning of April to Akulov, the Soviet consul in Cluj: “Hostile activity has strengthened a lot recently, especially on behalf of the Catholic church and the sects. They encourage the peasants not to work, not to give in their produce and not to pay taxes. Jehovah’s Witnesses mean a special problem since they call

---

82 Vostochnaja Evropa, document 318.  
83 ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 70/1953, 2–11 f. The first item on the agenda of the special bureau meeting held on 18 May 1953 was “the discussion of actions against the planned fair”.  
for peace, but accept the defense of peace only without arms and bloodshed. The agents of the sects have conducted this type of hostile activity with some success at the military garrison in Târgu-Mureș. Stalin’s death gave the opportunity for some to announce the upcoming end of communism. A professor at the Medical faculty told his students that Stalin had actually been dead for a long time.\footnote{Vostochnaja Evropa, op. cit. 768 (document 318)}

At a Party meeting a few days later Csupor talked about a characteristic aspect of anti-religious struggle, the traveling exhibitions on the origin of mankind. “In order to combat mysticism 154 meetings and exhibitions have been organized on the origin of man where 8,000 people participated. As a result six remained of the 20 Jehova’s Witnesses in Praid/Parajd, although their number increased from 108 to 140 in Ocna de Jos/Alsósófalva and Ocna de Sus/Felsõsófalva.”\footnote{ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 68/1953, 51–52. f. (Meeting of activists. Lajos Csupor’s report on the Party’s activity from January 1953.)}

As mentioned before, along with religious emotions, continuous nationalist manifestations and rivalry between ethnic groups were also considered dangerous and the authorities tried to break them with all means. Hungarian leaders appointed in July 1952 were aware of the fact, to use Zoltán Szővérfi’s words, “that the nationality issue is the most important question for regional Party organizations, especially here in the HAR.”\footnote{ANDJM, CR PCR Mureș, dos. 69/1953, 127. f. (Minutes of the bureau meeting on 10 April 1953)}

But it was not at all easy to make the HAR and especially its administrative center, Târgu Mureș – a typically provincial, petty-bourgeois “eat-well town” – into a “proletarian city”. Despite all efforts (see, for example, the myth generated around the Géza Simó furniture factory, “the biggest furniture factory in East-Central Europe” where, to intertwine the social and national content of propaganda, almost all workers were Hungarian), reality was bleaker than the press depicted it. A constant shortage of housing proved to be the gravest problem without doubt. According to a 1951 document, and thus before the HAR, 72,000 residence permits were approved mainly as a result of the establishment of Târgu-Mureș as the capital of the Mureș region in 1950.\footnote{ANDJM CR PCR Mureș, dos. 42/195, 12. f. (Activity report of the economic sector of the party’s Regional Committee in the last months of 1951.)} Due to the overcrowding with state and Party offices, in the
mid-50s the locative space *pro capite* fell down at 4.2 m², and forced co-habitation became also part of the everyday life in Târgu-Mureș.  

**CONCLUSION**

The collective memory of Hungarians living in the HAR preserves the years following its establishment as a period of cultural development, however paradoxical it may seem when taking into account the high level of ideological pressure, the massive political reprisals and the extremely low standard of living suffered by most of the population in the first decade of the communist regime.

The role of “cultural ghetto” Moscow attributed to the HAR perhaps offers the most suitable explanation. The Romanian authorities were aware of the fact that a reprisal against Hungarians, at least in the first period, would give rise to the suspicion of oppressing nationalities. The administrative umbrella represented by the HAR made the preservation of a particular kind of Hungarian cultural tradition possible for the local majority.

Universities, newspapers, reviews, folk-dance groups, professional and amateur theatres played an outstanding role in reproducing elites and preserving the Hungarian identity. At the same time, the national forms of “greenhouse” Stalin offered to the Hungarians of Szeklerland should have softened its socialist content: the “little Hungary” represented by HAR should have strengthened the loyalty to the Romanian state. But the population’s enthusiastic reaction to the Hungarian revolution of 1956, which was the first major political test for the region and its leadership after the death of Stalin, displayed all the internal contradictions of the “Hungarian policy” imposed by Stalin on Romania. The coexistence of a Romanian “civic” identity (being a loyal citizen of the Romanian state) and of a Hungarian “cultural” one (feeling part of another community) proved to be an illusion. As a logical consequence, the Romanian communists led by Gheorghiu-Dej, who had never been enthusiastic about the HAR, decided to eliminate this “alien body”, and practically dismantled it in December 1960 by reshaping its borders.

---

89 ANDJM CR PCR Mureș, dos. 114/1955, 12. f.
National Strategies and the Uses of Dichotomy

There is broad consensus among contemporary theorists of nationalism that “nation” always is – or ultimately becomes – both political and cultural. Rather than a useful theoretical typology, the political-cultural dichotomy is better viewed as part of the repertoire of nationalist strategies. Although modern nationalists have understood the importance of forging both political and cultural unity if they desire to create stable institutional paths for perpetuating a nation on a desired territory, one of their prominent strategies has been to emphasize either political or cultural requirements of “nationhood” to accomplish this end.1

Influential theorists of nationalism have provided interesting accounts of the evolution of the concept and practice of nationhood from primarily political in early cases of nation-building to predominantly cultural in late-nationalizing states in Europe.2 There is another side of the political-cultural nationalist strategy, however, that has received less attention in the literature: Change from one set of requirements over another is not linear; shifts can take place from political strategy to cultural and back even in the course of one national history. Depending on the particular conditions under which they act (what their territorial interests are, in what phase they find themselves in creating or consolidating a link between territory and people, and what the international framework allows or encourages at the time), national-

1 Nationalism as a political strategy is inherently linked to the emergence of the modern territorial state. For a comprehensive account of the modernist-primordialist spectrum of theories, see Anthony D. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge, 2001.

2 Perhaps the most influential account of the consequences of this process for the European states’ democratic potentials is Liah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
ist political elites will at times advocate political nation and at other times cultural nation.

A simplified account of Hungarian nationalism, for instance, might be the following: Hungarian political elites pursued a political nation until the second part of the 19th century (although this political nation was by no means civic in the contemporary democratic sense), then in the second part of the same century shifted to a nationalist strategy that pursued a nation based on the idea of cultural homogeneity (although this cultural concept of the nation was rarely ethnic in a narrow sense of the term). The idea of a unitary Hungarian nation in the Carpathian basin, based on shared ethnicity, was prevalent during the interwar period and World War II. After the Soviet takeover in the region, the Hungarian government placed no obvious emphasis on nation-building and limited its scope to the population living within Hungary’s political borders – a strategy that might be viewed as based on the political concept of the nation. Then, the post-communist Hungarian state shifted back to a cultural concept of the nation.

Such simplified accounts, however, veil the essence of nationalism – the one thing that all nationalisms share – i.e. that it always entails contestations over the meaning and boundaries of nation and national homeland. Even under communist one-party rule in Hungary, when political elites appeared to be de-emphasizing nation and liberal dissidents (i.e. the counter-elites) considered themselves to be part of trans-border communities with their intellectual kin in the region, the so-called populist (nape) movement in Hungary participated in a decidedly ethnic process of national reproduction. The participants of this movement (many of them educated urban youth) set out to revive (in some sense even re-live) Hungarian folk traditions and to re-establish links with co-ethnics in neighboring countries, particularly in Romania. Indeed, the “populist-urban” intellectual debate that gained renewed prominence in the latter part of Hungarian communism and continued well into the first years of democratization highlighted key points of contention among Hungary’s cultural elites (many of them in political office, especially in the first parliamentary cycle) about whether nation is an attractive category and, if so, who should belong to the nation and under what terms. After 1990, the most significant change from the communist period was that Hungarian minority elites in neighboring countries could openly join this debate.

---

about the nation. Prominent minority Hungarian leaders began sending strong messages to Budapest that they claimed part of the Hungarian culture and wanted to be included in the new/old Hungarian definition of the nation.

The re-emergence of the vision of a unitary Hungarian nation after decades of sharp political boundaries separating the citizens of Hungary from their kin coupled with aggressive policies of de-nationalization directed at Hungarians especially in Romania and Czechoslovakia raises an intriguing question for nationalist theory: Once modern national institutionalization proceeds long enough to create a sense of common nationhood in a population, can the nation be undone through dramatic institutional changes? If the nation is, as Rogers Brubaker compellingly argues, an “institutionalized form, practical category, contingent event,” does a former nation become a non-nation when the institutions that have perpetuated it change? Was, for instance, the generation of Hungarians in Romania that resented becoming part of Romania after 1918, no longer part of the Hungarian nation after the border change? Was the next generation of Hungarians in Romania that refused to assimilate to the Romanian nation, a non-nation until 1990? Are Hungarians in Romania who favor the current national strategy again part of the nation? Or, will they be “denied” nationhood if the Hungarian institutional process that peaked in the so-called status law fails? Who can answer these questions?

However these questions are addressed, it appears that significant part of the Hungarian population outside of Hungary maintained a concept of shared Hungarian nationhood in the changed institutional structures even during the harshest communist regimes in Romania and Czechoslovakia – perhaps precisely because of the relentlessness of these regimes. Since 1990, consecutive democratic governments of Hungary have followed a consistent trans-sovereign national strategy partly in response to this “popular demand” by critical segments of the Hungarian population inside and outside of Hungary, and partly due to key political leaders’ personal beliefs and commitments. This strategy claims to be based on a cultural concept of nation but is,

---


5 Another example comparable to the Hungarians left outside of post-Trianon Hungary after having participated in a relatively well-established “modern” national process might be the Polish “nation” that survived – according to Polish national accounts – three political partitions.
of course, profoundly political: Its aim is to transcend the current limitations of citizenship and make it possible for Hungarians in the region to live as though there were no political borders separating them. It entails a network of trans-sovereign institutions that link Hungarians in the neighboring countries to Hungary and encourage them to remain Hungarian “in their homeland,” i.e. to withstand assimilation and remain members of the Hungarian nation where they are instead of moving to Hungary. This project envisions the European Union as a supra-national framework that will allow for institutionalized Hungarian cultural reproduction in the region. Continuing tensions between Hungary and its neighbors (including those that aspire for EU membership) over the strategy, however, highlight the difficulties that Hungarian political elites face in trying unilaterally to “virtualize” their borders in a region of states that have little interest in weakening their sovereignty with respect to Hungary.

Beyond the inherent interconnectedness of the cultural-political dimensions of nation-building and the difficulties of mapping the necessary and sufficient institutional forms that nations require to survive, the Hungarian case demonstrates the complexities of nationalism in the new/old Europe and highlights the challenges for nationalism in the era of globalization. Clearly, collective identities are relevant not only in post-communist Europe but throughout the world. Modern collective identities are rooted in the same European political and intellectual history (and just as firmly rooted) as is the ideology of liberal individualism. Modern democracy emerged in Europe through “the exceptionally penetrative sovereign, territorial state.” So long as the principle of territoriality remains influential, it remains the logic of the

6 Zsuzsa Csergõ and James M. Goldgeier: Virtual Nationalism. Foreign Policy, July/August, 2001. 76.
state to create institutions that will preserve its stability and continued cultural ownership over a territory. In other words, the territorial state continues to promote collective national identities, and territorial states will also continue to pitch such identities against each other wherever border changes and other institutional shifts have created sharp incongruences between state borders and mutually claimed cultural spaces (homelands). Such is the case of the “Carpathian basin.”

Nationalism is an inherently constraining (or particularist) ideology, yet—or perhaps precisely because of this—it has tremendous popular appeal in the region. Even if we accept the claim of contemporary “democratic nationalisms” that they provide an institutional framework for the fundamental human desire to reproduce cultures on homelands, nationalism has yet to answer the following question: How can states perpetuate historically and spatially bounded collective cultures in increasingly diverse (multi-ethnic) societies at the same time they are upholding the democratic principles of inclusion, equality, and universal rights and liberties? There is an inherent tension between the aims of particularism and universalism, and the ethnic-civic dichotomy of nations provides no satisfactory solution for resolving it.

The ethnic-civic spectrum does provide at least normative suggestions to those who want to make the nation a potentially more inclusive category. In contrast to more complete political ideologies (such as variants of democratic theory and Marxism), nationalism does not provide a blueprint for a desirable political and economic system. The primary pursuit of nationalism has been to sort out who should belong to which nation on which homeland (and on what basis), and what should happen to those who do not belong. This set of questions continues to constitute the most likely source of nationalist contestation not only in post-communist Europe but also in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Asia. The choices that nationalist elites make in emphasizing one set of requirements for nationhood over another have profound consequences for the democratic potential of the so-called Westphalian nation-state—the state model that remains deeply in-

9 Vladimir Tismaneanu: 

fluential in the contemporary world, despite integrative and global processes that raise questions about its future dominance. Clearly, when the requirement of membership is that one share the nation’s “ethnicity,” it can become rather difficult for aspiring new members (and impossible for people coming from substantively different cultures) to participate in the nation under equal terms. When the primary requirement is shared citizenship, and citizenship means one’s participation in a democratic social contract, the prospects for inclusion and equal participation become much more promising and membership more desirable.

Nonetheless, it is widely accepted among contemporary scholars of nationalism that the ethnic-civic typology of nations is a problematic and misleading simplification. As we find ourselves increasingly surrounded by a discursive framework of globalization, narrower conceptions of ethnicity are losing their appeal in favor of broader definitions that suggest ethnicity “happens” everywhere where human beings engage in various practices of cultural reproduction. There is also broad agreement among students of ethnicity that multiple processes of cultural reproduction (ethnicity) unfold simultaneously in all societies, including inside what used to be considered “ethnic nations.” Meanwhile, what used to be considered textbook cases of “civic nationalism” reveal striking similarities to “ethnic nationalism,” as schools, churches, the media, the military, and various other state and private or public institutions perpetuate unified national canons and mental maps of national homeland even in places like Britain, France and the US – long considered the birthplaces of modern liberal democracy. Therefore, “ethnic nationalism” is either unappealingly exclusive or theoretically “boundless.” “Civic nationalism,” although at first sight theoretically appealing, has too often led to justifications of majority cultural hegemony in the name of a paternalistic state that claims to create an “equal playing field” for socio-economic mobility. (From the perspective of the well-meaning member of the state’s “titular” majority, assimilating to the majority culture is good for minorities.)

On its best days, civic nationalism traces its roots to the ideas of universal liberalism. Even the staunchest defenders of universal liberalism admit, how-

---

ever, that the state (no matter how democratic) cannot be completely neutral on questions of ethnicity, especially on the question of language use – which in the European context is the most significant means of institutionalizing cultural reproduction.\footnote{Brian Barry: \textit{Culture and Equality}. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 107.}

How, then, is it possible to find the right institutions for spacially bounded cultures to allow for multiple processes of cultural reproduction? If “nation” is indeed to become (remain) desirable in a broadening Europe, nationalism must tame the aspiration to collapse multiple identities into one and instead allow for the richness of human experience, including different practices of nationhood within one state. Ethnic neutrality may be an impossible or undesirable goal for any social institution, but the democratic state must uphold (at least on the level of principle) the ideal of toleration that allows for the mutuality of relationship among individuals and groups who participate in multiple processes of cultural reproduction – and simultaneously protect the freedom to opt out of these processes. Any satisfactory answer to the dilemmas of nationalism must embrace mutual respect and toleration as the ultimate goal. Political community must be founded on the value of toleration that allows both for the reproduction of cultural differences and for co-existence in the same state and under the same democratic regime. In Ingrid Creppell’s words, “Toleration essentially implies a continued relationship of some significant level of mutual accommodation. . . . [or] the capacity to hold both conflict and mutuality together at the same time.”\footnote{Ingrid Creppell: Introduction. In Ingrid Creppell: \textit{Toleration and Identity} (forthcoming, Routledge, 2003. 6.)}

The “Carpathian basin” has a great potential for becoming a desirable place if various nationalist elites are willing to face up both to the diverse ways of ethnicity not only among but also within nations that claim mutual homelands. It is also critical for people in the region to acknowledge the darker sides and reclaim the sunnier legacies of common cultural and institutional traditions, including those of the Hungarian kingdom. Non-nationalist intellectuals and cultural elites have perhaps the largest responsibility for seeing that these legacies are reclaimed in such a way that helps national strategies become more compatible.\footnote{A promising example of much needed scholarly debate about these issues is the volume edited by Balázs Trenčsényi et al: \textit{Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies}. Budapest: Regio Books; Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2001.}

\footnotetext[16]{A promising example of much needed scholarly debate about these issues is the volume edited by Balázs Trenčsényi et al: \textit{Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies}. Budapest: Regio Books; Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2001.}
Diaspora and Nationalism: an Anthropological Approach to the International Romani Movement

1. Introduction

Dispersed communities all over the world lumped together by mainstream societies under the label ‘Gypsy’ or ‘Tzigan’ (Cigány), which often called Rom/Roma by themselves, were rarely characterized by insiders or outsiders as a nation. Indeed the diversity of these populations prevents their inclusion into any traditional taxonomy of nations. Common territory, language, history and religion are elements of a definition that could not be forced on Roma communities without excluding large parts of them. A segment of the Roma elite, however, still plans the unification of their people following the model of the nation. For elite leaders the nation, as social formation, seems a viable solution on the one hand to fight against stigmatization and marginalization of their people and on the other hand a way to handle social and cultural problems they face. Beyond the self-perceived interest of the Roma states where Roma live, they also expect solutions to domestic problems by considering Roma as national minorities. At the supra-state level, international bodies, Roma and non-Roma NGOs, are looking forward to solutions to problems of human rights, refugees and migration within the classification of national minorities.

In addition to the endorsement of nationalism and national minorities, alternative political projects are promoted by a variety of Roma and non-Roma actors. Proposals like pan-European minority or transnationalism imagine the future...
ture of the Roma without the implication of nation-building elements. These political enterprises are more sensible to the resources offered by supranational structures and to the process of European integration, although proponents of more traditional projects often contest them.

In this study I would like to present a sketch of international Roma politics, concentrating on recent developments and suggest an anthropological interpretation of the emergence and maintenance of the social formation called “Romani movement”. The example of the Romani movement can offer some theoretical and methodological conclusions that could contribute to better understanding of relations between diaspora and nationalism and could direct the attention of analysts to the role of the institutions at the supra-state level in building and maintaining collective identities.

Although there has been increased attention on Roma related issues in the recent years by social scientists, few studies have been conducted on the international, political tendencies among Romanies. If I could build up a linear account of Roma politics, I would say that in less than 50 years time, the Romani movement passed through a variety of experimental, political projects which took centuries for other political movements all over the world. But the eclecticism of the Roma movement resists any attempt to capture it into such a linear narrative. Different models for political action are often present at the same time in various places, with actors taking and implementing various elements in their strategies from divergent political projects. Nevertheless, I hope to show that there is a tendency towards a more clearly delineated system of political principles and practices responding to the realities of the globalizing world.

I would like to clarify the terms used to speak about this group of people. ‘Gypsy’ is a term used by outsiders, gathering under the same label all Romanies, and is often considered by insiders as offensive, much like the term Tzigan. I will use both, although I use the term ‘Gypsy’ to refer to outsiders’ representation of various groups. To include all groups with a single name, I use the label Romanies, as they prefer to call themselves.

As a means of introduction, I would like to note that I am aware of my position as a Gadjo (non-Roma) but I do not see it as a handicap in this enterprise. In many aspects I am sympathetic with the goals of international Roma politics and I believe this movement has the strength to accept critiques and a variety of differing opinions.

To outline the structure of this study: first I will present my theoretical presuppositions and methodological framework introducing the key con-
cepts. Next, a historical overview of the second half of the twentieth century, followed by various orientations of the movement with emphasis on the developments I consider most important for interpretation of Romani politics. A concluding section closes the study.

2. Theoretical considerations

First, I would like to outline my basic theoretical presuppositions with their methodological implications, and to propose preliminary definitions for the basic concepts that will be instrumental during the analysis. The search for an adequate theoretical context for the Romani movement is difficult due to the diversity and diffuse nature of the phenomena included under the heading of Romani politics. I found few studies that have attempted to analyze the topic, and most are focused on particular areas, therefore, leaving little to base generalizations and the elaboration of a more comprehensive framework upon. Both promoters and critics of the movement have dubbed it ‘nationalism’, yet the adaptation of classical theories of nationalism have seemed unfit, primarily, but not exclusively because of the lack of state or territorial claims.

As an initial term of reference I chose the international nature of the movement. By this internationalism I mean that the Romani movement not only extended internationally as early as the 1970s but also, I would argue, that it should be viewed and understood as an international phenomena, not as something particular to one state or a single group. The different groups are indeed embedded in the realities of the countries they live in, but the institutions and actors involved are spread worldwide and their projects often transgress state borders or continents. In order to follow the phenomena both in local, social and political contexts and on the international scene the theoretical frame and the methodological procedures should encompass sub-national, national and supra-national levels.

2.1. Multi-sited ethnography

My previous studies drove me in the direction of an ethnographically informed understanding of social life. Anthropological theorization has recently turned more towards the study of groups in the context of world history or world system. Following the general, social scientific project of Wallerstein on world-systems Eric Wolf’s work provided an explicitly

---

anthropological version of a world system analysis. In a seminal essay,² George Marcus was arguing for a kind of social research practice, which he calls *multi-sited ethnography*. In the most succinct form the definition of this methodology is an emerging ethnography of the world system. If compared with the concept of ethnography in the world system, the ethnography of the world system or multi-sited ethnography displays several distinctive characteristics. Following his distinctions I will summarize some of these characteristics in order to outline the essence of multi-sited ethnography in comparison to the ethnography in the world system.

The ethnography in the world system usually continues the tradition of classical, anthropological fieldwork focused intensively on a single place. Ethnographic data is then supplemented by other methods such as archival research and adaptation of the work of macrotheorists in order to develop a world system context. In this way the single, on-site observation is interpreted in the framework of a general context. Authors following this model of ethnography built up a valuable part of the anthropological literature. The most adequate terrain for this kind of analysis can be found in colonial and more recent incorporation of peoples into the economic and political macroprocesses.

