

“American Letters” Imre Széchenyi’s 1881 Tour of America

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Under the heading “Hungarian Nobles travel to America,” the March 27, 1881 issue of the Budapest-based weekly *Vasárnapi Újság* [Sunday paper]¹ reported somewhat belatedly that five young aristocrats arrived in New York City. The article informed its readers that the goal of the noblemen’s trip was to study American wheat markets, wheat exports and the issue of immigration. Indeed, five young nobles from Austria-Hungary completed a study tour of the USA in 1881. The members of the group were the Count Imre Széchenyi and his brother Géza, (aged 23 and 21), Count Ernst Hoyos (25), Count Géza Andrassy (25) and Baron Gabriel Gudenus. The group was lead by the 42 year-old, German journalist/economist, Rudolf Hermann Meyer.² The five young aristocrats were related to each other. Meyer viewed Count Hoyos and Baron Gudenus as Austrians and the other three as Hungarians. The group’s arrival was also noted by the March 6, 1881 issue of the *New York Tribune*, which listed their coming under the heading “prominent arrivals” and gave their lodgings as the Grand Central Hotel. An interview with Géza Andrassy, the spokesman for the group, was published on page 8 of the *New York Tribune* the following day. Andrassy stated the one of the purposes of the group’s trip was to study cattle breeding and agriculture in America. The reporter mistakenly identifies the Széchenyi brothers as the “sons of the great Hungarian patriot of that name, who together with Kossuth, opposed the Hapsburg monarchy in 1849.”³

After the tour Imre Széchenyi and Rudolf Hermann Meyer published books about their American experiences and observations. Széchenyi’s book was written under the pseudonym I. Somogyvári and was titled “*Amerikai levelek*” egy hosszabb zárszóval [American letters with a longer postscript], while Rudolf Meyer’s was titled *Ursachen der amerikanischen*

Concurrenz [Causes of American Competition]. Chapter 39, of the 42 chapters in Meyer's book discussed public administration in America and was written by Géza Andrásy.⁴ While Meyer's book was long, 832 pages, Széchenyi's was a mere 132. Both books were published in 1883. Meyer published a second, more than 600-page book in the same year, titled *Heimstätten- andere Wirthschaftsgesetze der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, von Canada, Russland, China, Indien, Rumänien, Serbien und England* [Homestead and economic laws in the USA, Canada, Russia, China, India, Romania, Serbia and England]. In his first book Meyer mentions the trip and his companions several times, while on p. 513 of this second book, he again mentions the study trip he completed with the five aristocrats.⁵

Imre Széchenyi spent about eight months in the US, from March to October 1881, and his travels took him to places throughout the USA. His book is composed of three parts, the first part is a collection of the letters that he sent to the Hungarian papers while in the USA, and the headings of the letters were indications of where they were written; New York, Washington, Florida, New Orleans, San Antonio, Kansas, Albuquerque, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Winnipeg (Canada), and Chicago. The second, briefer part of the book is a collection of drawings, prints and explanations of the workings of new American agricultural machinery that he saw in the US. The third section, his postscript, was where he compared Europe's vs. America's advantages in agriculture and offered solutions for Hungary so that Hungarian agriculture could increase its competitiveness in world markets. We know from Meyer's book that Széchenyi visited several other places in the USA, e.g. Yellowstone River and Las Vegas, but these side-trips could be classified as tourist visits and he did not write about these places.

In the book's foreword Széchenyi states that his goal for writing the book was not only to write a travelogue but also to observe "the reasons behind the threatening American competition." In the postscript Széchenyi predicts that in the European markets competition will increase, as "in addition to exports from the United States, Canadians exports will grow, Australia recently started, India just entered, and Mexico will enter the marketplace in the near future...." He goes on to say that in his summary of the competitive advantages of the United States he will exclude those that are "due to the constitution and geography" and will concentrate on those that can be copied by Hungary.

