

Summaries

Angol absztraktok

The Paradox of Mimesis

BÉLA BACSÓ

In my examination of Aristotle's *Poetics*, I tried to delineate an approach which explains the *mimetic* character of artworks. We can explain Aristotle's notion of *mimesis* only if we are able to connect the *Poetics* to his other works (i.e. to *De Anima* and *The Nicomachean Ethics*), and it would be very important as well to sever the notion of *mimesis* from the old-fashioned idea of *imitation*. As Gadamer in one of his early texts explained: „For there is no doubt that the essence of mimetic representation consists precisely in the recognition of the represented in the representation. A representation intends to be so true and convincing that we do not advert to the fact that what is so represented is not 'real'.” Or, as in a recent excellent explanation of Aristotle's mimetic concept of art Halliwell formulated: „The idea of mimetic mirroring dissatisfied Aristotle, and this fits with his general avoidance of a conception of mimesis as a counterfeiting of the real.” In my analysis I scrutinized the interpretation of artworks as being mimetic in a non-imitative sense and also the *paradoxical* existence of artworks in our world, due to their dual status as both reflecting and creating the “real world”.

Skepticism and Compensation. On Odo Marquard's Political Philosophy

LÁSZLÓ LEVENTE BALOGH

Although Odo Marquard is not a political thinker *par excellence*, the political implications of his ideas cannot be denied. Marquard is a representative of that sceptical political generation whose peculiar liberal-conservatism has uniquely determined the intellectual and political relations of the Federal Republic of Germany until to-day. Since Marquard did not write any political works or monographs, or political philosophy, we must reconstruct his political philosophy and its sources from the particular motifs of his thinking. Marquard's two basic philosophical concepts are scepticism and compensation, the examination of which also sheds light on some his other basic ideas.

The Theory of Abstract Sets Based on First-Order Logic with Dependent Types
MIHÁLY MAKKAI

Since the mid 1990's, the author has been working on a foundational project involving higher dimensional categories on the one hand, and model-theoretical methods used for typed versions of first-order logic on the other. In this paper, the project is called the Type-Theoretic Categorical Foundation of Mathematics, and it is referred to by the acronym TTCFM. The present paper is a discussion of the first level of TTCFM, abstract set theory. To display the close relationships, as well as the differences, of abstract set theory and topos theory, I will base my discussion on a review of parts of F. William Lawvere's paper [-]. The present paper starts out with a general introduction to TTCFM.

He Does Care for the Art of Poetry As Such. On Schiller's Literary Typology
ZOLTÁN PAPP

The paper (whose title is an allusion to the *Ars Poetica* of the Hungarian poet Attila József) is a critical analysis of Schiller's treatise *On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry*, focussing on a fundamental contradiction in the text. On the one hand, Schiller insists that modern, artificial culture as a whole cannot regain the naturalness that once marked ancient Greece. On the other hand, sentimental poetry is necessarily imperfect unless it is able to take on traits belonging to its opposite. The first motive seems to be stronger, but the criteria that define the contrast of the two types of poetry are flexible enough to allow for a synthesis. Thus, whereas culture as such remains artificial, literature can represent a new kind of naturalness.

„Abschrift der Natur” – The Copy of Nature
SÁNDOR RADNÓTI

August Wilhelm Schlegel's *The Painting*, written in 1799, is a record of an actual visit to the Dresden gallery a year before. Its characters, Schlegel, his wife, Caroline, and his brother, Friedrich, had in fact a debate about art, and the picture descriptions in the essay were written by Caroline. My study focuses on the question of mimesis; as landscape by definition encompasses a mimetic similarity to a real or imagined land, I concentrate on this part of the debate. At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, an academic hierarchy of artistic genres was still prevalent, and the low estimation attached to landscape made it, *par excellence*, a modern genre. This, however, brought about contesting the basis of the hierarchic classification, i.e. that landscape is a mechanic replication of nature, as opposed to poetic narration. To this end the old, Renaissance anti-mimetic argument is actualised: the elective theory, according to which by creating a fictitious montage of selected bits of landscape, the artist can 'improve' nature. This prepared the ground for the more modern anti-mimetic thought that landscape teaches the viewer to see; not in the sense of everyday vision, but as a kind of cultural practice. Landscape aims not to enrich our knowledge about nature, but to evoke a modern relationship with it. That is why Philipp Otto Runge put it onto the agenda of contemporary art.

