There is a marked contrast between the pre-war history of Bukovina and that of Bessarabia. Before 1774 Bukovina formed a part of the Moldavian Principality; perpetually harried in the course of the Russo-Turkish wars, it was a completely neglected and uncivilised country before it came under Austrian domination. Ethnically as well as religiously it was the most chequered land in Europe. In 1910, in a population of 798,355, there were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenes</td>
<td>305,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>273,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>168,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>36,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyars</td>
<td>10,391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

besides Armenians and Jews. The denominational situation was similarly kaleidoscopic. The majority of the population, being Slav and Rumanian, was Greek Orthodox, but there were large minorities belonging to the Roman Catholic and Armeno-Catholic creeds, Uniates, and Protestants of various shades, and Jews professing the Mosaic faith.

Under Moldavian rule the cultural standard of the people was as low as it could be. Some traces of civilisation were introduced by the German and Magyar settlers who came to the land before 1774, but the rest of the population was in a lamentably backward state. "The Austrians", — writes Professor Seton-Watson, — "when they took over found not a single doctor or apothecary in the whole country, no bridges, and scarcely any roads, and only two recognised schools, apart from two or three private institutions. The

1 See previous articles under the same title in the August, October and December 1942 and the January, March and April 1943 issues of this review.
greater part of the land belonged to the monasteries, of which there were twenty-six."

The Austrian administration set to work to amend this shocking state of affairs — attributed by Professor Seton-Watson to Turkish rule, although in point of fact it was the outcome of Rumanian misgovernment — and succeeded "with permanently beneficial results."

Before 1849 the country had a hybrid constitutional status; it was joined to Galicia, but had a separate and efficient military administration; it had no legislative body of its own, but was represented, since 1817, in the Galician Diet. In 1861 it was raised to the status of an autonomous Kronland and obtained a separate Diet, in which the various nationalities were proportionately represented by means of a complicated electoral procedure.

The provincial constitution of 1850 declared that "all the races inhabiting the province are equal and have an inviolable right to the care and preservation of their nationality and language". No restrictions were laid on the use of any language; an order of the Statthalterei pronounced Ruthene and Rumanian to be official languages — Landessprachen — together with German; nor were any obstacles placed in the way of the other minority languages; even the use of the cyrillic alphabet was permitted in official intercourse.

At the same time effective measures were taken to raise the cultural standard of the population. Professor Seton-Watson, writing of the university of Czernowitz, says that "every effort was made to promote Rumanian and Ruthene culture at the same time; "and his words might apply to the whole cultural organisation of the province. In 1914 there were 63 German, 87 Ruthene and 185 Rumanian elementary schools; 4 German, 2 Ruthene and 4 German-Ruthene normal schools, and since 1875 a German university at Czernowitz. It cannot be denied that in the sphere of higher education the German-speaking inhabitants were more favoured than the others, but it must be remembered that the Austria of 1914 was after all a German State, and as the Bukovina Germans stood on a higher cultural level than either the
Ruthenes or the Rumanians, it was only natural that they should have higher educational demands.

Under such circumstances it is no matter for wonder that the population of Bukovina lived tranquilly under Austrian rule and showed no signs of disaffection. In 1848 the Rumanians, obedient to the wise advice of their leader, the eminent historian E. Hurmuzaki, refrained from demanding re-annexation to Moldavia; all they desired was provincial self-government within the framework of the Habsburg Empire. And this notwithstanding the fact that from an ethnical point of view Bukowina was well adapted for the fostering of irredentism, the northern part being wholly Ruthene and the southern mostly Rumanian, each territory having on its border the ethnically related mother country, Russia and Rumania. But it so happened that the internal conditions which breed irredentism were completely lacking. The disaffection which began to spread among the Ruthenes at the end of the nineteenth century was fomented by Russia, and the irredentistic endeavours of the Rumanians during the last stage of the Great War were instigated from the Rumanian kingdom.

At this point a slight digression may perhaps be permitted in order to show, by means of a private letter, not only the general Bukovinian attitude, but also the manner in which sensible Rumanians who lived outside the contagious atmosphere of Bucharest and Transylvania wished to solve the Rumanian question.

