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What is an Existential Emotion?

My aim in this paper is to make more precise the idea of an existential emotion. I want to explain exactly what it might mean to say that there is a subset of emotions which qualify as existential. The framework for my analysis follows Heidegger's account in *Being and Time*.¹ While I follow that account, I will be adjusting the vocabulary, probing it in certain ways that he himself does not and building on it to reach some new insights. In fact, my central question about which emotions are existential and what makes them so, uses the term "existential" differently from Heidegger to pick out a certain character, potent and insightful, that some emotions can have.

The paper has three parts: In the first part, I will need to say something about my use of the concept of emotion (a term which is absent from Heidegger's text). Despite what some commentators on Heidegger and other theorists of emotion say, I will argue that Heidegger's notion of *Befindlichkeit* is essentially about we call emotions and that emotions come in two types: i) moods and ii) object-specific emotions. I will argue that Heidegger takes both types (correctly) to be intentional, that is, directed at or about something. This something is their "object" in a phenomenological sense of that term. I will say what the two types, moods and object-specific emotions, have in common and what sets them apart. In the second part of the paper, I want to use the notion of existential in a way that applies to certain emotions (It might apply to other things as well). I will then ask which emotions can be existential and what makes them so. Is it only moods that are existential? And, among moods, are there certain of them such as *Angst* that have a special claim to being existential in the sense used here? This will lead to me to the third part of the paper in which I pursue the various ways in which emotions can be seen as existential depending on how and what they disclose. In the end, I will pres-

¹ Heidegger 1962. Page numbers in the article are indicated by SZ and the German pagination included in the margins of the English edition.

ent a sort of template for the existential character of emotions and suggest how the notion of existential might be understood to apply to other things besides emotions (such as ideas or literary works).

I. BEFINDLICHKEIT, EMOTIONS AND MOODS

Heidegger's neologisms usually have an important point, but they can complicate matters, especially if they only allow us to speak in his way and not to correlate what he says with claims made in our ordinary manner of speaking. In a short but important part of *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses the notion of *Befindlichkeit* as one of three ways (*Weisen*) constitutive of the thereness (the "Da") of Dasein. Most of his discussion is about moods (*Stimmungen*). But he also discusses fear which he calls not a mood, but a mode (*Modus*) of *Befindlichkeit*. But what is a mode of *Befindlichkeit*? And what is *Befindlichkeit* given that it encompasses both moods and modes which are not moods?

My suggestion is the following and it does indeed conflict with many commentaries on Heidegger as well as with some intuitions about how to use the English word "emotion." First, Heidegger's modes of *Befindlichkeit*, such as fear (or anger or jealousy) refer to what we ordinarily call emotions. His analysis of fear makes this quite plain. Second, we can take Heidegger's moods to denote roughly what ordinary speakers mean by "moods", though he fleshes out the notion of a mood in a quite distinctive manner to which I'll return shortly. Third, if moods and object-specific emotions belong to one single category, how shall we understand that category? What is it that Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* encompasses? At this point, I would like to make a controversial move. We can accept what much of what Heidegger says about *Befindlichkeit* – that it is a way of finding oneself, that it is a kind of attunement, that it is a condition for the possibility of anything mattering to us which is a condition for the possibility of anything meaning anything determinate to us – yet also hold that *Befindlichkeit* covers the entire domain of human emotions.

This claim requires a brief defense because it conflicts with the way that many people in English and other languages use the term "emotion." Many are inclined to think that moods are not emotions because emotions are always object-specific, while moods are not. But must or should we use the term "emotion" in this way? Doing so might prevent us from seeing that moods and object-specific emotions have something in common, something that is hard to define but gets at how we feel about things in a, well, emotional way. This is strongly indicated by the fact that anger or sadness can be both an object-specific emotion and a mood. This can't be a mere coincidence or a mere linguistic oddity. Both are feelings of a certain sort. Not any type of feeling. They are not, for instance, like feelings of heat or pain which are what philosophers call

sensations. But a certain type of feeling that seems best captured by the term “emotion.”

