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From the national adaptation of the NATO Crisis Response System, to the National Comprehensive Approach Action Plan in Hungary

A NATO Válságreagálási Rendszerének nemzeti adaptációjától az átfogó megközelítés nemzeti akciótervig Magyarországon

Abstract

National adaptation of the NATO Crisis Response System initiated wide ministerial discussions about the co-operation of civil and military elements of crisis management. As a result, in 2012 a new law came into force in Hungary on the national crisis response measures’ system, which is based on the co-ordinated engagement of civil-military capabilities and interagency cooperation in accordance with the concept of the Comprehensive Approach. Moving on this path, the author of this article argues in favour of applying the Comprehensive Approach at the national level for interior crisis situations, which is a brand new, particular interpretation. The article gives a detailed insight into a governmental Comprehensive Action Plan made by the author that reflects this new interpretation.

Absztrakt

A NATO Válságreagálási Rendszerének nemzeti adaptációjája a minisztériumok közötti széles körű egyeztetések sorát indította el a válságkezelés civil és katonai elemei közötti együttműködésről. Ennek eredményeként 2012-ben egy új jogszabály lépett hatályba Magyarországon a nemzeti válságreagálási intézkedésrendszerrel, amely a civil és katonai képességek koordinált alkalmazásán és szervezetközi együttműködésén alapul, az átfogó megközelítés konceptiójával összhangban. Ezen az úton továbbhaladva e cikk szerzője amellett érvel, hogy az átfogó megközelítést nemzeti szinten is alkalmazzák belső válságok esetében, amely az átfogó megközelítés merőben új, sajátos értelmezése. A cikk részletes betekintést nyújt a szerző által készített átfogó megközelítés kormányzati akciótervbe, amely tükrözi ezt az új értelmezést.
THE ADAPTATION PROCESS OF THE NATO CRISIS RESPONSE SYSTEM

The need for a new NATO crisis reaction system already got mooted at the Washington Summit in 1999 where member states emphasized the importance of the comprehensive interpretation of security issues, which the Alliance had already endorsed in 1991. Pivotal principal of this concept is that besides military dimension, NATO underlines the necessity of political, economic, social, humanitarian and environmental factors in crisis management.

At that time the Alliance still applied its Precautionary System, which was destined for traditional warfare between large military blocks. By the end of the 21st century it became obvious that due to the fundamental transformation of the security environment, NATO had to make a significant turn in its policy. In place of deterrence of a single military block representing enormous military power, a method and a doctrine had to be found for managing crisis situations that could occur anywhere on the globe on different scales from law to high intensity.

Upon approval of the Strategic Concept as of 1999 the Alliance commenced to shape a new mechanism as a result of which the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) came into force on 31 September 2005, superseding the long before obsolete Precautionary System. In the NCRS Manual the Alliance invited member states to harmonise their crisis management systems with NCRS. In Hungary the first question raised was that which system to be harmonised. The country had systems destined for specific types of crisis like military defence, law enforcement, disaster relief, civil defence, emergency health care, counter terrorism, critical infrastructure protection etc., however it could not be stated that these – let us call them subsystems - constituted a whole and coherent nation-wide system. Thus it had to be declared that Hungary did not have a national crisis management system to be harmonised with NCRS.

The above fact logically brought the idea to create such a system. To do so, two fundamental conditions had to be fulfilled: endorsement at the political, and consensus at the professional level. In 2005 none of these conditions were met, nevertheless some conclusions could be drawn:

— there was no national crisis management system, and the existing subsystems and their crisis management capabilities were allocated to different ministries, so capabilities were divided. The result was an ad hoc cooperation among crisis management actors,
— in want of support by political and professional stakeholders the creation of a coherent national crisis management system was not an option,
— without harmonized engagement of civil-military capabilities compatibility with NCRS was not possible.

Taking these conclusions into consideration, in 2005 the Hungarian Ministry of Defence commenced the NCRS adaptation process and negotiations with the ministries began. First step was to get a statutory authorization on the basis of which the Government could
start to build up the national system. At that point it was revealed that there were significant disagreements between the ministries as to the method of the solution.

