

KOSSUTH AND AMERICAN NON-INTERVENTION

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On the night of 4 December 1851, the former Hungarian Governor Lajos Kossuth landed in New York City to a scene that could only be described as unbounded enthusiasm.¹ Never in the history of the United States had a foreigner received such a welcome. Americans, who had eagerly followed his exploits during Hungary's recent struggle for independence in 1848-49, saw in Kossuth those liberal and democratic qualities they identified in themselves. He was Washington reborn in a Hungarian mould. Even the British had identified these qualities. On 21 July 1849, Ralph Osborne of Middlesex told Parliament, "Kossuth was a representative of religious and civil liberty, just as Washington was. He was fighting for principles which had always been traditionally popular in British public opinion".² In a Burkeian sense, Kossuth was fighting for the rights of Englishmen just as the Americans had done in their revolution in the previous century. Little did the Americans realize that Kossuth had come to their shore to awaken them of their responsibilities as a World Power³ and to get them to abandon Washington's dictum against non-interference in European affairs.

Kossuth believed it was necessary to draw America out of its isolationism thereby utilising its strength and democratic principles to help change Europe in the direction of democracy. By taking her (United States) rightful place among the Great Powers she could join with Great Britain in an alliance of democratic states that would prevent the absolute powers of Europe, particularly Russia, from violating the policy of non-intervention.⁴ Kossuth's mission was to convince America to intervene in European affairs for the purpose of enforcing the policy of non-intervention. On the surface this seems somewhat absurd: convince the Americans, who adhered to the policy of non-intervention to openly violate the principle for the purpose of its enforcement. But in Kossuth's reasons for proposing such a venture there is a certain logic that makes this policy acceptable and necessary for Hungarian independence.

For Kossuth Russia was the main obstacle to Hungarian independence and European security. During the latter months of the Hungarian War for Independence, Nicholas I sent troops to aid the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph that were responsible for Hungary's defeat. Kossuth and the rest of the world believed that the Austrian Empire had been saved by Russia's intervention.⁵ At the time of the invasion, Kossuth requested from British Foreign Minister Palmerston an "explicit statement ... on behalf of the principle of non-intervention."⁶ In May 1849, when discussing the matter with the Russian minister in London, Baron Ernest P. Brunnow, Palmerston told him: "Make and end to it (the intervention) very quickly."⁷ Earlier, in a letter to the British Minister in

St. Petersburg, Palmerston stated that the British Government did "not consider the occasion to be that which at present calls for any formal expression of the opinion of Great Britain on the matter..."⁸ Austria's existence was vital to Britain's concerns. Austria was a bullwork against Russian expansion in the Balkans, and thereby protected British interests in regards to the Eastern Question and keeping the straits out of Russian hands. So even though the British identified with Kossuth's liberal democratic principles, an independent Hungary was contrary to British interests. Therefore, the British gave both Russia and Austria *carte blanche* for their joint operation against the Hungarians. Naturally, all this remained unknown to Kossuth.

Following the failure of the Hungarian Revolution Kossuth took exile in Turkey, where he became the focus of an "Eastern Crisis". Kossuth understood the "overwhelming influence" Britain exerted upon the European political theatre. He also realized the importance of public opinion in influencing parliament and the cabinet. He was forever receiving letters commenting upon the popularity he enjoyed on the island. He hoped through this popularity and his connections within Britain to convince them to accept his principle "the intervention for non-intervention".⁹ He wrote from Turkey:

"Being thoroughly convinced of this principle's importance ... I regard it as my most important task to agitate for this as soon as I am free. I shall do the same in America. By carrying this into effect, Hungary will be free and independent very soon."¹⁰

