Hungarian Chair Symposium, March 29, 2003, Bloomington: Between East and West: Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 20th Century

*Thomas Cooper*: Mimesis of Consciousness in the Fiction of Zsigmond Kemény

*Pál Deréky*: Eigenkultur - Fremdkultur. Zivilisationskritisch fundierte Selbstfindung in den literarischen Reisebeschreibungen der Aktivisten Robert Müller und Lajos Kassák
Hungarian Studies appears twice a year. It publishes original essays - written in English, French and German - dealing with aspects of the Hungarian past and present. Multidisciplinary in its approach, it is an international forum of literary, philological, historical and related studies. Each issue contains about 160 pages and will occasionally include illustrations. All manuscripts, books and other publications for review should be sent to the editorial address. Only original papers will be published and a copy of the Publishing Agreement will be sent to the authors of papers accepted for publication. Manuscripts will be processed only after receiving the signed copy of the agreement.

Hungarian Studies is published by

AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ
H-1117 Budapest, Prielle Kornélia u. 19.
Homepage: www.akkrt.hu/journals/hstud

Order should be addressed to AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ,
H-1519 Budapest, P.O. Box 245, Fax: (36-1)464-8221, E-mail: journals@akkrt.hu

Subscription price for Volume 17 (2003) in 2 issues EUR/USD 148.00, including online and normal postage; airmail delivery EUR/USD 20.00

Editorial address

H-1067 Budapest, Teréz körút 13. II/205-207. Telephone/Fax: (36-1) 321-4407
Mailing address: H-1250 Budapest, P.O. Box 34, E-mail: hstudies@sanni.iti.mta.hu
Homepage: www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/filo

Editor-in-Chief
Mihály Szegedy-Maszák

Editors
Richard Aczel
Gábor Bezeczky
József Jankovics
Peter Schimert

Advisory Council
Loránd Benkő (Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Budapest), László Kosa (Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Budapest), Denis Sinor (Indiana University, Bloomington), Bo Wickman (University of Uppsala)

©Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2003

HStud 17(2003) 1
Peter Pastor: Major Trends in Hungarian Foreign Policy from the Collapse of the Monarchy to the Peace Treaty of Trianon 3
Pál Pritz: Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 13
Nándor Dreisziger: The Long Shadow of Trianon: Hungarian Alliance Policies during World War II 33
Ignác Romsics: The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 57
Csaba Békés: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Superpowers 65
Andrew Felkay: Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Kádár Era 79
András Simonyi: Hungarian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the New Millennium 91
Thomas Cooper: Mimesis of Consciousness in the Fiction of Zsigmond Kemény 97
Pál Deréky: Eigenkultur - Fremdkultur. Zivilisationskritisch fundierte Selbstfindung in den literarischen Reisebeschreibungen der Aktivisten Robert Müller und Lajos Kassák 157
Gábor Ébli: Representing which Past? - Bicentennial Reflections on Museums in Nineteenth-Century Hungary 171
CONTRIBUTORS

BÉKÉS, Csaba
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

COOPER, Thomas
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

DERÉKY, Pál
Universität Wien, Wien, Österreich

DREISZIGER, Nándor
Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada

ÉBLI, Gábor
Institute of Art History, HAS, Budapest, Hungary

FELKAY, Andrew
Kutztown University, Kutztown, PA, USA

PASTOR, Peter
Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, NJ, USA

PRITZ, Pál
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

ROMSICS, Ignác
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

SIMONYI, András
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, Hungary

Sponsored by Ministry of Education
Hungarian foreign policy from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in November 1918 to the Peace Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 concentrated on maintaining Hungary's integrity and finding ways to break out of the international isolation in which the newly independent state found itself. Such were the aims of the regimes that followed each other in succession, and which are identified with the names of Mihály Károlyi, Béla Kun, and Miklós Horthy.

Keywords: Peace Treaty of Trianon, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Allied powers, Transylvania

Hungarian foreign policy from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in November 1918 to the Peace Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 concentrated on maintaining Hungary's integrity and finding ways to break out of the international isolation in which the newly independent state found itself. Such were the aims of the regimes that followed each other in succession, and which are identified with the names of Mihály Károlyi, Béla Kun, and Miklós Horthy.

In World War I the dismantling of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Monarchy became one of the major war aims of the Allied powers by 1917. This policy was driven by the need of the Allies to undermine the home front of the enemy, and thus to bring about victory. It was ideologically justified by the principle of self-determination. President Wilson's "Fourteen Points," announced in January 1918, and soon after accepted as the publicly held war aim of the Allies, put dampers on these recently held goals. Article ten only spoke of autonomous development of the nationalities within the Dual Empire. By June 1918, however, even Wilson had come around to the previous position of the Allies, concluding that the Dual Monarchy had to go, as it was wished and willed into disappearance by the nationalities of the empire.¹ This revised war aim of the US president, however, did not find its way to the media at that time.

The impending defeat led the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister István Burián to propose peace negotiations with the Allies on the basis of the "Fourteen Points."
The appeal reached Washington on October 7, 1918. Emperor Charles also took his cue from point ten of Wilson's war aims, and on October 16, 1918, announced the reorganization of his Austrian realm on the basis of ethnic and federal principles. He called on the various ethnic groups to set up national councils in order to bring about his sought after restructuring within the imperial confines. The American reply came on the following day, pouring cold water on Burián's peace overtures and on Charles's reorganization plans. The imperial government was informed that the US recognized the Czechoslovak National Council; Wilson was thereby "no longer at liberty to accept mere 'autonomy'" of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities "as basis for peace." The US message turned Charles' declaration into a symbolic date for the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, which had been created in 1867. On the same day in the Hungarian Parliament, István Tisza, who as Prime Minister of Hungary had voted for war in the Imperial Council in July 1914, admitted that the Dual Monarchy had lost the war.4

The Hungarian National Council was formed in Budapest on October 25, headed by a parliamentary opposition leader, Count Mihály Károlyi. The council was supported by three parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Károlyi Independence Party, and by the Radical Party. The last was under the leadership of the sociologist Oszkár Jászi, who specialized in the nationalities problem. It was he who had penned the council's twelve point program that included a call for the creation of an independent Hungary. It also outlined a foreign policy for such a Hungary. It featured the repudiation of the German alliance, and a demand for an immediate end to the war. It also favored recognition of the "newly created Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, South-Slav and Austrian states" and close economic and political cooperation with them. The program even outlined the need for the establishment of embassies abroad, to be led by reputable Hungarian democrats whose major responsibility was "to stress ties between the Hungarian and sister nationalities out of their common interest." In the spirit of the "Fourteen Points," the councils' last point spoke of the need to send to the expected peace conference representatives who favored disarmament and supported the establishment of strong international organizations.

It is significant to note, however, that the council was only willing to recognize the Czech, and not the Czechoslovak state. This indicated that the council had no problem with contemplating a future Austria shorn of some of its Czech, Slovene and Polish territories. As for Hungary, however, it was willing to part only with the autonomous kingdom of Croatia. Indeed, the program stressed, "In a new Hungary the distinction between the nation and the nationalities would lose its malignant significance. The country would change into a brotherly alliance of equal peoples who would support integrity based on common economic and geographic interests and not on national jealousies."5
On the night of October 30-31, a revolution of soldiers forced Archduke Joseph, the homo regius of Emperor-King Charles, to appoint Károlyi as prime minister—not because he was a party leader in Parliament, but on the basis of his being the president of the National Council. In his newly-formed cabinet Károlyi took the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs and adopted the foreign policy program of the National Council as a guideline for the revolutionary government. Károlyi assumed that with an international reputation as an anti-war politician, his leadership at the helm of the Foreign Ministry could be translated into successful foreign policy. Thus, he bet the prestige of the government on Allied support, which, in fact, failed to materialize.

On October 28, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Artur Arz von Straussenburg ordered immediate armistice negotiations. On November 1, the Allies communicated their terms. On the same day the Hungarian government denied the Dual Command’s right to negotiate on Hungary’s behalf. Yet on November 3, when the military representatives of the already defunct Dual Monarchy signed the armistice, the Allies considered its terms to be binding on both Austria and Hungary. The Hungarian government nevertheless sought a separate armistice, hoping that such an agreement would mean its recognition by the Allies. It was with that in mind that a Hungarian delegation, headed by Count Károlyi, went to Belgrade on November 8. Its aim was to negotiate another armistice with the commander in chief of the Allied Army of the Orient, the French General Louis Franchet d'Esperey. Although military occupation of Hungarian localities by Allied troops were spelled out in the draft treaty, Article 17 guaranteed that the Hungarian kingdom would be under Hungarian jurisdiction. This article seemed to fulfill the Hungarian goal of preserving the country's integrity, and the delegation departed from Belgrade with a feeling of success. On the twelfth, however, the Hungarians were informed that the Allied Supreme Council in Versailles considered the Convention of Belgrade of purely military character with no political significance. This meant that the treaty did not represent Allied recognition of the Hungarian government. Actually, the victors never recognized the Hungarian government, which was initially headed and later presided over by Károlyi, during its almost five-month existence. The convention was signed on November 13, and became an appendix to the Armistice of Padua. On the same day King Charles abdicated, and on the sixteenth the Hungarian People's Republic was promulgated.

Hungary's lack of recognition by the Great Powers gave an opportunity to Hungary's neighbors to use force, and to take some of Hungary's territory in November and December 1918. The nationalities' right to secede on the basis of self-determination justified their interventions. The Hungarians, on the other hand, insisted that the question of frontiers would have to wait until the upcoming peace
conference. Naturally, Hungary expected Allied backing for the democratic republic's goal to maintain its integrity. At this point the Hungarians could not imagine that the new state would be treated as a defeated power and would not be invited to the bargaining table in Paris.

As mentioned earlier, the Hungarian National Council's original declaration counted on democratic representatives to spread the good name of the new Hungary, whose aim was to have its nationalities coexist in a so-called "Eastern Switzerland." Yet Hungary managed to gain ambassadorial accreditation only to one country - the Republic of Austria. To stress his government's democratic character at a time when women were about to receive the suffrage in Europe, Károlyi sent a feminist representative to Switzerland. This was viewed by the Swiss government as an affront to the status quo. In fact, women received the vote there only in 1971. On November 29, 1918, Károlyi's step was decried by the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon as an impudent act. He indicated that it gave Károlyi's government "an ultra-democratic façade, though its unique goal is to maintain the enslavement of its non-Hungarian nationalities." Pichon's view indicated that France had no interest in maintaining Hungary's integrity. Hungary remained isolated, and the Allies continued their wartime blockade. On January 18, 1919, the Paris Peace Conference opened without the presence of the defeated powers. Hungary was among the missing.

Much of Hungary's territory was occupied by its neighbors, who resolved to make their provisional conquest permanent at the negotiating table. French policy was hostile, while the other Great Powers seemed indifferent at best. On February 26, in order to put a stop to Romanian-Hungarian flare-ups, the Council of Ten in Paris adopted a neutral zone between Hungary and Romania. This would have forced the Hungarians to withdraw to a demarcation line that was reminiscent of the borders of the 1916 Treaty of Bucharest. This treaty accorded Romania not only multi-ethnic Transylvania, but also a huge chunk of purely Hungarian inhabited lands in return for joining the war on the Allied side. On March 20 the decision was handed to the Hungarian government in the form of a forty-eight-hour ultimatum. Coming from the Peace Conference, the document was seen by President Károlyi as the ultimate defeat of the government's effort to overcome its isolation and to hold on to Hungary's integrity.

Instead of accepting the ultimatum, Károlyi decided to call for the resignation of his prime minister and the government. He also intended to resign. He planned to transfer power to the Social Democratic Party, which was the only mass party in Hungary. He hoped that the socialists would be supported by the Socialist International, which, at its February Congress in Berne, had denounced a dictated peace and called for self-determination based on plebiscite or referendum. At the same time, he advised the socialists to seek the passive support of the commu-
nists, so that Hungary would not be attacked by the Soviet Russian Red Army, which was reported to have some of its units nearing Hungary's frontier."

The socialists, however, went one step further. On March 21 they fused with the communists, and issued a joint communique declaring that they would take power. The concluding sentence indicated the new direction in Hungary's foreign policy: "For the assurance of proletarian rule in the struggle against Entente imperialism, a complete military and ideological alliance must be achieved with the Soviet Russian government." During the same night they set up the Revolutionary Governing Council. Its president was the socialist Sándor Garbai, but real power was in the hands of the communist Béla Kun, the commissar of foreign affairs. Kun, a former prisoner of war in Russia had achieved distinction during the Bolshevik revolution and the civil war, had founded the Hungarian section of the Bolshevik Party there, and was a trusted comrade of Lenin. In November 1918 he returned to Hungary with two hundred supporters and founded the Hungarian Communist Party. As commissar of foreign affairs, he was counted on to bring Soviet Russia to Hungary's side. Thus, unable to break out from its isolation by courting the West, Hungary embarked on pursuing the same goal by turning to the East.

On March 22 the Revolutionary Governing Council issued its first manifesto, which declared the creation of a Soviet Republic, whose government

will organize a gigantic proletarian army that will strengthen the dictatorship against the Hungarian capitalists as well as the Romanian boyars and Czech bourgeoisie... and offers the proletariat of Russia a military alliance.

Thus, the major foreign policy aims of the Hungarian Soviet Republic were the same as its predecessor's: to break out of its isolation and to preserve Hungary's integrity. The latter, however, was coated in terms of proletarian internationalism.

On April 16, the communist daily Vörös Újság declared that the Hungarian Soviet Republic did not recognize the existence of a nationality question. It did not consider the non-Magyar speaking citizens of Hungary to be nationalities and believed that transforming the republic into a federal state would solve the language problem. On June 29, 1919, the state came to be called the Federated Socialist Soviet Republic of Hungary in the new constitution. Kun clarified the constitution by explaining that the right of secession was not mentioned because it was deemed unnatural in a proletarian state.

Hungary's expectation to have Soviet Russia's help in fighting against Hungary's neighbors, who had Allied backing, proved illusory. Already on March 22, when Lenin was officially informed that Soviet Hungary was offering a defensive-offensive alliance to Soviet Russia, he replied only by sending his greetings
and left the proposal unanswered. He failed to support a full-scale Red Army push to unite with the Hungarians, although Commissar of War Leon Trotsky favored this strategy. Instead, Lenin chose Stalin's strategy to divide the army and make simultaneous pushes in the Ukraine and Siberia. On April 11, Kun reported to the Revolutionary Governing Council that he had sent messages to the Soviet Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Gregorii Chicherin and to Lenin asking them when the two Red Armies would be unified on one front, and proposing that the Russian Red Army make an incursion into Transylvania at Máramaros (Maramureș). On April 21, Kun fired off an impatient message to Lenin, asking why the Soviet leadership paid attention only to the Ukraine and Russia, and not to Hungary. Kun noted: "We always believed that the Red Army would come to our assistance. ... The Romanians and the Czechs are on the move." Not receiving any reply, he appealed to Lenin again on the 27th: "Unification with Soviet troops through Galicia is a question of life and death for us... We are in a desperate situation, without an army. If you do not help us, we will share in the fate of the [Paris] Commune." Help, however, did not come. Lenin considered the conquest of the Ukrainian Donets Basin more important than Khristian Rakovskii's plan of linking the Russian Red Army with the Hungarian through Romania.

Soviet Russia also failed to deliver less tangible, symbolic support, which was sorely needed by the Hungarian Soviet government. For example, in spite of repeated requests, the Soviet government never sent an official ambassador to Budapest. Nor was Nikolai Bukharin sent to the party congress as a morale booster, as was requested of Lenin by Kun. It seems that Lenin was preoccupied with the Russian revolution at the expense of world revolution.

On August 1, 1919, the Hungarian experiment with communism came to an end. In his farewell speech to the Budapest Workers' Council Kun admitted that the Soviet Republic had failed militarily, economically and politically. Invaded by the armies of the neighboring states, the government had proved unable to preserve Hungary's integrity. The failure of Soviet Russia to come to Hungary's aid also indicated that the government was unable to escape from its isolation.

After the collapse of the Béla Kun regime the new People's Republic of Hungary attempted to recapture the days of the Károlyi regime. It returned socialized property to private ownership, and abolished all socializing institutions. The new government, headed by the socialist Gyula Peidl expected to seek Allied support, but four days later, on August 6, it was overthrown. In the shadow of the Romanian occupiers, István Friedrich formed a government. Friedrich tried to have a coalition cabinet, but it was not to the liking of either Horthy or the Romanians. In October the Paris Peace Conference sent Sir George Clerk to Hungary with the goal of putting an end to flux and to having a government in Budapest that could accept the peace treaty. On November 14, the Romanians withdrew from Budapest and a few days later, the counterrevolutionary National Army,
organized in French and Romanian-occupied Szeged, entered Budapest with Admiral Miklós Horthy leading the troops. That same month István Friedrich was replaced with the clerical Károly Huszár, who was backed by Horthy's forces. On November 25, 1919, in the name of the peace conference, Clerk recognized the government. For the first time since October 31, 1918, Hungary had a government that was recognized by the Western Great Powers. Hungary was on the threshold of breaking out of its isolation. Back in Paris, on December 1, 1919, Sir George could report that the Hungarians wanted to collaborate with the Allies and wished "to prove their good intentions." 24

In January 1920, corrupt parliamentary elections were held under the watchful eyes of the National Army. When on February 3, 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris expressed its objection to the restoration of the Habsburgs in Hungary, it was an implicit signal that the Great Powers favored Horthy leadership over Hungary. 25 On March 1, 1920, Admiral Horthy, who since November 1919 had been de facto leader of the country, was "elected" regent of the Kingdom of Hungary by Parliament. It was under his stewardship that the Hungarian peace delegation was summoned to Paris to accept the preliminary terms of the peace treaty on January 15, 1920. The head of the delegation, Count Albert Apponyi, presented several notes that reflected that the counterrevolutionary Horthy regime was as insistent on territorial integrity as its revolutionary predecessors were. In one of them he declared: "The overwhelming majority of the ethnic groups in Hungary, even if incited to action by some leaders, had never desired to break away or separate themselves from the country to which they had centuries-old ties." 26 The Allied representatives were not won over to the Hungarian position by Apponyi's eloquence. Further resistance to the Carthaginian peace terms threatened international isolation.

In March, however, a glimmer of hope appeared, indicating Hungary could reverse the proposed peace terms and break out of its isolation. This was related to some changes in the French political leadership. The new premier and foreign minister, Alexandre Millerand, and the Quai d'Orsay's general secretary, Maurice Paléologue, seemed to believe in a restructuring of Eastern Europe that assigned a role to Hungary. For the sake of stability Paléologue favored a Danubian Zollverein for the lands of the defunct Dual Monarchy. In this new constellation, Hungary was seen as having a central role due to its geography and economy. The Hungarians, however, were unwilling to come to terms unless France supported, among other points, the reannexation by Hungary of some of the territories they were about to cede de jure, but already had lost to force by its neighbors. Autonomy for the Hungarians and Saxons in Transylvania that had been taken by Romania was also demanded.

On May 5, 1920, in the midst of Franco-Hungarian negotiations, the final peace terms were handed to the Hungarian peace delegation. The Allied and Hungarian
government representatives signed the treaty on June 4, 1920, at the Trianon Palace in Versailles. The Hungarian National Assembly ratified it on November 15, 1920. By August the Franco Hungarian negotiations hit an impasse. Political considerations prevailed in Paris, as most French decision makers did not wish to upset Hungary's neighbors. The news of a possible Franco Hungarian rapprochement prompted a Czechoslovak led Little Entente with Yugoslavia, which was joined by Romania later. By 1920-1921, the cost for Budapest's attempt to break out of isolation by improving relations with a victorious Great Power was its virtual encirclement and isolation by the small powers: its neighbors.

The Treaty of Trianon reduced Hungary's territory and population to one third of its pre armistice size—from 283,000 km. square to 93,000 km. square and from 20.8 million to 7.6 million people. Approximately 3.2 million ethnic Hungarians found themselves outside of Hungary's borders. The Horthy regime was forced to accept the new realities and, as the Franco Hungarian negotiation indicated, was willing to think in terms of limited revisionism. Yet, responding to the so called Trianon shock of the Hungarian nation, it embraced a public policy stressing integral revisionism. The rallying cry of the Hungarians became "nem, nem, soha" [no, no, never], a slogan that had first been coined by the propagandists of the revolutionary Károlyi régime. It became the sound bite for the counter-revolutionary Horthy régime. These avowed intentions, however, put Hungarian foreign policy into a straitjacket. This meant that during the interwar years a true breakout from international isolation could have been and was achieved only via the support of other revisionist powers, first Fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany.

Notes

3. Ibid., 368.
4. Magyar Képvisel ház, Képvisel házi napló (Budapest, 1918), vol 41, 294 295.


After June 4, 1920 the objective was nevertheless the restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary. How can such a program be implemented? There are three things that are definitely needed. 1. A relevant political force in the country. 2. An international situation conducive to the aims and a foreign policy that can make the most of it. 3. Hungary's former national minorities should be willing to return into Saint Stephen's empire.

1. The losers of the treaty of Trianon probably supported the recovery of the lost territories. This discontent supported and at the same time stifled the revisionist movement. The leaders of the country too strengthened the illusion that Trianon was a result of the revolutions of 1918 and 1919.

2. No great powers supported the restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary. The Germans showed the most receptive attitude, but neither the Weimar Republic, nor Hitler's Germany was willing to follow Bismarck's policy, who had considered it important to maintain a strong Hungary. Mussolini - even if he had wanted - could not have a say in this matter.

3. The Compromise of 1867 with the House of Habsburg maintained the Hungarian empire for another fifty years, but its hour struck in 1918. This is despite the fact that in the demise of Hungary the entente powers's intent, which was proved strong by history, was as important as the desire of the national minorities to secede. These questions are fully analysed in the study, which then states: in theory it would have been possible to follow a way different from the actual event, but in fact the tragedy of Hungary in the Second World War had to happen as inevitably as it actually did.

Keywords: Trianon, revisionist movement, Saint Stephen's Hungary, Hungarian foreign policy, nationalities, nationalism theoretical possibility
of view provide such a rich array of insights that taken together provide a degree of security for authentically exploring the past.

This is also true for the history of Hungarian foreign policy between 1919 and 1945. The literature discussing what happened could fill a considerable library; and there have been many kinds of interpretation, but there is no accepted agreement. We probably will not be mistaken if we say that the source of many uncertainties is the Treaty of Trianon; and Trianon will remain a wound for many Hungarians until the dominant nationalities of the neighboring countries allow their national minorities to become equal partners in their respective states. Perhaps it is not too risky to say that this will only happen when the European Union is expanded. Then everyday life will be penetrated by the norms of the cohabiting partner nations. This will be quite different from the situation today, when such accommodations occur only done on the legislative level. Put in another way, then there will arise a situation where the fate of a minority does not automatically involve discrimination. So the question remains emotionally charged. But this does not make it unnecessary, indeed, it will encourage the most authentic historical reconstruction possible.

What could be done in the crippled state after June 4, 1919? What could be the aims and what were the possibilities? The aim - as we know all too well - was the restoration of the Hungary of St. Stephen. In the September 1928 issue of the journal *Magyar Szemle* [Hungarian Review] we can read László Ottlik's much referenced article 'Towards a new Hungária'. In this study the author made an attempt - one must add that he must have been reflecting only his own personal opinion - to redraw a modernized and federalized image of the sunken empire, which might attract the nationalities that are now outside of Hungary's borders. This article began with the sentence: "No good Hungarian would doubt that the territorial integrity of St. Stephen's Empire will be sooner or later restored." Let us not discuss now to what extent this statement was true, or how hard it was for those who considered themselves 'good Hungarians' but were unable to identify with this program, which often brought them inconveniences and discrimination. Suffice it to state that the main significance of this statement was the public declaration of a Hungarian political program, which was not often declared but still existed.

How could a program like this be realised? Three things are surely needed for it: one, adequate support within the country; two, a favourable international situation and foreign policy advantages deriving from it; and three, the wish of the nationalities now outside of the Hungarian borders to be members once again of a state encompassing St. Stephen's Empire. These three main factors may be further divided into important subparts, the observation of which may make the answer convincingly accurate.
1. The losers of Trianon were surely for revision, and it is out of the question that broad strata of the society felt themselves crippled by the peace treaty. The vagabonds living in railway carriages in the Western Railway Station, the clerks made redundant, the landowners who were forced to leave their properties, and those who were separated from their relatives by the new borders and those limited by the new currencies were unified and supported a program that promised the return of a beautiful past, one which must have seemed even more beautiful within the miserable present conditions. The force of this idea was not to be underestimated and could easily be harnessed for mass demonstrations. It proved to be suitable for threatening the democratic forces, such as those that had led to the collapse of historical Hungary; and it was easy to motivate for campaigns against the neighbouring countries and the victorious powers. As the governments were clear about the fact that they could most efficiently serve the distant purpose - if they preferred conflict solution to conflict seeking, the relation of the official government policy to this social force was contradictory after the autumn of 1919. This force was a kind of genie to be kept in a bottle and used when needed. But it should be quiet - 'bottled up' - when not needed. Nevertheless, such an effort is never without problems; and the history of Hungarian foreign policy between the two wars illustrates these difficulties. Although István Bethlen used Pál Prónay and his team successfully for shaping the success of the Venice talks, it was not simple to 'disarm' them. Gyula Gömbös was almost done in, and the liquidation of the Lajta Banat was not an easy matter either. Some years later the franc counterfeiting scandal shook the system fundamentally; and without English help the prime minister would hardly have kept his position. Thus, if there had not been so many links between the counterfeiters and the government officials, there would not have been so much scandal. And it is also true that if these quarrelsome people could have been kept under control, there would not have been a scandal (or at least until later, much later, and not right after the cashing of the first banknote). The price for English support was obviously greater harmonisation with the given European order, and as a consequence, the franc affair did not bring the achievement of the basic goal closer but pushed it into the far future.

Another example was constituted by the revision movement that spread after 1927 and obviously influenced the goals of the government - both hidden agenda as well as the official one. Not much later, in 1928, István Bethlen in a new tone provided evidence of this influence in his famous speech at Debrecen. This speech is usually associated with the greater freedom of diplomatic movement, i.e., the end of the military control system in 1927 and the Italian-Hungarian Permanent Friendship Agreement of the same year. The self-assured voice was further supported by the birth of the Hungarian Revision League and its dynamic activities,
which were also effective abroad. On the other hand, this movement did not provide an unambiguous driving force because it had no horizon, was not tactful, and did not lend itself to flexible application. It was a 'roaring patriot melancholy', which meant that it was impossible to influence by rational arguments.

But was it necessarily so? In practice yes, but in theory no. In practice yes, because this system was a reaction to revolutions. It was openly proud of being 'counter-revolutionary' and rejected everything in connection with revolutions. Although even in the latest Hungarian historiography there are views maintaining that this aspect of the system eroded over the years, nevertheless a number of facts support the idea that even in the autumn of 1939 the founding fathers were proud of the circumstances of the birth of their system. Not much later the whirlpool of the Second World War engulfed the country, and there was as a result even less of an opportunity to change these determinations. From this point of view seeing and reflecting on the tragedy of the First World War and the Trianon catastrophe that emerged from it an unbreakable link appeared between the war, its end, and the revolutions. And one could not successfully question this link. Consequently the ideas of the reform generation at the turn of the century should have been considered anew and at least a little bit of the heritage of the revolutions should have been appropriated. The counter-revolutionary system fell back on István Tisza and made a cult of his heritage; and when it moved into action against those accused of his assassination it did so as a means to trample the revolutions into the mud. István Bethlen formed a country of the remaining wreckage and created a state on the ruins of historic Hungary, achievements which demonstrate his political abilities. Contrary to the often quoted accusations, Hungary was a capitalist and not feudalistic country; but there were so many remaining feudalistic traits (in the social hierarchy, in human relationships, in the system of social values, in customs and in taste) that it was not far from the truth to speak about a feudalistic Hungary. The narrowing of the right to vote - let alone the way it was carried out - drew the country back to the state before the revolutions. It not only created dissatisfaction because it narrowed the circle of those having the right to vote in many respects, but even worse was the virtual restoration of the open voting that was characteristic before 1918. Although the agrarian reform was surprisingly extensive, it did not satisfy the centuries-old hunger of the peasants for land, and it mostly preserved the system of large estates rooted in the feudalistic past. Although the pact with Károly Peyer in 1921 was a beneficial and successful step from the point of view of the system, as it built social democracy into the system, from a broader perspective we see that it also forced social democracy into this compromise. For the pact integrated the Social Democratic Party (SDP) into politics and into Hungarian society in a way that its significance was less than it had been in the age of Austro-Hungarian dualism. And this remains true despite the fact that social democracy had no votes in parliament under dualism,
while after 1922 it did. As a result, appearance and essence in this question were totally opposed to each other: the appearance favouring Bethlen and the essence spoiling the chances of Hungarian society to have a properly functioning democracy within the near future and to saturate the broadest strata and circles of the population with democratic thinking.

Although Bethlen's sense for reality dictated the need for making an agreement with the Social Democratic Party, deep in his heart he loathed social democrats, as he loathed the communists. And this was a grand error. He should have fought this loathing, and, for the good of the whole society, he should have overcome it. The leaders of social democracy of the period were ready to integrate into the system - if it had become more democratic - but Bethlen's worldview did not let him encourage this integration and thereby allowing the whole nation to profit by it. On the other hand, the political strength of social democracy was further augmented by its international social democratic connections, but the attitude of social democracy toward revision was very different from that of the Hungarian government. The SDP identified with the cause of the revision of the borders, but to a degree this identification was tactical. Nevertheless, it should have been the government that employed revisionism as a tactic. It had a broader scope to manoeuvre than the opposition, and this opportunity should have been used for forging and deepening the often-proclaimed goal of national unity.

As for the domestic possibilities, these questions were the most important ones, and theoretically they were the areas where much could have been done for reaching better understanding. Besides these, a number of additional factors must be taken into account. One of them is surely the ability of the country to defend itself. We have to take into consideration the condition of the economy, and we cannot ignore the workings of the diplomatic machinery. When the power and international weight of a state are considered, these are absolutely significant questions.

It is a commonplace that the peace treaty bound the country from a military point of view. The ban of recruitment was humiliating and deeply offended the sovereignty of the state. The professional army, consisting of only 35,000 men, would never have been able to defend the country against a possible attack by the fifteen to twenty times larger Little Entente armed forces, which were equipped with more modern technology. The Győr Program fundamentally changed this situation, but by the time the signs of this rearming were recognized, the Little Entente had largely become ineffective. Consequently, Hungarian foreign policy could not be supported by the armed forces. The military leaders restrained rather than encouraged development, and so they constituted an ever present warning of the barren possibilities. It was not merely this restraining role that was fortunate, but also their detached attitude to politics. Most of the army officers had been the soldiers of the Austro Hungarian monarchy, where they had been saturated with
the notion that soldiers must carry out orders and not get involved in politics. Their national loyalty could not have been questioned objectively, but during the time before 1918, when they had to carry out the orders of the super-national monarchy, they acquired a kind of mentality that appeared hopelessly lukewarm during a time of the nationalistic hopes for revision. Nevertheless, it is true that Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös brought about great changes by retiring the old officers, which resulted in the saturation of the military leaders with the ideas of the period. They began getting involved in politics; and politics in those circumstances could only point one way, toward a sensitivity to National Socialism, the Hungarian Nazi (Arrow-Cross) movement and the aspirations of Ferenc Szálasi. All this produced a peculiar situation that could be discerned already during the time of Prime Minister Pál Teleki, and made it very hard for him to govern effectively. Eventually during the time of Prime Minister László Bárdossy the difficulties arising from the peculiar situation would become fatal. This characteristic situation was that the political role of the army emerged before the armed forces proved able to support a revisionist foreign policy. Put in another way, the military leaders supported modifications in foreign policy before such changes could be implemented. When there were favourable territorial changes in the years 1938—39, its role was mainly indifferent. When preparing for the attack on Romania in 1940, the role of the army was positive in that it encouraged the political leadership to reach results through taking the initiative. But between 1940-1945 it did not recognise the trap inherent in the situation resulting from the territorial changes. Indeed, by urging the blindest possible support for the Germans the leadership of the armed forces undermined the opportunities for manoeuvring in foreign policy.

Having written on the diplomatic developments elsewhere, I will only take up some of the questions here. In medias res: let us consider only one aspect of the First Vienna Award. How we got to the First Vienna Award has become a commonplace, but - as will be discussed later - an accurate outline of the background to the decision has not become generally known. Now perhaps that connection is of particular importance in that György Barcz the Hungarian envoy in London encouraged several times that the Hungarian government should acquire a written statement on the Vienna decision from the London government in order to support its oral consent. István Csáky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the time did not follow the advice of his colleague in the British capital. It is a great pity, as some months later in 1939, when Hitler terminated what was left of Czechoslovakia, London's logical response was to declare the Munich Agreement null. As a result the First Vienna Award sank into a swampy territory on the international level; and the Hungarian diplomatic apparatus tried to act on the basis of counter-insurance through its colleague György Barcza, who enjoyed a Ballhausplatz background. But the minister of foreign affairs swam with the current rather than prepare for the turn, which was far from being impossible even then. Although the
apparatus of foreign policy knew what should have been done, it lacked the power to convince its own head. The political line got detached from the intention of the apparatus, which remained far from being able to exert influence in the national interest.

Our other example was the Hungarian diplomatic attitude toward the immigrant Czechoslovak government formed in 1939. These events took place in London, and the way the envoy in London György Barcza responded shows how the apparatus reacted. He observed several times that there was no real role for the Czech immigration. But he soon realised the importance of the question and, with this in mind, he tried through Cadogan, the permanent deputy for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to encourage Britain not to recognise the Benes government. He emphasised that there was no Czechoslovak nation and it seems that he was able to influence the diplomat, because in one of his speeches he mentioned the two nations separately. And when London finally acknowledged the Czechoslovak government, there still might have been some scope for considering the Hungarian viewpoints. For Barcza was told that the acknowledgement was independent of the territorial question. Based on all of the above facts one might say that the Hungarian diplomatic service tried to prevent potential future difficulties, but the foreign policy leadership, which proved to be more and more loyal to the Germans, could not be so circumspect and flexible.

So far we have been stressing the positive role of the diplomatic machinery which was weakened by the constraints imposed by the political leadership. However, this diplomatic machinery had flaw that hamstrung the realisation of governmental policy. It lacked confidentiality, and this lack of confidentiality spoiled the efficiency of Hungarian foreign policy even in peace time. In a time of war it turned out to be fatal. The German intelligence service knew virtually everything about the Kállay government's attempts at drawing up peace agreements and informed Berlin. This is why it was so uncomfortable for the regent to meet Hitler for the first time in Klessheim in spring 1943, let alone the second visit to Klessheim just before the German occupation of Hungary. Unfortunately the tragic effects cannot be said to have resulted from the superior efficiency of German intelligence. The case of the Romanians constitutes a counterexample. Duke Barbu Stirbei, an appointed representative of the Romanian king, took part in secret talks with the Soviet mission in Cairo about Romania's abandonment of Germany and the war, yet the Abwehr knew nothing about it. This tell-tale mentality played a very important part in the fiasco of the Hungarian attempt at leaving the German side on 15 October 1944 in that it was not only inefficient, but sometimes even tragicomic. At the same time the Romanians had managed to do it successfully on 23 August 1944, and the adequate confidentiality on their part unambiguously contributed to their success.
Let us now have a look at the international situation. Here we must note imme­diately that no great power was for the restoration of St. Stephen's Hungary. The most positive were the Germans, but neither the Weimar Republic nor Hitler's Germany wanted to follow Bismarck and regard a powerful Hungary as important. Mussolini - even if he had wanted to support Hungarian aspirations - was not an important factor in this respect. It is only a sign of the usual Hungarian ignorance in foreign policy that many tended - and some do so even today - to overestimate the significance of the unambiguously friendly declarations of the Duce.

Considering the other relations of Rome will help us in evaluating the Italian-Hungarian relationship. There was nothing good in the Italian policy towards Romania for Budapest. Italy's opposition to the southern Slavs was more favorable to Hungary, but for the support to the Croatian Ustasha, which can only be explained up to a point by the self-interests of Hungarian foreign policy, Budapest paid quite a high price. Suffice it to refer to the isolation in foreign policy after the assassination in Marseille, when Gömbös virtually had to blackmail Mussolini to receive some support from Rome in order to overcome this isolation. In the 1920s the Italians had a very good relationship with Prague, but later on they did more and more to bury Czechoslovakia. Mussolini called Czechoslovakia a 'crocodile' state', he named it sometimes a 'crocodile monster', sometimes an 'artificial crocodile' and declared that it must disappear based on history's judgement. The Italians looked on Munich and the liquidation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 negatively because these events integrated the Czech-Moravian territories into Nazi Germany and created Slovakia as a fascist puppet state. But most of them did not oppose the idea that the territories with a Hungarian majority should belong to Hungary. These were later given back to Czechoslovakia because Hungary fought on the wrong side in the Second World War. The First Vienna Award was not annulled later for the same reason that the other decisions were annulled. The latter, with the exception of the Sub-Carpathian territory, were made during the war period and reflected the intentions of the defeated enemy, which was acceptable neither in London, nor in Washington. On January 1st 1993 Prague let Bratislava leave peacefully, an event that had not been earlier anticipated. Prague's reply to Slovak separatist intentions at the time of the peaceful revolution in 1989—90 had been a firm 'no' and, in order to add further emphasis to it, the Czechs stressed that in their attempts to leave Slovaks were questioning the Treaty of Trianon itself. Hence the southern border of the country would be uncertain. And then the great turn, the peaceful separation, took place, and Trianon was covered with the veil of complete silence. What was going on here? There can be little doubt that this secession constituted a partial correction of the Europe created at
Paris after World War I. Two of the favourite children of Versailles, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, turned out to be incapable of life. But the fact that they proved to be unfit for life does not necessarily mean that St. Stephen's Hungary may be reincarnated. We must remember that the initiator of these great changes was nationalism, which created nation-states. This nationalism gave birth to Slovakia, and it was this nationalism that made Prague recognise the fact that although Czech nationalism needed 'Czechoslovakianism' as a crutch in 1919. But in the totally different Europe of the 1990s, and with a completely different Germany, Prague did not need the burden known as Slovakia any more.

In this light it is most unfortunate that the leaders of Hungarian diplomacy did not have the necessary patience in October 1938 to bargain with their neighbours and to draw up a better agreement. Budapest preferred the larger but more risky agreement to the smaller but firmer one. But why? Because, as we noted in point one, they did not reconsider the past after 1919 and were unable to get rid of the past. In particular they could not envisage a future in which the Hungarians were not a leading power but 'merely' one of several nations and countries. This is why they preferred the huge risk of being loyal to the Germans, and this is why they let the decision be made by Hitler. They blindly believed in the illusion that they would get the position of 'primus inter pares' from the grace of Berlin.

Here it is worth considering how Hitler was not seen clearly in Budapest, as well as in other places. Few, only a very few people, read Mein Kampf and even those who did, tried to believe that Hitler, the Chancellor, will not identify with the extremist views of Hitler, the movement activist. In this respect the Budapest considerations on the crushing of the Röhm coup d'état are very instructive here. Although the massacre, the liquidation of the old and faithful supporters of the party and the disgusting propaganda campaign that followed - i.e., trying to make people believe that Röhm's movement was a revolution of homosexuals - was received with disgust in Hungarian political circles, when informing the public, they emphasised that Hitler had 'restored order in the empire with an iron fist'. István Bethlen's paper, the 8 Órai Újság [8 O'clock News], saw the main consequences that crushing the coup would bring as involving the consolidation "necessary to carry out the great responsibilities of Germany." Such a great abstraction from the real bloodshed by official Hungarian policy makers was possible not only because they thought that their purposes might be realised with Germany carrying out its 'great responsibilities', but also because they expected that after Röhm's 'second revolution' Hitler's position would be consolidated in a way that would make the character of German National Socialism more conservative, and consequently more similar to the Hungarian political system. The Budapest judgement that the liquidation of Röhm and his collaborators reinforced Hitler was of course accurate in this respect, but they made a fundamental error in wishfully expecting that a German policy more sensitive to Hungarian needs would emerge
as a consequence. A great part of this grand error was caused by a kind of 'knowledge of supremacy' that was often applied in Budapest to judge the events in German politics. Being able to abstract from the bloody nature of events might even be a virtue, rather than an error, but the given way of abstraction meant an abstraction from the bandit nature of Nazism. In other words, this abstraction was in great part a result of not understanding the essence of fascism.

This incomprehension was the root of the ignorance, and a number of political errors were the consequences. This was why they failed to see the essence even when Hitler hid his territorial demands behind the slogan of ethnic revision. As Mária Ormos has pointed out lately, "the majority of the Hungarian political group recognized only after Hitler's invasion of Prague that Germany did not act on an ethnic basis, but was engaged in 'raw expansion'." But let us have a look at this topic from a broader perspective. The English politics of appeasement was caused by a similar blindness. Furthermore, it is also true that the leader of Italy, being a formal partner of Germany, was in a much better position than Hungary, the Duce, "was surely ignorant of the conquering plans of Hitler." The Hungarian political leaders must be judged in this light, and we may say that the non-transparency of Hitler's plans was a wall that obstructed the sight of the Hungarian political leaders, as well as those of others.

At the same time the Hungarians were much better informed about the activities of the Bolsheviks. The Hungarian political leadership could not get out of the snares of the Second World War because although the Anglo-Saxon powers kept recommending an alliance with Moscow, Hungary stuck to the German ally. This occurred with the consent of the majority of the population. Although the horrible acts of the Germans were already becoming clearer, nevertheless the population understood that there was a fundamental difference between the two countries in respect to ownership of property. While Hitler's political system did not attack private property, and so the acceptance of capitalism kept the two countries close to each-other, the collectivist nature of the Bolshevik system appeared horrible to many. In addition, in the question of the Soviet massacre at the Katyn forest the broad strata of the Hungarian population believed the German version. We must also take into consideration that it was the sons of the Polish nation who were the victims of the scandalous massacre, who had been the friends of the Hungarian nation, and then we can better understand why the reluctance to form an alliance with the Russians will be at once plausible. The more so because such a connection would necessarily lead to a capitulation in which one logical consequence would be the appearance of the Red Army on Hungarian soil.

But the Hungarian-Soviet relationship did not begin this time; it had roots going back several decades in the past. And this past was marked by missed opportunities. On the Hungarian part it was the effect of ideological burdens restraining political manoeuvring, while on the Soviet side it was an animosity that arose as
a consequence of Hungarian refusals. The spirit of Rapallo influenced the thinking of some leaders, and István Bethlen did not reject Russia out of hand. Kálmán Kánya, a man with a Ballhaus platz background, who considered things in a relatively detached way in Berlin in 1924, signed the agreement on establishing diplomatic relations, but the forces of Hungarian internal politics, with the Regent as their leader, prevented it from becoming a law. The relations were renewed only some decades later. Although it is true that Hungary revived diplomatic relations with Russia before the states of the Little Entente, the Soviet Union in the League of Nations did not consider the peace system of Versailles from the point of view of the 1920s, and the spirit of Rapallo had already disappeared. Hungary moved closer and closer to Nazi Germany, while the Antikomintern Pact made on the basis of the German-Italian axis put confrontation in the place of the formerly good Berlin-Moscow relationship. Moscow was not against Hungarian revisionist intentions at this time, and as a consequence it wanted to prescribe a kind of sober manoeuvring for Budapest. But the latter was incapable of it. If it manoeuvred, it only manoeuvred against Berlin, and so it was able to avoid the Kiel offer by Hitler in August 1938 to take part in the attack on Czechoslovakia and gain the whole of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) in exchange. As this made the Führer very angry with Hungary, he did not do much for Hungary in Munich. From this point of view it would also have been logical for Hungarian diplomacy to do everything possible for the success of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak agreement. But they did not do this, and Hungary, obliged by the First Vienna Award, tried to comfort the Führer. In this spirit Hungary declared that it would quit the League of Nations and join the Antikomintern Pact. Moscow's answer to cut off diplomatic relations was a clear sign of the fact that the great power was offended. When some months later Hitler signed a pact with Stalin at the expense of Poland, as another move in his grand chess play, Hungary restored diplomatic relations with Moscow. This step was worthy of a trip to Canossa.

While the Soviet-Hungarian relationship was blocked by a sense of having been offended on the Soviet side and by ideological barriers on the Hungarian side, the relationship between Moscow and Bucharest was openly antagonistic because of Bessarabia. And this antagonism made Moscow put aside its feelings of offense and to seek accommodation with Budapest on the Transylvanian question. If the Transylvanian spirit that 'fought between two pagans for the country' had really existed in Hungarian foreign policy during the twentieth century, it would have been worth considering what the Soviet-German contract of 23 August 1939 about abstaining from attacking each other offered to Hungarian diplomacy. Let us have a look at the facts and observe the Soviet standpoint of the time, which was favourable for us in the Transylvanian question and which could have been utilised by a flexible Hungarian foreign policy stripped of its ideological considerations. The Soviet people's commissary declared on 4 July 1940 at the
Molotov-Kristóffy meeting that his government "considered the Hungarian territorial demands against Romania as grounded and would be ready to second them in an eventual peace conference, should they be solved at such a conference." In addition to this, he spoke about the fact that "in a possible Hungarian-Romanian conflict, the Soviet Union's moves would follow from her standpoint on the territorial demands." On 24 August, before the Second Vienna Award, Molotov met the Hungarian representative again and restated that Hungarian demands for Transylvania were grounded, while the Romanians did not manage to get any encouragement in Moscow. If Hungarian diplomacy had enjoyed flexibility and adequate perspectives, it would have utilized the opportunity, since this opportunity contained the possibility of setting up a German-Soviet (or, eventually a German-Italian-Soviet) peace conference. Judging from the antecedents, it is not too risky to say that the Soviets would have been happy to participate. Hitler would have been unhappy for certain, but what could he have done against it? What would the consequences have been of a possible German refusal? We believe it would have produced a situation that would have provided further possibilities for Hungarian diplomacy. But, on the other hand, if the agreement had been drawn up, Hungary would have been secured for both possible outcomes. The state of affairs would have been incomparably better in the case of both a German and Soviet victory than the one that really came about after the war. If we consider the fact that it was impossible for the Germans to win this war, then we will see that Hungary would only have been secured by the Soviet-American-English coalition. Let us think the matter through further. If Transylvania had been returned to Hungary with Soviet help, then Prime Minister Bárdossy would have had much more scope for operation in June 1941 and would not have had to suffer the pressure of the military leaders. And if this pressure had been smaller, entering the war might have been put off. Entering the war later would have had many advantages, including the reduction of suffering and losses, but at the same time the Soviet leadership would not have turned against Hungary so much. There may be no doubt: the new Molotov declaration of 23 June 1941, which is usually overestimated in historiography, was not a mere reiteration of the former Soviet standpoint. There was a completely new element in it: the reality of being threatened. Earlier it had been very easy for the Russians to speak about it, but in June 1941 the question was much more emphatic. There may be no doubt that the new offer was motivated by the enormous threat to the Soviet empire. So, if the refusal of the former offers left some feelings of offence in the Soviet leaders, this refusal was so harsh that offended Moscow as a great power. The Hungarian 'reply' was supported by its entry into the war on the German side. (For the well-known reason Prime Minister Bárdossy simply put the report aside and did not inform the Regent; there was no formal reply.) Bárdossy was right to state at his later trial that he did not consider this message important as it had been motivated by the
contemporary situation. After 1945 not only historians, but also newspapers and schools exaggerated the significance of this telegram. They did so in order to put the Horthy regime on the pillory. And Horthy, in his usual short-sighted way, contributed to this campaign when (not realising the significant dimensions of the question, i.e., that it was discrediting the political system marked by his name), in order to get rid of his personal responsibility, he made Bárdossy accept the odium of the whole affair (and so doing he falsified the way things were). One consequence of these various desires was the fact that the frequent weakness of Hungarian diplomatic thinking got even more pronounced in this respect.

All this does not mean that there were no alternatives in Hungarian foreign policy; it only means that the alternative existed only theoretically. There was no alternative in the world of realities. We would not like to be misunderstood: these considerations have nothing to do with the world of the rosy 'What would have happened if...'}} and the frequent staring into the past, which not only hinders the real knowledge of the past, but at the same time it also blocks the narrow paths to that direction. For three objective and two subjective reasons the theoretical considerations could not have been realised as alternatives.

We see one objective reason in the fact that Hungarian diplomacy, which had oriented itself towards Europe since its foundation more than a thousand years before, did not get any effective help from the representatives of this civilisation. French diplomacy was built on the Little Entente, whose goal was to suppress Hungarian aspirations. As long as it was powerful enough, it had some possibilities. Nevertheless, eventually it got imprisoned by this formation in its Eastern European policy. Although British diplomacy provided a very important help to the Hungary in the 1920s, it was not ready to redraw the borders, and in the 1930s it soon realised that Hungary was not capable of opposing Hitler's Reich. Sir Orme Sargent, the head of the responsible department in the Foreign Office, advised his superiors on 25 May 1938 to leave Hungary alone to its fate, i.e., not much after the Anschluss and at a time when his country showed unusual strength in making Hitler retreat temporarily from his plans to destroy Czechoslovakia. In what other ways could his words have been interpreted: "let us not get persuaded to waste our time and money, trying to save a country like Hungary where the game is already over." Another objective factor was that the makers of Hungarian diplomacy, left alone by Western civilization and supported by the majority of Hungarian society, preferred to choose Hitler's to Stalin's empire.

This is the final explanation for the fiasco of the Kállay government's attempts at peace agreements. The path before Hungarian diplomacy to successful peace treaties was blocked by decisive factors that meshed together like cogwheels. We must emphasise that the results came about not from any predispositions but a series of bad decisions and an inability to utilise the opportunities. London basically stuck to the agreement made with Washington and Moscow, which may be
summed up as unconditional surrender. "The advantages of supporting the anti-axis Hungarians would probably have been exceeded by the suspicion of the allied partners, especially the Czechs, who were particularly worried about the Hungarian attempts at peace talks."  

31 It is true that Eden, who was not particularly a friend of the Hungarians, remarked on 12 February 1943, "There may be a turn forcing us to make some changes [my emphasis]," but he added at once that "should this happen, we may only act in concordance with the United States of America and the Soviet Union."  

32 What benevolence could Hungary expect from the Soviet leaders who were still deeply offended as the leaders of a great power by the refusal of their gesture of 23 June 1941 and who were outraged by the conduct of the Hungarian army in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union? It would have been logical to write 'Hungarian leaders' instead of 'Hungary' in the previous sentence, but the logic of history makes us write Hungary. The Soviet leadership was consciously not willing to distinguish between the two. Molotov's statement some months later, on June 7th makes this clear with chilly accuracy. "The responsibility for the war crimes should not only be taken by the Hungarian government, but more or less the Hungarian people as well."  

33 The British standpoint was much milder. "We would not like to mutilate Hungary... and we would not like to punish the people for the stupidity of their government. Our and our allied partners' standpoint will be inevitably influenced by the practical steps that the Hungarians want to do in order to get out of the power of the Axis..."  

34 But the Kállay government failed to profit from these possibilities. Indeed, if we are very understanding, we say that it was not able to make profit of it. The country was far from getting out of the imprisonment by the Axis, and after March 19th Hungary was occupied by the Germans in such an unfortunate way that the allied forces regarded Hungary as a satellite of the Germans, as the country's resources served the interests of the Axis and the majority of the Hungarian Jews were liquidated, which could not have been done without the active participation of the Hungarian state administration.

And now we must mention the question of German occupation and the psychosis that the Hungarian government, and in general: the Hungarian political elite, had in this respect. The country's independence was already much restrained by the German-Hungarian relations, when the elite still saw it as intact. It saw the independence as intact but felt that the country was in a cage.  

35 And meanwhile they already feared the sound of German boots, even though there was no real danger of it yet. This emerged as early as in the autumn of 1939 when the government was brave to turn down the German request in the Polish question. Later, the entrance into the war against the Soviet Union was justified by Prime Minister Bárdossy and several other leading figures with the explanation that it would now be possible to avoid the German occupation of Hungary. This way they did not face the need to finish the war on the German side because they were always...
coping with the ghost of the occupation, and they mystified it. And they did nothing, really nothing, against it.\textsuperscript{36} The responsibility of Regent Horthy and the various prime ministers, together with the ministers for national defense deserve mention above all. Of course it is true that the terrible facts of the German practice of occupation abhorred Hungary. But those who observed this must have seen that the practice of German occupation was different in every country. It might have been noted that life in the Czech-Moravian Protectorate went on relatively peacefully.\textsuperscript{37} The argument is often quoted that they wanted to avoid the occupation at all cost in order to save the great majority of Hungarian Jews. For many people in the leadership this must have been important, but when considering it, we can hardly forget the hard facts of the legal acts against the Jews and the very painful reality of 1944, i.e., the fact that the Jews of Hungary were deported with the active participation of the Hungarian Gendarmerie, the Hungarian State Railways, and in general the Hungarian state administration.\textsuperscript{38}

The third objective factor was the very anachronistic state of Hungarian society and its political system of institutions. On the brink of the war and within its turmoil it acted even more as a determining force against the realisation of a more flexible political practice.

We see one of the above mentioned subjective reasons for the weakness of foreign policy thinking in the role of political public opinion. The essence of the other subjective factor lies in the fact that the Hungarian system was so much bound by its own ideologies that it refused the real possibility of a co-operation with Moscow due to a great sense of self-esteem and 'moral height'.

And finally we must consider the question of whether the nationalities cut off from Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon wanted to belong to Hungary again and whether they wanted to live in 'St. Stephen's fatherland'. László Teleki wrote as early as in 1848 that not only Austria had died "but also the Hungary of St. Stephen".\textsuperscript{39} The wisdom of Ferenc Deák and the ability of Count Andrássy for forging compromises made it possible to draw up the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which made the Hungarian Empire survive for a half a century longer, but in 1918 the clock finally struck midnight. Moreover, nothing is changed by the fact that the Entente powers' desire to break up the empire, a desire that turned out to be historically wrong, was just as important as the separation efforts of the nationalities in tearing apart greater Hungary. And during the eight decades after the separation, none of the nationalities has opted for a future within the framework of a greater Hungary. The fact that this is so is mainly influenced by nationalism. So while the nationalities firmly wished to create their own nation
states, the prevailing Hungarian public opinion after the revolutions cursed the excessively lenient policy towards the nationalities and saw it as a reason why St. Stephen's kingdom had collapsed. In so doing it opposed the official laws giving nationalities model rights, and in order to avoid making the same 'error' again, it encouraged the practice of violent assimilation. From all this follows that public opinion was reluctant to accept László Teleki's truth.\textsuperscript{40}

The nationalities separated from Hungary after the First World War did not wish to return to the country. This is one of the reasons why it was impossible to restore the country of St. Stephen. There were no signs of this even in the 1920s or 1930s. The above mentioned article by Ottlik was not accepted by the nationalities either. And the minority policy of the country that tried to restore itself reminded them of the Bourbons, rather than the heightened spirituality and the administrative practice embedded in Pál Teleki's intentions.

Hungarian historiography usually stresses that there was no possibility to agree with the neighbours, as they did not want to return any territory, while Hungary wanted all the territories returned. This holds true for the period of the 1920s and 1930s, when there was virtually no possibility for any changes. When the situation changed, both Budapest and the neighbours modified their standpoints. The facts of the redrawn borders show this very clearly. It follows from this that there was a possibility for direct agreements, which would have restricted Berlin's field of operation rather than enlarged it. The historiography of the 1970s and 1980s recorded only the failure of the Komárom Talks and ignored the relevant material in the series \textit{Diplomatic Writings to the Foreign Policy of Hungary} and the relevant memories of \textit{History Mapped} by András Rónay, which state that Prague was ready to accept the border that was very similar to the border drawn in the First Vienna Award, but with the significant difference that it wanted to keep the towns Bratislava, Nitra, Košice, Uzhgorod and Munkačëvo and their surroundings along the border. And as far as the peace talks in Turnu Severin are considered, András Hory is incorrect in saying that the Romanians did not want to give back anything. It is true that they wanted to give less than what was given by Berlin, but it was much more than what the Hungarian party thought feasible after the end of the war.

So, hard as it may be, we must state again that we should have drawn up an agreement with our northern neighbour and played the Soviet card. For the disastrous situation of the Kállay government,\textsuperscript{41} where there was virtually no hope, was also shaped by the policy of the former governments. And a very important part of this policy was the way these territorial changes were made. There was a possibility of a direct agreement before the First Vienna Award, and - in principle - a German-(Italian-)Soviet jury should have been encouraged instead of the Second Vienna Award. There was hardly any other possibility for Sub-Carpathia and Voivodina.
In conclusion, we would like to stress that we would not like to be misunder­stood. When we speak about missed opportunities, we 'merely' say that there was a theoretical possibility for a path other than the real one, but practically there was hardly any hope for avoiding the tragedy of the Second World War for our country. For the external circumstances were very serious and the political elite of the time, due to its weaknesses, was not able to utilise the small field of operation left open to it. This remains their responsibility, which would be a mistake not to record. But hopefully the times are over when only their responsibility is taken into consideration, and the very serious external circumstances are ignored.

Notes

1. And at the same time it also changes the image traditionally handed down to us.
2. The military committee of the League of Nations terminated on 31st March 1927, Bethlen went to Rome between the 4th and 6th of April and the Hungarian Revision League was founded on 27th June. The Debrecen Speech took place on 4th March 1928.
3. 'Bömböl honfibu', an expression by László Németh.
4. The situation is accurately illustrated by the fact that László Ottlik had to clarify himself because of his above mentioned article mainly because it was seen as a relative of Oszkár Jászi's ideas of federation. And Ottlik did not take kindly to any of this 'kinship'; he made every attempt to prove that he had nothing to do with Jászi's ideas. The second Ottlik article can be found in: Éva Ring, ed., Helyünk Európában (Our Place in Europe) (Budapest, 1986), Vol. I, 170-182.
6. The economy developed at a modest rate in the whole period, so this was not a strong base for an aggressive foreign policy.
7. There would be some point in discussing the role of the apparatus with foreign policy or rather, it would be logical. Still, we believe that the apparatus must be discussed here because we consider it such a social sociological creature whose make up, but rather its mentality was formed by the nature of the Hungarian society of the time.


15. The leaders/makers of Hungarian foreign policy knew already in 1935 when Mussolini suddenly turned to Paris that nothing could really be built on the support of the Italians, but they did not consider it important to inform Hungarian public opinion about it. And in 1940 Italy’s defeats made it clear to those able to see that Rome became one of the satellites of Berlin. But meanwhile, Hungarian public opinion did not realise the fact that one of the main pillars of Hungarian foreign policy had collapsed. Herczegh, *ibid.* (1999) 321.

16. It was especially their mutual interest in preventing a Habsburg restoration, which is totally understandable historically, that brought the two countries together.


18. Prague feared even the defeated Germany very much. If we only think of the 3 million Sudeten Germans whose new country was to be Czechoslovakia, we can see that their fears were well grounded. But the so called ‘Czechoslovakianism’ was not only needed by the Czech nationalists, but also by the French nationalists. For the French conception of security policy needed the guarantee for the influence of Paris in Central and Eastern Europe, and, as a consequence, for curbing the Germans.

19. It is best illustrated by the (euphemistically put: not too wise) fight for the position of first joiner to the Three Power Contract.


22. The practice of the Hungarian Council Republic (Tanácsköztársaság) of 1919 kept it in memory with memorable examples.


24. Gyula Juhász wrote that the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs initiated the restoration of the functioning of embassies in March 1939. In: *A moszkvai magyar követség jelentései, 1935-1941* [Reports of the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow, 1935-1941] (Budapest, 1992), 8. The documents were selected, the notes and the index were made by Peter Pastor.


27. "The Soviet Union protested in a memorandum against the fact that Germany and Italy alone had decided in the Transylvanian question, which Moscow was deeply involved in". Herczegh, *ibid.* 313.

28. As Albrecht Haushofer, who was clear about the bandit nature of Nazism and assassinated by SS men in April 1945, had tried as early as 1941 to influence the various circles of the Reich with a peace design that would have annulled most of the territorial changes that were in favour of Hungary and as Hitler himself had no particular interest in the happy fate of Hungarians, it may probably be taken for granted that a final German victory would have restrained Hungary more than the situation after Trianon.

30. Quoted by Gyula Juhász: Magyarország nemzetközi helyzete és a magyar szellemi élet 1938–1944 [Hungary's International Situation and the Hungarian Intellectual Life 1938–1944] (Budapest, 1987), 9, 10. And two years later it restated the English standpoint in the same way: "We never wanted to guarantee that country against Germany as we had done with Romania. In other words, we acknowledged that Hungary belonged to the German sphere of interest." Herczegh, ibid., 21Y.

31. Ibid., 406.


33. Ibid., 158, 159.

34. Ibid., 102.

35. Miklós Kozma noted probably not only his own conviction in his diary at the end of September 1938 when writing: "There are 9 million Hungarians living in the cage created at Trianon. It is flanked by the Little Entente on three sides and the fourth side has been taken by Germany since the Anschluss. If in the future, and it is doubted by no one, we get back our territories peacefully or in a bloody way, it only means that we'll live in a somewhat bigger cage. Ruthenia (Sub Carpathia), on the other hand, means that we manage to break the ring of the Little Entente between Romania and Czechoslovakia and we have a common border with Poland. It is only natural that we must keep on with the friendly policy towards Germany pursued so far, but it is equally natural that in another way than it is done now. The line Warsaw-Budapest Belgrade Rome is not opposed to policy of the Berlin Rome Axis, but it's a great relief to us." However, history proved that the real judgment of the situation was followed by plans built on sand, as the plan of the horizontal axis, which had a long history in the previous years, could not be a real force against Berlin. MOL K 428 Diary entry on 28 September 1938. The text quoted several times was first referred to by Magda Ádám: Magyarország és a kisantant a harmincas években [Hungary and the Little Entente in the 30s] (Budapest, 1968), 327. These thoughts are similar to those of Géza Herczegh's statement: "Hungary with a territory of 160,000 square kilometers was exactly so defenseless and exposed in the circle of Hitler and his satellites as the Hungary with a territory of 93,000 square kilometers within the claws of the Little Entente." (Herczegh, ibid., 331.)

36. See, for example Gyula Kádár: A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig [From the Ludovika to Sopronkőhida] (Budapest, 1978).

37. It would be worth studying the consular reports from Prague between 1939 and 1944 and to follow to what extent they were known in Hungary.

38. Mentioning the argument that the peoples of Eastern Europe, regardless of being winners or defeated, shared the same fate after 1945 in the Soviet sphere of interests belongs to the afterlife of the question. This view is true to a certain point only. If we only think of the territories set out by the peace treaties, then this statement can hardly be maintained. For the borders set out by the peace treaties have their great significance even today. Let it suffice to mention only the hard life of being a minority and the environmental catastrophes inflicted on neighbouring countries. This is why today's security policy has a much different content than it did between the two wars. It means that until there exists a unified Europe, and there is a unified environmental policy or protection, the question of the borders will remain. And even if the new order exists, the historical fact that this issue has been very important for long decades will not be changed.

40. Géza Herczegh writes that this truth was demonstrated again in April 1941. For "the nationali­ties of the historical country did not want to return, and no superpower wanted to restore the Hungary of St. Stephen." Herczegh (1999), 330.

41. See Antal Czettler’s A mi kis élet halál kérdéseink. A magyar külpolitika a hadba lépést 1 a német megszállásig [Our Little Questions of Life and Death. Hungarian Foreign Policy from Entering into the War to the German Occupation] (Budapest, 2000) for the latest material on the question.
The Treaty of Trianon was the peace settlement that the victors of World War I imposed on Hungary after the war. The treaty's severity was unprecedented in modern European history. By dismembering the multi-ethnic "historic Kingdom of Hungary" the treaty left Hungarians less than a third of their former territory and transferred 3.3 million of them to neighboring states. Not surprisingly, Trianon came as a shock to the Hungarian people and constituted an enduring blow to the Magyar national psyche. During the next quarter century, Hungarians were obsessed with the idea of reversing this dictum and the primary objective of their foreign policies was the creation of international conditions in which the revision of Trianon could become possible. For this purpose the regime in Budapest sought allies, as this aim could be attained only with outside help. By the first half of 1941 this search had led to Hungary’s entanglement in an alliance with Nazi Germany. Once Hungary became a partner in the Nazi war, the danger emerged that if the country did not toe the German line, Hitler would reverse the frontier adjustments that he had rendered earlier in Hungary’s favor. Already during the late summer of 1941 some of Hungary’s statesmen realized that the Third Reich might not win the war, but their plans to limit then contribution to the Nazi war effort and to prepare for defection from the Axis were frustrated by the fear that, if they abandoned or weakened the alliance with Berlin, no more "lost" Hungarian lands could be regained and lands already recovered might be forfeited again.

**Keywords:** Peace Treaty of Trianon, First World War, Second World War, Hungarian national psyche, Hungarian foreign policy

No agreement exists among historians as to whether the First or the Second World War constituted the greater tragedy for Hungary. A solid argument can be made for characterizing the second of these great conflicts as having been more cataclysmic in its effect on Hungary's evolution. Still, some historians insist that World War I had more profound and more lasting impact. When they do so, they inevitably refer to the most dramatic consequence of that conflict, the peace settlement that followed the war, the Treaty of Trianon of June, 1920.

The question of which of the twentieth century's great conflicts inflicted more damage on Hungary may never be settled conclusively. This is so partly because...
it is not possible to isolate the impact of these wars, or to discuss them in isolation from each other. Though the author of these lines can think of many reasons for viewing the developments of 1939–1945 as having caused enormous damage to Hungary, he has to admit that the roots of these events can be traced back to what had happened during 1914–1920. In fact, it can be argued that without the great tragedies of those years, the Second World War may not have been as cataclysmic in Hungary as it was. More precisely, as will be suggested in this paper, without the Treaty of Trianon, Hungarian involvement in the Second World War might have been on a more limited scale, and it might even have started later. If, indeed, the First World War had been the greater tragedy for Hungary, it was so because that conflict, or more precisely its consequences, helped to predetermine the country’s involvement in the second.

As far as its immediate impact is concerned, there can be little doubt that World War II caused the greater physical damage to Hungary. During the final phases of the conflict the country was a battleground between Axis and Allied (mainly Soviet) forces. This stands in sharp contrast to the First World War when only peripheral areas of Hungary were invaded. The human and material costs of the movement of the front through the country in 1944–45 are still being felt by Hungarian society and the visible signs of the destruction wrought still scar the landscapes of many Hungarian cities and villages. Furthermore, unlike the First World War, which was followed by only a temporary occupation by foreign troops of most of Hungary, the Second World War resulted in foreign rule that lasted nearly two generations. During it totalitarian control was introduced and time-honored Hungarian institutions were abolished. In fact, Hungary’s communist rulers tried to mould a pluralistic, Christian, western-oriented country into a one-party, atheist state, with a command economy and a regimented culture oriented entirely towards the despotic world of Soviet Russia. Today, more than a decade after the end of the communist experiment in the country, Hungarian society is still only in the initial stages of recovering from the totalitarian rule that had been imposed on it in the wake of World War II.

Historians who argue that World War I had been the greatest tragedy of modern Hungarian history almost invariably refer to the fact that it was in the wake of that conflict that the "thousand-year-old" historic Kingdom of Hungary had been dissolved, and Hungary was reduced to a land-locked little country, a shadow of its former self. It is difficult to disagree with this line of argument. The Treaty of Trianon, which was imposed on Hungary in June of 1920 by the victors of World War I, was unparalleled in its severity in modern European history.

The most dangerous long-term effect of the Treaty of Trianon was the impact it had on the Hungarian national psyche. The post-1920 generations of Hungarians were intensely preoccupied with the "tragedy of Trianon" and with schemes for reversing the treaty’s territorial provisions. One consequence of this type of in-
tense preoccupation was the tendency to blame all the country's wrongs on Trianon. Not surprisingly, many of interwar Hungary's economic and social problems were not effectively debated and solved.

There were, however, even more menacing psychological effects of Trianon. As Professor S. B. Várdy has observed, the initial Hungarian reaction to Trianon "was emotional, haphazard, [and] misdirected..." What was most misdirected in these reactions was the tendency to blame the tragedy of Trianon on Hungary's millennium-long ties to Europe. In a way, this type of reaction is understandable. In the destruction of their 1,000-year-old kingdom many Hungarians saw the betrayal of their nation by Europe, the very Europe to which Hungarians throughout the centuries had tried so hard to belong. The national disenchantment with everything Europe stood for led many Hungarians to search for alternative identities, to a re-examination of their roots and history, and to the embracing of their Eastern heritage and cultural connections. It led to the rise of the "Turanian" movement in Hungary with its nostalgia for the pre-Christian values and traditions of the Magyars. It also led to what Várdy calls the rise of the "new-Paganism" i.e., fascism, a political movement that "offered quick, simplistic and often less than moral solutions to the nation's complex and long-standing problems".

While many in Hungary searched for salvation from the wrongs and humiliations imposed by Trianon in a new, largely un-European national identity combined with right-wing radicalism, the country's leaders sought to reverse the judgement of Trianon through other means. These included sustained efforts to convince the governments of the powers primarily responsible for the drafting of the treaty's provisions, of the injustice of those terms. Hungary's leadership also embarked on a propaganda campaign, conducted both at home and abroad, to rally public support to the cause of treaty revision. On the international level, the campaign achieved little beyond attracting a few converts to the cause, while at home the campaign preached to the converted and managed to keep the frenzy of revisionist clamor at a near-constant boiling point.

Besides engaging in propaganda to convince the outside world of the injustices of the Trianon treaty, Hungary's leaders tried to use diplomacy to further their aims. Post-World War I Hungary, unlike the Hungary of the Dual Monarchy of the pre-1918 period, had its own foreign office and the beginnings of a national diplomatic service. This independent foreign policy apparatus faced an uphill struggle. Not only was the state it represented a small, land-locked and impoverished country, but it was highly isolated. Its neighbors had greatly benefited from the dismemberment of Hungary and banded together in the so-called Little Entente, a strategic alliance created to make sure that the new territorial order in Central Europe would not be disturbed.

Hungary's policy-makers knew full well that, without friends - and, especially, great power friends - their chances of breaking the country's isolation and mak-
ing any progress in the direction of treaty revision would be marginal at best. The fact that for small, weak countries alliance policy is far more important than it is for great powers, was not lost on the Hungarian leadership. For these reasons, for inter-war Hungary alliance policy was the cornerstone of the country's foreign policies and this situation continued - in fact, intensified - after the outbreak of the Second World War.

The search for allies took Hungary's policy-makers in several directions. For a brief time in the early post-war period it seemed that France, the very France that was behind some of the most onerous provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, would be the object of Hungary's search for a great power ally, but dallying with the idea of friendship with Paris proved ephemeral. More promising were the prospects of cultivating links with Italy, a country that was also unhappy with the post-war territorial settlements, not because they brought losses for Italians but because they did not provide enough gains. Indeed, by the end of the 1920s, Mussolini's Italy came closest to being the great power friend that Hungary's leadership had sought.

The rise of the Nazis to power in Germany promised to change the European power constellation. The new German government's anti-Versailles rhetoric was welcomed by certain of Hungary's leaders who wished to cultivate Berlin's friendship. The complicating factor was the cool relationship that existed between Hitler and Mussolini during the mid-1930s. In this connection it has been pointed out that it was Gyula Gömbös, Hungary's Premier from 1932-1936, who tried to smooth the differences between the two. By the time Mussolini was driven closer to Hitler by the international developments starting with the fall of 1935 - the crisis over Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and the outbreak of civil war in Spain - the way was clear for better relations between Budapest and the countries of the newly established Rome-Berlin Axis. Nevertheless, Hungary proceeded in her quest for powerful allies with a great deal of circumspection, especially in the wake of Gömbös's illness and death in the early autumn of 1936.

The events of the following eighteen months, culminating in the Nazi annexation of Austria in March of 1938, reinforced these tendencies. The man at the helm of Hungarian foreign policy at this time was Kálmán Kánya, Minister of External Affairs from February 1933 to November 1938. Under his guidance, the primary aim Hungarian foreign policy after the Austrian Anschluss became the preservation of Hungary's free hand in international affairs through the avoidance of subordination of the country to Nazi German influences. The quest for revising the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon was not given up, but it was pursued with caution and was sought in a manner that would not prejudice Hungary's independence and would not lead to involvement in a European conflict on the side of Nazi Germany.
To counter the ever-growing influence of Nazi Germany in East Central Europe, Kánya and a few other members of Hungary's elite looked to Great Britain, the only European great power that in their estimate could act as a possible bulwark against further German expansion. By the late autumn of 1938, however, it became increasingly evident to Hungary's policy-makers that the expectations attached to the idea of cooperating with Britain to counter German influence were unrealistic. The "British card" proved to be a less-than-viable element in Hungary's alliance policy. The fundamental reason for this turn of events has been pointed out by American historian Thomas Sakmyster, who concluded that at the time the British statesmen assigned a "very low priority" to Hungary in their strategic thinking and displayed a "striking ignorance" of that part of Europe.\(^\text{10}\)

The disappointment of several of Hungary's leaders in Great Britain's behavior in the Czechoslovak crises of 1938 and 1939 varied in intensity and longevity. A few of them, such as Premier Béla Imrédy, became profoundly disillusioned with Great Britain, while others retained faint hope that London could one day be counted on as a friend of Hungary.

Hungary's leaders' basic attitudes to their country's alliance policy were being shaped already during the years leading up to the outbreak of the war in September of 1939. Only a few members of the country's elite were irrevocably committed to one orientation or another. The situation that existed in this connection on the eve of the war can be described as a faction of the Hungarian leadership leaning toward an alliance with Nazi Germany, while another faction, realizing the danger of such alliance, searched for some other alignment to serve Hungary's interests. Some advocates of the latter persisted in the increasingly vain belief that friendship with Italy could counterbalance German influence in central Eastern Europe, while a few continued to cherish the hope that Britain would become more interested in exerting her influence in the region.

These contradictory tendencies in Hungarian strategic thinking continued after the outbreak of the war. Unfortunately for the prospects of a Hungarian free hand in foreign policy, the preoccupation of some of Hungary's statesmen with their country's independence had to co-exist with the desire of the vast majority Hungarians, and especially the members of the military and right-wing political parties, for treaty revision. The crises of the first two years of the war and, especially, the triumphs of Nazi arms throughout Europe, would have significant impact on the thinking of Hungary's masses, as well as her elite, on the question of alliance policy.

Revisionist ambitions had a momentum of their own. Success in one direction increased expectations of victory in the others. The regaining of what is today's southern Slovakia through the First Vienna Award of November 1938 only increased Hungarian hopes for treaty revision elsewhere in the Carpathian Basin.
The fact that every change in the international borders in Hungary's favor made the country more indebted to Nazi Germany was lost on many of the advocates of the "gathering in" of the detached Hungarian lands.

The danger of reliance on Berlin, however, was not dismissed by Count Pál Teleki who became Hungary’s Premier early in 1939. His alliance policies have been described as "cooperation with Germany" and the simultaneous cultivation of "favorable relations with the West."\(^\text{11}\) The German plank in Teleki's policies soon paid dividends when, with Hitler's secret approval, the Hungarians occupied Carpatho-Ruthenia in March of 1939, thereby completing the disintegration of the post-World War I state of Czechoslovakia. The re-acquisition of this part of the Carpathian Basin created a joint Hungarian-Polish border and gave vague hopes to a few of Hungary's leaders that with greater cooperation between Poland, Hungary and Italy, German influence in the region could be curbed.

As war-clouds gathered over Europe's skies in the summer of 1939, Teleki tried to make sure that his country would remain neutral in the forthcoming confrontation, and that it would retain the good-will of Great Britain and France. Partly for these reasons, on the eve of the expected German attack on Poland, Teleki announced his government's plan to remain neutral in the conflict. He held to his position despite Hitler's furious protests. Moreover, when war broke out, the Teleki government denied the Germans' request for the use of northern Hungary's railways for the shipment of German troops to Poland's southeastern borders.\(^\text{12}\)

Despite the crisis in German-Hungarian relations of the late summer of 1939, throughout this period Budapest strove to maintain friendly ties with Berlin and to exploit German-Hungarian friendship and the unsettled international situation for its own purposes. The Hungarians' quest for treaty revision during the first year of the war was directed against Rumania. They hoped to maneuver the government in Bucharest into a position in which it would have to make substantial territorial concessions to Hungary, without the country committing itself to a military alliance with Germany.

International developments of the time offered hope to Hungary's leaders that this policy would work. The fact was that Rumania's strategic position had gradually deteriorated. The destruction of Czechoslovakia had shattered the Little Entente. Rumania's international circumstances further weakened in the late summer of 1939. At the time, Bucharest was aligned with Britain and France, but the sudden rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia at the end of August, and especially the occupation of Poland by these two powers in September, isolated Rumania. The Bucharest government's predicament was further exacerbated by the fact that Hungary was not the only country eager to press territorial demands against it. In the wake of the Great War, Rumania had gained lands not only from Hungary but also from Bulgaria and Russia. The Bulgarian claim to
southern Dobruja probably did not alarm Bucharest unduly, but the desire of the
Soviet Union to regain Bessarabia was more threatening. Furthermore, Rumania
was also a possible target for a military occupation by Germany. The Ploesti oil-
fields were one of the most important sources of energy in Europe and Hitler
could not afford to allow them to fall into unfriendly hands. Against these dangers
the Rumanians had few defenses. France and Britain were hardly in a position to
offer serious help. Although they had issued a guarantee to Rumania in the spring
of 1939, the growth of German influence throughout Central Europe meant that
this commitment had lost its credibility.

Bucharest's increasing difficulties gave rise to hopes in Budapest that the
"Transylvanian question" could be solved in a manner satisfactory to Hungary's
interests. How differently Hungary's civilian and military leaders approached this
issue is illustrated by the plans that were advanced by ex-Premier Count István
Bethlen and Chief of the General Staff Henrik Werth. The scheme of the former,
outlined in a long, secret memorandum to the government, started with the premise
that Germany would lose the war. Accordingly, Bethlen argued, Hungary should
remain neutral in the European struggle and preserve her strength for the attain-
ment of her national aims at war's end. Bethlen hoped that by participating in
some kind of a security arrangement for postwar Europe, and by not annexing
Transylvania but allowing it to become an autonomous member of a loose East
European federation, Hungary could obtain Western diplomatic support for her
plans. 13

General Werth's schemes for Transylvania were different. The Chief of Staff
was not willing to wait until the outcome of the war was settled. When the Rus-
sian threat against Rumania surfaced in the winter of 1939-1940, Werth urged his
government to prepare for the recovery of Transylvania by force in case of an
armed conflict between Moscow and Bucharest.14 In April of 1940 Werth ap-
proached his government with a memorandum. He began by asserting that Ger-
many would more than likely emerge victorious in the war. Werth, who had just
held discussions with members of the German General Staff, informed his civil-
ian superiors that the Germans had offered their cooperation against Rumania.
But simple military cooperation was not sufficient according to Werth. Hungary
had to abandon her neutrality and become an ally of Berlin so that she could
regain the lands she had lost in the wake of World War I. Knowing that certain
members of his audience were not convinced of Germany's invincibility, Werth
added that, even if Germany did not win the war, Hungary could retain her con-
quests because at the end of a long struggle the Allied Powers would be "too weak
to send large forces into the Danube Valley." 15

The approach that the Hungarian leadership after some delay adopted differed
from that advocated by Werth. Teleki was repelled by the idea of abandoning the
country's neutrality. Unlike Werth, he was doubtful about the prospects of a Ger-
man victory. He felt that the superiority of moral strength and physical resources was on the Allied side. In a letter to Horthy, he rejected the Chief of Staffs proposals.\textsuperscript{16}

Although Teleki rebuffed Werth's plan of regaining Transylvania with German military help, he did not give up hope of attaining a revision of Ms country's eastern boundaries through other means. The opportunity seemed to have presented itself in the summer of 1940. At the time Hitler was still hoping to force Britain to her knees and thereby ending the war in Western Europe. To do this Hitler needed peace elsewhere in Europe, especially in the southeast, from where came many of the foodstuffs, fuel and raw materials needed by the German war machine. In the meantime, the Russians had decided to act. At the end of June they confronted Rumania with an ultimatum demanding the return of Bessarabia. The Soviet move caused hectic activity in Hungary. The country’s armed forces were mobilized and frantic efforts were made to ascertain Rome’s and Berlin’s attitudes to a Hungarian occupation of Transylvania in case of a Russo-Rumanian conflict.\textsuperscript{17} But that conflict never came about: Rumania surrendered Bessarabia to the Soviets without a fight and from Berlin came word that Germany would be most unhappy about any disruption of peace in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{18}

Even though the best opportunity for regaining Transylvania was lost, the Hungarians continued their threatening attitude towards Rumania, demanding at the same time that the dispute be submitted to a conference attended by the statesmen of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Rumania. Teleki’s aim was evident: threatened by a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict at the time when Germany’s interest demanded peace in Eastern Europe, the Axis powers would be forced to support the Hungarian claims in any negotiations on the issue. Hitler, however, did not wish to act as a mediator in a territorial dispute between Hungary and Rumania. In mid-July, he rejected the idea of a four-power conference and told the Hungarians to negotiate with the Rumanians on a bilateral basis.\textsuperscript{19}

In order to counter these threats, Rumania’s King Carol took steps to improve his country’s international position. In the spring of 1939, after the German occupation of Prague and Hungary’s re-annexation of Ruthenia, he mobilized Rumania’s army and, to imbue his people with a spirit of resistance, proclaimed the slogan "not one furrow," referring to territorial concessions desired by the Hungarians. It was at this time that Bucharest accepted an Anglo-French guarantee, but balanced it with an economic agreement with Germany which, in the words of one historian, "assured a dominant position for Germany in the Rumanian economy."\textsuperscript{20} While King Carol had realized the need to appease the Germans already in 1939, most of his subjects did not do so until the fall of Paris to the Wehrmacht in June of 1940. This development caused disappointment and a great deal of soul-searching in Bucharest. Its lessons were not lost on King Carol and his advisers. Soon Rumania renounced the Anglo-French guarantee. Next, the
government sought a rapprochement with the leaders of the extreme rightist Iron Guard movement. At the same time, more right-wing politicians were co-opted into the country’s leadership and anti-Semitic laws were introduced.  

As could be expected under the circumstances, the Hungarian-Rumanian discussions, mandated by Hitler in July, achieved nothing. There was no real reason for Bucharest to make concessions: by this time Rumania had acquired a new friend in Germany. The Hungarians could do no more than continue their threats against Rumania and hope that Hitler, for the sake of peace in Southeastern Europe, would intervene in the dispute. They did not have to wait long. In August the Führer decided to settle the question of Hungarian-Rumanian relations. This was almost exactly what the Hungarians desired, but they wanted Hitler to act as a mediator in the dispute and not as an arbiter. They did not want to see another Vienna Award announced in which Germany and Italy imposed a settlement favorable mainly to German interests. If everything else failed, Teleki was prepared to accept arbitration, but he wanted the Rumanians to ask for it: if Bucharest called for arbitral award, Budapest could insist on certain preconditions. Moreover, if the revision of the boundaries came about through arbitration requested by Rumania, the settlement would have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the West, and Hungary would have a better chance to retain the territories gained at the end of the war.

Teleki’s plan then, was to threaten war in Southeastern Europe and compel the Rumanians to request Hitler’s intervention. But Teleki was double-crossed. At the critical moment, Werth informed the Germans that, as a final measure, Hungary was willing to accept arbitration rather than go to war. After such a disclosure, it was not difficult for Berlin to call Teleki’s bluff. In the end the fate of Transylvania was settled by another German-Italian dictum, one which transferred northern and easternmost Transylvania to Hungary. The new territorial arrangement, as well as the manner it was imposed, left both Budapest and Bucharest bitterly dissatisfied. Nevertheless, for the Hungarians, the Second Vienna Award proved to be the high-point of 1940. It has been argued that this event signaled the reduction of Hungary to the status of an Axis puppet state, yet it did not mark of her involvement in the Nazi war. Nevertheless, the Award was soon followed by Hungary’s accession to the Tripartite Pact, a move which several contemporary observers, as well as later-day historians, have deemed to have achieved the above result. Still, Hungary's leadership continued to avoid involvement in the German war.

As has been mentioned above, Teleki was aware of the increasing danger to his policy of German friendship (coupled with territorial revisionism), yet neutrality in the war. Especially menacing were the rumors that Hitler was preparing to invade Russia. To strengthen the prospects of continued Hungarian neutrality even in such an eventuality, Teleki took steps to improve relations between Budapest
and Moscow, and continued to cultivate good relations with still nonbelligerent Italy, even though he was aware of the fact that the "Italian connection" no longer had the same value in counterbalancing German influence as it used to have years earlier.

The best opening Teleki had to bolster his country's dwindling sovereignty was establishing closer links with Yugoslavia. Indeed, with Slovakia and Rumania being Nazi client states, the only substantial window Hungary had toward the non-Axis world was through Belgrade. So, Teleki initiated negotiations with the regime of Prince Paul, the Yugoslav Regent. The result was the signing of a Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty of peace and friendship in December. The statesmen of both countries no doubt believed that through this agreement they had reduced the chances of their countries becoming involved in the war. Teleki's policy of closer links with Belgrade was predicated on the Yugoslav government maintaining an attitude of friendly neutrality vis-a-vis Berlin. While Prince Paul was inclined in this direction, certain elements of Yugoslav society were not, as the two countries' rulers soon found out.

Early in the new year Teleki and his closest associates made preparations for the possible failure of their plans to stay out of the expected German-Russian conflict. At a meeting attended by Horthy, Teleki, Bethlen and a few others, a plan for the creation of a Hungarian government-in-exile was drawn up. It was to be put into effect in case the Germans made demands on Hungary that were incompatible with Hungarian sovereignty, in which case Teleki's government would resign and Horthy would appoint a new government headed by a prominent Hungarian statesman residing in the West, while he himself would go into passive "internal exile" in Hungary. The leading representatives of the Atlantic democracies were consulted in regards to this plan and London was asked to promise to recognize such government. Such promise was not received by the Hungarians; nevertheless, they sent Tibor Eckhardt, the leader of the opposition Smallholder Party, to the West to act as the spokesman for Hungary should Teleki's worst fears materialize.

No sooner did Eckhardt leave the country than another crisis developed in East Central Europe. In view of Hitler's desire to strengthen Nazi influence in Eastern Europe, Berlin was anxious to gain assurances from Belgrade of Yugoslavia's friendly disposition toward the Axis. Accordingly, Prince Paul's regime was pressured into acceding to the Tripartite Pact. This deed, however, precipitated a military coup in Belgrade, accompanied by demonstrations throughout Serbia in favor of the Allies. Hitler was incensed and decided to crush Yugoslavia. As Hungary was in the path of one of the armies ordered to take part in this operation, she was expected to cooperate.

The Yugoslav coup of late March constituted a severe blow to Teleki's scheme of prolonging Hungary's neutrality in the war. Hitler considered Budapest's col-
laboration essential and informed Horthy accordingly. In return for Hungarian participation, the *Führer* was ready to support Hungary's territorial demands on Yugoslavia. Horthy reacted to Hitler's offer by acknowledging the existence of Hungarian claims in the south and welcoming the idea of discussions between members of the German and Hungarian general staffs. The question of "if," "when," and "under what circumstances" Hungary would participate in the war was then discussed first at a meeting of the cabinet and then at a meeting of the country's Supreme Defense Council (SDC). At this latter meeting six of Hungary's leaders spoke against accepting Hitler's suggestion of unconditional Hungarian participation in the planned war against Yugoslavia, while four argued in favor of it.28

In the debates about participation in the campaign against Yugoslavia, Hungary's leaders stated many of their concerns; however, certain worries they dared not to voice openly as they would have angered the Germans. Some of these concerns were expressed only in secret correspondence. In a confidential letter dealing with this subject, written later by Bethlen to Eckhardt, the former Premier spoke of Hungarian fears in April of 1941 that the Germans planned the establishment of a German state southeast of Hungary based upon the large ethnic German population there. Bethlen also pointed out that the unwritten condition of the December 1940 Hungarian-Yugoslav pact of friendship had been a promise by the Yugoslavs that they would not abandon the pro-Axis line of their foreign policy. If Bethlen's state of mind is any indication of the attitudes of Hungary's leaders in those crisis-ridden days of late March and early April, then it can be said that the reluctance to get involved in the war was counterbalanced by a feeling of betrayal by the Yugoslavs as well as a fear of the further envelopment of Hungary by an expanding Third Reich. Most members of Hungary's elite seem to have come to the conclusion that Hitler had offered them the choice between the proverbial carrot and the stick and, after some agonizing, they decided to opt for the former. The one leader who was most troubled with this state of affairs was Teleki. As the hours passed, he increasingly saw his scheme of avoiding involvement in the war collapsing. Less then thirty-six hours after the adjournment of the SDC's meeting, he committed suicide.30

The crisis of the early spring of 1941 did not bring about the final stage of Hungary's descent to the status of a Nazi satellite. Teleki's worst fears did not materialize: the British did not declare war on the country as he had probably feared in the last hours of his life, and the Gennans did not create a full-fledged German state on Hungary's southern border. For a while Hungary could continue to enjoy nominal non-belligerence in the war; however, this state of affairs was not to last very long.

The next crisis in Eastern Europe came when Hitler launched the invasion of the Soviet Union in June. Unlike in the case of the Yugoslav war, when the *Führer* had asked for Hungarian cooperation as soon as he had decided to act, no advance
request for Hungarian participation in *Operation Barbarossa* was issued in Berlin. The *Führer* did not even inform Budapest of his intention to attack Russia. The Hungarian Chief of General Staff Werth, however, was sure of the forthcoming German move and asked his country's civilian authorities to offer their help to the Germans. Werth in fact warned László Bárdossy, the man who succeeded Teleki as Premier, that reluctance on Hungary's part to participate in the war might result in a situation whereby the border between Hungary and Rumania might be again adjusted by the Germans, this time in favor of Rumania, which according to Werth's knowledge had already committed itself to participation in the Germans' planned Russian campaign. Werth's demands for a Hungarian offer of a military alliance with Germany were rejected by the government.

On the 22nd of June, *Operation Barbarossa* was launched by the Germans. The next day, General Kurt Himer, the Wehrmacht's representative in Hungary, informed Werth that the German military would welcome a Hungarian offer of cooperation in the war, and that the offer would have to be "voluntary," as the German government did not wish to make a fonnál request. Once again the cabinet debated the question and once again it decided against making such an offer. Indicative of the unease with which the government had acted, was a decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Moscow as a concession to the Germans and those elements of the Hungarian public who were demanding a show of solidarity with the Nazi "crusade against Bolshevism."

On the 26th of June the city of Kassa (today's Košice) in northeastern Hungary was bombed. To this day no one knows for sure who had done this bombing, but the Hungarian command of the time blamed the attack on Russia. Bárdossy, who had opposed Hungary's entry into the war up to now, came to suspect that the bombing was a staged provocation to get his country involved in the war and felt that if the Germans were willing to go to such lengths to drag Hungary into the conflict, resistance was useless. So, when the cabinet met that same day to discuss the matter, Bárdossy himself proposed the declaration of a state of hostilities between Hungary and the Soviet Union. The next day the Hungarian air force staged a raid against certain Soviet targets and soon a few units of the army joined in the Axis invasion of Russia. Hungary once again deployed her military in support of Germany. On this occasion the decision proved to be a prelude not to an occupation operation in former Hungarian lands but to irreversible involvement in war. Still for the time being, the Hungarian commitment to the Nazi war machine remained a token one.

The debate in Budapest about wartime Hungary's alliance policies was not settled in June of 1941, it just underwent a mutation. For those among Hungary's elite who favored a German alliance the focus shifted from a question as to who should be Hungary's preeminent ally to a query emphasizing what should be the nature and extent of Hungary's commitment to the Nazi war effort. At the same
time, for those among Hungary's statesmen who at one time or another before June, 1941 had doubted the German alliance, second thoughts about committing their country to the Nazi cause were not long in surfacing.

Among those who argued that the Hungarian commitment to Nazi Germany should be more substantial was General Werth. Already in the summer of 1941 he began demanding the deployment of more Hungarian troops to the Russian front. He next submitted another long memorandum to the government in which he accused Hungary's civilian leadership of obstructing the war effort and thereby damaging the country's national interests. He called for the sending of half of Hungary's military forces to the front as proof of Budapest's commitment to the Axis cause.\textsuperscript{35}

Not all of Hungary's generals agreed with the Chief of Staff. Lieutenant-General Ferenc Szombathelyi, the commander of the units already on the Russian front, also produced a memorandum on the situation in which he advised the ending of the Hungarian military's involvement in a war the outcome of which he deemed uncertain. Next, Szombathelyi was given a hearing by Horthy after which the Regent asked for Werth's resignation.\textsuperscript{36} Werth had no choice but to comply and did so on the pretext of ill-health. His successor became Szombathelyi. Simultaneously another pro-German officer, General H. László, the chief of the General Staff's Operational Section, was also replaced. This change in Hungary's military command has been seen by some historians as a "reversal" of Hungary's alliance policy.\textsuperscript{37} Not surprisingly, it was followed by a request by the Hungarian leadership that Hungary's troop commitment on the Russian front be reduced. The request was opposed by Hitler but, at least for the time being, he did not insist on the Hungarians making a more substantial commitment to the war effort - no doubt because in the late summer of 1941 Hitler still believed that his war would soon end in victory.

Hungary's leaders, in particular Horthy and his closest advisors - including above all his eldest son István - had come to the conclusion, already before the autumn of 1941, that Hitler might not win the war.\textsuperscript{38} Unfortunately for them, acting on these conclusions proved far more difficult than they ever imagined. In fact, in December their hopes of reversing the German alliance suffered serious setbacks.

The first of these came early during the month when Horthy, who was almost seventy-three at the time, took ill. His illness kept him from functioning as a head-of-state and even gave rise to rumors that he had only a short time to live. It was just at this time, only a few hours before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, that an ultimatum came from London that Hungary should withdraw its troops from the Russian front otherwise she would find herself at war with Britain. As the ultimatum could not be complied with without precipitating a crisis in German-Hungarian relations, Britain duly declared war.\textsuperscript{39} Next came the fallout from
the Japanese attack on the United States. As is known, Washington responded to this with a declaration of war on Japan. This in turn resulted in a declaration of war by Berlin on Washington. The Bárdosy government was told to follow suit, and it did.\[^{40}\] Worse still, early in the new year, the German military command, realizing that Hitler's dream of quick victory had crumbled, succeeded in badgering the Hungarians into committing more of Hungary's forces to the Russian front. The man who accomplished this task was Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who used the time-honored method of threatening Iris Hungarian counterparts and, at the same time, offering them rewards. In particular, in his discussions with Horthy, who had recovered from his illness by the first week of the new year, the German stressed that declining the request for more troops could infuriate Hitler, and that accepting it could help Hungary in her quest for regaining even more lost Magyar lands.\[^{41}\]

Despite this fateful concession to Berlin, which in a year's time would lead to the greatest tragedy in modern Hungarian military history, Horthy continued on the path of preparing his country for a possible break with the Third Reich. One of his undertakings that some historians see as having been made with this purpose in mind was his effort to arrange for an orderly succession to his position as Regent should he die or become incapacitated. Several candidates' names were brought forth, including Horthy's own son István, which proved the most attractive to the old man.\[^{42}\]

Horthy's endorsement of the candidacy of his son has been dismissed by some as a bid to establish a "Horthy dynasty," but this interpretation is emphatically rejected by historian Peter Gostony who concluded that the elevation of István Horthy to the post of Vice-Regent was an essential element of Miklós Horthy's plan to pave the way for Hungary's defection from the Axis. Considering the aged Horthy's vulnerability to illness, as well as to being made hostage by the Germans, it was essential - so Gostony argues - to have a high-profile successor whose sympathies were squarely with the Western democracies.\[^{43}\]

The next major move Horthy undertook was to make way for the appointment of a new head-of-government for Hungary, someone who would be willing to undertake the task of leading Hungary out of the Nazi cobweb. Horthy did not see Bárdossy suitable for this purpose as he had evidently lost faith in Hungary being able to follow any other course of action besides the German alliance. Accordingly, Horthy requested Bárdossy's resignation and replaced him with Miklós Kállay, a man Horthy believed to have the inclination and the guts to stand up both to the Germans and Hungary's own right-wing radical factions.\[^{44}\]

With Kállay's appointment as Premier began wartime Hungary's arduous quest for a complete revamping of the country's alliance policy. It was a quest without realistic hopes. Some historians, including András Bán, refer to this period of Hungary's wartime history as an end-play, as an epilogue to the story of Hunga-
ry's loss of the Western Powers' respect and trust in 1941. Nevertheless, international events, such as the Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942, the German defeat at Stalingrad soon thereafter, the abortive defection of Italy from the war in 1943, and the rumors of a planned Allied invasion of the Balkans gave rise to a belief among Kállay and his associates that everything was not lost and that their hopes for a strategic surrender to the western democracies were not completely unrealistic.

The enormity of the difficulties faced by Kállay were not underestimated by him and his associates. The danger they faced was obvious: if the government was seen as boycotting the Nazi war effort, the Germans and/or their followers in Hungary could drive it from office. Accordingly, Kállay embarked on a policy of double-dealing and double-speak, which soon became obvious to all and became known to Hungarians as the "kállai kettős" the double-dance of Kálla. Kállay's supporters understood and tolerated it, the pro-Nazi elements of Hungary's elite detested it, while ex Premier Bárdossy warned that, through his double dealing, Kállay was likely to lose the goodwill of the Germans, without gaining that of the British and the Americans.

The story of the Kállay government's secret contacts with the Western Allies has been told before. For the purpose of establishing and maintaining these contacts the Hungarians dispatched secret agents to neutral capitals: Stockholm, Istanbul, Lisbon and Berne. Coordinating the activities of a lose collection of amateurs (entrusting diplomats with such tasks would have immediately attracted the attention of the Germans), proved difficult. But the gravest problem that would confront the Kállay government in its secret negotiations with the Western Allies was the fact that whatever it offered was seen as too little by the governments in London and Washington, while whatever the latter demanded, was seen as unreasonable by the Hungarians. In the end, it was Hitler who dealt the final blow to Kállay's scheming. In March of 1944 he ordered the Wehrmacht to occupy Hungary and forced the appointment of a government in Budapest that he could trust.

Interestingly enough, not even this development put an end to the Hungarian search for a change in the country's wartime alliance policy. The fact was that Horthy and his closest advisors were most unhappy with the situation that developed after their country had been occupied and were determined to regain a measure of control over Hungary's affairs. Little could be done while the Nazis were still in control of much of Central and Western Europe but the situation changed after further reverses were suffered by the Wehrmacht, especially in France after the Allies' landing in Normandy. In late August of 1944 Horthy replaced the government installed by the Nazis in March with a government made up of his most trusted military officers and senior civil servants.

To the surprise of many, Horthy's move did not bring retaliation from Berlin, despite the fact that it had obviously irritated Hitler and his entourage. Some
compromises were made in the composition of the new government to appease Berlin, nevertheless the new administration did embark on its mission. Many pro-Nazi officials, installed only recently after the German occupation of Hungary, were removed from power, and the deportation of Jews to Nazi concentration camps - discontinued on Horthy’s orders even before the new government had taken office - was stalled by obstructionist tactics.

The new government had two rather contradictory objectives: to keep the country from being occupied by the Red Army and to prepare Hungary’s defection from the war. Some members of the cabinet could not decide which of these objectives was more important, and they could not realize, or were slow to realize, that both of these objectives could not be pursued simultaneously. Horthy himself seems to have been placing greater emphasis on Hungary's exit from the war. For this purpose he dispatched two secret missions, one to Anglo-American headquarters in Italy and the other to Moscow. Although both delegations managed to reach their destinations, they failed to attain their aims. The first delegation was basically rebuffed while the second was in the end presented with armistice terms that were impossible to implement.

The Germans got wind of these activities and undertook various counter-measures. They began arming members of Hungary's right-radical Arrow-Cross Party and sheltered the party’s leaders from possible arrest by pro-Horthy authorities. They dispatched special SS operations units, commanded by Otto Skorzeny, to kidnap important members of Horthy's entourage. Their foremost prize became Miklós Horthy Jr., by then the Regent's only surviving child.

As is well-known, the Horthy regime's attempt of 15 October to defect from the war failed. Elements of the Hungarian military sabotaged Horthy’s efforts. In Budapest itself, some members of the security forces defected to the Arrow-Cross. More importantly, the German high command in Budapest took no chances. They saw to it that officers suspected of unconditional loyalty to Horthy were arrested early during the crisis. Furthermore, soon after Horthy had made Iris armistice announcement, they captured the radio center and began issuing counter-proclamations. They also brought heavy armor into the streets and threatened to take Horthy's headquarters by force. Horthy soon realized what he should have known much earlier: he and his advisers had been virtual hostages of the Germans from the very start. Within about 36 hours the whole affair was over. With the royal palace surrounded by German units, and with key members of the cabinet detained by SS troops, the Hungarians had to yield. Under the threat of severe sanctions, the Nazis could dictate the terms of the recantation of Horthy's armistice proclamation and arrange for the transfer of power to the right radical Arrow-Cross party and its leader Ferenc Szálasi. With that development concluded the last of the Hungarian wartime attempts to change the country's alliance policy.
Despite the hopes of some of Hungary's leaders to the contrary, Hungary remained Hitler's "last ally."

Since the end of the Second World War Hungarian alliance policies during the war have been assessed in various ways. During the country's age of communism, and especially in the 1950s and 1960s, historians accused the country's ruling elite of acting on their class interests, which tied them right-wing causes and an alliance policy that excluded cooperation with the democratic powers, the foremost of which - according to the official ideology of the day - was the Soviet Union. Even before the demise of communism and especially after the return of political pluralism to Hungary in 1989, historical interpretations began to change. By the late 1990s, very different opinions had begun to surface. Not unrepresentative among them was the judgment of András Bán, who concluded that after 1938 the primary objective of Hungarian foreign policy became the "preservation of the country's independence" and after September of 1939, "keeping it out of the war."

The important role that the Hungarian quest for the recovery of territories lost through the Treaty of Trianon had played in Hungarian alliance policies just before and during World War II, has been acknowledged by historians both before and after 1989. And there can be no doubt that the overwhelming desire to revise the territorial terms of that treaty had a powerful impact on the country's policies. Although a few of Hungary's leading statesmen realized the danger of achieving territorial change with German help, they refused to restrict their efforts in this direction. Even though treaty revision indebted Hungary more and more to Nazi Germany, the policy of seeking it was not abandoned or abated throughout 1940, or in the spring of 1941, when it increasingly carried the risk of offending the western democracies and threatened with the prospect of leaving Hungary with having no other viable option than the German alliance.

After Hungary's involvement in the war, the desire for further territorial revision, or the keeping of the lands already regained, continued to prejudice the chances - and at times these chances were very slim indeed - of reversing Hungary's strategic commitment to the Third Reich. The threat, intimated early in 1942 by Ribbentrop, that Hungary might lose some territories that she had regained earlier, played a role in the country committing greater forces to the Eastern Front. Similar threats later during the war kept the Hungarian government toeing the German line.

Some historians, including Bán, have argued that Hungary's successive governments had no other option than to pursue treaty revision. Indeed, in view of the almost unanimous support for treaty revision by the general public of Hungary, and especially by such influential elements of the Hungarian body politic as the armed forces, opportunities for regaining of "lost Magyar lands" could not be
missed, especially on such occasions as the imminent collapse of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. Much later, in the fall of 1944, it was a largely vain hope of Horthy to expect Hungary's soldiers to turn against the Germans, who had been their comrades-in-arms for three years, and whom they no doubt regarded as the "liberators" of the lands that had been returned to Hungary between 1938 and 1941.

The failure of Hungary's wartime regime to abandon the German alliance of 1941 was not just a function of Budapest's revisionist policies in that year and thereafter, but was the result of the fact that much of Hungarian society was deeply imbued with the spirit of revisionism. The responsibility for this state of affairs has to be shared by all of Hungary's post-1920 governments. Through their relentless and pervasive propaganda they had helped to keep revisionist sentiments at a constant boiling point. When revisionism became a danger to the maintenance of a Hungarian "free hand" in foreign and strategic policies, these sentiments could not be simply turned off. The momentum built up by the pre-war, i.e., pre-September 1939, revisions of the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon carried the country into the Second Vienna Award in the summer of 1940 and the war against Yugoslavia during the following spring. These events sealed the fate of Hungary's search for allies as they committed the country to an alliance with the Third Reich. This alliance, despite the efforts of Horthy, Kállay, Bethlen and their associates, could not be reversed even though it became obvious to these people, apparently already in 1941, that Germany might lose the war. Hungary was fated to remain Hitler's "last ally" and suffered accordingly at the hands of the peacemakers at war's end. Not surprisingly, she lost all the territories she had ever regained.

This brings us back to the question as to which of the world wars of the twentieth century had inflicted greater damage on Hungary. After examining the Second World War and the failure of Hungary's wartime alliance policy, or more precisely the inability of the country's leaders to retain a free hand in foreign affairs and to preserve their country's neutrality, especially during the critical year of 1941, leads us to the conclusion that it was this second great conflict that caused the greater and the more lasting damage. Had involvement in the war been avoided, or at least delayed to 1942 or 1943, it is conceivable that the revision of some of the terms of Trianon might have been allowed to stand, and a precedent for more than the temporary adjustment of the frontiers established. But as Hungary had been one of Hitler's first East European allies, and became his last ally, all prospects for treaty revision had vanished in this war. The tragedy that had started for Hungary in 1914 and reached its zenith in 1920, was completed during World War II.
Notes

My research into Hungary’s wartime history has been supported by various grants, most of them coming from the Arts Research Program of the Royal Military College of Canada, provided by Canada's Department of National Defence. For this help I am grateful.

1. Human costs included military and civilian casualties, a massive exodus of refugees, as well as the deportation of tens of thousands to Soviet labor camps. The war also saw the destruction of most of the country’s Jewish community and the expelling of a large part of Hungary’s German ethnic group at war’s end.


3. For further details see my "Hungary and the Second World War," 15-21; and "Thousand Years of Hungarian Survival," 41-47.

4. This argument has been used recently by S. B. Várdy, in his review of the book Hungary in the Age of Total War, 1938-1948, which appeared in the Hungarian Studies Newsletter (New Brunswick, NJ, USA), Nos. 58-61 (2000): 7.

5. As a result of this treaty Hungary lost 71.4 % of her territory and 63.6% of her population. Rumania alone received a larger share of the Kingdom of Hungary’s former territory than that which was left to Hungary. The excuse for this territorial settlement was the principle of national self-determination, but in the application of this principle the rights of millions of Hungarians to self-determination were disregarded: historic Hungary’s dismemberment involved the transfer of close to 3.5 million ethnic Magyars to the so-called "successor states." Hungarian calls for plebiscites in the territories concerned were ignored, with the minor exception of the case of the town of Sopron on the Hungarian-Austrian border. The irony of dismembering the multinational Kingdom of Hungary was the fact that the states that benefited most from it were themselves multi-national, in some cases even more mixed ethnically than Hungary had been before 1918.

With the territorial losses came the loss of resources and infrastructure. For example, Hungary lost 89% of its iron-production capacity, 84% of its forests, and 62% of its railway lines. What was left of the country had to rely very heavily on imports of raw materials. Although the country retained most of its food producing capacity, it had to depend on fickle and greatly disrupted export markets to produce any income from exported produce to pay for the imports that became essential for the national economy. Poverty became rampant in the country’s villages.

The treaty also disrupted Hungary’s transportation and communication systems. Most of Hungary’s railway lines found themselves in detached territories. Even lines in the Hungarian heartland ended up with parts of them passing through foreign territory. The same happened to some roads and telegraph lines. Water transportation systems were also disrupted. The treaty, furthermore, caused mass migrations. During 1920, 426,000 refugees left the successor states and settled in Hungary, often swelling the ranks of the unemployed. For a recent summary of the terms and immediate impact of the Treaty of Trianon see Tibor Frank, "Treaty revision and doublespeak: Hungarian neutrality, 1939-1941," in European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents


11. Frank, "Treaty revision," 159. According to Frank, the Teleki government was "conservative and cautious in its politics" with the exception of its anti-Semitic legislation which went far beyond the anti Jewish legislation of Teleki's predecessors (158 159).

12. On Hitler’s "stormy" reaction to Teleki’s plan to observe neutrality in the upcoming conflict see Frank, "Treaty revision...," 160f. After the onset of hostilities, the Hungarians, instead of facilitating the German’s assault on Poland, opened the border to Polish refugees. Tens of thousands came. In time, most of the Polish soldiers who managed to escape to Hungary were allowed to proceed to the West, where they joined the Polish units which, after the Normandy invasion of 1944, fought alongside Allied troops. For Hungary’s policies during September 1939 see Gyula Juhász, Magyarország külpolitikája, 1919-1945 [Hungary's Foreign Policy, 1919-1945] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1969), 207 209. For more details, see the same author’s A Teleki kormány külpolitikája, 1939-1941 [The Foreign Policy of the Teleki Government, 1939-1941] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1964).


16. Ibid., 106.

17. Ibid., 121 124.

18. Telegram, [Ribbentrop], to State Secretary von Weizsäcker, 1 July 1940, giving instructions to von Erdmannsdorff, the German Minister in Budapest. Also, memorandum by [Weizsäcker], 2 July 1940, detailing the German demarche to the Hungarians. Printed in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918 1945* (hereafter DGFP), Raymond James Sontag, John W. Wheeler Benett, *et al.* eds. Series D (1937 1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23 August 31, 1940* (London, 1957), doc. nos. 75 and 81.

19. News of Hungary's threatening attitude was reported to Berlin by Erdmannsdorff, the German minister in Budapest. See his telegraphic reports of July 1st and 2nd, printed in DGFP, Series D (1937 1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23...*, doc. nos. 69 and 85. The record of the discussions between Hitler, Count Ciano and the Hungarian delegation of 11 July 1940 are given in doc. no. 146 (179 182). These events are summarized in Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája*, 150f.

20. Nicholas Nagy Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 303. In his memoirs, Rumanian diplomat Alexandre Cretzianu tells the story of the economic negotiations with the Germans and the origins of the Anglo French guarantee. According to him, Viorel Tilea, the Rumanian Minister in London, told the Foreign Office that the Germans had presented his government with an ultimatum to accept the proposed economic pact. Tilea's ruse worked: it resulted in the offer by London and Paris to extend a guarantee to Rumania, in order to forestall a possible German invasion of that country. British efforts to have Moscow, Warsaw, and Ankara involved in the guarantee were not successful. Alexandre Cretzianu, *Relapse into Bondage, 1918 1947: The Political Memoirs of Alexandre Cretzianu*. S. D. Spector, compiler, chapter 7 in *Southeastern Europe* 16 (1989 [1997]): 58 61. Rumanian discussions with the Foreign Office were conducted at the time by Tilea and Cretzianu.


22. The story of these negotiations is outlined in András Hory, *Még egy barázdát sem* [Not even one furrow] (Vienna, 1967), 34 73. Hory was a senior diplomat in Hungary's diplomatic service during the late 1930s. He headed the Hungarian delegation.

23. Memorandum by Teleki addressed to Regent Miklós Horthy, 1 September 1940. Printed in Miklós Szinai and László Sz. cs (eds), *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai [The secret papers of Miklós Horthy]* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1965), doc. no. 49 (pp. 233 239).

24. The award transferred about a million Rumanians to Hungary and left almost half a million Hungarians within the new boundaries of Rumania. A settlement which would have been satisfactory to both sides was probably impossible. For further details see Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. 1, 422 424. For the award's text, see DGFP, Series D (1937 1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23...*, doc. no. 413 (pp. 581 584).


26. Teleki would have no doubt preferred a Hungarian Russian non aggression pact, but because Horthy opposed this idea, he had to be satisfied with a trade agreement and such gestures of friendship as the return of the Hungarian flags that the Tsarist army had captured at the end of the Hungarian struggle for independence in 1849. On improving relations between Hungary


28. The most strident pro-German position was taken by Werth, while historian Bálint Hóinan, the Minister of Cults and Education, saw Hungary's future in terms of taking the side either of Germany or Russia, a situation in which siding with Hitler seemed the lesser of two evils. Antal Náray, *Náray Antal visszaemlékezése, 1945* (The recollections of Antal Náray, 1945), edited and introduced by Sándor Szakály (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1988). Náray was the SDC's secretary and was in charge of keeping the meeting's minutes.

29. The text (apparently reconstructed from memory, as the original had been destroyed) of István Bethlen's July 1941 letter of Tibor Eckhardt can be found in the latter's papers, Box 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Ca.


33. The argument that, until the 26th of June, Bárdossy did not want to join the German invasion of the USSR is made in my article "New Twist," 234-235. See also Francis S. Wagner, "Diplomatic Prelude to the Bombing of Kassa: Reflections and Recollections of a Former Diplomat," *Hungarian Studies Review* 10 (1983): 67-78.

34. Several scholars have suggested that Bárdossy's conclusion might have been accurate, though no concrete evidence has ever been found to support their theories. For the most substantial of these arguments see Thomas Sakmyster, "The Search for a Casus Belli and the Origins of the Kassa Bombing," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 10 (1983): 53 65.


36. Ibid., 271ff.

37. Notably by Mario D. Fenyo, the author of *Hitler, Horthy and Hungary; German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). Fenyo calls this change "one of the mysteries" of Hungary's participation in the war. Fenyo discusses Hungary's entry into the war and the early phase of her involvement in Hitler's Russian campaign in chapters 1 and 2. The deterioration of Budapest's relations with Britain and the United States is discussed in chapter 3.

38. Swiss-Hungarian historian Peter Gosztonyi (known to Hungarians as Gosztonyi) had argued that Horthy was the first Axis leader to realize that the Red Army would not collapse under the German onslaught and that already in September, 1941 he had decided that Hungary "had to get out of the war." Péter Gosztonyi, *A Kormányzó, Horthy Miklós* [The Regent, Miklós Horthy] (Budapest: Téka, 1990), 128.136. This date is also accepted as the time of Horthy's "conversion" by Sakmyster who, writing in 1989, explained that the men who brought the Regent around to this view were "Bethlen and a few trusted military advisors." See Thomas Sakmyster's

39. The German invasion of the USSR in June, 1941 created an alliance between London and Moscow. In September Stalin asked Britain to declare war on Finland. The British leaders had reservations about complying with the request but Stalin persisted. At the end of November, the UK leaders decided to give in to his demands and soon issued ultimatums to the government of Finland, as well as those of Hungary and Romania, demanding that they end their military operations against the USSR. As these demands were not complied with, the UK went ahead with the declarations of war.

40. Bárdossy did not believe that Hungary's involvement in the war could be reversed. In any case, with Hungary being at war with the UK, Bárdossy did not feel that it mattered much if she was at war with the US as well. See my papers: "A Dove? A Hawk? Perhaps a Sparrow: Bárdossy Defends his Wartime Record before the Americans, July 1945," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 22 (1995): 71-90; and "Was László Bárdossy a War Criminal? Further Reflections," *Hungary in the Age of Total War*, 311-320.


42. The story is discussed in Rita Pén tek, "István Horthy's Election as Vice-Regent in 1942," in *Hungary in the Age of Total War*, 276-280.


45. Bán, *Illúziók*, especially part DT (the conclusions).


50. The very first revision of the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, granted through the First Vienna Award, had grudging approval in Western Europe, including tacit approval in London. Gastony, "Hungarian," in *Hungary in the Age of Total War*, 235; and Balogh, "Peaceful Revision," 45. No such recognition was accorded to Hungary's post-1938 revisions of the Trianon settlement.
The Paris Peace Treaty by which hostilities between Hungary and the Allied Powers were officially ended was signed on February 10, 1947. It consisted of eight articles covering territorial, military, economic, political and other terms. The paper focuses on the territorial decisions that restored the 1920 Trianon frontiers with a small rectification in favour of Czechoslovakia. The American, British, Soviet and French peace delegations were in complete accord that the 1920 Trianon boundaries should remain in force along Hungary's frontiers with Austria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. With regard to Transylvania, however, a sharp discussion developed. The Western powers supported a compromise solution while the Soviet Union was opposed to any modification to the Hungarian-Roumanian frontier established at Trianon. Eventually the Soviet position prevailed. The decision was received with bitterness in Hungary but it did not cause hysteria. The majority in Hungarian society understood that neither a restoration of historic Hungary nor even a compromise solution based on ethnic principles was possible.

Keywords: Hungary, World War II, Peace preparations during WW II, Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920, Hungarian revisionism

The Paris Peace Treaty by which hostilities between Hungary and the Allied Powers were officially ended was signed on February 10, 1947 in the building of the French Foreign Ministry on the Quai d'Orsay. It restored the 1920 Trianon frontiers, with a small rectification in favour of Czechoslovakia. These basic facts are well-known. My goal with this short presentation is to explain how and why this decision was taken. At first the wartime and postwar foreign political perspectives and considerations of the decision-makers - the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union - will be analyzed. In the second part of my talk I will focus on the Hungarian peace expectations. And finally, I am going to deal, very briefly, with some aspects of the peace treaty itself.
The United States had essentially three long-term objectives concerning Hungary and the region usually called Eastern Europe. Firstly, to knit the states within the region together in viable and stable alliances, through federation or confederation. State Department experts considered this crucial, especially based on the considerations of security and economic viability. The security consideration meant that they wanted the region to be a bulwark against possible German or Russian penetration and even against joint Russian-German aggression, as had happened in 1939. The other main consideration, economic rationality, involved diminishing the social tensions and creating the basis for functioning democracies. Secondly, they also hoped to minimise national friction through a closer alignment of linguistic and political boundaries and such expedients as exchange of populations living near border areas. And thirdly, assisting democratic regimes to power in place of the dictatorships and authoritarian systems of the inter-war years also figured on their agenda.

In order to reduce the potential for national conflicts, the Americans advocated significant alterations to the Trianon frontiers along every segment except the border between Hungary and Austria. As boundary changes and exchanges of populations alone did not seem adequate to address the case of Transylvania, they considered that either the Székely area should additionally be granted wide-ranging autonomies from Romania or else, as an alternative to frontier changes, Transylvania as a whole should be reshaped as an independent state.¹

The British experts arrived at recommendations for frontier changes that were very similar to the American proposals. They suggested the re-annexation to Hungary of border areas inhabited mainly by ethnic Hungarians, such as the Csallóköz, Partium and the northern section of Bácska. They too believed that reaching a mutually acceptable settlement on Transylvania was "by far the most difficult problem in the whole area"; and "... the most hopeful solution" to them appeared to be one in which Transylvania would become an independent political entity either as part of a confederal arrangement including both Hungary and Romania as members, or else as "a buffer state with complete independence."² The implementation of a federative approach was as much integral to British plans as it was to the Americans. Through negotiations with exiled political representatives, the frameworks for both an East Central (Czecho-Polish) and a South East (Graeco-Yugoslavian) European confederation had already emerged during 1942. During his visit in Washington, D.C. in May 1943 Prime Minister Winston Churchill added a wish to see alongside these alliances "a Danubian Federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire."³
Whereas American and British ideas for the region can be looked on as the well-intentioned schemes of detached observers with no direct stake in the matter, the Soviet attitude was in line with the expansive strategies that Russia had been nurturing for centuries as a neighbouring Great Power. Consequently, it regarded the formation of any alliance of states on its western borders, especially one that might be under Anglo-Saxon tutelage, as inherently hostile and something to be rejected out of hand. The official Soviet position was set out in a memorandum that Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, communicated to the Western Allies in June 1943: "as regards the question of the creation of a federation in Europe of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece including Hungary and Austria - the memo emphasized - the Soviet Government are unwilling to pledge themselves as regards the creation of such a federation, and also consider the inclusion of Hungary and Austria within it as unsuitable." During the Three Power talks held in November 1943 at Teheran, Stalin also indicated that, "It would be complete nonsense if, once Germany had been partitioned, one were then to create new combinations, whether Danubian or of any other kind." This dispute was essentially settled by the decision made at the Teheran Conference to proceed with invasion plans for the Normandy beaches, rather than in the Balkans. By the end of 1943, both U.S. and British diplomacy had more or less agreed to let Stalin have his way in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the idea of any kind of regional cooperation between the Baltic and the Adriatic sea was considered with more and more reservation.

On the territorial issues in the west Stalin's minimal aim was to preserve the old Russian imperial frontiers, which were recognised in the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In time he was to add demands for part of East Prussia and "Transcarpathian Ukraine," that is Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Kárpátalja). The Soviet leadership rejected Hungarian revisionist claims in other areas, as well. This approach was usually justified by Hungary's role in the war. In the case of Transylvania, however, even the Soviet attitude was somewhat permissive. In return of Bessarabia, which was considered in Moscow as integral part of the Soviet Union, the majority of Soviet decision makers were ready to compensate Romania with Transylvania. Some experts and foreign political advisers, however, considered the possibility of an independent Transylvanian state, as well. They cynically assumed that such a state "would remain a bone of contention between Hungary and Romania" and thus would not survive "without the constant patronage of one of its neighbours, which in this instance would be the Soviet Union." The USSR would have preferred to obtain agreement on the issue while the war was still in progress and to incorporate into the Romanian annistice terms an assurance that after the war, in exchange for Bessarabia, the Romanians would
recover "Transylvania or the greater part thereof." However, due to British and American objections, the wording that ended up in the actual agreement included a provisio that this was "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement." The British and American governments expressed no comparable reservations about the border issues between Czechoslovakia and Hungary or Yugoslavia and Hungary. After the German occupation of Hungary without any Hungarian resistance in March 1944 and the Arrow-Cross coup d'etat in October 1944, which was legalized by Admiral Horthy, the Regent, the previous pro-Magyar sympathy among Western Powers diminished further. In fact, by the end of the war they were inclined to accept the status quo ante bellum as proposed by the Soviet side.

At the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three in July 1945, the American delegation proposed, and the others accepted, the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers of the five principal victors: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, China and France. Its task was to produce draft treaties for ex-enemy states including Hungary. The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London in September 1945. The Hungarian border issue was discussed on September 20. The American, British, Soviet and French delegations were in complete accord, without any discussion, that the 1920 Trianon boundaries should remain in force along Hungary's frontiers with Austria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. With regard to Transylvania, however a sharp discussion developed.

The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin and US Secretary of State James Byrnes argued that no decision should be taken until there had been a chance to assess the respective claims of the two states. This recommendation was initially supported by France’s foreign minister, Georges Bidault, as well. Molotov, the Soviet delegate, however, was stubbornly opposed to any modification whatever, even symbolic, to the Hungarian-Romanian frontier established at Trianon: "... the bulk of the population of Transylvania, Molotov argued, was Roumanian, though there were many Hungarians and some Germans. These nationalities were closely intermingled, and it was impossible to draw a line which would not leave many Roumanians in Hungary and many Hungarians in Roumania." As the debate was winding up, Bidault accepted Molotov's arguments and switched to supporting the Soviet view. Bevin now stayed silent, leaving Byrnes alone at the end of the session in insisting that a border strip of approximately 3,000 square miles should be returned to Hungary. About one half million Magyars were living in this area.

Since the matter had not been resolved, it was deferred for further consideration by the foreign ministers' deputies. Their meeting took place the following year, in April 1946, again in London. Two months prior to this, the British Foreign Office had made up its mind that it was now in favour of retaining the Trianon borders between Hungary and Romania. Having lost the support of Britain as
well as France and wishing to avoid "unnecessary" confrontations with the Soviet Union, the Americans moderated their own position. They still would have liked to see the Romanian and Hungarian governments "directly negotiate with one another over an adjustment of the border which would significantly reduce the numbers of inhabitants living under foreign rule," but even that was unacceptable to the Russian delegate. The final decision, taken at the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in Paris on May 7, 1946, was that Hungary must accept the Trianon borders with Romania as well as Austria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Had they had British and French support it is possible that the Americans would have insisted on at least a token compromise. Alone as they were, however, they judged the matter to be a lost cause, and did not want to further test Soviet-American relations, which were strained enough as it was.9

II

The new, post-war Hungarian government, based on the pre-war left-wing opposition, had not imagined that the Allied powers would decide on the country's borders without any consultation with the involved parties. As in 1919–1920, it was taken for granted in Budapest that thorough preparations for a peace settlement made sense, and most people hoped for some form of border revision, at least along the frontier with Romania, if nowhere else. In order to win over support for this, Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy led a series of delegations to the capital of each of the Great Powers between April and June 1946.

The first stop of the Hungarian pilgrimage was Moscow where talks were held between April 9 and 18. Taking into consideration the post-war realities, the Hungarian delegation presented revisionist claims only against Romania. The maximal Hungarian demands included annexation of a territory of 22,000 square kilometers to Hungary. This was not more than one fifth of Transylvania and had a population of 1.5 million. The minimal version envisioned a territory of 12,000 square kilometers with a population of almost one million. In the second case the ethnic Hungarians constituted a slight majority whereas in the larger claim they amounted to about one third of the total. The delegation was received cordially by the Soviet leadership. Stalin did not even raise any objections to Hungary raising the issue of adjustments to its border with Romania, and Molotov went so far as to urge the opening of bilateral negotiations on the matter directly with the Romanians. Neither Stalin nor Molotov gave the slightest hint about what had been going on at the Council of Foreign Ministers, or what the Soviet position was in reality. So that the members of the Hungarian mission were left with the false impression that the Soviet Union not only had no objection but even backed the country's territorial claims against Romania. Thus, the resolution of the May 7 Conference
of Foreign Ministers, which was not kept secret, came as a complete shock to politicians and the general public alike in Hungary. Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi even wanted to fly back to Moscow in order to have some explanation. Finally, his more experienced colleagues persuaded him that it would be pointless.\textsuperscript{10}

The next station of the Hungarian delegation was Washington, where they arrived on June 8. Here too the reception was warm and much more honest. The exchanges with the Americans left Prime Minister Nagy in no doubt that the Soviet leaders had played a double game and deliberately misled the Hungarians. Secretary of State Byrnes explained "how the question of Transylvania had slipped entirely into Soviet hands, and that the decision of May 7 was entirely at their insistence." He added, "If the Soviet government would undertake to introduce the Transylvanian question again, the United States was ready and willing to support Hungary’s position." Knowing the Soviet position, this meant that Washington regarded the issue closed: the Trianon borders between Hungary and Romania would stay in place.\textsuperscript{11}

The Hungarian delegation was received in London on June 21-22. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and the leaders of Foreign Office also made it clear that there was nothing to be gained by pursuing the issue of Transylvania any further in view of the "Russian attitude." They only promised that "if the two governments could reach agreement, they would have the support of His Majesty's Government." In addition to that they emphasized the importance of seeking peaceful accommodation and economic cooperation with their neighbours.\textsuperscript{12}

On the return journey from London, the Hungarian delegation stopped off in Paris on June 25. This, however, proved even less productive than the talks in Washington and London. Georges Bidault made it clear that France was in no position to assert its will on any of the big issues of the day. During their stay in Paris, the Hungarian politicians also had the opportunity to meet with Molotov again. Interestingly enough, he acted as if he had forgotten about the Soviet attitude adopted two months earlier in Moscow. He simply tried to shift all the blame for the May 7 decision onto the Americans. Thus, the Hungarian mission arrived home at the end of June 1946 empty-handed.\textsuperscript{13}

In spite of the lack of foreign support the Hungarian delegation to the peace conference, which opened in Paris on July 29, submitted territorial claims against Romania. Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi demanded the annexation of a territory of 22,000 square kilometers to Hungary that is the maximal proposal presented in Moscow a few months earlier. In addition, he also proposed territorial autonomy for the Székely lands. On American advice, this territorial claim was scaled back
within a few days to a demand for 4,000 square kilometers but even this failed to
gain the backing of any of the Great Powers. The Hungarian Roumanian border
dispute was closed by the Peace Conference on September 5, 1946.\textsuperscript{14}

Transylvania, however, was only one of the territorial issues related to the
Hungarian borders that was considered in Paris. The possibility of a slight modi-
fication of the Czechoslovak Hungarian border was also discussed. However, this
question was raised not by the Hungarian, but the Czechoslovak delegation. The
Czech and Slovak politicians renewed a 1919-1920 demand for five villages that
stood on the Hungarian side of the Danube opposite Pozsony/Bratislava. This
claim was based on strategic considerations. Largely on American insistence, the
conference accepted the territorial claim only in part, awarding just three villages
to Czechoslovakia - a total of 43 square kilometers of land.\textsuperscript{15}

The settlement of the territorial issues was covered by Article 1 of the treaty
text, with seven further articles covering military, economic, political and other
terms. The military provisions enjoined Hungary to limit the strength of its mili-
tary capabilities. The financial terms obliged Hungary to pay war reparations to a
total value of 300 million American dollars, two thirds of which were to go to the
Soviet Union and one third to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The only provi-
sion that could be seen as favorable to Hungary was Article 4, which stated that
"Following the ratification of the present Treaty, all Allied armed forces are to be
withdrawn from Hungary within 90 days" except those "need[ed] for the Soviet
army to maintain its lines of communication with the Soviet zone of occupation
in Austria." This stipulation, however, was implemented with some delay: as we
all know, the last of the Soviet troops left Hungary in 1991.\textsuperscript{16}

The Paris Peace Treaty, as I have already mentioned at the outset, was signed
on February 10, 1947. Although it naturally provided no cause for rejoicing on
anybody's part in Hungary, it also provoked none of the bitterness and hysteria
that had accompanied the signing of the Trianon Treaty in 1920. The segments of
the Hungarian society sensitive to the nationalities question realized and had be-
gun to accustom themselves to the fact that not only integral revision was unim-
aginable, but even a fair compromise solution, a revision based on ethnic princi-
ples was out of question. For Hungary, as István Bibó, a leading figure of the
peace preparations suggested, only two courses of action were left: to avoid "mu-
tual hatred" by setting an example of "staunchness and moderation between small
nations" and at the same time to show and adopt a sense of responsibility "for the
fate of Hungarians living outside the frontiers."\textsuperscript{17} Others came to similar conclu-
sions. The most significant among them was Gyula Székfű, leading historian of
the interwar period. In the future, he would write in his famous, or perhaps infa-
mous, 1947 book, "we must give up the struggle and propaganda for revisionism
once and for all"; and "the sole wish" that Hungary might address to the neigh-
bouring states, he emphasized, was "honorable observance of the civic rights of
Hungarians living in their midst and their humane treatment." The way out of the quandry that was advocated by these two outstanding representatives of Hungarian intellectual life—one of conservative interwar Hungary and the other of the democratic postwar Hungary more than half a century ago is still valid to this day.

Notes

THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE SUPERPOWERS

CSABA BÉKÉS

Research Group for the History and Documentation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest Hungary

The fate of East-Central Europe until the fall of the communist regimes was determined by the status quo that the allies set up in 1945. Despite the fact that it has never been formally recorded in any official document, both superpowers, which controlled the bipolar world order after World War II - namely the United States and the Soviet Union - attributed a pivotal role to this tacit agreement in the East-West relationship. Their mutual consent started to work as an automatic rule of thumb in the chilliest years of the Cold War era, and developed afterwards, when the sporadic East-West conflicts needed to be managed. On the basis of this conception, the passivity of the West at the time of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is not as surprising and incomprehensible as contemporary public opinion in Hungary regarded it. The Hungarian uprising was not merely inconvenient for the western powers but it totally contradicted their policy, which especially after 1955 aimed at a compromise with the Soviet Union through the mutual acquiescence of the existing status quo.

Keywords: Hungary, history, 1945 - Soviet Union - foreign policy, 1945 - United States - foreign policy, 1945 - Cold War, East-West relations, 1945

I. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Superpowers: Improvisations and Decisions of Historical Importance

In this paper I intend to have a closer look at the international relevance of two significant elements of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. My analysis focuses on two particular aspects: first, to what extent could the Soviet and American authorities make sensible decisions in such an inordinate situation; and second, whether their decisions were the right ones in defence of their political interests.

News of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, contrary to what many expected, caused considerable havoc in Washington. The American government had no firm concept and strategic plan in case such an unlikely event should happen. Suddenly the Eisenhower administration had to face the fact that despite their massive liberation propaganda in Eastern Europe, the United States, the world's larg-
est military power, had a very limited potential of intervention in the Soviet sphere of interest in case of an anti-Soviet uprising. To maintain their political prestige, however, it was most important for the United States to conceal this inadequacy as best as they could from international public opinion. This delicate situation prompted those improvisational steps that the American administration made as a reaction to the Hungarian revolution. One of these spectacular steps was that, initiated by the Americans, the three Western Great Powers officially asked the UN Security Council to put the question of the Soviet intervention in Hungary on the agenda of its session on 28 October.³

From a historical perspective, however, it proved to be more important that the American government, which had already reassessed "for internal use" its policy toward the satellite states in July 1956, was now compelled to do the same for the general public as well. None the less, while the above mentioned No. 5608 decision of the National Security Council was preceded by a long and meticulous preparation, which included the participation of experts, there was no time for such accuracy in those stormy days at the end of October 1956, so the new directives were formed in the midst of ad hoc negotiations of the highest authorities and on the basis of hasty, improvisational decisions.

Following a suggestion on 26 October by Harold E. Stassen, the president's advisor on disarmament, it was decided that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in his canvassing speech for a Dallas audience the following day, would incorporate a message for the Soviet Union, suggesting that if the East-European states achieved freedom and independence, it would not jeopardise the security of the Soviet Union, because the United States would accept that these countries receive a neutral status, similar to Austria's, and would never become NATO members. In the very last moment, however, both the neutral status and the ban on NATO membership were excluded from the speech, so the famous declaration eventually conveyed no more than the following: "We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies."⁴ It is small wonder, after all, that in the current situation this emphatically defensive and topical statement was interpreted in Moscow as the United States' confirmation that they would refrain from intervention in the interest of both Poland and Hungary.

The above cited declaration, however, was of historical importance even in this radically amended form - despite the fact that usually only its role in pacifying the Soviet Union is emphasized. All previous official statements of the Eisenhower administration regarding the satellite states were based on the assumption that should these states become independent one day, they would automatically be part of the western world, which in this context includes NATO membership at the same time.⁵ Declaring that the United States did not consider these states as potential military allies, practically meant the repudiation of their former position, i.e., a significant change of paradigm in American foreign policy. In this
way the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its subsequent suppression - reluctantly acknowledged by the Americans - became a catalyst in a process that started in the summer of 1956 and lasted until the mid-sixties, and which resulted in a new, more pragmatic American foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. The new principle was gradually leaning towards the _de jure_ acknowledgement of the European status quo, and instead of liberating the satellite states - although in a historical perspective this hope was never given up - it aimed at softening and liberalising the prevailing communist regimes, primarily through exerting economic pressure on them. The historical irony is that while the ideologically driven "liberation policy," relying on every nation's innate right to independence, failed to positively influence the state of the region, the subsequent "defeatist^1^ US policy of self-restraint contributed effectively to the fall of communist systems in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union had begun.

Shortly, or perhaps long after suppressed revolutions and uprisings several questions arise: could it have happened otherwise; was the defeat unavoidable, or was there the slightest chance of victory? Had the result been due to an unfortunate turn of internal and external conditions? Hungarian society has not been able to come to terms with the failure of the 1956 revolution and has placed the event among the other historical traumas of the nation. Until recently, the public have assumed that the historic chance was missed because the western states eventually failed to deliver the expected assistance. Accordingly, when re-estimating the events, the focus of attention by Hungarians was always what the West and particularly the United States could and should have done in order to help the Hungarian cause. Although contemporary public opinion had every reason to expect genuine western support on the basis of American liberation propaganda, especially from a moral point of view, today we cannot disregard the above mentioned international conditions that fundamentally influenced the outcome of the Hungarian revolution. The facts reveal that the United States actually had no political means at their disposal to force the Soviet Union to give up on Hungary. Moreover, it is most likely that any form of military intervention could have resulted in a direct conflict between the superpowers, which could have precipitated the outbreak of the third world war.

This all means that the outcome of the Hungarian events in fact depended not so much on the western attitude as on how Soviet leaders would handle the political crisis that started on 23 October 1956. It is well-known that Tito in his speech delivered in Pula on 11 November 1956 considered the first Russian intervention a mistake, yet it is surprising how much neglected the fact is that the Soviets alone (and no one else) were in an _exclusive situation to decide_ on 23 October 1956. That is, they could have decided differently _then and there_. There was nothing to prevent the Soviets from using the Polish scenario in Hungary. Furthermore, at the meeting of the CPSU Presidium in the evening of 23 October, a distinguished
member of the leadership, Mikoyan, who was most familiar with the Hungarian situation, clearly outlined the alternative solution: "Without Imre Nagy they can’t get control of the movement, and it’s also cheaper for us. (…) What are we losing? The Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send troops." Mikoyan's suggestion was practically the only sensible alternative in the given situation, yet he was alone with his opinion at the Politburo meeting. The Soviet leaders, who showed a pragmatic approach towards the main issues of world politics after 1953, who had managed to give up on the idea of military intervention in the last moment when resolving the Polish crisis - an intervention which would have been prompted by the ideological and emotional motivation of Cold War reflexes - were unable to exercise the same policy of self-restraint when it came to the Hungarian uprising. In this way Khrushchev and his companions made the worst possible political decision from their own point of view as well, starting a process - against virtually the only anti-Soviet freedom fight in the history of the Cold War - the uncomfortable consequences of which they sought to avoid by resorting to an imminent military campaign. Of course it cannot be guessed how the situation was to have developed in Hungary had the Hungarian government and its military forces been entrusted with the task of pacification. It is more than likely, though, that in such a case there would have been a slight chance of consolidating the situation and, similarly to Poland, of establishing a promptly introduced but firmly controlled and limited reform policy, which the Soviets would later accept as a passable solution that does not jeopardise their fundamental strategic interests. In such a case, however, we would be talking about the victory of the reform communist movement instead of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Having said that, it is just as conceivable that the government of Imre Nagy would have been unable to cope with the conflict and gradually slipped in an increasingly radical direction. Thus, the Soviet Union would still have had to subdue the uprising with military intervention in a few days or weeks. In the latter case, however, they could have said that they really did everything in their power to bring about a peaceful solution and it was not their fault that they failed. It is therefore not too farfetched to say that in handling the crises of East-Central Europe between 1953 and 1981, 23 October 1956 was the only occasion when the Soviet leadership made an entirely mistaken decision from the point of view of their own imperial interests, which resulted in a situation directly opposed to their original intention. At the same time, it means that the invasion of 4 November, 1956 was a logical and unavoidable consequence of a flawed political decision. The first Soviet intervention propelled such a dynamic impetus in the Hungarian events, which - unlike Poland - after a certain point could not be handled by political means and within the framework of the system any more. Consequently, by the end of October the rapid collapse of the communist system became more and more apparent, and this in
turn posed a genuine threat to the integrity of the Soviet bloc. By that time there was no alternative decision that the Soviets could make: their only reaction was to be armed intervention.

While it is so rarely emphasised or even realised in old and recent analyses of the subject how decisive the first Soviet intervention was, the general reinterpretation of Soviet policy towards the Hungarian revolution has recently, following the disclosure of the so-called Malin notes, gained a new impetus. These notes give a non-verbatim, often fragmentary yet immensely informative account of debates about the Hungarian crisis in the Soviet Politburo and provide an insight for the first time into the polemics at the highest echelons of Moscow, which eventually led to the decisions we know all too well. These documents confirm those earlier presumptions that there were serious, often heated debates in the Kremlin about the right policy to follow. Even in the light of the lately disclosed historical sources, however, researchers have widely different opinions on what was actually at stake in these debates.

Basically two different points of view can be identified. According to the first one, the Soviet authorities were more open toward handling the crisis than we had previously thought, and consequently the final suppression of the uprising was not the only alternative. Had the events taken a more favourable — and usually not specified - turn, there would have been a fair chance for the revolution to be victorious. Going one step further, some presume that the liberation of East-Central Europe could have happened 33 years before the actual event of 1989 and 1990. According to the second, directly opposed opinion, the message of the Malin notes does not contravene our previous assumption about Soviet policy in the issue. What is more, it generally confirms what we could only guess before. The debates within the presidential body were indeed serious and perhaps more heated than one could imagine. The real aim of the dispute between the "liberals" and the "conservatives," however, was not at all giving up on Hungary (i.e., realising the triumph of the revolution) as merely deciding what compromises and sanctions could be granted to the government of Imre Nagy in the given situation, so that they could consolidate the situation within the framework of the communist system. Although I hasten to add that I personally represent the latter theory, it is worth conducting a brief survey to find out what kind of facts and information seem to confirm the idea that the Soviets would have been ready to give up Hungary if need be. It might sound surprising but in the minutes of Politburo meetings between 23 October and 4 November 1956 there is only one really important but vaguely decisive piece of information which could be used for such an interpretation. On 30 October the Presidium - under pressure from a Chinese delegation which had arrived in Moscow - unanimously (!) declared that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary. Nevertheless, the key to the interpretation of the often fragmentary Malin notes is that new information had better be construed
in view of all known and recently disclosed information on the one hand, as well as in the global context of world politics and East-West relations on the other hand. In this respect, it is more than obvious that the potential of such a favourable decision from the Soviet authorities depended by no means on their disposition to "give up" Hungary as such. Just opposite: it would have been the maximum political concession that Soviet leaders were willing to make - to avoid what even they thought would be the worst possible solution: military intervention - had the government of Imre Nagy been able to consolidate the situation without jeopardising the communist regime and the integrity of the Soviet bloc. There are several concrete examples in the Malin notes in this regard, proving that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would have been possible only if these two conditions had been met. Suffice it to mention two specific, poignantly expressed and documented examples. Foreign Minister Shepilov, who took part in the debates mostly as the representative of the "liberal alternative," said the following when supporting the above decision: "With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We'll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time." That is, the well-calculated consequence of their step was by no means the restoration of the capitalist system but the consolidation of a situation similar to that of Poland, i.e., the formation of a well-defined communist system, which could operate with more autonomy, yet remained loyal to Moscow and within the framework of the Soviet bloc.

Mikoyan expressed most clearly the necessity of keeping up the status quo by hook or by crook, even though he always represented the most liberal opinion in terms of Hungary. "We simply cannot allow Hungary to be removed from our camp," he said at the Politburo meeting on 1 November, one day after the decision was made about the need for intervention, while he tried to convince the others that there were still political means to find a solution, and they should wait another 10-15 days before launching an intervention. The irony of fate is that while on 23 October Mikoyan was the only one who assessed the situation sensibly, pushing the strategy of wait and see then, on 1 November the same position meant that now he was the only one in the leadership who could not understand (or accept) that the Hungarian events were indeed beyond the scope that the Soviet Union could tolerate. Today, it is generally accepted that by the end of October Hungary had experienced an irreversible democratic transition, which would have resulted in the complete elimination of the communist dictatorship, had it not been for outside intervention. The events between 1 and 3 November only reinforce this opinion; it was not incidental that at the Politburo meeting on 3 November Mikoyan himself suggested János Kádár as the head of the new government.

All in all, we can conclude that the Malin notes do not contain any facts or information that would imply that anyone in the Soviet leadership was willing to
accept the changes in Hungary, as well as the obvious consequences that would include the emergence of a democratic system. Come to think of it, this is not that surprising. Allow me to refer once again to a well-known fact: it has been common knowledge for long that Tito himself agreed to the plan of Soviet invasion on the night of 2 and 3 November on the island of Brioni, in order to save the communist system in Hungary. More than that, he later officially declared that the second invasion was unavoidable. Having said that, it is beyond any doubt there was no one more interested in the victory of national communism than Tito, in this case in the success of the Imre Nagy. Consequently, if at the beginning of November even Tito thought - despite his fundamentally positive disposition, and rightly - that the communist dictatorship in Hungary was in grave jeopardy, it would have been most peculiar if the Soviet leaders, who had conceded even more moderate changes within the political framework of communism only under the pressure of a serious crisis, had shown more compliance than the Yugoslav authorities.

After the intervention of 4 November it seemed that the proposal made by the CPSU Presidium at their meeting on 30 October, which did not concern fundamental issues but was of historical importance nevertheless, lost its relevance once and for all. Paradoxically, though, out of all the East-Central European states it was Hungary and the Kádár leadership, which came to power in those days and consolidated its supremacy rapidly with a dual strategy of stick and carrot, that would stretch the boundaries of Moscow’s tolerance at all times and achieve a relatively independent internal development during the decades after 1956. Also paradoxically, a relatively independent foreign policy, just barely tolerated by the Soviet Union, was achieved by Romania, a state whose internal system was in many respects more retrograde than the post-Stalinist Soviet system.

In my opinion, the lost historical opportunity of 1956 - if there was any - can be defined as follows: had the Imre Nagy government been able to miraculously stop the democratic process, which spread with an extraordinary rapidity, the Soviet leadership would have been willing to withdraw their troops from the country; thus making a compromise more significant than in the resolution of the Polish crisis, where this possibility was not even mentioned seriously. It means that Moscow was ready to grant the privilege of relative internal and external independence at the same time to one particular satellite country, that is to Hungary. Khrushchev and his colleagues were leaning towards such a complex concession in the critical situation, which the Soviet authorities would never again accept in the following decades. A relatively independent internal and foreign policy in any allied country was considered too dangerous from the point of view of imperial interests.
II. The International Aftermath of the Revolution

In the following paragraphs I intend to give a sketchy outline of the significance of the Hungarian revolution in the further development of the East-West relationship, in the detente process, and how the events of 1956 later influenced Hungary’s position and diplomatic elbowroom in international politics.19

The detente process that started after 1953 was temporarily disturbed and arrested but definitely not terminated by the Hungarian revolution and its suppression; moreover, the revolution did not influence the future of the process either. The tension caused by Western objection to Soviet intervention was in fact expressed in the field of propaganda, predominantly on the forums of the UN, while both the Americans (together with the British and French) and the Soviet authorities were willing to negotiate as before. The spring of 1957 brought about the rekindling of international dialogue, and a new East-West summit was under preparation by the end of the year.

The most direct effect of the revolution was that the great Western powers, through their attitude, expressed undoubtedly that the West acknowledged the European status quo of 1945 and did not want to question its relevance, despite all of the propaganda stunts. Naturally it satisfied the Soviet leadership more than anyone else, because instead of a tacit agreement now they got a firm de facto guarantee that in resolving future conflicts within the boundaries of their empire they would not have to consider the point of view of the Western states, not even when they resort to the most drastic means. In this respect the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 certainly provided the Soviet Union with a much more favourable position because the uncertainty threatening - in actual fact only at the level of propaganda - the security of the East-Central European region by the United States through its psychological warfare was ended after 1956.

This guarantee of security policy, gained in 1956 and lasting until the collapse of the Soviet Union - together with scientific results in missile technology and space research in the late 1950s - contributed to the strengthening of the international position of the Soviet Union and gave a boost to the self-confidence of Soviet leaders. Later, it would indirectly influence the strengthening of several tendencies: the elaboration of Khrushchev’s adventurist foreign policy, which led to the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis. In the long run the increasing self-confidence strengthened the emancipation tendency, which made the Soviet Union a superpower on a par with the United States from a military and strategic point of view by the end of the 1960s. However, it indirectly helped the deepening of the classic detente policy that began at the end of the sixties. This in turn contributed to the signing of the Helsinki Agreement (1975) on the basis of de jure acceptance of the European status quo and helped to realise the practice of “compelled coexistence.”20
The revolution influenced in a peculiar way Hungary's later role in the East-West relationship and her position in international politics. Learning from the experiences in 1956, the Kádár regime, to say the least, did not strive for a more or less independent foreign policy; moreover, it openly proclaimed both in Hungary and abroad that it rigorously followed the directives of Moscow at all times. In less spectacular and more disguised spheres of foreign policy, such as economic relations with the West and in secret missions for mediating during the Vietnam war as well as in the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, the significant role played in the preparation of the European security conference, Hungary maintained a cautious but ffin tendency all along, which aimed at utilising the available political leeway most effectively but without drawing much attention.21 This practice was directly the opposite of the Romanian strategy, which proclaimed both for their domestic public and abroad that, beginning with the mid-sixties, Romania dissented from the Soviet line and was eager to demonstrate the existence of a truly independent Romanian foreign policy. At the same time the country, as far as the basic interests and aims were concerned, similarly to Hungary, remained a solid member of the Soviet system of alliance.

On the basis of official and spontaneous social reaction in the West to the suppression of the revolution, and the commitment of the UN General Assembly to the issue of Hungary, many might have thought that the Kádár regime would not be able to consolidate their relationship with the West for a long time. None the less, the defeat of the Hungarian uprising instead prompted western politicians to carry on with the policy of reinterpretation, which meant that after 1956 they completely did away with the theory of liberating enslaved nations. From then on, the new goal was "softening" and liberalising the communist regimes of East-Central Europe. In this respect the Kádár administration, aiming at the systematic rehabilitation of the communist regime after November 1956, i.e., trying to organise a system that works effectively, proved to be a most promising partner.22 Having said that, it is not surprising that Britain decided to stabilise relations with Hungary as early as the spring of 1957, although given the circumstances this intention remained reserved for "internal use" only for the time being. Discretion was necessary, as the Kádár regime wanted to accomplish a specifically Hungarian variation of the post-Stalinist system parallel with the inconceivably brutal and widespread retaliation campaign after the revolution, to which western politicians responded with morally righteous indignation. Thinking sensibly and considering the security interests of the Soviet Union they admitted the necessity of pacification and restoring law and order, none the less, partly under pressure from public opinion on home ground, they expected the Hungarian government to forgive the "delinquents" and "deviants" just as magnanimously and as pragmatically as they intended to win over the majority of the population for their policy. Perhaps we can risk the presumption that if the West, and primarily
the United States, had exerted pressure on the Hungarian government in order to make it more moderate, and to alleviate the zeal of political retribution directly, by means of secret negotiations, as later in 1960-1962, they might have forced more serious compromises from the Hungarian government much earlier. Instead, the West appealed to the widest public and used such diplomatic forums as the UN. Eventually the Hungarian case was taken off the agenda of the UN General Assembly in December 1962, in return for which Hungary granted amnesty to the majority of those convicted for their participation in the revolution. Nevertheless, the retribution campaign itself could have been influenced, mitigating its austerity, and thus directly saving dozens of human lives. What makes it all plausible is that the main objective of the Kádár regime in foreign policy right after 1956 was to break out of its almost complete diplomatic isolation and to demonstrate that even from a western point of view the new system, although its conception was far from immaculate, was no worse, perhaps even better than the other communist regimes. Apparently the West registered this attempt quite soon, but the recurring issue of Hungary in the UN was so instrumental, especially for the United States, in the struggle of superpowers for the influence over the third world, that direct negotiations with the Hungarian authorities only became possible once the UN debate had been obviously exhausted.

In this way in Western policy Hungary only gained the status of bloc normal - i.e., the same recognition as the other communist states - after the amnesty of 1963. Having said that, Hungary became a favourite straight away, together with Poland. The peculiarly Hungarian variation of the post-Stalinist system - worked out by the mid-sixties and relying mostly on the lessons of the revolution - created a more flexible and tolerant communist model of its own kind, which happened to align with the goal of American foreign policy after 1956: a policy that abandoned the rhetoric of liberation for good. Paradoxically the Hungarian revolution of 1956, striving for the principle of universal human freedom, was totally out of tune with the actual objectives of western politics - even though many thought that the uprising rendered the conditions of "liberation." The Kádár regime, however, with their pragmatic approach, managed to align with western expectations of the time more than any other country of the Soviet bloc for decades after 1956.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was published as: "Hidegháború, enyhülés és az 1956-os magyar forradalom" [Cold War, Detente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution], in Évkönyv V. 1996-1997 (Budapest: 1956 Institute, 1997), 201-213.
2. Generally on the policy of the superpowers see Bence Kovrig: "Liberators: the Superpowers


5. This thesis is indirectly proved by the reluctance showed by the US in accepting the idea of Austria's neutrality prior to the conclusion of the Austrian state treaty in 1955. The above mentioned fact, i.e., that in the last minute the reference to the ban on NATO membership and to neutrality were omitted from the speech of Dulles on October 27, 1956 seems strongly to support the idea that up till that moment the potential incorporation of the East-Central European countries into NATO had been a serious intention of the US leadership.


7. In this context I disregard the partisan warfare in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation, because of the peculiar circumstances of the invasion.

8. Typically enough, although the Soviet leadership was well aware of the rapid escalation of Hungarian events, at the Politburo meetings after 23 October no one cared to attribute it to the wrong decision. Moreover, with the exception of Mikoyan, they all assessed it as a wise step afterwards.


11. For the first publication of this view see: Csaba Békés - Melinda Kalmár: Optimizmusra
76

CSABA BÉKÉS

szükség van de illúziók nélkül. Volt e esély 1956 ban? [Optimism is a must have without illusions. Was there a chance in 1956?]. Népszabadság, 22 October 1996.


13. Just as important, yet often overlooked by scholars, is the significance of so-called negative information; i.e. the analysis of what party leaders did not talk about. On the basis of this, it is apparent that Soviet leaders were not afraid of western intervention in Hungary because there are no important observations on this issue recorded in the notes. If they had reckoned with such an exigency, they would not only have had to put it on the agenda for discussion but immediate security measures would have been taken (e.g., total mobilisation of the armed forces, etc.)


16. Ibid., 394.

17. Ibid., 397.


19. For more detailed recent analyses on the aftermath and effect of the revolution see Péter Kende: "Mégegyszer a magyar forradalom világpolitikai jelent ségér " [Once again on the significance of the Hungarian revolution and world politics.] In Évkönyv IV (Budapest, 1956 Institute, 1995), 7 23; Csaba Békés: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics, Chapter 3.


22. Instead of the terms "restoration" and "consolidation" commonly used with opposite political bias for describing the reconstruction period following 1956, in recent scholarship Melinda Kalmár introduced a term much more appropriate for an academic analysis: rehabilitation [szanálás]. Cf. Melinda Kalmár: Ennivaló és hozomány. A kora kádárizmus ideológiája [The ideology of the early Kádár era] (Budapest: Magvet Kiadó, 1998).


24. The number of those sentenced to death because of their participation in the revolution was incredibly high and altogether 230 people were executed.

János Kádár came into power in 1956 and remained in office until 1988. He has left his stamp on all aspects of Hungarian life. This paper will show that Kádár, despite the circumstances of his coming into power, lack of domestic support, and being an international outcast, he emerged as an effective political leader and an internationally respected statesman.

Keywords: Soviet bloc, the Kremlin's foreign policy, the 1956 uprising, "Hungarian question", New Economic Mechanism, Warsaw Pact, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, UN

At the onset, outside of the Soviet bloc nations, Kádár faced complete international isolation. Even though he never deviated from the Kremlin's foreign policies, gradually, he was able to break out from the isolation. His attempt to be accepted by the international community suffered a serious setback on account of his initial harsh persecution of the participants of the 1956 uprising, especially after the execution of Imre Nagy and his collaborators. On the other hand, Kádár's friendship with Khrushchev and his unfailing loyalty to the Soviet Union allowed him more freedom to maneuver in his domestic policies. Eventually, political restrictions were relaxed, and domestic economic reforms were promulgated. As a consequence, the West responded more favorably to the Kádár regime's initiatives to establish itself in the international community. At the same time, the Hungarian economy needed modern Western industrial equipment and technology and an access to foreign markets to sustain itself.

Hungary did not follow Romania's more independent-minded foreign policies. In 1967, it severed its diplomatic relations with Israel, and in 1968, it participated in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Hungary received "most favored nation" status from the United States and became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The once vilified János Kádár gradually achieved universal recognition and even respectability. By the late 1980s he had been received by most Western European heads of state and had hosted most of them in Hungary. As for the United States, President Carter re-
turned the "sacred" crown to Hungary, secretaries of state Cyrus Vance and George Schultz paid visits to Hungary, and so did Vice-President George Bush. Clearly, Kádár did not move Hungary out of Soviet orbit but he charted a course that brought Hungary closer to Western democracies.

Considering that he was installed into office only as a Hungarian mouthpiece for the Kremlin, one might easily conclude that János Kádár had no independent foreign policy. In retrospect, one cannot dismiss thirty-two years in Hungary's history without a closer look at the country's interaction with members of the Soviet bloc countries, the non-aligned nations, and with the Western democracies. Thus, this paper will explore these dimensions of Hungarian foreign policy. János Kádár's rule over Hungary for more than a generation has left its stamp on all aspects of Hungarian life, and most certainly on the country's foreign policies. While this study will focus on Kádár's foreign policies, relevant domestic policies will also be taken into consideration.

In 1956 the Soviet Union crushed the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary. The decision for the military intervention was made in the Kremlin, but the Soviet leaders needed a Hungarian figurehead to give at least a semblance of legitimacy to their attack. For this reason they entrusted János Kádár, an inconspicuous, non-Stalinist, dedicated long-time Communist functionary, with the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party and the government. It is the contention of this writer that János Kádár, despite the inauspicious beginning, lack of domestic support, and international isolation outside the Soviet bloc, emerged as an effective political leader in his own right. Hungary's rapid recovery from the ruins of the 1956 uprising, and the country's acceptance by the international community, was the direct result of Kádár's ability to overcome the alienation of his compatriots without incurring the wrath of the Soviet Union.

In the early years the Kádár regime had no foreign policy; it was entirely at the mercy of the Kremlin. But the Russian leaders realized that in order to give the newly installed regime a chance to survive, the country's economy had to be revived. That task could not have succeeded without the infusion of significant economic aid. Material aid and credit came from the Soviet Union and concurrently, the Kremlin instructed its client states to extend all possible help to Hungary (see Table I).

In addition, Hungary was given long-term loans: 250 million rubles in convertible currency from the Soviet Union, 200 million from China (half of it in cash and the rest in merchandise), sixty million marks from the German Democratic Republic in raw materials, and goods and seven million rubles from Bulgaria. Loans from the West were refused, but substantial gifts through the International Red Cross reached Hungary. Five thousand tons of merchandise and medicine, valued at 2,500,000 Swiss Francs were delivered by December 21, 1956.
In the final analysis, the Soviet Union assumed a large part of the financial burden for Hungary's economy. As the economy began to revive, Kádár had to give some explanation for the stationing of the Soviet troops in Hungary. It was clear to everybody that the Kádár government could not have come to power and stayed in power without the help of the Soviet army.

### Table 1
Economic aid to Hungary from communist countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount of Currency</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>38.0 million rubles</td>
<td>cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30.0 million rubles</td>
<td>conv. currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>90.0 million kronen</td>
<td>credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>100.0 million zlotys</td>
<td>credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>13.0 million leis</td>
<td>credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5.5 million rubles</td>
<td>credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>150.0 million dinars</td>
<td>credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>22.0 million marks</td>
<td>credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.2 million rubles</td>
<td>conv. currency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Népszabadság, January 22, 1957.

The justification for the continued presence of the Red Army in Hungary was to provide security for the socialist countries and to counter the American buildup in Europe as well as the threats posed by NATO and the rearmament of West Germany. To legitimate the presence of the Soviet troops in Hungary, on May 27, 1957, the Kádár government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union that spelled out the "legal status of those Soviet troops, which have been temporarily stationed on the territory of the People's Democracy of Hungary".2 Despite the elaborate agreement, neither the number of troops nor the proposed length of their stay was specified by the document.

The Soviet intervention and the circumstances of Kádár's coming to power isolated Hungary from the Western world. But fellow socialist leaders, in addition to extending economic assistance, paid personal visits to show their solidarity with Kádár and to provide recognition to his regime. On a more practical level, the Communist dignitaries came to Hungary to size up Hungary's new leader. In late 1956 high level Czechoslovak, German, and Romanian delegations came to Hungary. In early 1957 Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Soviet government and party leaders met in Budapest to evaluate the situation in Hungary. Soon after that meeting Kádár traveled to Moscow to meet with the Soviet and Chinese leaders. Consequently, Chou En-lai visited Hungary. From there on, numerous
mutual visits took place between Kádár and Khrushchev. Impressed by Kádár's earnestness, modesty, sincerity and devotion to the Communist cause, Khrushchev took a special liking to his young Hungarian protege.³

Beyond establishing some limited trade relations with non-Communist countries, the Kádár regime was unable to free itself from Western diplomatic isolation. News from the United Nations was discouraging. Since December 12, 1956 a special committee made up of representatives from five nations, Austria, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, had been investigating the situation in Hungary. Concurrently, the Credentials Committee refused to seat the Kádár government's representative. In September 1957, despite objections from the Kádár regime, the General Assembly heard and accepted a highly critical report from the Committee of Five, which condemned the Hungarian situation. Recognition by the UN was much sought after by Kádár because without it Hungary remained an international outcast. In the meantime, contacts with representatives of the Soviet bloc nations continued. In June 1957 Zhivkov of Bulgaria paid a visit. In August Ho Chi Minh arrived. In September Cedenbal of Mongolia stayed in Hungary for four days. On September 27 Kádár led a delegation to China.⁴

By 1958, living conditions had improved, and apparently the population had come to accept the inevitable. There remained one thorny, unsettled question, the fate of Imre Nagy. Except for the usual condemnation of Nagy's revisionist activities, hardly anything was said about his legal status or even about his whereabouts. Unexpectedly, on June 18, 1958, on the third page of the Népszabadság, appeared an announcement by the Ministry of Justice: "verdict was reached in the criminal trial of Imre Nagy and his associates." The international reaction was swift. Leaders of the Western world and the non-aligned nations expressed shock at the executions. Demonstrations and rioting took place in front of Soviet and Hungarian embassies. In the United Nations many delegates condemned the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates, and the Special Committee on the Hungarian Problems pointed out: "The Hungarian government in bringing Imre Nagy to trial was acting contrary to the solemn assurances that János Kádár had previously given on behalf of Ms government, including those confirmed by letter to the Yugoslav government."⁵ The Yugoslav government confirmed this charge.

The international furor at the news of the execution had been anticipated. All Hungarian legations received special warnings and were advised to brace themselves for the storm of protests. As for the domestic reaction, Kádár was taking a great chance. The execution of Imre Nagy was not in Kádár's best interest. The news in Hungary did not generate any outright protest. After the extended period of revolutionary fervor and defiance of the Soviets and the Communists, hopes for national independence faded as the nation's political life sunk into apathy. Individuals privately mourned Imre Nagy and cursed his killers, but could do
nothing publicly. The news of Nagy's execution stirred up bitter memories, reinforced distrust of the Communists, and gave way to political cynicism.\textsuperscript{6}

Imre Nagy's execution seriously damaged the Kádár government's attempts to improve its relations with non-Communist nations. But in order to revitalize the country’s economy, trade with non-Communist countries had to be resumed; but before the resumption of foreign trade diplomatic relations had to be normalized, so that removal of sanctions, trade barriers, and tariffs agreements could be negotiated. Despite the pressing economic considerations, the Kádár regime was not willing to make political concessions to the West, fearing that they would be interpreted as weakness.

The strong opposition of the United States to the Kádár regime resulted in a prolonged adverse relationship between the two countries. Consequently, that hindered Hungary's case at the UN and its dealing with the other Western democracies. In addition to the repeated American denunciation at the UN of the illegitimate seizure of power by the Soviet-sponsored Kádár, in Budapest the American legation had given asylum to Hungary's besieged Catholic Primate, Cardinal Mindszenty. To make matters worse, the newly appointed American ambassador, Edward T. Wailes, who had arrived in Budapest on November 2, 1956, refused to present his credentials to János Kádár.\textsuperscript{7}

On February 21, 1957 after the General Assembly of the United Nations accepted the American motion that "the Credentials Committee make no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the representative of Hungary," the Kádár government responded by requesting the removal of Wailes, who had still not presented his credentials. The American diplomat departed on February 27, and for the ensuing eleven years, the United States legation in Hungary was headed by only a charge d'affaires} From that point on Hungary's policies towards the U.S., more than ever, reflected the ups and downs of Soviet-American relations. In the spring of 1957 Assistant Military Attache Captain Thomas R. Gleason was accused of "open espionage" and was expelled from Hungary. In response, Washington expelled Gleason's Hungarian counterpart. On the first anniversary of the October uprising President Eisenhower gave an extremely critical speech on the Kádár regime. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry considered a strongly worded protest, and some hard liners urged to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S. Kádár vetoed that notion. Even the protest was not sent. After Kádár's consultation with Khrushchev, he was told not to criticize Eisenhower because such criticism may hurt the ongoing Soviet-American negotiations. Hungary only criticized Henry Cabot Lodge's remarks at the UN.\textsuperscript{9}

To counter U.S. criticism the Kádár regime began an investigation of American espionage in Hungary. In fall 1958 two American military attaches were charged with spying and recruiting Hungarian citizens. In a stern note to the U.S.,
the Hungarian Foreign Ministry objected to the subversive activities of the Americans, and it complained about the continuous anti-Hungarian broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Furthermore, the note accused the U.S. of discrimination against Hungary, including the refusal to grant visas to athletes and scientists and disallowing Hungary’s participation in the 1959 World's Fair. In response the U.S. stipulated that Hungary must live up to its international obligations under the UN Charter.

At the UN, Endre Sik, Hungary’s foreign minister, attempted to be more conciliatory. He claimed that with the sentencing of Imre Nagy and his associates, court proceedings against "counterrevolutionaries" had been completed. The United States was not impressed. To show evidence of its legitimacy, on November 16, 1958, the Kádár government held parliamentary elections. The outcome was not different from previous Communist-controlled elections. Party-sponsored candidates received 99.4 percent of the votes cast. In the meantime, the Kádár-Khrushchev friendship was becoming more and more cordial. Both in Russia and Hungary, meeting followed meeting between the two men. As the international situation worsened, and the four-power conference was canceled on account of the U-2 American spy plane incident, Kádár indignantly echoed the Soviet condemnations of the "American provocation."

In summer 1960 Kádár hosted the entire Khrushchev family at a Hungarian Trade Exhibit in Moscow. After an elaborate dinner Khrushchev held court. He gave an assessment of the American presidential candidates. He ridiculed Nixon and by calling him "the Soviet expert" referred to the so-called "kitchen debate." Khrushchev had no praise for Kennedy either: "they are like a pair of boots - which is better, the left or the right - is hard to tell." In November of that year Khrushchev decided to attend the opening of the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations in New York. The official reason for that trip was "to move toward complete disarmament and to end the cold war." At the same time, he mobilized all the satellite leaders to make an appearance in New York. Kádár was invited to accompany him on the Soviet ship, Baltika. That was Kádár's first trip to the United States.

On September 19, 1960 the Baltika docked at Pier 73 at 25th Street in New York City. Only a few protocol officials and representatives of the press were present to greet the visitors. The media focus was on Khrushchev. To the chagrin of Kádár, the Hungarian delegation was restricted to Manhattan. Kádár could not even join the Soviet delegation at their Glen Cove estate on Long Island. Kádár had some opportunity to do some sightseeing and shopping. He was quoted as saying "the dollar has the least value in America," obviously he was referring to the exchange rates. During his stay, the shrewd and enterprising businessman Cyrus Eaton held a lavish reception in honor of Kádár. Consequently, whenever Eaton traveled to Hungary on business, Kádár personally welcomed him.
On October 3, 1960 Kádár had his chance to address the United Nations. When he was called to the rostrum many delegates walked out in protest. Kádár's speech was well researched. At first he expressed his complete solidarity with the Soviet Union, then defended the two countries' trade relations. He argued that those relations could not be called colonial considering that the Soviet Union was supplying Hungary with raw materials, and it was buying finished goods in return. Such relations were contrary to the definition of colonialism. In regard to the "Hungarian question" at the UN, Kádár accused the United States of keeping it alive as a baseless attack on the Soviet Union and Hungary. Kádár pointed to the ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeeping forces in the Congo; thus, they could not have been relied on to restore order in Hungary in 1956. As for the West accusing the Soviet Union of defeating a "national uprising" in Hungary, he claimed that it had crushed a "counterrevolutionary putsch." To support his argument, Kádár reasoned that national movements could not be defeated in two-three days. As an example, he pointed to the long-lasting Algerian liberation movements. Kádár did say that those who in 1956 had attacked the "legitimate system" in Hungary had been punished, but he emphasized that criminal proceedings against the conspirators had already been completed. Kádár was hoping for some positive results from his American trip, but there were no immediate favorable responses either from the UN or from the U.S.

In 1961, Kádár attended the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That congress was a high mark of Khrushchev's power, but it was marred by the "Albanian question." Albania had been too slow to de-Stalinize. At the congress Chou En-lai was not ready to condemn the Albanians. On the other hand, Kádár rushed to second Khrushchev's denunciation of the Albanians and launched an attack on those who would not renounce the cult of personality. The Twenty-second Congress provided Kádár with the opportunity to move against the remnants of Stalinism in Hungary.

In November 1962 Kádár triumphantly presided at the Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Foreign policy issues received only routine mention: adherence to Soviet policies was stressed, and Hungary's ongoing difficulties with the UN and the U.S. were brought up. Kádár pointed out that life in Hungary was getting "easier and it was better," and even travel restrictions to the West had been relaxed. In 1962 Kádár instructed János Radványi, the new Hungarian charge a'Affaires in Washington, to begin reconciliation negotiations with the United States. Kádár was very concerned about showing any sign of weakness in his dealings with the West. He stubbornly resisted any Western pressure. But before reducing the pressure on Hungary, the United States wanted to see additional improvements in Hungary, specifically the Americans wanted amnesty for political prisoners.

At the Eighth Congress Kádár reported that ninety-five percent of the political
prisoners had already been released. The United States responded accordingly. On December 20, 1962, it submitted a resolution for the removal of the six-year-old "Hungarian question" from the agenda of the UN. In July 1963 U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, paid a brief visit to Hungary. That visit signaled the concluding chapter of the "Hungarian question." U Thant gave a favorable report on Hungary to the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations, which in turn seated the representatives of the Kádár regime, thus accepting the country as a legitimate member of the international community. Consequently, relations between Hungary and the United States were also improving, but a real diplomatic breakthrough could not occur until the Mindszenty issue was resolved.

In 1963, while Kádár was vacationing in the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet conflict erupted. The Chinese criticized Khrushchev's policies of peaceful coexistence, rapid de-Stalinization, and also the handling of the Cuban missile crisis. Kádár seized the opportunity to be one of the first satellite leaders to express his "100 percent solidarity with Khrushchev's policies, and condemn the Chinese comrades for breaking the unity of the Socialist peace camp". As a possible reward for his loyalty, Khrushchev convinced Tito to invite Kádár in Belgrade. Since the 1958 execution of Imre Nagy, Tito had kept his distance from the Kádár regime. As a result, the visit to Yugoslavia constituted a breakthrough for Kádár.

On April 17, 1964 Kádár once again traveled to Moscow to celebrate Khrushchev's seventieth birthday.

By 1964 it became evident that Hungarian economic developments depended on technological modernization. Signing scientific and technical agreements with the Soviet Union and with fellow Socialist states was not sufficient. Purchasing more advanced Western industrial equipment had to be considered. On the other hand Hungary was short on hard currency, and its domestic products were not competitive in Western markets. Initially, Austria and Yugoslavia were possible venues for reaching the capitalist markets. In summer 1964 an Austrian trade delegation came to Hungary, and it was soon followed by a delegation led by Tito. Tito was a sufficiently pragmatic politician to sacrifice principles for possible trade advantages.

In October 1964, while the world was distracted by the Eighteenth Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo, the Soviet leadership announced the replacement of the previously much-honored Khrushchev with Leonid Brezhnev. Kádár received the news in Poland and was slow to respond. But he valued his Communist Party discipline above personal relations. Despite his close friendship with Khrushchev, he accepted the Kremhn's decision without any outright objection. He did not waver in his loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Already in the mid-1960s Kádár was intent to introduce major economic reforms in order to assure the country's continuous economic development. The proposed reforms significantly diverged from Soviet practices. The so-called New
Economic Mechanism was to allow the formation of a controlled market based economy. At that point the Soviet Union was Hungary's number one trading partner: 35.6 percent of Hungary's foreign trade was with the Soviet Union; and an additional 29.4 percent with Comecon countries. At the same time Hungarian exports already reached 120 countries, and imports came from sixty-eight others; in fact, regular trade existed with 100 countries.\(^{21}\)

In 1967, while the Hungarian leadership was feverishly working on the introduction of the economic reforms, fighting broke out in the Middle East. Kádár was summoned to Moscow to decide on a common response to the "Israeli aggression." In line with the Kremlin, Kádár and fellow Communist leaders, with the exception of Romania, condemned Israel and severed diplomatic relations with it.\(^{22}\) The conflict in the Middle East did not interfere with the planned introduction of the Hungarian reforms.

On January 1, 1968 the New Economic Mechanism was officially inaugurated. The Kremlin was not enthusiastic about the non-Marxist experimentation, but Brezhnev did not oppose it.

The fact that the NEM received a fair start, to a great extent can be attributed to the political developments in Czechoslovakia. The country's press began to criticize the entrenched Communist leadership and the system. Prague was moving toward its own version of glasnost. Alexander Dubček moved up to head the Czechoslovak Communist party, and during his leadership Czechoslovakia rapidly gravitated toward significant political reforms. At the height of the crisis, Dubček came to Hungary to renew the two countries' Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Dubček's meeting with Kádár was most cordial, although in light of the recent events, Kádár warned Dubček about the imperialists who would do anything

... to lure one or another Socialist country with their enchanting siren song away from the Socialist camp... They entice people with Western loans and talk about the superiority of Western freedom and democracy, but they remain silent about their sick society.\(^{23}\)

To prove his point Kádár listed the ongoing Vietnam war, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert Kennedy. In conclusion, Kádár stressed that Hungary would remain true to the just signed Treaty of Friendship.

Less than a month after Dubček's visit Kádár was again summoned to Moscow to take a stand against the "imperialist-inspired" counterrevolutionary developments in Czechoslovakia. Kádár asserted that there was "no anti-Soviet Communism and neither was there Socialism without Communists."\(^{24}\) The Kremlin's main concern was that Czechoslovakia might secede from the Soviet-controlled bloc. The concern in Hungary was that the Czechoslovaks' radical political reforms could endanger Hungary's economic reforms. On July 14 the Warsaw Pact lead-
ers met and sent a warning letter to their Czechoslovak comrades in which they expressed their concern about the possible collapse of the socialist system in that country. Romania did not attend the meeting and did not sign the letter. The Czechoslovak leaders did not heed the warning and pushed for additional reforms.

On August 20, 1968 the following bland announcement was made by the Kremlin: "Joint fraternal forces had taken action in defense of law and order in Czechoslovakia." News of the invasion was toned down and instead of direct reporting the Hungarian media quoted articles from Pravda. Despite the recently concluded Treaty of Friendship, Kádár joined the Soviet-led invasion of its neighbor. Once again proving his loyalty to the Kremlin, Kádár was protecting his own maneuverability at home.

Once again Kádár’s loyalty paid off, Hungary received favorable economic considerations from the Soviet Union. From 1971-1975 the USSR remained Hungary's chief supplier of fossil fuels and raw materials. With the availability of an ample supply of cheap Soviet oil, Hungary was rapidly converting to the use of oil. As a result of the NEM, the country’s foreign trade with the socialist countries was gradually decreasing. In the early 1970s the trade balance with the West showed a slight surplus. In 1973 Hungary heartily approved the Arab oil embargo as a weapon against the imperialists. Trouble started when Hungary realized that 10-12 percent of its oil requirements had to be purchased abroad. The Soviet Union was unwilling to increase its oil deliveries because it was more profitable to sell to Western European countries.

In 1975 Kádár traveled to Helsinki to attend the Third Session of the Conference for European Security and Cooperation. In addition to Brezhnev and U.S. President Ford, the conference was attended by practically all European heads of state. The Helsinki Agreement, which legitimized post-World War II borders and guaranteed the observance of "human rights," was signed by 33 countries.26

Hit hard by the ever-increasing oil prices, the Hungarian trade balance suffered serious setbacks. Hungary criticized the European Economic Community and the United States for their protectionist trade barriers, but at the same time, Hungarians applied for substantial Western loans. The Kádár regime's explanation was that the country had an excellent credit rating and a sound economy, and loans were obtained on "sound fiscal principles." Despite the macro-economic difficulties, Hungarians were living better than most of their socialist neighbors and were free to travel to the West.

On December 6, 1976 Kádár himself traveled to Vienna. The purpose of the trip was to lower trade barriers. Answering reporters' questions, Kádár responded that he was willing to travel anywhere in the interest of his country. In 1977 he traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, and then to Italy, where he even had an audience with Pope Paul IV. Relations with the United States rapidly improved
after the 1971 departure of Cardinal Mindszenty from the American Embassy. In January 1978 the Carter administration decided to return the historic crown of St. Stephen and other coronation regalia to Hungary. The gesture symbolized an approval of Kádár’s internal policies, and was to some extent the "coronation" of János Kádár.27

The United States also granted Hungary "most favored nation" status. Despite the improved foreign relations the domestic economic conditions had worsened. By 1980 Hungary owed $7 billion to Western banks. Nevertheless, the World Bank reacted positively to Hungary's additional loan requests. In fact, in May 1982 Hungary was admitted in the International Monetary Fund and in July, into the World Bank. Membership to the international financial organizations helped Hungary to consolidate and refinance its pressing short-term loans.28

In 1983 Vice-President George Bush visited Hungary and speaking for the Reagan administration he said: "We in the United States are heartened by Hungary’s efforts to expand contacts, to foster tolerance, and meet commitments that bind our countries under the Helsinki Final Act." At the formal dinner Bush hailed the U.S.-Hungarian relations "as a model for the rest of the world."29

Two years later U.S. Secretary of State George P. Schultz stopped in Hungary and was impressed by János Kádár. He noted: "He [Kádár] was a person whose views on how change comes about were worth listening to." Then Schultz added: "Clearly he is a member of the Warsaw pact and makes that very clear, and no doubt what he is telling me is what the Soviets would like him to tell. But he is a person with a lot of experience and depth as an individual and has been on the scene for a long time."30

The accolades continued. In July 1986 the Human Rights Committee in Geneva praised the Hungarian government’s detailed report on "Civil and Political Rights: 1980-1985." Similarly, Amnesty International found only minor human rights violations.31 Kádár, despite apparently insurmountable odds at the onset of his coining to power, emerged as an effective leader, who succeeded in charting a political and economic course that improved the living standards of the Hungarian people and received not only the Kremlin's but also the Western democracies' approval. Kádár did not move Hungary out of Soviet orbit - he never intended to do so - but he succeeded in maneuvering his country into an orbit that to some extent overlapped the orbit of Western democracies.

Notes

4. Ibid., 114-115.
6. Feikay, Hungary and the USSR, 121-123.
8. Ibid., 179.
10. Ibid., 42.
14. Feikay, Hungary and the USSR, 143-144.
15. Ibid., 144-147.
17. Feikay, Hungary and the USSR, 158.
27. Ibid., 250-253.
28. Ibid., 255.
Hungary’s intention with both NATO and the European Union was to “anchor” the country institutionally as soon as possible to the West. This institutional anchoring was important because we badly wanted the international investment community to understand that Hungary is part of the western structures, so businessmen have nothing to fear when they come to Hungary to invest or to be part of privatization.

Keywords: foreign policy, political, economic and military alliances, European Community, NATO

Hungarian foreign policy as it is conducted today has its roots in the past. Its style also has its roots in the past. It is at times radical and at other times reluctant. During the nineteenth century as well as during the twentieth century Hungary was a part of alliances with different powers. And once it regained its independence, Hungary immediately joined new alliances again. These developments certainly have had their effects on the way the country conducts its international relations today.

I would argue that the romantic phase of the post-Soviet attitude in foreign policy is over. In the beginning of the 1990s we did have this romantic and euphoric attitude toward Germany, the European Union and the United States. I had the feeling at the beginning of the 1990s, right after the changes, that this naivete was somehow rooted in the idea of gratitude of the West. Which is of course totally ridiculous. There is no gratitude in history! I remember going to Copenhagen in November 1989 where I met Mary Dau Hansen, one of the well-known conservative researchers in Denmark. She had studied Central Europe and the Soviet Union. I was euphoric and told her I believed in immediate EU membership and that NATO would embrace us soon as well. And she responded with a smile: wait a minute, you have to stop being euphoric; the memory of democracies is short. As the matter of fact today I believe that she was right: we had to come to terms by the mid 1990s that this is not about being grateful, this is not about gratitude; this is about hard-core interest driven power politics. There is
nothing wrong with that, it is just reality. And if it is reality, then we can cope with it and Hungary, and we will be fine.

In the last 12 years we have all be trying to catch up with lost time. Our powerful presentation of the cause of integration was related to the fact that we wanted to catch up very fast. We Hungarians wanted to push our integration process on the way to cushion the recovery of our economy. Basically that is exactly what has happened. Our intention with both NATO and the European Union was exactly this: to "anchor" Hungary institutionally as soon as possible to the West. This institutional anchoring was important because we badly wanted the international investment community to understand that Hungary is part of the western structures, so businessmen have nothing to fear when they come to Hungary to invest or to be part of privatization. There was an underlying security concern also: the general instability of the region and the still undecided direction of development of the then Soviet Union.

I would therefore argue that the margin of deviation from the integrationist line has been minimal, as each of the consecutive democratically elected governments have embraced NATO and EU membership as two of the pillars of foreign policy. The third pillar concerned Hungary's relations with our immediate neighbors and the attendant Hungarian minority issues. One problem, however, has emerged: the elite is torn between understanding and accepting the limits of flexibility, the need for a consensus dictated by reality, and between belonging to one political grouping, one political family. So while I believe that a consensus exists on the basics of Hungarian foreign policy, and there is very little room to deviate from it by the individual governments, at the same time in the practical interpretation of this foreign policy there can be huge differences, especially relating to style. This has been particularly apparent over the last thirteen years in matters related to military action and minority issues. Therefore, I think one of the issues we desperately have to sort out quickly is how to make sure that these differences do not rock the foundations of our foreign policy.

I want to reiterate that I do not think there is an alternative to the above mentioned three-pillar foreign policy. But I want to stress again that there can be such serious differences in emphasis that these may at times be transformed into differences of substance. We have to come to terms with the fact that the challenges for Hungary are exactly the same as those for the other democratic members of the European Union and for part of the Transatlantic family. The real challenge is globalization, its impact on security, economy, health, science, culture and lifestyle. Globalization is not a question of choice, globalization is with us, and Hungary has become a part of this process. It does not help to try to reject it, as if Hungary could somehow escape its consequences. Unfortunately I have sometimes heard statements from politicians and the members of think tanks in Hungary that indicate an unwillingness to come to terms with globalization. When
this happens, I have a feeling of déjà vue. Many of you remember back in the Kádár era there was this idea in 1970s and 1980s that the effects of the oil crisis exists in the West only and will not affect Hungary because we will stop this crisis from entering our country at the border. That is a pretty voluntaristic idea. Sometimes I have this strange feeling that some of the politicians and maybe some of my colleagues believe that Hungary can be isolated from the rest of the World. Let us pretend we are not part of it; and maybe the world will not notice Hungary, and Hungary will then not be affected by the rest of the world. Such an attitude lacks seriousness. Hungary is very much a part of the world, and very importantly part of the Western world; and it would be ridiculous not to be looking outward and instead trying to isolate ourselves rather than proactively engaging and helping to determine in which direction the world is moving. Therefore, the threats and challenges for all of us who believe in the democratic world is exactly the same. Today terrorism constitutes a most grievous threat to security. Let me be very clear: the heightened tensions related to terrorism will not go away in the near future. The bad news is that unfortunately these threats and challenges are here to stay. The issue is how our society will react: are we going to fall apart or are we going to find the way to interact and cooperate together to make sure that these threats are fought and that terrorists fail? The challenges of the world's economy, health, science and culture, are all also challenges that we have to face together, and there is no alternative for Hungary except to join with its friends and allies on both sides of the Atlantic and to be part of the search for a solution.

In the mid 1980s I started to write my doctoral dissertation. It was supposed to be about Danish foreign and security policy. Obviously the dissertation though was not about Denmark; it was about Hungary. You all know that during the 1970s and 1980s, when we wanted to write something controversial about Hungary, we disguised our intention by seemingly writing about something else. As the matter of fact my study was actually about Hungarian security policy and the possibilities of a small nation within the Warsaw pact to liberate itself from the Soviet imperialism. Yet, formally it was about Danish foreign security policy. Furthermore, what I tried to do then was not a unique phenomenon because other people did the same. The idea was to have a look at a small NATO nation that had been able to make minor amendments to NATO decisions on medium range missiles and the like. Denmark was deviating from the common policy of NATO, and I wanted to see if there were any lessons to be learned for a small country such as Hungary. Could Hungary do the same within the framework of the Warsaw pact and perhaps end up with Finlandization, which would have been fairly radical. There was at that time no sign yet of the systemic change, the breakup of the "socialist camp," which would soon come. Not in our wildest dreams did we see Hungary becoming a part of NATO, or the European Union.
My conclusion was unfortunately that nothing could be learnt from the Danish example, because Denmark was a good NATO ally, despite its differences; and today it is still a good NATO ally. The only lesson I learned did not concern ideas of leaving the Warsaw pact, but involved the price to pay for obstructing NATO decisions. Another lesson learned concerned the limitations to which the foreign policy of a small nation was subject. The Danish problem of a lack of foreign policy consensus was rooted in the country’s past. Consequently, I do believe that some of the problems that we are facing today in building consensus is rooted in the past as well.

The attitudes favoring neutrality by many Hungarians today remain difficult for me to comprehend because I believe that neutrality was never a real option for Hungary in the past decade. But let me now turn to the three pillars that I mentioned earlier.

First, I would like to talk about the European Union pillar. We are finally going to become members of the EU. We have concluded our negotiations and the referendum is just around the corner. There is overwhelming support in the country for our membership. By the way, I believe the European Union made a huge mistake by not enlarging in the early 1990s. The enlargement would have driven the Transatlantic agenda and would have also driven the strategic security agenda. But the EU failed to do so and displayed petty attitude. I do think that a delayed and late enlargement is taking place. Thus, I do believe Europe let us down because it made false promises to us in 1990. It’s a fact. Nevertheless, that is in the past and by now a subject for research; and there are huge amounts of documents, which I trust will support what I have just said. But the bottom line remains that Hungary is going to become a member of the European Union at a moment where the enlargement of the EU is so crucial once again both to us and to the European Union. We know that we will be jumping on a moving train. The EU is in constant change. We are not joining the European Union of the early 1990s. We are joining a European Union that is trying to cope with the scope of enlargement. It is also making efforts to create a security and a defense dimension. It has to adapt to be able to face the new challenges. The last events of the last couple of weeks have revealed some of the problems. The discussion of the Austro Hungarian monarchy provided by András Gerő has been helpful. Why did the Austro Hungarian monarchy prove to be so strong and so viable? Because there was a common economic policy, common foreign policy, and there was a common defense policy. Two of these are lacking for the European Union, and as long as the European Union is not able to embrace a common credible security policy and a common foreign policy, it is not going to be able to act as a super power. We will work in that direction within NATO and in furthering US Hungarian relations. We are not choosing between the Transatlantic relationship and Europe. I want to be very very clear: more of Europe for us does not mean less of America. It will mean
more possibilities with the United States as well. We are not abandoning America in terms of business relations. Obviously strategically and for our security the relationship to the United States is crucial for us and will remain so. European defense is not going to replace the United States as our formal ally in our security policy.

The second pillar is NATO. NATO has to change; NATO has to adapt. We Hungarians think that it is right to say that the institution of choice in the transatlantic relationship will be NATO, and there is nothing wrong with the American leadership in NATO. However it will have to change too, if it wants to be able to respond to the threats of the twenty-first century. It will have to be able to act fast and in a credible way, if and when necessary. It is good that NATO is enlarging to take in our neighbors from the East, thus extending the zone of security and stability. Hungary will want to contribute, consequently we are pursuing military reforms. And we would like to be sure to use our resources in a useful way, so that our capabilities reflect a real need. The relationship between Europe and America is of course a key question. There is no alternative to America and Europe working together but sometimes cooperation appears to be increasingly difficult. I think we have to find new ways to make sure that this relationship will remain.

The third pillar concerns our relationship to our neighbors. Probably this is the sphere where the biggest differences can be detected between the consecutive governments of the last twelve years. None of the governments can abandon or neglect the issue of our relationship to our neighbors and the quest to improve the situation of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. But in terms of methods, there have been serious differences. I do not have the time here to delve into the details, but I think the bottom line is that this third pillar is going to remain with us. On the other hand as we move into the European Union and as NATO embraces our neighbors, we Hungarians will be able to see an improvement in the situation of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. Within the broader region we will strive to build better relations with Russia, which now is an important partner of both NATO and the EU.

Last, but not least, let me say a few words about Iraq. The Hungarian position on Iraq has been very clear during the last six months, since President Bush’s speech at the United Nations. The Hungarian position has been that we would like to see the conflict resolved by peaceful means through the United Nations. We have also determined that in the end we will have to make clear to Saddam Hussein that the international community is ready and willing to move militarily, if peaceful means do not work. Why did we say this? We said this because we thought that the unity of the international community and providing a credible threat against Saddam Hussein would have provided the best chance for a peaceful solution. Unfortunately this did not happen. I must say the failure of the international community in standing together against Saddam Hussein is probably the real reason
why we had to go to war. Some of you might recall that toward the end of January
the British, the Spanish the Italian, the Danish, the Portuguese, the Polish, the
Czech, and the Hungarian leaders signed a letter supporting the United States. We
signed the "letter of the eight," which was intended to build a greater unity within
Europe, as well as to strengthen the unity between the United States and Europe.
The message, which we wanted to send, was that we are not going to allow Saddam
Hussein to drive a wedge between us. It is most unfortunate that some countries in
Europe, which are close friends and allies and are absolutely crucial in our de vel­
opment, have chosen to go in a different direction. Obviously we did not agree
with the French and the German position, and we did not agree with the way the
communications between the US and some of the European allies where con­
ducted. Hungary early on made a commitment and a contribution. Together with
the United States we have been training Free Iraqi Forces in Hungary since Janu­
ary. This was a clear statement of support. We also granted over flight rights to the
United States during the war. We have also supported the decision by NATO to
help Turkey. Hungary is thus a part of the coalition of those who are willing to
support the efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein.

The present day events will have a huge impact on the whole structure and
system of security that was established after 1945, which will probably have to be
reviewed and revised. The way the UN makes decision in order to secure its role
must be placed under scrutiny. This situation is in a way unfamiliar because we
were used to the stability of the international system. The system that we created
more than fifty years ago might not serve us completely, when we have new threats
and new challenges. I would like to conclude by saying that yes there are a number
of dilemmas. Hungary has chosen to have a very pragmatic foreign policy; and
rather than finding a theory and putting it into practice, we are doing it the other
way around. We are implementing it in practice, and then later in a few years you
historians will build a theory around it.
This article examines the novels of mid-nineteenth-century Hungarian author Zsigmond Kemény. Falling roughly at the beginning of what is often referred to in critical literature as the century of psychological realism (1850-1950), Kemény's novels contain numerous examples of the various narrative techniques developed by authors throughout Europe as they called on language to serve both mimesis of action and mimesis of thought. His works can be cited as examples of a European wide shift in literature away from the narration of events towards the narration of thoughts and feelings. This corresponded to the emergence of the conception of the individual that accompanied the Romantic rejection of the Enlightenment faith in the universality of humankind. As texts drawn from one of the less familiar literary traditions of Europe, Kemény's novels constitute illustrations of the international nature of this trend. Moreover, they represent works that develop the distinctive potential of the novel as a genre the audience of which (the reader) has access not only to the actions and deeds, but also the thoughts and impressions of a subjective consciousness.

Keywords: Zsigmond Kemény, psychological novel, free indirect discourse, interior monologue, stream of consciousness

A. Introduction

"Between 1913 and 1915 was born the modern psychological novel." This statement, made by Leon Edel in his book *The Psychological Novel*, constitutes, even according to Edel himself, something of an exaggeration. While the concept of the psychological novel may have emerged in the decades following the publication of the three works referred to by Edel as marking the inception of this genre (Proust's *Recherche du temps perdu*, Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and Dorothy Richardson's *Pilgrimage*), to claim, as Edel does, that it was these writers who, "for the first time... were seeking to find words that would convey elusive and evanescent thought" is to ignore numerous critical studies written well before the publication of Edel's book. Despite his dramatic assertion, Edel does not make this mistake. He takes care to note, for example, the observa-
tions of such critics as Wyndham Lewis, who found a predecessor to the stream of consciousness technique in Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*, and Harry Levin, who compares passages from the diary of Fanny Burney to interior monologues in *Ulysses*. Edel himself revises his view. "It was in reality no coincidence that Marcel Proust, James, and Dorothy Richardson found themselves writing psychological novels at the century's turn," he explains. "They were children of the romantic century: rationalism and reason had long before yielded to introspection and feeling."  

Edel's contention concerning the importance of the works of these three authors in the creation of the psychological novel may seem valid, however, if one examines not the history of this genre, but rather the history of the criticism that sought to define it. It was in the decades following the publication of these works that historians of literature, in their search for a sort of genesis of this seemingly new fascination with psychology, developed new interpretations of novels by authors like Flaubert, Austin, or Henry James. Works such as *Madame Bovary*, which had previously been characterized as archetypal examples of Realism, came to be regarded as early manifestations of a shift of interest away from the narration of events towards the narration of thoughts and impressions. A flurry of articles published mostly in the 1950s and 1960s developed new critical concepts to facilitate these readings by supposedly enabling readers to discern passages in third person fiction that expressed the viewpoint of a particular character. This was accompanied by attempts to develop analytical procedures that would allow a reader to detect moments in a text in which the voice of the narrator yielded to the voice of a character.  

Edel's assertion concerning the birth of a unique genre gave way to a new understanding of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth as a period of transition in the history of the novel from social to psychological realism, a transition of which the works of Joyce, Proust, and Dorothy Richardson represented not the inception, but the culmination.  

A persuasive argument in favor of this interpretation came in 1978 with the publication of Dorrit Cohn's book length study *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction*. Adopting a typological approach to the study of the narration of consciousness, Cohn outlines three distinct techniques that allow for varying degrees of mediation by the narrator in the narration of the thoughts of a character. Drawing examples from a range of novels written in the period beginning in the late eighteenth century and ending roughly in the mid twentieth, Cohn offers paradigmatic illustrations of these techniques. She contends, and her examples suggest, that over the course of this period novels in which an authorial narrator recounts the thoughts and impressions of characters gave way to novels in which characters themselves give voice to their thoughts. This shift in narrative techniques, she argues, corresponds to a growing interest in personal and subjective experience.
A reader searching for examples from one of the less familiar literary traditions of Europe with which to support this interpretation would find a useful resource in the novels of Zsigmond Kemény. These novels, characterized by numerous critics as the first psychological novels in Hungarian, contain examples of each of the three techniques identified by Colin. Falling at the beginning of the period Cohn describes as the "century of psychological realism, - roughly 1850 to 1950," they seem to corroborate her thesis concerning the evolution of the psychological novel. They can be said to occupy an early moment in the development of new approaches to the narration of consciousness, after the novel had begun to include the voices of characters giving expression to their thoughts, yet before narrators deferred to these voices entirely.

Kemény's novels serve as more, however, than examples that might be cited to affirm Colin's interpretation of the history of the novel. As works in which a variety of approaches to the narration of consciousness are adopted, they represent illustrations of the distinctive potential of the novel as a genre. Like the drama the novel can create a fictional world in which fictional characters act. Unlike the drama, however, the novel is not restricted to the presentation of surface alone (action, spoken word, or event). It can explore from a variety of perspectives the consciousnesses of its characters, narrating both those levels of thought of which a character may be aware and those of which he/she is unaware. In the words of Käte Hamburger, the novel "is the sole epistemological instance where the I-orinigarity (or subjectivity) of a third-person qua third-person can be portrayed." Kemény's novels epitomize this aspect of the genre.

**B. Context**

The student of Hungarian literature cannot help but notice, when he/she confronts the secondary literature on Zsigmond Kemény, the variety of labels that have been ascribed to his novels. They have been referred to alternately as 'historical novels,' 'social novels,' 'psychological novels,' 'saloon novels,' and 'novels of purpose.' Often critics draw comparisons between Kemény's novels and works by authors such as Heinrich von Kleist, Walter Scott, Victor Hugo, Balzac, Dostoevsky, and others, but these function merely as substitutes for the generic labels, with 'Walter Scott' acting as a stand in for 'historical novel' or 'Balzac' for 'social novel.' The diversity of these comparisons seems puzzling in light of the fact that Kemény, unlike his two prolific contemporaries, Miklós Jósika and Mór Jókai, wrote very few novels, four that would fall under the category of historical novel (Pál Gyulai - 1847, Widow and Daughter - 1855-57, The Fanatics - 1858-59, Forbidding Times - 1862), two that could be considered social novels (Husbandand Wife - 1852, Phantom Visions on the Soul's Horizon -1853),
and a few shorter novellas (including *Maelstroms of the Heart* 1851, *Love and Vanity* 1853, *Alhikmet, and the Aged Dwarf* 1853). The use of such a variety of labels to refer to this small handful of narratives can give one the impression, looking into the critical literature on Kemény, of reading the proverbial description of an elephant written by a group of blind men.

Of these labels, however, there is one that recurs with notable consistency. Without exception every critic to have written on Kemény before the year 2000 has at some point referred to the emphasis given in his novels to the narration of the thoughts and emotions of characters. In fact, even in his own lifetime Kemény had the reputation of a writer whose works showed an unprecedented (in Hungarian literature) interest in psychology. In an article written in 1854 fellow novelist and poet Pál Gyulai (not to be confused with the title character of Kemény's novel *Pál Gyulai*) comments that Kemény's "faithful depiction of passions (...) places emphasis on psychological developments." Ágost Greguss, author of the first systematic treatment in Hungarian of Schlegel's concept of romantic irony (*A szépészet alapvonalai* [An Outline of Aesthetics], 1849), claims in an article from 1856 that, "each of Kemény's works is a psychological study in the strictest sense of the term." After Kemény's death these interpretations of his oeuvre were canonized in histories of Hungarian literature. Ferencz Szinyei, author of a monumental history of prose fiction in Hungarian, calls Kemény "the creator (...) in our literature of the modern psychological novella and novel." Dániel Veress, writing almost a century later, concurs, citing Kemény's *Love and Vanity* as "the first psychological novel, in the whole sense of the term, in Hungarian literature." Mihály Szegedy Maszák, a contemporary critic thoroughly familiar with international trends in European literary history, writes that, "Kemény initiated a development in Realism which lead to the formation of the psychological novel." He goes on to add that with the exception of Stendhal no European author before Flaubert, James, and Dostoevsky was as preoccupied with psychology as Kemény. Numerous similar citations could be added. One final example is sufficient to demonstrate that Kemény's reputation as the author of the first profound psychological novels in Hungarian has endured. Dezső Kozma, writing in the last year of the twentieth century, asserts, "among our writers few knew as much about the most subtle tremors of man's inner life as he."

This broad consensus offers a critical angle from which one can impose some unity on the oeuvre of an author whose works otherwise display striking dissimilarities. Novels set in sixteenth and seventeenth century Transylvania can be set alongside novels set in mid twentieth century Hungary as examples of narratives that deploy numerous strategies in order to give expression to the thoughts of characters. Drawing comparisons with other works of European literature, one can see Kemény's novels as part of a process, beginning with Richardson's *Pamela* or Goethe's *Werther* and culminating in the stream of consciousness experiments
of Dujardin or Joyce, in which narrative fiction came to focus less on the narration of events and more on the narration of thoughts and emotions. His novels can be analyzed as the manifestation in a less widely known literary tradition of a broadly European shift in conceptions of the proper subject matter of narrative fiction.

Much of the critical literature on Kemény operates on the premise that interpretations of his novels must be based on observations concerning his life. Nowhere is this better epitomized than in the contention of Ferencz Szemlér that, it is impossible to separate the literary work and the man from one another. From the creator emerges the work, but in the work the creator himself can be discerned in his entirety. The historian of literature strives to find explanations for the work on the basis of biography.]

The pervasiveness of this assumption is made clear by the fact that very few critics writing on Kemény fail to include biographical sketches in their books and articles, though Ferencz Papp’s two volume biography of Kemény, based partly on documents that have, in the turbulent decades following its publication in 1922, been lost or destroyed, remains the most thorough account of the author’s life. However, since there is no comparable material available on Kemény in English, it is necessary, as a preface to a discussion of the philosophical context of his novels, to give a brief summary of his life.

Zsigmond Kemény was born in 1814 in the small town of Alvinc, Transylvania (today Vintu de Jos in Romania), at the time a territory of the Habsburg Empire. By the time of his twentieth birthday he had already begun to take an active part in the political life of Transylvania, participating in the local assembly as an advocate of the liberal opposition. In 1835, following the forceful dissolution of the assembly, Kemény composed a brief study entitled "Historical Fragment" (Históriai töredék) of a period in Hungary’s history beginning with the reign of King Mátyás in 1458 and concluding with the assassination of the Cardinal Martinuzzi of Transylvania in 1551. This period saw what many consider the worst disaster of Hungarian history, the defeat of the Hungarian army at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1526. This defeat led to the occupation of most of Hungary by Ottoman forces for the following 150 years. The mountainous region of Transylvania, which had been the eastern part of the Hungarian kingdom, became a princedom that maintained its precarious independence by paying tributes to the Sultan. "Historical Fragment" is important as the first of many essays Kemény wrote on Hungary’s history. It is an early indication of the interest he took in the turbulent past of his native land, an interest that was later reflected in his decision to write several novels set in the conspiracy ridden courts of sixteenth and seventeenth century Transylvania.
Towards the end of the 1830s Kemény spent two years in Vienna studying medicine. Here he was exposed to the writings of German authors such as Goethe, Schiller, and Friedrich Schlegel. As the liberal reform movement in Hungary gained strength Kemény returned to Transylvania to take an active role in politics as a member of the liberal opposition. The 1840s were a time of tumultuous transitions in Hungary, as charismatic statesmen like Lajos Kossuth and fervently populist poets such as Sándor Petófi fueled the growing desire among the Hungarian population of the Habsburg Empire for independence. Kemény took a skeptical attitude towards this movement. As a native of Transylvania, one of the more ethnically diverse regions of Hungary, he recognized that Hungary did not form a linguistically homogenous whole. Kemény feared that the diversity of its population would imperil the country if it were to attempt secession. When revolution did break out in 1848 Kemény welcomed the measures adopted by the new government, including the abolition of serfdom and emancipation of the Jewish population of Hungary, while at the same time remaining apprehensive about the outcome of the struggle for independence. His fears were realized when, in 1849, with the help of the Russian army, Austria defeated Hungary’s forces and a new era of authoritarian repression began.

In the years following the defeat of the revolution Kemény wrote two essays ("After the Revolution" Forradalom után and "One More Word After the Revolution" Még egy szó a forradalom után) condemning the leaders (most particularly Kossuth) who had led Hungary into what Kemény had correctly predicted would be a hopeless, bloody struggle. Fearing that the upheavals of the era would sever his generation from its traditions. Kemény contributed to the preservation of Hungarian national identity by supporting cultural organizations such as the Újabbkori Ismeretek Tára. In 1853 he himself published the text of the Grievous Hungarian Chronicle (Siralmas magyar krónika), a manuscript of seventeenth century Transylvanian scribe János Szalárdi, from which Kemény took the story of his novel Widow and Daughter (Özvegy és leánya). In 1855 he became the chief editor of Hungary’s most important political periodical, the Pest Diary (Pesti Napló), for which he authored several articles criticizing Vienna for its expansionist foreign policy. By 1860 he had begun to play an active role as a spokesman, through his articles in the Pest Diary, for the political party led by Ferenc Deák, who sought to win more autonomy for Hungary within the Habsburg Empire through compromise. These efforts came to fruition in 1866 67, when the imperial government in Vienna, threatened by the ever stronger German state under Bismarck, negotiated the so called Compromise of 1867, recognizing Hungary as a kingdom within the Empire, autonomous in all aspects of public life except for foreign policy, military, and banking. By this time, however, Kemény's health had declined. He no longer ran as a representative of the political party in
MIMESIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE FICTION OF ZSIGMOND KEMÉNY

which he had played a formative role. By 1870 he had ceased to write for the Pest Diary. In 1873 he returned to Transylvania, where he died in 1875.

Kemény's literary career spanned what could be characterized as the two most tumultuous decades of Hungary's history in the nineteenth century. Casting off its feudal institutions, Hungary began, through the liberal reforms initiated in the 1840s and realized, partly, in the Compromise of 1867, its development into a modern democratic state. In the rapidity of these changes Kemény perceived a danger. He feared that as a result of the many upheavals of its history, from the Ottoman occupation to the liberation of the country in the late seventeenth century by the Habsburg armies to the failed struggle for independence in the mid nineteenth, Hungary would lose touch with the culture of its past. In the two novels that have usually been characterized as social novels (Husband and Wife and Phantoms Visions on the Soul's Horizon) Kemény offered a critique of the era's faith in progress by depicting what he perceived as the inevitable failure of rapid change imposed on a culture from without. In his four historical novels, based in part on Transylvanian manuscripts, Kemény hoped to reestablish some continuity between the literary culture of his generation and the literature of Hungary's past.

Yet to characterize these works as historical or social novels is perhaps to overlook their importance as examinations of the complexity of the human psyche. In a letter to Jósika, Kemény himself described his novel Pál Gyidai as "less the sketch of an era as the sketch of a psyche." The story of Gyulai's fate, Kemény commented, was uninteresting. The faithful historian "could hardly create something interesting [out of it]." In his essay "Life and Literature" Kemény contends that the author of fiction must not content himself with faithful depictions of historical characters. "We all know the motives of our actions rarely come to light," Kemény comments.

Furthermore the stated reasons are more often ostensible, or are cleverly reasoned out of conjectures after the fact.

It is certain that, concerning human virtue and sins, there are a few rubrics, and it is into these categories that public opinion groups our actions about which people speak on the streets, in the salons, and in coteries.

But in nine out of ten cases a secret instinct whispers to us that the world is in error, because our actions, praised or condemned, grew out of different sources. Sometimes for example out of a fact that we were careful not to disclose, an exasperation that is a secret, or a


* Bel le a történészethez hűn, alig lehet valami érdekest gyártani. (Ibid., 444.)
We are faced with the same riddles, Kemény comments, when dealing with the figures of history. Our knowledge of the motives behind their acts rests equally on "ostensibilities." The historian is compelled to admit only those explanations that can be documented or demonstrated. The author of fiction, Kemény comments, cannot content himself with these explanations. An author seeking to recreate the characters of history must recognize that, "as soon as [these characters] act simply according to historical motivations, they will be regarded as lacking motive altogether."

Kemény's comments are echoed in the writings of twentieth century novelist E.M. Forster. In his *Aspects of the Novel* Forster remarks that a novelist writing about Queen Victoria cannot limit his tale to the retelling of actions and events. He must "reveal the hidden life at its source (...) tell us more about Queen Victoria than could be known, and thus (...) produce a character who is not the Queen Victoria of history." What Forster and Kemény touch on in these remarks is the fundamental difference between dramatization and narration to which Thomas Mann referred when he dismissively characterized drama as an art of silhouette:

The novel is more exact, more complete, more knowing, more conscientious, and deeper than the drama in all things that concern cognition of men as body and character, and, in contradiction to the view that the Drama is the truly three dimensional form of literature, I admit that I perceive [drama] more as an art of silhouette and only narrated man as round, whole, true, and three dimensional. One is a viewer at a theater performance; one is much more than this in a narrated world.

If the novel, unlike the drama, is limited to mere words on a page, it is at the same time less constrained by the illusion of mimesis. There is no restriction, for example, on time, and the novel can depict the events of centuries in a matter of
seconds or devote hundreds of pages to the events of an hour. More importantly for this discussion, the novel is not limited to appearances, and can explore in depth the subtle, mysterious, sometimes contradictory relationship between spoken language and unspoken thought.

In his writings on form and function in literature Kemény draws precisely this contrast between the novel and the drama. "If the novelist has the right," he contends, "to offer little story and can make do without (...) the interest aroused by plot complication which the author of drama cannot do then we can at least ask of him that in place of plot we see true life, which can draw us in with its calm progression, in place of deliberate complexity always changing and developing feelings, impulses, passions[..]" This statement represents a striking antithesis to a European doctrine of literary aesthetics inherited from Aristotle's Poetics. For Aristotle "plot is the first principle and, as it were, soul of tragedy." Of the components of a drama (spectacle, character, plot, diction, lyric poetry, and thought), "the most important (...) is the structure of events." This view, though it underwent a number of revisions and substitutions over the centuries, nevertheless continued to exert a powerful force on attitudes towards literature up until the beginning of the nineteenth century. As late as 1858 it surfaced in an essay by Hungarian novelist Miklós Jósika, who maintained that, "the interesting story [is] one of the crucial components of the novel."

Yet Kemény’s comment, however radical a departure from Aristotle's dictum, hardly constituted an idea novel at the time he wrote his essay. It was rather an echo of views that had already found expression in works by authors from all over Europe. Decades before Kemény was born Rousseau had claimed, as the chief virtue of his novel La Nouvelle Héloïse, "the simplicity of the subject and the continuous chain of interest, which (...) is sustained over six volumes, without episodes, without fantastic adventures[...]" It is easy to rouse the reader's attention," Rousseau contended, "by ceaselessly presenting him with extraordinary events (...) But to keep it always focused on the same objects, without the aid of marvelous adventures, that truly is more difficult[...]

Friedrich von Blanckenburg, one of the first to attempt a systematic theory of the novel, expressed similar disdain for narrative that relies on intrigue. Distinguishing between the writer (Dichter) and "the mere story teller" (bloß Erzähler), Blanckenburg insisted that the true writer must acquaint his readers with "the inner existence [das ganze innere Sein] of the character in its entirety."

Wordsworth, in his "Preface to the
Lyrical Ballads," wrote that in his poetry "the feeling (...) gives importance to the action and situation, and not the action and situation to the feeling." In 1833, in an essay entitled "What is Poetry," John Stuart Mill stated his view that it matters little that "the incidents of a dramatic poem (...) be scanty and ineffective," as long as "the delineation of passion and character (...) be of the highest order." Whereas according to Aristotle, "without action there could be no tragedy, but without character there could be," for these authors this contention was clearly not valid.

A reader searching for some explanation for this apparent shift of interest away from plot towards character might be tempted to interpret this change as a corollary to what has been described as a fundamental opposition between Enlightenment and Romantic thought. Critical literature has tended to characterize the Enlightenment as a period dominated by an assumption of the uniformity of human-kind. Romanticism, on the other hand, has been considered a movement that regarded differences between cultures and individuals as significant. These conclusions, presented in elaborate detail by such authors as Arthur Lovejoy (not one to ascribe carelessly to period concepts) and M. H. Abrams, rest on copious excerpts from the writings of authors defined as representative of the two movements.

Rather than reproduce these arguments, it is sufficient to refer to two citations that illustrate this contrast. The first, from David Hume's *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* written in 1748, expresses the belief referred to by Lovejoy as the "Uniformitarianism" of the Enlightenment. The second, from Johann Gottfried Herder's *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele* written in 1778, articulates a contrary view claimed to be typical of Romanticism.

It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the acts of men, in all nations and all ages, and that human nature remains the same in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow from the same causes. (...) Mankind are [sic] so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior.

The deepest ground of our being is individual, in feelings as well as thoughts (...) All the species of animals are perhaps not so distinct from one another as man is from men.

Such a shift in conceptions of humankind provides a context in which the interest in character expressed by Kemény and others seems a natural part of a larger
philosophical trend. Aristotle's definition of drama as mimesis of action, it could be argued, harmonized well with a view of human nature as uniform. If the passions underlying a particular deed are common to all then the writer merely has to depict the deed in order to imply the passion. Kemény himself offered this characterization of the poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In an essay entitled "Classicism and Romanticism" he contended that Renaissance poetry "painted not the man, with his impulses and passions, but rather the impulses and passions themselves, unbound from circumstance and mediating elements." For a movement that rejects the principle of uniformity, if Romanticism can be referred to as such, the writer cannot rely on characterizations that derive exclusively from descriptions of actions and events. Blankenburg touches on this, contending that, "When we, in the real world, cannot understand and observe in each instance the causes that depict an occurrence this way rather than that, this is because the sum of the causes is too large and various, the whole too entangled in itself more so than we would like." Poets and authors of narrative fiction must find other techniques, apart from the description of actions, through which to create unique characters by exploring a range of possible interpretations of a specific deed or occurrence.

This notion of humankind as "individual, in feelings as well as thoughts" can be seen as the impetus behind numerous changes of form in narrative fiction throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth as authors sought new means of expressing the emotions and perceptions of characters. As several works on Romanticism demonstrate, following Young's *Night Thoughts* and Gray's *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*, first published in 1742 and 1751 respectively, the use of the first person in verse accompanied the ascent of the lyric as a form propitious to the exploration of personal experience over the epic as a form more suited to the retelling of events. The latter half of the eighteenth century could be said to have witnessed an analogous development in prose fiction. Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761) and Goethe's *Werther* (1774) exemplify a shift away from a retelling of events, typified by such novels as Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), towards an examination of the thoughts of characters freed from the mediation of a narrator. In Hungarian literature József Kármán's *Fanni's Legacy* (*Fanni hagyományai* 1794), also an epistolary novel, evidenced a similar desire for a narrative form that focused on character over plot. This tendency continued in the nineteenth century in narratives that, though written in the third person, nevertheless devoted as much attention to a character's reflections as they did to plot. Stendhal's *Le Rouge et le noir* (1830) or Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*.\(^{56}\)

---

A renaissance költészete (...) nem az embert feste indulataival és szenvedélyeivel, hanem magokat az idulatokat és szenvedélyeket, feloldva az esetleget l és a közvet t elemeiktől.\(^{[1]}\) ("Classicismus és romantikus." In: Koszorú. 1964, Jan. 10. 25. 26.)
could be mentioned as examples of novels that use such techniques as interior monologue or free indirect speech to narrate the thoughts of a character. Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment* (1866) could be cited as a work that focuses on the ambiguous relationship between act and motive. So-called stream-of-consciousness fiction can be seen as a logical conclusion of a trend towards the removal of the mediating presence of the narrator.

In this light Kemény’s works, published between 1847 and 1862, seem to fall roughly in the middle of a shift that began in the last decades of the eighteenth century and ended, if indeed it ended at all, with the Structuralists’ challenge to the notion of the individual. Robert Humphrey, in his book *Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel*, argues for such a historical turn from novels of action to novels of thought. "There is a difference," he contends,

and it is a tremendous difference, between Zola and Dreiser, say, two novelists who attempted a kind of laboratory method in fiction, and the stream of consciousness writers. It is indicated chiefly in the difference in subject matter - which is, for the earlier novelists, motive and action (external man) and for the latter ones, psychic existence and functioning (internal man). The difference is also revealed in the psychological and philosophical thinking in back of this. Psychologically it is the distinction between behavioristic concepts and psychoanalytical ones; philosophically, it is that between a broad materialism and a generalized existentialism. Combined it is the difference between being concerned about what one does and being concerned about what one is.32

Although the distinction that Humphrey draws between the fiction of Dreiser and Joyce is certainly plausible, his contention could be said to be equally true of Balzac and Flaubert or, for that matter, Jósika and Kemény. The shift he identifies from behavioristic concepts to psychoanalytic ones could be said to have appeared in literature long before William James coined the term stream-of-consciousness in 1890.33 Kemény works could be cited as texts that support Dorrit Cohn’s conclusion that "the 'inward turning' of the stream-of-consciousness novel is not nearly so singular a phenomenon, nor so radical a break with tradition as has been assumed[.]"34

C. Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness: Dorrit Colin

Should she go up to the curtain? After all, she had a right to see the body to which she had given life... and death. She was the mother and the murderer, she had baptized and cursed, nursed and devoured her child... the female Saturnus. Oh Sára! Had the window glazed
This passage, from Kemény's novel *Widow and Daughter*, describes the thoughts of widow Tamóczy as she stands outside the room in which the body of her daughter lies draped in a shroud. Mrs. Tamóczy is slowly coming to understand that she herself is to blame for her daughter's suicide. Not only did she force her daughter to marry against her will, she plotted to bring about the execution of the man Sára loved. Her obsessive loathing of Mihály Mikes and his family left her blind to the fact that her daughter had fallen in love with Mihály's son János. Not realizing that Sára had willingly fled her mother's home with János, widow Tamóczy had insisted that János be apprehended for kidnapping. Under the (mis­taken) impression that János had been sentenced to death, she had told her daugh­ter with glee of the impending execution. Sára, upon hearing this, had taken leave of her mother and gone to her room, where she had stabbed herself in the heart.

*Widow and Daughter*, originally published in three volumes in 1855-56, is, as previously noted, a historical novel based on an account found in the *Grievous Hungarian Chronicles* (Siralmas Magyar Krónika) of seventeenth century scribe János Szalárdi. At the time Kemény composed his novel several other authors were writing similar narratives based on this tale, among them Albert Pálffy (The House in Szeben *A szebeni ház*, 1853) and Sándor Halmágyi (Battle of Hearts *Szívek harca*, 1855). Unlike the works of these authors, which tend to focus on retelling the events of the story, Kemény's novel gives great importance to the narration of the emotional struggles of the characters. Mihály Szegedy Maszák characterizes it as "a psychological tragedy... superimposed on a story borrowed from a seventeenth century historian."35

András Martinkó refers to Kemény as "one of the great masters of the complex use of perspective in Hungarian literature."36 The description of widow Tamóczy's troubled deliberations certainly seems an example of this. It could be said to shift several times between the viewpoint of the third person narrator and that of Tamóczy. The fact that the passage begins with a question rather than an assertion suggests that it constitutes an echo of the thoughts running through Mrs. Tamóczy's mind rather than merely descriptive statements given from a third person per

---

8 Fölmenjen-e a tér t höz? Hisz neki joga van látni a tetemet, melynek életet adott... és halált. az anya és a magzatgyilkos, keresztelt és átkozta meg, szoptatta és falta föl gyermekét... a n Satumus. Ő Sára! Az ablak homályosult e el, vagy Tarnóczyné szeme, hogy alig lát odáig? De a teremb 1 most lehallott a zokogás... egy s ró asszony hangja. Judit kesereg az anya helyett, tépi köntösét, szár tj leomló hajával könnyeit. El, el innen! (Ózvegy és leány. 423.)
spective. The exclamation "Oh Sára!" could be construed as a direct quote of Mrs. Tarnóczy's unspoken thoughts. The explicit reference to Tarnóczy in the fifth sentence, however, implies the perspective of the narrator, while the exclamation with which the passage concludes suggests a return to the thoughts of the widow.

How might a reader approaching a passage such as this one address these ambiguities? If, as Edel contends, point of view "must be at the center" of any study of the psychological novel, this question is crucial to developing interpretations of Kemény's works as early examples of this genre. What critical procedures might a reader adopt in order to make distinctions between a statement that expresses the view of a narrator and a statement that expresses the view of a character? To what extent can these statements be said to depict the mental state of a character? Can a reader distinguish discrete techniques that allow for shifts in perspective? Does there seem to be any pattern in the use of these techniques over time?

It is to these questions that Dorit Cohn's *Transparent Minds* offers possible answers. In her discussion of narrative modes for the presentation of consciousness Cohn identifies three techniques each of which imply a radically different relationship between the narrator and a statement depicting the inner life of a character. In order to distinguish these concepts from similar ideas discussed in the works of her contemporaries Cohn coins three terms: psycho-narration, quoted monologue, and narrated monologue. Psycho-narration refers to commentary by a narrator on the thoughts or the emotional state of a character. Quoted monologue refers to passages that can be read as if they were direct quotations of a character's thoughts as those thoughts are articulated by the character. Narrated monologue refers to a passage that present the character's thoughts in the guise of third person narration. These techniques can be distinguished from each other, Cohn argues, based primarily on grammatical but also on stylistic criteria. Psycho-narration is third-person narration reported in past tense. Quoted monologue is rendered in first-person present tense. Narrated monologue, though it preserves the third-person pronoun and the past tense, is cast in the idiom of a particular character, which is distinct from the idiom of the narrator. Examples of these categories may prove more helpful than explanations of the linguistic grounds on which they are based. I use the same sentence to introduce each of the following three examples:

*Psycho-narration:* The little boy looked up and saw someone coming. He realized that it was his mother. She seemed tired to him.

*Quoted monologue:* The little boy looked up and saw someone coining. "It's mommy!" he thought. "She looks kinda sleepy."

*Narrated monologue:* The little boy looked up and saw someone coming. It was mommy. She looked kinda sleepy.
These examples make clear the basic features of the three techniques defined by Cohn. While a reader, it would seem, can generally recognize psycho-narration and quoted monologue by the grammatical form in which they are cast or, for that matter, by the inquit formule ('he thought') with which a character's thoughts are often introduced, this can be more complex with narrated monologue. In this example the colloquial speech indicative of a child's vocabulary ('mommy' and 'kinda sleepy') suggests that these sentences represent the thoughts of the child as he would have put them into words.

Cohn was not, as she acknowledges, the first critic to coin terms for these concepts. Her terms, however, have a degree of exactitude that others lack. Derek Bickerton, for example, used the term 'omniscient description' to refer to a narrator's commentary on the mental state of a character.39 This is imprecise, Cohn points out, since omniscient description could refer, for example, to the narrator's description of events of which a character is unaware. Psycho-narration, she explains, has the advantage of referring both to the subject matter described (psychological processes) and the activity it denotes (narration). Quoted monologue could be seen as a synonym either for interior monologue or soliloquy. Cohn argues that these two terms refer to the same phenomenon. The quotation of a character's thoughts, she argues, is always distinguished from the narrative around it by "the reference to the thinking self in the first person and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense."40 Narrated monologue resembles free indirect discourse with the important difference, Cohn insists, that it refers only to the narration of a character's thoughts, not his speech.

Although Cohn's study is, in principle, a discussion of these three forms and the potential of each as a tool for the mimesis of consciousness, it nevertheless traces the outlines of a historical process. "I have not altogether disregarded the historical dimension," Cohn writes in the preface.

The direction in which I sweep across the principle techniques generally corresponds to evolutionary changes of fictional form: from vocal to hushed authorial voices, from dissonant to consonant relations between narrators and protagonists, from maximal to minimal removes between the language of the text and the language of consciousness (...) [t]he fact that I begin with narrators who exclude inside views and end with interior monologue texts that exclude narrators also suggests that my typological lines are not entirely disengaged from the historical axis.41

In formal terms (those provided by Cohn), the changes to which she refers can be summarized as a move away from narratives in which psycho-narration is the dominant technique towards narratives in which quoted monologue prevails. Whereas psycho-narration tends to create the illusion of an author speaking to the
reader about the thoughts and feelings of characters, quoted monologue allows for the silencing of this authorial voice as characters give voice to their thoughts themselves. Cohn argues that over the course of the nineteenth century, as authors such as Flaubert and Henry James advocated the removal of conspicuous narrators from fiction, quoted monologue came to play an ever more prominent role in narrative, culminating in the almost complete disappearance of psycho-narration in some of the stream of consciousness novels of the early twentieth century.

Cohn’s concepts furnish the reader with tools with which to evaluate the merits of the now cliche (in Hungarian literary history) characterization of Kemény’s works as psychological novels. Analyses of these texts reveal that the author availed himself of each of the three modes for presenting consciousness defined by Cohn. Moreover, one finds in Kemény novels examples of the many forms these different modes may take. This suggests a new perspective from which to consider Kemény’s place in European literary history. His works offer illustrations of the narrative techniques developed by writers throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth as they called on language to serve not only mimesis of action, but mimesis of consciousness.

D. Psycho-narration

Returning to Edel’s assertion concerning the origins of the psychological novel, one finds in his work another suggestion regarding the progenitor of this genre. Having conceded that his original claim is an oversimplification, Edel contends that, "the psychological novel [was] accidentally founded by Samuel Richardson." If one traces the psychological novel back to the epistolary novels of the late eighteenth century (notable examples include Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) in English, Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761) in French, Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774) in German, József Kármán’s *Fanny's Legacy* (1794) in Hungarian), then the technique described by Cohn as psycho-narration was long in coming. Up until well into the nineteenth century many authors of narrative fiction seemed hesitant to suggest that they had unlimited access to the thoughts of their characters. The injunction of Friedrich von Blankenburg notwithstanding ("the writer [Dichter] (...) cannot hold to the pretense that he does not know the inner world of his characters"), characterization in third person fiction tended to rely on the narrator's mention of telling gestures such as "she blushed" or "he sobbed." As Cohn points out, the narrator of Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), though he does enter into the mind of the title character, is more reluctant when dealing with Sofia, describing her reactions but denying any knowledge of her thoughts:
A gentle sigh stole from Sofia at these words, which perhaps contributed to form a dream of no very pleasant kind; but as she never revealed this dream to anyone, so the reader cannot expect to see it related here.\(^4\)

A fascinating example of similar reticence is found in the novel *Abaß* (1836) by Kemény's contemporary Miklós Jósika. Although in the preface Jósika claims, "it is a psychological sketch that I give to the reader,"\(^5\) his narrator rarely touches on the thoughts or feelings of the characters, relying instead on descriptions of the observable:

> The old man's face suddenly whitened, he screwed up his eyes, and it seemed as if he wanted to flee.\(^6\)

Alongside such passages, however, run others in which the narrator appears to have some knowledge of his characters' emotions:

> The rough man felt something, he himself knew not what, but the feeling was pleasant to his heart. It seemed from his face that he was almost surprised.\(^1\)

Jósika, writing almost a century after Fielding, is willing to wander into his character's mind, but then quick to retreat and fall back on the technique of mentioning an observable detail from which the character's emotional state can be inferred. This tendency, which, according to Colin, "dominates the third person novel well into the nineteenth century,"\(^4\) explains the characterization of Jósika as an author whose characters "are often distinguished from one another only by their appearances, sometimes only by their names."\(^7\) Some critics, noting the interest Kemény's works evince in the inner lives of their characters, draw contrasts between the two authors. Szinyei contends that in his historical novels, "Kemény does not bother sketching the external details of the era as much as Jósika."\(^8\) Papp maintains that Kemény's characters, "in who we feel at every moment the movement of an endless inner life, are in total opposition to the heroes of Jósika's novels."\(^9\)

These observations concerning differences between Kemény and Jósika notwithstanding, Kemény's narrators are occasionally as hesitant as Jósika's to describe a character's mental state. In the following example from an early, unfinished novel by Kemény entitled *Queen Izabella and the Hermit* (*Izabella királyné Kézany a durva férfi érzett valamit, maga sem tudta mit, de szívének elfogódása kellemes volt. Úgy látszik arcából, hogy szinte megdöbbent. (Abaß. 19.)

\(^1\) Az öreg arcát hirtelen sápadtság ömlé el, szemeit összeszorítá, s úgy látszik, szökni akar. (Abaß. 13-14.)

\(^{10}\) A durva férfi érzett valamit, maga sem tudta mit, de szívén elfogódása kellemes volt. Úgy látszik arcából, hogy szinte megdöbbent. (Abaß. 19.)
és a remete) the queen of Transylvania listens to the sound of a cannon being fired in the distance to mark the admission of her son into the ranks of the Ottoman armies that have occupied her homeland and robbed her of her child:

She heard the blast of the cannon that signaled her son's entry into the Sultan's tent. At that sound, both anticipated and feared, she fell back into her seat, her pale face resembled that of a corpse, but her lips moved. Probably she prayed, only half conscious, as if she were dreaming that she stood before an altar and spoke to God about her child.

Not only do Kemény's narrators occasionally seem unwilling or unable to describe a character's thoughts, they too, like the narrators in Jósika's novels, sometimes offer only descriptions of observable details that suggest a character's emotional state. The following passage from Pál Gyulai describes the facial expressions of Gergely, a ruthless, power-hungry man, as he torments Pierro, an innocent entertainer who has become embroiled in political schemes:

He twisted the muscles of his face in such contortions that one artist could have assembled an entire album of the most fascinating caricatures, while another who had chosen to do a study on grief and woe could have traced every mark of tormented sorrow and mocking resignation.

Hungarian literary critic and novelist László Németh argues that passages like this one reveal the influence of Kemény's experiences as a student at a medical school in Vienna. As a young man Kemény studied, among other things, the musculature of the face. He was also exposed to the theories of Ignaz Paul Vitális Troxler (founder of "Anthroposophie," supposedly a mix of philosophy and anthropology), according to which the muscles of the face contract in specific ways in response to changes in a person's emotional state. "It was here," Németh contends, "that Kemény's realism learned the language of facial expressions and gestures that both serves and betrays the soul." While there may be some truth that the occasional descriptions of facial expressions in Kemény's novels were influenced by his exposure to the theories of Troxler, as an approach to characterization this technique was so widespread in European literature that it hardly calls...
MIMESIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE FICTION OF ZSIGMOND KEMÉNY

for explanation. It is a feature that Kemény's novels have in common with the works of virtually all of his contemporaries.

The difference between Kemény's novels and those of Jósika lies in the fact that in Kemény's this technique plays only a minor role. Alongside mention of telling gestures the reader finds passages in which the narrator describes the thoughts or feelings of characters. These descriptions go well beyond the mention of a fleeting sensation, exemplified by the statement of Jósika's narrator that "The rough man felt something... pleasant to his heart." In Kemény's novels the narrator rarely hesitates to enter into protracted explanations of emotional processes that may have taken as little as a few seconds or as much as several years. Moreover, the narrator often shows himself to have more knowledge of a character's psyche than the character himself. These descriptions by the narrator of a character's inner life are examples of the mode for presenting consciousness referred to by Cohn as psycho-narration. The frequency with which they occur in Kemény's fiction goes a long way towards explaining his reputation as the author of the first psychological novels in Hungarian.

For examples of psycho-narration the reader need go no further than Kemény's first published novel, Pál Gyulai. Set in late sixteenth-century Transylvania, it is a historical novel that tells the tale of an advisor to Zsigmond Báthory, prince of the region perched precariously between the Ottoman Empire to the south and the Holy Roman Empire to the north. The stability of the principedom is threatened by the ambitions of the callow Zsigmond's powerful and influential cousin Boldizsár. Eager to maintain public order, the secret council, comprised of members of the nobility, has voted to have Boldizsár murdered if he takes any action that might spark an open conflict. Out of a sense of loyalty to the prince's family, Gyulai (the title character) resolves to take action to ensure Zsigmond's safety. Hoping to provoke Boldizsár, he orders the execution of Senno, the leader of a group of traveling entertainers whose only crime is having defied Gyulai's interdiction on the performance of music on the occasion of Boldizsár's arrival in the capital. Gyulai's plan goes awry. The public is outraged at the news of Senno's execution. Boldizsár learns of the council's decision to exile or murder him. Eager to calm public opinion and pacify Boldizsár, Prince Zsigmond, whose life Gyulai had sought to protect, delivers the hapless advisor to Boldizsár's troops, who execute him.

As intricate as this plot summary may appear, the novel itself is slow paced, or at least it may seem so compared with those of Kemény's contemporaries. The focus is less on the retelling of the actions taken by the characters than on descriptions of the emotional torments they undergo before reaching their decisions. "Even the most superficial reader," writes Péterfy, "notices the orientation of the imagination towards the inner world in Kemény's first work." For example, while the narrator devotes twenty-six pages to a description of Gyulai's deliberations over
whether or not to have Senno killed, Gyulai's execution itself is not narrated (in the traditional sense) at all. The narrator skips this part of the story entirely, informing the reader of the execution only through brief mention of gossip on the street in the days after it has taken place. Szegedy Maszák explains, "Kemény needed the slow paced narration because he intended to give a greater role to interior action than exterior."52 Kemény himself made an interesting remark concerning his choice of protagonist that indicates the lack of importance he attributed to plot. In a letter to Jósika he wrote, "there is not a page in the histories on which I could not have come across a more interesting man than my hero, who really did nothing more than write two dissertations, serve as an advisor, and die the victim of ill fate (...) If my works should have a large public, this is not due to the raw material, but rather to its adaptation."1

The following sentence is an example of a passage in which the narrator avails himself of more than just description of the observable in depicting a character's emotions. It refers to Senno's reaction upon realizing that in the time he has spent in prison he has begun to fall seriously ill:

His mood we could say had improved, since, into his wild despair, of which the one extreme was delirious rage, the other resigned numbness, a gentler emotion had mingled, the thought of his own decay."

Unlike the description of Gergely from the same novel, this sentence gives no mention whatsoever of Senno's appearance or, for that matter, his gestures. It focuses solely on inner happenings. There is not a single noun that refers to an object. In fact of the eight nouns five refer to emotions. The narrator describes Senno’s mental state in precise terms. In Cohn’s terminology, this is psycho narration: "the narrator's discourse about a character's consciousness."53

Cohn distinguishes two types of psycho narration: consonant and dissonant. In dissonant psycho narration the narrator remains distant from the character, describing his emotional state in terms that the character never would have used. As an example of dissonant psycho narration Cohn cites a passage from Balzac’s Père Goriot:

The next day Rastignac dressed himself very elegantly, and at about three o'clock in the afternoon went to call on Mine de Restaud, in

1 Nincs a históriában lap, mellyen sokkal érdekesebb férfira ne akadhattam volna, mint az én h sőm, ki tulajdonkép egyebet nem csinált, mint két dissertátiót [sic] rt, tanácsnokoskodott, és szerencsétlenül meghalt. (...) Ha tehát munkámnak nagy publicurna leend, ez nem a nyers anyag érdeme; de a földolgozásé. ("Magyar rók levelei b. Jósika Miklóshoz. I. B. K. Zs. levelei." 444.)

"'Kedélyét valamennyire j avultnak mondhatnók, miután a vad kétségbeesés közé, melynek egyik véglete rjong düh, a másik hideg dermedt volt, enyhébb érzés, mélázat a hervadásról vegyült. (Gyulai Pál. Vol. I, 462-463.)
dulging on the way in those dizzily foolish dreams which fill the lives of young men with so much excitement: they then take no account of obstacles nor of dangers, they see success in everything, poeticize their existence simply by the play of their imagination and render themselves unhappy or sad by the collapse of projects that had as yet no existence save in their heated fancy; if they were not ignorant and timid the social world would not be possible. Eugene walked with extreme caution in order not to get muddy."

As Cohn points out, "no sooner does the narrator mention an inner happening ('indulging... in... dreams') than he imposes a value judgment ('dizzily foolish')[]." There is a disparity in this passage between the narrator's view of the character and the character's view of himself. "Even as the narrator draws the reader's attention away from the individual fictional character," Cohn observes, "he fixes it on his own articulate self: a discursive intelligence who communicates with the reader about his character - behind the character's back." The description of Senno's reaction is an example of dissonant psycho-narration. The explicit self-reference ('we could say') and the complexity of the sentence, with its abstract vocabulary and convoluted structure, foreground the narrating presence, drawing the reader's attention to the production of the discourse through which Senno's emotions are depicted. The ironic assertion that Senno's mood has 'improved somewhat' emphasizes the distance between this narrating presence and the character. There is no indication of any attempt by the narrator to espouse the character's vocabulary or to construct the sentence in a way that would reflect the form that a person in despair might give it. Although this passage refers to Senno's state of mind, it cannot be said to represent his thoughts. He does not speak, rather he is spoken about.

This sentence illustrates several of the advantages psycho-narration offers in the presentation of consciousness over descriptions of observable details that suggest a character's mood. What may be most readily apparent is that psycho-narration allows for a summary of a mental process that may have extended over a long period of time. Senno's oscillations back and forth between the different poles of despair took place over the course of days, yet the narrator is able to encapsulate this in one sentence before launching into a ten-page description of a brief conversation between Senno and a prison guard. Thus psycho-narration allows for vast differences between what Cohn refers to as "time of narration" and "narrated time." A passage from Kemény's novella Maelstroms of the Heart offers another illustration of this. The protagonist of the story, Anselm, learns that a woman whose favor he once courted has taken another lover. Though he cherishes no feelings of affection for this woman whatsoever, his vanity is wounded. He himself is surprised by the extent to which this news upsets him:
Anselm paced back and forth in his room restlessly.

First vengefulness flashed through his soul, then indifference, with a touch of its cold hand, calmed his racing blood, then he felt disgust trample across his nerves, then spite arose, ruling like a tyrant over his other feelings, then finally memory lit its lights one by one so he could look with somber eyes of discontent onto the empty memories of past times."

As in the passage describing Senno's despair, here too psycho-narration allows for a quick summary of the range of emotions that Anselm experienced. Unlike the other two techniques identified by Cohn (quoted and narrated monologue), in which the character himself plays a role in the narration of his thoughts, psycho-narration can be used to describe psychological processes that take place over the course of years or that are over within a matter of seconds.

Another significant feature of dissonant psycho-narration is that because it represents the narrator's description of a character's inner life, it need not be restricted to the character's knowledge of his own feelings. There is no reason to infer from the sentence describing Senno's despair that Senno himself has arrived at the precisely this understanding of his emotions. As Szegedy-Maszák observes, "the narrator, drawing attention to his own presence, can communicate more faithfully even than his protagonists what is going on in their psyches." Cohn refers to this as the "cognitive privilege" of the narrator. "[T]his cognitive privilege," she writes, "enables [the narrator] to manifest dimensions of a fictional character that the latter is unwilling or unable to betray." A curious example of this is found in Widow and Daughter. The narrator raises a question concerning Tarnóczy's reaction to her daughter's suicide:

"To what extent did the sin of [her daughter's] suicide curb her zeal ousness? It would be hard to say, since in our lonely widow piety and hypocrisy had mingled to such an extent that she herself couldn't draw the line between pretense and truth anymore."

Here the narrator's cognitive privilege is qualified. While he sees into Tarnóczy's psyche sufficiently to perceive her hypocrisy (of which she presumably is unaware), he is unable, or at least claims to be unable, to distinguish the point where

"Anselm álmatlanul jár szobájában. 
Majd a bosszú villant meg lelkén, majd a közöny h ves szárnylegenintse csillap tá véreite, majd undort érze szilajul átnyargalani idegein, majd a dac ébredt föl zsarnokkényt zve a többi benyomások felett, majd pedig az emlékezet gyűjtá meg egyenki lámpavilágait, hogy az elégtelenlenség komor szemeivel a múlt id k üres emlékeire nézhessen. (A sz v örvényei. 27.)

Mennyire láz tá fel vallásosságát az öngyilkosági b n? Nem könny kipuhatolni; mert árva özvegyünkben a hit a képmutatással úgy összevegyült, hogy maga se tudná a szerep és a való határait kijelölni. (Özvegy és leánya. 422.)"
this hypocrisy might give way to genuine faith. The implication is that whatever religious sentiments Tarnóczy's might once have held, these have become totally submerged beneath her grotesque pretense of piety.

This passage demonstrates yet another function of dissonant psycho narration. The narrator, superior to the character in his knowledge of the character's inner life, can cast his description of that inner life in a form that implies or for that matter makes explicit an ethical judgment. Another example from Widow and Daughter provides an illustration of this. The following passage focuses on the reaction of Tarnóczy to the discovery that her plan to ruin the loathed Mikes family has hit a snag:

Tarnóczy's pride, as soon as she withdrew beyond the gaze of the public eye, turned into torturous anguish.

Something whispered to her that fortune had turned her face on her and, at the prompting of a brazen whim, cast her smile on the house of the Mikes family. All her plans, a marvelous tapestry woven of religious fanaticism, hypocrisy, and an implacable thirst for vengeance, were beginning to fray before her very eyes.

Mrs. Tarnóczy would never refer to her schemes as an interweaving of fanaticism, hypocrisy, and thirst for vengeance. The disparity between the narrator's viewpoint and that of the character suggests to the reader that the character cannot be trusted to describe her own reactions. It is not simply a question of the narrator's cognitive privilege, but also of the character's sincerity, both with the reader and with herself.

Finally, the sentence describing Senno's emotions demonstrates the tendency of dissonant psycho narration towards generalization illustrated in the example cited by Cohn from Balzac. As previously noted, there is no evidence of an attempt on the part of the narrator to phrase the sentence in a way that might echo Senno's thoughts. The feelings described (despair, rage) are referred to as abstractions. The sentence takes on the air of a generalization about human emotions that the narrator finds an apt description of what is taking place in Senno's mind. This interpretation is supported by the passage that immediately follows this sentence. The narrator raises a question and offers a response to it:

What aroused this stolid temper?

Physical disease, which is the most powerful consolation for sickness of the soul.

7 Tarnóczyné büszkesége, mihelyt a közönség szeme el tt visszavonult, k nzó szorongássá változott.

Valami súgta neki, hogy arcát elford tá lé a szerencse, s ledér szeszélyével a Mikes ház felé mosolyog. A vallásos vakbuzgóság, a sikerült képmutatás és engesztelhetetlen bosszú csodás vegyületéb l sz tt tervek szálanként kezdtek szemei el tt foszlani. (Özvegy és leánya. 394.)
Because there are few men, who, having finished counting up delights in life, having been led by their emotions either to resigned despondency or vain hope, seeing no other prospect than to be plunged into the whirlpool of a horrifying disaster by the mailed fist of fate, there are few men who will not welcome as a merciful spirit an ailment that reassures them of natural death.9

This is an example of what Cohn refers to as an "ex cathedra statement," a feature "typical of psycho-narration with maximal distance."59 Such a statement is set apart, Cohn argues, by the switch to present tense verbs, a tense Cohn describes as the "gnomic present the tense used for timeless generalizations."60 An ex cathedra statement indicates the move from specific to general, as the narrator shifts from describing the emotions of a particular character to explaining those emotions with reference to an abstraction applicable to all humankind. "[T]he inner life of an individual character," Cohn explains, "becomes a sounding board for general truths about human nature."61

Kemény's novels have often been compared with those of Balzac, and this use of dissonant psycho-narration as segue to a generalization could be said to be a feature common to the works of both novelists. Numerous critics have noted Balzac's fondness for generalizations. Jonathan Culler points out how frequently Balzac's characterizations rest on stereotypes. Eugene de Rastignac is described as "one of those young men moulded for work by misfortune." Baron Hulot is referred to as "one of those men whose eyes light up at the sight of a pretty woman."62 Cohn maintains that the tendency towards generalization that frequently accompanies dissonant psycho-narration is typical of Balzac's works. She observes that in the preface to the Comédie Humaine Balzac characterizes his project as "the description of social species[.]"63 In reference to the example cited, Cohn notes that as soon as the narrator begins to describe Eugene's thoughts he immediately switches to a description of a general type. "When the text at length returns to Rastignac," she points out, "we have learned much about his peer group, but little about his own thoughts."64 This is not an isolated example. As Cohn observes, "it is hard to find in the Comédie humaine a single instance of psycho-narration that is not followed and dwarfed by authorial glosses[.]"65

To liken Kemény to Balzac on the grounds that both authors use characters as "sounding boards for general truths," however, would be misleading. Examples

---

9 Mi költé fel e szel d lendületet?
A testi kór, mely a lélekbetegségekben a sors leger sebb vigasztalása.
Mert kevés ember van, ki azon nyavalyát, mely természetes halállal biztát, egy könnyörül nemt ként ne fogadja akkor, ha az élettorommel számadását berekesztette, ha szvenvedéiley végcsüggedésre vagy túlzó inerényekre ragadtákt volt, s más kilátást nem ismert, mint a végzet vasöklét I mélységébe lőkettvén, egy rém t katasztrófa örvénye közé sodortatni. (Gyulai Pál. Vol. I, 462 463.)
of dissonant psycho narration in Kemény's works are remarkably rare, and it is
even more unusual for these passages to incorporate a movement from specific to
general. To claim, as János Dengi does, that Kemény's approach to the depiction
of the inner lives of his characters "is nothing other than Balzac's analytical tech­
nique"**66** is to overlook the extremely important difference between an author who
prefers generalizations and an author who avoids them. Dengi contends that
Balzac's novella *La Maison du chat qui pelote*, the story of an unhappy marriage
between an artistically gifted man and a kind hearted but unimaginative woman,
was the source for Kemény's novel *Husband and Wife*. While the two works
share a similar plot, the techniques through which the characters' consciousnesses
are presented are quite different. Two examples (many more could be given) from
Balzac's novella illustrate how quickly the narrative moves from specific to gen­
eral when describing the emotions of the characters:

Theodore répandait sur chaque journée d’incroyables fioritures de plaisir, il se plaisait à varier les emportements de la passion par la molle langueur de ces repos où les âmes sont lancées si haut dans l’extase qu’elles semblent y oublier l’union corporelle.

Dompté pendant près de deux ans et demi par les premiers emportements de l’amour, le caractère de Sommervieux reprit, avec la tranquillité d’une possession moins jeune, sa pente et ses habitudes un moment détournées de leur cours. La poésie, le peinference et les exquises jouissances de l’imagination possédent sur les esprits élevés des droits imprescriptibles.**67**

An example from Kemény's novel gives an indication of his inclination to
shun generalizations when describing a character's emotions. This passage de­
scribes Albert's frustration at the fact that he cannot simply abandon his wife
Eliza for his lover Iduna:

Albert's fevered nerves, which in his dreams conjured forth specters
from the past and in the mirror of the future sketched Iduna's sufferings
with fantastic outlines, made him minute by minute more frantic, and
since he attributed his misfortune to Eliza's stubbornness, his rage
towards her went beyond all boundaries/

This should not be understood to suggest that a reader does not find any gener­
alizations in Kemény. The difference between his works and those of Balzac lies
in the fact that in Kemény's novels such moments are rare. Dengi's contention, a

---

**Albertet lázas idegei, melyek álmaiban a múltból szellemeket idéztek föl, a jövendő tükrében pedig Iduna szenvedéseit rajzolták le fantasztikus vonalokkal, perencenkint dühöng bbé tették, s minthogy szerencsélténységét Eliz makasságának tulajdoníra, ellene haragja minden határon tülemelkedék. (Férfi és nő . 210.)**
view shared by several other critics, constitutes an oversimplification that ignores this crucial distinction. To characterize Kemény as the 'Hungarian Balzac' or 'Balzac's follower,' as has often been done, is to miss entirely the attention given in his novels to the creation of individual characters rather than 'social species.'

The other type of psycho-narration identified by Cohn, consonant psycho-narration, is distinguished by the tendency of the narrator to adopt the perspective of the character. Here there is no cognitive privilege. The narrator's knowledge of the character's mind coincides with the character's self-knowledge. Nor is there any striking contrast between the idiom of the narrator and that of the character. A character's mental state is presented in words and images that might have occurred to the character himself. In consonant psycho-narration the narrator "remains effaced and (...) readily fuses with the consciousness he narrates." As an example of consonant narration Cohn cites a passage from Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man:

The rain-laden trees of the avenue evoked in him, as always, memories of the girls and women in the plays of Gerhardt Hauptmann; and the memory of their pale sorrows and the fragrance falling from the wet branches mingled in a mood of quiet joy.

Here the presence of the narrator is less palpable than in the passage describing Senno's despair. There are none of the conceptual terms that imply a distanced, analytical perspective. Where there is evidence of an interpreting presence (for example the metaphorical phrase "pale sorrows") this seems to be the result of the interpretive activity of the character, which is then reported by the narrator. Moreover, there is no sign of any cognitive privilege of the narrator. He offers no explanation of the thoughts and impressions he describes. Unlike the sentence describing Senno's despair, in which the narrator identifies specific causal relationships between Senno's varying emotions, this passage gives no indication as to why, for example, the rain-laden trees evoke memories of women from the plays of Gerhardt Hauptmann.

Consonant psycho-narration is far more common in Kemény's novels than dissonant. His narrators rarely partake of the cognitive privilege implicit in dissonant psycho-narration. Often they seem as uncertain as the characters themselves. In the following passage the narrator of Pál Gyulai describes the impressions of Sofronia, mistress to Prince Zsigmond, as she begins to sense that she has fallen in love with Genga, one of the members of the Italian troupe of traveling entertainers. Sitting alone in her chamber Sofronia gazes at her own reflection in the mirror:

Her feelings were numbed by the breath of a sensual pleasure. It seemed as if to press her lips to the image in the mirror would be the
most delirious and sating joy, to bury her breast against her own breast, to mingle her breath with her own breath. It seemed as if with her eyes another eye watched her, as if another yearned, as if this body reclined in the armchair was the object of the desire on the face of an unfamiliar stranger, as if her ardor and languor were at the same time someone else's.

And whose was this dreamt form, onto whom Sofronia had cast her own feelings, with whom, in her imagination, she already felt frail and sinful? She herself could not say, for it was but a colorfully mingled vision of her impressions. One moment the outlines of the prince seemed to rise to the surface, then those of Genga, but amidst all the transformations the dark, scorching, penetrating eyes of the Italian were there, the serenity of the face on which long vanished passions still flickered occasionally betwixt the ruins of extinguished joys.

As in the passage from Joyce, there is little evocation here of the narrator as a distanced, critical presence. Phrases that imply interpretation ("the dark, scorching, penetrating eyes," "the ruins of extinguished joys") seem to constitute moments where the narrating voice has borrowed terms and images from Sofronia's consciousness. There is, moreover, little indication of any cognitive privilege. Rather than present himself as more knowledgeable than Sofronia, the narrator actually defers to her. "She herself could not say," he comments, implying that if she doesn't know then he certainly cannot (though this could also be construed as a disingenuous tactic). The narrator seems as hesitant as Sofronia herself, raising the question "Whose was that dreamt form?" but not offering an immediate or unambiguous answer.

This passage illustrates well the expressive potential of consonant psycho-narration. The merging of the perspective of the narrator with that of the character allows for a depiction of Sofronia's consciousness in all its uncertainty. By failing to make explicit Sofronia's vague sense that she may have feelings for Genga, the narrator hints at the elusiveness of these feelings. The relative paucity of dissonant psycho-narration in Kemény's novels suggests a reluctance on the part of the author to imply that mental states can ever be subsumed in words, whether by a
character or by an omniscient narrator. Even in the hands of a narrator with access
to the inner lives of his characters language still serves as little more than an list of
labels and images with which one can allude to, but never capture or finally name,
elusive thought.

Cohn's discussion of psycho-narration suggests a trend in European literature
towards an ever more intimate relationship between narrator and character. While
at the beginning of the nineteenth century narrators evinced a hesitancy to de­
scribe the inner lives of their characters, by the 1850s such descriptions were
common. Towards the end of the century these descriptions had often come to
subordinate the narrative so completely to the viewpoint of the character that
Wayne Booth went so far as to contend that in such passages the character be­
comes the narrator.⁷¹ Although Kemény is characterized in secondary literature as
the author of psychological novels, the frequency with which this characteriza­
tion is accompanied by a comparison to Balzac suggests that an important aspect
of his works has been overlooked. Though his novels contain examples of both
kinds of psycho-narration, the preponderance of consonant psycho-narration sug­
gests his works have more of an affinity, at least from the point of view of charac­
terization, with the novels of twentieth century authors such as Virginia Woolf or
Joyce than they do with those of Balzac. Kemény 's novels are populated not with
representative figures of social species, but rather with characters striking in their
individuality.

£. Quoted Monologue

If psycho-narration evolved from tentative assertions concerning a character's
emotions to detailed descriptions of the depths of a character's psyche, quoted
monologue can be said to have undergone a similar development. Beginning as
intricate soliloquy that adheres both to rules of grammar and conventions of dis­
cursive composition (use of extended metaphor, parallel constructions, etc.), quoted
monologue evolved over the course of the nineteenth century into passages com­
prised of short, ungrammatical phrases that seem, according to modern linguisti­
cs, to mirror more accurately the verbalization of unspoken thoughts. The be­
ginnings of this process could be located in the spoken monologues of late eight­
eenth- and early nineteenth-century novels, while its culmination could be said to
have come with the publication of Finnegans Wake, in which the narrator frac­
tures not merely the unit of the sentence, but the unit of the word.⁷²

The tendency in Kemény's novels towards monologue has not gone
unmentioned in secondary literature. Péterfy notes that "Kemény's characters speak
more to and with themselves than to or with each other."³³ "If monologues could
create a dramatic hero," he contends, "Pál Gyulai would be the striking exam­
ple."³⁴ Mihály Sükösd claims that the monologue "is [Kemény's] most successful
tool in depicting his characters. Dániel Veress says of Kemény's characters, "They are almost incapable of real dialogue, their natures, their interest in themselves make them prone, above all else, to monologues." What these critics fail to note, however, is that the monologues in Kemény's novels take very different forms. These include both the audible speech of characters, who, when left alone, give voice to their thoughts, as well as the unspoken thoughts of a character either in solitude or in the company of others. Moreover, interior (or quoted) monologues in Kemény's works vary considerably in length and complexity. Whereas many are prolonged passages in which the character expresses his thoughts in complex sentences, others are merely short exclamations that seem almost to burst spontaneously from the character's mind. Kemény's novels thus contain examples of the monologue in all the forms in which it appeared over the century of psychological realism identified by Cohn.

The monologue was by no means absent from narrative fiction in the eighteenth century. Chapter two of book seven of *Tom Jones*, subtitled "Containing a conversation Mr. Jones had with himself," for example, contains a long monologue. However, as Colin points out, this monologue is explicitly introduced as the audible speech of a character. It is prefixed with the statement, "and starting up, he cried". This tendency to have characters speak monologues aloud lasted well into the nineteenth century. It occurs, notably, in Stendhal's *The Red and the Black*. While the protagonist of this novel, Julien, could be characterized as one of the first obsessively introspective characters of third person narrative fiction of the early nineteenth century, several of the monologues in which he frequently indulges are avowed as speech rather than thought. As Cohn observes, in his longest monologue, which occurs when he is in prison, Julien even rebukes himself out loud: "Talking to myself in solitude, two steps away from death, I am still a hypocrit."

Like the works of Fielding and Stendhal, Kemény's novels contain examples of spoken monologues. Senno, for example, speaks aloud to himself in prison:

'Saint Antal of Padua! Senno often cried out, 'could a slave spend his time more usefully than I do here? Does not every minute reward me? I am a usurer, who gets great interest for a trifling sum. Gyulai locked me away, and here I make use of this circumstance, which others would regard as disheartening. For tomorrow the common folk will hold for me a man of civic virtue, a great patriot.'
Péterfy makes the remark that, had Kemény written dramas, "his protagonists would have taken stage separately, one after the other, and in profound, poetic voices speculated about fate." This suggestion is particularly interesting considering that several chapters of Pál Gyulai are given in the form of a dramatic script. This script includes stage directions and even the voice of the 'director.' In scene twelve of this play within a novel one of the characters does indeed appear separately to speak in poetic terms about his fate:

Gergely: Excitement, this alone is life: the rest is but vegetation. (Pause)... are not my prospects magnificent? I, who spent six years as a schoolteacher in Enyed, am now the master of events (...) rapturous is the feeling of strength, of power... even if the world hardly even suspects it."

Alongside the chapters of Pál Gyulai that are written as dramatic script are others that incorporate letters, excerpts from characters' diaries, and poems recited by the characters. These constitute several of the forms of narrative that have been characterized by critics and theorists of stream of consciousness fiction as precursors to the interior monologue.

By the time Kemény began his literary career in the 1840s, the spoken monologue had begun to defer to the silent interior monologue. This is the mode for presenting consciousness to which Cohn refers as quoted monologue, achieved through "the silencing of the monologic voice." Cohn offers an example from Stendhal:

Before my journey, I took her hand, she withdrew it; today I withdraw my hand, she grasps and presses it. A fine opportunity to repay her for all the contempt she had for me. God only knows how many lovers she has had! She perhaps chooses me only because it is convenient for us to meet.

From the Realist perspective quoted monologue has the advantage that it does not rely on the reader's willingness to accept the implausible premise that the characters of a novel, when left alone, speak aloud to themselves in complete, and sometimes complex, sentences.

Kemény made extensive use of the quoted (interior) monologue. Szegedy Maszák notes, "There is hardly a Hungarian novel in the nineteenth century in which the interior monologue plays a role as frequently as in The Fanatics." In Pál Gyulai, for example, while some of Senno's monologues are avowed as speech,
others are not. In the following passage Senno thinks about his wife, who, to his surprise, has come to the city in which he was arrested hoping to be able to see him:

Ah Eleonóra, even the deepest sufferings could never excite you to fever, your sturdy constitution scoffed at besieging grief (...) why did you long for your husband’s prison cell, you, who could not have given the vain artist the gratification of taking back into his warm arms the spark from which he draws life.

Saint Antal of Padua! Senno often cried out.

The vocal outburst with which this passage concludes makes it clear that it is presented as unspoken thought, or, in Cohn’s terms, quoted monologue. Often, however, Kemény’s novels offer no hint to indicate whether a monologue is to be understood as spoken or silent. Szegedy Maszák suggests that this may have been a deliberate strategy on the part of the author to avoid estranging his readership: "The silent interior monologue was so rare in Hungarian prose in the mid-nineteenth century that the author of Pál Gyulai, Widow and Daughter, and The Fanatics probably didn’t aim to resolve this ambiguity because he thought this way his audience would more readily accept the unusually frequent use of monologue."\(^{83}\)

Quoted monologue creates opportunities for contrasts between a character’s speech and his thoughts that would be impossible with spoken monologue. Passages of quoted monologue falling alongside passages of dialogue can reveal a character’s insincerity with another character. Kemény’s novels develop the expressive potential of such contrasts. In the thirteenth chapter of Widow and Daughter, for example, Haller, the aging man to whom young Sára is betrothed against her will, comes to Sara’s home. Here he meets Sara’s aunt Judit, who has helped Sára to flee. As the two of them converse Judit struggles to conceal her nervousness, while Haller muses that Judit is a pleasant, attractive woman:

‘What a beast,’ Judit thought to herself...

‘What a modest, shy woman,’ Peter thought at the same time, noticing [Judit’s] agitation.

(...) ‘[Widow Tarnóczy] often mentioned the beautiful [Judit]’ Haller continued.

‘Ah!’ gasped Judit, blushing.

Blood rushed to her face as if she were a little girl.

‘What innocence!’ Haller thought.

Ah Eleonóra, te a legmélyebb fájdalom miatt sein tudtál forró lázba esni, szilárd egészséged dacolt az ostromló bánattal (...) miért vágytál hét férjegi börtönébe, te, ki a húi m vésznek azon elégtételt nem adhattad volna, hogy meleg karjai közt nyerj ismét életszikrát?

Paduai Szent Antalra! kiáltta gyakran Senno[.] (Gyulai Pál. Vol. I, 413.)
T can imagine all the awful things [Tamóczy] said about me!' [Judit] thought bitterly to herself.

(...) ([What skin! [Judit thought.] Yellow parchment taken from the covers of old books! And the bones!..) "Ah, what a beautiful gold necklace," she said, looking at the jewelry... (Has my sister in law gone mad?)"

Cohn contends that, set against the backdrop of dialogue, passages of quoted monologue acquire a sincere tone. "For no matter how insincere we are with ourselves," she argues, "we are always more insincere with others." The passage from Widow and Daughter suggests that this is not always the case. While Haller is indeed sincere in his thoughts about Judit, Judit, as becomes clear in later chapters, has deceived herself concerning her feelings for Haller. Her sigh, and the blush that accompanies it, hint that the affection she later develops for Haller is present in her first meeting with him, though she herself doesn't realize it. A reader could interpret her fixation with Haller's appearance, though ostensibly an expression of her sympathies for the young Sára, as an indication of an unconscious attraction that Judit's conscious mind labors to deny. In this passage an older approach to the presentation of consciousness, the mention of an observable detail from which an emotion can be inferred, supplements what could be considered a younger approach. The contrast between Judit's thoughts, expressed in quoted monologue, and her bashful reaction suggests that quoted monologue can serve both to depict a character's thoughts as well to expose self deception.

The possible insincerity of quoted monologue is a topic touched on several times in Kemény's novels. A long passage of quoted monologue is often followed by a comment from the narrator that throws into question the character's sincerity with himself. In Pál Gyidai, for example, Sofronia lies to herself about her feelings for Genga. Embroiled in the struggle to save Šenna, she devises a plan to win the aid of Boldizsár. She resolves to write Boldizsár a letter professing her fondness for him and pleading with him to intervene on Šenna's behalf. Upon hearing...
her plan, Genga, a close friend to Senno, seems skeptical. He cautions her that it does not befit a woman to prostitute her affections. In light of the dire circumstances, however, he accedes to Sofronia’s plan. Together the two of them craft a letter entreating Boldizsár to come to their aid. Genga departs with the letter, leaving Sofronia alone to contemplate the dangers she faces:

'Strange,' she thought, 'that I was daunted by the danger of this undertaking, whereas he feared because of its moral implications! Why didn’t Genga say, 'Sofronia, you may suffer, because of your noble nature' (...) Why didn’t he speak of these awful things? Are there not sufficient examples of this? (...) Well I know the fate that threatens the mistresses of princes, emperors and sultans once they have fallen under suspicion. One is tied in a sack and tossed into the waves of the Marmora, another the king strangles with his own hand on the plush pillows of his chamber, slowly, smiling, without uttering a single word of reproach to her. (...) Why was he more afraid for my virtue than my life? Should I not seek here (...) the admission of some tender affection...? Ah, what dreams these! (...) Sofronia, he never offered you love, and you... yes, you wouldn’t have accepted it. (...) I don’t love him, that’s certain.'*

The narrator appends this passage with the remark, "Sofronia’s emotions tired themselves out as they strayed in these deluded musings." Here again one mode for presenting consciousness supplements another. The narrator intervenes (psycho-narration) to underscore the insincerity of the character’s ruminations (quoted monologue).

This passage suggests a comparison between Kemény and Marcel Proust. Although Proust is cited by Edel as the author of one of the first modern psychological novels, his approach to the narration of consciousness stands in stark contrast to that of Joyce. As Genette notes, "Nothing is more foreign to Proustian psychology than the utópia of an authentic interior monologue[.]") In Proust’s work a character’s inner speech invariably reveals less about his true feelings than it does about his self deception. In A la recherche du temps perdu Proust gives a descri

* Különös gondola, hogy én vállalatom veszélyét 1 valék áthatva, pedig annak erkölcsi eredményeit 1 felt! Mért nem mondta Genga: Sofronia, kegyed szenvedhet nemeslelk ségéért, szenvedhet, sok, igen sok k ne és megalázatátást. (...) Mért nem beszélelt rém t dolgokat? Nincsenek rá példák? (...) Hisz én is halám, mi sors fenyegeti a podeszták, fejedelmek, hercegek, királyok, császárok és szultánok gyanús kedveseit! Egyiket a Marmora hullámai közé vetik zsákba kötve; másikat a felséges úr legpuhább vánkossan saját kezével megfojja lassan, mosolyogva, szemrehányások nélkül. (...) Mért féltette inkább erkölcsemet, mint életemet? Ne keressem e itt egy (...) gyöngéd érzés nyilatkozatát...? (...) Min álmod ezek. (...) Hisz, Sofronia, neked soha szerelmet nem ajánlott, s te... igen, te el sem fogadnád. (...) én nem szerettem t, ez kétségtelegen." (Gyulai Pál. Vol. I, 254.255.)

7 Sofroniának e tévegekben egészten kifáradta érzelméi[.] (Gyulai Pál. Vol. I, 255.)
tion of a process he refers to as "the rectification of an oblique interior discourse" that bears an eerie resemblance to Sofronia's monologue:

And if in some cases - where we are dealing, for instance, with the inaccurate language of our own vanity - the rectification of an oblique interior discourse which deviates gradually more and more widely from the first and central impression, so that it is brought back into line and made to merge with the authentic words which the impression ought to have generated, is a laborious undertaking which our idleness would prefer to shirk, there are other circumstances - for example where love is involved - in which this same process is actually painful. Here all our feigned indifferences, all our indignation at the lies of whomever it is we love (lies which are so natural and so like those that we perpetuate ourselves), in a word all that we have not ceased, whenever we are unhappy or betrayed, not only to say to the loved one but, while we are waiting for a meeting with her, to repeat endlessly to ourselves, sometimes aloud in the silence of our room, which we disturb with remarks like: 'No, really, this sort of behavior is intolerable,' and: 'I have consented to see you once more, for the last time, and I don't deny that it hurts me,' all this can only be brought back into conformity with the felt truth from which it has so widely diverged by the abolition of all that we have set most store by, all that in our solitude, in our feverish projects of letters and schemes, has been the substance of our passionate dialogue with ourselves.\(^86\)

Just as the words that Swann repeats endlessly to himself constitute deviations from the 'felt truth' that must be abolished, Sofronia's monologue is an expression of feigned indifference (feigned to herself) that clouds her understanding of her own emotions. While the quoted monologue may seem to bring the reader closer to a character's psyche than psycho-narration by silencing the narrator and allowing the character's thoughts to 'speak for themselves' (as it were), there is no guarantee, as Kemény and Proust suggest, that the character's understanding of his psyche is lucid or that the words in which some of his thoughts find form accurately depict every aspect of his inner life.

One way in which quoted monologue can depict different dimensions of a character's inner life is by rendering these 'passionate dialogues' in an explicitly dialogic form. By incorporating patterns of self-address in which the second person pronoun refers to the speaking (thinking) subject, quoted monologue can present conflicts within a character's psyche in the form of multiple voices. Pál Gyulai contains a fascinating example of internal dialogue between character and conscience. This dialogue is achieved through a blend of psycho-narration and quoted monologue, but a quoted monologue that gives voice only to the accusations that weigh on Gyulai's soul:
As soon as he was alone Gyulai thought of Senno, and the thought condemned him, tyrannically and unjustly. His conscience, the judge bribed and corrupted by false reasoning, never wanted to believe that he had had the prisoner of the bastion killed because, out of loyalty to the family of the Prince, he had wanted to provoke Báthory Boldizsár to commit an offense against public order. In vain Gyulai explained to him the circumstances, in vain he described all his former fights, in vain he conducted him to the dungeon of Fogaras, where he had sat shackled, only then to win back at the hands of Zsigmond's father both his freedom and honor, (...) because his overly rigorous judge, the stubborn conscience, listened to the accused's pleas with a bemused smile, and with cold words, like so many daggers, answered: My good friend, you rave, you are delirious, and that is why you imagine your deeds so poetic and romantic. Matters are otherwise. You murdered Senno out of revenge, your genteel pride could not tolerate the cursings of a common man. You are a delicate yet ferocious lord. Yours is the spirit of the minion of Tiberius or Caligula moved into the favored advisor of Zsigmond. Oh, I believe that you were the one who murdered Agrippina and the mother of Nero! You are an evil creature, and whatever protests you make, you are eternally damned.²

Cohn contends that passages of quoted monologue like this one, in which a character refers to himself in the second person, "seem to confirm Freud's notion that the voice of the conscience (the superego) is constituted through the internalization of the parental voice, or the voices of other authority figures."87 Whether or not such a passage confirms Freud's view, it indicates, at least, that the conception of consciousness as an amalgamation of competing voices was a theme in literature well before the advent of modern psychology.

A more vivid example in support of this notion of the internalization of the voice of authority is found in Kemény's Widow and Daughter. Mrs. Tarnóczy

¹ Gyulai, mihelyt magányban volt, Sennóra gondolt, és e gondolat el télt zsarnokul, igazságtalanul. Lelkiismerete, az állokoskodásoktól megvesztegetett b ró, sohasem akarta hinni, hogy a bástyaráb azért öletett meg, mert Báthory Boldizsárt törvénytelenségre kellett izgatni a Kristóf háza iránti hálá miatt. Hasztalanul beszélt el Gyulai neki minden körülményt, hasztalan világos totta föl régi küzdelméiről, hasztalan vezette t a fogarasi börtönbe, hol bilincsre volt verve, és Zsigmond atyjától egyszerre nyerte a szabadságot a becsülettel vissza, (...) mert túl szigorú b rája, a makacs lelkiismeret, misztikus mosoljával hallgatta a vádlott mentéségeit, s fagyos szavakkal, melyek megannyi gy łkok valának, válaszoló: "Jó barátom, te rjöngs, s azért képzeled ily költ înnek, ily vadregényesnek tetteid. A dolog másként áll. Te megöletted Sennót boszúból, űri g göd nem t rhtette egy porembernek szitkait. Te kényes nagy űr vagy és vérengz nagy űr. A te szellemed Tibérius vagy Caligula valamelyik kugyencéb 1 költözött Zsigmond kugyencébe. Én elhiszem, hogy Agrippinát és Néró anyját is te gyilkoltad meg. Ah, gonosz lánya vagy te, s bármint szabadkozol, elzárhoztál. (Gyulai Pál. Vol. II, 306 307.)
fears that her plot to ruin the Mikes family may come to nothing. She gives expression to her rage, but another voice emerges from the depths of her psyche:

'Let me not see the proud and ostentatious castle of the Mikes family until the flag of mourning flaps above the emblem on its gate!' Mrs. Tarnóczy sighed in a wild outburst.

But lo, a foreign voice startled in her breast, from the lips of her seemingly dead conscience, which until now had been silent. It is written in the pages of the holy book, it reads: Why should I wish evil upon someone on whom the Lord wishes no evil? Why should I curse him whom the Lord has not cursed?... Horrible, horrible!...

But the lord will curse them, his hand will weigh down on them. It is on them already (...) If they are not to suffer unending torment, why have I prayed, and why did I suffer, if all my loathing is futile?

Here it is apparent that the voice of Mrs. Tarnóczy's conscience, or rather the words in which this voice finds expression, is the internalized voice of authority. This authority is not merely the Biblical passage to which the voice alludes. It is the figure making the allusion. This is the figure with which the voice of Mrs. Tarnóczy's hatred for the Mikes family enters into a dialogue. It is significant that, whereas in the passage from Pál Gyulai one of the voices of Gyulai's consciousness is rendered in psycho-narration, in Widow and Daughter both the voices of Mrs. Tarnóczy's consciousness find expression in quoted monologue. The fact that the voice of Gyulai's protestations of innocence is merely summarized by the narrator (psycho-narration) suggests that the voice of his conscience (which is quoted) has triumphed. There is no longer any competition, Gyulai has succumbed entirely to his guilt. In the passage from Widow and Daughter, on the other hand, where both voices are rendered in quoted monologue, there seems to be a moment of struggle in Mrs. Tarnóczy's mind. The absence of any response to the questions with which this internal dialogue concludes, however, suggests that this struggle has been decided and the voice of Mrs. Tarnóczy's conscience has fallen silent once more.

This dialogic approach to the rendering of consciousness is identified by Bakhtin as one of the distinguishing characteristics of the fiction of Dostoevsky. In his

---

a8 'Ne lássam a Mikesek büszke és hivalkodó várát, m g kapujának c mere fölött a gyász zászlója nem lobog!' sóhajtá Tarnócznyné vad kitöréssel.

De me, idegen szózat rezzent meg keblében, a lelkiismeretnek, e tetszhalottnak, eddig néma ajkairól: — rva van a szent könyv lapjain, hangzék: 'Miért mondjak gnoszt annak, akinek nem mondott gnoszit az Úr; és miért átkoznám azt, kit az Úr nem átkozott' ... Borzasztó, borzasztó! ... De meg fogja ket átkozni az úr; rajok nehezedik keze! Hisz rajok van, (...) Ha nem szenvednének végtelen k nt, miért imádkoztam, s miért szenvedtem én, ha gy lőlni csak er tlenül szabad? (Özvegy és leánya. 395.)
book Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Bakhtin observes that in the works of Dostoevsky the inner life of a character is "thoroughly dialogized":

in its every aspect it is turned outward, intensely addressing itself, another, a third person. Outside this living addressivity toward itself and toward the other it does not exist, even for itself. In this sense it could be said that the person in Dostoevsky is the subject of an address. One cannot talk about him; one can only address oneself to him. Those 'depths of the human soul,' whose representation Dostoevsky considered the main task of his realism 'in a higher sense,' are revealed only in an intense act of self-address.88

In an essay entitled "The Problem of the Text," Bakhtin contends that, "After Dostoevsky, polyphony bursts powerfully into world literature."89 As only one of Kemény's novels has ever been translated into any other language (Husband and Wife was translated into German), they obviously never had the same influence as those of Dostoevsky. However, the fact that in his novels the conflicts taking place in a character's consciousness are depicted through dialogue can be interpreted to suggest that Dostoevsky's fiction, however innovative it may have been, was also in part a product of broadly international trends in conceptions of the relationship between language and the psyche, trends that left their mark in works composed by a Hungarian author two decades before Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment.

There is another significant difference between the passage from Pál Gyulai and the one from Widow and Daughter that points to one of the limitations of quoted monologue as a tool for the rendering of unspoken thought in language. If the shift from spoken to silent (quoted) monologue constituted a step towards greater realism because it no longer demanded of the reader that he accept the premise that characters, when left alone, speak out loud to themselves in long, grammatically complete sentences, it presented an entirely different problem of verisimilitude. While few would deny Victor Hugo's contention that "It is certain that people do talk to themselves,"90 modern psycho-linguistics would raise questions concerning the form Hugo gives verbalized thought in Jean Valjean's monologue in the third chapter of the seventh book of Les Misérables. Over the course of several paragraphs Valjean attempts to persuade himself that he need not trouble himself over the fact that another man has been arrested for his crimes. His monologue traces a carefully reasoned argument from beginning to end with only occasional interruptions in the form of short exclamations ("good God," "Ah!"). There is little indication of any stylistic peculiarity that might distinguish this unspoken monologue from a speech that a character might make in the course of spoken dialogue. Unspoken thought seems to adhere to the same rules that govern speech.
In his book *Thought and Language*, published shortly after his death in 1934, linguist Lev Semenovich Vygotsky takes issue with this conception of inner speech as "speech minus sound." Vygotsky contends that inner speech is a distinct phenomenon, "with its own laws and complex relations to the other forms of speech activity." The distinguishing feature of inner speech, according to Vygotsky, is its syntax. "Compared with external speech," he writes, "internal speech appears disconnected and incomplete." The tendency in inner speech towards abbreviation and discontinuity is the result of a process Vygotsky refers to as predication. When putting thought into words, a person will omit the subject of a sentence and all words connected with it, focusing only on the predicate. The explanation for this, Vygotsky contends, is the invariable presence in inner speech of the factors that allows for predication: "We know what we are thinking about - i.e., we always know the subject and the situation." Inner speech, according to Vygotsky, consists of predicates only.

The contention that inner speech is governed by its own set of laws makes new demands on authors seeking, through quoted monologue, to give a realistic depiction of a character's mental life. Quoted monologue must be stylistically distinct from speech. It is in the works of Joyce that a reader finds the canonical examples of monologues that adhere to Vygotsky's definition of inner speech. An excerpt from the third chapter (Proteus) of *Ulysses* suffices to illustrate the tendency towards incomplete sentences and associative thought patterns:

Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane. But he adds: in bodies. Then he was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By knocking his sconce against them, sure. Go easy. Bald he was and a millionaire, *maestro di color che sanno*. Limit of the diaphane in. Why in? Diaphane, adiaphane. If you can put your five fingers through it, it is a gate, if not a door. Shut your eyes and see.

Stephen closed his eyes to hear his boots crush crackling wrack and shells.

Numerous features of this passage, including the shift from present to past tense verbs and from first person to third person pronouns, suggest that, while the first paragraph represents Stephen's unspoken thoughts, the second represents the discourse of a third person narrator. But this change of perspective (or speaker) is also implicit in the shift from the grammatically fractured structure of Stephen's inner speech to the grammatically complete sentence with which the citation concludes.
Vygotsky's distinction between inner and outer speech undermines the plausibility of quoted monologue as it appears, for example, in the passage cited by Cohn from Stendhal, which I give again here for ease of reference:

Before my journey, I took her hand, she withdrew it; today I withdraw my hand, she grasps and presses it. A fine opportunity to repay her for all the contempt she had for me. God only knows how many lovers she had had! She perhaps chooses me only because it is convenient for us to meet.

There is a rhetorical complexity to the first sentence that may seem too deliberate for mental speech. The sentence is comprised of two striking figures: parallelism and chiasmus. The parallelism consists of the repetition of the subjects in the two phrases separated by the colon (I/she), as well as the repetition of an adverbial phrase ("before," "today") that introduces the two opposed statements. The chiasmus is created by the transference of the verb 'withdraw' from the second clause of the first phrase to the first clause of the second: "I took/she withdrew: I withdraw/she grasps." The intricacy of the interaction of these figures creates the impression that the passage is not a spontaneous thought, but rather the product of deliberate composition.

It is the presence of rhetorical figures in passages such as these, along with a tendency to adhere to rules of grammar and discursive composition, that led some critics to draw a distinction between interior monologue and what they referred to as soliloquy. Derek Bickerton gives an example from Walter Scott's *Fortunes of Nigel* (1822) that illustrates clearly the possible complexity of (what he refers to as) soliloquy:

\begin{quote}
She is right, and has taught me a lesson I will profit by. I have been, through my whole life, one who leant upon others for that assistance, which it is more truly noble to derive from my own exertions. I am ashamed of feeling the paltry inconvenience which long habit had led me to annex to the want of a servant's assistance - I am ashamed of that; but far, for more I am ashamed to have suffered the same habit of throwing my burden on others, to render me, since I came to this city, a mere victim of those events, which I have never even attempted to influence - a thing never acting but perpetually acted upon - protected by one friend, deceived by another; but in the advantage which I received from the one, and the evil I have sustained from the other, as passive and helpless as a boat that drifts without oar or rudder at the mercy of the winds and the waves.\end{quote}

As Bickerton points out, not only the syntax and sentence length, but also the rhetorical figures of this passage suggest careful composition. The third sentence,
Bickerton notes, contains repetition (I am ashamed'), antithesis ('never acting... perpetually acted upon,' 'protected by one friend, deceived by another,' 'the advantage which I received from the one... the evil I have sustained from the other'), and parallel pairs of adjectives and nouns ('passive and helpless,' 'oar or rudder,' 'winds and waves') that all contribute to create the impression of deliberate oratory rather than unstructured thought. Given its complex rhetorical structure, Bickerton argues, this passage cannot not be equated with interior monologue. It should be referred to, rather, as soliloquy.

While it is not necessary to accept Bickerton's distinction (Cohn does not[^97]), no reader can fail to notice the stylistic differences between inner speech as it is suggested in the citation from Scott and the inner speech of Stephen. There is a similar contrast between the passage in which Gyulai's conscience condemns him for his pride and the passage in which Mrs. Tarnóczy dismisses a fleeting doubt concerning her righteousness. The voice of Gyulai's conscience speaks in long, intricate, and grammatically complete sentences. This may add to the impression that Gyulai has succumbed to this voice, which speaks deliberately, in complex forms, with no fear of interruption. The voice of Mrs. Tamóczy's hatred, on the other hand, responds to the voice of her conscience with two ellipses (in the original), emphatic exclamations, and unanswered questions. For ease of reference I quote this passage again here:

> But lo, a foreign voice startled in her breast, from the lips of her seemingly dead conscience, which until now had been silent. 'It is written in the pages of the holy book, it reads: Why should I wish evil upon someone on whom the Lord wishes no evil? Why should I curse him whom the Lord has not cursed?'... Horrible, horrible! ...
> But the lord will curse them, his hand will weigh down on them. It is on them already (...) If they are not to suffer unending torment, why have I prayed, and why did I suffer, if all my loathing is futile?

While it would be an overstatement to equate the discontinuities and associative patterns in Mrs. Tamóczy's internal dialogue (that stand in contrast to the deliberate, rhetorical patterns in Gyulai's) with the discontinuities in the passage cited from Ulysses, there is the suggestion in Mrs. Tamóczy's monologue that internal speech is distinguished from external speech by the tendency towards fractured syntax in structure and association in content. This passage can be seen as an early example of an interior monologue distinguished from traditional soliloquy by stylistic features that imply a radically different grammar governing the verbalization of unspoken thought.

This is not the only instance of discontinuous inner speech in Kemény's novels. In the last pages of *Widow and Daughter*, for example, Mrs. Tarnóczy scuttles
gleefully to the castle where, she mistakenly believes, lies the body of a member of the despised Mikes family:

Her feet stumbled on the rocks and sweat trickled down her forehead. Doesn't matter! Who'd worry about one's health, one's life now! ... Revenge! Revenge!
She reached the gate.
Full of coaches the courtyard. The main hall shimmers, glimmers, much more than the room in Szeben where Sára lay... Now she lies in the grave! But what's happening here?

There are two crucial features of this passage that bear resemblance to the interior monologue in Joyce. For the sake of comparison I offer the following example, again from the Proteus chapter of *Ulysses*:

His feet marched in sudden proud rhythm over the sand furrows, along by the boulders of the south wall. He stared at them proudly, piled stone mammoth skulls. Gold light on sea, on sand, on boulders. The sun is there, the slender trees, the lemon houses.

In Kemény as in Joyce the shift from past to present tense suggests the shift from the discourse of the narrator to the quoted monologue of the character. This is the 'unsigned' interior monologue, identified by Cohn as "an innovative pattern" introduced by Joyce." More importantly, in both passages the quoted monologue is distinguished by unconventional syntax. The phrase "Full of coaches the courtyard" is an example of the predication to which Vygotsky refers. Whereas according to standard word order this sentence would read, "The courtyard is full of coaches" ('Az udvar tele van kocsikkal'), here the emphasis is on the sight (the predicate) that captures Mrs. Tarnóczy's attention. Moreover, the verb 'is' is omitted entirely. The jump from the main room to the room in Szeben where Sara's body lay is an example of the associative patterns typical, according to Vygotsky, of inner speech. This pattern continues to the end of the passage. Mrs. Tarnóczy's thoughts skip quickly and without deliberation from the room in Szeben to Sara's grave and then back to the room in which she stands.

This comparison between Joyce and Kemény should not be exaggerated. What in Joyce becomes a standard approach to the presentation of consciousness in

---

**Footnotes:**

---

Lába kövekbe botlott, s ver ték csurgott homlokáról. Nem tesz semmit! Ki ügyelne most egészségére, életére! ... Bosszú! A bosszú!
A kapuhoz ért.
Teli kocsikkal az udvar. Csillag villog a f terein, sokkal inkább, mint Szebenben az a szoba, hol Sára feküdt... Most ö a s rboltban alszik! De mi történik itt? (*Özvegy és leánya*. 434.)
Kemény still constitutes a rare exception. One finds in his works several examples of interior monologues that show a tendency towards predication, but these are few and far between in comparison to the number of interior monologues (or soliloquies according to Bickerton) that seem to make little distinction between unspoken thought and audible speech. However, these examples do suggest that Kemény was uneasy with the identity between inner and outer speech implied by interior monologues that follow standard discursive patterns. The presence, in novels written in the mid nineteenth century, of 'predicated' interior monologues can be interpreted as evidence in support of Cohn’s conclusion that the first 'pure' incarnation of this technique in the novels of Joyce "appears not so much as a creative miracle but as the result of very high probability." Joyce's innovation lies, according to this view, not in the introduction of a radically new technique, but rather in the development of the expressive potential of this technique.

Yet whatever its expressive potential, the quoted monologue is a limited approach to the presentation of consciousness. As Cohn points out, "just as dialogues create the illusion that they render what characters 'really say' to each other, monologues create the illusion that they render what a character 'really thinks' to himself." This illusion can be difficult to maintain. Often passages of quoted monologue can seem to be unjustifiable oversimplifications of complex mental processes. Kemény touches on this several times in his novels, appending a quoted monologue with a remark suggesting that it represents only an approximation of a character's thoughts. In Widow and Daughter, for example, an old man at the seat of a carriage carrying the body of a youth who has been killed in a duel reflects on the vanity of life:

Horváth quietly drove the carriage carrying the body.

(…)

How short is life! What vain, fatiguing effort to bother with tomorrow, and to let our cravings carry us off into the distant future! How laughable the sun worship of the ground hog or the day fly's dream of immortality, the day fly who, flying above the river from which it rose, is immediately drowned by the first wave!

At the conclusion of the passage the narrator adds, "Tedious variations of this thought kept returning to Horváth's mind." A similar example is found in Pál Gyulai. Senno fears that someone has learned of his wife's presence in the town:

Horváth csendesen vitte halottját kis útkocsijában.

(…)

Mily rövid az élet! Mily hiú fáradság tör dni a holnappal, s vágyainkat a távol jövend felé eregetni! Mily nevetséges lehet a vakandok napiniádása s a kérésznek álma a halhatatlanságról, mely a folyam főött, melyb 1 kikelt, röpködve, az els habbal ismét belemerül!!

E gondolat unató változatokban tért vissza Horváthhoz.[.] (Özvegy és leánya. 363.)
Is there someone who knows that the maestro has a wife, who knows this woman, who could have discovered where she is lodged? We raise these questions only once, because we do not count ourselves among those who favor repetition, but for the sake of faithful presentation we feel it necessary to mention that Senno rolled it before himself in several different versions.

These qualifying remarks imply an uneasiness with the identity between language and thought implicit in quoted monologue. The mental state of a character, Kemény seems again to suggest, cannot be transcribed. The narrator of Pál Gyulai makes an observation that expresses this view. Commenting on Gyulai’s deliberations as to whether or not he would be justified in having Senno executed, the narrator remarks,

Who can look into his own soul’s inner sanctum at his whim? (...) I am firmly convinced that all the moods of our soul derive from our thoughts, but mostly from fragments of thoughts so miniscule, smaller and faster than could ever materialize in words, that we never grow aware of them. In such a process, independent from us, yet under the spell of these tiny promptings wholly rooted in us, the seed bed of our actions, our state of mind takes shape."

It is curious to note that similar reservations concerning the quoted monologue appear in the writings of the twentieth-century novelist Nathalie Sarraute. As a member of the nouveau roman generation Sarraute was writing well after stream of consciousness fiction had lost its novelty. Her own novels, like those of Kemény, tend to blend psycho-narration with quoted monologue, as if in recognition of the limits, perhaps, of each. In her essay Conversation and Sub conversation she uses imagery not unlike that used by Kemény to refer to the depths of the psyche inaccessible through quoted monologue:

the immense profusion of sensations, images, sentiments, memories, impulses, little larval actions that no inner language can convey, that jostle one another on the threshold of consciousness, gather together in compact groups and loom up all of a sudden, then immediately fall

Létézik-e más, ki tudná, hogy a rnaestrónak neje van, ki ismerné e némbert, ki fölfödözhette lakását? E kérdéseket mi csak egyszer hozzuk föl, mert nem tartozunk az ismétlések barátai közé, azonban az el adási h ség kedvéért szükségesnek tartjuk érinteni, hogy Senno több versen görd tette maga elébe[.] (Gyulai Pál. Vol. I. 188.)

Ki tudna saját lelkének szentélyébe tetszése s kénye szerint nézni? (...) Állhatatosan hiszem, hogy minden hangulata keblünknek eszméinkb 1 származik, de töbnyire oly eszme páránnyokkal, melyek kisebbek és gyorsabbak, mintsem szavakkban megtestesülvén észrevétessznek magunk által is. Ily t lünk független, noha bel lünk támadt hatásocskák közt alakul tetteink növényágya, a kedélyállapot. (Gyulai Pál. Vol. n, 130.)
apart, combine otherwise and reappear in new forms, while unwinding inside us, like the ribbon that comes clattering from a telescriptor slot, is an uninterrupted flow of words.\textsuperscript{102}

That two authors writing at such different times (one long before William James coined the term stream of consciousness, the other well after this term had been adopted to describe a genre of narrative) would both refer to spheres of psychological existence impenetrable through quoted monologue suggests that Cohn is correct to argue that despite stylistic differences, the interior monologue is effectively identical to the soliloquy that prefigured it. The essential features of both are the same ("the reference to the thinking self in the first person, and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense"). As the comments of Kemény and Sarraute indicate, the limitations of these techniques are also the same: they touch only on the spheres of consciousness that find expression in words.

F. Narrated Monologue

If quoted monologue and psycho-narration seem, as approaches to the presentation of consciousness, to stand in opposition to each other (one consisting entirely of the narrator's discourse, the other entirely of a character's), the technique referred to by Cohn as narrated monologue can be said to constitute a bridge between these two poles, or, in Cohn's words, a "synthesis of antitheses."\textsuperscript{103} Narrated monologue allows for the expression of a character's thoughts in that character's idiom while preserving the third-person reference and tense of narration. Unlike psycho-narration, narrated monologue represents a character's discourse, not the narrator's. Unlike quoted monologue, however, it blurs the boundary between thought and language.

Cohn is careful to distinguish narrated monologue from other, similar critical concepts. She notes that the French style indirect libre and German erlebte Rede, though they too designate the rendering of silent thought in third person narrated form, refer also to the analogous rendering of speech. Cohn's term refers only to the rendering of thought, which, she argues, "presents problems that are quite separate, and far more intricate and interesting than its more vocal twin."\textsuperscript{104} Furthermore, Cohn's narrated monologue does not refer to figurai narration in which the discourse of the narrator seems to express the viewpoint of a character. This concept, described by Pouillon as "vue-avec," refers more broadly to a character's perspective, whereas Cohn's term applies only to thoughts. Narrated monologue should not be conceptualized as "vue avec," but rather as "pensée avec." "By implying the correspondence to a (potential) quoted monologue," Cohn explains, "[narrated monologue] pinpoints a more specific 'thing'."\textsuperscript{105} The line between
figurái thought and its context is not always clear, Cohn concedes, but "the term 'narrated monologue' suggests a method for discerning its location or for explaining its effacement."\(^\text{106}\)

Narrated monologue, according to Cohn, is easily distinguished from the other two modes. Grammatically it resembles psycho narration, but the absence of what Cohn refers to as "mental verbs" lends it the appearance of quoted monologue. As an example Cohn cites the following passage from Portrait of an Artist. Stephen is in church, waiting to give confession:

The slide was shot too suddenly. The penitent came out. He was next.
He stood up in terror and walked blindly into the box.

*At last it had come.* He knelt in the silent gloom and raised his eyes to the white crucifix suspended above him. *God could see that he was sorry. He would tell all his sins. His confession would be long, long. Everybody in the chapel would know then what a sinner he had been. Let them know. It was true. But God had promised to forgive him if he was sorry. He was sorry.* He clasped his hands and raised them towards the white form.[\(^\text{107}\)]

According to Cohn the italicized portions of this citation represent Stephen's thoughts. A simple transition of pronoun from third to first person and verb from past to present tense, she contends, will 'translate' this passage into a more traditional narrative form in which a character's thoughts are introduced with inquit formulae: "He thought, 'at last it has come'. He knelt in the silent gloom and raised his eyes to the white crucifix suspended above him. 'God can see that I am sorry,' he said to himself. 'I will tell all my sins. My confession will be long, long.'" However, this 'translation', Cohn notes, is not the text. "By leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent," she argues, "the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figurái consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation."\(^\text{108}\)

As an interpretive tool, narrated monologue enables a reader to construe a passage of third person narration as an expression of a character's thoughts. In Kemény's novella *Love and Vanity*, for example, one finds a sentence that, though it is given in third-person past tense, can hardly be said to represent the view of the narrator:

*The beautiful lady [Sarolta] found them far less interesting nowadays. Their ideas no longer possessed any channel, their ways of thinking quickly sunk to betises, and their conversation was undeniably fade. Why and how? Only the demons of caprice know.*\(^\text{110}\)

\(^{\text{106}}\) [A] szép deln most sokkal érdektelenebbnek találta ket. Eszméiknek többé nem volt elég allure je; gondolkozásmódjuk hamar sűrűd/fkh ffe be, s társalgásuk kétségügyü/vuiy/\(<? volt.
Neither the content of the sentence beginning with 'their ideas' nor its idiom can be plausibly attributed to the narrator. It reflects, rather, the unspoken, perhaps unverbalized thoughts of Sarolta, who has grown bored with the company of her acquaintances.

This passage illustrates the potential of narrated monologue as a tool for irony. Because narrated monologue involves the narration from a third-person point of reference of a character's mental discourse it invariably transforms that discourse itself into an object. While the semantic content of the sentence of narrated monologue in this passage is perhaps a sufficient indication that it does not represent the view of the narrator, the style also suggests the agency of a character. The French terms, a vocabulary used by some members of the Hungarian upper class in the nineteenth century as a sign of refinement, are features of Sarolta's idiom. While these terms have their own objects (or signifiers) in Sarolta's discourse, here they take on additional meanings. Embedded within third-person narration, Sarolta's discourse itself becomes the signified of the narrator's discourse. It represents the speech - and the mannerisms - of the particular social milieu that has shaped her pretensions and aspirations. While Sarolta's discourse refers to her acquaintances, the narrative refers to her discourse. By foregrounding a character's discourse, narrated monologue creates an ironic distance between the narrator and the language of the narrative.

Narrated monologue, like the other two modes defined by Colin, is not limited to third-person narratives. It can be used by a first-person narrator retelling, for example, a moment of his youth. Kemény's unfinished novella The Life of Love begins with the narrator's description of the days of his childhood, when he was often distracted by thoughts of his bewitching classmate Mari. He writes of the times he and his friends would sneak into her father Bartalics' garden:

If, in the springtime, we stole into his garden to pick dark violets (...) what did he care? Just let us keep our peace with their big, wooly dog, just don't let Mari see us: Bartalics, he didn't even get up to leave his room! But Mari, the agate-dark eyed Mari, she was our great persecutor. If we were up to some mischief, not with words -

S hogyan és miért? A szeszély démonai tudják[,] (Szerelem és hiúság. 199.) I must say a few words to justify the translation I have given of this passage. In the original Hungarian text the italicized words are not 'charmne,' 'betises,' and 'fade,' but rather 'allure,' 'platitudes,' and 'fade.' I replaced 'allure' and 'platitudes' with 'charmes' and 'betises' only because these first two words have identical English cognates. I took this liberty in order to preserve an important feature of the original text. Had I translated these words 'correctly' they would have blended into the rest of the text. In the Hungarian they stand out as pretentious affectations that evoke a particular context. I thought it important to retain this aspect of the original text. I offer this English version of the original as one possible translation and freely admit I have taken an interpretive liberty in my translation.
no but with a single look she chased us off. Though she went to school, just like us, and her coat was more worn than the other girls' who studied with us in that building.88

Though this memory, specifically avowed as such, is rendered in past tense verbs from a third person perspective, the inclusion of words and phrases characteristic of a child's idiom suggests that certain statements represent the thoughts of the little boy. The imperative statements ("Just let," "just don't let"), by momentarily effacing the past tense, close the distance between the moment recounted in the narrative and the moment of narration itself. While the adult vocabulary of the brief interruption ("the agate dark eyed Mari!") reestablishes this distance by introducing an utterance that cannot be attributed to the mind of the little boy, the childish logic of the concluding sentence again reduces this gap by evoking the thoughts of the disgruntled boy as he puzzles over his own timidity.

This passage is a superb example of one of the most important uses of narrated monologue. Because it does not rely on phrases such as "I thought" or "it seemed to me," it enables an author to introduce into a retrospective first-person narrative the thoughts of his younger self without disrupting the flow of the story. In this example it creates virtually seamless shifts from the voice of the narrator as an older man recounting his childhood to the voice of the child. The difficulties of creating vivid accounts of past experiences in first person narratives have been noted by numerous critics ever since Percy Lubbock made his infamous claim that authors seeking to narrate the workings of a character's mind should abandon the first person form "as soon as the main weight of attention is claimed for the speaker rather than for the scene[.]."109 Lubbock's meaning is lucidly summarized by Adam Abraham Mendilow:

Contrary to what might be expected, a novel in the first person rarely succeeds in conveying the illusion of presentness and immediacy. Far from facilitating the hero reader identification, it tends to appear more remote in time. The essence of such a novel is that it is retrospective, and that there is an avowed temporal distance between the fictional time that of the events as they happened and the narrator's actual time his time of recording those events. There is a vital difference between writing a story forward from the past, as in the third person novel, and writing one backward from the present, as in the first person novel. Though both are equally written in the past, in the former the illusion is created that the action is taking place; in the latter, the action is felt as having taken place.110

88 [H]a tavasszal fekete violát szedni (...) belopóztunk, mit bánta ö? Csak a házi komondorral élünk békességben, csak a kis Mari meg ne lasson; Bartalics bizony érettünk ki sem mozdult a szobából! De Mari, az agát s tét szem Mari, nagy üldöz nk volt. Ha cs nyt tettünk, nem szavaival, tekintetével kergetett ki. Pedig is iskolába járt, mint mi, s köntöse kopottabb vala a többi leányokénál, kik velünk egy épület alatt tanultak. (A szerelem élete. 228.)
The passage from *The Life of Love* suggests that Lubbock's contentions concerning the limits of first person narrative may be somewhat hasty. Genette makes the provocative claim the Proust's *Recherche*, a first person narrative in which there are layers of retrospection, nevertheless "involves no modal distance between the story and the narrative: no loss, no weakening of the mimetic illusion. Extreme mediation, and at the same time utmost immediacy."¹¹¹ Kemény's novella could be mentioned as another example of the potential of retrospective narrative to evoke the past not as it is remembered, but as it was experienced. By blurring the distinction between recollection and experience it symbolizes, as Genette says of Proust, "the rapture of reminiscence."¹¹²

Narrated monologue is especially effective as a tool for the presentation of hesitant deliberations. Because, unlike quoted monologue, it does not imply that a character has successfully verbalized an impression or a suspicion, it renders thoughts in a tentative form. In the following passage from Kemény's *The Fanatics*, Klára, a devout Sabbatarian, thinks of her husband and the sin she fears he has committed by betraying his faith:

She didn’t want to weep or sigh, she didn’t want to think on her own misfortune, only the thought of freeing her husband turned in her head.

And from what must she free him?
She had to free her husband from sin.
Ah, but if she freed him... could she save him from the accusation of his conscience?
Klára shuddered in her premonition of the grave, the critical hours.
What should she do if her husband lost his self respect, or if, unable to bear the shame, instead of seeking sanctifying repentance he should sink into the maelstrom of wild despair?
After what had happened it was impossible for Klára not to believe that her husband, because of some secret and tremendous temptation, had strayed from the path of virtue, broken with God, and risked his eternal being for worldly interests.º¹º

¹¹¹ Nein akart könnyezni, sóhajtani, nem akart saját szerencsétlenségére emlékezni, csak férje megszabad tása forgott elméjében.
S mit 1 szabad tsza meg?
A b nb 1 kellett férjét kiragadnia.
Ah, de ha szabadad tette... megmentheti e a lélekvádtól?
Klára visszaborzadt a komor, a válságos órák el érzete ben.
Mit tegyen, ha férje elveszti önbecsülését, vagy ha a szégyent nem tudva hordozni, a tisz tó bánat helyett a vad kétségbeesés örvényébe sülyed?
Az el zmények után lehetetlen volt Klárának nem hinni, hogy férje valami titkos és nagy k sértés miatt letért az erény útjáról, meghasonlott az Istennel, s földi érdekekért örökkévalókat kockázattatott. (A rajongók. Vol. I, 256 257.)
Though the borders between standard narrative and narrated monologue are perhaps not immediately clear in this passage, syntactic and stylistic features of several of the sentences suggest that they can be interpreted as thoughts on the threshold of verbalization in Klára's mind. Narrated monologue, as Cohn points out, "teems with questions, exclamations, repetitions, overstatements, colloquialisms." Here it is precisely these features that imply shifts to narrated monologue. Words and phrases such as "accusation of his conscience" ("lélekvád"), "sanctifying repentance" ("tisztító bánat"), and "path of virtue" ("erény útja") evoke the language of Klára's consciousness. The question in the second sentence and the response to this question depict the dialogue taking place in her mind.

With the exception of the narrator's assertion that "Klára shuddered in her premonition of the grave, the critical hours" (an example of psycho narration), the pattern of question/answer dialogue continues through the rest of the passage. This is not unlike the dialogues from Pál Gyulai and Widow and Daughter that are rendered in quoted monologue. The crucial difference is that by maintaining the third person reference the narrative does not insist that Klára has actually formulated these thoughts in words. Her doubts and fears tremble in regions of her consciousness not immediately accessible to language.

Klára's thoughts are often rendered in narrated monologue. The following excerpt describes her anxieties as she lies awake after a long and fatiguing journey:

The trip had tired Klára, but it failed to bestow peaceful dreams on her.

She knew that the next day she would come to a turning point in her life and in the destiny of her family.

If she fled with her husband, where would they settle in this vast world?

And if her husband didn't want to leave, when would they find peace in this life, which quarreled so with their fates and their hearts?

There the desert horizon without a point where the eye might rest, here the depths with their twisting whirlpools.

There squalor, here doom!

So many reasons why the woman's eyes would not close."

Az út elfárasztá Klárát, de mégsem ajándékozta meg csendes álommal.

Tudta, hogy másnap fordulópontozt ut élethe és háznépének sorsa.

Ha férjével bujdosásnak indul, hol fognak tanyát verni a széles világon?

S ha férje nem akar távozni, mikor fognak nyugalmat lelni az életben, mellyel sorsuk vagy szük megheaslonlott?

Ott a sivatag láthatár nyugpont nélkül, itt a mélység a sodró örvénnyel.

Ott nyomor várat rágjuk, itt süllyedés!

Mennyi ok, hogy a n szemei be ne csukódjanak! (A rajongók. Vol. I, 292.)
Again, though grammatically these questions and the two statements expressing hopelessness that follow them are rendered from the third-person point of reference, the content and the style imply that they are Klára's unverbalized thoughts reported by the narrator. The narrator's vague remark, "so many reasons why the woman's eyes would not close," suggests the elusiveness of these thoughts in Klára's mind. Klára is perhaps the most introspective and least vocal character of a novel in which virtually all of the characters are introspective. Her thoughts, however, almost never find form in quoted monologue. She is also one of the characters least in control of her fate. Tossed by circumstance into situations entirely foreign to her, she is constantly troubled by fears and doubts that she struggles to confront. Narrated monologue, because it renders her thoughts without imposing the rigid order required by quoted monologue, is the ideal approach to presenting her disordered mind. Quoted monologue, no matter how inchoate, can only present thoughts as a succession of words. This inevitably creates the impression of linearity. Narrated monologue, though it preserves a character's idiom, avoids this implication by maintaining the hiatus between thought and language.

Narrated monologue thus incorporates advantages of both of the other two modes identified by Cohn. Like psycho-narration, narrated monologue can touch on a character's thoughts without implying that the character has sufficient grasp of these thoughts to have translated them into words. Like quoted monologue, narrated monologue allows for the expression of a character's thoughts in that character's idiom. It minimizes, without removing, the narrating presence, focusing the text on the inner life of the character without relinquishing the narrative to the voice of that character entirely.

According to Cohn's historical model of the history of the novel, narrated monologue emerged comparatively late. While it appeared occasionally in eighteenth century novels such as *Tom Jones*, it was in the middle of the nineteenth century that it emerged as a dominant approach to the narration of consciousness. This coincided with two trends: the growing interest in inner over outer experience; and the desire to create unobtrusive narrators whose presence would hardly be noticed by the reader. The supreme practitioner of this technique (according to Cohn but also Lubbock, Proust, Stephen Ullmann, R. J. Sherrington, and others) was Flaubert. It continued to figure in the novels of twentieth century writers such as Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Faulkner and even novelists of the nouveau roman generation such as Sarraute, but in competition with the syntactically fractured, discontinuous interior monologue exemplified by certain passages in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Kemény's use of narrated monologue reflects both his desire to create narratives that give voice to the thoughts of their characters as well as his anxiety concerning the inadequacies of interior monologue.
G. Conclusions

If the nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the focus of narrative fiction away from the retelling of events towards the narration of the thoughts and feelings of characters, Zsigmond Kemény can be said to fall in the middle of this shift. His novels are reflections of the emerging interest in individual, subjective experience that accompanied the Romantics' rejection of the Enlightenment faith in the uniformity of humankind. John Stuart Mill's contention that the true poet is not heard, but rather overheard could be applied to the characters of his novels. Incessantly losing themselves in their own thoughts (even when in the company of others), they seem constantly to explore the limits of self knowledge through language.

Yet as the critical tools provided by Cohn help demonstrate, Kemény does not rely on a character's verbalization of his thoughts alone in exploring the complexities and contradictions of the human psyche. He adopts all the available narrative techniques for the presentation of consciousness. If Wolfgang Kayser is correct to assign drama the "priority of event" and "to the private world of the novel the priority of figure," Kemény's novels represent works that develop this genre to its full distinctive potential.

Kemény has often been characterized as an author of works that are difficult and even tediously complex. As Szegedy-Maszák observes, these contentions tend to focus on those passages of Kemény's works "in which the author struggles to find means of expressing the human psyche." Szegedy-Maszák writes,

I find this accusation unjust, or rather historically unfounded, because Kemény had very few precursors to whom he could look back. Henry James succeeded only decades later, through long and focused effort, in achieving a similar goal, though he wrote in the language of Shakespeare, and there were, among his precursors, such investigators of the psyche as the masters of the eighteenth century epistolary novels, Sterne, or Jane Austen. The stylistics of the psychological novel must be created in each individual language, and in this respect there was no organic tradition behind Kemény."

If Kemény's works can be regarded as part of a trend in European literature, they may equally be construed as seminal texts in Hungarian literature. Twentieth century Hungarian authors such as Dezső Kosztolányi or Sándor Márai, whose works (for example Skylark translated by Richard Aczel 1993 ox Embers translated into English from German by Carol Brown Janeway 2001) have, through translation, won acclaim even outside of Hungary, owe a debt, it could be argued, to Kemény, whose experiments with the uses of language as a tool for the representation of consciousness created a new genre of novel in Hungarian literature.
Editions of Kemény's works cited:

A szerelem élete. In: Kisregények és elbeszélések. 227 256.
A szív örvényei. In: Kisregények és elbeszélések, I-lA.


Notes

2. Ibid., 16.
3. Lewis likens the following passage from the Pickwick Papers to the monologues of Leopold Bloom:
   "Terrible place dangerous work – other day - five children mother tall lady eating sandwiches forgot the arch crash knock children look around mother's head off sandwich in her hand – no mouth to put it in head of a family off shocking, shocking..." (Cited in Edel. 18.)
4. Ibid., 27.
5. R. J. Sherrington's Three Novels by Flaubert is an extreme example of this. Sherrington contends that in the works of Flaubert, "only scenes and actions which can be seen through the eyes of the characters, and which are important to them, are now presented." R. J. Sherrington, Three Novels by Flaubert (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 81.
6. Pouillon's vue avec, adopted later by Todorov, served to denote passages of a text that could be said to depict the viewpoint of a character, while Benveniste's distinction between histoire and discours, renamed personal and a personal by Barthes, attempted to identify the speaker of a text. However interesting, from a theoretical perspective, the concepts proposed by these critics may be, they rest on highly questionable methodology. Pouillon claimed that the perspective of a character (vue avec) could be recognized on the basis of its deviation from the perspective of an "impartial observer." This raises the obvious question, how can one speak of impartial observers in fictional texts? Todorov, who adopted and expanded Pouillon's approach, attempted to develop a similar framework, basing his conclusions on an equally problematic distinction between "objective" and "subjective" language. Benveniste's concept of discours and histoire (text spoken by a narrating presence and text that narrates itself) rests on such tenuous distinctions that Barthes, in his essay Introduction à l'analyse structural des récits, actually confuses the two and ends up reversing Benveniste's original conclusions. See: Jean Pouillon, Temps et roman (Paris: Gallimard, 1946); Tzvetan Todorov, "Les categories du récit littéraire," Communications 8 (1966): 125 151; Emile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguisáque générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); Roland Barthes, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits," Communications 8 (1966): 1 27.


14. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, "Id és tér Kemény Zsigmond regényeiben," *Literatura* (1979), 79. ("A XIX. században egyetlen magyar próza rót sem érdekelten mértékeben a bels okság a világirodalomban pedig Stendhalt leszám tva talán senkit sem Flaubert, Dosztojevszkij, és James el tt.")

15. Dezso Kozma, *Eleven örökség* (Kolozsvár: Tini vár, 2000), 51. (" rónik közül kevesen tudtak annyit az ember bels világának legfinomabbb reedite ae l, mint .")

16. Ferenc Szemlér, *A költészet értelme* (Bucharest, 1965), 119. ("A m vet és az embert egymástól elválasztani nem lehet. Az alkotóból fejlj ki a m , de a m ben teljes egészében fellédethet az alkotó maga. Az irodalomtörténetirő az életrajz alapján igyekszik magyarázatot találni a m re[]")


das Drama, in allem, was die Erkenntniß der Menschen als Leib und Charakter betrifft, und im Gegensatz, zu der Anschauung, als sei das Drama das eigentlich plastische Dichtwerk, bekenne ich, daß ich es vielmehr als eine Kunst der Silhouette und den erzählten Mensch allein als rund, ganz, wirklich, und plastische empfinde. Man ist Zuschauer bei einem Schauspiel; man ist mehr als das in einer erzählten Welt."


20. Ibid., 51, 1450a.

21. Miklós Jósika, Regény es regény tészet (1858), 500. ("Újabb id ben az tészét nem egyszer azon sajnálatos tévedésben van, hogy a szép forma minden rt betakar s minden hiányt elfőd, miként erre már feljebb céloztunk. Mi ezt sohasem fogjuk elhinni, s az érdekes mesét a regény egyik főkellékének tartjuk." Italics in original.)


23. Ibid., 534.


31. Blankenburg, 263. ("Wenn wir in der wirklichen Welt nicht jedesmal alle die Ursachen, die eine Begebenheit vielmehr so, als anders hervorbringen, begreifen und beobachten können: so geschieht dies, weil die Summe der wirkenden Ursachen zu sehr groß und mannichfaltig; das Ganze zu sehr in einander gelocht ist, als daß wir sie darin ze entdecken vermögen.")


33. William James, The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1911), Vols 1 3. James fust used this term in the sixth chapter of Principles, entitled "The Mind Stuff Theory," in which he wrote, "one need not treat as the physical counterpart of the stream of consciousness under observation, a 'total brain activity' which is non existent as a genuinely physiological fact" (Vol. 1, 180). In the ninth chapter, entitled "Stream of Thought," he explained the grounds for this metaphor: "Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. // talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought,
of consciousness, or of subjective life" (Vol. I, 233. Italics in original). Later in the same chapter, in a passage that could be said to prefigure Joyce's innovations, he writes of the inadequacies of language as a tool for the presentation of consciousness: "If there be such things as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between objects exist in rerum naturae, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known. There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward coloring of its own. In either case the relations are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades" (Vol. I, 238. Italics in original).


37. Edei, 38.

38. In his *Narrative Discourse* Genette outlines categories similar to Cohn's and illustrates them with examples similar to mine. He distinguishes three possible techniques for the narration of speech: narrated speech, transposed speech, and reported speech. He gives the following examples:

- Narrated speech: I informed my mother of my decision to marry Albertine.

- Transposed speech: I went to find my mother: it was absolutely necessary that I marry Albertine.

- Reported speech: I said to my mother (or: I thought): it is absolutely necessary that I marry Albertine.

These would correspond to Cohn's psycho-narration, narrated monologue, and quoted monologue. The crucial difference between Genette's categories and Cohn's is that, with the exception of reported speech (which, in spite of its name, refers, according to Genette's example, to thought as well), Genette's apply to speech, and therefore do not address the questions raised by the stream of consciousness novel, whereas Cohn's refer explicitly to thought. (Gerard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: an Essay in Method*, transl. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), 171 172).


40. Cohn, 12.

41. Cohn, v.

42. Edel, 27.

43. Blankenburg, 264. ("Der Dichter, wenn er sich nicht entehren will, kann den Vorwand nicht haben, daß er das Inne seiner Perßonen nicht kenne.")


46. Cohn, 21.

47. Ferencz Papp, "B. Jósika Miklós és B. Kemény Zsigmond," *Budapesti Szemle* 140/2 (1909):
199–229,209. ("Jósika alakjait gyakran csak a külségek, néha csak eltér nevek különböztetik meg egymástól.")

48. Szinyei, Novella és regényirodalmunk: A Bach korszakig, JJ, 222. ("Kemény a korrajz külségeivel nem tör dík annyit, mint Jósika.")

49. Papp, 209. ("Kemény alakjai, kikben minden pillanatban végőlelki élet mozgását érezzük, teljesen ellentétesek Jósika regény h seivel.")

50. László Németh, "Az én katedrám," in Németh László munkái (Budapest, 1969), 602. ("Realizmusa itt tanulta meg a lelket szolgáló és lelket eláruló arcjátékok és testmozgások nyelvét.")

51. Jen Péterfy, "Báró Kemény Zsigmond mint regény ró," in Péterfy Jen Munkái: Irodalmi tanulmányok (Budapest: Franklin Társlat), 55. ("A képzelemnek a belső irányultságát a legfelületesebb olvasó is észreveheti Kemény első művén.")

52. Mihály Szegedy Maszák, Kemény Zsigmond, 110. ("A lassú ütem elbeszélésre azért volt szüksége, mert a belső cselekményességnek fontosabb szerepet szánt, mint a külső nek.")

53. Cohn, 14.

54. Cited in Cohn, 24.

55. Cohn, 24.

56. Ibid., 25.

57. Mihály Szegedy Maszák, Kemény Zsigmond, 77. ("a figyelmet önmagára iránytó elbeszél akár még a h. seinél is h. benn ismerhetetl az, ami végemegye a lelükben.")

58. Cohn, 29.

59. Ibid., 28.

60. Ibid., 25.

61. Ibid., 23.


63. Cited in Cohn, 23.

64. Cohn, 24.

65. Ibid., 24.


68. See: Zoltán Ferenczi, "Kemény Zsigmond Emlékezete," Budapesti Szemle 159 (1914): 1 25, 12: "Kemény studied in depth the nature of personality driven by passion, and in this doubt­lessly Shakespeare and Balzac were his masters[.]" ("Ö mélyen tanulmányozta a szenvedély által vezetett jellemek természetét s ebben kétségtelenül Shakespeare és Balzac voltak mesteri[.]"); Ferenc Szinyei, Kemény Zsigmond munkássága a szabadságharcig. Akadémiai Székhálosló. (1920, Oct. 1.) (Budapest: Stephaneium Nyomda Könyvkiadó R. T., 1924). 16. "He gave great attention to the appearances of a character, particularly the face, but here partly under the influence of Balzac he reaches deeper[.]") ("Alakja külséjeinek, f. ként arcának le rása nagy gondot ford t, de itt részben Balzac hatása alatt már mélyebbre nyúl[.]"); Jen Pintér, A Magyar Irodalom Története (Budapest: Franklin Társlat, 1938), JJ, 327. "The way in which the writer sketches the psychological life of this unhappy man [the protagonist of Husband and Wife], this soul searching and psyche analyzing artistry can be said to be unparalleled in our old literature. In the choice and the adaptation of the theme of this novel Kemény stood under the influence of Balzac." ("Ahogyan az ró ennek a boldogtalan embernek
lelki életét megrajzolja, ez a lélekklátó és lélekelemzés vészet páratlannak mondható régibb regényirodalmunkban. A regény problémájának megválasztásában és feldolgozásában Balzac hatása alatt állott."

69. Cohn, 26.


71. Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: 1961), 164. Booth contends that,"any sustained view (...) temporarily turns the character whose mind is shown into a narrator."

72. In Finnegan’s Wake Joyce frequently runs words together, as in the following examples:

As we there are where are we are we there from tomtittot to teetootomtotalitarian. Tea tea too oo. Finnegan’s Wake (New York: Viking Press, 1939). 260.
Methought as I was dropping asleep somepart in nonland of where’s please (and it was when you and they were we) I heard at zero hour as ‘twere the peal of vixen’s laughter among midnight’s chimes from out the belfry of the cute old speckled church tolling so faint a goodmantrue as nighthood’s unseen violet rendered all animated greatbritish and Irish objects nonviewable to human watchers save ‘twere perchance anon some glistery gleam darkling adown surface of affluent flowandflow as again might seem garments of laundry reposing a leasward close at hand in full expectation. And as I was jogging along in a dream as dozing I was dawdling, arrah, methought broadtone was heard and the creepers and the gliders and flivers of the earth breath and the danceotongues of the woodfires and the hummers in their ground all vociferated echoating: Shaun! Shaun! Post the post! with a high voice and O, the higher on high the deeper and low, I heard him so! And lo, mescemed somewhat came of the noise and somehow might amove allmurk. Now, ‘twas as clump, now mayhap. (403^104.)

73. Péterfy, 55. (‘‘Kemény alakjai többet beszélnek magokkal és magoknak, mint egymással és egymásnak.’‘)

74. Ibid., 55. (‘‘Ha monológok drámai h st megteremthetnének, Gyulai Pál volna rá szemenszedett példány.’‘)


76. Veress, 85. (‘‘Szinete képtelenek az igazi párbeszédré, alkatuk, önmagukra irányuló érdeklődés mindenekfelett a monológra teszi hajlamossá ket.’‘)


78. Péterfy, 56. (‘‘Ha Kemény drámát írt volna, azt hiszem, h seid mind külön, egymás után lépnek föl és mély, költ í szavakban addig elméldkednek a sorsról.’‘)


80. Cohn, 61.


82. Szegedy Maszák, Kemény Zsigmond, 253. (‘‘Aligha van még egy magyar regény a XLX. században, mely annyira gyakran szerepeltetné a bels monológot, mint A rajongók.’‘)

83. Ibid., 81. (‘‘Kemény m veiben különösen gyakoriak az olyan részletek, amelyekr 1 lehetetlen megállap tani, hogy bels monológok e vagy küls k. A néma magánbeszéd még annyira ritkán fordult el a magyar szépprózában a XLX. század közepén, hogy a Gyulai Pál, az Övegy, A rajongók s a Zord id szerz ja valósz n leg már csak azért sem törekedett egyértelm ségre, mert azt gondolhatta, gy könnyebben elfogadja a közönség a szokatlanul gyakori monológokat.’‘)

84. Cohn, 82.

85. Genette, 180.

87. Cohn, 91.
92. Ibid., 225.
93. Ibid., 235.
94. Ibid., 243.
96. Cited in Bickerton, 234.
97. Cohn's term quoted monologue, as previously noted, refers both to soliloquy and what Bickerton calls direct interior monologue. She points out that this distinction rests on the definition of interior monologue as associate and the soliloquy as rational and deliberate. "[I]t is impossible," she argues, "to decide on the basis of such nuances whether a text is, or is not, an interior monologue: many quotations of fictional minds ... contain both logical and associate patterns. ... The interior monologue-soliloquy distinction, moreover, makes one lose track of the twin denominators common to all thought-quotations, regardless of their content and style: the reference to the thinking self in the first person, and to the narrated moment (which is also the moment of locution) in the present tense." 13.
98. Joyce, Ulysses, 42.
99. Cohn, 272.
100. Ibid., 174.
101. Ibid., 76.
103. Cohn, 98.
104. Ibid., 109.
105. Ibid., 110.
106. Ibid., 110.
108. Cohn, 103.
111. Genette, 169.
112. Ibid., 109.
113. Cohn, 102.
115. Mill, ibid., 109. "Poetry and eloquence are both alike the expression or uttering forth of feeling. But if we may be excused the seeming affectation of the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard. Elocuence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling
confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, and bodying itself forth in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavoring to influence their belief, or move them to passion or action.

116. Wolfgang Kayser, *Das sprachliche Kunstwerk* (Berne: A. Francke AG Verlag, 1948), 369. ("Indem so die Figuren [eines Dramas] dauernd 'dem andern' zugeordnet und in die Spannung auf das Kommende gestellt sind, indem andererseits auch der Raum, soweit er nicht neutraler Schauplatz ist, voller Spannung steckt, kann man sagen, daß zum Dramatischen an sich der Vorrang des Geschehens gehört, so wie zur 'privaten' Welt des Romans der Vorrang der Figur gehört.")

117. Miliály Szegedy Massák, "Tragikum és irónia Kemény Zsigmond történetszemléletében." *ItK* (1990): 94–100, 95. ("Akik Kemény rásmódjának nehézkességére hivatkoznak, általában azokra a részletekre szoktak utalni, melyekben az ró közdelmet folytat az emberi tudat kifejezésére. Jogtalannak, pontosabban történetietlennek érzem e vádat, s f ként azért, mert Kemény nagyon kevés el zményre támaszkodhatott. Henry Jamesnek évtizedekkel kés bb is csak hosszú s kitartó munkával sikerült elérne hasonló célt, pedig Shakespeare nyelvén rt, s el dei között a léleknek olyan felder t i voltak, mint a levélregény XIV. századi mesterei, Sterne vagy Jane Austen. A lélektani regény kifejezésmodját minden nyelven meg kell teremteni, s ebben a tekintetben Kemény mögött nem állt szerves hagyomány.")
EIGENKULTUR – FREMDKULTUR

ZIVILISATIONSKRITISCH FUNDIERTE SELBSTFINDUNG
IN DEN LITERARISCHEN REISEBESCHREIBUNGEN
DER AKTIVISTEN ROBERT MÜLLER UND LAJOS KASSÁK

PÁL DERÉKY

Universität Wien, Wien
Österreich


Schlüsselwörter: Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, Expressionismus, Exotismus, Messianismus, Wien – Budapest 1910-1930


„Gott ich sag dir - der Brüüer - ich flieg auf ihn damisch, so ist das ein Wunder, er ist doch dynamisch. Was hab ich von den andern, so blasiert und kränklich, teils sind sie nachdenklich, teils sind sie bedenklich. 
Pervers sein ist schön, doch auf die Dauer zu fad,  
er allein, schau ihn an, hat den Willen zur Tat.  
Unter Stimmungsmenschen ist er Aktivist,  
und ausserdem ist er der einzige Christ."  

Die Szene endet mit einem 'All right' Brüllers.6


Trotz vieler Schein-Analogien ist jedoch Müllers Schrifttum keine Blut und Boden-Literatur. Adolf Bartels, das Oberhaupt der völkischer Kritik, hat „Jüdisches", „Entartetes" an seinem Werk festgestellt, und ihm wäre wohl - hätte er es erlebt - wie Gottfried Benn der Vorwurf des Kulturbolschewismus nicht erspart geblieben. Umso mehr, als er ihn auf sich selber als Ehrentitel bezogen hat:

Man möchte sich fragen - schreibt Müller 1920 -, ob Expressionismus, Aktivismus und Bolschewismus nicht Synonyme für dieselbe moderne Erregung sind, je nachdem sie sich auf verschiedenen Formgebieten ausspricht, dem der Kunst, der Kultur, der Politik.8

Im gleichen Jahr beschrieb er die Aktivismus-Auffassung des neuen Menschen:

Der Aktivismus ist eine Emotion seelischer Grundtatsachen wie die Gothic oder die Aufklärung. Er zentriert das Leben neu, und zwar nicht ohne seine Wirkungen unkontrolliert zu lassen wie der Dichter, von dem er abstammt, sondern mit einer entschiedenen undich-
Donau-Alpenmenschen, zwecks Expansion und Genus smaximierung zur Verfü-
gung zu stellen, wollte Kassák mit Hilfe der neuerweckten mythisierten Urkräften des europäischen Mittelalters" und der Errungenschaften moderner Technik die Arbeiterjugend der Welt emanzipieren und zum Kunstschaffen befähigen (Kassák: Schöpferische Menschen). Beide gaben ihren Utopien literarische Ausdrucks-
formen, die sie jeweils auf ihre eigene Art mit Bildern einer Reise allegorisieren.
Es handelt sich um Zeitreisen: Bei Müller in die Urzeit bzw. in die Zeitlosigkeit des Urwald-Daseins, bei Kassák werden jene historischen Christus-Darstellungen (er beziffert ihre Zahl mit dreitausend), die sein Protagonist während der Reise gesehen haben soll, durch die Person eines Reisegefährten extrapolirt bzw. wird der Glaube an die kommende russische Revolution in die Zukunft projiziert.

Slim wurde das Opfer einer Eifersuchts. Man denke sich drei weiße Männer, die mit der Glut der Tropen im Blute um eine Indianerin werben - da fällt mir ein, sie hieß Zana. Ob die Trägerin dieses Na-
mens mit jener Priesterin Zaona identisch ist, die Jahre nach den Geschehnissen, die hier erzählt sind, den großen Indianeraufstand entfesselte, war nicht zu erweisen.

Somit wurde bereits im Vorwort die Handlung des Buches umrissen, das nach der Einschätzung des Herausgebers keineswegs als Literatur gelten kann, viel eher als Zeitdokument, als „Urkunde“, denn


„es ist ganz belanglos" markieren eine beträchtliche semantische Abweichung, die vom Zeitgenossen Gáspár auch richtig gedeutet wurde: Statt Sinnverweigerung oder Sinnnegierung werden die Konsequenzen der vorangegangenen Behauptungen in Frage gestellt. Das unbestreitbare Scheitern soll nicht als notwendig und unausweichbar erfolgendes Aufgeben, sondern als Auslöser einer notwendigen Neudefinition verstanden werden. Sehen wir uns das eingangs angeführte Zitat etwas ausführlicher an: „[...]* und wer morgens aufbricht unsicher ob er abends heimkehrt * der ist am glücklichsten wenn er eine wendbare haut hat * denn wer könnte schon über sich hinwegsehen * was wir aufstellen das ist aufgestellt * aber was wir aufstellen bedeutet nichts [hat nichts zu bedeuten] * die flüssen sind bereit in stücke zu brechen wenn sie sich beeiilen wollen *“ (Stauffer).

unabänderlich, infolge dessen als nicht der Rede wert angenommen. Der öffentliche Teil des Ichs wird „geheilt“ und „berufen“, der private bleibt farblos; weder schön noch häßlich, weder klein noch groß, tritt er als Objekt der Leserbegierde nicht in Erscheinung. Farbe und Bewegtheit bekommt es nur als kollektives Individuum, als Künstler, als Sachverständiger der Arbeiterklasse für Fragen der Bildung und der Kunst. Es ist zwar das private Ich, das siegreich die Probe des feinen Lebens besteht, die Austern werden aber nicht gegessen, um seine Eitelkeit zu schmeicheln, sondern um die Höherwertigkeit eines kollektiven Individuums zu demonstrieren. Müßig zu sagen, dass diese hochartifizielle Einstellung sich nicht lange pflegen ließ: Sie ist kurz nach Kassáks Rückkehr (infolge einer Amnestie im Herbst 1926) nach Ungarn sowohl als Bildungs- als auch als Dichtungsideal zusammengebrochen.


Notes


170


REPRESENTING WHICH PAST?

BICENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON MUSEUMS IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY HUNGARY

GÁBOR ÉBLI

Institute of Art History, HAS, Budapest
Hungary

In 2002, Hungary celebrated the bicentennial of the foundation of its National Museum. As the initial, universal collections branched off into a range of specific museums during the later 19th century, this development characterised the successes and failures of the whole of the "museum idea" in this Central European country of a belated but rapid modernisation. The astounding number of museums in Hungary founded primarily in the half-century preceding the Great War betrayed considerable diversity in their focus upon universal vs. national values, as much as upon a didactic vs. a scholarly mission. Much of this variety has been forgotten, although quite a few of its benefits are worth reviving today.

**Keywords:** public collections, national memory, visual education, national identity, art exhibitions, applied arts, museum architecture, institutions of culture, urbanisation, hungarica

In Western museums discourse interest in the socio-political factors that shaped the foundation of museums in the modern age has multiplied in recent decades. Now, with some delay, a similar surge in researching the complexity of nineteenth-century museum foundations can be observed in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, this development is reinforced by publications and exhibitions on the bicentennial of the "museum idea," which is traced back to the initiation of the National Museum in 1802. Also, as cultural policy and private patrons are beginning to look at Hungarian museums differently today, many a public collection - such as the Museum of Ethnography, which celebrated its 130th birthday just last year - is changing its profile by activating some of its own, partly forgotten, traditions. Thus, re-examining the museums' roots in the past often has current, pragmatic connotations.

Much of this re-assessment revolves around typically Eastern European questions: with how much of a delay after the Western precedents were Hungarian

---

* A shortened version of this paper was presented at the seminar Multiple Antiquities, Substitute Antiquities and Fragile Modernities in Central and Eastern Europe, organised by Collegium Budapest, in March 2003.
museums established, and how efficiently did they adopt the leading foreign patterns? Thus, for instance, the Museum of Applied Arts - which was first allotted an independent budget in 1872 -justly prides itself on having closely followed the British and Austrian public collections in the decorative arts, and thus preceded other museums of its kind in Europe. While such comparisons have their value, the following presentation proposes a different approach. Instead of judging Hungarian museums by an assumed universal standard, why not look at them in their diversity?

The word "museum" has been applied to a number of public collections only in retrospect. Today we use this umbrella notion for a variety of institutions, yet we must be aware of the fundamental differences in their - initial and later - function, organisation, and message to the public. There were serious differences with regard to universal vs. national collections, and to the focus upon the different layers of the past vs. the present, in the individual institutions. Museums adopted different strategies in integrating local and international material; and, while most of them came into being as some kind of a "shrine of memory," there were important variations in the ways they evoked the past. This paper examines the original structure of museums in Hungary along these two lines, and argues that while nineteenth-century museums typically came into being with a nationalistic message and a focus upon the historical past, Hungarian museums deviated from this in several ways.

To prepare the ground for this different vision, it is worth beginning with the range of museums that were called to life with a commitment to the present, rather than to the past. Although today a traditionalist institution, the Museum of Applied Arts was initially just one of them. Its aim was to promote the visual education of manufacturers and of the visiting public, in order to fuse industrial mass production with aesthetic sensitivity. Born of the idea of William Morris' "arts and crafts" movement, the MAA in Budapest first served as a depository of production samples for the Design School, housed in the same building. Objects of the past were collected and shown as items of instruction for the craftsmen of the present. At the Vienna World Exhibition in 1873, the first acquisitions for the MAA embraced contemporary - i.e., historicizing (Revivalist) - objects. Furthermore, its building (1896), a masterpiece of Hungarian Art Nouveau, mobilised geographically and temporally distant motifs in a current design. Only the separation of the school from the museum after the Great War brought a decisive turn - to the art of the past. For all four decades of its operation in the long nineteenth century, the MAA remained a pragmatic center, serving educational schemes of the present. Moreover, while Hungarian applied arts features were highlighted in the exhibitions, the collection had no explicit national focus; and its universal scope was reinforced during the twentieth century.
The Museum of Technology and Industry (1882) was likewise established to provide practical instruction, rather than assembling a historical collection. Functioning as a school and research centre for engineers, it facilitated industrial innovation—i.e., the overcoming of the obstacles of the past and the backwardness in the Hungarian economy. Even those portions of the handicrafts collection of the National Museum (initiated in 1808) that were transferred here were used in education. Soon, contemporary industrial items were no longer collected, either, in the assumption that innovation would quickly make them look obsolete; and this institution paid no attention to the "age value" of objects. This precipitated the death of this museum: by its thirtieth anniversary, the institution had surrendered collecting, and turned into a laboratory.

The Museum of Commerce (1886) did not care either for, or about, the past at all. Based on an export sample storehouse, it presented a changing permanent exhibition of Hungarian industrial products, and attracted a considerable 200,000 visitors a year by recurrently showing the latest achievements, and removing from its exhibitions the items produced a few years earlier, as useless remnants of the past. When austerity enforced the closure of the exhibition, however, the historical value of the objects was realised, and they landed in the National Museum (1923). The collections of educational tools in the Museum of Pedagogy (1877) experienced a similar fate, when the museum terminated in 1922. By contrast, two further museums of a pragmatic mission—the Museum of Transport (1899) and the Museum of Criminology (1908)—shifted on their own, over the decades, from being a resource center for contemporary experts in their field, to presenting material of historical interest, and thus were saved from liquidation. Turning into a collection of items of the past offered survival for these museums.

The Museum of Agriculture (1896), which issued from the Museum of Horticulture (1869) and the Museum of Husbandry (1891), also had a sophisticated relationship to the past. While initially no more than a model show for farmers, it assumed a central role in representing past agricultural patterns in the Millennium Exhibition (1896) that commemorated the settlement of the Hungarian tribes in the Carpathian Basin a thousand years earlier. From 1907, the permanent exhibition included a diorama-like presentation of 28 so-called "ancient professions" [ősfoglalkozások], such as hunting, fishing and forestry, based on the anthropological collecting trips of Ottó Herman, an instrumental figure in Hungarian paleontology. As a result, the museum was chartered as a scholarly institution (1912) and has flourished since, becoming the largest of its kind in Europe, and being popular with young visitors.

Whilst most of these instances resembled the classic museums only distantly, the exhibitions on agriculture showed a close proximity to those in the Museum of Ethnography. For many decades part of the National Museum, ethnography
developed in Hungary along the parallel lines of national and universal collections. Interest in the "primitive" cultures triggered overseas expeditions, while the search for an "authentic" national culture fostered research into local folk customs. The first ethnographic collection ordered in scholarly taxonomy was that of Hungarian fishery, by Herman, which was revealed in the National Exhibition in 1885, published as a book two years later, and sent to the Paris World Exhibition in 1900.

While ethnological collecting trips to various parts of the world, both by Hungarian aristocrats and by the government-funded museum, continued until the Great War, the museum primarily focused upon Hungarian ethnography. This subsumed saving the contemporary material culture, and the record of the habits, of the peoples of the Carpathian Basin and of those in Europe related to them, as these were threatened by industrialisation and urbanisation. The notion of "national folk heritage" was born when modernisation rapidly dismantled a rural culture that had earlier not been valued on its own, because it had been a given trait for centuries. Now that changing life patterns made these objects and customs disappear, their foreseeable shortness lent value to them. In assembling items then still actively used in peasant households, the museum was saving what was soon to be the future's past. It suggests the speed of this process - and the hunger of the modern, urban public for an encounter with what they suddenly regarded as their half-exotic "Other" - that the first permanent exhibition of the ethnology of the Carpathian Basin opened as early as 1898. Many of the forms and patterns used by "folk art" (another category freshly invented in Europe just then) were also thought to supply models for the renewal of contemporary applied arts. In this, the scholarly holdings of ethnography were to offer a source of practical inspiration similar to the shows of the MAA.

Ethnography had had from the first moment a distinct interest in re-constructing the linguistic and material elements of the ancient Hungarian past. The holdings of the first expedition to Siberia (1839) and the results of visiting the Finno-Ugric peoples related to the ancestors of the Magyars were inventoried as specimens of natural science in the National Museum - yet soon they were transferred to the Department of Ethnography. Searching for the roots of Hungarians became a hotly debated issue, and the museum turned into a locus for determining some of the key historical (and contemporary) elements of national identity. If ethnography could be related in many respects to the pragmatic missions of other museums, this programme tied it to the activities of the flagship of Hungarian public collections - the National Museum. This connection indicated the politicisation of ethnography. While its status in scholarship was not questioned, ethnography was considered a central tool in governmental self-representation, both to the local population, and to the international audience.
The National Museum was the central site for assembling, identifying and showing items of national identity. Yet its exclusive focus upon Hungarian history took more than a century to settle. While founded in the wake of patriotism in 1802, for most of the nineteenth century it remained a universal collection in two senses. First, until the differentiation of individual museums from the 1870s onwards, its collections covered all areas of scholarship, from mineralogy to the arts, and a focus upon history became exclusive in the twentieth century only. Second, until well after the Great War, the museum was "national" as an institution, rather than in its collections that incorporated much universal material. Until the 1870s, historical and other scholarly material, as much as items of Hungarian and those of universal relevance were accumulated side by side. For most of the nineteenth-century, these groups of objects were exhibited together, so that the public had no encounter with an isolated reconstruction of the past as "history," nor did it see Hungarian material separate from its universal counterparts.

The preferences of key figures in the museum's history - such as founder Count Ferenc Széchényi, major donátor Miklós Jankovich (1836), and the most charismatic director Ferenc Pulszky (1869-1897) - oscillated between an attention to "hungarica" as opposed to universal holdings. If the museum's task was seen in strengthening the patriotic cohesion of Hungarians as an "imagined community," just being born of the nationalism of the age, then a local focus seemed justified. Yet, if the museum was to be a scholarly institution with an educational function, in the forefront of European museums, to familiarise the public with various civilisations, then its "national" responsibility implied not to be bent upon the provincial, but rather to re-invent it in the context of the universal. This issue - whether a museum is "national" by virtue of its collections or by its ownership and constituency that may well request universal exposure - is still alive in Hungary (and elsewhere).

In the nineteenth century, this discussion was carried out mostly in archaeology, the most dynamic field, and (as late as today) the largest department of the National Museum. As a result of the museum's excavations in Hungarian soil (begun in 1839), and of private donations, the holdings became so significant that Budapest hosted the 8th International Congress on Ancient Archaeology and Anthropology in 1876, which was an excellent occasion to present Hungarian findings in a universal context. The idea of a full-fledged Egyptian and an Antique Collection, separate from holdings coming from the territory of Hungary, arose at the turn of the century, but materialised rather slowly in the Museum of Fine Arts (established 1896), and accelerated only from the 1930s onwards. The first original Antiquities were not acquired for the MFA before 1907, when Antal Hekler - who had completed his doctorate with Furtwängler in Munich just then - bought parts of the Arndt Collection from Germany. For most of the nineteenth century,
museum acquisitions of antiquities were restricted in Budapest to plaster casts of architectural and artistic icons ranging from the Greco-Roman times to the Renaissance, as the Hungarian government financed no more than these copies, used as an educational trajectory.

In contrast, international acclaim for Hungarian archaeologists, and the growing local interest in saving the treasures of the distant past hidden in Hungarian soil, boosted archaeological research in the Hungarian provinces from the late 1850s. Spurred by the Benedictine priest and scholar Flóris Romer in Győr, a stunning series of provincial museums—among them around fifty of lasting importance—were founded all over the country. They focused upon either local ethnicity (Balassagyarmat, Jászberény) or the archaeology of their region (Nyíregyháza, Székesfehérvár). Intake of classical antiquities was exceptional, such as the purchase by Békés County in 1873 of the Etruscan and Roman items of painter Gyula Haan, which he had put together in Italy. Other local museums specialised in ethnography (Hódmezővásárhely), geology (Veszprém), natural history (Miskolc), or centred around a sizeable library (Szeged). Clerical collections (Eger, Esztergom, Pannonhalma) were outstanding in the fine arts, not least because they combined a universal scope with preserving the treasures of the Gothic and the Renaissance in churches in Hungary, threatened with physical decay.

The capital also featured its own local collection, the *Municipal Museum* of Budapest (1887). As systematic excavations of the Roman remains in the city's territory (Aquincum) were launched, from the 1870s, and the medieval parts of Buda Castle were unearthed, from the 1880s, agreement was reached with the National Museum that these holdings were to be administered by the Municipal Museum. Thus, Budapest, a young metropolis—a unified city only since 1873—received a chance to construct its own historical past, as part of a wider national narrative, which was *per se* part of universal history, as well. Items of the past assumed different meanings on each of these three levels. In addition, Budapest soon became receptive towards its contemporary culture, too, and the Municipal Museum was the first among local museums to collect and exhibit artworks by living artists.

Public art collections, on the whole, had a slow rise in nineteenth-century Hungary, and sorely exemplified the divisions between national and universal, as well as historical and contemporary values. The first permanent public art gallery opened as late as 1846, as a fruit of donations of Old Masters to the National Museum. Soon, works by living Hungarian painters—working at that time mostly abroad—were acquired. However, the public comprehension of the classical and of contemporary works remained fundamentally different. Just as the notion of the "museum" is applied to diverse institutions in retrospect, that of "art" subsumes these holdings under one and the same cover only today. Classical works mostly by
foreign masters, as a secular practice of art had been present in Hungary not for long - came from aristocratic and clerical collections (Pyrker, Ipolyi, and Esterházy Collections), and from a concerted series of state-funded purchases by Károly Pulszky in Italy in 1893/1894. These works were valued for their aesthetic, while the nineteenth-century Hungarian allegoric, academic and history paintings were tools in conjuring national sentiments and enlivening dramatic points of the heroic past. When further additions came, these works were grouped separately, and the classical masterpieces were put on show in the newly built Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1865).

Until the completion of the Museum of Fine Arts (1906), an "art museum" in the modern sense operated only in the Academy, whereas the public art galleries of the National Museum drew many visitors - for the illustrative-emotional effect of the paintings shown. Although these rooms in the National Museum presented some nineteenth-century foreign masters, as well (mostly from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), Hungarian art dominated this patriotic show, which was rather similar to a national pantheon and was called the National Picture Gallery (1851-1906), until it merged into the new MFA. Thus, universal art concentrated in the Old Masters collections, kept separately, whereas Hungarian masters determined the public vision of living art. This local art of the present was instrumental in constructing and disseminating the images of the (idealised) national past, yet its separation from the exhibition of classical European art drove a wedge between the aesthetic standards applied to the universal as opposed to the patriotic context of the Hungarian works. Although the twentieth century brought numerous variations in Hungarian museums on combining classical and modern, and Hungarian and international art, their comprehension and aesthetic value have remained rather different to date.

This conflict of local and universal art also characterised the exhibition record of institutions that had no permanent collection, and were thus not chartered as proper museums, yet played a seminal role in national representation as much as in public visual education. The Exhibition Hall (first erected 1871, then rebuilt in a new location in 1896) and the National Salon (1907) were the major public galleries, but it was often the smaller institutions - such as the Artists House (1909) and the Ernst Museum (1912) - that invited more international art shows. The closest approximation of universal aesthetic standards was achieved in Hungary in private collections, which rivalled those of Western cultural centres until after the Great War.

In conclusion, museums in nineteenth-century Hungary betrayed considerable diversity in their establishment and function. The representation of the past was a key task of many of them, and this often focused upon constructing a specifically national past - the traits of national identity and heritage. Nonetheless, not all collections had a national focus. In fact, the twentieth century was to bring a
closer commitment to national values in Hungarian museums, as the two lost
World Wars increased the financial and ideological pressures upon most of them
to represent the local past, and separate national exhibitions from those of universal
collections. With the Great War, the "golden age" of Hungarian museums
from the 1870s to the 1910s ended abruptly, and their universal engagement was
restricted drastically, never quite to recover.

In a first wave, from the early 1920s to the 1940s, the break up of the Austro
Hungarian Monarchy severely diminished the constituency of Hungarian muse­
mums, and the truncation of the country brought financial incapacity to acquire
works from the international art market. A shift towards conservative values in
cultural policy increased the attention to exhibitions of national interest. Second,
the Communist take over after World War II further isolated Hungarian museums
internationally. Thus, overall Hungarian museum development may be understood
as an opposite to generic shifts in museums in the Western hemisphere over the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whereas museums internationally rose on the
tide of nationalism in the nineteenth century, and became more cosmopolitan in
the twentieth, Hungarian museums reared a wider universal focus in the nine­
teenth century than they could afford in the twentieth century.

Select Bibliography to Museum Collections in Hungary

Múzeum, 1956.
Múzeum, 1996.
Galavics, Géza Gerda Mraz, eds. Von Bildern und anderen Schätzen: Die Sammlungen der Fürsten


**INSTRUCTION FOR AUTHORS**

*Hungarian Studies* appears twice a year. It publishes original essays - written in English, French and German - dealing with aspects of the Hungarian past and present. Multidisciplinary in its approach, it is an international forum of literary, philological, historical, and related studies. Each issue contains about 160 pages and will occasionally include illustrations. All manuscripts, books and other publications for review should be sent to the editorial address. Only original papers will be accepted for publication.

**Submission of Manuscripts**

Manuscripts should be sent in traditional, printed format and on disc or by e-mail to the editors:  
Phone: (36-1) 321-4407  
E-mail: hstudies@sanni.iti.mta.hu  
Homepage: www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/filo

**Presentation of Manuscripts**

The printout should be typed double-spaced on one side of the paper, with wide margins. The order should be as follows: title page, abstract, keywords, text, appendix, acknowledgements, notes, references, table, figure captions. For more information see the publisher's homepage: http://www.akkrt.hu/journals/hstud or contact the editor.

**Title page.** The title should be concise and informative. A short running title of no more than 40 characters should also be supplied. This is followed by the first name(s) and surname of the author(s), and the name of the institution the author works at. The mailing address, e-mail address and fax number of the corresponding author must also be given in a footnote.

**Abstract** should not exceed 200 words.

**Keywords** should not exceed 10.

**Notes** should be endnotes.

**References** in the text should follow the author-date format without comma. Where there are more than two authors, the name of the first author should be used, followed by et al. Publications by the
same author(s) in the same year should be listed as 1999a, 1999b. List the references in chronological order in the text and in alphabetical order at the end of the paper. The style and punctuation of references should conform to that used in the journal. See the following examples:


Martin Buber, *Das problem des Menschen* (Heidelberg: Lambert Scheider Verlag, 1984), 35.


*Tables.* Each, bearing a title, should be self-explanatory. They should be mentioned in the text, numbered consecutively with Arabic numerals and placed on separate sheets at the end of the manuscript, following the References. Their approximate position should be indicated on the margin of the manuscript.

*Proofs and reprints.* One set of proofs will be sent to the corresponding author, who is requested to return it to the editor within 48 hour of receipt.
From the Contents of the Forthcoming Issue

Essays on the works of Imre Kertész