"This mode has shown that the heart of contemporary ethnographic analysis is not in the reclamation of some previous cultural state or subtle preservation despite changes, but rather in the new cultural forms to which changes in colonial subaltern situations have given rise."³

An important distinction for the ethnography in the world system is the opposition between *subaltern* and *hegemonic* culture. While hegemonic culture is the expression of the dominant social forces, such as colonial powers or world market, the subaltern culture is the ‘voice under domination’, the multiple ways of responses to the process of incorporation from ‘below’. Encounters between these two forces produce encapsulation, resistance, cultural mixture and finally (in the postcolonial discourse) contesting the hegemonic order. In this perspective the emergence of postcolonial discourse is in itself a sign of declining hegemony.

Another opposition in this paradigm is the distinction between the system and lifeworld. The study of the ‘system’ belongs to social sciences engaged in an explanation of economic and political processes with global impact, or

³ Marcus, 96.
at least building up models with purposed explanatory power on the macro level. The ethnographer focuses on the human dimensions of these processes using methods of participation and close observation of everyday life. His observations are informed by knowledge about the ‘system’, but his terrain is more the practice of the everyday life and the ‘lifeworld’ of the actors.

These distinctions in the ethnography of the world system, or multi-sited ethnography, are challenged or at least brought under scrutiny. Instead of utilizing them as instruments of analysis or frame for interpretation, they become the objects of study and the practice of their construction, part of the ethnographical investigation.

“For ethnography this means that the world system is not the theoretically constituted holistic frame which gives context to the contemporary study of peoples or local subjects closely observed by ethnographers, but it becomes, in a piecemeal way, integral to and embedded in discontinuous, multi-sited objects of study.”4

This investigation implies new types of involvement and observation for the ethnographer too. Multi-sited ethnography is not a comparative analysis of different, on-site, ethnographic studies but the ethnography of the relationships between these sites. This relationship should not be studied from a ‘bird’s eye view’ perspective, but from the point of view of the actors located on the different research sites. Therefore, the ethnographer is not a faraway observer who tries to verify his hypotheses with the ‘gathered data’, but he, himself, is constructing the object of study following the relationships, interactions and exchanges of the actors.

Among the different modes of construction of research Marcus lists5 a series of strategies for research design; following the people, following the thing, following the metaphor, the conflict and other dynamic objects of study. Some of these are not entirely unused in previous ethnographies, but in the multi-sited ethnography they form the base of the construction for the object of the study.

2.2. Globalization and Diaspora

From a methodological perspective, as I mentioned above the study of connections between sites develops the vision of the international dimensions of the Roma movement. This procedure requires a reconsideration of

---

4 Marcus, 97.
5 Marcus, 105–110.
the traditional, local-global opposition. From the perspective that starts the investigation from the locally embedded pillars, the endings of the global connections of the global dissolved into the different perspectives of the globalized actors and is then reconstructed as Marcus puts: “[t]he global is an emergent dimension of arguing about the connection among sites in a multi-sited ethnography.”

This approach to global phenomena produces a rather particular perception of globalization and its economical, political, and human consequences. Interaction becomes the core of analysis, and consequently the importance of interconnectedness and agency increases. Although this perspective is refreshing and crucial in its methodological implications I would like to supplement the analysis in two respects. The historical dimension of the connections and the economical processes in the background of previous and present stages could enhance the sensitivity of my interpretation.

The works of another anthropologist, Jonathan Friedman, are concerned with the problems of the recent decline in global hegemony, which according to his interpretation, can be identified in two major processes: the contraction of hegemonic centers and the rise of new geographical areas accompanied by political fragmentation, and increasing economic competition. Friedman includes these processes in a complex global process model of hegemonic expansion and contradiction developed in his earlier book. For the purpose of this study I use only a few elements of his model without challenging his economically based interpretation. I would also like to avoid identifying the problems dealt with here as automatic outcomes of the macroprocesses he discusses. Moreover, some of my findings could serve as basis for refining his suggestions.

In fact his interpretation of the cultural impact of the globalization is rather similar to that implied by Marcus. An additional element that Fried-
man emphasizes is the problem of cosmopolitanism, more precisely its elite-bound nature.

“Globalization is, in fact a process of local transformation, the packing in of global events, products and frameworks into the local. It is not about de-localizing the local but about changing its content, not least in identity terms. A cosmopolitan is not primarily one who constantly travels the world, but one who identifies with it in opposition to his own locality. (...) The true cosmopolitans are as always, members of a privileged elite, and they are not so in objectively cultural terms, if such terms make any sense, but in terms of their practices of identity.”

Elsewhere he develops his critique addressed to the discourse of cultural hybridity in length. I do not want to enter this debate, but to introduce the concept of diaspora, and connect it with the problem of cosmopolitanism. Following the suggestion of James Clifford as regards diasporas I will investigate whether the emerging Roma movement could recover something regarding a particular case of ‘non-Western model of cosmopolitan life’.

Defining diaspora is not an easy task; Clifford dedicates a good part of his study to definitional efforts. I shall review some possible opposition against which diasporas could be defined. According to Clifford “[d]iasporas are caught up and defined against (1) the norms of nation states and (2) indigenous and especially autochthonous claims of “tribal” peoples”. Another distinction which describes the process of diaspora identity formation is from ‘outside’ negatively, by the discrimination of the social environment and from ‘inside’ by the positive identification with world-historical forces, such as ‘Africa’ or ‘China’ or religions like the ‘Judaism’ or ‘Islam’.

Diasporas are usually related to the (im)migration process but in this perspective it is more important that the immigrant communities do not choose to assimilate but rather define themselves in contrast to the nations or ethnic groups they live with. Moreover, in some cases even the assimilated mem-

10 Friedman, Indigenous Struggles …, 397.
13 Clifford, 250.
14 Clifford, 256.
bers of the diaspora may dissimilate as an effect of the ethnification of the diaspora; even established national minorities may choose to foster international or transnational connections instead of reinforcing the loyalty to the nation state where they live. In this respect, diasporization is more dependent on the decline of national hegemonies than on the process of migration.

In spite of its evident subaltern or counter-hegemonic nature the ideologies promoted by diaspora populations inside national hegemonies are not free of ethnicist or even nationalist orientation, though I accept Clifford’s note that the distinction is necessary between “nationalist critical longing, and nostalgic or eschatological visions, from actual nation building – with the help of armies, schools, police, and mass media”. In order to make this distinction, the identification of political and economical forces and the social embeddedness of these ideologies are indispensable. While James Clifford speaks of the need for “awareness of the constant pressures of transnational capital and national hegemonies” Jonathan Friedman formulates his opinion in more deterministic terms:

“The question of the diasporization process is simply the ethnification of transnational connections, so that communication, social relations, and economics become organized across boundaries rather than immigrant groups becoming transformed into separate minorities. Diasporization is simply the ethnification of the immigration process. It is unlike other processes of fragmentation because it structures itself in global terms, being both subnational and transnational.”

Friedman sees in the emergence and consolidation of diaspora identities the sign of declining global hegemony and includes it into his typology of cultural politics and political fragmentation. I take his powerful model as the source of useful distinctions, but I do not see my analysis as an application of his theory. Moreover, I hope to give a more detailed interpretation where as his model would suggest straightforward explanations.

I sought out a variety of sources for the investigation, and attempted to select those approaches that utilize the interpretation of the actors. My sources range from different, self-representations of Roma leaders (interviews, decla-
rations), and political or quasi-political publications (reports, programs, policy papers) of various organizations engaged in Romani issues, to scientific approaches to Roma with analytical or normative purposes. In my analysis I will try to give a contextual, if possible ethnographic, interpretation of these positions and interpret their differences. The ethnographic approach to written texts means not only comparing various documents, the ethnographer must always be aware of the socially embedded nature of the discourses. An analysis of the processes through social reality is constructed through communicational acts is definitely a field for ethnographic investigation. In the meantime, the universe of discourses must be seen as existing somewhere in the foreground and in interaction with political and economical processes.

I see my study of international Roma politics as part of a broader anthropological enterprise. The analysis of political projects prepares the groundwork for a more comprehensive understanding of Roma and the societies in which they live. Therefore, the multi-sited approach should be seen as a larger project to be pursued. I hope this analysis contributes not only to my studies, but studies of others aimed at a better understanding of the problems encountered here, which I believe are not only the problems of the Roma.

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Here I will present an overview of the second half of the twentieth century from the perspective of the Romani movement. Major historical events such as the Nazi genocide of WW II, the Cold War and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe provide the initial frames of the movement. The Romani movement is influenced both from ‘inside’ and ‘outside’: charismatic leaders and cultural or political organizations articulate their projects and visions, mobilizing Roma towards the fulfillment of these political tasks. The societies in which Roma live often treat Roma with discrimination, or pursue persecutive or assimilative policies. The interplay of these forces have and continue to shape the development of the Romani movement.

Developments in particular states such as France, Germany, India and Britain played an important role in the incipient articulation of the political will of the Roma, and therefore, before turning to an analysis of the emergence of the international cooperation of the Romani organizations, their national contexts must be considered. Moreover, the various political projects (national minority rights, Romani civil rights movement, European Minor-
ity, nationalism and transnationalism) are embedded in a particular social and political environment, and the ideological and political divergences should thus be viewed within these contexts. Although, I am more interested in the recent developments of the Romani movement – those of the end of the 1990s – it can hardly be understood without investigating the recent history of emerging political mobilization of the Roma. A short listing of the main events and protagonists of the early 20th century is important in order to exemplify the magnitude and importance of the changes that have been going on since the 1970s, and which accelerated in the last decade. In my review of the early history of Romani movements I rely on historical accounts, but I am aware that the historiography of the movement is part of the debate and contest between different positions.

3.1. The early organizations

Descriptions of the interwar period trace the roots of Romani activism in some Eastern European states as Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. In Romania, in the 1930s local and national organizations were founded and several journals were published by and for Roma; Neamul Tigañesc (1930–34), Glasul Romilor (1933), O Rom. In Poland, Michael Kwiek II, a prominent member of the Polish Roma dynasty, announced in 1934 his idea of creating a Romani state on the banks of the Ganges in India. Later, Janusz Kwiek, crowned on July 4, 1937 as Janos I. King of the Gypsies, before thousands of people, announced his intention to approach Mussolini’s fascist government to allocate for an area between Somalia and Abyssinia for Roma settlement.

The unity imagined and represented from ‘above’, and the call to gather under collective representation, is a long lasting motive of Romani politics. The appealing power of such representation does not depend solely upon the leader, but on the social and political contexts that reinforce or diminish his influence. The role of charismatic persons in the incipient stage of the movement, however, should not be underestimated.

Tragically, the outsider “unified” representation appeared in the most extreme of Nazi racism. As early as 1937 racial scientists like Robert Ritter and


20 Such as Ionel Rotariu. More recently perhaps the activity of Rudko Kawczinsky in Germany is worth mentioning, although he began as a grass-root mobilizer.
Eva Justin proposed decrees against ‘asocials’ which were passed by Himmler. The measures were applauded by professional social and welfare workers. Measures taken against the Roma ranged from sterilization to eradication. About a half a million Roma were killed in the so-called euthanasia programs and concentration camps of WWII. The history of the Gypsy Holocaust or porajmos is still a topic that has been inadequately researched.

After the war in 1959, Ionel Rotariu (a Romanian Gypsy) was acknowledged in France as ‘Vaida Voievod’ the Supreme Chief of the Romani People. Rotariu founded the World Romani Community, and planned Romanestan in Somalia. He also began to print passports for Roma, but in 1965 Charles De Gaulle dissolved the World Romani Community, bringing the idealistic project of the World Romani Community to a halt. In the same year (1965), Vanko Rouda (a Hungarian Lovari Rom) established the International Gypsy Committee, a more pragmatic association. The Committee organized the first World Romani Congress (WRC), near London between 8–12 April 1971.

3.2. The World Romani Congresses and the International Romani Union

World Council of Churches and the Indian government funded the WRC 1. The International Gypsy Committee was renamed to International Rom Committee (Komito Lumniako Romano) because outsider labels such as Gypsy or Tzigan were rejected. Vanko Rouda was reconfirmed as president. Delegates from twenty countries including India attended the Congress. A national flag and anthem were adopted, commissions for social affairs, war crimes, language standardization and culture were established. Present at the conference was Padmashri Weer Rajendra Rishi, an Indian linguist who soon after founded the Indian Institute of Romani Studies, and published, in Punjab, the journal Roma.

The second World Romani Congress was organized in Geneva between 8–11 April 1978. It was marked by the reinforcement of relations and mutual recognition between the Roma and India. Besides symbolic attachment, India expressed its support for the demands of the Roma at the United Nations.

---


22 see Kenrick and Puxon, 150.
The International Rom Committee was renamed International Romani Union (Romano Internationalno Jekhethanibe or Romano Ekhipe) through which it granted consultative status in the person of Jan Cibula, at the UN Social and Economic Commission in 1979. Rishi was elected honorary president of the IRU. He developed a theory about Rajput (warrior caste in the medieval India) origins of the Roma.

Evaluating the decade following the first WRC, Grattan Puxon a non-Roma, member of the IRU presidium writes:

“In Indian commitment has now become a vital factor in our struggle for emancipation. Some mystery continues to surround the caste or tribal origins of Roma within India. In my opinion, while a proper subject for research, it is of no great consequence today whether the ancient ancestors of European Roma were Rajputs or low-caste musicians. As Prof. Jusuf iterates, by language and culture Roma are Indians and that is what matters. But whereas India has long emerged from the tribal level to nationhood, Roma dispersed outside India are only presently overcoming handicaps and seeking national minority recognition.”

This might well summarize the main aspiration of the period. Identification with the ‘mother country’ and fostering ties with it appeared to be the way to unification, or ‘reunification’, as some Roma leaders preferred to say. Unity or jekhipe (oneness) was understood in terms of common origins, language and culture.

In 1981 the German Sinti League in Götingen organized the third World Romani Congress, with the support of the Association for Threatened Peoples. Sait Bali was elected president, Rajko Djuri secretary (both from Yugoslavia), and Romani Rose from West Germany as vice-president. The main topic for discussion was the fate of the Roma under the Nazi regime, and the problems related with reparation demands. Organizations from Germany shared their experiences with the German government and administration. New presidium was elected and the committee was enlarged to include representatives from the twenty-two national states present at the congress.

23 Liegeois, 160.
26 Liegeois, 160.
The fourth, WRC (1990), was symbolically placed in Eastern Europe. It was held in Serock, near Warsaw and was sponsored partially by UNESCO. Participation was even greater than the previous congress, the presidium of national representatives was enlarged again to include members from twenty-eight countries. The new presidium elected showed Eastern European domination: Rajko Djuri (Yugoslavia) president, Emil uka (Czechoslovakia) general secretary, Sait Bali (Yugoslavia), Stanislaw Stankiewicz (Poland), and Viktor Famlusen (Sweden) as vice presidents. Ian Hancock succeeded Jan Cibula in the UN consultative status. In 1997 Hancock also was appointed by Bill Clinton, replacing William Duna in the Holocaust Memorial Council.

Projects such as language standardization and the compilation of an exhaustive Romani encyclopedia remained high priorities on the IRU agenda. The preservation of culture and the unity of the Roma people appeared to go hand by hand. The movement inspired intellectuals, both Roma and non-Roma, with an interest in history, culture and language of Roma. The processes should be viewed in the context of world-wide decolonialization, and hence, the emergence of new nations. The case of Roma in Europe is even more particular because of the ‘reverse colonialism’ in the sense that a decolonializing state, India, was chosen as the mother country for the diaspora by Roma intelligentsia.

During the period of the later two WRC, the IRU expanded and became the umbrella organization for more than forty associations in almost thirty countries, with large number of representatives from national organizations. What was initially Western European based movement became centered in Eastern Europe, where most Roma live. In the meantime, in western countries an alternative way of political mobilization emerged. The Romani civil rights movement, with its roots in the social and historical realities of Western Germany, signals the dawn of new problems and the need for the new responses.


28 Hancock, 148.

29 Ronald Regan as the first member of the Holocaust Memorial Council representing the Roma had appointed William Duna in 1987.
Nicolae Gheorghe and Ian Hancock, two prominent Roma leaders and members of the IRU presidium, were suspended from their functions (almost excluded) due to lobbying activities in 1993 April, at a meeting in Brno.\(^{30}\) In 1999, Ian Hancock published a declaration on the RomNews in which he severed all contacts with the IRU, and his support for the Roma National Congress, a Germany based umbrella organization.\(^{31}\)

### 3.3. The emergence of the Romani civil rights movement

The case of Germany is paradigmatic for the emergence of the Romani civil rights movement. The civil rights movement did not emerge from an intellectual interest in the Roma nation or reunification, but was rather based on a grass-root mobilization in Germany after WW II among Roma and Sinti. The turning point for the movement came in the 80s when institutional and ideological divergences appeared among diverse groups of Roma in Germany.

As Yaron Matras\(^{32}\) pointed out, controversies, which began in the 1980s, polarized over the attitude assumed towards Romani immigrants and refugees. Divergences have their roots in the social history of the Romani movement in Germany. The tension emerged between the position of the established and recognized national minority groups, represented by the ‘Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma’ led by Romani Rose and non-German citizens, new immigrants and asylum seekers embraced by the ‘Rom und Sinti Union’ (later renamed as Roma National Congress) linked with the activity of Rudko Kawczynski.

In Germany, following WW II Roma concentration camp survivors appeared, raising awareness of the extent of the Holocaust and the responsibility of the government to re-integrate and make reparations for the past. Although gaining recognition as victims of Nazi racism and genocide, however, was not an easy process. The claim, that Romanies were persecuted for criminal and vagrant behavior, not because of their ethnicity or race, survived the Nazi regime. In the early 1950s the Bavarian local parliament passed a law

---


\(^{31}\) Hancock, RNN Exclusive: Statement Regarding my Position in the International Romani Union, 1999, [http://www.romnews.com](http://www.romnews.com)

in order to restrict the movement of the vagrants directed against Roma-
nies. 33 Furthermore:

“The postwar German public also shared the authorities’ judgment, consid-
ering the Nazi persecution of the Romanies to be part of the war on crime – an as-
pect regarded as one of the ‘good sides’ of Nazism in wide circles of the Ger-
man public; 44% of the Germans today do believe that Nazism also had its
‘good side.’” 34

Despite these attitudes, claims for Roma recognition and reparation
were developed. The ‘Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma’ (Central Coun-
cil of German Sinti and Roma) was modeled after the ‘Zentralrat der Juden
in Deutschland’ and the Association for Endangered Peoples played an im-
portant role in the institutional establishment of the movement. The Sinti
and Roma challenged the German state and administration with an empha-
sis on elements of continuity with the Nazi past, 35 but chose integration into
the German society based upon the principle of citizenship. The two ele-
ments composed the essence of the national minority approach outlined and
enforced during the decades of the Cold War.

In the period of international polarization and the closure of the commu-
nist block, Yugoslavia and Poland were two relatively open countries allow-
ing Roma to travel and work abroad. After 1973, however, the immigration
for work was restricted in Germany and the possibility for Roma to settle in
the country was reduced to asylum seeking procedures. Roma were rarely re-
garded in Germany as persecuted persons.

In this context the new form of Romani civil rights movements
emerged. And, using the argument of Germany’s responsibility for the Holo-
caust, demanded the right for Roma group right for settlement rather than in-
dividual reparation and financial compensation. Campaigns in Hamburg in
the late 1980s resembled earlier civic disobedience actions. And, as result, spe-
cial regulations were adopted and thousands of people who were threatened
with deportation to Yugoslavia and Poland were granted resident status. 36

33 Margalit, Gilad: Antigypsyism in the Political Culture of the Federal Republic of Germany: A Paral-
lid with Antisemitism? Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism,
34 Margalit, 11.
35 Matras, 55. gives the example of the hunger-strike in Dachau in 1980.
As opposed to national minority claims, the Roma civil rights approach gained terrain by advocating universal human and civic rights, as well as the transnational community of Romanies. From work with refugees emerged the idea of a pan-European minority. The Hamburg based Roma National Congress became the promoter of a militant Roma nationalism understood in these terms. The more traditional leadership, engaged in the national minority approach around the ‘Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma’, was challenged to demonstrate their support for Eastern European Roma.37

3.4. The role of Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism

1989 meant not only the fall of communism in the eastern part of Europe but the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a major reconfiguration of the two-poled world system. The Roma movement faced the new situation with institutional establishments, mostly in Western Europe, a history of political mobilization, and a set of traditions in political projects and visions. Eastern Europe played a role in the majority of these projects; a region where most of the world’s Roma population live, it has both symbolical and practical importance in the development of political ideas and projects. The success of these projects could also be measured by their impact on future of the Eastern European Roma.

On the other hand, the opportunities and limitations of Roma politics are framed by the general political transition of the region. The problems of democratization or nationalization of Eastern European states, and the process of European Union enlargement raise problems that seek solutions for both majorities and minorities (including the Roma) of these states. In addition to reconfiguring political hegemonies, transformation and development impose problems on the welfare and social systems of the region. Roma are among the most disadvantaged groups struck by unemployment and poverty. The fear of a possible mass migration from Eastern Europe to western countries is again and again raised in political forums. In this way the eastern part of the continent is perceived as a source of treat.

The increased awareness of such problems is signaled by important papers published in the second half of the 1990s; in 1995 the Minority Rights

37 Matras, 59.
Group Report, \textsuperscript{38} and in 1997, a policy paper\textsuperscript{39} by the Project on Ethnic Relations. These later developments signal the changing dynamic of Roma political projects and the reshaping of international policies regarding the Roma.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In this study I proposed to give a description of the international Romani politics and to interpret the social and political formation of Romani movement. My theoretical framework and methodology was based on the works of anthropologists such as George Marcus, James Clifford and Jonathan Friedman. Multi-sited ethnography, as outlined by Marcus, aims at developing the ethnography of the world system by analyzing the emerging relationships between different localities. Therefore, the global dimensions of social and political phenomena are brought under scrutiny from the perspective of the locally embedded actors. In this way the world system does not provide a holistic frame for ethnographical research but is in itself the object of study.

Economical macroprocesses, such as the emergence of globalized capitalism, and historical political events, such as the collapse of the two poled political world hegemony give the background for the analysis. They are interpreted from the point of view of the perceptions and effects that can be identified in the discourses and practices of the international Romani movement. The alternative strategies for Romani politics, such as the quest for recognition a national minority, Romani civil rights movement, pan-European minority and transnationalism need to be seen in correlation and interaction of these developments.