On 23 October 1851, Kossuth landed in Southampton on the first leg of his journey. He hoped to convince the British to accept his non-intervention ideas then go to America and convince them to form an Anglo-American alliance to oversee its enforcement. Such an alliance would counterbalance the alliance of despots.¹¹ In a speech at Winchester on 25 October, Kossuth, Cobden and Crosskey, the American Consul in Southampton, outlined Kossuth's ideas to the British public. First, Kossuth said, "Russian's intervention destroyed all hope of reconciliation ... with the Habsburgs".¹² He had deposed the monarchy; while governor of Hungary, he was ruling out any future cooperation with them. Cobden was next in suggesting that Britain enforce the principle of non-intervention and to prevent others from violating it. Finally, Crosskey said that a US-Britain alliance would prevent the recurrence of another Hungary.¹³ A speech delivered three days later by the former secretary of the treasury, Robert Walker, who mentioned that Kossuth's liberation from Turkey "was the first joint intervention of England and America in favor of freedom".¹⁴ Unfortunately for Kossuth, he would be carried away with the enthusiastic receptions he received from his speeches in both Britain and America. As will become evident, such enthusiasm did not mean acceptance of his ideas.

Kossuth continued to give speeches, all very moderate in tone, until he left for New York on 20 November. According to Dénes Jánossy, "He never wanted to risk (losing) the sympathy of the bourgeoisie which retained the power of the governing against all attempts of the working classes".¹⁵ He had already generated bourgeois distrust by the tone of his speech at Marseilles.¹⁶ After arriving at Southampton he refused the socialist workers invitation to deliver a

speech at a banquet in his honor. Later on, he felt compelled to accept the workers invitation to Copenhagen House, for which the conservative press, particularly *The Times*, attacked him.¹⁷ Kossuth used the opportunity to attack communism and socialism as being destructive of social order and personal property, and as being the same movement because they desired the same result.¹⁸ Here it is quite clear that Kossuth was not advocating a class struggle or revolution for Hungary, as many conservative circles frated after his Marseilles speech. What he was advocating was an independence movement that used the American model rather than the French.

What must be discussed is the lack of attention that was given by Kossuth and the British to the nationality problems within Hungary. Although the failure of the revolution was in part due to Kossuth's inability to solve these problems, this important aspect was not discussed, and there were no attempts to meet the Romanian emigrés to discuss future joint cooperation.¹⁹ Up to the Crimean War Kossuth's speeches illustrated that he firmly believed Hungary was strong enough to secure its own independence as long as Russia was not allowed to interfere.²⁰ Kossuth considered he was dealing from a position of strength. He needed neither the nationalities nor an association with them, to achieve the Hungary he desired. Cooperation with the nationalities would mean giving them concessions within Historic Hungary. All Kossuth needed was to convince America to abandon its traditional policy of non-interference, as established by Washington during his farewell address, and to adopt a policy of interference for the protection of the right of non-interference.²¹ This was his goal when he landed in New York.

After receiving a tumultuous reception from the people of New York, Kossuth embarked upon convincing the Americans to accept his ideas. In a speech at Utica, New York, he told a crowd of admirers that "the continent of Europe was afflicted with three diseases in 1848—monarchist inclination, centralization and the antagonism of nationalities".²² This speech was delivered before he reembarked for England. However, these three issues were the focus of all his speeches across America. Not only did they hold the key for the failure of the revolution, he thought, but they represented a threat to the American Republic as well as the emerging states of Europe. In his memoirs he wrote the following:

"The principle of this central power is identical with that of the power of Russia. Every government, therefore, whose principle was identical with that of the government of Austria could always depend upon assistance of that power. Thus, the west of Europe stands here face to face with a permanent coalition, having an opposite principle of existence. A coalition must be met by a coalition."²³

On 6 December, in Castle Garden, New York, Kossuth began his work on the formation of such a coalition. He told his audience that Britain had "for ever abandoned every sentiment of irritation and rivalry, and desires the brotherly alliance of the United States ..."²⁴ Supposedly, according to Kossuth, Britain desired such an alliance "to league with you (the United States) against the league of despots, and with you to stand sponsor at the approaching baptism of European liberty."²⁵ This baptism that would bring Hungarian independence as its objective.