Main cause of these disagreements was that – due to the above mentioned comprehensive security policy and lessons learned at crisis management operations – NATO realized that recent crisis situations could not be solved solely by military means. This became evident already during peace support operations in the nineties. Today, in stabilization and reconstruction operations where main tasks among others are transformation of public service and justice, development of energy or transport systems, training local policemen, building schools etc., more emphasis is laid on the involvement of civilian experts into crisis management efforts. As a result, besides military crisis management measures, NCRS contains several packages of civilian measures like economical, diplomatic, media, critical infrastructure protection, CBRN, health care, civil defence, air policing, counter terrorism type measures.

If Hungary desires a national crisis management system, which is in harmony with NCRS, it is inevitable that civil measures should be elements of it. The majority of the ministries were anxious about it because they feared that this way the Ministry of Defence would exceed its sphere of authority thus violating other ministries’ competences. In contrast, the Ministry of Defence argued that civil measures would be the responsibility of civilian ministries, while Ministry of Defence would only deal with military measures. For instance counter terrorism, or civil defence measures would belong to the Ministry of Interior, and diplomatic measures would belong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some ministries insisted on simply omitting civil measures from the national system. To do so would have resulted civil measures not having been elements of the national crisis management system, consequently wouldn’t have been harmonized with NCRS, thus wrecking the very goal of the whole process.

First tangible result of NCRS adaptation could be found in a new Home Defence Act, which came into force in 2005 and in which the Parliament authorised the Government to establish – upon NCRS recommendation - an NCRS Compatible National Crisis Response Measures System.[1] This title definitely was a compromise in a sense that an overall, coherent national crisis management system was not an option in absence of an endorsement at the political and consensus at the professional level. What had to be created was nothing else, but a pure set of crisis response measures (CRM) that were in harmony with NCRS measures, and supplemented with national decision making procedure.

Second step of NCRS adaptation process was to draft a detailed governmental decree on “NCRS Compatible National Crisis Response Measures System” and then to discuss it with the ministries and other stakeholders and potential actors. Owing to the disagreements mentioned above this process took years, involving several rounds of negotiation, countless draft versions that were thrown in trashbins, and several compromises causing a significant delay.

In the meantime NCRS had to be applied in some way, since it was already in force. In absence of written law, and of defined areas of responsibility, decisions were made on an
ad hoc basis. The first set of national crisis response measures were completed in 2006 that were put together into a manual with a narrative guidance. Though the manual was not officially approved, it was used and tested in exercises, particularly in NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) where it proved to be much of an asset.

The breakthrough befell in 2012. In this year there was a significant wave of modifications in the national legislation, which among others, involved a new Constitution, a new Home Defence Act and its implementation decree, a new Disaster Relief Act and its implementation decree, just to mention the most important ones from the crisis management side. Finally the most desired goal was also achieved, a Governmental Decree on NCRS Compatible National Crisis Response Measure System came into force containing a national decision making process, a system structure, coordination methodology, and the national crisis response measures themselves. [2]

During its first real life test the NATO Compatible National CRM System proved to be a very effective tool for planning and implementing the appropriate steps of national reaction. Upon arrival of a NATO declaration message it took not more than 10 minutes to identify the appropriate national CRM, the responsible authority, the actors and national tasks. All authorities and actors concerned were alarmed and informed immediately and the Defence Administration Coordinating Working Group was convened the following day. After a short period of negotiation and coordination, a proposal for declaration of national CRMs was on the table of the Government within two days.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND THE NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Since NCRS and the NCRS Compatible National CRM System have several civilian measures, the question of civil-military interaction could not been bypassed during the adaptation process. For this reason it was logical to invoke the idea of the Comprehensive Approach (CA). CA has several interpretations: it is called a special philosophy, a concept, or sometimes shared points of view, or a code of contact. If we examine it from a knowledge management perspective, CA is a process of organizational learning or cumulating organizational knowledge.

