The years following the First World War were a period of transition and adjustment for all the nations and states of the Danubian basin. Hungary, for instance, which had previously occupied a dual relationship with Austria in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was reduced to one-third its pre-war size and lost sixty percent of its population. The war caused the collapse of the old world and forced individuals to adjust to the realities of a new Europe. This paper examines the plight of one individual, the Hungarian intellectual and former minister of nationalities in the post-war government of Mihály Károlyi, Oszkár Jászi (1875-1957), and his struggle to carry his dream of a democratic Hungary in a Danubian confederation to a new life in post-war Vienna and America.

This article will focus on three periods of Jászi’s life: the first part covers his Hungarian period (from 1875 to May 21, 1919) when Jászi struggled to bring democratic reform to his country. These were the formative years of his life and influenced the course Jászi would follow until his death. The second period, from May 1919 to 1925, was characterized by Jászi’s efforts to keep the Hungarian emigration together in Vienna while he negotiated with the leaders of the successor states and wrote about the importance of a democratic Hungary to the security of East Central Europe. Jászi hoped to awaken the successor states to the dangers that existed in a Danubian basin constructed of small independent states between large expansive powers. The third period, from 1925 to 1957, concentrates on Jászi’s life in America and his attempts to educate the American people on the need to bring a democratic confederation to the Danubian basin for the purpose of future European security.

Throughout his life, Jászi believed democracy could not develop in Hungary as long as its “feudal” landlords were allowed to exploit labor and hinder the implementation of democratic reforms. Hungary needed organic reforms, because its political system could not be relied upon to initiate reform from above. Like the West, Hungary needed a middle class. Jászi felt that universal secret suffrage was needed in order to initiate a middle-class movement. After all, the Industrial Revolution had not changed the political reality in Hungary. Before the war, Jászi saw the inequity of a system that allowed an electorate of less than 400,000 people the power to control and determine the destinies of over 17 million. The main culprit for this injustice was money earned without the usage of labor. The profits made off the latifundia and usury capital were
the forces behind the failure to pass a suffrage act that would benefit all the citizens of Hungary. In 1908, in one of his article, “Miért kell az általános titkos választó-jog?” [Why is Universal Secret Suffrage Needed?], Járai zsi wrote that it was impossible to expect change from those in control of the present system. Hungary’s “feudal” landlords, who, after the war, accommodated themselves to the regime of Miklós Horthy, were aware of any threat to their positions and power within the country. Those who had vision and hoped to change Hungary into a modern state were easily labeled agitators, socialists, or demagogues. Járai zsi believed that land reform was the key that unlocked the door to suffrage. Land of the great latifundia and churches had to be dispersed to the peasantry. Afterwards, those peasants who did not possess land would become members of the industrial work force and make the way open to universal secret suffrage, or what Járai zsi called the “midwife” of bourgeoisie democracy. In other words, Hungary had to destroy the last remnants of feudalism before embarking upon the next step towards a bourgeois society.

Járai zsi saw the democratic transformation of Hungary as vital for the continuation of historic Hungary, although, early on he had some difficulty escaping from the throngs of nationalism. He believed, somewhat in the fashion of Marxist–Leninist doctrine, that “mankind is so constituted that the road to internationalism leads through the national”. Járai zsi was a socialist. His brand of socialism, “liberal socialism,” was to be the key to opening Hungary’s door to democracy. Since Hungary did not possess a strong bourgeoisie or middle class, the organized proletariat was the next, perhaps only, choice to lead the state on the path to a democratic future. Járai zsi did not advocate Marxist socialism. In actuality, he rejected all the existing political systems and trends during his lifetime: capitalism, fascism, communism, and social democracy. He did not want to see the elimination of “private ownership and free competition” that the Marxist socialists thought necessary for their democratization program. He rejected capitalism because of its monopolistic stage. Liberal socialism, led by an organized proletariat, would destroy the evils of capitalism: surplus labor and unearned income. Járai zsi and his followers in the Radical Party, through liberal socialism, would attempt to carry Hungary along the path that Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös had intended after the Ausgleich of 1867. They were going to carry Hungary on its next stage towards constitutional democratization.

