

# Summaries

GERGELY AMBRUS

## **Personal Identity: Narrative Constitution vs Psychological Continuity**

The paper investigates Marya Schechtman's narrativist account of self and personal identity, which she dubbed the "Narrative Self-Constitution View". I lay out the main features of this conception by contrasting it with the views of Derek Parfit, a major contemporary representative of the psychological relationalist tradition originating from Locke and Hume, to which Schechtman's theory, and narrativism in general, may be seen as a major alternative. After presenting the main features of these two accounts, I set out to defend Parfit against an important criticism of Schechtman which seeks to discredit Parfit's notion of quasi-memory (and quasi-belief, quasi-desire etc. as well). Parfit's psychological continuity view essentially depends on these notions, hence undermining them provides a ground for accepting narrativism. However, I also argue that the psychological continuity view fails seriously as well, as it does not account for identification I take to be a necessary condition of being the same person. Lastly, I discuss certain possible explanations of identification, and address the question whether these support the narrativist or the psychological continuity view.

*Keywords:* narrative constitution, psychological continuity, Schechtman, Parfit, q-memory.

GÁBOR BOROS

## **First Phase of the Narrative Theory of Identity and Emotions: Dilthey, Misch**

In the last decades, a number of philosophical and psychological theories have made serious attempts to discover and make use of various aspects of different types of narratives from the "novels of time" through biographies and autobiographies to interviews with members of contemporary groups or individuals in therapeutic analysis. Their aims were to understand identity in a broad sense, personal, group-, national, emotional, and other types of it. The initiators and proponents of these theories rarely referred to the two German philosophers, active between the mid-19<sup>th</sup> and the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century who attributed a fundamental role to autobiography as a particular kind of narrative both in history and in philosophy. In spite of their being neglected, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch merit to be integrated in the history of the narrative identity-movement. They emphasised the fundamental importance of establishing narrative connections between the seemingly isolated events in life histories as the most effective instrument to establish meaningful

and coherent life-units. This paper will regard Dilthey and Misch as our contemporaries in order to weigh up their contributions to a renewal and enrichment of the theory of narrative identity and the narrative theories of emotions. Our other aim is to persuade the reader that from this perspective, it is worth involving them in the general discourse on identity and narrativity.

*Keywords:* autobiography, narrative identity, Georg Misch, Wilhelm Dilthey

PHILIPPE CABESTAN

### **Bad Faith *versus* Unconscious: a Credible Alternative?**

It must be admitted that Freud's way of thinking has already lost a part of its credit. However, it is certainly not a reason to claim that the hypothesis of the unconscious is null and void. Therefore, in the paper I will examine whether and how it's possible to keep Freud's hypothesis. First, I would like to draw attention to Heidegger's criticism, which is based on an ontological argument, according to which natural and human phenomena belong to different forms of being. Consequently, one cannot speak of human behaviour as if it were a physical or chemical process. Then, I shall discuss the relation of Sartre's concept of bad faith to the notion of unconscious behaviour. Sartre, as illustrating his concept, proposes that a hysteric is aware of what he doesn't want to be aware of; and, as long as he tries to escape from it, he is necessarily aware of what he tries to escape from. But, of course, the explanations of unconscious behaviour which rely on the concept of bad faith cannot be exhaustive; furthermore, we also have to make room for a notion of unconscious which does not imply that we consider the unconscious as a noun (MacIntyre) or as a thing in-itself (Sartre).

*Keywords:* unconscious, bad faith, Sartre, Freud.

JAMES CARTLIDGE

### **Heidegger's Philosophical Anthropology of Moods**

Martin Heidegger often and emphatically claimed that his work, especially in his masterpiece *Being and Time*, was not philosophical anthropology. He conceived of his project as 'fundamental ontology', and argued that because it is singularly concerned with the question of the meaning of Being in general (and not 'human being'), this precluded him from being engaged in philosophical anthropology. This is a claim we should find puzzling because at the very heart of Heidegger's project is an analysis of the structures of the existence of 'Dasein', an entity that human beings are an instantiation of, the entity that has a relationship of concern towards its existence and which is capable of raising the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger argues that because he only analyses human beings insofar as they are Daseins, he cannot be doing philosophical anthropology, but only fundamental ontology. In this paper, I refute this claim. I provide a sketch of philosophical anthropology which conceives it as the other side of anthropology's coin. Where anthropology is concerned with understanding human difference, philosophical anthropology attempts to understand what is common to all instances of human existence and elucidate its significant features and structures. Whether he likes it or not,

Heidegger is engaged in exactly this kind of project because *anything that applies truly to Dasein applies truly to human beings*. With this in mind, I examine Heidegger's analysis of moods to demonstrate that Heidegger's work is best understood as involving a kind of philosophical anthropology.

