

The Radicalization of Hungary's Swabian Minority after 1935

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After World War I, the victorious Allies redrew the national boundaries of the defeated Central Powers, partly in order to liberate their various ethnic minorities. The Paris Peace treaties might have redressed a few of these peoples' plight, but tensions between some of the East Central European states and their German-speaking minorities soon poisoned the international atmosphere and opened the door to German penetration of the region. The literature concerning these intra-national controversies is vast. Trianon Hungary's German minority, the so-called Swabians, has received fairly extensive coverage by Hungarian, Austrian, German and North American area specialists.¹ In spite of this, with the exception of Loránt Tilkovszky, no scholar has investigated in depth the radicalization of Hungary's Swabian minority, a process that began shortly after Hitler's *Machtergreifung* in Germany.

This study explains how the *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* (VK), the pro-Nazi wing of Hungary's Swabian movement, endeavoured to wrest concessions from the Hungarian government after 1935.² It concentrates on the year 1938, a crucial watershed not only for Hungary, but for the entire Danubian area. The Third Reich achieved hegemony in Central Europe that year. Austria was incorporated into Germany in March, and Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland followed in October. For the first time, Hungary and Germany shared a common frontier in what had once been Austria before the Anschluss. Now, Hungary risked being isolated from Poland and Italy by further German advances in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The Magyars were alarmed lest these external perils be exacerbated by internal difficulties. The government and public feared that Nazi propaganda would seduce the Swabians, especially those residing in Hungary's western counties adjoining former Austrian territory.

During the early postwar years, the few Swabian *völkisch* (nationally conscious) radicals had been harmlessly dispersed in the government-sponsored *Ungarländisch-Deutscher Volksbildungsverein* (UDV), the only Swabian cultural organization tolerated in Trianon Hungary. When the dissidents within the UDV, mainly young intellectuals, seceded from the parent organization in 1935, they still lacked mass support. But by 1938, the VK had begun to attract devoted followers from among a growing number of disaffected Swabians stimulated by Germany's successes. The *Deutscher Volksbote* (DV), the VK's official monthly publication, served as an efficient propaganda tool by combining thinly disguised National Socialist doctrinal appeals with protestations of Hungarian patriotism.³ The DV's editorials and articles were couched in eloquent but simple prose, so that the average Swabian peasant or worker might readily comprehend the essence of their *völkisch* messages. The DV's 1938 issues are particularly pertinent. They clarify how the VK's radical leaders sought to secure a special position in Hungary for their co-ethnics by exploiting Swabian desires for local autonomy and indigenous educational facilities.

A historical survey of the Swabians' position in Hungary explains some of the VK's reasons for demanding change.⁴ Prewar Hungary's German population of nearly two million out of eighteen million inhabitants had been vastly reduced as a result of the country's dismemberment.⁵ On June 4, 1920, the Treaty of Trianon ratified most of the post-war territorial changes. Hungary's population shrank by about two-thirds, and her territory by nearly three-quarters. This treaty also dictated several measures, including an array of regulations for the treatment of Hungary's remaining ethnic minorities. Post-Trianon Hungary's population of about eight-and-a-half million included a few scattered Rumanians, Slovaks, and Serbs. But the German minority was fairly numerous and influential. In 1930, the number of Hungarian citizens claiming to be German approached a half million, or nearly 6 percent of Hungary's total population. Only about 100,000 of them were scattered throughout Trianon Hungary. The remainder resided in strategic regions near Yugoslavia; around Budapest not far from the Czechoslovak frontier; and in the counties adjoining Austria.⁶

At war's end, Hungary's rulers enjoyed what they perceived to

be an unprecedented advantage. For many centuries, Hungary had been a multinational country; now, she had become a Magyar state, with the major exception of the Swabians. Postwar leaders wanted Magyars to be the dominant nationality. Non-Magyars could use their mother tongue, maintain their cultural heritage, and attend ethnic elementary schools in localities having sizeable minority populations, if they desired. However, if non-Magyars wished to succeed in professional careers or ascend the social ladder, they had to learn Magyar, and adopt Magyar cultural norms.⁷