Table 1. Széchenyi's summary of the agricultural advantages of each continent (p. 92).

	Europe's advantages	America's advantages
1.	Low interest rates	Majority of land is cultivated by owners.
2.	Inexpensive labour	Cheap land prices and fertile soil.
3.	Geographic proximity to markets, thus shorter transportation routes	Inexpensive building construction.
4.	More controlled social relations (?)*	The elimination of middlemen and warehousing costs due to grain elevators.
5.	Greater application of scientific knowledge in agriculture	Cheaper transportation.
6.		Lower taxes.
7.		Larger landholdings.
8.		Use of machinery.
9.		Better educated and more intelligent farmers.
10.		Security of landownership.

*(?) in the original

The Economic background

In the 19th century, Hungary, like most other countries on the continent, was a predominantly agricultural society. According to Scott Eddie's calculations,⁶ Hungary's agricultural population in 1869 was 75% of the total population. In 1880 this percentage dropped only to 74%, and in 1890 to 72.5%. Agriculture employed most of the country's labour; 75% of the labour force worked in agriculture in 1869, 71% in 1880, and 69.9% in 1890. The distribution of landholdings in Hungary has been studied by Eddie.⁷ It is summarized in the Table 2 below. The 1867 distribution of holdings was published by Károly Keleti in 1873 and is also quoted by Széchenyi (p. 108). As the table shows, the majority of landholdings were very small.

Table 2. Distribution of landholdings

Size of units (holds)	1867		1885
	Properties in 1,000s	Area 1,000 ha	Area 1,000 ha
0-5	1,444	3,801 (14.2%)	9,368 [^] (33.2%)
5-30	904	4,847	

		(18.1%)	
30-200	119	3,879 (14.5%)	4,262 [†] (15.1%)
200-1,000	13	3,833 (14.3%)	3,529 (12.2%)
1,000-10,000	5	8,195 (30.6%)	8,511 (30.2%)
Over 10,000	0.2	2,262 (8.4%)	2,539 (9%)
Total	2,486	26,817	28,209

[†]0-35 holds; [‡]35-200 holds (One hold = 1.42 acres = 0.575 hectares)[‡]

On the political front, the Compromise of 1867 (the *Ausgleich*), which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, gave autonomy to Hungary to deal with internal affairs but provided for a common external policy, including the continuation of the customs union that had been established in 1850. The agreement on the customs union was renewed every ten years, until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I.

Austria was the largest buyer of Hungarian crops (70%) and Hungary was significant destination for Austrian exports (40%).⁹ Similar results were shown by calculations completed in the 1880s; that is, 86.5% of wheat export went to Austria, 7.52% to Germany, 5.9% to Switzerland; while 55% of the flour export went to Austria, 20.6% to Great Britain, 8.33% to Germany, 5% to Italy, and 4.23% to Switzerland.¹⁰ The period between 1866 and 1872 can be described as a period of increasing free trade in Europe. The reversal began in 1873 and lasted until 1879 — and in many countries even longer. The economic depression began with financial failures in Vienna that spread to most of Europe. It also affected the American banking system starting in late 1873. A liberalized incorporation law in Germany led to the founding of new enterprises, such as the Deutsche Bank, as well as the incorporation of established ones. Euphoria over the military victory against France in 1871, combined with the influx of capital from the payment by France of war reparations, encouraged stock market speculation in railways, factories, docks and steamships. On May 9, 1873, the Vienna Stock Exchange crashed, no longer able to sustain false expansion, insolvency, and dishonest manipulations. A series of Viennese bank failures resulted, causing a contraction of the money available for business lending. In Berlin, the railway empire of Bethel Henry Strousberg crashed, bursting the speculation bubble there. The contraction of the German economy was exacerbated by the termina-

tion of war reparations payments by France in September 1873. The reaction to the depression was protectionism and an increase in tariff rates.