For the United States, a country that was absorbed in its own domestic crisis over slavery, European events were viewed from the tainted vision of a people distantly removed and out of touch with the actual situation. But Kossuth's struggle had epitomized those ideals that Americans understood as their own. Using their own revolution as a model they viewed all kings and monarchies as innately evil and vehemently anti-republican. All monarchies opposed and suppressed those ideals that the United States had fought their revolution to achieve. They infringed upon the Lockean liberties that were so dear to the American soul. Kossuth was one of them. In heart, spirit, and sentiment he was an American. But as he spoke they did not listen as much as they attempted to draw him into the cauldron over the slavery issue. Kossuth reiterated that he took it "to be duty of honor and principle not to meddle with any party question of your (US) domestic affairs".²⁶ Nevertheless he could not rid himself of the slavery issue no matter how hard he tried. Thus, while he professed his "admiration for the glorious principle of union, on which stands the mighty pyramid of your (US) greatness".²⁷ He had to walk the thin line defining American sensitivity. It was never easy. Particularly when he traveled in the South where his reception was not nearly as warm as it had been in the North. In March 1852, he told a crowd in New Orleans:

"What have I to do with abolitionism or anti-abolitionism? Nothing in the world. That is not my matter; I am no citizen of the United States; I have neither the right nor the will to interfere with your domestic concerns; I claim for my nation the right to regulate its own institutions; I therefore must respect, and indeed I do respect, the same rights in others."²⁸

Kossuth attempted to avoid the problem of slavery in his speeches. But as Donald Spencer points out Kossuth, like Americans themselves, could not "praise 'freedom' and 'independence' and 'liberty' (for) Hungary without noticing the simultaneous absence of these rights among black slaves at home".²⁹

On 11 December, at a Speech at the Cooperation Dinner in New York, Kossuth conveniently quoted from Secretary of State Daniel Webster's speech on the Greek Question. Webster had said, "The law of nations maintains that in extreme cases resistance is lawful, and that one nation has no right to interfere in the affairs of another."³⁰ Of course, Kossuth used this as a springboard in his speech on Hungary. The monarchist forces had not only destroyed Hungary, but were a threat to destroy all nations who valued freedom, particularly the United States. On 26 December, he told a crowd in Philadelphia that, "... we struggled for the great principle of self-government against centralization because centralization is absolutism; and is inconsistent with constitutional rights".³¹ The following night he warned a crowd in Baltimore about the Russian menace. He used Napoleon I's warning about how in fifty years, Europe would either be republican or Cossack.³² He then proceeded to link the fortunes of republicanism with that of Hungary: "Hungary once free, Europe is republican; Hungary permanently crushed, all Europe is Cossack."³³ One month later in Pittsburgh, 26 January 1852, he told his audience that, "there are many here in this Hall who will yet see the day when the United States shall have to wrestle for life and death with all Europe absorbed by Russia".³⁴ In Cincinnati he attacked centralization as the

enslaver of nations.³⁵ Finally, when America had begun to lose enthusiasm for Kossuth's cause, he told a crowd in Salem, Massachusetts, 6 May 1852, that had America recognized Hungary and declared Russia's intervention to be a violation of international law, Hungary could already have its independence.³⁶ Kossuth believed America had the power and obligation to prevent Russian interference in Hungary. The theme of Kossuth's speeches is grasped quite correctly in Spencer's following quote:

"... the United States (according to Kossuth) was no longer simply the mecca of republicanism but had become its arsenal as well. Even when he bullied his hosts, as he did regularly, he reinforced this theme by challenging them to accept their destined role as a world power."³⁷

It was mentioned earlier that Kossuth had also blamed the nationalities for Hungary's failure in the revolution. In Britain, he was able to avoid this topic, but not in America.³⁸ In a speech at the Banquet of the Press in New York City, Kossuth said the following concerning the nationalities:

"... permit me to speak on the question of Nationalities, a false theory of which plays so mischievous a part in the destinies of Europe. No word has been more misrepresented than the word Nationality, which (has) become in the hands of absolutism a dangerous instrument against liberty."³⁹

Kossuth was alluding to the Habsburg's policy of using population statistics to show that the Hungarians were a minority in their own land, not to their military use of the minorities during the revolution.⁴⁰ This policy, Kossuth believed, was necessary "... to justify before the world the extinction of Hungary, the partition of its territory, land reincorporation of the dissected limbs into the common body of servitude (Austria) ..." ⁴¹ Later on, Kossuth boldly told his critics such falsehoods as this:

