

Summaries

Is it Permissible to Believe in Moral Responsibility?

LÁSZLÓ BERNÁTH – TAMÁS PAÁR

In this paper we counter arguments which claim to establish that, in light of insufficient evidence, we should suspend belief in moral responsibility. We propose two arguments, the first of which shows that even if we lack sufficient evidence for moral responsibility it is not the case that we should suspend belief in it. We are under the obligation to suspend our belief about moral responsibility only if we are actually morally responsible – as we cannot have any significant obligations in case we are not morally responsible. We substantiate this argument by scrutinizing the various ways a skeptic could demand us to suspend our judgment. Our second argument shows that taking into account all our possibilities, our best option seems to be to continue believing in moral responsibility. Otherwise we would risk too much, including failing to believe in important truths and disregarding significant moral obligations.

Doxastic Deontology without Voluntary Control

GÁBOR FORRAI

The paper challenges William Alston's argument against doxastic deontology, the view that we have epistemic duties concerning our beliefs. The core of the argument is that doxastic deontology requires voluntary control over our beliefs which we do not have. Alston relies on the ought implies can principle (OIC) to substantiate the idea that deontology requires voluntary control. The paper argues that Alston misconceives the OIC principle which constrains our duties in the epistemic cases, namely, the „can” of OIC should be explained in terms of individual cognitive capacities rather than voluntary control. This understanding of doxastic deontology saves our everyday doxastic deontological judgments but also renders doxastic deontology useless for epistemological purposes; in particular, it offers no hope for the deontological concept of justification.

Why Is It Not Working?

VIKTOR GENG

The presumed dichotomy between so-called propositions of fact and propositions of value is often criticized from different aspects. One of these critiques is based on the sup-

position that in the process of choosing and accepting a so-called factual claim epistemic values always play a significant role (explicitly or implicitly). In other words, accepting factual statements presupposes values. Consequently, facts and values are inseparable from each another. In the paper I discuss some objections to this view. In my opinion, the idea that epistemic values play a significant role in accepting factual claims does not necessarily refute the logical thesis of dichotomy between facts and values – in particular not in the way the critics of the dichotomy argue for this.

Mathesis universalis and the Infinite

Mathematics as a Norm of Knowledge in the Early Modern Age

TAMÁS PAVLOVITS

Early modern philosophers founded the method of scientific knowledge, the *mathesis universalis*, on mathematical methods. This method is based on a simple mental operation (*intuitus*) by which reason is able to know simple ideas and their connections directly. At the same time, early modern mathematicians (who were more often than not philosophers as well) developed new mathematical methods which integrate the infinite into mathematics (projective geometry, calculus). However, these methods cannot be founded on the basic mental operation of knowledge because the infinite refuses to be immediately known. The paper analyses this tension between the *mathesis universalis* and mathematical methods based on the infinite in the early modern age. The paper argues that mathematics did not live up to the philosophical norm of knowledge defined on the basis of mathematics.

Physicalism on Shaky Grounds

The Interpretation of Materialism in View of Samuel Alexander's Space-time Theory

DÁNIEL PAKSI

Materialism (physicalism) is the most popular ontological view among philosophers today. The reason for this, however, is not that there are strong philosophical arguments for it or that scientific facts clearly support it. Rather it is because 1) by the deceptive concept of physicalism it gives the impression as if physics and science would necessarily be on its side; 2) the concept of physicalism is so loose that almost everything could fit in; 3) its analytical methods prevent that successful counter-arguments and facts could appear within one coherent framework, that is, it prevents the emergence of a real, significant contender to physicalism. I also argue that Samuel Alexander's emergentism is a real, coherent contender and that 20th physics is not siding with materialism but rather with Alexander's emergentism. Besides I will also show that the allegedly strongest argument in favour of materialism, which is based on the concept of the causal closure of the physical world, is in fact unfounded.

**The Veins of Time on the Leaves of Ideas
The Absurd Temporality of the Antinomies and the Monogram-argument**

OTTÓ HÉVIZI

This paper is an attempt to argue for and with Kant against Kant, who, as is well known, claimed that temporality only belongs to our empirical experiences, not to our ideas. However, one can find numerous examples of the opposite view in Kant's writings. My thesis is that the pattern Kant followed in his philosophizing on time and temporality (i. e. the forms of our conceptions of time) has also been unconsciously applied by him in the field of ideas, especially in that of the cosmological ideas in the antinomies. The so called „monogram“-argument is an attempt to give a clear and logically correct form to this claim. In addition to the above argument, my paper means to provide another important proof of the very strong link between antinomies and temporality: namely, that the four pairs of theses-antitheses presented in Kant's antinomies correspond to the oppositions given by Sextus Empiricus in the chapter „On the Time“ in his *Pyrrhonianum Hypotyposion*. The conclusion of my paper is that Kant's cosmological ideas had certain temporal roots.

**Kant on Imagination and Phantasy
The Relation between Objective Experience and Non-realistic
Sense Formation**

ÁKOS FORCZEK

In my paper I focus on the Kantian distinction between imagination and fantasy. First I expose the role the schematising imagination plays in the teleological process of producing objectively valid cognitions as Kant describes it in the two versions of the *Transcendental Deduction* and the *Schematism Chapter* of the first *Critique*. Next I examine the function of fantasy on the basis of several passages from the published *Anthropology* and especially from Kant's handwritten literary remains. I point out that Kant characterises the operations of fantasy as uncontrollable processes of spontaneous sense formation which incessantly jeopardise discursive thinking. I argue that he tries to cope with this problem on an anthropological level by appealing to the operative concepts of normality and abnormality, pathologising fantasy and excluding it from the scope of his critical interests. My paper aims at grounding the possibility of elaborating a more complex theory of experience within the Kantian framework than outlined in the *Critiques*.

The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon

MÁRTON KORÁNYI

In spite of the fact that Francis Bacon was a politician in the first place, his political philosophy is not so well-known as his thoughts concerning the sciences. The cause of the subordinate role of politics may be that he didn't really systematize his political ideas, which can be found dispersedly in different contexts and in various works. In the paper I try to reconstruct the principal elements of Bacon's political philosophy. I start with

the analysis of some essential ideas of his moral philosophy which have connection to his political thinking. After that I focus on the sources of his ideas and review some of his essays contrasted with the writings of Guicciardini and Machiavel in order to understand better the intellectual context of his works. The main themes of this chapter are the concept of civic greatness, the role of simulation and dissimulation in politics and the architecture of fortune. Finally, I present some contradictions in Bacon's political thoughts between its realist elements like the necessity of making amoral decisions sometimes and the Christian virtue of charity, and suggest that Bacon believed that these contradictions may have been resolved by the development of sciences which could reconcile political oppositions and facilitate living in society.

The Connection between the Phenomenology of Religion and Theological Origin Heidegger on the 'Historical'

ANNA JANI

Heidegger's investigation of the 'historical' is apparently divided among the problem of the phenomenological method and the question of the early Christianity. In this sense Heidegger understands the 'history' of Christianity either as the reference (*Bezug*) to the factual life, which means at once that Christianity is not involved in our life, otherwise it is an execution (*Vollzug*) of factual life in the event of Christianity. Part of the 'historical' is defined through the Heideggerian analysis: it is a question whether it is coming from the interpretation of the phenomenological method, and whether the phenomenological method could only be achieved by the Christian life experience, or the investigation aims at the Christian life experience by the historical phenomena. Heidegger's analysis of the historical phenomena raises the question, if it is possible to arrive from the 'historical' to the core of the Christianity.