Széchenyi's answers

Széchenyi feared the loss of the European, especially the German market, the British flour market and possibly the loss of the Austrian market for Hungarian agricultural products. Why? When Austria lost the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and Austria was excluded from the German *Zollverein* system (customs union), Austria and Hungary became viewed as outsiders, that is, tariffs were applied to them. As Széchenyi said "one of the reasons for our loss in sixty-six was the disparity of our arms."¹¹ To prevent the repeat of such defeat, "we also purchased breech-loading rifles! We must do the same with [agricultural] competition from America." (p. 92) Hungary must adopt strategies and tools used by the US, as the price of American agricultural products, including the cost of transportation, was below that of many European producers' prices.

While the total wheat export from the USA in 1850 was 792,768 bushels, 0.8% of all exports, by 1867 it had grown to 6,192,371 bushels, or 4% of all exports. In 1850 2,431,824 barrels of wheat flour were exported, by 1878 exports of wheat flour had increased to 3,947,333 barrels, a 60% increase. Based on the *US Statistical Abstracts*,¹² the table below summarizes wheat produced and exported from the USA (pp.124 and 126).

Table 3.

American wheat production and exports 1869-1878 (in bushels)

	Total production (domestic and imports)	total exports	% of wheat in total exports
1869	225,407,093	17,907,442	7.94
1870	260,998,226	36,996,585	14.18
1871	236,601,879	34,797,215	14.71
1872	232,269,023	26,999,985	11.62
1873	251,473,604	39,591,451	15.75
1874	282,900,792	71,833,749	25.39
1875	308,405,747	53,327,474	17.29
1876	293,704,558	56,441,828	19.22

1877	289,685,406	40,790,064	14.08
1878	365,545,154	73,654,621	20.22

The largest markets for US grain were England, Ireland, France, Belgium and Germany. For Hungary to be able to compete, Széchenyi called for government action and intervention. The first step in this process, Széchenyi argued, should be the improvement of the living standard of the farmers/landowners. A landowner (*földbirtokos*) is a person according to Széchenyi, "who can support himself and his family without having to look for outside employment" (p. 109) As table 2 above shows, the amount of land owned by the majority of Hungarian peasants was small and subject to further subdivision, so government intervention was needed to prevent the further division of land. The biggest advantage American producers had over Europeans, according to Széchenyi, was the fact that in the US the cultivators of the land were the owners of the land. Ownership made "better farmers" who can "react to changes in market conditions quickly." (p. 93) A stable landowning class is "ready to protect its property." (p. 94) One big factor for the stability of American landownership was the Homestead Act. This Act was a federal law that gave an applicant freehold title to up to 160 acres (1/4 section, 65 hectares, 37.4 holds) of undeveloped federal land. The law required three steps: filing an application, improving the land, and filing for deed of title; which was meant to protect the farmers' property. Homestead laws were designed to protect the farmer's home from creditors, and provided the right of occupancy to a surviving spouse, minor children, and unmarried children of a deceased owner. It also afforded reduced property tax treatment for the farmer. "Homestead exemption" refers to the tax exemption or reduction, and the exemption from debts or execution for the payment of debts. However, the exemption does not mean that landowners could not lose their home to creditors or that a lien could not be placed on the home. If the farmer borrowed money with the home as collateral, the mortgage holder could foreclose and the exemption had no effect. If an unsecured creditor sued and obtained a judgment, the creditor could enrol the judgment as a lien on the property. In most states there was a homestead exemption of between \$300-\$500, meaning that creditors could not execute on the homestead and take the home. In a way this concept is opposite of the ideas of Sándor Matlekovits (1842-1925),¹³ a prolific writer on economic issues. His 1865 book, *A földbirtok: a nemzetgazdaság jelenlegi álláspontja szerint rendezve* [Land ownership: in light of the current

state of the economy],¹⁴ argues against government intervention on property size (p. 39) and this was a book that Széchenyi may have read.