I identified two, broadly defined periods of the Romani movement in the 90s. The early years of the decade are marked by a crisis stemming from previous political projects, leading to new problems emerging with the fall of the communism in Eastern Europe. During the first period, issues like language standardization, Romani encyclopedia and reunification\textsuperscript{1} by an emerging high culture were high priorities on the political agenda. Somehow, in contrast yet without rupture, the end of the 1990s can be characterized by a more technical orientation of Romani politics. The role of new elites in the


Economically polarizing world presented problems brought under scrutiny on the stage of Romani politics. Following Jonathan Friedman’s categories, the Roma elite’s position could be partially described as ‘global elite’ or ‘elite diaspora’.40 Friedman assumes that the cosmopolitan elite, that communicates easier among his/her fellows, and identifies more with elite members of similar position, tends to use the discourse of cultural hybridity.41 On the other end of society can be found the low class essentialization, or the ethnicization of poverty. So, according to Friedman the differences in social position appear in the “the contrast between hybrid/creole identifications and essentialisation that is common to lower-class and marginalized populations, as well as what are referred to as ‘redneck’ leaders of ethnic mobilizations.”42

Perhaps this holds true, as when members of different social strata articulate their interests in opposition or competition with each other, but in the debates of the Roma elite there are no signs of normative use of hybridity. Moreover, the emphasis on common identity in the case of the Roma is a strategy of inclusion and integration; the Roma elite search to bridge the gap in social position via discourse. The elite does not stigmatize the strategy of ethnic mobilization, moreover, it is integrated into political projects. A trend in recent efforts, activities and discourses of the new elite can be identified in the endeavor to bridge the economic and social distance by fostering common Romani identity. Consensus, or at least compromise and collaboration between elites with mobilizing potential and the ‘globalized’ but not ‘hybridized’ new elite could be a crucial element of the future of the Romani movement. Both parts have something to offer: the mobilized Roma population can give legitimacy to the new elite, while the elite can transmit local problems and claims to the more general public. This aspect of the Romani movement is characteristic in comparison with other cosmopolitan elite practices that often invest more effort in the discourse of hybridity as opposed to low-class ethnicism as described by Jonathan Friedman.43

The Roma elite is promoting cooperation among the elite and collaboration with international institutions but does not contrast this activity with

41 Friedman, Global Crisis …
42 Friedman, Global Crisis …, 88.
43 Friedman, Global Crisis …
the project of ethnic mobilization in Roma communities. Seeking compromise and consensus with locally effective leaders shows the direction of diaspora ethnicization and a kind of cosmopolitan project. In the new diaspora project the centre of the community has moved from the symbolic homeland of India to European based operational projects. The Indian origin thesis is not abandoned, only balanced by the awareness of centuries in Europe that could make Roma European.
This study aims to present the governmental and political background in Budapest against which the birth of the Status Law can be examined: the circumstances, potential and ideas existing before 1989, the Hungarian nationality policies of the three successive governments of the 1990s, and the system of relations between Hungarian national politics and Hungarian minority politics, which underwent significant changes up to the end of the 1990s.¹

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLITICAL PROCESSES BEFORE 1989

1.1. Hungarian national minority groups living beyond the borders of Hungary constitute minorities created via the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty. According to statistical data from 1910, members of these communities created by force² totaled 3.5 million, while it is now less than 2.5 million. Population loss, which can be interpreted within the framework of parallel nation-building endeavors of Hungary and its neighbors, can be attributed to migration

¹ By Hungarian national politics I mean the politics of a relevant state or government is meant, whereas Hungarian minority politics refers to the political activity of a Hungarian minority living beyond the borders of Hungary.

² In a historical sense, these are communities (created by force) which were excluded from the process of building their own nation through political processes and which, in the subsequent period of 80 years, became committed communities or residual communities in that their minority elite simultaneously produced responses to the nation-building challenges of their motherland and of the majority state where they lived, as well as to the modernization demands of their own society.
to the mother country, assimilation, the Holocaust, as well as a decrease of natural population growth. Following fundamental changes in the 1950s and 1960s, a similarly significant deterioration can be observed in the indices of social statistics and social positions of the Hungarian minority, such as in its ratio within urban population and its level of urbanization, as well as in its level of schooling, and in its occupational structure.

With more extensive opportunities of migration, these trends have become stronger during the past decade. It has turned out that these are not mere consequences of political campaigns, but represent interacting processes causing changes in the structure of society, while intensifying each other’s effects. The number of Hungarians in Slovakia decreased by 46,000 between 1991 and 2000, which can chiefly be attributed to assimilation processes. Only one-tenth of this decrease can be explained by natural population decrease and hidden migration. Yet, in opposition to the situation in Slovakia, the following distribution of factors responsible for a decrease of 193,000 Hungarians living in Romania can be identified: natural population decrease around 40%, migration 50%, changing nationality 10%. Paradoxically, in Yugoslavia population censuses have revealed a lesser degree of population loss among Hungarians (50,000) than forecasted (90,000).


6 A scholarly debate on the causes of ethnic Hungarian population decline was published in Magyar Középből, No. 4. 2002. 3–110.

sive causes here are also natural population decrease and migration, chiefly to Hungary. Quite evidently, these are long-term processes that cannot be addressed by political campaigns or "action plans to save the Hungarian nation" initiated either by the minority community or by the kin-state.

If we consider the functioning of these communities, we can distinguish three sub-types:

a.) Functioning communities of ethnic Hungarians in today’s Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia can only be interpreted within the conceptual framework of diaspora research. Characterized by a growing inability to reproduce themselves, these chiefly rural communities are actually scattered communities, where an aged Hungarian population represents a small minority even within its settlements, often lives in mixed marriages, and uses the majority language even in its everyday public communication.

b.) As a result of changes over the last ten years, migration to Hungary affected the middle and professional classes of the Hungarian minority living in the Ukraine and Yugoslav Voivodina. Ethnic Hungarians in these regions lead their lives in local, rural communities with a thinning professional class of their own. These local communities are becoming increasingly homogeneous; those who have convertible knowledge or skills leave their native soil and an increasing ratio of those who stay live in rural, agrarian communities.

c.) Only in the case of Romania and Slovakia can we speak of minority fractional societies with existing and socially structured systems of institutions. There is a significant difference between the two countries regarding future generations, which is not only a mere statistical issue. There is a sharp difference in terms of social integration. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia is much more integrated, from economic and cultural aspects, into Slovak society than the Hungarian minority in Romania is into Romanian society. This fact can be attributed to the different levels of civic development, and the historical and cultural characteristics of these two countries.

The structure, or sphere, which has been ambitiously termed as the “system of institutions of Hungarian minority” or “minority Hungarian society” for the past ten years, has continually tried to organize itself into some kind of system, if for nothing else, at least for the sake of influencing the distribution of funds coming from Hungary. This network does not operate as merely a virtual organization, but operates in various subsystems. These include: organizations for political interest representation, political parties, positions in local authori-
ties, civil society, independent forums (media) of the minority, cultural institutions and in-
sstitutions producing professional knowledge and know-how, and church institutions. The relations of these six subsystems, or more accurately the relations of the interests of the elites leading them, determine the responsive nature and ca-
pacity for integration and modernization of these communities. As opposed to the majority societies, here there is a definite lack of state institutions, appointment carried out by political elections, and no clear constitutional system of legal relations.

1.2. Hungarian nation politics of the governments in Budapest can be di-
vided into eight periods from the end of World War I to present:

1: from 1918 to 1941 – a period between the two world wars character-
ized by a revisionist view of the future;
2: from 1938 to 1944 – national politics from a majority position during World War II;
3: from 1944 to 1948 – a period characterized by a lack of means to influ-
ence national politics;
4: from 1948 to 1968 – a period of the propaganda of automatic resolu-
tion of the issue based on the principle of internationalism;
5: from 1968 to 1986 – a period of developing the ideology of dual-loy-
alty and of minorities assuming a bridging role;
6: from 1986 to 1992 – attempts in Hungary to handle the problem insti-
tutionally;
7: from 1989 to 1996 – creation of a system of Hungarian institutions be-
ond the borders of Hungary;
8: a period starting in 1996 with the creation of Hungarian Standing Conference (HSC) and continuing with the passing of the Status Law in 2001 and onward – political institutionalization of Hungarian-Hungarian re-
lations and the integration of the system of cultural institutions of the Hun-
garian nation perceived in ethnocultural terms.

Of these sub-systems, the functioning of the sphere of political interest representation is
Between the two world wars Hungarian national politics was determined by the desire for revision, basically a revisionist view of the future. Among various versions, the restoration of historical Hungary was the idea most vocally represented through social organizations. This was the period when the aims of Hungarian national politics showed the least deviation from long-term foreign political objectives, since there was a consensual desire for revision in Hungary and among Hungarians living abroad.

During World War II (from 1938/1940/1941 to 1944), owing to the presence of large nationality groups on the increased territory of the new country, in lieu of Hungarian national politics, we can rather speak of national politics conducted from a majority position. The Hungarian standpoint held before, i.e. that the handling of the minority issue could be implemented through the creation of national autonomies, was removed from the agenda and the emphasis was put on further development of the 1868 Nationality (Minority) Law.9

Period characterized by a lack of means to influence national politics (from 1944 to 1948). During the peace negotiations following the end of World War II Hungary had no political allies to support its endeavors to achieve legal protection for Hungarians living beyond its borders.

Period of the propaganda of automatic resolution of the problem. From the 1950s the political standpoint concerning the cause of Hungarians living beyond the borders was determined by two basic principles. On the one hand, the nationality issue was considered an internal affair of each socialist country, at least according to the internationalist dogma. On the other hand, according to the official phrasing, with the victory of Marxism-Leninism, national conflicts will also be resolved, since they were a reflection of class oppression of the bourgeoisie and the feudal ruling classes.

The rediscovery of the problem took place in the second half of the 1960s, starting from 1964.10 An ideological-political survey of the issue was undertaken in 1968 by the Agitation and Propaganda Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party [MSZMP in Hungarian.

---


10 This process is summarized in Arday, Lajos: Magyarok a szomszédos államokban – külügypolitikák változása [Hungarians in the Neighboring Countries – Changes in our Foreign Policy]. Manuscript, Library of the Teleki László Foundation, Ks. 1992/1040.
ian abbreviation] when it discussed relations maintained with Hungarian literary life abroad.\textsuperscript{11} It was established that “through its traditions and language, this culture is a constituent part of the entire Hungarian culture. For this very reason, with greater care than before, we should cultivate our ties with the culture of Hungarians living in the neighboring socialist countries and we should also feel responsible for the development of these cultures.”\textsuperscript{12} Officially, the ideology of \textit{dual-loyalty} was endorsed: national minorities (national minorities in Hungary and Hungarians living beyond the borders) were seen to be culturally linked to their own national culture and, through their citizenship, to the culture of the country in which they live.

It is hard to separate the process of \textit{institutionalization} from the re-emergence of the problem. A conceivable level of this process was the \textit{institutionalization of scientific research}. In 1968 Hazafias Népfront [Patriotic People’s Front] asked for a comprehensive report on the cultural situation of Hungarians living beyond the borders. In 1972–73 the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party ordered a several thousand-page overview of the cultural relations between Hungary and its neighbors. Then in 1985, as a response to memoranda submitted by intellectuals, the Institute for Hungarology was created to conduct research on Hungarians abroad.

\textit{At the level of party politics} the Political Committee dealt with the issue in 1976.\textsuperscript{13} The unpublicized draft resolution finalized in 1977 acknowledges that the nationality issue is an internal affair of every country, but deviations from Marxist-Leninist norms of national politics can be indicated to the party leadership of the neighboring countries. The document urges an extension of Hungarian–Hungarian relations, with exemplary attention to be paid to the problems of nationalities living in Hungary, and the raising of issues through international channels. Although the document acknowledges that this problem is an internal affair, it acknowledged that “it is also a question of foreign policy for Hungary”.\textsuperscript{14} From this point on, references with increas-

\textsuperscript{11} MSZMP KB Agit. Prop. Biz. ülésé 1968. március 26. [The meeting of the Agitation and Propaganda Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party on 26 March, 1968], Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives], hereinafter abbreviated as MOL, 288. f. 41. csop. 91.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. 2.
\textsuperscript{13} The Political Committee discussed a proposal prepared by Frigyes Puja, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 20 December 1976. Following the discussion, János Berecz, Head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee reworked the proposal dated 20 January 1977. MOL, 288. fond 5. csop. 707. ö. 29–48. f.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 9.
ing frequency were made to Hungarians living in neighboring countries in various forums.

The situation changed in 1986–87 with the publication of the three-volume *History of Transylvania*\(^\text{15}\) The final point of the communicational process was the statement made by Mátyás Szûrös (Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Central Committee of MSZMP) in January 1988: Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary form a part of the Hungarian nation. This statement had a relieving effect primarily among Hungarians living beyond the borders. (This was one of the developments viewed as symbolic in Hungary, but considered as real political acts in the target communities.) The associates of Mátyás Szûrös, Csaba Tabajdi and Imre Szokai, in an article which generated great public interest in February 1988, elaborated that *issues concerning the Hungarian nationality beyond the borders constitute an inescapable part of Hungary’s neighborly relations.*\(^\text{16}\) In fact, following this article the institutionalization of Hungarian national politics started with the creation of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary and the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad (GOHMA). But this already belongs to the seventh period, when, after 1989, a Hungarian system of institutions was gradually created and by the mid-1990s two things had become clear: a) there were no partners in the political elites of the majority nations for the implementation of national autonomies envisioned in a consocial model; and b) the system of minority institutions couldn’t be sustained from the resources of the Hungarian minority alone. The eighth period in Hungarian national politics is definitely marked by the strategic steps taken by the governments in Budapest in relation to these two problems.

2. HUNGARIAN NATIONAL POLITICS OF GOVERNMENTS IN BUDAPEST AFTER 1989

2.1. Before comparing the Hungarian national politics of the Antall, Horn and Orbán governments,\(^\text{17}\) I address the following question: What are

---


\(^{17}\) In this topic I rely on two fundamental studies: Tóth, Judit: Az elmúlt évtized díszpórápolitikája [The diaspora-politics of the past decade] In Sík, Endre – Tóth, Judit *Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad: a Historical Outline* 127
the generally accepted basic principles of Hungarian national politics in Hungary that have been shaped since 1989?

For the past decade a consensus has been reached among Hungarian political parties at least on a theoretical level concerning some of the issues of Hungarian national politics. One may say that, as concerns the issue of European integration, this issue has “apparently” enjoyed the widest agreement among political parties. The common view of the parties can be summarized as follows:

a) It is not the location of the borders, but their quality that must be changed. Only MIÉP (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life) has taken an ambiguous stand in this respect. If we take a closer look, however, it comes to light that standpoints also differ in relation to issues of granting employment opportunities, permanent residence and visas for ethnic Hungarians.

b) Hungarian minorities of the neighboring countries are entitled to have their independent system of cultural institutions in the countries where they live. There is also a basic understanding among the parties that cultural autonomy could be the framework for this. But as regards the path leading to this autonomy, opinions differ in Hungary, as they do they among elite groups beyond the borders. There are groups that expect autonomy on the basis of “natural law”, whereas others believe it is feasible only through continual, step-by-step building of institutions.

c) The principle of treating the representatives of Hungarian political life beyond the borders as equal partners. The implementation of this principle is very difficult. This is partly because the political weight of the partners is not equal – a politician of the Hungarian minority beyond the borders frequently finds himself or herself in a position of asking for help in or from Hungary.

d) The interest representation of the Hungarian minorities beyond the borders in international forums is always the task of the actual Hungarian government on the basis of international legal norms. Regarding this issue, Hungarian politicians behave as if Hungary has already been provided with a protective power status through the basic agreements reached between Hungary and its neighbors. However, this has not been recognized so far by other, non-bilateral, agreements.

e) The support of Hungarians living abroad is an integral part of the actual state budget of Hungary and the structure of public foundations on a continuous basis. There

---

is no consensus, however, in this respect and a serious debate has not yet been started upon the decision-making mechanisms regarding the distribution of funds, strategic target programmes and monitoring of utilization.

2.2. Hungarian national politics of the Hungarian governments

2.2.1. The Hungarian national politics of the Antall government (1990–94) was fundamentally determined by two factors. On the one hand, a place had to be found for the problem in governmental work and an appropriate institutional framework had to be constructed. On the other hand, this government had to bluntly face the trio of priority issues for Hungarian foreign policy: Euro-Atlantic integration, relations with neighboring countries, and Hungarian national politics – and achieve a delicate balance among them. The Hungarian national politics of the Antall government may be summarized in three goals: a) Based on international human rights and minority protection norms, assume the task of diplomatic protection of the Hungarian minorities. b) Based on west European examples, create a central European model that will set an example for handling the minority issue. This endeavor determined the concept of minority law in Hungary: instead of recognizing cultural and language rights for the individual, they created a system of minority self-governance.\textsuperscript{18} Simultaneously, the Hungarian parties abroad developed their concepts of autonomy and co-nation status.\textsuperscript{19} c) The third decisive factor was what later became known as the Antall doctrine: No decisions can be made about issues of Hungarian national politics concerning Hungarians living abroad without hearing and considering their own opinion.\textsuperscript{20}

2.2.2. From the outset, the Horn government (1994–98) did not consider handling the cause of Hungarians living beyond the borders as a historic and national mission, but instead based its rhetoric on constitutional and per-


\textsuperscript{20} This, naturally, did not constitute a right of veto.
sonal responsibility. As opposed to the good-intentioned and ambitious initiatives of the Antall government, which often failed to take the facts of international reality into full consideration, the Horn government’s Hungarian national politics were characterized by an endeavor to be concrete and pragmatic. The most characteristic features of their politics were the following: a) Due to competition in relation to European integration and tense relations with neighboring countries, issues concerning Hungarians living abroad couldn’t – even seemingly – endanger the stability of the region. Thus, this issue was placed in the sphere of interest of foreign policy and subordinated priorities of integration. b) These were the circumstances under which the basic agreements with Slovakia and Romania were signed. These involved obligatory steps, which did not significantly influence the political situation of Hungarians abroad. Nevertheless, they freed Hungarian foreign policy from the danger of being labeled as one “endangering stability”.

2.2.3. In order to understand the Hungarian national politics of the Orbán government (1998–2002), we must consider two features that differed from those of the previous governments. On the one hand, the geopolitical weight of Hungary changed in the region in the second half of the 1990s due to the use of the Tászár Military Base by US soldiers and Hungary’s joining NATO. On the other hand, FIDESZ politicians had not been socialized (and specialized) in handling conflict, as opposed to the older intellectual-politician generation, which had been socialized in the struggles within the party apparatus and in the fight for reform during the 1970s and 1980s. Since the debate on the Hungarian-Romanian basic agreement, in which Viktor Orbán integrated the political Right by directing public discourse at history and at the future and leaving the Left, whose thinking remained on the level of practical techniques and actions, at a loss for an answer, FIDESZ has relied on and also benefited from its skills in showing a vision of the future.

21 This government regarded Hungarians living abroad primarily as a disadvantaged group, and only secondarily did it consider them as “part of the Hungarian nation”.

22 A detailed summary of this dilemma and the foundation of the concept of modernization and economic support are given in Lábody, László: A határon túli magyarság és a gazdasági együttműködés [Hungarians living beyond the borders and economic cooperation] Társadalmi Szemle No. 11, 1993. 67–73.

out from this, I characterize the Hungarian national politics of the Orbán government by the following: a) As opposed to the traditional approach of Hungarian foreign policy based on “realistic” policy-making within the system of relations existing between great powers, and relying on connections with certain, strong international factors, this government represented a "constructivist" view, according to which conditions are in a state of constant change, and in which Hungary must actively participate. The government’s pivotal point was the most efficient representation possible of national interests, both in the process of European integration and in regional relations. b) FIDESZ regarded the problems of Hungarians abroad not as a burden, but as a natural fact. This issue was regarded by the party as one of the core issues, and also a successful one as such, because the Left was at a loss in terms of a proper response.

3. PRELIMINARIES AND FOCAL POINTS CONCERNING THE DEBATE ON THE STATUS LAW

In this section I would like to clarify the situation of Hungarian minority and regional politics from which the concept of the Status Law derived, and to survey the decisive elements of the debate about the law.

3.1. Strategic orientation in the mid-1990s: by 1994–95 it had become clear in all the four countries where Hungarian minority organizations had developed a concept of autonomy that they could not be implemented in the short run. The majority political classes unambiguously rejected these demands. It seemed evident for the minority political elites that they should abandon their permanent, symbolic actions in favor of autonomy in order to prevent provoking further propaganda campaigns hostile to minorities. They would have had to face the national propaganda machineries and governmental apparatuses of Mrčiar, Iliescu and Milošević without enjoying the support of the opposition of the respective countries, not to mention those of Hungary.

The concept of co-nation was further developed by Miklós Duray (Slovakia – Hungarian Coalition Party) and Csaba Lőrincz (an expert of FIDESZ) in order to implement national integration involving a systematic approach to nationality policy. Csaba Lőrincz’s starting point was based on the necessity

24 The party apparatus of FIDESZ involved the greatest number of persons coming or descending from beyond the borders or having personal relations with Hungarians living beyond the borders.
of a possible legal notion, which would embrace the Hungarian minority living in a given country. In order to facilitate the granting of the Schengen visa, he proposed an organization, the membership of which might provide such positive discrimination.\(^{25}\) In 1996 Viktor Orbán asked the government to support the autonomy concepts of the Hungarian minorities and their involvement with a right of veto in preparing international agreements that might affect them. Orbán wanted to tie Hungary’s support of neighboring countries, in terms of their joining the European Union and NATO, to improving the situation of Hungarians beyond the borders.\(^{26}\) This is where we can find the roots of HSC. This is also closely related to the concept of co-nation, which grew out of autonomy plans. The laws required for this, however, must be drafted by legislation in Hungary.

They envisioned national autonomy not as being represented by a one-off legal act, but as social self-building. In political practice they wanted to gain support from the newly developing sphere of Hungarian entrepreneurs living beyond the borders, and church personalities playing a decisive role in providing social care. Nevertheless, the support of the “politics of the basic agreements” was at least as important. During the debate on the Status Law, Tamás Bauer and János Kis highlighted this element as an alternative strategy to be followed as opposed to the Status Law concept.\(^{27}\) This strategy aimed to handle the situation of the Hungarian minority in a given country by exerting pressure through the minority mixed committees to be established as a result of the basic agreements.