Heidegger doesn't use the term emotion at all. Not only is it less common in German than in other languages, its etymology contradicts one of Heidegger's core commitments. Etymologically, it comes from the notion of moving out of some perhaps neutral state. But Heidegger thinks that we are always in some mood and that there is no neutral, mood-less state. And so it's not clear that the etymology helps much here or that it should limit us in any way. We are free to use words in ways that depart from their origin. And we might need an umbrella term for both moods and object-specific emotions. Although Heidegger uses the term “feelings” (*Gefühle*) at one point, this won't do the job because, as mentioned, it is too broad in that includes sensations such as warmth and pain. At another point, Heidegger contrasts his account with earlier philosophical theories of the “affects.” Yet the term “affect” is clinical or academic and possibly misleading since, in medicine, it highlights the largely bodily or facial expression of feeling, not the feeling itself. So, for lack of a better term and for the sake of convenience, I will use the term “emotion.” But much of what I will say does not depend on my choosing that term, except insofar as it presupposes that moods and object-specific emotions belong to a single category.

Now, let me return to moods. If it is a type of emotion, what type is it? Because it contrasts with object-specific emotions, it is natural to think that moods, being non-object-specific, are diffuse or generalized emotions. Yet some philosophers take issue with this way of seeing things. For example, in an essay on Heideggerian moods, Matthew Ratcliffe writes:

It is commonplace to regard moods as generalized emotions, meaning emotional states that are directed at a wide range of objects [...]. A mood, for Heidegger, does not add emotional color to pre-given objects of experience [...]. [A] a mood is not a generalized emotion. It is not a way in which any number of entities appear but a condition of entities being accessible to us at all. (Ratcliffe 2013. 159.)

Ratcliffe is right to say that, for Heidegger, having a mood is an enabling condition. It enables our access to entities by allowing them to matter to us and thus allowing them to mean something in particular to us. Moods, for Heidegger, do not merely “color” objects that are already accessible because already individuated and fixed with a prior determinate meaning. But none of this inconsistent with moods having a generalized directionality. Having some mood or other may make possible the accessibility of entities, while at the same time it is also the case that the moods we have are generalized such that they are directed at not just this or that thing, but anything that comes its way. Moods are both constitutive (if Heidegger is right) *and* generalized background emotions that “cloak” whatever we encounter in an object-unspecific way. Note the word “cloak”

here. I use it, despite its similarity to the word “color” because I want to hold on to the generalized character of moods without giving the impression that the role of moods is at all secondary or superficial.

Now, if moods are generalized emotions, then it would seem to be that when I’m in a sad mood, I’m sad about everything and that the *object* of my sad mood is, as it were, everything. But I do not want to say this. I want to say, following Heidegger as we shall see that moods cloak everything or anything but that the object of our moods is actually something else. Before I say what it is, let me first say something about the idea that moods like other emotions have objects because all states of consciousness, if I can use that non-Heideggerian parlance here, have objects and moods are one type of conscious state.

Do moods and the modes of *Befindlichkeit* such as anger have *objects* for Heidegger? Heidegger does not talk about the “objects” of *Befindlichkeit*. Heidegger does not want to use, of course, the word “object” (“*Objekt*”, or even “*Gegenstand*”) because it implicates what he takes to be an untenable dualism of a self-contained subject and a subject-independent object. He speaks of *Dasein* and for physical object he uses the term “*innerweltliches Seiendes*” for such things as tables and chair. But the philosophical term “object” does not always refer to physical objects; it sometimes refers to what are called intentional objects, that which conscious states or acts are about or directed at.² (I’ll set aside for now Heidegger’s avoidance of the term “consciousness.”) But Heidegger has another term for what emotions are about or directed at. It denotes, in this context, exactly what the term “intentional object” denotes. That term in Heidegger is “*Wovor*.” In his discussion of fear as a mode of *Befindlichkeit*, he says that such modes have three aspects: the “*wovor*” (the in-the-face-of which) of fear, fearing itself, and the “*worum*” of fear (“that about which or for the sake of which we fear.”) The fearing or emoting itself is the experience of being in a particular state (e.g., fearing rather than loving). When we fear an approaching bear, the bear is the “*wovor*” and the “*worum*” is always *Dasein* itself, its survival or well-being (regardless of whether it is mine or someone else’s). Moreover, Heidegger says in this passage that the tripartite structure of emoting itself, the “*wovor*” and the “*worum*” applies not only to modes such as fear but also to *Befindlichkeit* generally (SZ 140). He later applies this same three-part structure to *Angst*. So the point is that all emotions, including all moods, have a “*wovor*” or, as