Contrary to Matlekovits, Széchenyi does not only see the role of the state in determining the minimum size of property, he also assigns several other roles to the state. If farms are small, economies of scale in production cannot be achieved by individual farmers, but with the state's help, transaction costs can be reduced and *network externalities* can be achieved. Based on his American experiences Széchenyi urged that, to reduce transaction costs, the Hungarian state should: 1. Provide regular and reliable information and statistics, i.e. price discovery methods, and 2. Extend educational opportunities to all.

According to Széchenyi each state in the US had a department of agriculture and there was also a federal department of agriculture. In his book he describes the federal Department of Agriculture, headquartered in Washington DC and surrounded by an agricultural experimental station as well as a model garden. The department is charged with publishing statistics, new findings in agriculture, and publishes crop reports. Széchenyi was most impressed with the experimentation carried out in the basement of the department with new machinery. He praises the department for mailing out seed packets and information free of charge, and also for sending students to the best European schools to study. He reports that the department also has agents in Europe who are charged with finding markets for American products. The departments of agriculture in each state, naturally see their role as helping the local farmers and they achieve this by publishing annual and monthly statistical reports. These state agricultural departments also provide weather predictions by flying colour-coded flags, and organize county-wide agricultural fairs. Széchenyi concludes that both the "federal and the state governments do everything in their power to help improve the welfare of the farming community." (p.117) This is because the various government departments bear the cost of providing information, the farmers' productivity increases. Széchenyi argues that the work carried out by both the federal and state departments of agriculture is one that drives the growth of the agriculture sector, as it impacts productivity, reduces costs and improves the standard of living for farmers.

Today we would probably judge parts of a subheading in Széchenyi's book politically incorrect. The subheading reads "the better education and higher intelligence level of the farming classes" (p.112) and deals with the education and reading abilities of various ethnic groups. There were three reasons why Americans are better educated than their Hunga-

rian counterparts according to Széchenyi. There are the schools themselves, the press, and active participation by Americans in public affairs. As for the school system itself, though schooling is not compulsory, American education is superior to the Hungarian system as it is free. In new states, schools are funded by revenues from sale of property donated by the federal government.

At the time Hungarian literacy or, rather, illiteracy rates were quite appalling. According to historian István György Tóth, in 1880 “42.6 percent of the population [in Hungary] aged fifteen to nineteen was illiterate, this proportion among the age-group over sixty was 58%.”¹⁵ Széchenyi wrote that most blacks were literate (p. 13), US statistics of the period say otherwise. According to these in 1880 “only” 17% of the total population was illiterate, and 8.7% of the white native-born and 12% of white illiterates were foreign born; but 70% of the blacks were illiterate.¹⁶

The American press is criticized by Széchenyi for going after sensational news, but is praised for providing the readers with lots of practical information, and even detailed market reports. These reports are a component of public education as they add to the knowledge of the farmers. He reports that “the freedom of the press is more perfect [than in Hungary], as editors do not have to worry about the terror of various organizations of journalists.” (p. 118)

The educational value of participatory government is praised by Széchenyi. He refers to Géza Andrassy’s detailed notes on various levels of government in the state of Michigan. These notes became the chapter on public administration in Meyer’s book. Széchenyi comments that many positions in public administration are elected positions and that the majority of the officials elected receive only small compensation. The two advantages of this electoral system with minimal compensation are, according to Széchenyi, the facts that running the government is inexpensive and the “bureaucrat” must maintain his farm to survive. With this description of the American local government Széchenyi implicitly criticizes the Hungarian system. In that system, to use the words of historian László Kontler, most districts were the “patrimony of local potentates and political groups, elections were, as a rule, managed, and there was large-scale patronage at all levels of administration.” While in the US, with the passage of the 15th amendment in 1870, all males could vote, even after the passage of electoral reform of 1873 in Hungary only about 6% of the adult male population could vote, as voting was based on property qualifications.¹⁷

Széchenyi summarizes the differences between Europeans and Americans by their respective answer to the question, “why do you do this, this way, instead of that?” In most cases a European will answer “my father, my neighbour does it this way.” If the same question is posed to a Yankee, the answer is “I do it this way because I want to achieve this or that, this way.” (p. 120) The point that Széchenyi makes, is that the Americans always think about their goals. To transfer this goal-oriented mentality to Hungary, he proposes that the Hungarian county governments should encourage the acquisition of these American attitudes.