In the second half of the 1990s, after the signing of the Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian basic agreements, significant changes occurred in Hungarian national politics of neighboring countries as election results and European integration began to assume priority positions. A discriminative political approach was replaced by integrative Hungarian national politics. The practice of integrating Hungarian minority elites seemed to prevail in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and Serbia. On the other side of the


\(^{27}\) Kis, János: A kisebbségi kérdés az új világrendben. [The Minority question in the new world order]. Beszélő, No. 4, 2002.
process Hungarian minority Hungarian minority parties joining coalition governments or granting their external support to the governing party represented political elites.28

3.2. In the mid-1990s, in parallel with the narrowing of practical opportunities regarding the future of Hungarian minorities, new relations developed in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and national interest representation in the Carpathian Basin. In the second half of the 1990s, after the signing of the basic agreements, as a result of NATO membership and the upswing of its economy, Hungary’s weight significantly grew in the region. This was the second time in its 20th-century history that Hungary arrived at a position of initiative from the point of view of enforcing its national interests,29 given that it had become a member of a military alliance embracing Europe and, at the same time, one of the most promising candidates of a political alliance. In this situation, the FIDESZ government, pursuing its own concept of nationality policy (in particular with the Status Law) took up a pro-active position, as opposed to the re-active neighborhood-policy practiced so far in the form of crisis management.

In the meantime, minority protection and national autonomy, accepted as a future project, also underwent significant conceptual changes. After 1989, until the signing of the basic contracts, both majority and minority politicians renewed the trend of thinking mainly in terms of a legal and security-policy framework. In the debates and programmes of the second half of the 1990s, the socio-political side of minority protection prevailed. This is also quite evident from the path-finding concepts mentioned above, which were meant to give simultaneous answers to the questions of integration into the motherland and into the home country, and to the organization of the minority’s own society.

Below I examine the debates about the Status Law from this aspect.

3.3. Concerning the Status Law, the debate focused on concepts, the impact of the law and the techniques of its implementation.


29 The first such situation developed in the second half of the 1930s. It led to the first and second Vienna Awards and Hungary’s commitment to Germany.
The concept was developed gradually over years, but became a central issue of public discourse only from 2000. Between 1996 and 1998, the establishment of Autonómia Tanács [Autonomy Council] for the institutionalization of Hungarian-Hungarian relations and a concept developed for handling the Schengen problem emerged in connection with utilizing the increased relative geopolitical weight of Hungary in the wake of its NATO integration. At the same time, developing the institutionalization of Hungarian-Hungarian relations appeared in the ideas of Miklós Duray and in those of the MVSZ (World Organization of Hungarians), which had worked out a concept of external citizenship and represented it in the legislative process. In the debates following the announcement of the Status Law (on 31 October, 1999), one of the conceptional aspects of argumentation was the granting of status or favorable treatment. Should the law grant a special new legal status or should it grant favors to Hungarian minorities? In 2000/2001 the ideas of national reintegration and “contractual nation” replacing the concept of “mosaic nation” were published but never publicly debated.

In FIDESZ politics, as represented by Zsolt Németh, the communication of unity within the programme of the “reunification of the nation” was in the foreground (instead of the development of stability within the nation, as urged by minority politicians: an image of a multi-centered nation). In

30 A Polgári Magyarországért [For a Civic Hungary]. In Lőrincz, Csaba et all.: Nemzetpolitika ’88-’98.
31 Lőrincz, Csaba: Nemzeti érdekek érvényesítése Magyarország csatlakozása során az euó-atlanti államok közösségéhez [Representation of national interests in the process of Hungary’s joining the community of Euro-Atlantic states]. Manuscript, TLA Kv. 2379/98.
32 Duray, Miklós: Az egyetlen demokratikus kibontakozási lehetőség az önkormányzatok megerősödése [Strong local authorities as the only opportunity for democratic development]. In Változások közölőn, 185–201.
34 Report of MTI (Hungarian News Agency) about Viktor Orbán’s press conference.
35 The term “mosaic nation” comes from Sándor Csóri. The term “contractual nation” was the title of a presentation held by Zsolt Németh at the third HSC meeting, but in reality this was an evaluation of the situation of foreign politics. The essence of the concept was summarized in the above-cited writing of Borbély and by the article Szarka, László: Szerződéses nemzet [Contractual nation]. Magyar Nemzet, 20 November 1999. In more detail by the same author: Mozakkemzertből szerződéses nemzet [Contractual nation from mosaic nation]. Európai Utas, No. 36, 1999. 76–78.
this sequence of debates on the internal concept, the idea of systematizing the existing legal framework into a strategically well-considered structure emerged, but had no political support.37

Regarding the social effect of the law on Hungarian minorities, the focus of attention was whether the law would increase or decrease the migration of Hungarians from the neighboring countries. Debates on international effects dealt with the relations of the European Union and Hungary, or, more accurately, the process of integration, as well as the changes in neighborhood policy. An over-discussed problem of the latter was whether there had or had not been any preliminary agreement.38 As opposed to this, the key issue was how effectively Hungarian foreign policy was able to represent its interests under the new European conditions. In this respect a Euronationalist standpoint clashed with a standpoint representing the norms of a united Europe.39 The discussion about the effects of the law in Hungary raised a demand for a deeper rethinking of the concept of nation (ethnocultural community vs. political community).40 On the other hand, the future image creation of the

39 The former standpoint sees Euro-Atlantic integration as a more efficient implementation of national interests, whereas the other puts the emphasis on taking over Western values facilitating modernization.
Hungarian political Right could be dealt with through the debate about the Status Law.\footnote{Borbély, Zsolt Attila: A státustörvény mint a magyar (re)integráció eszköze [The Status Law as a means of Hungarian (re)integration]. \textit{Provincia}, No. 5, 2001.}

3.4. After indicating the focal points of the debate, three \textit{basic dilemmas} must be highlighted.

The theoretically most exciting part of the issue constitutes a group of \textit{approaches to the concept of nation-state}. It was Tamás Bauer, who most markedly represented the standpoint that Hungarians living beyond the borders, being citizens of other countries, form a part of these countries’ political communities. The Status Law may interrupt this process of integration. As opposed to this view, Zoltán Kántor, Béla Bíró and others argued that Hungarian minorities had not participated in Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, Ukrainian, Croatian and Slovenian nation-building and, in spite of being integrated politically, they remained outsiders in these endeavors. In reality, this standpoint represents the future image strategy of the “beyond the borders” political life of the 1990s, which considered the Hungarian minority a separate political community and a supporting pillar. Bauer was right in saying that the level of integration is a key issue within a given country. This does not depend on the Status Law, but on potential paths of social mobility within a given society and on the price to be paid for taking them. From this point of view, the situation is entirely different in Slovenia and Slovakia as opposed to that in Romania and the Ukraine, where „paying attention to Budapest” is of great importance. The Status Law can be interpreted in the context of this process as introducing the national aspect to culture and identity of existence.

As a response to the assumption that the Status Law reflects a step backward to ethnic communities existing before the modern state, Zoltán Kántor, Miklós Bakk, George Schöpflin and Brigid Fowler elaborated the notion that the Status Law represented a step beyond the concept of nation state: a post-modern statehood as opposed to a Westphalia statehood, and a diversity of regions and cultures in a united Europe as opposed to a European Union of nation states.\footnote{See the articles of the authors published in \textit{Magyar Kisebbség}, No. 1, 2002, as well as Schöpflin, György: A magyar státustörvény: politikai, kulturális és szociológiai kontextusok [The Hungarian Status Law: political, cultural and sociological contexts] In Kántor, Zoltán (ed.): A státustörvény: Előzmények és következmények, 9–17.} If we separate the concept of Status Law from the political, public discourse surrounding it, then Bauer is right in saying that, as
a result of the Status Law, an ethnicity-centered concept of nation has been consolidated as opposed to a citizenship-centered one.

Here we can observe the presence of a non-repeated professional view from the autonomy/co-nation debates of the 1990s: from a Hungarian viewpoint, the concept of a Slovak, Romanian and Serbian nation-state was considered as ethnocratic, as opposed to the west European concept of nation-state, which developed from an absolutist state model through a process of democratization. In the former, the emphasis is on ethnocracy and state-building nationalism, whereas in the latter structure it is on citizens comprising the nation, who enjoy equal rights and assume responsibility for domestic conditions. The latter is a state with civic values, and the creation of a co-national relationship could serve its establishment by pushing the ethnocratic elements of the given central European state formations into the background.

This debate deriving from different viewpoints can also be conceived as a debate between an approach regarding the nation as permanent and as one with a distinct boundary (describable with a political and cultural system of concepts) and a view rooted in nation-building and nationalism (as endeavors to enforce national interests). In addition, the representatives of the latter view interpret the activities of the Hungarian elites beyond the borders as part of minority nation-building. Paradoxically, politicians and government experts arguing for the Status Law ignored this view, although it was supportive of the law. And, similarly to the law’s critics, they interpreted (unitary) nation as a concrete and permanent reality and did not put the accent on nationalism as a diverse and colorful system of integration of forms of national existence. They happened to neglect the Hungarian results of studies on nationalism over the past ten years. Zoltán Kántor, Miklós Bakk and George Schöpflin, who played an important role in the debate, could not convince the participants to utilize these results. In other words, such attempts failed to create a modern conceptual (and professional political) framework around the text of the law. There was no political acceptance for this.

3.5. In the course of the law’s preparation, the government compared the Hungarian initiative of laying of professional foundations for the law to similar laws of other countries. With this they considered the matter done. There was no professional discourse on a wider scale involving diaspora migration, which is regarded as a worldwide phenomenon, or the Westphalian vs. post-modern state model in the context of the European Union. No professional conferences were held during the elaboration of the law, where, if not amendments, but at least a system of arguments could have been worked out to control the course of the debate from Hungary. Domestic professional meetings were only held after the phrasing of the text of the law, in which only lower-rank representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GOHMA participated. Conciliation around the law were started by a group with little experience in public administration and no experience in law codification, thus there was no such leading expert personality who could have resisted actual (party) political ideas (thereby defending professional efficiency).

Domestic legal analyses of the text of the law (in studies by Balázs Majtényi and Judit Tóth) also prove that in all decisive issues, political logic gained the upper hand over professional logic. This professional preparation made it clear that the “cause of the nation” is rooted in socially given situations and, therefore, it is a function of actual political wills today in Budapest.

---

44 Not even the rather poor English translation of the law was consulted with experts doing research on national minorities and nationalism.
The Electoral Success of Dominant Parties Representing the Hungarian Minority in Romania and Slovakia

1. Introduction

This paper attempts to offer an institutional account of the electoral success of ethno-regionalist parties. Hence, it presents the preliminary results of a comprehensive project dealing with factors favoring the formation of ethno-regionalist parties and the determinants explaining their electoral, office-holding and policy success. Ethnic politics acquired salience in the previous decade(s), both in Western and in Central Eastern Europe, hence, making it a promising topic for research. Furthermore, from the party analyst’s perspective, in spite of quite an impressive geographical spread and enduring historical presence in various party systems,1 this approach, the three concepts capturing the ethno-regionalist parties’ impact and a taxonomy of determinants, was first put forward in Lieven De Winter: Conclusion: a comparative analysis of the electoral, office and policy success of ethnoregionalist parties. In Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsans (eds.): Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. Rutledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science. London & New York: Rutledge, 1998. 204–247

insufficient attention has been devoted—until recently—to ethnically based parties.

In this article, however, I will focus solely on the dominant parties claiming to represent the interests of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia. This study is meant to be a plausibility probe3 regarding a possible hypothesis for further research. The preliminary findings could help refine or amend the initial hypotheses in order to conduct a well-grounded, full-fledged analysis of all post-Communist countries bordering Hungary and featuring Hungarian minorities (Croatia, Romania, Serbia–Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine). This case selection presents two advantages. On the one hand, the countries under scrutiny have been analyzed to a lesser extent, and on the other, the ethnic groups chosen allow a quasi-experimental research design entailing the control of certain variables that shape the cultural outlook of the groups in question.

In order to provide a (partial) institutional explanation concerning the electoral success of ethno-regionalist parties, I will examine how the institutions making up the political participation dimension4 of the political system affect the share of legislative power which minorities, or more precisely, dominant political parties claiming to represent them, can capture on the national level. The argument is structured into three parts. The first part is dedicated to theoretical and methodological issues. Its first section elaborates a definition of ethno-regionalist parties in order to delimit the universe of political actors, which must be considered in a larger context. Its second section identifies the systemic variables expected to influence the electoral fate of a party rep-

---


representing an ethnic/national minority. In the second part of the paper, the available empirical data are presented and analyzed, while the last part tries to formulate some conclusions banking on the findings of the previous one.

2. CONCEPTS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. The notion of ethno-regionalist party

The classification of parties into party families takes into account three sets of characteristics: (i) the ‘genetic’ origin of parties, that is, the conditions under which they initially mobilized and the interests they claim to represent, (ii) their links across national frontiers, that is, their membership in party federations or institutionalized multinational political groups, and (iii) the policies they tend to pursue.5 For the theorist who coined the term, ‘regional and ethnic parties’ constitute one of the families he identified.6

Ethnic parties have been considered for a long time, at best, marginal aspects of political life and, thus, neglected as candidates for systematic research. Perhaps this explains the absence of a standard expression that refers to these parties, or put differently, the embarras de riches in what concerns the technical terms used for labeling them. In what follows, I will briefly illustrate this lack of terminological consensus. Instead of using Beyme’s expression, Gallagher, Laver and Mair speak of ‘regionalist and nationalist parties’, but consider them a residual group lending with their classification some credence to my previous claim.7 Ferdinand Müller–Rommel defines eight ‘small party families’ among which we find ‘regionalists and nationalists’ advocating the interests of various minority groups8, while Daniel-Louis Seiler writes about ‘autonomist parties’.9 One may encounter the expressions ‘eth-

---

7 Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, op. cit. 182.
nic party’, ‘ethnically based party’\textsuperscript{10} or ‘ethnopolitical party’,\textsuperscript{11} as well. Most contributors to a relatively recent publication on the topic\textsuperscript{12} prefer to use the generic term ‘ethno-regionalist parties’, which I readily borrow. The reasons for doing so are the following: first, this attribute of the notion ‘party’ covers two important aspects of contemporary politics on which the demands voiced by these parties rest, i.e., ethnicity and regionalism; and second, other adjectives (nationalist, autonomist etc.) reflect – most probably – only differences in degree with regard to the character of these demands.\textsuperscript{13}

Nevertheless, both the multitude of terms and the need for an encompassing one testify to the confusing diversity of the (ethno-)regionalist group. For this reason, Derek Urwin wrote, more than two decades ago, that ‘conceptual exactitude’ should be sacrificed at the expense of an exhaustive, even eclectic, account. Hence, in line with what has been until recently the trend in party system literature, he mainly concerned himself with measuring and explaining regional patterns in electoral returns.\textsuperscript{14} From this perspective, it sufficed to delimit the universe of actors included in the analysis without devoting special attention to definitional matters. One should distinguish, however, between regional parties, i.e., parties exhibiting a regional concentration of electoral support without appealing to distinctive regional or ethnic identities, and genuinely ethno-regionalist parties, i.e., parties appealing to an ethno-regional constituency by voicing ethno-regionalist demands.

Under these circumstances, one can easily understand why Ferdinand Müller–Rommel argued that the most pressing tasks are the formulation of an empirical definition and the elaboration of a framework of analysis.\textsuperscript{15} I will focus now on the first problem, as it is instrumental to delimiting the uni-

\textsuperscript{12} Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan (eds.), op. cit.
\textsuperscript{13} The fact that international conferences and workshops are nowadays devoted exclusively to these parties proves their increased importance and the legitimacy of their conceptualisation as a distinct (and maybe new) party family, as I also try to suggest.
\textsuperscript{15} Ferdinand Müller–Rommel: Ethnoregionalist parties in Western Europe: theoretical considerations and framework of analysis. In Lieven De Winter and Huri Türsan (eds.), op. cit. 18.
verse of ethno-regionalist parties, both in Europe in general, and in Central (Eastern) as well as South-Eastern Europe in particular.

Three issues complicate the definitional task regarding ethno-regionalist parties. First, some regionally concentrated organizations either act as pressure groups or—in spite of claiming to be parties—refuse to participate in elections as a protest against what they consider an illegitimate authority. In contrast, there are several organizations presenting candidates at national, regional, local and even European elections in order to obtain a share of power as a means of achieving policy goals. Second, there are parties, which defend the interests of their potential supporters by demanding the allocation of certain resources to the (in-)group, and parties, which claim that other groups (namely, the out-groups considered by them ‘alien to the nation’) should be prevented from enjoying certain rights and resources. Finally, ethno-regionalist demands—going as far as overtly espoused secession—are often combined with the advocacy of specific socio-economic policies. This makes it rather complicated to identify the primary goals of such a party, i.e., whether it should be categorized as ethno-regionalist or not.

One way to achieve conceptual exactitude—including all elements of the category in question while excluding all elements that do not belong to it—is using a minimal definition of ethno-regionalist parties. The definition should be minimal in a twofold sense: by placing a minimum requirement both on ‘partyness’ and on ethno-regionalist character. Throughout this paper, I will consider the ability to elect candidates to representative bodies as an indicator of electoral success, not of partyness. The sole indicator of partyness will be the willingness to compete in elections as a means of acceding to office (and being able to share in the exercise of policy-making power). Furthermore, ethno-regionalist character will be defined as a primary policy concern re-

---

16 This behaviour has been an enduring feature of the parties representing the Catholic community of Northern Ireland, namely the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin (SF). Their policy was either to boycott regional elections or refuse to take up the seats they have won in the Northern Ireland Assembly or the UK House of Commons. See Alan Day et al. (eds.): Political Parties of the World. 4th edition. London: Cartermill Publishing, 1996. 611–612. With regard to my complete set of cases, it must not be overlooked that the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina boycotted the elections held in Serbia during the last weekend of 2003.

17 The xenophobic Lega Nord seems to be a good example for the second type of behaviour.

18 The latter two problems are also mentioned by Ferdinand Müller–Rommel, op. cit. 19.

garding the expression, recognition and protection of a distinct, ascriptive cultural identity and of the ensuing interests shared by the ascriptive minority group, including the accentuated development of the region inhabited by the groups’ members. Thus, I treat the peripheral position and geographical concentration of minorities as being variables rather than definitional criteria, even if most minorities exhibit both characteristics. The reason for this is the fact that geographical concentration (or ethnic demography) is a matter of degree and affects the electoral success of these parties. More importantly, I do not use the official party name as an indicator of ethno-regionalist character. Doing so could be misleading: there are some parties that include ethno-regional references in their names, but do not necessarily advocate ethno-regional interests and policies, and vice versa.

For this research, the units of analysis – i.e., the organizations that according to the criteria outlined above qualify both as parties and exhibit ethno-regionalist traits – are the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania [Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség/RMDSZ/]; as well as the ‘Coexistence Political Movement’ [Együttélés Politikai Mozgalom/E/], the Hungarian Christian–Democratic Movement [Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom/MKDM/], the Hungarian Civic Party [Magyar Polgári Párt/MPP/] (formerly Independent Hungarian Initiative – Független Magyar Kezdeményezés/FMK/), the Hungarian People’s Party [Magyar Néppárt/MNP/] and the Hungarian Coalition Party [Magyar Koalició Pártja/MKP/] which resulted from the fusion of E, MKDM and MPP in 1998, in Slovakia. It must be stressed that while the RMDSZ emerges clearly as the dominant, or even hegemonic, party claiming to represent the Hungarians in Romania, ethnic Hungarian parties in Slovakia show a more variegated pattern of intra-ethnic political competition marked by a ‘dominant coalition’ forged for each separate election prior to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and the formation of the stable ‘Hungarian Coalition’ after 1994.

20 For other definitions see, for example, Ferdinand Müller–Rommel, op. cit. 18–19. and Jan Erik Lane and Svante Ersson: Politics and Society in Western Europe. London: Sage Publications, 1991. 104.

21 Apart from these parties, the Hungarian People’s Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity [Magyar Népi Mozgalom a Megbékélésért és Jólétért/MNMMJ/] contested elections in Slovakia in 1998, while three parties of the Hungarian minority in Romania also ran in elections: the Independent Hungarian Party [Független Magyar Párt/FMP/] in 1990, the Hungarian Free Democratic Party of Romania [Romániai Magyar Szabaddemokrata Párt/RMSZDP/] (in 1996 and 2000) and the Forum of the Székler Youth [Székely Ifjak Fóruma/SZIF/] in 1996.
2.2. Analytical Framework

This paper operationalizes electoral success as a specific form of institutional power, namely legislative influence, and examines the conditions under which national/ethnic minorities can earn a share in it. Two qualifications are necessary. First, electoral success of an ethno-regionalist party can be interpreted in various ways. It may mean the sheer national vote share garnered by the party in question or ‘the proportion of the targeted electorate, [i.e., the population of a region or an ethnic group]’ casting their votes for the party.22 More sophisticated indicators based on electoral strength have been suggested by Jorge P. Gordin and Derek Urwin, respectively. The first scholar compares the vote share obtained by the ethno-regionalist party to the vote share of the region’s largest party,23 while the second computes a hypothetical vote share estimating the proportion of votes a party would obtain if its electoral support were evenly distributed across the country, thus controlling for party size and the population of regions alike.24 These measures all construe electoral success as mobilization of support. My suggestion is to concentrate on the legislative seat share obtained by the parties in question, as in this manner their possible political impact may also be assessed. The explanation is straightforward: legislative strength can be used both in coalition bargaining and for putting forward or blocking policy proposals.

Second, the specific sets of conditions that will be dealt with here pertain to the participation dimension of the political system. For the purpose of the present paper, the most salient systemic variables that ceteris paribus determine the chances of an ethno-regionalist party to be electorally successful are the nature of the electoral system used for electing the (lower chamber of) parliament25 and the format of the party system – operationalized best as the effective num-

22 The second, more appropriate operationalisation, has been proposed in Lieven de Winter, op. cit. 211.
25 I use this convention for the sake of comparability.
ber of legislative parties. Ceteris paribus refers mainly to factors intrinsic to the ethnic party and the nominal group, as well as to various influences from outside the national polity.