² See Tim Crane 2008. 489, on the idea of an intentional object. Crane discusses briefly whether moods have objects though he does not reach a conclusion. Analytic arguments for propositional objects should not be regarded as unacceptable to Heideggereans. First, this idea has its roots in Brentano and Husserl. Second, while Heidegger rejects talk of “subjects” and “consciousness” it is still the case that *Dasein* (unlike a stone) is something to which things are disclosed and thus is something like a subject and has something like consciousness. (But this is of course denied by more radical readers of Heidegger and by Heidegger himself.)

I'll call it here in light of contemporary philosophy of mind, an object. (Note, by the way, that the object or "*wovvor*" of an emotion is not necessarily the same as its cause. For example, I may be nervous about an interview which is the *object* of my nervousness even if its cause is too much coffee.

So, now to return to the question of the object of moods: If moods have objects, i.e., something that they are directed at, and if moods are not object-specific but generalized, then it would seem that the object of a mood, such as a sad mood, is everything. But this is, I think, not quite right. It is plausible to hold that everything can be an object of *thought* or *belief*. But it is implausible that everything is the object of our moods, at least, that is of ordinary moods (I'll come back to the distinction between ordinary and a class of special moods later in the paper.) If we believe that everything is physical or, alternatively, that everything is created by God, then our mind is directed at a certain "object," namely, everything, at least in a certain aspect. But moods would seem to be different. Everything is not the object of a sad or angry mood because everything takes in far too much. Is one really angry or sad about everything, about every single thing such that it includes everything *down to the very last thing*? This seems unlikely. One can have a belief about everything because believing something can come in one fell swoop, but I doubt that one can be sad about every last thing all at once. It would be more correct to say that a sad mood is not about everything but about anything, that is, anything that comes my way. It cloaks or casts its pall on whatever I happen to encounter. This is its generalized character, anything not everything. Yet note that "anything" is a variable, meaning that it has the logical form "For any x, if x comes my way, x will be seen as sad or sadness-evoking." But it seems odd to think that the object of my mood has a form involving this kind of variable. A variable seems to be an unlikely object of my moods. So, it seems reasonable to think that the object of a mood must be something else. In fact, this is Heidegger's view. Everything is not the object of a mood, rather there is something else that is. It strikes me that Heidegger has a view about what that object is and it strikes me as a rather good answer to our problem.

For Heidegger, the object of a mood is neither a particular object or state of affairs *nor* everything *nor* the variable "anything"; it is something very particular. Moods bring us up against the fact that Dasein is delivered over ("*überantwortet*") to being and consequently that Dasein is an entity that "must be existingly" (*dass existierend zu sein hat*) (SZ 134). More briefly, moods are directed at the bare fact that Dasein "is and must be", "*dass es ist und zu sein hat*" (SZ 134). Heidegger also formulates this point by saying that we are "thrown", i.e. that we find ourselves existing (and existing in particular circumstances) without having chosen to do so. What we are thrown into is not just that we must deal with having to exist in a generic sense of "exist," but that we must exist in the specifically Heideggerean sense of "exist" replete with all of the necessary and universal

features (*Existenzialia*) that are constitutive of Dasein, e.g. being *Mitdasein* or social, being mortal or *Sein-zum-Tod*, being a project, etc., etc. In other words, our moods have as their object our having to be being-in-the-world. When I'm in a sad mood, I'm sad about that and when I'm in an irritated or a happy mood, I'm irritated or happy about having to be existingly, having to be being-in-the-world. I may not be conscious that being-in-the-world is the object of my mood, since moods are not transparent in their structure, but that is what all moods, on this account, are directed at.