Széchenyi praises American ingenuity when he writes that most of the machinery that was imported from Europe to America in a short time became modified and transformed into more useful and more efficient machinery. The reason for this is the fact that American ingenuity was aided by protection by the patent of office — and the high cost of labour. All these factors together create efficient farms. As new land is added and methods of farming become more efficient, production grows and American agricultural exports will reach more and more European countries.

In economics and business, a network externality (or effect) is the effect that one user of a good or service has on the value of that product to other people. When network effect is present, the value of a product or service increases as more people use it. This is not the same as the concept of economies of scale, which means that making many copies of something is cheaper, per item. Network externalities means that there are benefits if increasing number of people use the same thing. Széchenyi lists two examples where adopting the American usage would lead to network externalities for Hungary. These are: 1. standardized wheat grades and 2. the use of grain elevators to store the wheat. Using standardized wheat grading system helps to ensure that producers get paid maximum value for their grain according to the quality of the grain, reliable grading helps attract and keep customers who buy grain for its consistent quality and lastly graded grain allows the use a bulk handling system that helps keep handling and transportation costs low. This last advantage is connected to Széchenyi advocating the use of grain elevators. He describes that in Hungary each producer's grain was kept separate, while in the US transportation was in bulk, as grading occurred at grain elevators near railroads. Through grading, grain with similar qualities received from different producers is combined into larger lots for more efficient handling and transportation. Széchenyi acknowledges that Hungary had taken steps in this direction after the visit to America of Ödön Miklós (1857-1923) to

study grain elevators, and the subsequent building of grain elevators in Budapest between 1880 and 1883.¹⁸

Among other American advantages that Széchenyi discussed were in the realm of construction. In the US farmers could order ready-to-assemble buildings. These were delivered by railroad and reduced the cost of the construction of farm buildings. He also advocated the use of warehouse warrants in Hungary. In America a warehouse warrant was a receipt for the deposit of goods/wheat in a warehouse or grain elevator. This receipt represented a title of ownership to the goods deposited and could be sold as such on a commodity exchange as well as used by farmers as loan collateral.

Széchenyi's book created quite a stir in Hungary. Within three years of its appearance two books were published to refute some or all of his arguments. In 1885 Zoltán Bosnyák (1861- 1948),¹⁹ a playwright and an employee of the Ministry of Interior, published his criticism of Széchenyi's work in a book titled *A birtokminimum mint agrárreform Magyarországon* [Minimum landholding as agricultural reform in Hungary]. The book argues against Széchenyi's goal of terminating the continuous break-up of smaller properties, suggesting that state intervention would create not a more productive agriculture but more waste (and communism). According to Bosnyák the whole idea of preserving properties originated with Rudolf Meyer (see p. 5 of Bosnyák's book).

Jakab Pólya's (1844-1897)²⁰ *Agrár politikai tanulmányok: Minimum, homestead. Öröködési jog* [Studies in agricultural politics: Minimum, homestead. Right of inheritance]²¹ was published in 1886. It mentions Széchenyi's proposals in a positive light (p.26). But Pólya disagrees with Széchenyi's conclusion, namely that tiny holdings near large estates "breed passionless lives and unemployment (poverty)," and argues that poverty in the Hungarian countryside was due to ignorance, the peasants' lack of ambition, and their lack of opportunities to improve their standard of living. Pólya argues that the legal system could not deal with the minimum land-holdings issues, only additional bureaucracy would be created with the passage of such laws (issues like determining minimum by land quality, access to water, etc). While Bosnyák's book centered on trying to disprove Széchenyi's logic, Pólya's book started with the discussion of methods employed by other states (e.g. the 1825 law in Bavaria, the 1827 law in Sweden, and the 1843 law in Poland) to achieve the goal of property size maintenance. Pólya argued that plots too small to provide sustainable income will encourage the creation of larger estates and thereby increase poverty. In certain areas, Pólya added, namely in those that are