"The Croatian and Slavonians themselves repeatedly urged us in the common parliament to afford them opportunity to learn the Hungarian language, that having the right, they might also enjoy the benefit of being employed in the government offices of our common Hungary."⁴²

Kossuth was trying to use the American example of cultural assimilation in a Hungarian mode. The nationalities, like those coming to America daily, would gladly Magyarize themselves to become one with the standard ruling culture. In an age of awakening nationalism Kossuth attempted to convince his American audiences that the nationalities within Historic Hungary possessed no national sentiments of their own. Hungarian cultural superiority was so prevalent and universally accepted that the minorities were willingly assimilating to the Magyar nation. Since most Americans were ignorant of the politics in Eastern Europe, and were more concerned about their own domestic problems, it is easily understandable why many believed Kossuth's explanation of the nationality problems. It is also understandable why Kossuth was so lukewarm about supporting the confederation with the nationalities while he was in Turkey. He had no desire to share power or to associate with the minorities. He still had the misconception that Hungary was capable of achieving its own independence if

Russian intervention was prohibited. Not only did he refuse to share power with his fellow Hungarian emigres, he also wanted to use the minorities, much like the Habsburgs had been doing, to get the results he wanted: an independent Hungarian state. One can easily predict how the exiled minority leaders must have felt after reading transcripts of Kossuth's speeches. It is understandable why the Romanian and Serbian leaders showed great reluctance in accepting Kossuth's future confederation plans. They simply did not trust him. Ironically, at a banquet in Washington on 5 January 1852, Kossuth said the following:

"... whenever there exists a nation of sufficient knowledge and wealth and population to constitute a government, then a National Government is a necessary and proper result of nationality of character."⁴³

Apparently, according to Kossuth, the nationalities in and around Hungary did not possess the "nationality of character" to constitute a nation, let alone a government.

Kossuth received a great deal of encouragement and resources for his liberation movement. The tone and sentiment of his speeches suggested that he expected Hungary's second war of independence to begin shortly. In all probability, he would begin organizing the campaign once he returned to Europe. He already had an organization set up in America, with Paul Hajnik as treasurer to supervise the American half of the venture. Americans were more than willing to donate to Kossuth's cause. When Kossuth returned to England he left his unorganized organization behind him selling Hungarian bonds and purchasing more munitions. Also, ships had to be leased or purchased to ferry the supplies overseas when he sent the word that he was embarking on his noble crusade to liberate Hungary. However, time, lack of funds and mismanagement eventually took its toll on Kossuth's American resources.

Kossuth was not just busy buying arms. While in the South, he attempted to form "a well trained army, presumably tested in battle, and ready for deployment against Austria at his command."⁴⁴ He planned to control and direct both military and political leadership. He told his audiences, however, that after achieving Hungarian independence, he would, like Cincinnatus and Washington before him "retire and leave the running of the country to someone else".⁴⁵

Kossuth's credibility came under serious attack when the purpose of this expeditionary force became known.⁴⁶ The battle tested troops were to get their experience in Haiti. Actually, Kossuth and a Southern colonel named Pickett,⁴⁷ planned to organize this force, consisting mainly of southerners, to assist the Dominican Republic in its struggle against the black republic of Haiti. The force was to have six small battalions of about 1500 American and foreign troops.⁴⁸ Although the invasion never took place, Kossuth, an ardent supporter of the principle of non-intervention, had shown himself willing to violate it when the opportunity served his purposes.⁴⁹ Interestingly enough, after the Crimean War, he would willingly advocate the principle's violation as the only means to attain Hungarian independence.