Three further observations must be made in order to spell out the hypothesized relationship between these two variables and the dependent variable. First, since ethno-regionalist parties – according to a conventional approach – tend to be small parties, they have better chances in more fragmented party systems. However, the electoral system seems to be the most important institutional element affecting the electoral fortunes of parties in general. It provides incentives to voters to support or refrain from supporting certain parties and, finally, transforms vote shares into legislative seat shares. Hence the second observation, that ethno-regionalist parties, again by virtue of their apparent smallness, are expected to fare better in systems with a higher degree of proportionality, as voters will not fear 'wasting' their votes on them, nor will the transformational mechanics of the system severely punish them. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that such a hypothesis may be warranted. Finally, one must not exclude the joint effect of the party system and the electoral system, bearing in mind the relationship between the two. As a rule, a two-way relationship is noticeable:

\[ \epsilon = \frac{1}{(\sum p_i)^2}, \]

where \( N \) stands for the 'real' (arithmetic) number of legislative parties in the system, while \( p_i \) for the seat share of party \( i \).

---


27 Ferdinand Müller–Rommel: Small Parties in Comparative Perspective: The State of the Art. p. 4. and Peter Mair: The Electoral Universe of Small Parties in Postwar Western Europe. pp. 44, 46–48, 60. (Both in Ferdinand Müller–Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), op. cit.) In spite of the momentary adoption of this ‘definition’, I do not wish to accredit or accept – once and for all – the idea that ethno-regionalist parties are small parties, or even worse, equate one concept with the other. Suffice, for the moment that the framework of analysis, which can be built on the basis of various contributions to the volume referred to in this note, might prove to be very useful for studying ethno-regionalist parties simply by virtue of the fact that they tend to operate under similar systemic circumstances with small parties.

28 These are the so called psychological and mechanical effects of electoral systems discovered decades ago by Duverger. Maurice Duverger: Political Parties. Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen, 1964.

29 For instance, Peter Mair tested and proved such a hypothesis for small parties in general, op. cit. 54. (He used, however, not the measure of electoral system disproportionality that will be employed here.)
the electoral system shapes the party system, but the parties themselves may sometimes engineer changes in the electoral system, too. Nevertheless, the effect of the electoral system on the party system tends to be stronger than its converse in long-established democracies, whereas in new democracies the party system has a stronger impact on the electoral system than the other way around. This is attributable to a lesser extent to the phenomenon of institutionalization, which makes party system development somewhat independent of changes in the electoral system, and to a larger degree to the processes of bargaining and negotiation in which actors are involved in the early phases of constitution-making, up until the point where the main institutions of the political system become entrenched. As Kitschelt argued, one might conceive of this period as being characterized by an institution-free environment in which institutions are endogenous to party competition. Actors, or more precisely parties, choose or design institutions in accordance with their interests, beliefs and expectations regarding the probable outcomes of democratic competition.30

Based on the above arguments, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

\( (H) \) The chances of ethno-regionalist parties to obtain higher seat shares in national elections increases with the proportionality of the electoral systems and with party system fragmentation.

The independent variables mentioned above (and the underlying concepts) are central to Arend Lijphart’s seminal analyses concerning the distribution of power under different political systems and party systems. Consequently, for purposes of measurement, I rather extensively refer to his work on democracies.31 Lijphart’s encompassing study on electoral systems in democracies characterizes them through a set of four primary variables (the electoral formula, electoral thresholds, district magnitude and assembly size) and four secondary variables (ballot structure, malapportionment, apparentement and presidentialism).32 However, the most comprehensive electoral system indicator,

which also suits the purposes of the present paper and which will be used as the primary electoral system variable, is Michael Gallagher’s (least squares) index of disproportionality. Two arguments can be offered in support of this approach. First, the proposed measure tends to point to or mirror the electoral formula, the most salient electoral system variable, without over- or understating its proportionality. Second, on the basis of what has been previously said, this variable is expected to have quite a large impact on the electoral fortunes of ethno-regionalist parties and to be rather robust as well.

The following analysis linking the electoral success of ethno–regionalist parties to party and electoral system features should be carried out both in time— making diachronic/longitudinal comparisons by taking ‘snapshots’ of the political systems—and over time (by averaging the ‘snapshots’) in order to grasp the general trend of change. Such a combined approach assures the validity of synchronic/cross-national comparisons, and facilitates longitudinal within-country analyses through multiplying the data points.

3. OVERVIEW OF DATA AND FINDINGS

Since 1989 four legislative elections have been held in Romania: in 1990, in 1992, in 1996 and in 2000. This yields four snapshots and three averages regarding the country’s political system, provided that one does not consider the first (two-year) period as its own average and counts it twice. Over the same period, five national elections have been held in Slovakia: in 1990, in 1992, in 1996, in 2000 and in 2004.


\[
LSI_i = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{v=1}^{N} (v - \bar{s})^2}
\]

where \(N\) stands for the ‘real’ (arithmetic) number of electoral parties in the system, \(v\) for the vote share garnered by party \(i\), and \(s\) for the seat share allocated to party \(i\).

34 Arend Lijphart, op. cit. 157–158. and Table 8.2. p. 62.

35 Other electoral system variables might also have some direct impact on parties’ electoral shares. Arguably, the legal and the effective threshold, the size of the assembly and the (effective) district magnitude are the most crucial dimensions in this respect. The first two act as barriers to the accession of ethno-regionalist parties to legislative power, whereas the latter ones might help them, since their increase makes the electoral system more proportional. Nevertheless, all these effects are captured by Gallagher’s index of disproportionality. Furthermore, secondary electoral system variables, as the ballot structure, various possibilities of apparentement, and to some extent presidentialism might also play a role.

36 I borrow this distinction between temporary state and trend from Sartori. See Giovanni Sartori, op. cit. 347.
1992, in 1994, in 1998 and in 2002. Moreover, on the first two occasions state-level elections were organized simultaneously with the Czechoslovak federal ones. Since national legislative elections are considered first-order elections – that is, the most important ones – both in unitary and federal states, while state-wide elections in federal countries are deemed almost equally salient, I will treat all these competitions as the same kind of elections. Hence, seven snapshots and six averages are obtained for Slovakia. (However, only three of the latter are Sartorian ‘over time’ averages, the first two being computed by considering simultaneous federal and state-level elections.)

The relevant data for assessing the electoral strength of Hungarian ethno-regionalist parties in the two countries and for computing the indicators used as independent variables are official electoral statistics compiled by the research fellows of the Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe project of the University of Essex. The computations carried out on the basis of this dataset, yielded the values synthesized in Tables 1 and 2 for the independent and dependent variables. (Figures representing averages are boldfaced).

Table 1 – The electoral performance of the DAHR as a function of the Romanian electoral and party system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality index (LSIG)</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties (Es)</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proportion of lower house seats (S) obtained by the DAHR (%)</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 Data available at [http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexElections.asp]. (Last accessed on the 18th of January 2004.)
a) I discounted the political organizations of national minorities which gained representation in the assembly as a result of ‘positive discrimination’ and the ones which failed to obtain a seat because another organization representing the same ethnic group already secured at least one seat, too. Furthermore, independent candidates were also eliminated from computations in order to work with ‘sufficiently disaggregated data’ on unrepresented contestants – a recommendation made by Gallagher (op. cit. 48.).

b) The seat shares possessed by various parties and the effective number of parties were again calculated by neglecting the national minorities, which obtained a seat each as a result of ‘positive discrimination’. (This is a more realistic assumption than considering the parliamentary group of these national minorities a unitary actor similar to the ones formed by mainstream parties.)

Table 2 – The electoral performance of the ‘dominant coalition’ of Hungarians in Slovakia as a function of the (Czecho)Slovak electoral and party system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LSIG</th>
<th>Es (%)</th>
<th>S(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–1992b</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–1992c</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1992f</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1992h</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1992i</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1992j</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1994l</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1994m</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) These figures were computed on the basis of data concerning the Slovak National Council, the parliament of the Slovak part of the federation.
b) These figures were computed on the basis of data concerning the Slovak Section of the Federal Assembly’s lower chamber, the Chamber of Nations.
c) Common list presented by the Coexistence Political Movement and the Hungarian Christian–Democratic Movement.
d) Common list presented by the Coexistence Political Movement, the Hungarian Christian–Democratic Movement and the Hungarian People’s Party.
e) Hungarian Coalition (common list presented by the Coexistence Political Movement, the Hungarian Christian–Democratic Movement and the Hungarian Civic Party).
f) Hungarian Coalition Party.

In order to test hypothesis (H), I conducted correlation–regression analyses lumping together the data on both countries. First, I tested each part of
hypothesis (H) separately, assessing the impact of electoral system proportionality and party system fragmentation in isolation from each other. Then, I proceeded with multivariate regression. Each test was conducted twice: first, on the raw data excluding the averages, and second, considering all averages and thus multiplying the available data points.

On the one hand, the Pearson correlation coefficient between electoral system proportionality and the success of ethnic Hungarian parties was a low 0.123. However, even this weak relationship was not statistically significant (at the 0.1 level). (Considering ‘over time’ averages, the coefficient increased to 0.220, the significance improved, too, but still did not attain the 0.1 level.) On the other hand, party system fragmentation showed a strong and statistically significant correlation with the electoral success of these parties ($R = 0.720, R^2 = 0.518$ and $\text{Sig} = 0.006$) when only the raw data were plugged into the equation. (After including the ‘manufactured’ data points, both $R$ and $R^2$ increased to 0.725 and 0.525, respectively, and the relationship became significant on the 0.001 level.) The trivariate analysis yielded the following estimate with the initial data:

$$S(\%) = 4.111 + 0.099 \text{LSI}_c + 1.177 E_s, \quad (1)$$

where $R^2 = 0.557$ and the only statistically significant coefficient is the one pertaining to party system fragmentation ($\text{Sig} = 0.014$). (All coefficients in equation /1/ are unstandardised.) Adding the ‘artificial’ data points the prediction changed to:

$$S(\%) = 3.367 + 0.146 \text{LSI}_c + 1.275 E_s, \quad (1')$$

with an $R^2 = 0.612$ (61.2% explained variance), all the coefficients being statistically significant: the constant and the coefficient of electoral system disproportionality on the 0.1 level and the coefficient of party system fragmentation on the 0.001 level. (The coefficients in equation /1'/ are again unstandardised.)

4. INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings seem to suggest that contrary to previous theoretical expectations the electoral system, or at least its disproportionality as captured by Gallagher’s least squares index, plays little influence on the seat shares obtained by Hungarian ethno-regionalist parties in Romania and Slovakia.
However, the fragmentation of these party systems is the institutional feature that provides them with fair chances to compete successfully. This situation may have various methodological and substantive explanations. From a methodological point of view, the multiplication technique employed in the analysis showed that if more complete time series or perhaps data on more countries featuring Hungarian minorities were available, the trivariate model would probably gain in validity. Another methodological complication is the meaning of the ‘comprehensive’ least squares index. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Gallagher himself, disproportionality is usually affected by other electoral system dimensions (such as thresholds, district magnitude and malapportionment as well), not to mention the fact that the distribution of votes (and seats) among parties is also influential. Thus, the second independent variable may have an effect on the first one.

From a substantive point of view, the complications regarding the possible entanglement of the model’s independent variables can be solved in two ways. One can, rather inelegantly, explain them away by repeating what has been said at the end of section 2.2. (Analytical Framework), namely, that in new democracies, party systems tend to develop relatively independently from the electoral system. Nonetheless, a more rewarding avenue of investigation would entail rephrasing the explanation as to allow the separate consideration of salient electoral system dimensions (e.g., the formula, the legal threshold, the district magnitude and malapportionment) as self-standing independent variables.

Still, another substantive point needs to be mentioned. This relates to the rather deceptive than apparent smallness of Hungarian ethno-regionalist parties in Romania and Slovakia. Both the Romanian and the Slovak party systems are at best intermediate, if not small party systems, because small parties polling less than 15% of the national vote each, on aggregate, almost always outperform large parties, i.e., parties that usually pass the 15% threshold. Moreover, in Slovakia only the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) [Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko/HZDS/] qualifies as a large party, whereas in Romania the Social Democratic Party [Partidul Social Democrat/PSD/] (the party that was once the National Salvation Front – Frontul Salvării Naționale/FSN/), the Democratic Convention of Romania [Convenția Democrată Română/CDR/] and perhaps more recently the Greater Romania Party [Partidul

39 Michael Gallagher, op. cit. 43.
România Mare /PRM/ could count as large parties. Taking into account these patterns of competition and concentration of power, it comes as no surprise that ethnic Hungarian parties capture the lowest share of legislative power when party system fragmentation is lowest, and the highest share when fragmentation peaks – thus converting their absolute smallness, an apparent disadvantage, into an advantage, a comparatively large size. This is also in line with the second part of hypothesis (H). What remains to be seen is whether the hypothesis receives stronger empirical support when electoral system dimensions are treated as separate variables.

In retrospect, the plausibility probe of hypothesis (H) may be deemed useful. It yielded two theoretically interesting conclusions, which may even be generalized later, unless, rather misfortunately, the cases examined here prove to be atypical or outliers. The first, namely, that ethnic parties – especially in new democracies – may be comparatively salient and ethnic minorities can control important power resources is amenable to testing on more complete datasets – certainly a task ahead. The second, the new avenue of theorizing on the impact of the electoral system on the ethno-regionalist parties’ success should be explored perhaps simultaneously with the comprehensive tests on the political influence of this (new) party family.

---

40 I borrowed this classification of parties and party systems from Peter Mair, op. cit. 44., 46–48.
I wish to begin my presentation with a frequently voiced assertion that sounds like a cliché – namely, communism is a ‘past that inhabits our present’. The paradox underlying this apparent cliché derives from a seemingly irresolvable contradiction: How could the yesterday inhabit our lives today, when it is the past precisely because it is no longer present? Of course it is on the basis of our expectations for the future that we today evoke our memories of the past. As the wheels of memory turn, a bridge thus forms not only between past and present, but one arises also between present and future, and, consequently, between past and future.

Jan Assmann distinguishes between two forms of collective memory. He refers to memory that has solidified in the form of myths, traditions, or historical narratives as cultural memory; and to the more malleable form, in which the communities that remember themselves lived through the past events, as communicative memory. The memory of communism in Eastern Europe is therefore mostly communicative. This has several consequences.

First, a culture does not intrinsically possess communicative memory. To the contrary, it is exactly the evoking of the past, as a social act, that creates the culture of remembrance associated with the event(s) in question. This process is, then, a culture-producing social activity. Secondly, it evokes the primary experiences of the larger part of the remembering community; which is to say, this community remembers past events in which it partici-

pated. In contrast with cultural memory – in which convention and knowledge validate a memory – in the case of communicative memory a paramount role is accorded the **witness**. Since however everyone remembers only certain portions or details of the communist era, those that impacted their own lives, the third singular characteristic of communicative remembrance is its **segmented** nature. As written by Reinhart Koselleck: the primary experience is always fragmentary and impossible to convey as a single experience, and every later “process of condensation” is secondary. For this reason, segmented remembering gives rise to mutually competitive narratives.

A contradiction

The measure of credibility is determined by our own sense of justice as derived from our experiences and by the social and political discourses. The writing of history and the politics of history account for the bulk of the latter. At the time the wheels of communicative memory are turning, we have in our possession no coherent, condensed narrative of communism. Consequently the political sphere may have more room to manoeuvre, becoming something of a writer, a scholar of history itself. In the quasi history that emerges, credibility is determined primarily by political utility.

Our segmented memory further muddles up the criterion of **credibility**. To remember in cultural terms means that we are capable – independent of our own experiences – of judging whether past events are real or unreal, whether one-time decisions were appropriate and fair or inappropriate and unfair, and what’s more, to view such events and decisions from a distance, absent of all moral content. In terms of communicative memory this would mean the following: despite our own dispersed and fragmentary experiences, we would be capable of accepting not only that other people possess fundamentally different experiences but perhaps that our own experiences, when viewed from our present-day perspective, are unpleasant and difficult to bear. In communicative memory, however, our own experiences, including our one-time suffering or joy, necessarily find their way onto one side of the scale; and it is with all this that we measure the experience of others.

The communicative memory of communism is therefore a protected discourse, I mean, protected from abuse, because the witnesses are many; which precludes the possibility of anyone telling any kind of story they well

---

please. And yet it is unprotected; for it has yet to be fortified all around by social conventions and by historians' narratives. Both the witnesses and the narratives are at the mercy of the whims of the politics of history.

And a dilemma

What does – what can – a witness remember? In his 1968 novel The Joke, Milan Kundera wrote, “I see a moving walkway (which represents time) and a man (who represents me) running in the direction opposite to the direction the walkway takes; but the walkway moves faster than I and therefore gradually bears me away from the goal I am running to reach; that goal (odd goal, situated in the wrong direction!) is a past of political trials, of auditoria where hands go up, of fear, of penal battalions and Lucie, a past which still has me under its spell, which I am still trying to decipher, unravel, and which still prevents me from living as a man should live, facing forward.”

Kundera struggles between the need to remember and the affirmation of life. According to him, the ruinous and indecipherable, impossible-to-unravel but elusive past hinders us from living our lives “facing forward.”

The answer would appear to be: better then to forget the past. But there are various ways of forgetting, too. Citing Nietzsche and Freud, Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between passive and active forgetting. Passive forgetting involves suppressing past memories and trauma into the subconscious, a process that carries the risk of these traumas reviving; that which is suppressed returns. Active forgetting is by contrast based on the processing of experiences and trauma: we can forget these memories because we are already ‘beyond’ them.

But is the only way out of this dilemma really through forgetting? Kundera wrote The Joke in 1968, in an era that had already left behind the heinous crimes of Stalinism but which had remained a ‘soft’ dictatorship – a dictatorship that had made these crimes taboo, which banned their remembrance. To this day Hungarian society has managed neither to process its experiences of socialist era nor to heal the wounds it suffered in those decades. While the revolution in 1989 did undo earlier taboos, the Hungarian Vergangenheitsbewältigung was left incomplete in most cases, not least as con-

---

cerned the nation’s experience of World Wars I and II, the Holocaust, and 1956; or rather, the politics of transition petered out with ill-matched, sometimes ignominious gestures aimed at restitution. At the same time, the decommunisation discourse of the political transition straightway divided Hungarian society into perpetrators and victims and offered a ready-made model whereby, with a few exceptions, we were all victims of communism.

A wideranging public debate that might have ripened our relationship to our nation’s socialist past was not to be. Instead, the cagey atmosphere of that era seemed in one important sense to prevail, as public discourse concerning secret information, for example concerning just who had or hadn’t been a „secret agent” during communism, appeared to be firmly in the control of narrow and less than transparent political interest groups.

In 2002, not long after the national elections led to the fall of the center-right government with the victory of a socialist-liberal coalition, it finally became clear that the discourse on decommunization was only part of a ‘now you see it, now you don’t’ sort of game – a game in which the newly elected prime minister, Péter Medgyessy, appeared as some sort of socialist James Bond from the 1970s. Hungarian society by and large reacted with indifference when even he admitted (after his election) that he had been a ‘secret agent’ during the socialist era.

From all this it seems as if Hungarian society has more or less forgotten socialism, and what’s more, by way of passive forgetting. Not so with the politics of memory, which from the start strove to create lieux de mémoire for the past.7

Nostalgia and the thirst for revenge – ironic and cynical remembering

Politics has numerous tools at its disposal to spur society to remember the past. Political gestures can be made, laws can be passed, educational programs can be initiated, memorials and museums can be built. What follows is a brief analysis of two government-sponsored initiatives at ‘musealization’, which shed light on two different forms of rememering.


Museum exhibits concerning the socialist era generally focus on narratives crafted by scholars or by visual artists. Not only do they convey knowledge but they can also awaken emotions in the visitor: they can calm them or incite them, make them cry or make them laugh. A successful museum can be the venue in which the process, the work of memory begins: visitors can evoke their own experiences in connection with what they see.

The Statue Park

In Hungary, the musealization of the socialist era got underway early on, in 1989. Indeed it happened, humorously enough, with the removal of the visible traces of the communist era – namely, with the decommunization of the street. Concern over spontaneous public initiatives to topple communist statues – initiatives that had a disconcerting air of mob rule to them – led political players to institutionalize the issue. While the majority of public opinion favoured leaving such statues in place, the fear of political violence resulted in the official removal of the statues, or, plainly put, the organized and restrained toppling of statues.

So it was that the idea of having a ‘statue park’ came into being. The park was finally opened in 1993, on the outskirts of Budapest, (as part of a huge – and later abandoned – effort the Hungarian government had undertaken to prepare for a world expo in Budapest in 1998). The choice of venue reflected a desire both to localize or marginalize the past and to marketize it (by rendering it into a quasi outdoor market – a market that, situated as it was within easy access of a major motorway, was aimed essentially at Western tourists).

No sooner does the visitor enter than he or she is greeted by a famous Hungarian poem by Gyula Illyés, “A Sentence on Tyranny,” making it implacably clear (as per one of the poem’s most memorable lines): “You yourself are tyranny.” The razor-thin ‘Scenes Wall’ practically falls upon the visitor: this crude, monumental brick wall serves simultaneously to distance him or her from the recent past (as if we were walking among thousand-year-old ruins or in a cemetery) and inspires terror owing to its vast proportions. And yet it is also ludicrous for the fact that there is nothing behind it: this is but a potemkin wall. The statues, having been removed from their original places, also have a double effect: on the one hand they seem much bigger and

---

more frightening on the ground in the relatively open space of the park; and on the other, they seem comical, locked up together this way.

Notwithstanding that the park also suggests the depths of hell, it is shaped in the form of a flower meant to represent the antithesis of tyranny. Its fundamental motif is a walk along that theme central to the long decades under the government of János Kádár, “the path of socialism.” The paths dictated by the statues and the park’s overall arrangement do not compose a chronological timeline, however. Instead, by presenting the history of the Hungarian workers’ movement and of Stalinism according to topic, the park does its part to reorganise collective knowledge away from a chronological perspective. By completely ignoring the long decades under Kádár, this new narrative resolutely distances the visitor from the nation’s relatively recent past. The recent past is ‘written’ in the Statue Park as a history not present at all among us; the park doesn’t assimilate our own life histories, our collective experiences of socialism. Thus it encourages the psychological distancing, the subconscious suppression, of the Kádár era. At the same time, the thematic arrangement emphasises Hungary’s connection to the international
workers’ movement and its later oppression by the Soviet Union, thus offering the visitor a relatively presentable picture of the socialist era – that is, one that posits Hungary as martyr.