The letter was written by Aurel Onciul, an outstanding figure among the few Rumanian politicians of Bukovina and a member of the Austrian Reichsrat. It was addressed to Colonel Edward Fischer, commander of the Austro-Hungarian forces in Bukovina, a valiant soldier and an excellent organiser.

It is not proposed to print this letter in its entirety, but a few words must be said about the circumstances under which it was written, and the description of which forms its introduction.

In April 1916, writes Onciul, he was visited by Professor Stere, a Bessarabian whom the reader may remember as
the principal exponent of the policy which demanded that Rumania should join the Central Powers, fight against Russia, and, postponing the solution of the Transylvanian question, proceed to the liberation of the Bessarabian Rumanians. Stere was in the confidence of the Rumanian Prime Minister Brătianu, who employed him on various missions to the Transylvanian Rumanians in order to induce them to come to terms with the Hungarians and thereby make possible the alliance with the Central Powers, the chief obstacle to which, according to Stere, was the intransigent attitude of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza. He, (Stere), came to Onciul to persuade him of the necessity of a concerted move on the part of the Austrian Rumanians for the purpose of exercising pressure on the Hungarians through the medium of the Viennese Government.

Stere rested on a misunderstanding of the relations between Budapest and Vienna and more especially of the character of Count Tisza and was consequently doomed to failure, but it gave an opportunity for Onciul to expound the Rumanian policy of a Bukovinian as he saw it.

He began by saying that Vienna could not interfere with Hungary's internal policy, and that an attempt to do so might risk the wholehearted participation in the war by the Hungarians, a loss for which Rumanian cooperation would be but poor compensation. In point of fact, — he continued, — the Allied Powers themselves are not particularly eager to obtain Rumania's help, being convinced that they will win the war with or without Rumania or even against her.

Very different would be the consequences for Rumania if she decided to enter the war.

If Russia was victorious, Rumania would perish whichever side she was on, simply because, geographically, she was in the unfortunate position of blocking Russia's way towards the Dardanelles. "Russia's victory would mean the death of Rumania, cooperation with Russia would be tantamount to suicide."

If Rumania was defeated on the side of Russia, she would be annexed by Austria-Hungary, for the Monarchy could not suffer to have an independent Rumania at her back.
She would be transformed into a province with a decent and honest administration and her people would be freed from their Greek masters who for two hundred years had sucked the country's life-blood under a false national flag. "This solution would be a piece of real good fortune for the Rumanian people, and we, the Rumanians of Austria-Hungary, would hail it with joy, for it would alter our situation and secure for us a leading role in the Monarchy."

If, finally, Rumania were to be on the side of the victorious Central Powers, she would win Bessarabia as far as Odessa. The alliance with Austria-Hungary would guard her against Russia's revenge. "In this case the King of Rumania would have to establish with the Emperor of Austria relations similar to those of the King of Bavaria with the German Emperor." This would put an end to the fear of a Hungarian invasion, which for the rest was never more than a myth. Count Tisza had stated that Hungary was already so saturated with Rumanians that he had no wish to increase their number, least of all by the acquisition of such spilt children as were the Bukovinian Rumanians."

The acquisition of Bessarabia would solve also the Transylvanian question. Aggrandised by this province, the Rumanian State would have an area of 300,000 sq kilometres with a population of 12 millions, whereas it could easily support 24 millions. It would be greatly to the advantage both of Hungary and Rumania to transfer to the latter the three million Rumanians of Hungary. The cost would not exceed 800 to 1000 million crowns, and the scheme could not but appeal to the Hungarians.

Such was the plan devised by a Bukovina statesman for the solution of the Rumanian problem. It had no sequel, for the fate of the Rumanians was decided at the Paris Conference. And now let us return to the story of Bukovina's annexation.

It was mentioned in previous articles that, during the period of Rumanian neutrality, Bukovina had formed one of the objects of bargaining between Rumania and the belligerent parties. Rumania claimed the province as the "ancestral cradle" of the Rumanian people, and the Allies
were willing to cede to her the southern half, inhabited principally by Rumanians, while Russia demanded the northern half, the population of which was wholly Ukrainian. In the first two years of the war the Central Powers were also disposed to let Rumania have southern Bukovina, if she entered the war on their side. Subsequently, after Rumania had sided against them, they formed new and different plans for the province.