Kossuth left American soil in July 1852. In all probability he had overstayed his welcome. America, regardless of the enthusiastic receptions it had given

Kossuth, had grown tired of him and his cause. The pressing issue of slavery in those territories acquired by virtue of the Mexican War of 1846-48, and the passionate moral issue over the institution itself, was reaching its emotional and constitutional climax in the decade before the American Civil War. Americans were more concerned with domestic issues than with a conflict thousands of miles away in defense of a people they did not know. Also, Kossuth had had the effrontery to tell his American audiences that Washington's dictum of non-interference in European affairs was anachronistic. He continually cajoled them to take their "destined role as a world power",⁵⁰ which only brought condemnation and further criticism from his enemies in Congress and the press. Kossuth did not understand the psyche of the American people and the importance of the slavery issue. Nevertheless, one must give him his due. He had taken America by storm and won its heart. As was mentioned earlier, they admired those qualities that he possessed that they identified as their own. Nothing illustrates this more than he becoming only the second foreigner, after the Marquis de Lafayette, to be honored in the United States Congress.⁵¹

By the time Kossuth had returned to England he had been away from Hungary for almost three years. In such a brief span the differences between the Hungarians within Hungary and their emigrés began to widen, and the gap between the emigrés themselves began to show greater stress. One thing was for certain, in an age of Neo-Absolutism within the Habsburg Monarchy, Hungary was not strong enough to achieve its own independence. Kossuth, much like the poet Mihály Vörösmarty and other Hungarians within Hungary, hoped for the next best alternative: a general European war. They believed that such a conflict between the Great Powers would result in the destruction of the Habsburg monarchy along with the re-establishment of an independent Hungary. Kossuth was eagerly waiting to assist in such a venture.⁵² The Crimean War was to be the answer to his prayers. However, the effects of the conflict were to be of great importance to Kossuth's final commitment to the Danubian Confederation. When the war broke out and the dissolution of Austria did not follow, Kossuth and the emigrés saw once again the importance of Austria's role in the balance of power and in the Eastern Question. More important, it was finally realized that Britain would not aid the emigrés in a re-creation of Hungary. On the contrary, she would do all in her power to hinder such a move. The only way Britain would recognize an independent Hungary would be through a *fait accompli*, or rather, the independence of Hungary successfully achieved by means that excluded Britain's participation and influence.

Despite Kossuth's preparations, America did not rush to join the British in destroying the deadly alliance of the absolute powers. Obviously, the Americans must have found the war quite strange with Austria and Russia on opposite sides. After all, Kossuth had spent months warning them about the threat they faced from the alliance of despots. More important, even with their domestic crisis the United States had differences with Great Britain in South America. As Jánossy states, "Britain's growing influence in Nicaragua and the Sandwich Isle was anxiously watched by American commerce."⁵³ America still felt Britain was its main nemesis; they had more to fear from the British than any other power. Also, America's closest Great Power ally was Russia, which desired a strong America

to counterbalance British power in the Mediterranean. Both America and Russia saw the main threat to their expansive policies coming from Britain. Once again, reality had taken precedence over ideals. Democracy played second fiddle to world politics.

Kossuth failed to understand the effects of American isolationism, and he was livid when America did not enter the Crimean War. He criticized President Franklin Pierce and the American people for not entering the war:

"His (Pierce) was the guilt; but whose was the fault? I cry out to heaven and to earth; it is yours! People of America, who accept the shame of that nothingness from your sewart, whom you could command."⁵⁴

Regardless of what expectations Kossuth had when he left America, Americans were not about to abandon Washington's advice and become embroiled in European affairs for which they had nothing to gain. Furthermore, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and Popular Sovereignty had moved their domestic crisis one step closer to civil war. Once again, Kossuth had to search out help for his cause. This time the road led to Mazzini and Napoleon III and the new idea of violating the non-intervention policy to achieve Hungarian independence.