Hungary's plans for a homogeneous Magyar nation-state clashed with growing Swabian autonomist aspirations. Before the war, the Swabians had been patriotic Hungarians, despite assimilationist practices that eroded their intelligentsia and thus imperilled their long-term ethnic survival. During the war, their leader, Professor Jakob Bleyer, conceded that the Hungarian state had every right to Magyarize the Swabian intelligentsia. It was, he believed, a normal part of urbanization and modernization through the natural process of acculturation. Swabian rural culture would survive these losses, but only if the German ethnic village school system remained vigorous.⁸

Shortly after the war, Bleyer changed his view about the passive role of Swabians in Hungarian society. As Minister of Education in postwar Hungary's first conservative government, Bleyer declared that the Swabians would have to be integrated into the Hungarian state system, although they would retain their linguistic and ethnic identity. German instruction in the nation's Swabian elementary schools and effective cultural programming directed mainly at Swabian rural communities, he thought, would ensure Swabian ethnic survival.⁹ Until his death in December 1933, Bleyer campaigned ceaselessly to preserve and improve German-language elementary village schools, and for the right of Swabian cultural associations to function undisturbed. But Hungary's rural intelligentsia, especially the Magyarized Swabian village teachers and clergymen, thwarted Swabian desires for adequate German instruction. The UDV functioned under strict government surveillance and supervision. Its range and types of operations were so severely curtailed that its social and cultural functions failed to satisfy Swabian aspirations.

In June 1935, a simmering controversy involving Swabian moderates led by Gustav Gratz, Bleyer's successor as head of the

UDV, and Swabian radicals directed by the UDV general secretary Franz Basch, erupted in a bitter confrontation. The Hungarian authorities had indicted Basch for having publicly defamed the Magyar nation. Basch was charged with treason, tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long jail term. Gratz immediately ordered Basch's resignation from his UDV post. When Basch refused, Gratz replaced him. Basch and his followers thereupon bolted, formed the VK, a rival organization, and began publicizing their views in the DV. This schism involving pro-government Swabian moderates under Gratz and the Nazi-oriented *völkisch* radicals under Basch was now complete and irreversible.¹⁰

The secessionists faced a number of difficult tasks. They had to persuade Swabians that the VK merited their support. This they did by enunciating various programmes designed to improve the economic, political, and cultural conditions of Swabian society without offending or frightening the Magyar public and the government. But by 1938 the Reich was much stronger than it had been in 1935. Almost simultaneously with the Austrian *Anschluss*, the VK escalated its demands on the Hungarian government. The radicals desired a better deal in the Swabian minority school system and special constitutional status for the Swabian minority.

In the VK's view, a thorough reform of Hungary's minority school system was long overdue. In the late 19th century, the German schools had prospered; but a number of ordinances deprived German-speaking students of all but elementary schools. Shortly after the war, even these institutions came close to extinction. A school law in 1923 created three types of minority institutions: Type A schools, or pure minority institutions, where Magyar was taught only as a subject; Type B schools, or mixed minority-Magyar institutions; and Type C schools, or Magyar institutions where German was taught only as a subject. In each community, parents and school boards decided which type of instruction would prevail. Only state-run institutions had to obey the law, but 86 percent of the Swabian schools were confessional. These were almost totally dominated by Magyar or Magyarized clergymen, and consequently Swabian parents desiring German education for their offspring in church-run schools rarely made headway.¹¹ Most Swabian parents had no choice but to send their children to

better-endowed and more adequately equipped Magyar institutions. Consequently, Bleyer and other Swabian leaders kept complaining to the government that the new regulation had failed to improve Swabian minority education.