During the war Bukovina suffered more severely from invasions than any other part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As a "threecornered land" with borders towards Austria, Russia and Rumania, it had great political and strategic importance for all three countries.

It was first invaded by the Russians in September 1914. Evacuated by the Russian forces in February 1915, it was invaded by them again in June 1916 in the course of the Brussilof offensive. Shortly after this the Rumanians entered the war. In August 1917 the Russians once again withdrew from the northern part of the country, and in March 1918, as a result of the preliminary peace of Buftea, the whole province was returned to Austria.

With the entry into the country of the Russian forces the attitude of a certain section of the Rumanian population underwent a complete change. The benefits of the excellent Austrian administration and civilisatory measures were promptly forgotten and the enemy was received with the utmost cordiality. "As a result of the friendly conduct of the Russians," — writes Constantine Kirițescu, the Rumanian historian of the war, — "sympathetic relations were established between them and the Rumanian people. In the border districts military and civil officials established close connections with the Russians and took part in cordial manifestations which were turned into political demonstrations aiming at the realisation of the Rumanian national ideal."

The Austrian authorities could hardly be expected to put up with this sort of thing in war-time, and they dealt summarily with those who maintained "friendly" political relations with the enemy. Such were chiefly to be found among the members of the Russophile Orthodox Churches, whether
Ruthene or Rumanian. But the great mass of the Rumanian people was unmoved; it was, as C. Kirițescu states, "guiltless of the crimes which the authorities imputed to it", that is, it had not caught the disease of irredentism.

When, in the autumn of 1918, it became evident that the Monarchy was on the verge of collapse, various plans for its reconstruction were brought forward. In the Hussarek scheme Bukovina was to be kept as a Crownland. The Rumanian members of the Reichsrat drew up a scheme for turning Austria-Hungary into a federation of States, with the Rumanian territories, including Bukovina, as one or the member States. This was a revival of Aurel Popovici's and Onciul's idea. The Rumanian members constituted a National Council which was to have established connections with the Transylvanian Rumanians. But by that time the latter had declared in the Hungarian Parliament that they intended to settle their own destiny independently of the Hungarian legislature, and the Bukovina enterprise petered out.

The Bukovina problem was complicated by the Ruthene question, which was one of the stumbling-blocks at Brest-Litowsk. It was hopelessly entangled with the creation of the new Polish and Ukrainian States, and no agreement had been reached concerning it between the German, Austrian and Hungarian statesmen. The Ruthene leaders were reasonable, they demanded no more than the northern Ruthene territories, but the Rumanians were refractory, they would not hear of a partition of the province.

The few Rumanian leaders who had not escaped from the country during the war years, convoked for October 27 an assembly in the hall of the Diet. Ruthenes and other nationalities were not invited to attend. After a short discussion it was decided that the meeting was a constituent assembly, adunarea constituantă, of the "Rumanian land". It was resolved that Bukovina should enter into a union with the Rumanian kingdom, and a National Council of forty-eight members was elected to represent the country at the prospective peace conference. The assembly passed a resolution declaring that any attempt at a partition of the country must be firmly rejected.
The Reverend Bejan, the aged *popa* who presided at the meeting, closed it with the words of the Gospel: "Now lettest thou thy servant depart, O Lord, according to thy word, in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation which thou hast prepared before the face of all peoples."

The leader of the Rumanians, Jancu Flondor, was despatched to the *Statthalter*, Count Etzdorf. Simultaneously a crowd gathered before the palace of the *Statthaltterei*, shouting *trească Romania Mare, trească Regele Ferdinand* — long live Greater Rumania, long live King Ferdinand! Flondor appeared before the *Statthalter* and demanded that the government should be handed over to the Rumanians. Count Etzdorf politely declared that he would not dream of such a thing. The Rumanians did not insist, and the crowd dispersed peaceably. The capital was still garrisoned by Hungarian and Croatian military.

In the first days of November the situation of the irredentist Rumanians became critical. Ukrainian troops entered Czernowitz and set up a government of their own. But the Rumanians took prompt measures to frustrate this enterprise.