*Keywords:* Heidegger, Continental Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ontology, Anthropology, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Moods, Emotions.

PHILIPP HÖFELE

### **New Technologies and the 'Heuristics of Fear': The Meaning and Prehistory of an Emotion in Jonas, Heidegger and Hegel**

In view of the ever-increasing dominance of technology in modernity, which goes hand in hand with an ever-faster development of new technologies as well as an ever-increasing blurring of the boundaries between the natural and the artificial, an evaluation of emerging technologies cannot be put off. As early as 1979, in his work *The Imperative of Responsibility*, Hans Jonas developed a 'heuristics of fear' as a principle and method for assessing the dangers of new technologies in the face of ignorance of their future consequences. As the article attempts to show, the task of this 'heuristics' amounts to more than assessing the risk of technical developments and presenting application-oriented measures based on this assessment. As a feeling, the fear should also illustrate *ex negativo* that which constitutes human existence as such, insofar as technology always inscribes itself in the self-image of humankind. This becomes clear when one goes back to the historical reference point of Jonas' conception of this feeling in Heidegger's analysis of *Angst*, from which it becomes clear that it is a matter of preserving the horizon of possibilities for human *Dasein*. However, Jonas does not only mean the open character of one's own existence in the sense of Heidegger. Similar to Hegel's concept of fear in "Lordship and Bondage", Jonas is concerned with a form of "selfless fear" that involves a collective We and is also concerned about future generations and their possibilities.

*Keywords:* Jonas, Heidegger, Hegel, technology, Angst, heuristics of fear

LORE HÜHN

### **Com-passion: On the Foundations of Moral Philosophy for J. J. Rousseau and Arthur Schopenhauer**

In a first step, the paper will show how Schopenhauer uses his theory of the essential identity of all living beings, which is founded on his voluntarist metaphysics and orients itself on the criterium of the capacity to suffer, in order to problematize the anthropocentric primacy of reason for the grounding of morals. In a second step, the paper attempts to provide evidence that, despite accepting the negativity of suffering without illusions, it is probable that Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion extends to a horizon of possibility articulated in the medium of that which should not be. The paper's critical central thesis is finally that the fundamental contradiction of the ethics of compassion is condensed in the figure of the ascetic. The sense of release (*Gelassenheit*) demanded by the negation

of the will excludes the normative reference to the other which Schopenhauer had once indicated as the mainspring of moral action.

*Keywords:* Rousseau, Schopenhauer, the ethics of compassion, ascetic.

HYE YOUNG KIM

### **An Existentialist Analysis of Forgiveness and Gratitude**

The emotions that are dealt with regularly in Existentialism are angst, guilt, fear, concern, and perhaps shame and such. This is because the core of the understanding of human existence is profoundly related to the finiteness of human existence. Furthermore, the influence of the Christian theological interpretation of human existence on Existentialism is undeniable, whether it was fighting or embracing the ideas of the Christian tradition. Either way, the emotions that were highlighted in existential philosophy or other fields of philosophy did not go further beyond the scope of these certain emotions. I attempt to examine other emotions that have been rather neglected in traditional philosophy, such as gratitude and forgiveness, and show how these emotions are fundamentally related to the understanding of our existence.

*Keywords:* existentialism, finiteness, forgiveness, gratitude.

CSABA OLAY

### **Alienation**

The paper discusses two aspects in the work of three paradigmatic thinkers of alienation: Rousseau, Marx, and Lukács. The first issue can be expressed with the question of what should be reappropriated in overcoming alienation? The second point concerns the question of how we experience our being alienated?

With regard to Rousseau, I examine the structure of what might be called a precursor conception of alienation. Alienation in his sense has the structure of possession and subsequent disappropriation of man's original constitution. Taking Marx's more specific concept into account, it can be pointed out that the general structure of alienation might be described with the possession – disappropriation – reappropriation formula. But in Rousseau we have a simplified version of alienation in the form of hypothetical possession – disappropriation.

The second, shorter part of the paper deals with Marx' theory of alienation. It will be shown that normative basis of alienation in the early Marx is the concept of man's self-realization in the working process that takes place in a double movement of a prior objectification and a following re-appropriation. The last part of my argumentation is dedicated to Lukács's theory of reification in *History and Class Consciousness*. I discuss Lukács's critique of capitalist society with an eye on how the concept of reification partly carries on and partly modifies Marx's conception of alienated labor. This part of the paper shows that even Lukács could not clarify how non-alienated conditions should be conceived.

*Keywords:* alienation, reification, Rousseau, Marx, Lukács.

CSABA PLÉH

**Narrative Identity in Its Crises in Modern Literature**

Modern memory schematization started with the schema notion of Frederic Bartlett. Bartlett used stories to support his constructionist theory. New structural approaches to stories have emerged in the work of Colby, Rumelhart, and others. Like Bartlett, they were looking for underlying social schematization and constraints. Narrative patterns promised to provide a substantial anchoring point for the otherwise elusive concept of schemata proposed by Bartlett. In contrasting the alternative models, the ones relying on elementary social attribution molecules were the empirical winners. This consensus affiliates memory schematization with theories that treat elementary sociality as a basic, non-constructed feature of the human mind. Parallel to research on narrative memory, a narrative movement was initiated in psychology by Jerome Bruner.

These psychological narrative theories were extended to the issue of decompositional theories of the Self. These usually approached from two angles: from the body image and from social roles and relations. The later social role based models turned into narrative construction theories of the Self, promoted by Paul Ricœur and Daniel Dennett, coming from very different philosophical heritages. These theories also relate to the issues of how modern novelists and theorists from Milan Kundera to David Lodge proposed novel writing as a factor in the birth of the modern Self. How then do they postulate a reader who considers the action plans, and how did they try to relate them to layers of action, intention, and feeling?

The twofold heritage was also accompanied by a third attitude that proposed the unfolding of the self in autobiographical story telling practices. The search for explanatory principles underlying schemata by the experimentalists, the use of autobiographical narratives, and the cultivation of broken narrative patterns in modern novels can be seen, as Jerome Bruner proposed, as a modern way to present the traditional dualism between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften* as a duality of a categorical and a narrative approach to the human mind.

*Keywords:* schematization, narrative theory, intentionality, novel writing, Self and narrativity.

JUDIT SZALAI

**The 'Reasons of Love' Debate in Analytic Philosophy:  
Reasons, Narratives, and Biology**

This paper is a contribution to the “reasons of love” debate in analytic philosophy. The claims it is meant to substantiate are the following. First, the “reasons-based”/“no-reason” views do not constitute a genuine theoretical dilemma: we do not love persons for either abstract properties that several individuals can share, or for some elusive “ipseity”. Second, descriptive and normative approaches (why persons love and why they *should* love others) should be clearly distinguished. Third, making distinctions between different forms of (romantic or quasi-romantic) love advances matters a great deal,

as reasons apply to these in different ways. The interplay of different factors in loving persons (personal properties of the beloved as reason-giving, joint history, and bio-psychology) are especially relevant to the types of romantic love.

*Keywords:* love, reason, history, narrative, biology.

TIM THORNTON

### **Narrative Identity and Dementia**

Given both that dementia undermines memory and the longstanding view that personal identity depends on memory, it seems likely that dementia undermines personal identity. That connection has, however, been criticised by those philosophers and healthcare professionals who subscribe to a narrative account of identity. While the capacity to author a self-narrative is also threatened by dementia, that need not undermine personal identity providing that the relevant narrative can be *co-constructed* with others. In this paper I set out the danger of any such view, explore its motivations and provide a minimal account of the role of narrative in dementia making use of the Wittgensteinian notion of secondary sense.

*Keywords:* dementia, person, narrative identity, co-authoring, Wittgenstein's secondary sense.

DAVID WEBERMAN

### **What is an Existential Emotion?**

My aim in this paper is to make more precise the idea of an existential emotion. The framework for my analysis follows Heidegger's account in *Being and Time*. In the first part, I will argue that Heidegger's notion of *Befindlichkeit* is essentially about what we call emotions and that emotions come in two types: i) moods and ii) object-specific emotions. I will argue that Heidegger takes both types (correctly) to be intentional, that is, directed at or about something. In the second part, I use the notion of existential in a way that applies to certain emotions, asking which emotions can be existential and what makes them so. Is it only moods that are existential? And, among moods, are there certain of them such as *Angst* that have a special claim to being existential in the sense used here? This will lead to me to the third part of the paper in which I pursue the various ways in which emotions can be seen as existential depending on how and what they disclose. In the end, I present a sort of template for the existential character of emotions and suggest how the notion of existential might be understood to apply to other things besides emotions (such as ideas or literary works).

*Keywords:* emotion, mood, existential, Heidegger.