

commentators. Neither advocated a complete denial of the German request: transportation of German troops across Hungary and help in the occupation of Yugoslavia. What the more moderate elements insisted on was placing limitations on the nature, size, and timing Hungarian participation. Teleki, for example, insisted that Hungarian troops not enter Yugoslavia before that country disintegrated, and that they should not, under any circumstances, cross the pre-1918 southern border of Hungary. Náray's version of events, however, reinforces the impression created by historians of wartime Hungary that the meeting did reach a consensus to proceed with caution. Subsequently, however, this stance was abandoned in discussions between the German and Hungarian leadership, the latter being represented by the General staff and Minister of Defence Bartha. For this change, Náray, like so many commentator before him, blames Horthy. Náray also adds that, after the Council's meeting, Bárdossy revised the minutes in a way as to make his speech appear more pro-German than it had been according to Náray's notes taken during the proceedings. Obviously, he was anxious to be on the side of the winners.

Late in 1941 Náray was relieved of his secretaryship. His next appointment was as head of Hungary's information services. His account of his experiences in this post offers glimpses of Miklós Horthy as a statesman (with whom Náray had a few interviews), and of István Horthy as a close acquaintance. He also relates how the Germans extended their control over the Hungarian broadcasting industry after their occupation of Hungary in March of 1944.

The appearance of Náray's memoirs is an important event for historians dealing with the story of wartime Hungary. Even more significant is the fact that, ever since the late-1980s, such works can be published in Hungary. It is also fortunate that Hungary has the people with expertise to evaluate and to edit such works properly. This volume in particular has been succinctly introduced and meticulously annotated by Szakály.

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Milan S. Durica, *Jozef Tiso, slovensky knaz a státnik, 1887–1939* [Jozef Tiso: Slovak Priest and Statesman, 1887–1939] Abano Terme: Piovan Editore, 1989. 318 pages.

This is a new work of the author on his favorite subject: Slovak politics and the struggle of the Slovaks for autonomy in the first Czechoslovak republic (1918–1938). This monograph is a study of Tiso by a fervent supporter of the idea of an independent Slovak state. We should keep this

fact in mind when we read Durica's account of a Slovak clergyman and politician from his early childhood to his becoming the Slovak Populist Party's deputy in the Prague Parliament, and later, the leader of the Slovak Republic (1939–1945).

Born in a small town in Upper Hungary, today's Slovakia, Tiso went from Slovak elementary school to Hungarian-language high school, to the Roman Catholic seminary in Nitra. He was selected by bishop Vilmos Batthyány for advanced studies in the imperial capital of Vienna. Here Tiso earned a doctorate in theology. During his years in Vienna (1906–1911) Tiso already demonstrated his Slovak nationalist convictions. After World War I, as a parish priest, Tiso displayed a keen interest in political life in the newly-established Czechoslovak Republic as a member of the Slovak Populist Party, founded by another Slovak priest, Andrej Hlinka. Tiso himself was incarcerated by the Prague government for his political activities.

Later he demonstrated considerable caution in his public life as a Slovak deputy in the Prague parliament. In the late 1920s became one of the Slovak members of the Czechoslovak cabinet. This participation of the Hlinka party in the government of the Republic diminished the popularity of the autonomist party among Slovak masses. The majority of Slovaks were against cooperation with supporters of what they saw as the "fictitious" idea of a single Czechoslovak nation.

Slovak presence in the Prague government was perturbed by the so-called "Tuka Affair." Professor Vojtech Tuka was a leading member of the Slovak Populist Party. In January 1928, he published an article in the official paper of the party. In it he explained that in October of 1918 a gathering of Slovaks in the city of Martin accepted a resolution according to which the Slovaks agreed to live in a common state with the Czechs for a period of ten years, after which they could decide their own political future. In view of this fact, according to Tuka, a legal void, a *vacuum juris*, would exist between Slovaks and Czechs after October of 1928.

Tuka was put on trial by the Czechoslovak government for his views and was sentenced to a fifteen year prison term. As a result of this court case, the Slovak ministers of the Prague government resigned, while the Slovak Populist Party continued its opposition to the central government and its demand for Slovak autonomy.

The Tuka Affair was a blow to Tiso who, out of fear, emphasized his faithfulness to the Czechoslovak republic until its demise. In 1938 he made contacts in Budapest and secretly discussed a possible compromise between Slovaks and Hungarians there. After the Munnich settlement, a meeting of the Slovak Populist Party declared the autonomy of Slovakia, still within the framework of the diminished and re-structured Czecho-Slovakia.

The Munnich Agreement of 29 September, 1938, specified that a revi-

sion of Czechoslovakia's borders with Poland and Hungary would have to be agreed upon within three months after direct negotiations among the governments concerned. On October 19, a Slovak delegation led by Tiso was received by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Here Tiso proposed the creation of an independent Slovak state and cooperation between it and the German *Reich*. In these and other negotiations, Ribbentrop used the Slovaks against the Hungarians and prepared for the penetration of German influence into Slovakia.

In the post-Munich discussions regarding the future of the Slovak Hungarian border, the government in Prague asked for arbitration by Germany and Italy in the matter, while the Hungarian government requested a plebiscite under international supervision in the territory inhabited by Hungarians adjacent the Hungarian border. The Prague government remained silent on this proposal of a plebiscite, while Tiso informed Ribbentrop that he could agree to it, but only if Jews were to be barred from voting. In the end, the dispute was settled through the arbitration of the German and Italian foreign ministers, rendered in Vienna, on November 2, 1938.

After the Vienna Award, according to Durica, the only choice for Slovaks was the attainment of complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia. Many young Slovak radicals, on the other hand, strove for the complete independence of Slovakia, and sought German economic and political help in this struggle. Slovak independence was declared in mid-March of 1939, after Hitler had occupied Moravia and Bohemia and placed them under German "protection."

Durica's present study on Tiso before his becoming the first (and only) president of an independent Slovakia, is a substantial work, based on research in numerous archival collections. It is a valuable contribution to a sensitive chapter of Slovak history, which presumably will be followed by a biography of Tiso the statesman and his struggle for the realization of his ideas and plans in the Slovak state.

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