On November 4 a young man of the name of Bodnarescu appeared in Iassy before the Prime Minister Marghiloman. He presented the text of the resolution of the constituent assembly and his authorisation to beg the Rumanian Government for moral and material support.

Marghiloman congratulated the Bukovinians on setting so good an example to the Transylvanians, who were always expecting outside help. He promised his moral support, and the material help of an organised constabulary. He explained that the Rumanian army would only be able to intervene if revolutionary excesses were to endanger the life and property of the Rumanian inhabitants.

Bodnerescu needed no more than this. He returned at once to Czernowitz, and already the day after Marghiloman received telegrams announcing that Suceava, Ițcani, Gura Humorului, Botoșani had been pillaged and Dorna Vatra devastated by the Ukrainians and Bolsheviks, and that the Rumanian constabulary was helpless in the face of these
outrages. Also, that the Ukrainians had occupied Bukovina as far as the line of the Seret. A telegram signed by Flondor asked for the intervention of the Rumanian army, failing which the most disastrous consequences might be expected for the "national cause."

Marghiloman immediately gave orders for the eighth army under General Zadik to enter Bukovina. According to his instructions, the army's task was "to protect the Rumanian population against outrages". The commander of the troops, however, was more sincere. In his army order General Zadik explained that frontiers drawn a hundred years before were powerless to separate Rumanian hearts and that the army was on its way to offer the Rumanian nation's devotion and assistance towards "the realisation of desires springing from the legitimate right of every people to determine its own fate."

On November 9 leaflets dropped from Rumanian aeroplanes informed the population that the Rumanian forces had crossed the frontier and were actually in the country. On the same day the disorganised Ukrainian army retreated and evacuated Czernowitz. But General Zadik did not know this, and — to borrow the words of the Rumanian historian Dr. Nandris, — he halted "with prudent circumspection" at a distance of eight kilometres from the town. The Rumanian inhabitants of Czernowitz had beflagged their houses and dressed themselves in festive garb to do honour to the entering troops, but "Saturday passed, Sunday passed, the crowds stood waiting in the streets, and nothing happened. The Ukrainians had long ago crossed the Pruth and still the General did not move. The people began to fear that the Ukrainians would return and that a terrible carnage would ensue." At last, on Sunday night, unable to wait any longer, the inhabitants of Czernowitz sent a deputation to General Zadik to tell him that he had nothing to fear, the enemy had left the town. Thereupon, on November 11, the troops were set in motion, and "on this historic day for Bukovina the victorious Rumanian army entered the town amid the tears and the showered flowers of the inhabitants."

Flondor, surrounded by the members of the National Council, received the General and, in his own words, "they
embraced as embrace, after a long and grievous separation, two loving brothers who are not to be parted again." A telegram was sent to King Ferdinand thanking him for the liberation of Bukovina from the Austrian yoke.

Yet the Rumanians were still dissatisfied. The resolution of October, writes C. Kirițescu, had only expressed the "desire" for a union, but had contained "no statement that the union had been achieved". Besides, confesses Kirițescu, the resolution having been passed without the concurrence of the other peoples of the country, "some formula had to be found which would confer an incontestable right" to carry out the act of union."

For this purpose the National Council was reinforced by twelve further members, selected from among the Bukovinian Rumanians who had previously fled the country but had now returned to it. It was convoked, under the name of "General Congress", for November 28. Soon a Bessarabian delegation arrived on the scene whose leader, Pan Halippa, Vice-President of the Sfatul, explained to the Bukovinians that the reason why Bessarabia had not accepted unconditional union had lain in the fact that Rumania had had a Conservative, Germanophile government at the time; now that its place had been taken by a Liberal government friendly to the Allied Powers, they would withdraw their conditions and accept complete union.

The congress was held in the palace of the Metropolitan, and there the Act of Union was passed. It might have been expected that its text would be drawn up in the dignified tone of an international document; instead of which, it was as vituperative as a hustings speech, filled with slanderous accusations against that Austria which had raised the Bukovinian Rumanians from Phanariote obscurity to a European level.