Responding to mounting complaints, the government released a new school law in 1935 which abolished all but Type B institutions. By September 1, 1938, all Swabian children would have to choose either Type B schools, if their parents or local school boards desired them, or Magyar establishments. The new regulation failed to stem the tide of complaints by the radicals. Pedagogically, the DV considered Hungarian minority education absurd.¹² Type B institutions were not minority schools at all; rather, the government's instruments for assimilating Swabian children.¹³ They were not staffed with competent German pedagogues, but by Magyar teachers with only a smattering of German. Teachers desiring minority education in the rural elementary schools faced retaliation by local functionaries, and risked obstructionism whenever they ordered German texts.¹⁴ From the *völkisch* perspective, bilingual minority schools violated the spirit of *Volkstum*. Georg Goldschmidt, editor of the DV, explained that bilingual schools were not truly German schools, even when they were taught by qualified non-German teachers.¹⁵ It was insufficient, in his view, merely to instruct children in the various disciplines; they had to be taught in perfect German and indoctrinated in the *völkisch* context. Swabian pupils would have to be acculturated in the German spirit, taught Magyar only as a subject, but at the same time encouraged to be Hungarian patriots.¹⁶

The DV publicized many complaints lodged by distraught parents against alleged abuses in the minority school system, and it offered several short and long-range remedies. The paper complained that the minority school system was dominated by Magyarized Swabian teachers, clergymen, and administrators who disdained German educational standards. It cited Somogy County, where German instruction had been banned by local officials since before the war in defiance of parental protests. In some localities, Swabian pupils were being punished for chatting in German after school hours. In more than one community, school prayers and other religious services had to be conducted in Magyar.¹⁷

The VK survey of several Swabian and mixed villages disclosed

a pattern of alleged violations. In nearly all instances the clerical teaching staff refused to permit German instruction of any type. These instructors either disregarded parental groups' decisions in favour of minority language instruction, or they sought to persuade parents to abolish German classes in favour of Magyar schools. In some localities, Magyarized clergymen or school authorities forbade parental groups to assemble; in others they tried to intimidate them. Allegedly, the gendarmerie was occasionally summoned to frighten the simple Swabian peasant folk. In some areas, parents were threatened with economic and other forms of discrimination.¹⁸ In most villages, efforts to introduce the government's bilingual instruction plan were either defeated or indefinitely delayed.¹⁹ Consequently, the villagers had to accept pure Magyar educational facilities for their children.

Zealous Magyar and Magyarized officials viewed the German educational system as a potential conduit for the dissemination of Pan-German and National Socialist propaganda among Swabian youth. In their own minds, sabotaging German instruction in the nation's schools served lofty patriotic purposes and thus made a lot of sense. Of course, the VK judged these practices from entirely different perspectives. In February 1938 Goldschmidt complained that the problems plaguing the German school system had intensified. The 1935 school law had aroused Swabian hopes and expectation which had been totally dashed thus far. All Swabian attempts to have school violations redressed had been thwarted by hostile administrators, who cleverly manipulated the system in defiance of the laws. Local functionaries laboured tirelessly to block parental requests for bilingual schools. If parental groups refused to cooperate, these officials would address the local school board, and badger its members until they agreed to establish pure Magyar institutions in the district. Indeed, after December 15, 1937, these pressure tactics bore their fruit. By virtue of a new decree, the nearly 400 minority schools situated in Swabian and mixed-language districts had to choose pure Magyar schools, unless they adopted bilingual instruction.²⁰ Once they had chosen Magyar educational facilities for their children, the parents could not change their minds.