capital and labour intensive — like the growing of grapes, flax, hemp, rice, and in horticulture — small plot size was an advantage. Another place where there should be small holdings, according to Pólya, was near factories as this type of ownership would “increase the independence of the working class ... and increase [the workers’] diligence.”²²

Although nothing came in Hungary of Széchenyi's suggestions regarding minimum landholdings, the issue did not disappear. As he wrote nearly two decades later in his foreword to the first volume of János Baross's *Agrár öröklési jog* [Agricultural inheritance law], there had been several books published opposing his ideas. In this foreword Széchenyi defined his original goal of writing his 1881 book as “to help the deteriorating position of the middle and small propertied class.”²³

Conclusions

Neither Széchenyi nor Bosnyák discussed how the termination of the further subdivision of landholdings was to be achieved, whether everyone who desires to own land should receive some holdings and from where would this land come from, or what was to happen with those who did not have enough land. According to Pólya, Széchenyi believed that land between 10 -160 hold (the equivalent of 14.2- 270 US acres) should not be allowed to be subdivided, but neither Széchenyi nor Pólya explained by what method this could be achieved. (Pólya, p. 25)

The seminal work on Hungarian visitors to the US in the 19th century was written by Anna Katona in 1971 and 1973.²⁴ She examined at the publications of 21 writers. She divided their writings by date, 10 writers visited the US before the Civil War and 11 between 1877 and 1900. The pre-Civil War writers were members of the “radical and the most intellectual part of Hungarian nobility” who described the US as a “New Paradise and a model to go by.” She summarized the works of the second group of writers as “grudgingly admiring the US, at the same time being critical of the US,” describing the US as hectic and a money-centered place. Majority of the writers in this group were scientists. Katona placed Imre Széchenyi in this second group, as his visit was in the post-Civil War period. Imre Széchenyi's book represents more of a transition between the first group and the second. Széchenyi was an aristocrat (just like his distant cousin, Béla Széchenyi, who wrote about his trip to America in 1862) who admired what he saw in the US and wanted his country to imitate the United States. And, just like most of the travelogues written by the first group, his book used statistics to prove his points.

An unanswerable question is how much was the young Imre Széchenyi influenced by Meyer's opinions and political views; the similarities of the two authors' observations in several places are striking. Meyer (1839-1899) studied history, philosophy and economics in Berlin. In 1864/65 Meyer worked as a tutor in Hungary, which is where he probably met some of the families whose sons he accompanied. The organization and the style of Meyer's book is similar to Széchenyi's. Both arrange their chapters according to the places visited and support their arguments with statistics. Although Széchenyi refers to Meyer in his book only once, (see Meyer's book, p. 80) Meyer mentions Széchenyi and his travelling companions a number of times, and refers to their discussions. Meyer relates for example that he and Imre Széchenyi compared notes (p. 123) and even quotes Széchenyi's remark that the Red River Valley near Fargo was similar to the Bánát region of Hungary. (p. 617) The success and the wealth of American farmers (and his political disagreement with Bismarck which resulted in his imprisonment) convinced Meyer to emigrate to the US and to start a farm. This farm was successful, and Meyer returned to Europe only in 1897.

The American belief in the importance of education, the practice of participation in local and national politics, the use of modern agricultural techniques in the US, made lasting impressions on the young Széchenyi. After his return to Hungary he did try to transplant some of what he had learned during his American tour to his native country. In his later life Széchenyi donated large sums to local public elementary and secondary schools. He was active in local and national politics. He served on the boards of Hungary's Agricultural Industrial Corporation, the Hungarian Industrial and Agricultural Bank, and the General Hungarian Creditbank. He was a director of the Hungarian Mortgage Institute and was the deputy director of the Hungarian Athletic Club. He also founded the Somogyvár kindergarten and was the author of three further books: a monograph on Somogyvár published in 1892, a book entitled *Teleitési Törekvések Németországban* [Efforts to establish settlements in Germany] (1893), and still another book called *Egyke* [Only child] (1906).²⁵

It might be added as a kind of a postscript that Imre Széchenyi, just like his distant cousin Béla,²⁶ referred to meeting Hungarians in the US only once. Both wrote about the unfortunate immigrants who were forced to leave Hungary because of economic hardships. Imre Széchenyi praised the US immigration system for helping new arrivals. It is interesting to note that the September 25th and October 23rd (1881) issues of the *Vasárnapi Újság* [Sunday paper] reported that the Széchenyi

brothers, Imre and Géza, and Count Andrásy were made honorary members of the San Francisco Hungarian Benevolent Club, but there is no mention of this meeting in Imre Széchenyi's book. Széchenyi mentioned meeting Slovaks (*felvidéki tótok*) in Kansas who were then employed by the railroads but were saving money in hope of buying a homestead. (p. 31) He also quoted an unnamed American-Hungarian housewife who supposedly said that "good cottage cheese strudels cannot be made from American wheat as the dough cannot be stretched." (p. 20)

NOTES

¹ <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00030/01412/pdf/01412.pf> (see page 205, bottom of column 2).

² Dr. Rudolf Hermann Meyer (1839-1899) studied history, philosophy and economics in Berlin. In 1864/65 Meyer worked as a tutor in Hungary, which is where he probably met some of the families whose sons he accompanied. [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Meyer_\(Publizist\)](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Meyer_(Publizist))

³ 1881, March 7, *New - York Tribune* (1866-1899), 8. Retrieved May 17, 2010, from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Tribune (1841-1922). (Document ID: 1340962882). The other stated goal was to look into the economic conditions of emigrants.

⁴ The chapter was also published in *Vaterland*, a periodical Meyer was associated with.

⁵ András Vári, "Fenyegetések földje. Amerika a 19. század második felében — Magyar szemmel" [The land of threats. America in the 2nd half of the 19th century — through Hungarian eyes] in *Korall, Journal for Social History*, issue: 26/2006. <http://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00414/00018/pdf/153vari.pdf>. According to Vári, amongst themselves the group's members spoke German, but Imre Széchenyi spoke English as well.

⁶ Scott M. Eddie, "Agriculture as a Source of Supply: Conjectures from the History of Hungary, 1790-1913," in *Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy*, ed. John Komlos (Boulder, Co.: East European Monographs, No. CXXVIII, 1983), 101-117.

⁷ Scott M. Eddie, "The Changing Pattern of Landownership in Hungary, 1867-1914," *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 20, 2 (Aug. 1967): 293-310.

⁸ <http://www.unc.edu/~rowlett/units/dictH.html>

⁹ D. Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914* (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1984).

¹⁰ Lajos Thallóczy (*Strommer*) (1856-1916), historian, member of the HAS and president of the Hungarian Historians Society. http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thall%C3%B3czy_Lajos; Lajos Thallóczy, *Oroszország és hazánk* [Russia and our country] (Budapest: Athenaeum R. Társulat, 1884).

http://books.google.com/books?id=TV1IAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Lajos+Thall%C3%B3czy,+Oroszorsz%C3%A1g+%C3%A9s+haz%C3%A1nk,+1884&source=bl&ots=JXsyEad5OR&sig=1EoU7aHzZqX4ct4PIT2OkRupCuE&hl=en&ei=JiThTPzaNIqsaOcot2NDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