To paraphrase the comments of those who dreamed up the idea of the Statue Park, “There is nothing, absolutely nothing, funny about this park.” To this Kundera would surely retort, “[L]aughter … has something malicious about it (things suddenly turning out different from what they pretended to be), but to some extent also a beneficent relief (things are less weighty than they appeared to be, letting us live more freely, no longer oppressing us with their austere seriousness).” Nonetheless, the Statue Park as experienced to this day by tens of thousands of visitors annually turned out to be funny: it has become the scene of irony-laden excursions at the end of which we can acquire the ‘last breath’ of communism, or rather, a CD featuring the ‘Best Songs of Communism’.

An ironic posture by no means suggests passivity or forgetting. In the words of Richard Rorty, "ironists" – those capable of irony, that is – "face up to the contingency of [their] own most central beliefs and desires."\(^{10}\) Indeed, laughter requires a sort of distance: the recognition that what only yesterday was frightening is today a source of humour. Perhaps it was the park's formal opening in the summer of 1993 that established the fundamental mood of its visitors. Indeed, the ceremony was modelled on a celebrated 1969 movie, "The Witness," that classic parody of Hungary's own Stalinist era of the 1950s; indeed, the ceremony was choreographed by none other than Péter Bacsó, the film's director. The caricaturing of tyranny, ironic remembrance, requires an active process of remembering.

The same goes for the objects that can be brought in the Statue Park's souvenir shop. As Ina Merkel mentioned, nostalgia is likewise a type of active remembrance, if not quite as contemplative as ironic remembrance.\(^{11}\) The relics of socialism first had to become *trash* in a symbolic sense, so that following their musealization they could become ennobled as cultic objects. Every station can be a step in evoking and processing the past.

In short: the Statue Park emerged from the collision of a medley of (somewhat overlapping) interests that all favoured its establishment. There were of course those who desired a radical shift away from state socialism and thus wanted all the era's statues toppled outright. And then there were

---


museologists who wanted to archive and exhibit. The park’s planners meanwhile wanted to convey a ‘serious’ message, the artists behind the opening ceremony aimed for irony, and the park’s operators had their eye on profit. Fortunately, all these interests were more or less realised – opening the door to a unique form of remembering the past: ironic remembrance or nostalgia.

The House of Terror

Almost ten years later, in 2002, another institution dedicated to reminding its visitors of the communist era opened its doors in Budapest. This was preceded, in 1998, by the election of a governing coalition led by the centrist-right party, the FIDESZ. Due to this shift political discourse became anticommunist again. By then Hungarian society had by and large completely forgotten the message of the Statue Park (again to quote from Illyés’s seminal poem): “[E]veryone is a link in the chain.” Calls sounded for the establishment of a ‘museum of communism’ – and these calls could, at least in theory, rest on the justifiable public need to display the heinous crimes of that era and to establish an honourable memorial to the victims of the red terror.

The ‘Hungarian House of Terror’, as this museum came to be known, aimed however to convey a more complex message to the general public. By linking the reign of terror carried out under Hungary’s brand of national socialism, or fascism, with the subsequent terror experienced under communism, this museum drew an equal sign between the two regimes and, what’s more, established a continuity between the two brands of terror. With this it aligned itself with that controversial, revisionist school of historical thought which regards the human devastation wreaked by these two types of dictatorship, and the regimes themselves, as of essentially the same nature. The underlying aim of such revisionism is to question the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and to make communism seem like Nazism, communists seem like Nazis. Moreover, this tendency suggests that the perpetrators and the vic-
tims were the same under both dictatorships. In the case of the House of Terror, this relativist interpretation of the Holocaust is further suggested by the structure and proportions of the venue: the crimes of Hungary’s fascist Arrow Cross are depicted in one room only.

Since the history of communism is depicted only in part, the exhibit can hardly be called comprehensive. Not that this was the aim. As the museum director herself has publicly declared, the institution aims to display terror in all its sensational aspects,12 to invite visitors to a historical ‘happening’.

For this, the institution’s planners conceived of an exhibit that profoundly calls into question the venue’s very nature as a museum. Strikingly few objects are on display, and only some of these are authentic; most are either of ambiguous origin or have been thrown together from disparate parts: props for the ‘happening’. The exhibit doesn’t so much as provide an accurate history of the building itself, which in 1944 was the headquarters of the Arrow Cross and later, under communism, served the same purpose for the notorious ÁVH, or the State Security Office.

The exhibit was formally opened in front of the building, on the Andrássy avenue, by the then prime minister, Viktor Orbán. The crowd included quite a few supporters of the extreme right wing – in particular, of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (known by its acronym, MIÉP) – who’d ar-

---
rived directly from a protest they had staged in front of the Socialist Party headquarters. This served to endow the ceremony with a further shade of meaning; for one thing, the suggestion that the communist terror is still present in our lives today; for another, the notion that the House of Terror is the child of both the political right and the extreme right – in other words, that these two political groups in Hungary can be a cohesive force.

The House of Terror thus creates a historical narrative that paints a picture of Hungarians as the victims of both Nazism and communism. In this narrative the communist terror persists well beyond the actual fall of communism – if not to this very day. And it communicates this message in a rather aggressive manner: the visitor cannot wander about the House of Terror at will; there are only group tours. Part and parcel of the ‘happening’ is a spectacular show that emphasises exceptionally loud sound effects. It is no surprise that many have come to refer to the House of Terror, which in Hungarian is Terror háza, with the witty and rhyming appellation Terror pláza (Terror Plaza) – a big shopping mall. No information is provided about the documents on display; not least, about their sources of origin. Flyers available in the individual rooms provide terse summaries on the given topic; and while they might be
well-balanced kernels of fact (which they often are not), by more or less taking their rightful place in the canon of texts positing Hungarians as victims, and in associated relativist discourse, the overall picture is one of falsehood. In the words of Peter Sloterdijk, this is the working of a cynical mind.\textsuperscript{13}

The exhibit awakens in many visitors a thirst for revenge. Often I’ve stood in front of the House of Terror in line with others waiting to go in, and among them no few were readying themselves even at the entrance to finally let loose inside and get down to really hating those communists. In the months after the museum opened, even the Office of History, Hungary’s version of Germany’s Gauck Institute, saw its attendance rise markedly. This suggests that the House of Terror inspired no few common folk among its visitors to feel as if perhaps they, too, had been persecuted by the communists way back when – as if they, too, had files to dig up in the Office of History. Not only did the museum’s website afford room for a ‘database of victims’ but so too for a ‘database of perpetrators’, allowing anyone to publicly ‘denounce’ anyone they well please. Both the ‘happening’ inside the museum

\textsuperscript{13} Sloterdijk, Peter: \textit{Critique of Cinical Reason}. Frankfurt am Main, 1983.
proper, and the institution’s website, resemble a TV reality show in that they communicate the message that anyone and everyone can be a heroic sufferer and a scholar of history.

In what way does this cynical politics of remembrance encourage people to evoke memories of the past? Large crowds have visited the Hall of Terror. When, after the Socialists returned to government after a four-year hiatus with the 2002 national elections, and a proposal was made to trim the institution’s state funding, the directors organised a ‘circle of friends’. This group undertook a media campaign suggesting that, ah yes, here we go again, the socialists were persecuting us. Of course this campaign glossed over the fact that the museum’s planned budget – as inherited from the previous government – was nearly three times that of a similar state-funded museum; which is not to mention that the House of Terror took in significant proceeds even from ticket sales. Symbolically, then, this museum continued to remain the ideological property of FIDESZ and of the extreme right.

In short: the cynical politics of remembrance has a very different effect on its audience than does the ironic sort. It makes reflection impossible, precluding any confrontation with the past, hindering humour and laughter. It demands submissive reception and it serves up this reparation in return: here, we can grieve for ourselves and pass sentence on others. We leave the House of Terror not with a sense of relief that might translate into these words: “Ah, how good it is that all that is in the past.” No, we leave brimming with anger at the communist ‘enemy’ and with a perverse sense of satisfaction at having seen, for example, the photo and name of a well-known liberal politician’s father on the wall of perpetrators. The House of Terror takes our cloudy historical knowledge of Nazism and communism up a dark alley – it exhibits half truths in spurious surroundings. Twentieth-century Hungarian history transmitted thus is the history of our wounds unhealed to this day. The exhibit produces visitors who leave full of even more frustration and resentment than they came with.

Nonetheless, even if the House of Terror is not exactly a national monument, for a distinct group of people it can still become a lieu de mémoire. These people light candles and place flowers by the foot of the building, and hold memorial services here on a day dedicated to the victims of communism. They are an odd mix of young right- and extreme-right wingers and old folks who feel as though they have come out the losers after decades of communism, and it is their collective aim to avoid having to remember as individuals.
**Uses and abuses of memory**

As we have seen, the Statue Park and the House of Terror have very much in common. Both aim to shape the way people remember the communist era, and both embody existing realms of public will. Moreover, both aim to make themselves marketable, and in doing so each creates a business – whether an outdoor market or a mall – out of memory. However, the differences run deep: while the House of Terror aims to assuage the thirst for revenge, the Statue Park aims for quite the opposite. The latter would shut away the past somewhere far away, the former would conjure it up like an evil spirit as the present. The latter does not transform the objects on exhibit, the former goes at them aggressively and turns them inside-out. More important, the Statue Park serves as a reminder that we were all participants in tyranny, while the House of Terror names 100 perpetrators and exempts the Hungarian people from having to look the past in the eye: everyone is a victim. Ultimately, however, the most essential difference between the two is that while one creates an opportunity for irony and for active remembrance, the other reaches for this cultural memory with cynical means: the liars call the liars liars…

*Translated from the Hungarian by Paul Olchvary*

Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statue Park</th>
<th>House of Terror</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antecedents</strong></td>
<td>Toppling and damaging of statues, 1989–90</td>
<td>Auschwitz exhibit, 1998–99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct impetus</strong></td>
<td>Institutionalisation of spontaneous public anger</td>
<td>Shift in the politics of memory: the appearance and institutionalisation of revisionist history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Site</strong></td>
<td>A field on the outskirts of Budapest</td>
<td>A palace built in 1880, in downtown Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for choice of site</strong></td>
<td>Convenient access for Western tourists arriving by car, the marginalisation of communism</td>
<td>Prior uses of the building (headquarters of the fascists in WWII, of state security during a portion of the communist era)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural approach</strong></td>
<td>Open-air park</td>
<td>Installation, exhibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects on exhibit</td>
<td>Statue Park</td>
<td>House of Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent but authentic; statues from open-air public spaces that city and municipal governments opted to remove. In terms of aesthetics, recognisability, and function, the overall effect is coherent.</td>
<td>Contingent but only partly authentic. Some objects have been put together from disparate elements, others are copies or of questionable origin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit method</th>
<th>in context</th>
<th>in situ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


| Narrative depicted | A primarily thematic and somewhat chronological lesson in the history of the workers’ movement | A primarily chronological and somewhat thematic history of collective suffering |

| Suggested role of fellow citizens during the depicted time period | “Everyone is a link in the chain” (as per Gyula Illyés’s poem) | Names and photos of perpetrators and of victims are on display |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Souvenir shop</th>
<th>A tattooed Stalin (on the cover of an art book)</th>
<th>CD, “Best of Communism: Selected Revolutionary Songs”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CD: “Best of KISZ: Pol-Beat from the Kádár Era” (KISZ was the acronym for the communist youth movement.)</td>
<td>CD: Polyushka (techno version)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CD-ROM on the Statue Park</td>
<td>CD-ROM on the Statue Park</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | A bookshop with 275 books, most of them historical scholarship but some by extreme right wing authors. Photo albums, travel guides. | A bookshop with 275 books, most of them historical scholarship but some by extreme right wing authors. Photo albums, travel guides. |
ATTILA MELEGH

From Reality to Twilight Zones. Transition of Discourses and the Collapse of State Socialism

*The discourse of rival modernities*

In the late 1970s there was clearly a general shift within the discourses on East and West. We can even say that the idea of East/West civilizational slope was reborn after 30 years of discourses on rivaling modernities or modernizationist quantitative/ideological slopes. This evolved discourse replaced one type of teleological, Eurocentric discourse about the world and within Eastern and Central Europe with another, which had not been seen for at least three decades.

Until its collapse, the “Eastern” block was seen as something very “real” and “concrete” with clear geographical boundaries. This “reality” was embedded in a discourse of modernization and progress. Within this discourse everything was spoken of in terms of ideologies and quantitative “competition” with other systems. Socialism versus capitalism, “backwardness” versus “superiority”, “progress” (toward socialism or modern economic systems for instance) “modernization”, “industrialization” and “catching up” were the key concepts utilized in the framework of global competition between blocks and incorporated nation states. There were “real” regions in Europe, “real” collective actors and “real” walls between them. The link between the sense of “reality” and the aforementioned categories cannot be better shown then by the title of a recent conference paper by Daniel Chirot, author of the influential book, *The origins of backwardness in Eastern Europe*.1 Focusing on the spread of “modern, liberal, Western, democratic, individ-

---

ualistic, capitalist way of life” this “nostalgic”, and with regard to the new, “postmodern”, anthropological approaches, overtly critical paper has been entitled, “Returning to Reality: Culture, Modernization and Various Eastern Europes”. Here the return to reality is not just another way of saying that Eastern and Central Europe has returned to “normalcy”, but it is also a witty remark, suggesting we should return to talk of “real” things like economic progress.

What happened to the sense of reality longed for by Chirot? How was it lost and how should we interpret this “reality” Was the socialist, Eastern European block more real? Or were observers just not reflective enough? The answer seems to lie less in the ignorance of the observers, or the actual “reality” of the Eastern block, but more in the change of discourses. It seems that sometime around the late 1970s an old/new civilizational discourse replaced a modernizationist discourse, allowing later discourses to constitute the world less as a competition between “real” powers in terms of quantitative economic and military capabilities, but as a descending slope of regional cultures. Through this transformation Eastern and Central Europe was vastly reconstructed as an object of dominant discourses, and hence, the shift of discourses, as well as that of integrated power, might have had a definite role in the “disintegration” or “decomposition” of Eastern and Central Europe.

As previously noted, until the 1970s Eastern and Central Europe, or rather the socialist block, was placed in a discourse of modernization, and the grand narrative of progress, which appeared sometime after the second world war. This discourse, promoted both in the East and the West, produced mainly hard, “real”, “comparative”, statistical facts on population development and economic growth, different branches of industry, agriculture, and the production level of the different countries. These “concrete” facts were clearly linked to a measure of military capacity in assessing the possible outcome of a war. It appears clearly in reports of such organizations like the CIA, where the main aim of espionage is the production of “real facts” concerning Soviet modernization. A recent collection of declassified documents shows that most of the reports concerned new computer and “automation” technologies, industrial capacities, pipe lines, energy production etc.


3 www.cia.gov/csi/books/index.html
until the early 1980s when it was replaced by assessments of ethnic conflicts and religious dissent. The application of the same modernization discourse on both sides is generally described as a “cold” war, yet the actual fight was more like a discursive war over the measurement of progress between two political systems.

This modernizationist, “reality” discourse was coupled with a discourse on something “unreal”: negative utopias of total power, like the “brave new world”, “big brother” system, and “animal farm”. The combination of this discourse on ideology and that of modernization allowed for the establishment of a wide network of Eastern European Studies departments and institutes following the Second World War. An additional discourse on totalitarianism also had a history.

With regard to totalitarianism, according to the analysis of Rupnik, we can establish two discourses. The first of these discourses, initiated in the 1950s was focused on the total centralization of the social and economic systems- in which centralization was based on the rule of one party. This kind of single party rule was understood as a totally, centralized, “tyrannic” rule which led to the total atomization, and consequent total destruction of the individual subject, and the development of “mob” seeking public appearance. Thus, totalitarian society became a collectivist power much to be feared by polities in the “West”.

In the late 1960s another totalitarianism discourse evolved creating a substantial break with previous ideas. At that time, the popularity of the aforementioned concepts declined radically in the West while the debate continued in Eastern and Central Europe. This new debate on totalitarianism among dissident thinkers deserves special attention as this criticism, coupled with the emergence of the idea of Central Europe, shows very clearly the discursive transformation at hand.

---


Havel’s greengrocer and the idea of Central Europe: Post-totalitarianism and discursive vacuum in the early 1980s

The “Eastern” perspective on totalitarianism, that is to say the one formulated by authors in the target area of debate, is interesting from several points of view. First, they sensed great social and political changes toward the establishment of discursive power in the East as well as the West. Second, the social system was not portrayed as a closed barrack, prison or isolated fortress in which new types of human beings (Homo Soveticus) were created under the totalitarian squeeze. Instead, according to prominent ‘dissident’ thinkers, totalitarianism became a rather airy political power in which the central political machinery, the propaganda system, and militarization was not the core of the political power, but a web of small, subtle lies which deterred everyday people like greengrocers from “living in truth”.6 The most crucial point, however, was that dissident thinkers of Eastern and Central Europe envisaged a kind of discursive “totalitarianism” which was becoming less and less real due to the decreasing visibility of political and ideological control. Havel exemplified this in his fictional account of a Czech greengrocer, who, without any ideological belief, places a banner in his shop window urging workers of the world to unite.

Havel’s story is emblematic as the discourse of progress (symbolized by the banner) was declared to be “empty”. The greengrocer, lacking any motivation, hung the banner with one of the key slogans of Marxist, progressive thinking, pointing to one aspect of the small web of “lies”. Thus, totalitarianism became more and more discursive, maintaining only a dominant mode of speech. Political control existed in the minds of the people; wall in the head (Mauer in Kopf) as they say in the debates on post-totalitarianism.7

Regardless of what we think about the analysis, it seems texts like Havel’s sensed a change in the discourses creating a collective “subject”. As the debate on totalitarianism shows, around the early 1980s the previous dis-

---

cursive system of modernization and progress collapsed, or withdrew, and revealed itself as only a “discourse.”

On the “Eastern” side, in the case of Hungary, this change in discourses has been demonstrated not only on the basis of texts written by political thinkers, but also in party documents, expert analysis and newspapers. Two Hungarian, political scientists, Kuczi and Csizmadia thoroughly documented how political discourses changed their vocabulary, their themes and the subjects involved in their work between the late 1970s and early 1980s. Political debates were becoming less and less focused on reforms of socialism, and increasingly concerned with how to adapt the country to the “West” as a norm. Even Csizmadia has revealed that the emerging discourse was the basis of new constellations of social and political power through which new social groups could be incorporated into state socialist Hungary. As Csizmadia summed it up:

“…the texts, debates, opinions dealing with the role of Western Europe first got together as a latent and then as a more and more public discourse and probably this discourse became one of the most characteristic traits of the 1980s… these views were not only written down or told, but transformed public life and the whole system.”

This discourse combining new objects, subjects, and styles first thematized the emptiness of the previous social and political categories, most notably the so called “socialist block”, the associated “cold world order” dividing Europe into two parts, and the related progress (modernization) narrative. It also (re)introduced new categories like the “West” and the idea of Central Europe.

The emergence of the idea of Central Europe reveals the aforementioned discursive transition at several levels. First, it is revealing as it was linked to the feeling of “untrue”/”false” discourses. Kundera, in his ‘seminal’ essay on the tragedy of Central Europe, speaks of Central Europe being hijacked West and being forced into an alien category of the “East”. According

---

8 Karnoouh, op. cit.
9 Kuczi, op. cit; Csizmadia, op. cit.
10 Csizmadia, 135.
to him, Central Europe is „situated geographically in the center, culturally in the West and politically in the East”. Furthermore, Central Europe was discursively hijacked as it had been cut into two opposing categories politically and culturally. Second, the idea of Central Europe was a category, which came to life like a returning ghost. Several major authors involved in this debate repeat the „fact” that the idea of Central Europe was not heard for decades either due to historical sins or political censorship. Thus, there is a clear reference to discursive arrangements according to which “Central Europe” first disappeared after the second world war and then reappeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s in political, historical and cultural discussions.

Third, even after its rebirth there were problems concerning its existence: Schöpflin talks about the “ghost” of Central Europe, Timothy Garton Ash asked revealingly in his *New York Review of Books* essay “Does Central Europe exist?”, and as György Konrád put it “Compared to the geopolitical reality of Eastern Europe and Western Europe, Central Europe exists today only as a cultural-political anti-hypothesis (eine kulturpolitische Anti-hypothese)…. “.

The question of Central Europe’s existence provides a clue to the new discourse as well as the process of discursive “transition”. First, Central Europe did not exist because it had to cleanse itself of historical-moral sins (i.e. Holocaust, but also of communism and totalitarianism). Timothy Garton Ash for instance, after a reference to its non-existence in the present tense, argued that it shares the fate of Niniveh and Tyrus; two morally corrupt cities, one destroyed by God and one forgiven by Him. The first task in overcoming this “moral handicap” was the “whitening” of Central Europe (shedding themselves of red and brown hues). The second task was to overcome the view of Central Europe as a recently released prisoner under probation. An exclusion mechanism is also clear in this ambiguous, ghost-like character. Central Europe was at the border of existence- the twilight zone. Semi-human creatures exist in this arena, which to some extent are like us, but on the other hand are morally, and physically corrupt, presenting a danger to “normal” individuals. Ash utilized this metaphor and spoke of a dark forest full of wizards and witches:

---

13 Ash, 1986; Schöpflin and Wood, op. cit.
14 see also Dancsi, Katalin: *Kelet-Nyugat fogásában: Közép-Európa helye szövegek térképen* [Captured by East and West. The place of central Europe on the map of texts] In Meleg, Szürke zónák ..., 139–156; Ash, op. cit.
“an endlessly intriguing forest to be sure, a territory where peoples, cultures, languages are fantastically intertwined, where every place has several names and men change their citizenship as often as their shoes, an enchanted wood full of wizards and witches, but one which bears over its entrance the words: Abandon all hope, ye who enter here, of ever again seeing the wood for the trees.”