The central government kept insisting that minority education would survive in the spirit of the 1935 school law; but the

December 1937 ordinance encouraged officials far removed from the government's scrutiny to thwart Swabian parental desires for minority schools in favour of Magyar institutions.²¹ In the October 1938 issue of the DV, a prominent Swabian complained that the September 1, 1938 deadline for the 1935 school law had come and gone, but that effective bilingual education was still no closer than before.²² A few months earlier, Goldschmidt had suggested safeguards to ensure the unhindered functioning of bilingual instruction. According to a clause in the school law, if at least forty parents in each locality submitted a written petition demanding minority education for their offspring, then the school authorities had to comply. Under this system, the government claimed, hostile officials would be unable to outmanoeuvre parental groups.²³ Goldschmidt suggested, therefore, that only written parental appeals be accepted by responsible officials.²⁴

Around the middle of 1938, the DV's campaign to combat minority school violations reached a new stage. Previously, the VK had grudgingly supported the 1935 school law, which it now wished to discredit by disparaging the concept of bilingual education. The VK sought an entirely new approach to German minority instruction. This sudden transformation coincided with the Austrian Anschluss. The Swabian radicals were emboldened by the Third Reich's appearance on Hungary's western border, and by the growing National Socialist influence among the region's sizeable Swabian population. In February, the DV had still vigorously promoted bilingual education. It had dispatched numerous agents bearing printed petition sheets to Swabian and mixed-language villages, in hopes of encouraging parents to seek bilingual education for their children. At that time, Goldschmidt had labelled anyone obstructing this campaign "not only an opponent and an enemy, but an irresponsible scoundrel."²⁵

By May, however, Goldschmidt had changed his mind. He condemned the government for having failed to promote the 1935 school law properly. In the same breath he repudiated the act, because its terms allegedly violated Hungarian law, and because parental groups would never be able to secure its implementation. The minority school dilemma would fester, in his view, until Swabians could send their children to German schools. Goldschmidt solemnly pledged to persevere until this objective was attained.²⁶

In July 1938, the DV moderated its stand on education, but not because it experienced a change of heart. Minister of Education Count Pál Teleki had delivered a stern warning to Swabians regarding minority instruction. The government would encourage their legitimate cultural and ethnic peculiarities, Teleki promised, but the authorities would resist any schemes devised under the guise of defending minority rights, if the government considered them harmful. Wherever non-Magyars desired to establish minority institutions in the spirit of the 1935 school law, they could do so, but only if the government approved. In Swabian regions with Magyar minorities, Magyar institutions would have to be established to serve magyar pupils. Teleki believed that Swabian educational aspirations would now be satisfied, and the government expected all further agitation to cease. Goldschmidt accepted Teleki's plan, but only if Magyar children attended Magyar schools, and Swabian children enrolled exclusively in Swabian institutions. In the past, pressure had been brought to bear on Swabian children to attend Magyar schools. This would no longer be tolerated. Goldschmidt urged a gentlemen's agreement, whereby assimilation of either nationality would be legally forbidden. He also suggested that in the bilingual schools, German subjects be taught exclusively by German teachers in the *völkisch* spirit.²⁷

In early November 1938, the Third Reich's influence in Hungary increased. That month the First Vienna Award restored large stretches of Czechoslovak soil with about one-million jubilant Magyars to Hungary. At the same time, the DV began to get more critical.²⁸ Heinrich Mühl wrote that as far back as 1923 the Swabians had doubted whether Hungary's minority school laws would ever be effective. In his view, the Magyars had never taken minority institutions seriously, and only used them to assimilate Swabian youth, rather than to create unilingual German institutions. In order to remedy this injustice, the government would have to consent to Swabian school autonomy. The ethnic community would serve as a corporate structure, and the VK would lead it. He warned the Magyars that not only individual German rights, but the demands of the Swabian *Volksgemeinschaft* would have to be honoured.²⁹

The VK's idea of what constituted a nation differed from the Magyars' understanding of that term. The VK adopted Hitler's definition, which the DV sloganized in its February 1938 issue:

“We are all sons of the German Volk, no matter where our cradle rocked.”³⁰ To the Swabians, nation and state were two distinct concepts. A person’s membership in the nation hinged exclusively on his birth, whereas his affiliation with the state was a matter of personal choice. Nationality was thus an exclusive corporation created by God. It consisted of individuals linked by language, race, culture, and shared historical experiences.³¹ The Magyars believed in assimilating alien peoples in the Magyar cultural and linguistic stream. To be a Magyar was a voluntary act of accepting Magyar cultural and political norms. To a Magyar, nation and state were synonymous and overlapping concepts.³²