¹¹ The Austro-Prussian War (Seven Weeks War, the Unification War) was a war fought in 1866 between the Austrian Empire and its German allies on one side and the Kingdom of Prussia with its German and Italian allies on the other, resulting in Prussian dominance over the German states. In the Italian unification process, this conflict is called the Third Independence War. The major result of the war was a shift in power among the German states away from Austrian and towards Prussian hegemony, and impetus towards the unification of all of the northern German states. It saw the abolition of the old German Confederation and its partial replacement by a North German Confederation that excluded Austria and the South German states. The war also resulted in the libartaion of Venetia from Austrian rule.

¹² <http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1878-01.pdf>

¹³ <http://www.kislexikon.hu/matlekovits.html> Sándor Matlekovits, *A földbirtok: a nemzetgazdaság jelenlegi álláspontja szerint rendezve* [Land ownership: in Light of the Current State of the Economy] (Pest: Kugler Adolf, 1865). <http://www.archive.org/details/afldbirtokanemz00matlgoog>

¹⁴ István György Tóth, *Literacy and Written Culture in Early Modern Hungary* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001), 200. http://books.google.com/books?id=icGSKXVSwIwC&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=literacy+rates,+Hungary,+1880&source=bl&ots=PTcSH5tmGd&sig=7yRNLPIGzslbPjp-rsNduiXUEL8&hl=en&ei=r2DtS_PbBYH6lweotZm1CA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CDAQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=literacy%20rates%2C%20Hungary%2C%201880&f=false

¹⁵ http://nces.ed.gov/naal/lit_history.asp

¹⁶ László Kontler, *A History of Hungary* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 281.

¹⁷ <http://www.kfki.hu/physics/historia/localhost/egyen.php?nanev=miklos>

¹⁸ http://netlexikon.hu/print.php?fn=1&id=2156&tn=yrk_Ryrgenwm

¹⁹ Jakab Pólya (Pollák) (1844-1897). Economist, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1893.

²⁰ <http://books.google.com/books?dq=birtok%20torveny%201883&q=Szemenyi&id=JroLAAAAYAAJ&ots=SGtzY6z1jn&output=text&pg=PA29>

²¹ In his review of the minimum landholdings debate in Hungary, Pólya dates the idea to István Széchenyi, who when giving instructions to the representatives of the county of Pest argued for a minimum of 30 hold (42.6 acres) for the nobility in 1831. According to Pólya, István Széchenyi's argument was based political goals, on building the 'Hungarian nation', for in "Széchenyi's time the nobility and the peasants were Hungarian, while the bourgeoisie was German. His

idea was to force the lesser nobility to become craftsmen and merchants.” (p. 24)

²¹ János Baross (1875-1926), <http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/BarossJ%C3%A1nos> <http://books.google.com/books?pg=PP1&lpq=PA75&dq=szechenyi+foldbirtok&id=x6tLAAAAYAAJ&ots=ATNuCAL7BV#v=onepage&q&f=false>

²² Anna Katona, “Hungarian travelogues on Pre-civil War America,” in *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok*, 5 (1971): 51-94. Anna Katona, “Hungarian travelogues on Post-civil War America,” in *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok*, 7 (1973): 35-52.

²⁵ <http://mek.niif.hu/00300/00355/html/ABC14240/14621.htm>, also at http://www.mtda.hu/books/az_egyke_szechenyi.pdf

²⁶ Tibor Glant, “Fájdalmas küldetés: Gróf Széchenyi Béla amerikai útja 1862-ben” [Painful mission: Count Béla Széchenyi's American trip in 1862] in *Gyarmatokból impérium. Magyar kutatók tanulmányai az amerikai történelemről*, [From colonies to empire. Hungarian researchers on American history], ed. Frank Tibor (Budapest: Gondolat, 2007), 88-103.