Járai zsi’s character and personality are important factors in assessing his support for the democratization of Hungary. He was born on 2 March 1875, in Nagykároly in a section of the northeastern border of Transylvania known as the Partium. During the first two decades following the Ausgleich a new reform generation was born. Járai zsi, his childhood friend the poet Endre Ady, the socialist Ervin Szabó, just to name a few, were born during this time. Less than a year after Járai zsi’s birth, Ferenc Deák died at the age of seventy-two. With Deák’s death the classical liberal ideas he championed seem to have died with him. According to Lee Congdon “Classical liberalism had fallen into disrepute in Hungary”. The Industrial Revolution and the liberal economic doctrines of the age caused the “exploitation of labor to the benefit of a few select individuals”. In Hungary this period was also one of chauvinist-integral nationalism. The
liberal gains of the past decades, particularly those concerning the nationalities, were ignored or violated to the benefit of the traditional Magyar land classes in their attempts to create a unified Hungarian nation-state. The second reform generation emerged as a reaction to the anti-democratic policies of the conservative class that supported the government of István Tisza. This new reform movement brought no less than an intellectual renaissance to Hungarian society.\textsuperscript{10}

Jászi played an important role in introducing both sociology and political science into Hungary. As editor of the periodical \textit{Huszadik Század} [Twentieth Century], established in January 1900, and as a member of the Társadalomtudományi Társaság [The Social Science Society], created in 1901, Jászi and his associates, from the law school in Péter Pázmány University in Budapest “provided a forum for the scientific analysis of society”.\textsuperscript{11} Jászi considered it vital “to examine the general rules governing social development in order to arrive at effective solutions to day to day issues”.\textsuperscript{12} “\textit{Huszadik Század} introduced the Hungarian intelligentsia to the scholarly investigation of the entire range of Hungary’s social, economic, and political problems ... the purpose of the Sociological Society, ... was to support and expand the works initiated the year before by \textit{Huszadik Század}.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Huszadik Század} published a variety of articles on a diverse number of topics, from different factions of Hungarian society. Endre Ady, Jászi, György Lukács, Mihály Póllányi, Ervin Szabó, and others used \textit{Huszadik Század} as an organ for their views on virtually every issue of significance in Hungary and Europe. Even though Lukács “was utterly opposed to Jászi’s brand of philosophical positivism, ... [and] regarded Jászi as muddled and as a very untalented person as far as theory was concerned”, he could never recollect “that Jászi ever failed to publish anything [he] had submitted to him”.\textsuperscript{14} Naturally Lukács was not a member of Jászi’s circle, but, the original goal of the journal was to be, to a certain extent, apolitical.\textsuperscript{15} By that they planned not to be an organ of any political movement or party. The founders, of whom Jászi said he had founded his circle with the establishment of the journal,\textsuperscript{16} eventually evolved into something that became more politically involved than initially anticipated. Jászi’s success as an organizer and his growing political awareness can be seen through his involvement with the journal and the society.

Many of the reformers who were associated with the journal had noticeable similarities. The following is a general comparison of the members of the \textit{Huszadik Század} circle:

They were born in the middle of the 1870’s to middle or petty bourgeois families, most of whom lived in Upper Hungary or Transylvania. Quite a few of them were Jews. They studied law, and their scholarly or artistic talents became apparent at an early age. Their ambition was to find independent jobs and a good livelihood, but initially they had little success. Partly because of family pressures and the need to earn their living, they took jobs around the turn of the century in some ministry or other office.\textsuperscript{17}

Following his graduation from the university Jászi took a job as a rapporteur in the ministry of agriculture. But within ten years he left his job to follow a more active role in politics.\textsuperscript{18}
Jászi's change towards an active role in politics was influenced by his trip to Paris in 1905. Both *Huszadik Század* and the Sociological Society reflected the change in Jászi's political awareness. Originally the society was to offer a forum for both conservative and radical views. The choice of Ágost Pulszky, son of Ferenc Pulszky and Lajos Kossuth's envoy in London, as president of the society was proof that a compromise or alliance had been worked out between the different factions. Pulszky, along with his former student and colleague Gyula Pikler, had a profound effect upon Jászi and the radicals. Pulszky's age made him acceptable to the conservative faction of the society led by Professor Győző Concha and Jenő Rákosi.

Until his Paris trip, Jászi was torn between active involvement in politics and dedicating his life to scholarship. Even before he left Paris it was apparent he was moving gradually away from scholarship. On 16 October 1904, in a letter to Ervin Szabó, Jászi wrote, "the earliest concrete [political] program to come from his pen". Listed below is Jászi's basic party program included:

A. Universal Suffrage  
B. Rights of Assembly and Association  
C. Nationality Act  
D. Popular Administration  
E. Nationalize Church properties  
F. (perhaps) Independent Customs Area.

Jászi's Paris letter to Szabó is proof of "the gradual change in Jászi's conviction". His letter of 2 April 1905 to Boldog Somló stated that his spiritual constitution was suited for scholarly work, but in a letter to Somló, dated 21 May 1905, Jászi decided on the side of politics, because "biologically [he] was not born a scholar".