The VK recognized that an unbridgeable gulf separated the *volksbewusst* Swabians from the assimilationist and pragmatic Magyar majority. The DV identified and clarified some of these seemingly irreconcilable differences. Its writers tried to convince the Hungarian public that, far from menacing Magyar values in Hungary, the Swabians would become the Magyars’ best friends once they were appeased. Ägidius Faulstich, a VK leader, considered it a “ticklish contemporary problem” to create the type of relationship between an ethnic minority and its motherland that would not be misconstrued as an unwelcome or disturbing intrusion by the host country.³³ In the current situation, the DV believed that responsibility for peaceful coexistence rested on Magyar shoulders. The Swabians had neither the wish nor the strength to destroy the Magyars’ dominance in Hungary. But the Magyars’ belief in assimilation raised the spectre of extinction in the eyes of the Swabians, and contributed to the bitterness of their rhetoric. The Swabians had to convince the Magyar public that as much as they desired bilingual education, and welcomed economic opportunities and personal advancement in Hungarian society, they wished to preserve their German *Volkestum* even more.³⁴ Also that all the other problems besetting Swabian society would have to be remedied within an autonomous ethnic framework.³⁵

After the Anschluss, Franz Basch appealed to the Magyar middle classes to forsake their “pathological fear of Pan-Germanism, National Socialism, or just united German power.” The Magyars must recognize that the assimilationist era was over. The Swabians were caught up in the same process of nationalist enthusiasm as Germans everywhere. Basch attempted

to placate the Magyar middle classes: they ought to be of good cheer, because Swabian beliefs did not violate the spirit of the Hungarian constitution, and whatever the Swabians demanded, harmonized with Hungarian laws. Swabians would remain Hungarian patriots, but simultaneously venerate the German *Volk*.³⁶

These protestations of devotion to Hungary coincided with the negotiations involving attempts by the VK to persuade the government to grant the Swabian ethnic group official legal status. According to the DV, the government rejected such a proposal, but conceded that the VK demonstrated “good will.” The DV cautioned, however, that Hungary could not permanently veto Swabian requests to regulate their own affairs.³⁷ A people thwarted for too long might easily become radicalized.³⁸ The July issue prominently featured Béla Imrédy’s June 2nd speech, in which the Prime Minister pledged to fulfill Swabian demands. He accused local officials who were paralyzing the minority laws as having “regressive minds.”³⁹

For months, the VK prepared the public for a comprehensive view of its programme. The July issue of the DV emerged with a tentative listing of Swabian demands. These included the right to choose a Swabian leader; the resolution of the school problem; freedom to organize a political party; and “permission to live according to the laws of the state and the eternal laws of nature.”⁴⁰ In August, Goldschmidt presented a detailed, definitive eight-point programme.⁴¹ The Swabian ethnic community would have to be recognized as a corporate structure, and the school problem would have to be solved in the spirit of the 1868 nationality law. According to Goldschmidt’s erroneous interpretation of this legislation, bilingual schools would be gradually transformed into German institutions, German teachers and texts would be made available, and all types of German schools would be created except universities. Swabians would be able to publish newspapers and magazines, establish autonomous clubs and associations, launch financial drives, conduct church services exclusively in German, and organize their own political party. This programme, which Goldschmidt labelled as the VK’s maximum demands, was rejected by the government.⁴² Goldschmidt complained that, in the long run, the government’s rejection was unacceptable. After all—he argued—the Magyars demanded similar rights for their own

compatriots in the Successor States.⁴³ Hungary could not expect the Czechs, Rumanians, and Yugoslavs to treat their Magyar minorities properly, if the Magyars of Hungary “abused” their own ethnic groups. Moreover, Hungary would never be able to fulfill her vaunted leadership in the Danube Basin unless she succeeded in organizing the region’s varied nationalities in a Hungarian empire that would grant ethnic autonomy to all non-Magyars.⁴⁴