How can we be so sure that being-in-the-world is the object of our moods rather than everything? Can we test that claim for its plausibility? It seems that we cannot test it by asking ourselves what we're consciously sad about when we're in a sad mood because the object of a mood is not always conscious. Introspection does not reliably turn up the object of consciousness. We can however ask ourselves whether we're really sad about cups and saucers and chairs and tables which are part of everything. The clear answer is that we're not sad about cups and saucers and chairs and tables. So we're not sad about everything. By default, then it must be something else. I would propose, whether we know it or not, is our having to be existingly our having to carry on under current circumstances is the better answer. At the same time that the object of our moods is being-in-the-world, our moods cloak anything that comes their way which is compatible with these things first being made available through the having moods, being somehow affect, to begin with.

To conclude this section, then: My reading of Heidegger is that *Befindlichkeit* is a fundamental and necessary aspect of our existence that picks out the emotional side of our existence. These emotions come in two kinds: object-specific and generalized moods. Both kinds of emotions have objects. The objects of moods is our being-in-the-world or, more precisely, our having to be being-in-the-world, which is to say our having to exist with all that's built into Dasein's existence and all the givens of the existence of any particular Dasein. (This having-to-be need not elicit sadness or despair, it may be encountered in delight, when we're in a very good mood or equanimity, when we're in a more neutral, serene mood.)

II. THE EXISTENTIALITY OF EMOTIONS

Might it make sense to say that some emotions are existential? Are the emotions that are existential moods rather than object-specific emotions? Or all or only some moods existential. Here I want to use the term "existential" not so much in Heidegger's technical sense but in a sense more familiar to us from a more generic sense of the term that happens to bear the mark of influence from existential philosophy. I have in mind an adjectival use of that term such that it can

describe certain phenomena such as emotions but other things as well, such as artworks or experiences. Heidegger hardly, if at all, uses the term “existential” in this way. His adjectival use is to designate certain structures as existential if they are necessary, universal and constitutive features of being Dasein. But I think there is value in using the term in another way if it brings out a certain aspect of things of real interest to us, namely an aspect that spotlights the human condition and that contrasts with our everyday absorption in very particular and often very parochial concerns and projects. Let me define it here as follows: something is existential if it brings to light in a profound manner something central to the human condition.

Before proposing my own idea of what makes an emotion existential, consider the following idea provided by Matthew Ratcliffe, the philosopher quoted above, who has developed the idea of an existential feeling in a book titled *Feelings of Being*. Ratcliffe argues for calling them “feelings” rather than emotions, moods or affects for interesting reasons that I won’t go into here. What is important here is his use of the notion that such emotions or feelings are *existential*. He writes:

Existential feelings are both ‘feelings of the body’ and ‘ways of finding oneself in a world’. By a ‘way of finding oneself in the world,’ I mean a sense of the reality of self and of world which is inextricable from a changeable feeling of relatedness between body and world. (Ratcliffe 2008. 2.)

I will not go into the “bodily” aspect which is unfortunately rather neglected by Heidegger. I want to focus on Ratcliffe’s notion that existential feelings are about “a sense of the reality of self and of world” which, as he goes on to say, is about “our relatedness to the world which can range from a feeling of belonging to the world to a feeling of detachment or alienation. Ratcliffe says that this detachment can manifest itself in a range of feelings such that reality can seem “surreal, unfamiliar, uneasy, not quite right or too real” (Ratcliffe 2008. 3). This is not a propositional attitude or belief, Ratcliffe says, but a feeling, i.e. something felt, felt in the body but about something outside of the body, namely and in a word, reality.

To my mind, Ratcliffe has correctly identified and nicely described an important phenomenon, one that lies at the heart of much existential philosophy, from Kierkegaard onwards, and much existential literature (Kafka, Camus, Beckett to cite just a few examples). It also fits and illuminates various pathologies he discusses such as depression, schizophrenia, etc. But his characterization of “existential” in this way seems to me too narrow. It seems to be organized around whether we are healthy, at ease and connected or whether we suffer from some pathology of disconnection. In plotting mood along a single axis of connectedness and detachment, it overlooks that there can be and often is much more to

existence than whether or not we feel at home in it. Let me turn now back to Heidegger for a wider way of characterizing what might make emotions and other things existential in the sense at issue here.

As we have seen, moods have as their object our having to exist in the manner distinctive of Dasein. This would be a broader answer than Ratcliffe's because existence has so much built into it, from *Mitdasein* (being a social creature), to being a project, to being mortal, to having a tendency toward inauthenticity, etc. Does this mean all moods are existential in bringing us up against the fact of having to exist? At this point, it is important to turn to Heidegger's discussion of *Angst*. It gives us a more specific sense of the object of moods – all moods, as well as special ones, the most prominent of which is *Angst*. It will also provide a distinction that can be marshalled for seeing what existential in the sense here means and why certain emotions have a special claim to being existential in that sense.

In his crucial section on *Angst*, Heidegger says that *Angst* is a fundamental and distinctive type of *Befindlichkeit* (“*Grundbefindlichkeit*”, “*ausgezeichnete Befindlichkeit*”, SZ 182, 184). In *Being and Time*, he abstains from calling it a mood. In his later “What is Metaphysics,” he does indeed refer to it a mood (Heidegger 1929/1993). I think the reason for this is while most moods are typically unnoticed backgrounds to experience, the experience of *Angst* is felt when one is in it. In fact, it is so dominant, so overwhelming that all else falls away. Still, it is a mood because it is an emotion or feeling and it is one that has a generalized character cloaking anything (and, even as an exception to the rule, everything, as we will see). It is, in a nutshell, an intense experience of homelessness, detachment, uprootedness.

What is the object of *Angst*? Heidegger says it is “being-in-the-world as such” (“*Das Wo vor der Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein als solches*”, SZ 186). His description of the object of *Angst* is more concise than his description, earlier in the text, of the object of moods in general. However, it seems clear that both moods generally and *Angst* in particular have as their object being-in-the-world, i.e. having to be being-in-the-world. Yet Heidegger adds something to the object of anxiety, namely, the “as such.” While the object of *Angst* is, like the object of moods, being-in-the-world, only *Angst*, unlike other moods, has as its object being-in-the-world as such. What does the “as such” add? I would suggest that the “as such” abstract away from a particular individual's having to be being-in-the-world. Garden-variety moods, such as irritation or sadness, run up against and disclose my *particular* having to exist in a *particular* set of circumstances at a given point in time. *Angst* runs up against and discloses what it is for any Dasein to have to be Being-in-the World in any set of circumstances at any time. In *Angst*, entities fall away as unimportant (“*ohne Belang*”) and as insignificant. This means that we come to see a certain philosophical truth that the world is, otherwise, except in the throes of *Angst* a network of significance and that Dasein's existence consists

in care, as specified by the Existentialia. My point is this: i) all moods have as their object being-in-the-world; ii) garden-variety moods have as their object my particular having to be being-in-the-world in particular circumstances; iii) Angst has at its object anyone's having to be being-in-the-world. That is, the object of Angst, is being-in-the-world as such. It imparts a certain insight into the human condition.

There are a few more things to say here. First: Is Angst the only special mood, while all other moods are garden-variety? If we continue to follow Heidegger (which we needn't do, of course), it is not the only special mood. In his essay *What is Metaphysics* (1929), he suggests that there may be other moods that are like *Angst* such as a certain kind of love, or a certain kind of joy, or a certain kind of boredom. In fact, in his 1929–1930 lecture *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (Heidegger 1995), he develops the idea of deep boredom, a mood which is special because it reveals the nature of what it is to be *Dasein* and what it is to have a world. Deep boredom may cloak everything, but its object is being-in-the-world, not my being-in-the-world but anyone's and everyone's being-in-the-world. This is the point of adding that being-in-the-world is revealed as such.

I will not follow up on other possible special moods here and why it is that they qualify as special, that is, how it is that they reveal what it is, in general, to be *Dasein*. That would take another essay. What I want to say here is that these special moods are excellent candidates for claim of being existential because they show us something about the general nature of existing in a way that garden-variety moods do not. *Angst*, and a fortiori, any mood is existential insofar as and because its object is existing as such.

Heidegger says something else about *Angst* that is relevant here. Earlier I said that moods cloak anything, though not exactly everything. But Heidegger says that the special moods such as *Angst* or deep boredom reveal things as a whole (i.e. everything) and also that they reveal (the) nothing (*“das Nichts”*). Thought, according to Heidegger, gives us only a formal idea of these, the sum-total of all that is and its negation. But, according to Heidegger, special moods and only special moods reveal the real thing: not merely the idea of everything or the idea of nothing, but everything or nothing itself. This claim goes beyond what has been said until now. I am not convinced that it is right. I think the position is that there is a difference between the formal idea of everything and an everything we can encounter that is the real McCoy (the genuine article). The same goes for nothing. There is the formal idea of nothing, that we can think, and then there is the genuine article, nothing itself as encountered in *Angst*. There are two questionable moves here. One is that there is a distinction that can be upheld in the two cases and the second is that we have access to everything and nothing in some non-idea-like, non-formal, non-propositional form. Whether this is defensible or not, it is an extra move that is not required by

the argument above. If it is defensible, then it would mean that we could call the special moods, the “as such” moods, totalizing moods because of their special contact with everything and nothing.

Back to the term “existential.” Let me add here a distinction between two levels of something being existential in the present sense. We can summarize our results stating the following: Garden-variety moods are *minimally existential* because their object is being-in-the-world but only insofar as it concerns my particular being-in-the-world. Special moods are *maximally existential* because they run up against and disclose and have as their object being-in-the-world as such. According to Heidegger some moods (what I have called special and maximally existential moods) are totalizing because they reveal everything and/or nothing. One might go on to say that maximally existential moods are philosophical because they reveal something about the general character of being human. Finally, I would suggest that one can import this notion of existential to artworks and other things and experiences. What I mean is that a novel, poem or play is minimally existential to the extent that it reveals the being-in-the-world of a particular Dasein in particular circumstances and an artwork is maximally existential to the extent that it reveals being-in-the-world as such or what has often been called the human condition.


III. RETURN TO OBJECT-SPECIFIC EMOTIONS

My argument has led to this point: While moods are existential, either minimally or maximally, object-specific emotions are not at all existential. Object-specific emotions are object-specific so they may well be of great importance, in some cases about life and death issues, they don’t tell us about being-in-the-world so they are not existential. They are about, have as their objects dangerous animals (and even harmless spiders) or rude car drivers or, to be more positive, caring parents or one’s favorite football team. Heidegger’s own treatment of fear suggests that object-specific emotions are not directed at our being-in-the-world. While there “*worum*” is always Dasein, their “*wovor*” is never anything but intramundane.