The last crucial point in this emerging discourse is that the borders of Europe and Central Europe cannot be fixed and the expansion of “Eastern” countries is extremely problematic.

“With no precise borders, with no center or rather with several centers, “Central Europe” looks today more and more like the dragon of Alca in the second book of Anatol France’s Penguin Island to which the symbolist movement was compared: no one who claimed to have seen it could say what it looked like. To speak about Central Europe as a homogenous geopolitical and cultural phenomenon entails risks. Even if we might agree with Jacques Morin’s affirmation that Europe is ‘a concept without borders’, the facts oblige us to remove from this concept the part of the European continent, with the exception of Austria, that under the name of Mittel-Europa organically belonged to it.”

Another prominent dissident thinker, Mihály Vajda, also asked for a serious investigation with regard to drawing the Eastern borders of Central Europe. He asked, in his essay on the problem of Russia’s Europeanness, “Who has excluded Russia from Europe?” The answer is Russia itself, hence, the one found guilty shall first prove its Europeanness, if at all possible. In a sense this new discourse can only be understood as “a constant border fight over ‘Eastern Europe’ and an attempt to push out parts of it”. In other words, the idea of Central Europe was linked to the demonization of the more “Eastern” parts of Europe like Russia and the Balkans, which bore practical consequences. Concerning later developments, Todorova rightly observed:

---

15 Ash, op. cit.
“To summarize, the third round in the development of the Central European idea after 1990 witnessed its entry from the politics of culture into political praxis. Far from becoming a region-building notion, it has harnessed as an expedient argument in the drive for entry into the European institutional framework. It is during this stage that the Balkans first appeared as a dichotomical opponent, sometimes alongside with, sometimes indistinguishable from Russia. This internal hierarchization of Eastern Europe was born out of political expediency, but in its rhetorics it feeds on the balkanist discourse.”

We can safely argue then that discourses on Eastern and Central Europe changed dramatically during the 1980s. And that during this process, the old, “realist” modernizationist/ideological discourse setting up quantitative scales was replaced by a new discourse decomposing the Eastern block into several regions with ambiguous qualitative borders, ordered into a “sliding scale of merit”.

The function of the qualitative East/West slope in recomposing Eastern Europe in the 1990s

The world would appear drastically different without the idea of an East/West civilizational slope replacing the modernizationist version of competing socialist and capitalist modernities. Among other things, there would not have been a quick and ‘consensual’ burial of socialism by an elite longing for a ‘normal (understood as Western) society’ after 40 years of ‘abnormality’. And we would not have seen the break up of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the subsequent civil war in the latter country.

Sorin Antohi rightly claimed that mimetic competition in imitating the West and for pushing aside other non-Western competitors leads to ‘fragile identities’, and hence to political disintegration. And along this line of thought, introducing the idea of chain Orientalism as one of the main mechanisms of the (re)emerging East/West slope, Bakic-Hayden correctly observed that “nested Orientalism” and the related change in power arrangements was a key to the Yugoslavian war:

“As a political entity, the former Yugoslavia encompassed traditional dichotomies such as east/west and their nesting variants (Europe/Asia, Europe/Balkans, Christian/Muslim) largely neutralizing their usual valorization. With

22 Antohi, op. cit.
the destruction of this neutralizing framework, the revalorization of these categories, now oppositions rather than simply differences has resulted in the destruction of the living communities that had transcended them.20

Also, without the valorization of this new slope there would not have been the ‘Eastern enlargement’ of the European Union in the way it was implemented. This has been demonstrated abundantly in the pioneering works of József Böröcz on imperialism of the European Union with regard to Eastern European candidates.24

To show the legitimacy of this argument and the links to our examples we need only to quote the Copenhagen criteria as announced in 1993.

“In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Member States took a decisive step towards the current enlargement, agreeing that ‘the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.’ Thus, enlargement was no longer a question of ‘if’ but ‘when’. Here too, the European Council provided a clear response: ‘Accession will take place as soon as an applicant is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required’.

At the same time, the Member States designed the membership criteria, which are often referred to as the Copenhagen Criteria.

As stated in Copenhagen, membership requires that the candidate country has achieved:
1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

3. the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

has created:
4. the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its administra-
tive structures, so that European Community legislation transposed into na-
tional legislations implemented effectively through appropriate administra-
tive and judicial structures.²⁵

As can be clearly seen, the EU enlargement process was not imagined as
a negotiation between the assigned political body of the EU and certain nations
states under a strict deadline, but as a timeless process (the question is just when)
of achieving certain capacities such as the “stability of institutions guaranteeing”
humanitarian liberal ideals guaranteeing “rule of law,” “human rights” etc. or
the “existence “ of a “functioning market economy, or the “capacity to cope
with” certain “pressures within the Union”. Even at first glimpse it can be seen
that the criteria were vague and implied processes with no real end. Any country
in the world could be found lacking some required conditions (see for instance
the guarantee of human rights) and therefore, it is merely a question of “translat-
ing” these ideals into a multidimensional slope and measuring countries accord-
ingly. This inherently leads to hierarchies not only between EU countries and
the applicants, but also between the applicants, being the prime source of the di-
vide and rule policy of the EU.

But the discourse and actions of the East/West slope not only facilitated
and made “meaningful” the radical changes in the everyday life of more than
300 million people, it also became firmly rooted in late, modern social and po-
itical life with aims on future, local and global politics in the widest sense
with regard to the region. The order of the discourse is and will be a core
structure in reacting to the processes initiated by late-modern, capitalist ex-
ansion. We can hardly imagine ourselves outside this discourse in the near
future as several functions, or mechanisms, which maintain this power
arrangement persist.

The East/West slope has created an ‘unholy’ alliance of local and Western
elites for dominating and disciplining East European societies caught in the
mass uncertainty of late modern capitalism. This alliance, and the East/West
dialogue at an institutional and individual level, is not without tensions,
twists and conflicting interests. But there is a general agreement on promot-
ing ‘European’ ideals, or more precisely, on promoting a move toward such

²⁵ http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm
ideals. This has and will serve the ‘imperial’, downward perspective of American and Western European political elites in controlling the region, using it for different, global, political and economic strategies. These ‘half-civilized’ and ‘half-educated’ Eastern European countries can be played out against each other or can be used for major power games between the United States and the European Union. This is clearly exemplified in the game between US Defense Attorney, Donald Rumsfeld and French president Chirac, who, in the debate over the invasion of Iraq, confronted two images of Eastern Europe for their own purposes: “New Europe” as a defender of “Western values”, or Eastern Europe as an uneducated child, which does not know how to behave in accessing European Union.26

Local elites, although occasionally protesting such treatment, nonetheless receive legitimacy and discursive material from the ‘West’ that helps to silence their opponents, or to engulf social, cultural and political problems into a debate on the sloping status of local societies. Due to the hegemonic nature of the East/West slope, those looking for step by step ‘modernization’, othering of local society, launching of petit imperialist projects, or fighting against the joint conspiracy of the ‘West’ led by Jews and/or liberals can portray each other as hindering advancement on the slope.27

In one way this fight disguises and in another way directly serves and facilitates class projects and the establishment of control and dominance over local populations. This is why one of the most important functions of the East/West slope and the idea of flexible East/West borders is the recreation and maintenance of racism and other forms of exclusion. Sociologically, the East/West slope controls, or rather, filters movement between different areas of the world or between social groups; ‘Eastern’ floods of migrants can be stopped, or made illegitimate, or from a frustrated nationalist point of view, ‘pro-Western’ Jewish-liberal ‘traitors’ and Roma groups can be excluded from the local society. This clearly can be seen in a scandal related to Hungarian Roma families seeking asylum in France in 2000. The affair is worthy of an in-depth, case-study analysis as it demonstrates the complex interplay of Western and Eastern elites imagining themselves on the East/West slope. This also seems to be a perfect example of repressive-racist mechanisms of


the new/old qualitative East/West discourse following the collapse of state socialism.

The Zámoly case and everyday repression in late-modern capitalism East and West

A few years ago, Roma families were forced from their homes by the local government, allegedly on the basis that their homes could collapse. The families moved into a community house in a settlement called Zámoly, being one of the areas of Hungary booming in terms of foreign investment. After a year, they were forced to leave under the pressure of the local mayor. The Roma families asked for direct help in order to build decent homes. Without a satisfactory solution, their presence became a local, and later a national, scandal deepened by physical atrocities and the murder of a young person who threatened the Roma families. Later, in July 2000, under the supervision of a Roma activist named Krasznai, some of these Roma families left for France to ask political asylum on the basis of persecution and lack of defense by the Hungarian authorities. Krasznai wanted “to draw the attention of Europe to what happens in Hungary”.28

Not long before the decision of the French Office for Refugee Affairs (OFPRA, March 8, 2001) on February 23, 2001, the well-known British security journal “Jane’s Intelligence Digest” published an article on “The New Russian Offensive”, claiming that under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russians tried to intervene into the affairs of soon-to be EU members. Among other accusations the periodical declared:

“And if surreptitious acquisition of industrial influence or illicit deployment of surveillance hardware were not enough, we have it on good intelligence community authority that recent events surrounding the Hague and the Zámoly Roma of Hungary has also been to a large extent engineered by Russian operatives. Members of the gypsy community of Zámoly appear to have been encouraged to plead persecution and violation of human rights before EU bodies and even to request political asylum so as to make Hungary look much worse than it is during the crucial EU accession negotiations which are currently taking place. This perhaps is one of the most damaging methods employed by

Moscow of late, one that was tried in the aspirant Czech Republic first and subsequently transplanted to Hungary.“

The origins of this text are of course hidden, but certain circumstances are rather clear. As we have learned from the then deputy prime minister of the Czech Republic, Pavel Rychetsky, the then British Minister of Interior Affairs, Jack Straw asked the Czech authorities in 2000 to investigate “what forces are behind the exodus”.

Thus, on behalf of the British government, and presumably its secret services, there was a definite attempt to find those carrying impoverished, Czech Roma families into Britain. This investigation was probably extended to Hungary when the Zámoly Roma left for France. The timing of the publication could be accidental. But there might be an alternative reading of facts according to which the article was a warning to relevant French authorities not to grant political asylum to people being manipulated by the Russian secret service. This was later exposed in a follow-up article, which presented the case in the interpretative framework of a Russian-Israeli-French communist plot:

“What is interesting, however, is that the political patron of the Zámoly group in Paris and Strasbourg, is the French Communist Party, which according to credible military intelligence authorities is known to have had strong associations with the KGB in the past. Add to this the information that the Zámoly group appears to have been financed by sources from Israel, which with the recent influx of Russian émigrés is known to be highly penetrated by foreign intelligence, and the story takes on a new dimension.”

This article was later published, with additional comments, in a Hungarian newspaper close to the previous, conservative, nationalist government. Demeter Ervin, the minister of security affairs, commented on the article. On a public television, news program the next day he indirectly supported the claims of JID. This was later widely commented on by Hungarian and international press organs. One week later JID seemed surprised by the interest they raised:


“Since we began publishing in 1938, it has been Intelligence Digest’s mission to investigate and bring to light important issues in security and intelligence. Many of our articles have attracted attention from the international media and from governments. Rarely, however, has one issue provoked national interest on the scale we have witnessed in Hungary this week.”

From a “Western” perspective the most likely meaning of the whole event is that JID, a British intelligence periodical, tried to manipulate the relevant French authorities by implicitly arguing that the case of these Hungarian, Roma families was not a refugee issue, but a foreign-service operation involving French communists. Perhaps the warning was a consequence of the late 1990s boom of Roma families from Central European countries asking for asylum in Britain. British authorities were afraid at that time to set a precedent in giving refugee status, which could then be used, against the British state when trying to control the number of asylum seekers. This further raised the general issue of handling persecuted people from politically safe countries, the citizens of which have free entry for a limited period into EU countries like France or the United Kingdom.

This fear of Roma groups reveals the anxiety of poor, uneducated refugees within the EU. As the quality of immigrants clearly creates the main problem in the case above, it falls in line with racist-biopolitical considerations. Roma families are feared to be less capable of integration and thus immigration authorities do their best to stop them before entering the country in question.

This anxiety clearly appeared in the acts of the British immigration officers who were transplanted to the Prague airport to monitor passengers departing to London. Their main aim was skin-color control, as can be seen in the case of a Roma journalist who, claiming the same purpose of travel and same financial background as her colleague, could not board a plane, while

33 Questions in Budapest, op. cit.
“the white” colleague was given a green light.35 Thus, it can be supposed in the case of JID that British authorities were truly afraid a positive reply to asylum seekers might set-off a new wave of “unwelcome” political refugees.

Aside from the immediate concern of “low quality” immigrants, the alleged investigation and the whole atmosphere of the article fit very well into an Orientalist, mythological, discursive framework in which “Eastern” elements conspire against the West, or would-be West Central Europe. It’s interesting that all of the actors mentioned can be decoded as “Oriental”: the Russians, the Israeli Russians, Jews, and Roma, very much in line with Nazi allegations in the late 1930s and 1940s. The alleged Israeli connection is also a perfect example of 19th century Orientalism when Jews were treated exactly as Arabs, also being Semite.36 The accusation against French supporters shows that communism can also be Orientalized due to the alleged links to the power system of the previous “East”.

Throughout the whole story the French connection is also revealing. That the entire operation was aimed against the EU membership of Hungary may be partly true. But it’s unlikely that the actors were employed by the Russian secret service. They were from the French left. Moreover, due to fear of a cheap labor source, and from a country promoting extreme, liberal, wild capitalism, most left wing parties within the EU were extremely suspicious of the “Eastern” barbarians who might be used as a Trojan horse by the European right wing.

The Hungarian reaction also clarifies important discursive mechanisms of the East/West slope. First of all, the overtly anti-Roma propaganda in the right wing, Hungarian press has been successful due to the fact that these Roma families crossed a border not allowed to them. They went to a region, the “West”, to which the whole country would like to move, and this “careless” action and the involved blame on Hungary, have brought to surface racist attitudes. This is emblematically shown by a current joke about the Zámoly Roma families according to which: “The Gypsies have come home. Why? Because they got their work permits.” The joke reveals an extremely normative image of the West as a “normal” region where everybody has to work. Roma are not capable of this- they only want money, and hence they have to come home. The main idea, however, is that they have taken the position of “white” Hungarians.

35 Nem engedték utazni a roma újságróit. [They have not allowed the Roma journalist to travel] Népszabadság, 27 July, 2001.
A normative image of the West emerges from the reaction to the Roma, who think that the West offers them much denied dignity. Hungarian liberal intelligentsia followed the same illusionary line by first blaming the Hungarian government for the whole affair, asserting that Ervin Demeter, the minister of security affairs, arranged the article during his visit to Britain. Thus, according to them, such a stupid accusation cannot come from the “normal” West. In addition, thirty or so representatives wrote a letter to the French government (not the Office of Refugees) thanking them for applying the principles of human rights and accusing the Hungarian government of risking EU membership by not doing enough for the Roma minority. This idealization of the West was so obvious that one intellectual who signed the petition later withdrew his support following an excellent analysis of the whole affair. Instead of idealizing the “West”, according to some governmental accusations, the socialists in opposition at that time attempted to retrieve the Roma families by allegedly offering money in the case of their return.

While these reactions show the “West” as the desired norm for the East, the reaction of the then Hungarian government, and the happy repetition of accusations by JID truly reveal the low position of the east on this slope. First of all, there is the feeling of inferiority that guides one to look for scapegoats in the tense process of joining the “West” and its institutions. In addition, in their view, Hungary was deeply “European” or rather “kidnapped West”, and therefore, could be pushed out of its proper place only by “alien” elements. The Secret service, the communists, and Jews were once again playing a game with a small, “European” nation. Thus it seems they spoke from the perspective of an inferior position while trying to rely on European, white racism, even though “Eastern” racism, paradoxically, was later used against countries trying to join the European Union.

 Altogether this story reveals several East/West exclusions: the Hungarians with regard to Roma; the Hungarian government with regard to liberals, its own Roma citizens, the Russians, the Jews; the British secret service and immigration officers with regard to the Roma, Eastern Europeans, communists and the Orientals; and the French left against East Europeans. The pieces of these repressive patterns add up to a meaningful story only in the

39 Kundera, op. cit.
form of discursive seaweed on the East-West slope. This discursive web helps bring biopolitical racism to life again and again and thus it cannot be separated from the issue of Eastern European difference. This is a complex web, a kind of epistemological sand trap, which sucks everything and everybody into it. Or in other words, we can see the workings of power arrangements of the new/old, East/West discourse whose construction per se leads to the rise of “Eastern” racism. In this French comedy all the roles are exchanged in a circle of false accusations masking the real sins. The Roma leave one prejudiced country for the sake of another in order to draw attention to their problem, “Western” racists are not seen as such by “Eastern” anti-racists who write a letter supporting the representatives of “Europe” as the protectors of human rights. “Western” racism is offered to “Eastern” nationalists, who, due to their humiliation and their own “instincts”, happily grasp the possibility in order to be punished later for such a crime. Nothing is definite and everything is hidden. Only the faces of the victims are clear in the cognitive patterns experimented with in the modern/colonial systems emerging in the 18th century. With this, Eastern Europe has arrived from “reality” into the twilight zones of late modern capitalism.
Contrary to optimistic political statements, enlargement will create new, dividing lines between initiated EU Member States and their neighboring third countries, especially in regard to border issues. To overcome the detrimental effects of restrictions on what was previously, relatively free movement, a new border or visa regime should be developed which takes account of bona fide crossing of borders and facilitates sub-regional development, while also taking full account of the security concerns. This article, meanwhile emphasizing the need for ‘Schengen friendly borders’ , examines how this idea appeared and developed in the latest phase of enlargement and neighborhood policy.

Who are the neighbors of Hungary and the EU? - Confusion over terminology

First of all, I would like to clear up some of the confusion over the term ‘neighborhood policy’ as it is used in different contexts in Hungary and in the EU. Hungarian neighborhood policy refers to the bilateral relations of Hungary with its neighboring countries, especially in the context of preservation and promotion of, and support to the Hungarian ethnic minorities whose members are neither citizens nor residents of Hungary. Thus, geographical proximity is an essential element, and the Hungarian policy does not cover distanced countries where large numbers of Hungarian minorities live. This concept is also reflected by the personal scope of the famous Status Law, or Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians living in neighboring countries, which aims at providing benefits and assistance to ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, the Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovenia. Though it is a neighboring state to Hungary, Austria is also excluded from
the scope, mainly due to the fact that approximately 90% of the ethnic, Hungarian minority living there did not lose its citizenship.

European Neighborhood Policy refers to the framework of relations with the Union’s neighbors who currently are not granted so much as perspective EU membership. There are a variety of expressions used by various institutional and individual actors. Aside from ‘European neighborhood policy’ or ENP in short, the ‘Wider Europe Initiative’ is also frequently used. And, one may also find references to the ‘ring of friends of Europe’, ‘relations with the Eastern and Southern neighbors’, ‘privileged relations between the Union and neighboring States’ or ‘the Union and its immediate environment.’ Despite this wide range of terminology, most documents refer to ‘European neighborhood policy’, and websites of the Community institutions also decided in favor of the latter term to name the policy field. Thus, this article will also use the latter term.

As to the question of exactly which countries are included, it has remained unclear until now. The disagreement over the definition and concept of EU neighborhood policy has been primarily due to the fact that even today, ‘there is no Mr. EU’ and that it has yet to be decided whom shall be the voice of Europe whose statements will be regarding as authentic and authoritative concerning EU external relations. For example, the president of the Commission, Romano Prodi referred to a ‘ring of friends surrounding the Union from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea’\(^1\), while Christopher Patten, Commissioner for External Relations and Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP advocate for more intense relations with and focus on the Russian and Newly Independent States’ within the framework of the neighborhood policy. The big EU Member States have also been lobbying for different priorities. For instance, while Germany favors a more Russia-oriented approach, France would place equal emphasis on African countries.

Nevertheless, the countries targeted by the EU external relations’ programs in the EU Annual Policy Strategy for 2005 gave a good indication of the dimension of the policy. According to the document, EU neighborhood policy is aimed at ‘neighboring States which are not (with the exception of the Western Balkan countries) candidates for EU accession’. The document includes initiatives towards Russia, the Western Newly Independent States\(^2\), the Western Bal-

\(^1\) Romano Prodi: A Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the key to stability Sixth ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5–6 December 2002.

\(^2\) The Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus
The very recent Commission Communication on European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper of 12th May 2004 in this regard reflects the latest developments. It clearly addresses the EU’s immediate neighbors to the east: the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Currently, there is a separate strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, which was launched during the 2003 St. Petersburg Summit. Yet, Russia will be eligible to receive funding from the financial instruments, which support the neighborhood policy. To the south, the policy is addressed to neighbors who participate in the Barcelona process: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, as well as the Palestinian Authority. As a result of recent political changes, Libya is on the track to being integrated into the Barcelona process and will eventually be included in the neighborhood policy. Although there is a clear tendency to clarify the countries involved, there is still dispute over whether to include countries in the Southern Caucasus, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. There is also confusion over Belarus as although it is an immediate Eastern neighbor, it has no contractual relationships with the EU. Nevertheless, EU neighborhood policy is expressly open to Belarus in the event of fundamental, political and economic reform replacing the present undemocratic situation.

Returning to the distinction between Hungarian and EU neighborhood policy, it is clear that the EU policy is definitely a wider concept than the Hungarian one. First of all because it refers to neighbors of the EU, thus, it inherently includes more countries than the Hungarian policy. Second, as while in the Hungarian context neighborhood refers to countries with common borders to Hungary, such an exact physical/geographical proximity is definitely not a criterion for the EU neighborhood policy, which is based on the concept of political proximity. In other words, EU neighborhood policy comprises an undefined number of countries with which the EU aims to maintain preferential relations for reasons of political, and especially security interests. Thus, not only geographical neighbors of the current EU 25 are included, but also neighbors of the accession countries including Turkey, for example, whose dimensions extend the range of countries involved to Geor-

---

3 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia
gia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and so on. Nevertheless, geographical proximity still plays a subsidiary role as the policy is applied to undefined countries falling within a sort of ring around Europe. And that is why EU Commission President Romano Prodi called the third countries included in the EU Wider Europe policy, the ‘ring of friends’, which does not denote a 360° circle around Europe but rather a half circle containing non-EU countries in the Eastern and Southern dimension – thus, excluding Norway, Switzerland and the micro states in Europe.