On November 26, 1938, the radical Swabians gained a temporary victory. The *Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn* (VDU), a new organization created in competition with the UDV, with Franz Basch as its leader, launched Hungary’s *völkisch* Swabians on the road to exclusive control of the German minority. The VK’s 1938 triumph was short-lived. Popular protest forced Prime Minister Imrédy to shelve the agreement. The VK temporarily muted its attack on the Hungarian government, on direct orders from Berlin. The Third Reich wished to avoid antagonizing Hungary at a time when her support would be needed on the eve of the planned attack on Poland.⁴⁵

Two years later, however, the Swabians reached their goal. On August 30, 1940, Hungary granted privileged status to the Hungarian *Volksdeutsche*, on the same day the German-sponsored Second Vienna Award was announced. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Hungarian Foreign Minister Csáky signed an agreement that established the *Volksbund* as the Hungarian German minority’s exclusive legal representative. Having gained the status of a corporate body, the Swabian *Volksgruppe* now functioned virtually as a state within a state, and could legally engage as an equal in every type of political economic, cultural and educational activity.⁴⁶

It would be tempting to ascribe the VK’s short-lived victory in 1938 to the persistence and perspicacity of the *völkisch* Swabian leaders. In fact, the VK’s unswerving determination on behalf of *Volkstum*, and its leaders’ unbending views on the nature of nationality, frightened Hungary’s public and government. In a flash of common-sense insight, the DV observed early in 1938 that, if an ethnic group desired to overthrow the *Staatsvolk* (the dominant nationality), or if the latter insisted on assimilating the former, a struggle was certain to ensue.⁴⁷ VK protestations of loyalty to Hungary notwithstanding, most Magyars remained

convinced that the Swabians in fact favoured the German *Volk* over the Hungarian nation-state. Conversely, most Swabians (and not only the radicals) were equally certain that Hungary expected every non-Magyar citizen to become fully assimilated. Only Germany's mediation between the two ideologically incompatible groups and their irreconcilable national objectives was able to defuse the controversies dividing them, albeit only temporarily. Thus, Swabian autonomy, achieved in August of 1940, was not a *bona fide* settlement of Magyar-Swabian differences, but a *Diktat* imposed on Hungary by the Third Reich for favours rendered.

The Swabian-Magyar controversy suggests that it may be impossible to settle differences definitively and equitably when fundamentally antagonistic creeds are involved. Hungary's Magyars embraced the nation-state principle, whereas the Swabian radicals subscribed to a *völkisch* philosophy. A compromise was out of the question, as the Swabian moderates discovered. Before Hitler's rise to power, a Hungarian citizen of German descent could simultaneously honour the German cultural nation and the Hungarian political nation-state; National Socialism, however, demanded single-minded devotion of all Germans to both the cultural and the political nation.

By insisting that even expatriate Germans be bound by these *völkisch* rules, the Third Reich forfeited its enviable position as an honest broker in all controversies in which other East Central European countries became embroiled in disputes with their indigenous German populations. Even at best, the involvement of a powerful third party in an intra-national dispute is bound to inhibit a lasting settlement. It not only tends to eliminate the possibility of a just resolution, but the imposition of a forced or a simplistic solution for complex issues also tends to aggravate the original grievances. Resentments then smoulder over the years, only to confront future generations with an intensified crisis. As the postwar expulsion of a large proportion of Hungary's German-speaking population on charges of treason attests, the doctrinaire Nazi-imposed solution to the Swabian problem could not last.

NOTES

1. Comparatively few German-Hungarians or their ancestors actually came from Swabia (Schwaben) in southern Germany, but the name has become widely used nevertheless.