Starting with an account of the treacherous annexation by Austria of the ancestral Rumanian land, the old seat and burialplace of the early Moldavian Princes, in 1774, the Act goes on to describe the "terrible sufferings of the Bukovinian people under the foreign yoke during a period of a hundred and forty-four years." They had had to shed their
blood for their oppressors on all the European battle-fields; their language had been banned alike in public life, in the churches and in the schools, and their people had been prevented from sharing in the riches of the soil. In spite of all this, they had never lost their faith in an ultimate reunion with their mother country, and now, at last, thanks to the heroic efforts of the Rumanian nation and its powerful allies, and relying on the principle of the self-determination of the peoples, they were able to declare the unconditional and eternal union of Bukovina with the motherland.

The great war has produced few more repellent documents than this unfair and mendacious composition. But it served its purpose, for by its means Bukovina became an integral part of the Kingdom of Rumania.

In the square outside the palace General Zadik explained to his soldiers the happy results of their glorious feat of arms, whereupon the soldiers, in the exuberance of their joy, caught hold of the passing Rumanian wenches and began dancing with them the Hora unriii, or jig of union, "so that the ground, the ancestral soil of the ancient Moldavian Voivodes, shook under their feet."

* * *

This affair of the Bukovina had a peculiar repercussion in Rumanian politics.

In the first days of November, when the Bukovinians appealed to Iassy for help, the Central Powers had already collapsed, revolution was in full swing both in Austria and in Hungary, and the diplomats of the Allied Powers were becoming daily more influential in Rumania. Thus when Marghiloman, in the afternoon of November 5, announced the dispatch of troops to Bukovina and expressed the opinion that the diplomatic representatives of the Allies would have to be informed of the occurrence, the King assented with an eager: "Oui, oui, oui!"

Next morning Marghiloman sent a Note to Sir George Barclay, the British Minister in Iassy, which was an open avowal of irredentistic activities. "The Rumanian Government", — it ran, — "would have failed in their duty if they
KING FERDINAND OF RUMANIA

had remained passive onlookers of the systematic destruction of the Rumanian inhabitants of this province."

On that same morning of November 5 Marghiloman was summoned to the king's presence at eleven a. m. — whether before or after the reception of his Note by the British Minister, it would be impossible to say. The ensuing interview has been described by himself in his Mémoirs:

"I was somewhat astonished by the summons. General Remniceanu's face and the King's air told me at once that something was wrong. Accordingly I abridged the contents of the telegrams. There was a pause. Then the King, very red in the face, said in a trembling voice: 'I have a painful communication to make to you. After you left me yesterday afternoon, the Ministers of the Allied Powers came to see me and informed me that they have no confidence in your government. And just now... the Allied Powers... as you know... They reproached us for having sent troops to occupy Bukovina, without having consulted them, whereas we should have come to an arrangement with them in regard to the disposal of this territory.' I said: 'My resignation is at Your Majesty's disposal, but I handled the Bukovina question with Your Majesty's entire approval and it was I who reminded Your Majesty that it would be well to inform the Allied Powers, in token of our amicable sentiments, of what we had done.'"

The king left this observation unanswered, and simply told Marghiloman that it was his purpose to form a non-party government. At the same time he assured him of his goodwill and begged for his support.

Marghiloman learned later that King Ferdinand had already the night before entrusted General Coanda with the formation of a new government: also, that he had known beforehand of the démarche of the Allied Powers.

In the afternoon of November 6 Marghiloman announced in the Senate the resignation of the Cabinet.

"I will not enlarge upon the causes of our going out", — he said, — "else I should be forced to make some unpalatable revelations concerning a certain intimate policy which is being carried on in this country. My withdrawal is
by no means a desertion. And at least it occurs as the final act of an apotheosis — Bukovina and Northern Bessarabia. We have saved the dynasty and the army, and have given the country Bessarabia and Bukovina in their territorial integrity ... We shall be found on the side of all that works for the maintenance of order and the greatness of our country; and resolutely opposed to every immoral and fraudulent regime of the sort by which we have hitherto been poisoned."

The commentary to this speech was supplied by Senator Bardescu, who remarked:

"This that has happened is a very dangerous thing; everywhere else anarchy comes from below; with us, it comes from the top. There is need of a constitutional reform to check the royal power.

(To be continued.)