After his return from Paris, Jászi wrote that solving Hungary's nationality problems was a priority to democratization. In order to solve Hungary's multi-national problems, Jászi examined how the West had solved its nationality problems. Like many of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe, Jászi looked westward to the more advanced democratic states as the examples to emulate. The more developed states of Western Europe, particularly Britain, France and Belgium, were all multinational states. By following their examples, Hungary hoped to solve its nationality problems and develop democracy for all its peoples.

Jászi abhorred the policy of magyarization because he believed forced assimilation made actual assimilation impossible everywhere. In reality, Jászi overestimated the willingness of the minorities to assimilate with the Magyar nationality. It should also be assumed, of course, that he underestimated the effect nationalism had on obstructing assimilation. He felt that if cultural and linguistic demands were accorded to the nationalities, along with the proper implementation of the Nationality Law of 1868, they would willingly assimilate to the Magyar culture. This process may have been possible during the previous century, but it was impossible for the Romanians or Serbians to assimilate to Magyarmód as long as their co-nationalss lived free in states which bordered the empire. Later, when Jászi contemplated the effect of nationalism
upon the minorities, it was too late for any solution except the construction of separate nation-states. Jászi’s faith in assimilation is evident in the Bourgeois Radical Party program that he helped formulate in June 1914. Even at this late date it was a program that was anti-federal and supported assimilationist measures. It was the war that convinced him to abandon his belief in assimilation as a solution to Hungary’s nationality problems.

During the war Jászi briefly toyed with the idea of Friedrich Naumann’s *Mittel­europe* because of the distinct economic advantages a large customs union offered Hungary. Once he realized its imperialistic designs inherent in the plan, however, he quickly abandoned the idea. Later, Jászi became actively involved against the war and militarism, and he supported both the peace movements within the monarchy and international peace based on the principle of Wilson’s 14 points. Unfortunately, at the end of the war and during the early months of peace, hardly anyone was willing to listen to Jászi’s ideas concerning peace and justice for the Danubian region. International events robbed Jászi of the opportunity to try and solve Hungary’s nationality problems. Jászi’s brief tenure as minister of nationalities (November 1918 to January 1919), in the Károlyi government was too short of time for him to implement his ideas.

As an exile, Jászi hoped to awaken the world to the dangers that existed in a Danubian region constructed of small independent states caught between expansive powers. The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy created a power vacuum. Jászi hoped to convince the successor states to accept his idea of a Danubian confederation based on democratic principles to solve the nationality problems of the region and protect the area being exploited by its more powerful neighbors. Jászi realized that his old world no longer existed, so he began to work on ways to improve the new one and protect it from the problems that were left behind. Nationalism was the main obstacle to any lasting peace in the region.

On May 21, 1919, realizing the socialist regime of Béla Kun had failed and fearing reprisals from the counter-revolutionary movement that was gaining strength under Admiral Horthy, Jászi left Budapest for Vienna. For the next six years Jászi struggled to keep the Hungarian emigration together while his own life was transformed by the pressures of post-war Europe. Jászi realized his efforts had failed when the successor states negotiated post-war settlements with Gustáv Gratz, Horthy’s foreign minister, and, in 1923, when the League of Nations, which was created as a result of the peace treaties, granted Hungary’s request for a loan. This loan was granted to Horthy’s government without the League receiving the democratic guarantees that Jászi and Károlyi demanded for Hungary’s infrastructure. The failure to get these guarantees caused the Hungarian émigré to split, and paved the way for Jászi to start a new life in the United States.

The Vienna years (1919–1925), were full of turmoil for Jászi. “He spent them in a feverish state of constant inner crisis and scruples, both public and private, and he could not calm down until he arrived to America.” During the early years of his exile Jászi was used by the successor states, and especially by Edvard Beneš, Czechoslovakia’s foreign minister, to propagandize against the Hungarian claims at the Trianon
Peace Treaty of 1920. Jászi faced the torturous discipline of trying to keep the émigré community together as a unified political body. Whereas Károlyi had been undisputed leader of the revolution, Jászi's organizational abilities made him one of the natural leader of the émigré community. Jászi was a tireless worker and dogmatic in his approach to the émigrés' goals. Besides going on numerous trips to see Károlyi in Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia, and his own family and friends in Slovakia and Transylvania, Jászi directed the Hungarian émigré paper, the daily Bécsi Magyar Újság, during its three years of existence. "He wrote hundreds of articles for Hungarian, German, and other journals in the successor states and several dozens for the Western press." He also published four books including his work on the Revolution and Counter-Revolution.

On 16 November 1919, Admiral Horthy entered Budapest at the head of a new national army. Horthy became the real power in Hungary and was elected regent on 1 March 1920. In January of that year election were held in Hungary in those constituencies that were under the control of the Hungarian authorities, and on 14 March, a coalition headed by Sándor Simonyi-Semadam took over control of the government. Hungary would be allowed to go to Paris to be received by the peace commission only after some domestic stability was established following the Kun regime. Later, Simonyi-Semadam's government was forced to sign the Treaty of Trianon on June 1920.