2. The Third Reich recognized the VK as the sole and legitimate Swabian representative in Hungary. Officially, Germany denied interfering in Swabian affairs. Unofficially and quasi-officially, however, Reich funds and agents found their way to the VK through circuitous routes.
3. All journals lacking government permits had to publish at intervals of not less than five weeks.
4. For a more thorough discussion of the period before 1938, see the following major publications: Ingomar Senz, *Die nationale Bewegung der ungarländischen Deutschen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Eine Entwicklung im Spannungsfeld zwischen Alldeutschum und ungarischer Innenpolitik* (Munich, 1977); Béla Bellér, *Az ellenforradalom nemzetiségi politikájának kialakulása* (Budapest, 1975); Thomas Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations and the Swabian Problem from Károlyi to Gömbös, 1919-1936* (New York, 1977); Matthias Annabring, *Volks Geschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn* (Stuttgart, 1954); G. Paikert, *The Danube Swabians* (The Hague, 1967); Franz H. Riedl, *Das Südostdeutschum in den Jahren 1918-1945* (Munich, 1962); C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors* (London, 1937); Michael G. Hillinger, *The German National Movement in Interwar Hungary*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1973; Anthony Komjáthy and Rebecca Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich. Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe Between the Wars* (New York and London, 1980).
5. Not counting Croatia.
6. Jakob Bleyer, "Bericht über die Lage der deutschen menderheit in Ungarn," in Gustav Gratz, *Dutschungarische Probleme* (Budapest, 1938): 245. The exact number of assimilated (Magyarized) Germans is impossible to gauge accurately.
7. C.A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934): 122; and J.A. Komjáthy and R. Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich* (New York and London, 1980): 43-4.
8. Jakob Bleyer, "A hazai németség," *Budapesti Szemle* (March 1917): 1-14.
9. "A nemzeti kissebbségek minisztériumának nyilatkozata," *Budapesti Közlöny* (August 17, 1919): 6.
10. According to Loránt Tilkovszky, they were completely dominated by Nazi *Volkstum* ideas. See "Volksdeutsche Bewegung und ungarische Nationalitätenpolitik (1938-1941)," *Acta Historica*, XII (1966): 61. For a dissenting view, see Joachim Kühl, "Das ungarländische Deutschum zwischen Horthy und Hitler," *Südostdeutsche Heimatblätter*, IV (1955): 132-4. Also see Annabring, *Volksgechichte*, pp.100-101; and János Hajdú and Béla C. Tóth, *The "Volksbund" in Hungary* (Budapest, 1962).
11. L. Tilkovszky, "A német irredenta és Magyarorszá," *Történelmi Szemle*, XIII(1970): 373.
12. Georg Goldschmidt, "Gewissenlose Irreführung," *Deutscher Volksbote (DV)*, IV, No.3, May 1938, p.5.
13. Heinrich Mühl, "Noch immer die Schulfrage," *DV*, IV, No.6-7, October, 1938, p.4.
14. "Gewissenlose Irreführung."
15. Georg Goldschmidt, "Die Schulfrage und die jetzige Leitung des UDV," *DV*, IV, No.1, February 1938, p.3.
16. Georg Goldschmidt, "Gehen wir in der Schulfrage einer Lösung entgegen?" *DV*, IV, No.2, April 1938, p.9; and "Schule und Volkscharakter," *ibid.*, No.4, July 1938, pp.6-7.
17. Jakob Zumpft, "Die Schulnot in der Schomodei," *DV*, IV, No.6-7, October 1938, p.3.
18. "Noch immer die Schulfrage."
19. Kaspar Hügel, *Abriss der Geschichte des Donauschwäbischen Schulwesens* (Munich, 1957), pp.22-3; and all 1938 issues of *Nation und Staat* (Vienna). For a dissenting view, see G. Paikert, "Hungary's National Minority Policies," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XI, February 1952, pp.214-15, who claimed that the minorities themselves demanded Magyar schools, so that their children might get ahead. Paikert admitted, however, that until the end of the 1930s, "the reluctance of lesser executives to put the educational legislation into effect reached at times...the state of almost open obstruction."(p.212). According to Paikert, this resistance was traditionally the "most effective and habitual vehicle of magyarization," and was zealously pursued by the majority of the lesser state officials, local bosses and the church authorities (*ibid.*).
20. 115.085/1937. IX.