A series of negative factors and experiences in international crisis management led the stakeholders and the actors to create and apply CA. “......lack of coherence and coordination among the diverse international and local actors in the international conflict management system has resulted, inter alia, in inter-agency rivalry, working at cross purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and sub-optimal economies of scale. All of these, taken together, have contributed to poor success rates, as measured in the sustainability of the systems produced as a result of these international interventions. [4, 2. p.]

CA was undoubtedly “invented” for international missions, particularly for stabilization and reconstruction purposes in failed states. If we talk about harmonized and coordinated engagement of civil and military capabilities, we indeed mean international efforts. “Whilst
there is no commonly accepted definition for the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, there is broad agreement that it implies the pursuit of an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions”. [5,9.p.] 

Apart from the mainstream interpretation we can find CA definitions without “expressis verbis” restricting its applicability to the international arena. “In his written memorandum, Daniel Korski gave us the following definition: In its simplest definition, the “comprehensive approach” means blending civilian and military tools and enforcing co-operation between government departments, not only for operations but more broadly to deal with many of the 21st century security challenges, including terrorism, genocide and proliferation of weapons and dangerous materials.” [6] 

Moreover, some nations like the United Kingdom acknowledge its dual use: “The CA is a concept which may be applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and crisis, both at home and abroad…….” [7, 1-5. p.] “Post-operational analysis of situations and crises at home and abroad has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of a joined-up and cross-discipline approach if lasting and desirable outcomes are to be identified and achieved.” [7,1-1. p.] 

It is obvious, that international organisations like UNO, NATO or the EU can think only internationally, which on the other hand does not prevent them from encouraging their member states to improve interagency co-operation at the national level as well. As a result, CA’s national version – called the Whole-of-Government Approach (WHOGA) appeared relatively soon in theories and in practice. A vital question is how multinational Comprehensive Approaches and national Whole-of-Government Approaches interact and what is the relationship among them. The Seminar Publication of the Comprehensive Approach Workshop in Oslo, Norway, 26-27 March gives the following definition: 

“Whole of Government Approach (WHOGA): This takes place within a specific country. The purpose is to harmonize the efforts of the various government agencies, for more rational use of resources and to contribute to multinational-level efforts. [4,4.p.] As we can see, WHOGA is also applicable in the international context, nevertheless the very next paragraph of the proceedings immediately moderates this rule: “Several national governments have been experimenting with improving the cooperation among government departments, with a view to improving the managing of their respective national and international challenges.” [4, 4. p.] 

It can be concluded that national level application of CA is already in the minds, however with different interpretations and meanings, and with the dominance of its application for multinational efforts. It is worth to study CA in complexity, and examine whether it has levels or layers other than the international one (see Figure 1). CA is often called a state of mind, so if we want to define CA levels, first one should definitely be the level of the individual. This means that first of all CA should be in our hearts and minds. 

In complex crisis situations departments and agencies will find themselves in the position of being a ‘supported’ or ‘supporting’ entity, therefore decision makers, planners and
actors must also individually recognize and acknowledge the interdependence of all participants. As long as CA is not supported personally, as long as its importance is not accepted in the minds of the individuals, interagency coordination will not work. This fact is broadly accepted, mainly in principles, although in specific crisis situations individual or organizational interests often supersede common or shared interests.

CA’s international level applicability is also accepted by everybody, so we can say that this is the classical or dominant interpretation of CA. It requires large scale coordination and cooperation, involving international organizations, member states’ agencies, host nation authorities, governmental, and non-governmental organizations. In the author’s interpretation this is the highest and most complex level of CA, therefore it should have solid foundations provided by the lower levels. The first one, the level of the individual was already mentioned. The author is convinced that there must be a second or national level, which is a precondition of a well functioning CA at the third, i.e. the multinational level. If interagency coordination does not work properly among national departments and agencies, if there are walls between the authorities, the planners and the actors at home, how could we expect that they will achieve an effective cooperation in the theatre where numerous participants are involved with significant diversity. Maybe that is the reason why CA is still not really a success story, since it is applied mainly right at the highest – at the international – level thus skipping the lower ones.

If CA proved to be an appropriate and fruitful tool of multinational crisis management, why not to exploit its advantages for national purposes too? Before taking stand on this issue, we need to ask a question: Is there a single organization, or agency in any country that possesses alone all knowledge, experience, preparedness, manpower, technical
equipment, financial resources, logistic support, IT background, necessary to manage complex crises? Based upon experiences, the answer to this question is a definite “NO”.

If we examine the reasons why CA came into life in multinational crisis management, which are also valid if the crisis occurs at home, some further questions may emerge: Is it necessary, that a crisis-torn country lines up and engages all available civil and military resources and capabilities? Is it needful within the governmental command and control system to diminish rivalry, lack of coherence and coordination, superfluous duplication of efforts and capability gaps, when managing an internal conflict? Is it requisite to harmonize activities of governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to optimize and rationalize the utilization of the resources, to enhance coherence, effectiveness and cost effectiveness? Is it useful that national actors know each other’s mandate, mission, goals, ways of thinking, and organizational culture? Based upon experiences, the answer to all these questions is a definite “YES”. These answers leave no doubt that the reasons why CA came to life are also valid for internal crises.

National level application of CA and WHOGA is not only logical and self-evident, but from a practical point of view much more feasible. „The comprehensive approach should be easier to implement at the national level as objectives are produced by each sovereign actor. At the international level the actors signing up to an internationally mandated goal may not agree on how to achieve it, and will not answer to any sovereign and dominant supranational president or prime minister. Under such circumstances coordination is difficult.” [8] “States and organizations have a hierarchical structure and a top leadership, and may thus apply a top-down authority to implement comprehensiveness, if so required. This option is not available in an international inter-agency setting, where collaboration has to be voluntarily as organizational independence is rarely surrendered.” [4, 6. p.]

Though hierarchy within a national administration is clear, cooperation and coordination could be arranged from the top by laws and orders, a CA cannot be based on command and control alone. That is why a totally integrated mega crisis management organisation is undesirable. “Whereas it may seem at the outset that a comprehensive approach will require a whole range of actors joining together under one leadership and one organization, doing everything together more or less as one organization, this is neither particularly realistic nor necessarily desirable.” [7, 7. p.]

CA requires facilitative leadership that balances the need to respect the independence of the participating agencies while at the same time manages their interdependencies. Therefore it is needed to value the advantages of independent action, and seek to coordinate among them, rather than integrating them into a single, larger entity. Adapting this principle for national level CA, we should utilize the diversity of the actors, whilst pursuing coherence exclusively at the country level. It then encourages each participant to undertake its own operational or implementation planning, according to its own principles, mandates and resources, but in a coordinated fashion.

It is evident that such a theory can be realized only in a flexible structure. For this purposes the author has created a conceptual model of national crisis management (see Fig-
ure 2). This model assumes that under the term “crisis” we understand all kinds of crises, form international armed conflict, through internal public disturbances, terrorist acts, to disasters. In other words, there is no distinction between civilian and military crises as the system is applicable for both. This corresponds with the recent security situation where one cannot draw a definite line between civil and military crises since there are several layers of overlap.

Figure 2.: A conceptual model of national crisis management system (made by the author 2014)

The model is based on civil, military and law enforcement capabilities that are organized into a national level pool. When the actual crisis occurs, different capabilities can be chosen from the pool in any composition that best suits the specifics of the current mission. This method is very similar to the task force concept that results a rather flexible crisis management structure and set of actors. “Like LEGO pieces, governmental capacities can be combined in creative ways suited to the crisis in question……” [9, 216. p.] Naturally this method works only, if some basic preconditions are met. One of them is the role of education and training and most notably the importance of sharing training assessments and practices with the actors, whose capabilities are organised into the national pool. “The majority of countries still organise military and civilian training separately even if joint civil-military training methods are being developed. In some countries training is already being conducted in an increasingly joint manner and, for instance, NGOs are being used for training purposes more often. Further integration of civilian elements into military training modules should be advanced.” [5, 20. p.]

Other preconditions of the model’s proper functioning are information sharing, shared knowledge management, joint, coordinated implementation, and shared lessons learned. These elements could serve on the long run as a sound basis for harmonised development
of national assets and capabilities. Required results of this process will be the elimination of capability gaps and duplications.

Besides capability pool the other main element of my model is a joint crisis management body. It has a core team, with recognised and distinguished crisis management experts, who are familiar with, and experienced in governmental command and control, crisis management process, and the general nature of all kinds of crises. They are permanent team members, regardless of the type or nature of the crisis. They are responsible for organising the decision making process, establishing a holistic picture of the crisis, and for coordinating the development of alternative solutions for implementation. The core team keeps contact and coordination with ministries, other governmental and non-governmental organisations and runs the knowledge management process. All crises need specialists, whose knowledge and experience is necessary for crisis management. These subject matter experts supplement the core team in a flexible composition as the nature of the crisis requires.

This model is based on well-known and proven methods of international crisis management, adapting them for national purposes. Engaging different sectorial capabilities from a pool in a flexible way, in the EU is called: “pooling and sharing”. Harmonising capability development, in order to avoid gaps and duplications, in NATO it is labelled: “smart defence”.

By applying this model, a well-founded and well-functioning national level CA can be established, that will have positive impact on the international efforts as well. If we have a well-functioning national CA system, it will be easier to take part in international S&R\(^1\) missions and apply CA in the international arena. “Interdependence between Comprehensive Approaches on the national and international levels is very clear as more coherent national approaches could facilitate a better coherence of multilateral responses and vice versa” [5, 25.p.]

Application of CA for national purposes is not only a theory any more in Hungary. First result of its incorporation into the national laws and regulations is the last National Security Strategy, which has several references to CA: [10]

Right at the beginning of the document, the Strategy declares, that Hungary interprets defence in a comprehensive manner. “The overarching management of the political, military, economic, financial and social dimensions of security – and within the latter, human and minority rights aspects – along with its environmental dimension has become indispensable in today’s world.”\(^2\)

According to the Strategy CA is a distinguished method of crisis management, but more important is that CA is to be applied at the national level too. “Preventing and managing the conflicts of today call for a global perspective and a comprehensive approach. Lasting and sustainable security and stability require the comprehensive and coordinated use of

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\(^1\) Stabilization and Reconstruction

\(^2\) paragraph 2
crisis management – including development policy – tools, an integrated civil-military approach and capability development, as well as the strengthening of cooperation among international actors. A comprehensive approach needs to be applied at the level of national government, too.\(^3\)

The Strategy also mentions CA’s national version, the WHOGA. The comprehensive management of the threats appearing in the National Security Strategy requires a comprehensive, whole of government approach. Accordingly, close and effective cooperation and coordination between the defence, national security, law enforcement, justice, disaster prevention and civilian crisis management institutions, along with the related adaptable frameworks must be strengthened. All government institutions have to be tasked to continuously evaluate in their own area of responsibility the elements of national and international security and exposure to threats, and to take steps necessary to manage and avert them. This can only be successful if governmental and sectorial resources are used in a coordinated and concentrated manner.\(^4\)

CA GOVERNMENTAL ACTION PLAN

Hungary’s National Security Strategy clearly defines the required direction of national crisis management, which is definitely CA, WHOGA, and interagency co-operation. The document laid down main principles and the framework, but a more detailed governmental concept still had to be elaborated for implementation. For this purpose, in 2013 the author prepared a governmental CA Action Plan for three years (2013-2016) with the aim to define the steps of how to build up a national CA system. The goal was to create a sequence of actions that would penetrate CA and interagency cooperation into all segments and all phases of crisis management from planning, implementation to lessons learned. The Action Plan has the following actions:

**ACTION 1: SHARED AND UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF CA BY ALL ACTORS**

Aim of this action is to have a common understanding on the meaning, scope, and applicability of CA, accepted by ministries, sectors, crisis management organisations, including all potential actors. With the involvement of crisis management participants a national CA definition is to be produced (preferably incorporated in national law) and supplemented with legal, professional and ethical principles, defining the aim, place and role of CA in the complex home defence system.

Elements of the action:

- Incorporating national CA definition into law;
- Creating commonly accepted CA terms;

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\(^3\) paragraph 6

\(^4\)paragraph 43
— Working out general CA principles, basic professional rules applicable for all types of crisis;
— Defining ethical rules of cooperation.

**Action 2: Defining Areas of CA Application**

Aim of this action is to enumerate and take into consideration security threats and challenges at the global, regional and national level, defining crisis types both in the international and the national arena. Next step is to specify those crisis types that CA is applicable for, and define the level of complexity and intensity of a crisis above which civil-military cooperation is desirable, in other words, defining CA application threshold.

Elements of the action:
— A general security analysis, based on National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy;
— Systematization and categorization of crisis types, based on the results of the general security analysis;
— Creating sectorial lists of crisis types that CA is applicable for, then assembling them into a nation-wide list;
— Analysing respective UNO, NATO, EU doctrines to determine options for national contribution in those international crisis management operations where CA is applied.

**Action 3: Incorporation of CA into Strategies**

Aim of this action is that CA be an important element of all security strategies both at the sectorial and the national level. Extensive civil-military cooperation should be a basic requirement in crisis management. A certain level of coherence becomes an obligatory element of all concepts, strategies and legal measures that deal with security issues.

Elements of the action:
— Publishing a Government regulation on how to incorporate CA in strategies;
— Revision of sectorial and governmental level strategies from the point of view of civil-military co-operation, their modification and supplementation where appropriate;
— Revision of defence administration implementation plans, incorporating civil-military cooperation issues in accordance with the modified strategies.

**Action 4: Establishing a Structural and Functional Frame of CA Crisis Management**

Aim of this action is to define potential actors of complex crisis situations, and to work out means and methods for co-operations.

Elements of the action:
— Creating sectorial lists of potential actors, containing their function, role, areas of responsibility, available means, equipment and resources (sectorial capability catalogues);
— Integrating sectorial capability catalogues into a national capability catalogue;
— Based on the national capability catalogue, creating pools of potential capabilities and actors for each crisis types determined in action; Designation of governing and co-ordinating bodies for each crisis types;
— Working out methods and detailed rules for actors’ co-operation.

**ACTION 5: ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

Initial goal of this action is to explore capability duplications and gaps, which is followed by reorganization and reallocation of capabilities where appropriate, in order to eliminate the unnecessary duplications and capability gaps.

Elements of the action:
— Comparing crisis types (identified in Action 2) with national capability catalogue (identified in Action 4);
— Rendering capabilities for each crisis types from the capability catalogue;
— Identifying capability gaps and duplications;
— Proposal for the Government on necessary capability reallocations and reorganizations;
— Modifications of legal measures where necessary;
— Preparing a schedule for implementation of capability reorganization and reallocation.

**ACTION 6: RENDERING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO CA PROCESS**

Aim of this action is to work out detailed legal measures and procedures to interest organizations and individuals in participating in the CA process.

Elements of the action:
— Creating funds for solely CA projects and purposes;
— Allocation of separated financial resources in ministries’ budgets for solely CA purposes;
— Applying tax and other financial reliefs for incomes assigned for CA development purposes.

**ACTION 7: JOINT KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT**

Aim of this action is to link actors’ databases, creating a nation-wide crisis management database and applying modern knowledge management methods for information processing, so as the requisite information is at the right person at the right time.

Elements of the action:
— Compiling sets of information necessary for managing different crisis types;
— Assembling sectorial crisis management databases;
— Setting the conditions for linking sectorial databases (legal measures, professional and ethical rules, information security, structural framework, means and methods, technical background);
— Nomination of knowledge workers.

**ACTION 8: JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY TRAINING**

Aim of this action is the establishment of a joint civil-military education and training system. Actors have information on other actors’ role, function, responsibilities, mandate, organizational culture, way of thinking etc.

Elements of the action:
— Civil-military interaction course at the National University of Public Service;
— General and pre-deployment training for civil experts, who are planned to deploy to international missions.

**ACTION 9: JOINT LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS**

Aim of this action is to establish a joint lessons learned process with the participation of civil and military actors, and to make harmonised proposals for the Government on crisis management issues.

Elements of the action:
— Identification of topics that are subject of joint lessons learned;
— Working out a unified method and documentation for the lessons learned process;
— Training personnel responsible for joint lessons learned tasks;
— Working out principles and rules for utilization of lessons learned.

**ACTION 10: SPECIFIC AREAS OF CA IMPLEMENTATION**

Aim of this action is to work out in detail the system of CA implementation in the following specific areas:
— Military operations (Article 5, and non-Article 5);
— Stabilization and reconstruction missions;
— Civil defence;
— Disaster relief;
— Counter terrorist operations;
— CBRN defence;
— Cyber defence;
— Crisis health care;
— Critical infrastructure protection;
— Wartime economy;
ACTION 11: SUPPORTING CA IMPLEMENTATION BY DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM

Aim of this action is to establish a mechanism that enables Defence Administration System to play a 'catalyst' or interface role between the civilian and the military side and foster CA development.

Elements of the action:
— Analysis of the Defence Administration System;
— Defining defence administration organisations and agencies that potentially foster CA development;
— Comparing the tasks of the defined defence administration organisations and agencies with the tasks of the potential actors in different crises;
— Upon results of the comparison, preparing a proposal for the appropriate amendment of the Defence Administration System’s tasks and functions.

The Action Plan was submitted to the Government that approved it in spring of 2013. From that moment a national crisis management system based on CA became an official national policy in Hungary.

SUMMARY

The approval of the NATO Crisis Response System in 2004 initiated wide ranging discussions within Hungarian public administration about the way of its national adaptation. Since Hungary did not have a national crisis management system that could have been harmonised with NCRS, negotiations began on establishing such a system. The lack of political will and professionals’ support prevented the emergence of a nation-wide, coherent crisis management system. As a result of the negotiations, and series of compromise, the Parliament gave authorisation for creating an NCRS-compatible National Crisis Response Measures System, that was not more than a pure set of crisis response measures in harmony with NCRS measures, and supplemented by national decision making procedure.

After several years of hard talks the ministries achieved consensus and in 2012 the Government issued a decree on the national adaptation of NCRS. The national system was tested at CMX exercises, and its first real life application occurred in 2014. The system proved to be well functioning, and at two NATO conferences was recommended as a model for other member states.

The adaptation process revealed the necessity of a harmonized civil- military cooperation in crisis management, which brought the issue of interagency cooperation and the CA on the table. Though CA is destined for multilateral efforts, its possible application in national crises was also taken into consideration.

If we would like to determine possible levels, or layers of CA, theoretically I distinguish three levels:
— Individual level;
The first and the third levels are widely accepted in international scientific literature. The new element in my theory is that I supplemented them with a third one, with a national level application. Though several nations are thinking in national level interagency co-operation under the name of WHOGA, that concept is also applied solely for multinational efforts, while my concept involves those of crises as well, that are to be managed by a single nation within its borders.

From a capabilities point of view the author proposes to organize all civilian and military capabilities of the nation into a pool, and engage them in a flexible composition, as required by the management of the actual crisis, similarly to the task force and pooling and sharing concepts. Besides engagement and implementation, I would underline the importance of capability development and transformation. On the long run different capabilities should be developed in a harmonized way, eliminating capability gaps and duplications. This is what the author would call “smart homeland defense”.

Putting theory into practice, the author prepared a three year long governmental action plan for establishing and testing a national CA system. According to the plan, CA need to be at the heart of the routine crisis management machinery from planning and training, through engagement, to lessons learned thus involving the whole crisis management process. The action plan was approved by the Hungarian Government, and its first result was a national definition of CA: “Comprehensive Approach is an interagency cooperation mechanism, that secures conditions for harmonized engagement of civil-military-law enforcement capabilities in a national, or international crisis, where crisis management exceeds the power and potentials of a single sector”. From that moment CA has been an official governmental policy in Hungary.

Key words: crisis management, NATO Crisis Response System, Comprehensive Approach, Whole of Government Approach, civil-military interaction, interagency cooperation

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