The economic and material losses of Trianon destined Hungary to the permanent status of an agricultural country with hardly any potential industrial base. The settlement separated Hungary's industry from its raw materials sources in Transylvania and Slovakia, and made it impossible for Hungary to fulfill its reparation payments as stipulated by the treaty. Hungary was denied any chance to revise the settlement by force, because Trianon limited the size of Hungary's army to 35,000 officers and men to be used only for internal order and border defense. Also, Hungary was not allowed to have tanks, aircraft, or heavy artillery. The construction of the Little Entente, an alliance of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania against Hungary, guaranteed that any attempt to revise the treaty by force would end in failure. Article 1 provided mutual assistance for any member that was the victim of an unprovoked attack from Hungary.

After Trianon, Hungary's foreign policy was focused on the revision of the "injustices" of the treaty. Any effective cooperation in the basin could not take place until the treaty was altered to return those territories, particularly those regions that bordered Hungary, where ethnic Hungarians formed a majority. The successor states were aware of Hungary's attitude and sought the protection of military alliances to guard their new acquisitions against any attempts to revise the treaty. Hungary, however, was aware of the political reality and sought to acquire the appropriate international standing that would enable it to build up its military strength and acquire the economic aid and resources that would prepare the country for the struggle that was necessary to overturn the peace settlement. Hungary's admission to the League of Nations and the subsequent loan granted by the League in 1923 was part of Horthy's plan to revise the settlement. His appointment of István Bethlen, a Transylvanian aristocrat, as foreign min-
ister was another consideration towards improving Hungarian relations with both Great Britain and France.37

The peace treaties and the new alliance system intended to bring security to Europe, but the disappearance of the Habsburg Monarchy created a power vacuum in East-Central Europe. The peace treaties were designed to make France the dominant continental power in Europe but the disastrous effects of the war made it impossible for the French to assert control of the region.

Europe wanted to put the war behind itself and move forward, but too many problems remained. Both France and Italy vied for control of the basin. In reality, only a few individuals held out hope for the future construction of a united Danubia. There was no attempt by any Danubian state to heal the wounds of war and develop an association for their mutual benefit and security. Jászi knew that a Danubian confederation could not take place as long as Horthy was in power in Hungary.38 South-Central Europe was too weak, divided, and vulnerable to economic and political exploitation to withstand the crisis of the interwar years. Hungary, not willing to accept the settlement, realized that it could not revise Trianon without the assistance of a great power. This search took Hungary to Italy and Germany, where the Versailles settlement had alienated both powers, even though Italy was on the winning side.39 As a result, the peace settlements possessed the seeds for their own destruction.

Jászi saw great problems for East-Central Europe if the two “Sick Men”, Germany and Hungary, were not satisfied. They would demand a just revision of the peace treaties. In 1923 he wrote, “there can be no hope of a peace until the wounds of these two countries are healed”.40 Not only would a new war not solve these problems, but it “would be the final catastrophe for all the people of Central Europe”.41 In 1936, Jászi described the Trianon complex as a “social and economic doctrine ... which attributes all the misery and backwardness of the people exclusively to the peace treaty”42 Jászi recognized the dual purpose of this doctrine to protest the injustices of the treaty and to act as a “defense mechanism [for the old ruling class], against the proletariat and landless peasants”.43

Jászi wrote about the failure of Hungary’s experiment in democracy. His writings, however, reveal an individual searching for answers. Jászi, the intellectual, could not understand why Hungarians and the rest of the world rejected his democratic ideas. With the rise of the Horthy regime, Jászi saw the failure of British diplomacy. He felt the British played the “principle part in rendering possible the bloodstained and reactionary rule”44 that briefly followed Horthy’s seizure of power. Showing his naïveté, Jászi believed the British had a role, or an obligation, to promote their democratic ideas to the rest of the world. Britain, like all countries, pursued a policy that safeguarded its own interest. The democratization of Hungary rested with the Magyars themselves. Jászi felt Britain left the principle of Wilson’s 14 points behind when negotiating the Treaty of Trianon.

Jászi continued to expose the evils of Horthy’s regime by vividly describing the horrors of the white terror in Hungary. His book, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, gives numerous accounts of these abuses. Jászi exposed the antidemocratic
nature of Horthy's regime and criticized the Allies for granting it a League of Nations' loan. Jászi realized Hungarian democracy could not be achieved as long as Horthy remained in power. A democratic Hungary had been Jászi's goal for the greater part of his life. He made it a crusade following his return to Budapest from Paris in 1905, and he continued to pursue this goal as an exile in Vienna and the United States.

As an émigré, Jászi described his goal of a democratic Hungary in a Central European confederation.

Only a through-going democratization Hungary, and loyal and intimate relations between this democratized Hungary and the new states, can create such an atmosphere in Central Europe as can cure the gravest evils of the present situation and clear the way for a democratic Confederation of all the small nations which are now tormented by the rigid dogma of national sovereignty. The historian R. W. Seton-Watson agreed with Jászi and wrote on the necessity of Hungary's democratization as an "essential preliminary" to permanent peace in the region.

By early 1920, Jászi was trying to create a united front among the Hungarian émigrés, and it became an issue whether the Communists should be included in the front. Károlyi wanted to include them, while Jászi disagreed with the Communists and knew they would be unwelcome by the West and among the successor states. He wished to keep them in a neutral position. Jászi and Károlyi had begun to move in different political directions, Károlyi towards the Communists and Jászi westward.

The emigration was frustrated in its political orientation. Károlyi and the Communists, including György Lukács and Kun, looked towards Soviet Russia for help. The Social Democrats hoped for aid from the Socialist International, along with support from the Socialist and Liberal public opinion in the western democracies. Among the émigrés were Habsburgists, who refused to associate with the Communists, while moderates hoped the West would become disenchanted with the Hungarian White terror and support the implementation of a democracy in Hungary.

On 30 March 1920, Jászi, Károlyi, and Pál Szende asked Beneš in Prague "whether [Beneš saw] the sense of an organized political emigration even without the participation of the Communist"? Beneš told them that success would be possible without the Communists.

There were two other questions that the emigration proposed to Beneš in which he lent his support.

1. Whether Czechoslovakia is willing to redress the injustices of the Peace Treaty?
2. Whether he is ready to acknowledge the Emigration in a semi-official way?

Beneš regarded the Horthy government as a threat to the democratic successor states. He expressed his desire to Jászi and Károlyi "to create an honest and sincere communication between the democratic forces of their nations", but the latter used them as a tool against the Horthy government's claims, while all the time giving Jászi and the democratic emigration the appearance of support. Beneš realized the strength
of the feudal structure in Hungary was too powerful to ignore, and Jászi’s group was not in a position to supplant Horthy without a full scale commitment from the West and the successor states. Suffice it to say, in March 1921, Beneš met Horthy’s foreign minister Gusztáv Gratz and began to reconcile Czechoslovakia with the Horthy government. Since the emigration had no popular base in Hungary, Beneš informed Károlyi that he could not be sure that they, after overthrowing Horthy, would pursue the “same nationalist policy of territorial integrity [as Horthy]”. Beneš, like most politician in the victor’s camp, wanted to put the war behind him and begin the process of governing Czechoslovakia. The newly formed Little Entente, and the support of France, protected the successor states from any Hungarian attempt to forcibly regain its historic boundaries. As Jászi would admit later, he and his followers were very naïve to have trusted Beneš.

Jászi was not of the same political calibre of Beneš, the Serbian politician Nikola Pašić, or Romania’s Take Ionescu. These men were politicians who understood the practical nature of everyday politics. Jászi was not pragmatic enough to handle the émigré politics. He still trusted the western democracies too much even after they destroyed the territorial integrity of historic Hungary and approved Horthy’s request for a loan. In a letter to Seton-Watson, Jászi wrote, “I see... how wrong, [the] shortsighted policy of the Entente makes in Hungary”. According to György Litván, however, Jászi “never gave up faith in the values of Western Democracy and the helpfulness of its Liberal and Socialist forces”.

To Jászi’s credit he accepted the reality of the successor states, and he renounced a forcible revision of the Trianon Treaty. During a memorial speech for Thomas Masaryk at Oberlin, Jászi recalled a conversation they had that pointed out the injustices of the treaty. Jászi quoted Masaryk as saying that if he were leader of Hungary he would peacefully seek out justice for the Hungarian minorities in the successor states where they formed a homogeneous mass, and the return of those border territories where Hungarians constituted a clear majority. Jászi accepted the political reality of the peace treaties but he would not accept the moral injustice that had been inflicted upon the Hungarian minorities in the new states.

Besides negotiations with Beneš, Jászi made trips to both Yugoslavia and Romania in an attempt to find support for his programs. He tried to convince the Yugoslav government not to withdrawal from Pécs-Baranya. He was well received by Nikola Pašić, Svetozar Pribićević, and others in Belgrade. He continued to work against the Horthy government and tried to convince the successor states of the danger of a revisionist government within their midst. In Bucharest he was received with much respect and sympathy, but as he remarked in a letter to Károlyi on 14 December 1920, the Romanian leaders, Alexander Averescu and Take Ionescu, would deal with one of Horthy’s agents more easily than with the emigration. In other words, “his person was received better than his proposals”.

As the successor states accommodated themselves to the Horthy government and showed less than a democratic resolve in the face of their new Hungarian problem, Jászi proposed his ideas of Danubian rapprochement and federation to the truly demo-
ocratic forces — mainly the intelligentsia and enlightened politicians — within these states. Before the end of 1921, he proposed a Danubian Cultural League that was to be formed among the democratic elements and intelligentsia of the region. He tried to create an enlarged version of the Huszadik Század Circle on a Danubian scale that could act as a democratic opposition and demand the introduction of justice, confederation, and foster Danubian patriotism. This organization would “combat chauvinism and defend the national and human rights of the minorities in each country”.

As time progressed, Jászí realized he had to differentiate between the governments in the successor states and the genuine democratic movements in those countries. Following Trianon, and after it became apparent that Soviet Russia was not a position to implement world revolution, the successor states adopted a business like attitude towards the Hungarian emigration. Jászí understood this change of attitude and hoped to appeal directly to the democratic forces in the successor states. The problem was, however, that these forces were weak and disorganized. The Romanian intellectuals, in particular, showed the greatest interest in Jászí’s ideas, and the left-wing Bucharest review Revista Vremii, even published Jászí’s articles on the Danubian problem.

In May 1923, Jászí visited Bucharest and was well received by Take Ionescu, Octavian Goga, Alexander Aversecu, Ion Brătianu, and Juliu Maniu among others. There were even discussions over whether to introduce Jászí to King Ferdinand. Afterwards, Jászí traveled to Transylvania where he was confronted with the reality of Romania’s nationality policy and its effect on the lives of the Hungarian minority. It became obvious to Jászí that, even though the Romanians in Bucharest listened sympathetically to his ideas about a democratic Hungary, Romania’s nationality policy in Transylvania was intolerant to the concerns of the minorities.

During his Vienna years, Jászí resurrected Kossuth’s confederation and attempted to draw a link between his emigration and the post-1848 Kossuth emigration. In “Kossuth Lajos emigrációja és az októberi emigráció” (Louis Kossuth’s Emigration and the October Emigration), published in Bécsi Magyar Újság, Jászí compared Kossuth’s emigration with his own. The post-World War I emigration was the continuation of the emigration from 1849. After 1862, Kossuth’s confederation caused him to be regarded as a traitor among some circles in Hungary, but Jászí, who faced similar criticisms from Horthy’s Hungary, saw Kossuth’s ideas as being far more important than Ferenc Deák’s “short sighted” Ausgleich with Austria in 1867. It becomes apparent, especially after his reflection on the revolution, that Jászí compared his role to Kossuth’s misunderstood part in Hungarian history. Jászí still believed that a Danubian confederation was one of the ways to achieve Hungary’s democratization.

At Oberlin in 1933, Jászí wrote an article, “Kossuth and the Treaty of Trianon”, in which he drew parallels with Kossuth and the peace treaty. He maintained that all the clear sighted elements of the Hungarian emigration came to realize that Hungary’s cause in 1848, “had been lost principally because of the opposition of the non-Magyar races, whose claims for equality had been repudiated by the revolutionary Magyar nobility and whose dissatisfaction was shrewdly fomented by the Viennese camarilla”. The failure of the revolution was a failure to come to an understanding with the
minorities. The war against Austria in 1849, was secondary, because success depended upon the nationality question.

Jászi explained that Kossuth's confederation, even in the 1850's, needed the Britain's help to be successful. Also, Jászi stated that Trianon was a mistake because it detached ethnic Hungarian territories away from Hungary for purely strategical purposes. "But the gravest mistake of the victors was that they consented to the economic dismemberment of a territory the separate parts of which are in many respects incapable of independent healthy economic life". What Kossuth's correspondence revealed, according to Jászi, was that Trianon was inevitable.

By 1925, it was apparent that the emigration had failed in its attempt to supplant Horthy. Károlyi talked Jászi into returning to Oberlin College, where Jászi had stopped on a six-month speaking tour of the United States between 1923 and 1924. Jászi had been offered a position in the political science department at Oberlin College. Jászi, to Károlyi's great fortune, talked the latter out of going to Soviet Russia in favor of the West. Otherwise, Károlyi would have found himself in the same position that confronted Béla Kun in the face of Stalin's purges. In 1925, at the age of fifty, Jászi left his old world behind hoping for a new and more peaceful life in America. Ultimately, he wanted the chance to influence American public opinion and foreign policy to accept his ideas concerning the construction of a democratic confederation of Danubian states that could one day become a United States of Europe. He hoped to draw America out of its isolationist policy thereby using its "strength and influence, on the European scene, to help change the conditions prevailing there and channel them in the direction of democracy and federalism".

Jászi joined the faculty at Oberlin and taught political science for seventeen years. When he retired in 1942, Jászi's colleagues and former students donated funds for the creation of the Jászi Lectureship in his honor. In 1953, Oberlin awarded him an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.

In 1929, Jászi wrote his most famous work The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, which described the failure of democracy in the monarchy, and condemned those forces, in particular, the feudal structure that supported Horthy, for preventing the democratization of Hungary. This book was a restatement of the major themes Jászi wrote about during his exile. It summarized the failure of the monarchy and restated Jászi's position on the necessity to bring democratic change to the Danubian basin and promote a confederation. According to Jászi, the Habsburg experiment still had "great theoretical and practical importance", however, to prevent the destruction of Europe by the forces of nationalism it was necessary to "eliminate national rivalries or at least replace them by other methods".

Jászi wrote that, "national solidarity [could not] be fostered where the progress of one nation is sacrificed to the interest of the other". Nationalism, according to Jászi, was the "growing realization of the consciousness of the human soul which can reach its completeness only in a national existence fulfilling the work which the World-Spirit assigned to every national individuality". National hatred, however, was only the transformation of class hatred, whose solution was in essence a moral issue.
still maintained that a federated structure, like Switzerland, was the answer to the Danubian problem, because, "it would satisfy the national aspirations of the various peoples". While in America, Jászi attempted to follow what he considered to be a just policy regarding the minorities in the Danubian basin. Even during the late inter-war period, Jászi still spoke out against the moral corruption of fascism and dictatorship, however, he was still only a candle in the wind. Meanwhile, he continued to educate his American audiences on the importance of the peaceful and democratic advancement of the Danubian peoples.

During the Second World War, Jászi was actively involved in the anti-Fascist "United Front", because he understood the importance of joint cooperation against the Axis and its allies. He was elected chairman of the Federation of Democratic Hungarians, but was distrustful of the Communists and disappointed Horthyites. Jászi believed it was America's "fundamental interest" to democratize Europe after the war, because, once again, "hundreds of thousands of Americans will die on account of tension created by absolutist dictatorial or plutocratic powers".

As the war ended, Jászi worried about the future of Central Europe under Russian control. He wrote that "Russian influence in that territory... will be preponderant. Russia will come out of this war as the greatest continental power of Europe". At first, Jászi supported the Russians' moves that eliminated the threat of the past "feudal" regime to Hungary's democratic development, however, in 1947, the Communists, with Russian support, destroyed their political opposition and gained control of Hungary. Their takeover ended any hope Jászi had that the post-war Hungarian government would finally bring democratic reforms to Hungary.

One of the many articles he wrote during his American years included, "Miért nem sikerült a dunavölgyi federációt megalkotni" [Why the Danubian Confederation Failed to Materialize]. Written in 1947, it exposed Jászi's reflections on that naïve period of his political development with the clear vision of hindsight. Naturally, those feudal forces that prohibited Hungary's democratization bear an enormous responsibility for the confederation's failure. The confederation failed to materialize because "a mouse and a lion cannot federate".

Jászi believed that a confederation could only be created by states with common political, economic, and social structures, and this was not the case of Balkan and Danubian peoples. Also, those who enjoyed privileges in the old system opposed federation. A confederation would reduce their power and influence within their countries. The Hungarian state could not overcome the end of the First World War because the force of events was above its power and strength. Federation is a product of democracy. In the example of Switzerland, it was a political form of Christianity. In Hungary the confederation made headway with very few people. The last chance for its realization died with the failure of the Károlyi Revolution when the smaller states were more interested in getting what they could acquire from the Entente at Hungary's expense.

In 1947, following the Second World War, Jászi made his last trip to Hungary. He
was somewhat hurt that the new Hungarian state only offered him a university position in Budapest as opposed to the political positions it offered other members of the émigré circle. After his return to America he published a report entitled “Danubia: Old and New”, in which he again attempted to show the need for a federalist solution for the future peace and independence of the region. The eventual socialist takeover of Hungary met with great displeasure in Jászi’s writings during his remaining years. However, he still continued to write about the need for both democratic and moral justice for the Danubian peoples up until his death on 13 February 1957. It was his belief that a confederation, based on the democratic principles, was the key to unlock the economic, political, and social door for future cooperation and security among the Danubian and Balkan nations. Jászi’s greatest legacy is the fact that his works and ideas are still discussed today as a possible road for future.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 638.
5. Ibid. Jászi rejected the ideas of the Social Democrats, which adopted a Marxist platform and joined the Second International, because they thought in international terms and ignored the nationality question. For them, the proletariat revolution would render the nationality issue obsolete.
8. This city, known today as Carei, became part of the spoils rewarded to Romania after the First World War.
9. Congdon, Beyond the “Hungarian Wasteland”, p. 112.
12. Ibid.
15. Congdon, Beyond the “Hungarian Wasteland”, p. 75.

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19. Pulszky was Jászi’s old mentor from the university. He is generally credited with having introduced English sociology into Hungary. Allen, Oscar Jászi and Radicalism in Hungary, p. 58.

20. Rákosi, who did not start his career as a conservative, was Eadre Ady’s chief literary antagonist. Congdon, Beyond the “Hungarian Wasteland”, pp. 74–75.


22. Oszkár Jászí–Ervin Szabó, Budapest, 16 October 1904, Szabó Ervin levelezése I (Budapest, 1977), pp. 577–582. Jászi was an atheist and supported measures that would lessen the importance of the Church in Hungarian society.

23. Congdon, Beyond the “Hungarian Wasteland”, p. 78.


29. Ibid., pp. 1–2.

30. Horthy was elected regent from a list of candidates because he, unlike Archduke Charles of the Habsburg dynasty, was acceptable to the Entente. Also, the West favored Horthy because of his unpolitical past and anti-Communist stance. For Horthy’s story see: Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs (London, 1956).

31. Those areas allocated to the successor states or occupied by the Romanian and Allied troops were not involved in the election.


33. Hungary retained 48.6 percent of its wheat, 64.6 percent of its rye, and 35.8 percent of its corn-producing areas ... the rump country retained 50.9 percent of the total industrial population, 55.6 percent of all industries, 82 percent of the heavy industries, and 70 percent of the banks. The agricultural population was now 55.8 percent of the total population. László Buday, A megezsonkított Magyarország (Budapest, 1921), pp. 104, 209. Cited in Janos, Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, p. 206. Also, see: Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, 1974), pp. 171–241.

34. Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, p. 5; and Gyula Juhász, Hungarian Foreign Policy 1919–1945 (Budapest, 1979), p. 50.

35. The Little Entente was a name given by Hungary to the Yugoslav–Romanian–Czechoslovak alliance. Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the official name for Yugoslavia, concluded the pact on 14 August 1920, the Romanians did not join the alliance until after the Polish–Soviet War of 1920. The Czechoslovak foreign minister Beneš was the principle architect of the alliance, but the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu, had his own plans for the political organization of the basin. This was another reason Romania hesitated to sign the agreement. Also, the French, in the desire to control the region, attempted to create a Hungarian–Romanian reproachment. See Francis Defé, The Hungarian–Romanian Land Dispute (New York, 1928), pp. 320–324, 332–333; J. O. Crane, The Little Entente (New York, 1931), pp. 7, 105 ff; Juhász, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919–1945, p. 57.


39. The Peace Commission awarded Yugoslavia territories which the Entente had previously promised Italy for joining the war against the Central Power.


41. Ibid., p. ix.


43. Ibid.


46. Ibid., pp. xxii–xxiii.


51. Ibid.

52. Litván, “Jászi’s Exile Years in Vienna”, p. 5.


57. Oscar Jászi, Memorial talk for Masaryk, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, 1937.


59. Ibid.

60. Litván, “Jászi’s Exile Years in Vienna”, p. 6.

61. Ibid., p. 7.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., pp. 7–8.

65. Oszkár Jászi, “Kossuth Lajos emigrációja és az októberi emigráció”, *JOP*, p. 409. It needs to be mentioned that the post-World War I emigration was far less homogeneous than the post-1849 emigration. Also, Jászi was fond of comparing himself with Kossuth, but the latter’s popularity at home and abroad was far greater.


67. Ibid., p. 88.

68. Ibid., p. 97.

69. Ibid., pp. 91–92. Jászi compared two maps of Hungary to justify his position. One map showed what Kossuth feared would happen if the nationalities were not given democratic rights, and the other was post-Trianon Hungary, and there is a strong resemblance between the maps. Jászi believed it was Kossuth’s
fear that Hungary, separated from Austria, and without “the support of a Great Power would be immediately dismembered into six parts”.


71. Ibid., p. 117.


74. Ibid., p. 4.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 25.

77. Ibid., p. 248.

78. Ibid., p. 286.

79. Ibid., p. 294.

80. Ibid., p. 103.

81. Jásci’s article, “The Ideologic Foundations of the Danubian Dictatorships”, is an example of his attempts to warn the United States of the upcoming crisis in Europe.


83. Ibid.


86. Ibid., p. 20. On July 14, 1947, Jásci wrote a letter to the New York Times that again stated Hungary’s domestic dilemma was still “the absence of a conscious middle class and an independent intelligentsia”.


88. Ibid., p. 17.

89. Károlyi became Hungary’s minister to France.

90. The works of Jásci and István Bibó have experienced a renaissance among those who study the history and problems of the Danubian basin.

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