21. Georg Goldschmidt, "Klarheit in die Durchführung der Schulverordnung," *DV*, IV, No.1, February 1938, p.2.
22. Heinrich Mühl, "Noch immer die Schulfrage."
23. Goldschmidt, "Klarheit..."
24. "Die Schulfrage und die jetzige Leitung des UDV." Also see Walter Schneefuss, *Deutschum in Süd-Ost-Europa* (Leipzig, 1939), p.78.
25. Goldschmidt, "Klarheit..."
26. "Gewissenlose Irreführung."
27. "Kultusminister Graf Teleki über die deutsche Frage," *DV*, IV, No.4, July 1938, p.6.
28. See Loránt Tilkovszky, "A Volksbund szerepe Magyarország második világháborús történetében," *Történelmi Szemle*, XI, 1968, pp.296-7.
29. "Noch immer die Schulfrage."
30. "Adolf Hitler sprach," *DV*, IV, No.1, February 1938, p.1.
31. "Das Wesen unseres Volkstumskampfes," *DV*, IV, No.2, April 1938, p.6.
32. Tilkovszky, "A német irredenta," p.371.
33. Ágidius Faulstich, "Volksgruppe und Mutterland," *DV*, IV, No.1, February 1938, p.1.
34. "Das Wesen unseres Volkstumskampfes."
35. "Sind Assimilierungsbestrebungen vorhanden?" *DV*, IV, No.2, April 1938, pp.6-7.
36. Franz Basch, "Der Entscheidung entgegen," *DV*, IV, No.3, May 1938, pp.1-2; "Wir stehen," *ibid.*, No.6-7, October 1938, p.1.
37. "Tatsachen, von denen wir ausgehen," *DV*, IV, No.3, May 1938, p.2.
38. "Wir schreiten der Entscheidung entgegen," *DV*, IV, No.3, May 1938, p.2.
39. Georg Goldschmidt, "Zurückgebliebene Gehirne," *DV*, IV, No.4, July 1938, p.4.
40. Georg Beer, "Der Sinn unseres Volkstumskampfes," *DV*, IV, No.4, July 1938, p.4.
41. Actually only seven points. See Franz Basch's seven point programme, reproduced in *Der Auslandsdeutsche*, XXI, 1938, p.782; and Franz Basch, "Deutscher Aufbruch in Ungarn," *Nation und Staat*, XII, 1938-1939, pp.210-11.
42. Loránt Tilkovszky, "Die deutsche Minderheit in Ungarn in der Zeit des Faschismus vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte der sozialistischen Länder Europas*, XV, 1971, p.74; and Loránt Tilkovszky, *Ex volt a Volksbund* (Budapest, 1978) pp.20-1.
43. Georg Goldschmidt, "Gedanken am 900 jährigen Todestag Stefan des Heiligen," *DV*, IV, No.5, August 1938, pp.1-3.
44. Georg Goldschmidt, "Unser Weg ist richtig," *DV*, IV, No.6-7, October 1938, pp.1-2. See Paikert, "Hungary's National Minority Policies."
45. Loránt Tilkovszky, "A német irredenta és Magyarország. A magyarországi népinémet (volksdeutsch) mozgalom útja," *Történelmi Szemle*, XIII, No.3 (1970) p.393.
46. Komjathy and Stockwell, *German Minorities*, pp.148-9; Hillinger, *German National Movement*, pp.217ff; Tilkovszky, *Ex volt a Volksbund*; Hajdú and Tóth, *The "Volksbund" in Hungary*; and Tilkovszky, *Revúzió és nemzetiségpolitika*.
47. "Das Wesen unseres Volkstumskampfes."