I would also like to draw the reader’s attention to another difference between the Hungarian and EU policy: to the cases of Romania and the Western Balkans. While third countries with which the EU has already concluded an Accession Agreement – presently Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey – are not included in the EU neighborhood policy, Romania is definitely one of the most important elements of the Hungarian neighborhood policy. The Western Balkans, comprised of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, are also excluded from the EU neighborhood policy because they are in the Stabilization and Association process. Yet, they are given the prospect of becoming members if they fulfill the Copenhagen economic and political criteria of EU membership.4

To conclude this comparison of the scopes of the Hungarian and EU neighborhood policy, the only, common feature seems to be that both policies are part of external relations and provide a framework of bilateral relations with third countries where Hungary or the EU have particular interests. According to the author, there are three very important differences between the Hungarian and EU neighborhood policies. First, there is a difference in the underlying political interests: while the political interests of Hungary are the ethnic/minority and identity policy nurturing of Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries, for the EU, the political interest is definitely security. Second, there is a different interpretation of what geographical proximity means. While in the Hungarian context it definitely refers to de facto common borders, at the EU level proximity is interpreted according to political interests – an unclear half circle around Europe. And lastly, I would like to mention the status of the countries targeted. While Hungarian neighborhood policy is directed towards its neighbors regardless of

---

their legal status in regards to the EU, be it a Member State or not. 5 EU neighborhood policy encompasses only non-EU countries, which are not envisaged to become EU members in the framework of an already established preferential legal relationship, i.e. accession agreement or the Stabilization and Association process. Thus, being included in the EU neighborhood policy raises an additional, political indication to the countries concerned: aspiration for EU membership is not impossible in the far future but is presently, definitely excluded for an undefined period.

**What is EU neighborhood policy about?**

European neighborhood policy emerged not so long ago as new, external relations, policy field of the EU. Thus, the exact meaning of neighborhood policy is under constant redefinition. To some, such as Commission President Romano Prodi, it is a debate about the EU’s future borders establishing ‘a ring of friends’. For the Greek presidency it involves a debate about our identity and values. To others, it is about devising a formula to satisfy countries that might otherwise hastily apply for membership, or who will fail to meet the criteria. In short, there is no agreement on the definition or even the concept of ‘Wider Europe’ 6 and various institutions and individual stakeholders still refer to, and advocate for, very different and often contradictory concepts.

Despite confusion over what is meant by EU neighborhood policy, there is a noticeable evolution from the more reserved aim of establishing ‘balanced relations with all its (the EU’s) neighbors’ 7 in 1994 to the idea of a more pro-active policy in recent years. The Copenhagen European Council of 2002 set the objective as ‘forward relations with neighboring countries based on shared political and economic values’ and promoting ‘democratic and economic reforms’ as well as ‘sustainable developments of trade’. 8 The European Convention was also a major step forward in this regard as it placed the neighborhood policy field on a constitutional level by including a title on ‘Privileged relations between the Union and Neighboring States’ in the Draft Constitutional

---

5 Although with the duty of differentiation between them from 1 May 2004.
6 Fraser Cameron: The Wider Europe – reflections on the EU’s strategy towards its wider neighborhood, post-enlargement to a Union of 25, the European Policy Centre, 2003. Available at the following website: http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/gistext.pl/774659-287?204&OIDN=250956&home

Treaty. During the work of the Convention this title was reworded to the softer ‘The Union and its immediate environment’ (Title VIII). Why such a tremendous change in the formulation occurred is not very clear but the inclusion of the policy in the Draft Constitutional Treaty is undoubtedly a major innovation and highlights the importance given to the development of new privileged relations between an enlarged Union and its periphery. The title consists of one article (Article 56), the first paragraph of which defines the general objectives and nature of EU – neighboring countries relationship: ‘The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on co-operation’. As happens quite often with EU provisions, it is a sort of everything and nothing: great visions but nothing concrete.

Nevertheless, through the ‘steep career’ of the EU neighborhood policy its objectives have been continuously redefined. The Annual Policy Strategy of the European Communities for 2005 mentioned amongst its policy priorities that ‘the Union will take on a new external responsibility, with emphasis on the neighborhood dimension’. The objectives described under the heading ‘External responsibility: Neighborhood and Partnership’ are still quite vague, nevertheless they give a good indication of where this policy field is heading: ‘The Commission will implement a new EU neighborhood policy and will strive to promote intra-regional cooperation’ and continues that ‘the Commission will be required to play a greater role in promoting sustainable development in line with Europe’s international commitments’. This is an explicit declaration of the objectives of the EU neighborhood policy: political and economic stabilization of the neighboring regions by transferring multilateral governance, ‘on the basis of the shared values in particular democracy, human rights, rule of law and respect of minorities’.

The latest Strategy Paper of the Commission of 12th May 2004 on EU neighborhood policy defines a set of priorities and key areas for specific action, which gives an indication of the most recent objectives: ‘political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society,

---

environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.’ In short, the idea is to draw neighboring countries closer to the EU economically, politically and culturally, and through reinforcing existing forms of regional and sub-regional cooperation, also reinforce their stability and security, and contribute to conflict resolution.

**Sensitive external borders**

Migration is increasingly perceived as a threat in itself to security as politicians connect it directly with transnational, organized crime and the unmanageable flood of the poor. However, it is a very short-sighted view, especially in the Central and Eastern European region. Besides “States” in the classic sense of international law, there exist true sub-regions stretching over two, three or even more countries, possessing a lively cultural, social and economic life facilitated by reciprocal, visa-free or even passport-free travel, negotiated after the changes of the political system in the 1990’s. Indeed, one of the great achievements of the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries has been the reintroduction of permeable borders that enabled the revival of said economic and social ties in the whole region. Applying the Schengen acquis strictly cuts up these sub-regions forcibly, introduces impermeable borders, and places these countries in different legal statuses in their relations to the EU. Thus, Schengen contradicts the regional interests of Central and Eastern European countries, which prefer maintaining the permeability of these borders.

In this regard, warnings from leading researchers and institutions began as early as the late 1990’s.12 Occasionally, their concerns were reflected in EU documents as well. In Agenda 2000 for example, adopted in 1997, the Commission acknowledged that enlargement ‘will influence EU relations and policies towards third countries and regions’ and warned that ‘adverse effects could result from enlargement, were it to be perceived as raising new barriers in Europe’.13 In 2001 The Centre for European Policy Studies identified several, highly sensitive borders which could adversely be affected by enlargement and the Schengen sys-

---

12 E.g. Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute, European Policy Studies (CEPS), Stefan Batory Foundation etc.
tem. In fact, such borders surround virtually the EU’s entire future external frontier:\(^\text{14}\)

- the Narva-Ivangorod border between Estonia and Russia, where Russian communities are living directly alongside each other;
- the borders of Russian Kaliningrad with Lithuania and Poland, given that Kaliningrad is due to become an enclave within the territory of the EU;
- the borders between Ukraine and its EU candidate neighbors (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) as well as between Belarus and Poland with quite extensive movement across these borders at present for purposes of trade and personal connections;
- the borders of South East Europe, where there is an outer ring of visa-free states (Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania [soon], Bulgaria and Greece), which surround an inner core subject to visa requirements [countries in the Western Balkans];
- the border between Moldova and Romania, with many Moldovans now acquiring dual Moldovan and Romanian citizenship because of the prospect of the new Schengen frontier;
- the Aegean islands of Greece which are very close to the Turkish coast.

Taking the example of Hungary, its relationship with its neighbors can be described by the strong physical connections and personal relations that derive from its common borders, infrastructure, and natural environment that should and can only be protected by joint and harmonized measures, transnational economies, and of course, the strong net of cultural, lingual and family ties.\(^\text{15}\) Enlargement of the EU and the eastward push of the Schengen border, thus the reintroduction of visas from 1\(^\text{st}\) May 2004 vis-à-vis countries whose nationals previously enjoyed the advantage of visa-free or passport-free travel, is undoubtedly a negative consequence of enlargement which may hamper well-functioning, bilateral, international relations. Hungarian ethnic minorities living in currently non-EU member countries will probably

---


be hit the hardest, and maintaining cross-border family ties will undoubtedly become more difficult.

**EU neighborhood policy and external borders**

After introducing the concept of EU neighborhood policy in general, the focus will now be turned to the issue of facilitated crossing of the external borders within the framework of this policy. Almost as a rule, all documents on EU enlargement and neighborhood policy state that ‘the accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union’s interest in enhancing relations with the neighbors’16, and ‘enlargement will benefit not only existing and new Member States but also neighboring countries.’17 Despite these over optimistic statements, however, enlargement will create new dividing lines in Europe, especially regarding the border issues.

Of the various documents on neighborhood policy of the past years, very few have touched upon the question of borders. However, parallel to the evolution of the objectives of the EU neighborhood policy, from maintaining good relations with neighbors to the possibility of including them in the internal market, the issue of cross-border movements has slowly come into light. Taking a step further, the idea of preferential and eased border crossing has recently become expressly included, although more at the level of statements than practical measures.

The 2003 Commission Communication on “Wider Europe”18 was of utmost importance concerning the issue of external borders in the context of EU neighborhood policy. It not only envisaged an ‘area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation’ etc., but also provided measures to be taken. ‘The EU and the neighbors have a mutual interest in cooperating, both bilaterally and regionally, to ensure that their migration policies, customs procedures and frontier controls do not prevent or delay people or goods from crossing borders for legitimate purposes’. Furthermore, under the heading ‘Perspectives for Lawful Migration and Movement of Persons’, communication, as an exception, surpassed broad statements and envisaged more pragmatic instruments to apply at the external border.
borders in order to ensure that ‘the new external border is not a barrier to trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation.’ It mentioned the need for ‘putting in place mechanisms that allow workers to move from one territory to another where skills are needed most’ and that ‘an efficient and user-friendly system for small border traffic is an essential part of any regional development policy. The EU is currently looking at ways facilitating the crossing of external borders for bona fide third-country nationals living in the border areas that have legitimate and valid grounds for regularly crossing the border and do not pose any security threat.’ However, in my opinion, the revolution lies in the following sentence: ‘the EU should be open to examine wider application of visa free regimes’.

Regarding sub-regional cooperation in the framework of neighborhood policy, it is interesting to note that while the Commission Communication mentioned both bilateral and regional cooperation, the Report of the European Parliament on the Communication clearly says that ‘a bilateral approach is more promising in the East as regional cooperation scarcely seems possible in view of these differences (i.e. differences between the neighboring countries)’19. Furthermore, the Report pointed out that ‘the regions concerned are already covered by major EU geographical cooperation programmes’ and noted that ‘the Communication does not give any clear indication how these will be streamlined, made more effective and how they will finally play a part to reach the ambitious goals of the new Initiative.’ This criticism by the European Parliament clearly indicates that policy formulation is still at the stage of debate over major principles and directions rather than the implementation.

Although the Annual Policy Strategy for 200520 did not contain any additional elements in this regard it did mention neighborhood policy as one of the policy priorities. Furthermore, it was novel as, through the issue of external borders, it connected external relations with enlargement, two areas that had been quite artificially separated before: ‘The Union’s new dimension and the new external borders resulting from enlargement, will make it necessary to put in place a stable, comprehensive political framework with the neighboring countries of the south and the east. Once enlargement becomes a reality, the implementation of this sphere of prosperity and stability will be the central external priority.’

Although the Commission’s latest strategy of 12th May 2004 on neighborhood issues reaffirms the need for a more flexible external border regime, it does not introduce any such novelty, but repeats only what has been said be-

---

fore: ‘Border management is likely to be a priority in most Action Plans as it is only by working together that the EU and its neighbors can manage common borders more efficiently in order to facilitate legitimate movements. … The goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security. Moreover, a Commission proposal for Regulations on the establishment of a local border traffic regime is currently under consideration by the Council and will, if adopted, make it possible for border area populations to maintain traditional contacts without encountering excessive administrative obstacles. The European Union may also consider possibilities for visa facilitation.’ What this new order at the external borders will look like in practice, however, remains to be seen as despite the proposals for two Council regulations on local border traffic21, there is no concrete plan envisaged.

EU minority policy and external borders

One of the underlying causes for drawing up a new order at the external borders is the issue of ethnic minorities who might be impeded in maintaining family ties with new EU citizens. Some authors even suggest that the EU and its Member States could be held liable of breaching their own international commitments if some flexibility was not introduced in this regard. Examples could include the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the Council of Europe 1995 Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities all of which contain affirmations to the effect that persons belonging to national minorities have the right to establish and maintain unimpeded contacts across frontiers with citizens of other states with whom they share common ethnic or national origin.22

Today, although quantitative approximations are extremely problematic, it might be estimated that no more than one-tenth of the population in Central and Eastern Europe belongs to an ethnic minority. Along the eight sensitive borders listed above, the three largest minority groups are: Rus-

---

21 2003/0193 (CNS) Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a regime of local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States; 200/0194 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a regime of local border traffic at the temporary, external land borders between Member States.

sians/Russophones. The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary have minority populations not exceeding 10% of the total population, in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania minorities comprise up to 25% and in Latvia and Estonia minorities, in fact, a single Russian-speaking or Slavic minority exceeds 30% of the population.

The rights of ethnic minorities are a new area of concern for the EU. This issue first came onto the agenda as a matter of external policy, when the EU began to redefine its relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The bloody collapse of Yugoslavia was taken as a dramatic warning of the potential throughout the post-communist region for a reemergence of ethnic conflict. But at the same time, the obvious aspiration of all Central and Eastern European states to ‘return to Europe’ has presented the EU with an opportunity to influence developments by including minority rights into a broad definition of political conditionality. The European Council of Copenhagen explicitly placed the protection of minorities amongst the political conditions for associated countries that aspire to apply for membership. It has to be highlighted however, that besides the EU, other organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation also greatly contributed to the positive achievements made in minority issues in the region.

Unlike certain regions, such as Moldova and the rest of ex-Yugoslavia, Central and Eastern Europe minority problems have not exploded into armed conflict and are not likely to do so. However, they continue to weigh considerably on the internal evolution of the region and its future relations with the EU. On the one hand, the underlying problem seems to be the dom-

---

23 According to Iris Kempe ‘Russophones’ refers to all former, non-Baltic Soviet citizens in the Baltic states as they tend to be Russified to a large degree. ‘Russian-speakers’ would be a misleading term as many Balts also speak Russian as a second language.
26 Giuliano Amato, Judy Batt, op. cit.
27 “Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.” In Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1.
inant conception of the state in Central Eastern Europe, and on the other, the currently intensified process of nation building. From this perspective, minorities are often viewed as peripheral and illegitimate. They create a potential to question the territorial integrity that is invariably perceived by the nationalizing state as the greatest threat. Nevertheless, it is not justifiable to assume that the situations of these countries are comparable. There is a considerable gap between the minority-friendly policy pioneered by Hungary, the lukewarm or indifferent stance of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the recently tempered hostility of Romania and Lithuania, the continued animosity of Bulgaria and Slovakia, and the confrontational position of Latvia and Estonia.

As a consequence of the ethnic minority issue in Central and Eastern Europe, enlargement will definitely confront the EU with new challenges both in the Inter-Member State and transnational context. As new members bring with them different interests in this matter, which often contradict with EU external relations’ policies or simply the agnosticism of EU, by channeling those interests in the EU decision-making procedure, Central and Eastern European countries will substantially alter the EU policy agenda in the near future.

Currently, there is no EU minority policy as such, however, because of factual constraints of regional history and geography, it is predicted to assume greater importance with the present and envisaged enlargements. Indeed, the Commission Communication on Wider Europe highlights that ‘cross-border cultural links, not least between people of the same ethnic/cultural affinities, gain additional importance in the context of proximity,’ clearly linking the minority issue with both internal and the external relations. Possibly, in the enlarged Union ethnic relations will be inserted in the development policy envisaged for euroregions and other trans-border arrangements. Nevertheless, a cross-border regional policy will be unsustainable without some flexibility introduced into the Schengen system.

29 Andre Liebich, op. cit.
30 Wider Europe – Neighborhood, op. cit.
Conclusions

Although EU neighborhood policy is still relatively in its infancy, as neighborhood policy seems to be becoming the broader and long-term framework of drawing countries closer to the EU politically and economically, it clearly needs to focus on emancipation and more conscious and consistent construction. Enlargement of the EU is a continuous process. Romania and Bulgaria are envisaged to accede in 2007. The door is expressly left open to countries in the Western Balkans. And, there is still debate over the candidacy of Turkey. Furthermore, although EU neighborhood policy is targeted towards countries that are not accepted as candidates for membership at present, in the future it is not unimaginable that they might eventually become members, taking as an example Ukraine, which has been strongly lobbying for candidacy.

Despite very optimistic and ambitious declarations about the benefits of enlargement to both new members and third countries who will become new neighbors, enlargement does create new dividing lines, especially regarding the external borders. The EU cannot allow itself to pursue a classic foreign policy pursued along the lines of inclusion-exclusion vis-a-vis new neighbors. Their exclusion from the process of Europeanization (i.e. transferring political and economic stability through institutions and instruments of EC/EU) contains a risk that should be avoided. Indeed, the EU neighborhood policy aims at the stabilization of the neighboring regions primarily through regional and cross-border co-operation. Since failed economies may lead to political turmoil in these countries, more is needed than just financial aid. The EU has to lead a conflict prevention strategy entailing effective support to the economic and political transformation that is at the very core of the democratization process of these countries.

At the 2004 enlargement round, the effect of enlargement on cross-border cooperation with third countries definitely did not receive the attention due of its relevance. New Members States should have been allowed to contribute their own concepts to the debate in advance. Accession states can bring new value to future specific policies and Eastern initiatives of the EU as their respective, comparative advantage stems from common historical ties, geographic and linguistic proximity, as well as shared experience of post-communist transition. The accession states enter the Union offering better knowledge of realities and understanding of (local) attitudes, as well as a unique set of experiences and know-how. While their financial and military
resources remain limited, they can bring in fresh ideas, regional initiatives and innovative modes of institutionalized interactions in relation to future Eastern and Southern neighbors of an enlarged EU.\textsuperscript{31}

Despite this idealistic vision of a constructive interaction between the EU and acceding countries, in my opinion the EU has not fully succeeded in taking precautionary steps to minimize the detrimental effects of enlargement vis-à-vis new neighbors. The EU has not succeeded in taking into account the historical legacy of the region, and its special geographical features. Nor has it recognizing that migration, minorities and security issues are intertwined at the external borders, including the most sensitive ones listed above. It would have been advisable to allow some concessions or exceptions in this regard. However, it should also be mentioned that the priority of applicant states to clear the way for accession to the EU as quickly as possible prevented them from voicing their particular regional interests 'loudly' enough. Thus, neither side has paid sufficient attention to the issue.

In the future, the feasibility, scope and alternatives to a more flexible Schengen border regime should be planned strategically in advance and made an essential part of further enlargements. Up to now, the visa strategy of EU Eastern enlargement has been restricted to the requirements of the acquis communautaire. However, there is a great need for an active visa policy that would go beyond the technical, standardized aspects of the Schengen regulations and stand for the basis of said sub-regional development. Such a flexible border regime should be designed to facilitate bona fide cross-border relations, and at the same time, capable of fully maintaining the security aspects of the external border. Thus, as far as the regions beyond the future EU borders are concerned, the key question seems to be exporting stability without importing instability.\textsuperscript{32}

Nevertheless, one should also be aware of the risk potentials of an eventual flexible border regime. By admitting the buffer zone countries into the EU, the Union will, for the first time, be in the direct neighborhood of two crisis areas, namely the Western Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Promoting the development of sub-regions comprised of areas of both member and non-member states sounds very appealing, however, there is an underlying paradox in the theory: migration always flows


\textsuperscript{32} Iris Kempe, op. cit. 12.
from poorer to richer countries. Why neighboring countries are still neighbors is due to the fact that they do not meet the economic and political criteria to enter the Union. Thus, easing the visa or border regime might lead to abuse of the legal means of admission by their nationals.

Several consequences follow. First, in what ways security can be maintained even if there are more grounds to enter, must be studied. This might lead to the redefinition of security in the context of migration. The second consequence concerns resetting the hierarchy of priorities. The short-term, almost day-to-day priority of the Community is maintaining its security. However, until there is a substantial gap between the life-standard of the EU and its neighbors, illegal migration will persist. Thus, in light of the long-term objective, one option would be to take the risk and bear the negative consequences of more flexible borders in the short run. The long-term objective would be to enhance economic performance in the neighboring country through sub-regional development to a level where the financial advantage of living in a rich country as an illegal migrant does not outweigh having a modest but legal income in the country of origin and living in the security of the one was born in. It also has to be highlighted that the possibility of EU membership is in itself a stabilizing factor. Thus, the EU should make it clear that the doors are open if a country meets the criteria, but should lay down those criteria in a transparent manner.

I would like to conclude by highlighting that there is a substantial overlap ratio between enlargement, external relations and justice, and home affairs. Thus, their strict distinction is no longer sustainable but shall be replaced by a joint approach towards the issues of minorities, sub-regional development and cross-border co-operation, visas, customs, and security within the framework of EU neighborhood policy.
Authors

NÁNDOR BÁRDI, historian
Teleki László Institute, Budapest

ANDRÁS BOZÓKI, political scientist
Department of Political Science, Central European University

STEFANO BOTTONI, historian
University of Bologna

BARBARA BŐSZE, lawyer
University of Ghent

ZSUZSA CSERGŐ, political scientist
Department of Political Science, The George Washington University

IRINA CULIC, sociologist
Department of Sociology, Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj

LÁSZLÓ FOSZTÓ, anthropologist
Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj, Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology

ÉVA KOVÁCS, sociologist
Teleki László Institute, Budapest

ATTILA MELEGH, sociologist, historian
Demographic Research Institute at the Hungarian Statistical Office

GYÖRGY SCHÖPFLIN, political theorist
Jean Monnet Professor of Politics, UCL-SSEES

ZOLTÁN ALPÁR SZÁSZ, political scientist
Department of Political Science, Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj