

## Preface

The present volume of the *Hungarian Philosophical Review* addresses current issues in the philosophy of self. The contributions may be divided into two larger groups. The first set of papers discusses themes that evolved in the frames of the narrative approach to self and personal identity. The second group is organized around the idea of existential emotions (e.g. *angst*, guilt, compassion, gratitude, forgiveness), the sort of emotions assumed to be fundamental for being an individual self (or a *Dasein*). The idea that both narrativity and existential emotions play an essential role in characterising the nature of human existence has become prominent in the last few decades.

The section *Narrativity and Self* begins with Csaba Pléh's paper which provides an overview of the origins of narrative theories of the self. Among the diverse sources Pléh lists psychological research on narrative memory, initiated by Jerome Bruner, philosophical theories suggesting a narrative construction of the self, promoted e.g. by Paul Ricœur and Daniel Dennett, modern novelists and literary theorists from Milan Kundera to David Lodge who proposed novel writing as a factor in the birth of the modern self, and also research on specifically autobiographical narratives that present the unfolding of the self in autobiographical story-telling practices. He concludes, agreeing with Bruner, that the search for explanatory principles underlying schemata by the experimentalists, the use of autobiographical narratives, and the cultivation of broken narrative patterns in modern novels can be seen as a modern way to present the traditional dualism of *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften* as a duality of a categorical and a narrative approach to the human mind.

Gábor Boros' paper addresses the particular role research on autobiography played in narrative theories of identity. Boros notes that contemporary narrativist theories of identity rarely mention Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch, two German philosophers, active between the mid-19<sup>th</sup> and the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. Dilthey and Misch, in Boros' opinion, were notable forerunners of these contemporary movements, whose views deserve to be integrated into the history of narrative identity movement. Boros also argues that the theories of Dilthey

and Misch are not only interesting from a historical point of view, but may also be seen as providing new ideas to the contemporary discourse on identity and narrativity.

Tim Thornton investigates another aspect of the narrative approach to self and personal identity, namely its possible applications to dealing with patients with Alzheimer disease and other types of dementia that lead to a diminished presence of selfhood and personal identity. Thornton starts his discussion with the longstanding view that personal identity depends on memory, and since dementia causes serious deterioration of memory functions, hence it undermines personal identity. He, then, draws attention to views of philosophers and health-care professionals who criticised this connection, relying on a narrative account of identity. These critics maintain that while the capacity to author a self-narrative is threatened by dementia, personal identity may nonetheless be saved if the relevant narrative can be *co-constructed* with others. Thornton explains the dangers of any such co-constructionist proposals, and also suggests an alternative, minimal account of what role narratives in dementia may play, making use of Wittgenstein's notion of secondary sense.

Gergely Ambrus addresses the philosophical debate between two strongly opposing approaches, the psychological continuity and the narrativist theories of the self and personal identity. In particular, he examines Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view and contrasts it with Derek Parfit's neo-Humean psychological continuity theory. Ambrus sets out to defend Parfit against a major criticism of Schechtman which seeks to discredit Parfit's notion of quasi-memory (and quasi-belief, quasi-desire etc. as well). Parfit's psychological continuity view essentially depends on these q-notions, hence undermining them provides a ground for accepting narrativism. Despite defending it from Schechtman's attack, the author also argues that the psychological continuity view fails seriously, as it does not account for identification he takes to be a necessary condition of being the same person. The paper concludes by considering some possible explanations of identification, and by considering whether they support the narrativist or the psychological continuity view.

Judit Szalai's paper is a contribution to the "reasons of love" debate in analytic philosophy, and in laying out her own position she draws upon the role of narratives in making distinctions between different forms of love. She argues for the following tenets. The opposition between "reasons-based" and "no-reason" views does not constitute a genuine theoretical dilemma: we do not love persons for either abstract properties that several individuals can share, or for some elusive "ipseity". Further, she also stresses that descriptive and normative approaches concerning love, viz. why persons in fact love others and why they should love must be clearly distinguished. Third, distinguishing between different types of love is important, since reasons apply to these in different way. Lastly, she also shows how the interplay of different factors in loving persons,

such as personal properties of the beloved as reason-giving, the joint history, and bio-psychological factors are relevant in understanding romantic love.

The section *Self and Existential Emotions* begins with David Weberman's paper attempting to delineate what is the subset of emotions that might be qualified as existential. He takes as point of departure Heidegger's account of affectivity in *Being and Time*, while adjusting the terminology and developing the conception in directions Heidegger did not explore. The paper examines Heidegger's notion of *Befindlichkeit* as a description of two types of what we call emotions: moods and object-specific emotions. The importance of moods lies in that moods bring us up against the fact that *Dasein* is delivered over ("*ueberantwortet*") to being and consequently that *Dasein* is an entity that "must be existentially". In a second step, Weberman analyses the existential character of certain emotions, showing also other moods than *Angst* to be existentially relevant. As a conclusion, the paper suggests an adjectival use of the term existential such that it can also describe other things, e.g. artworks or experiences.

Lore Hühn examines in her paper *Com-passion* how Schopenhauer, relying on the essential identity of all living creatures, casts doubts on the primacy of reason in delivering a foundation of morals. Instead of reason, Schopenhauer argues, the capacity to suffer should be taken as the basis of an alternative model of ethics of compassion to an ethics of recognition. Furthermore, compassion is a distinguished experience that strikes the subject in his innermost core, for it concerns the subject's fragility and vulnerability as basic elements of its finitude. Hühn explores the theoretical proposal of an ethics of compassion critically, and concludes that the fundamental contradiction of an ethics of this kind is exhibited in the figure of the ascetic. She highlights that the sense of release (*Gelassenheit*) implied by the negation of the will excludes the normative reference to the other which for Schopenhauer was earlier the chief motive of moral action.

Hye Young Kim analyses the general characteristics of emotions like angst, guilt, fear, concern, and shame that are regularly treated in Existentialism. In her view, these emotions are existentially relevant, because they belong to the core of human existence in its finitude. In addition, Kim underlines the Christian theological element in the interpretation of human existence. The paper investigates other emotions rather neglected in these discussions such as gratitude and forgiveness, and makes a case for the claim that these emotions are fundamentally related to the understanding of human existence.

James Cartlidge's paper articulates doubts whether Martin Heidegger's frequent refusal of the categorization of *Being and Time* as philosophical anthropology is justified. Cartlidge finds Heidegger's argument that his project as 'fundamental ontology' cannot be a piece of philosophical anthropology is not convincing, since at the very heart of Heidegger's project is an analysis of the structures of the existence of '*Dasein*'. Despite Heidegger's all protestations, *Dasein* is an entity that human beings are an instantiation of, the entity that has

a relationship of concern towards its existence and which is capable of raising the question of the meaning of Being. Cartlidge provides a sketch of philosophical anthropology as an attempt to understand what is common to all instances of human existence with its significant features and structures. He examines Heidegger's analysis of moods to show that his work is best understood as involving a kind of philosophical anthropology.

Philippe Cabestan discusses Freud's legacy, especially the hypothesis of the unconscious, with regard to its credibility. To do this, he first follows Heidegger's criticism based on the distinction of natural phenomena and human phenomena. In a second step, Cabestan considers Jean-Paul Sartre's concept of bad faith, because Sartre thinks that, for instance, the hysteric is aware of what he doesn't want to be aware of and, as long as he tries to escape from it, he is necessarily aware of what he tries to escape from. The paper argues that the concept of bad faith alone is not able to explain unconscious behaviour, and the theory of the unconscious needs to be liberated from tendencies that treat it as a noun (MacIntyre) or as a thing-in-itself (Sartre).

Csaba Olay examines three paradigmatic thinkers of alienation – Rousseau, Marx, and Lukács – in order to show a general structural problem of different conceptions of alienation. He identifies in Rousseau what might be called a simplified precursor conception of alienation which has the structure of possession and subsequent disappropriation of man's original constitution. The paper compares this view with a more specific version of alienation in Marx' thought that might be described with the possession – disappropriation – reappropriation formula. Olay analyses Lukács's critique of capitalist society within the Marxist tradition with an eye on how the concept of reification partly carries on and partly modifies the conception of alienated labour as a basic tenet of Marx's thought. The paper shows that Lukács could not clarify how non-alienated conditions should be conceived.

Philippe Höfele's paper seeks an evaluation of emerging technologies on the basis of Hans Jonas' "heuristics of fear" that constitutes a principle and a method for assessing new technologies without knowledge of their future consequences. Höfele shows that this "heuristics" offers more than assessing the risk of technical developments, since the fear reveals at the same time *ex negativo* what constitutes human existence as such. In Jonas' view, a new technology always appears in the self-image of mankind what is illustrated by his historical reference point in Heidegger's analysis of *Angst*. Heidegger's description clarifies the importance of preserving the horizon of possibilities for human *Dasein*. Höfele argues that Jonas completes Heidegger's analysis of the open character of existence with the proposal of a "selfless fear" that involves a collective We and future generations as well.

*Gergely Ambrus – Csaba Olay*