But having thought a bit more about the matter, it strikes me that this might be wrong or far too hasty. Some object-specific emotions might well have an existential component or at least an existential follow-up. A couple of examples: A friend of mine recently felt deep grief when her beloved cat died and it threw her into what could legitimately we called an existential crisis – a crisis about the nature of being-in-the-world and our aloneness underneath it all. It brought out for her, what Heidegger might call, the reality of a certain deficient mode of *Mitdasein*. Similarly, being upset about the sudden diagnosis of a life-threatening ailment might precipitate a kind of existential crisis in which all sort of

questions about the nature, value and point of being-in-the-world come to the fore. Or, modifying an example from Schopenhauer, a storm at sea might elicit object-specific emotions that border on or lead to existential ones. In such cases, the object-specific emotion seems to precede both temporally and perhaps even logically the existential mood or existential experience. So, one might say that it is not the object-specific emotion that is existential but a certain mood that it triggers. Now, Heidegger, to my knowledge, does not see or mention this. In the closing paragraphs of the section on fear, he discusses how fear, if it is sudden, can slip into *Erschrecken*, or into *Entsetzen*, if it is combined with *Grauen*. But none of these states is existential in the sense meant here, none are about being-in-the-world. Heidegger's section on object-specific emotions is very short. But I would propose the following: while moods are directly existential, minimally or maximally because their object is being-in-the-world, object-specific emotions can be indirectly existential, because while their object is not being-in-the-world, they can very quickly turn into an experience which does indeed have being-in-the-world as its object. Grief for one's dead cat can in principle bring about a state that raises existential flags.

To summarize this interpretation, I provide the following diagram:



IV. RUNNING UP AGAINST, DISCLOSING AND REVEALING

The reader may have noticed the following terminology used in my analysis. I have said that moods have objects that they “run up against,” or “disclose” or “reveal.” In Heidegger’s text, there is also use of various descriptors such as “*begegnen*,” “*aufbrechen*,” “*sich zeigen*,” “*enthüllen*” and most prominently “*erschliessen*” (disclose). There is a sentence in Heidegger’s text that has especially tipped me off to what I would call a certain ambiguity in these words and perhaps in the all-important Heideggerean notion of disclosure (or disclose and disclosive). On SZ 185, Heidegger introduces Angst as a “methodologically disclosive” (“*metho-*

disch erschliessende”) *Befindlichkeit*. But, earlier he had said that all *Befindlichkeit*, all moods and emotions are disclosive. So why does he say here that *Angst* is disclosive and methodologically so. Well, perhaps his point is that while all emotions are disclosive, only *Angst* is methodologically disclosive because it helps us to the philosophical insight of what makes the world a world and what makes *Dasein* care. In fact, I think this is so. And it supports the distinction I have made between garden-variety and special moods, where the former are about my being in the world and the latter about being in the world as such which has a certain methodological privilege because it tells us about the philosophical nature of *Dasein* and world. This point signals, I think, a certain ambiguity in the term “disclose.” When moods disclose the world as irritating or sad or worthy of joy, they do so by letting things appear and matter in a certain way. But they don’t necessarily reveal anything new or give us any new insights beyond just the world appearing in a certain way. But when *Angst* is experienced, we are led to new insights. New things are revealed to us that go beyond things appearing in a certain way. It seems that one can distinguish two senses of disclosure: i) letting things appear in a certain way and ii) giving us new revelations or insights. This may even be in line with a criticism levelled by Tugendhat (1967) about Heidegger’s theory of truth as disclosure and unconcealment. That is, truth as disclosure only tells us that what truth presupposes, namely, letting things appear in a certain way. It is another matter altogether to say whether things appearing in a certain way gives us any purchase on the world and whether it gives us a new insight that was absent until a particular disclosure took place. Perhaps this is another way in which garden-variety moods are different from special moods. While garden-variety moods disclose in the first way, letting things appear in a certain way, only special moods give us new insight or realizations. These new realizations are maximally existential, giving us new insights into the “as such” of our existence. In fact, in this sense, special moods are not only maximally existential, they are philosophical. This is a reason to think that philosophy does not rely on arguments alone. Certain special moods might have a role to play in advancing philosophical enlightenment about the human condition.

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