Notes

1. For Kossuth's objectives while in America see: Jánossy, Dénes A., *A Kossuth-Emigráció Angliában és Amerikában 1851-1952*. I. (Budapest, 1940).
2. Osborne, Ralph, Parliament, 21 July 1849, cited in Jánossy, Dénes A., *Great Britain and Kossuth*, (Budapest, 1937), p. 26.
3. Kossuth was farsighted enough to realize that the United States would be a Great Power. He misunderstood, however, when the United States would come to realize this fact. His was the error of time. Conversations with Gábor Pajkossy, 5 August 1988, Budapest. Cited below as *Conversations*.
4. Non-intervention stipulated that the powers had no right to interfere in each other's domestic affairs. Agreed upon during the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, this allowed the absolute powers to suppress reactionary and republican movements within their borders. Also, it gave them a free hand in handling their minorities, particularly the Poles, who were partitioned between Russia, Austria and Prussia.
5. It is my contention that in 1849 Hungary lost the opportunity for military victory; however, I am not convinced that Austria possessed sufficient strength to conquer Hungary by itself. I do believe that a draw or a negotiated peace could have been achieved as long as a Hungarian fighting force and government eluded the Habsburgs. The Russian invasion negated any possible success for such a negotiated peace.
6. Kossuth-Palmerston, cited in Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 22.
7. Brunnow-Nesselrode, London, 18 May 1849, cited in Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 24.
8. *IBID*. Note: These included Richard Cobden, a member of Parliament and the Peace Party; David Urquhart, former diplomat who was very supportive of Turkey and anti-Russian; and the Hungarian emigrés Ferenc Pulszky and László Teleki.
9. Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 57.
10. Kossuth-Teleki, Kutiahia, 22 August 1850, cited in Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 57.
11. Kossuth, The Democratic Society of the Friends of the Constitution, London, 6 November 1851, cited in Jánossy, *A Kossuth-Emigráció*, pp. 817-818. Note: Kossuth believed since Britain would not interfere in the domestic affairs of any state she "would not tolerate the intervention of other states (Russia) in a third state's (Austria) internal affairs".

12. Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 88. Whoever took up arms broke the law. Austria initiated the conflict by invading Hungary in 1848. Franz Joseph was never crowned King of Hungary. He had never taken the oath to the Hungarian constitution, so he was not the legal King. Ferdinand still held that title. Hungary was fighting for the April Laws of 1848. Kossuth's deposition of the monarchy was consistent with the constitution, but foolish since it ruled out the possibility of a negotiated settlement during the latter days of the war. *Conversations*.
13. Jánossy, *Britain*, pp. 88–89.
14. Abbot Lawrence–Kossuth, London, 28 October 1851, cited in Jánossy, *Kossuth-Emigráció*, pp. 714–15.
15. Kossuth–Thornton Hunt, Winchester, 25 October 1851, cited in Jánossy, *Kossuth-Emigráció*, p. 713; also, Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 95.
16. The French Government refused to let Kossuth travel through France. Afterwards, Kossuth wrote a “fiery article” to the *Peuple de Marseille* denouncing Napoleon III and his government while praising the French People.
17. Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 95.
18. *IBID.*, p. 100. Also, see Tibor Frank, *Marx és Kossuth* (Budapest, 1955).
19. Spencer, Donald S., *Louis Kossuth and Young America: A Study of Sectionalism and Foreign Policy 1848–1852* (Columbia, MO, 1977), p. 53.
20. It needs to be mentioned that the idea of a Danubian Confederation, that Kossuth discussed with the Romanian, Serbian and Polish emigrés while he was an exile in Turkey in 1849, resurfaced in discussions within the emigre community in 1853. Kossuth granted considerable territorial and political concessions to the other nationalities. See: Kovács Endre, *A Kossuth-emigráció és az európai szabadságmozgalmak*, Budapest, 1967.
21. Spencer, p. 53.
22. Kossuth Louis, *The Select Speeches of Kossuth* (New York, 1854), p. 397.
23. Kossuth Louis, *Memories of My Evile* (New York, 1880), p. 38.
24. Jánossy, *Kossuth-Emigráció*, p. 253; also, Kossuth, *Select*, p. 38.
25. Kossuth, *Select*, pp. 38–39. Note: Kossuth had to take extreme caution about not being used as a political tool in the domestic politics of Britain and America. Cobden warned him to “keep out” of British politics. In the United States he was at the mercy of the slavery issue. According to John Komlos (*Kossuth in America 1851–1852*, Buffalo, 1973), “extremists in both sections of the United States were prepared to judge the Hungarian cause only in terms of their own domestic struggle”. See *Komlos*, p. 66.
26. *IBID.*, p. 39.
27. *IBID.*
28. Spencer, p. 149.
29. *IBID.*, p. 180.
30. Kossuth, *Select*, p. 60.
31. *IBID.*, p. 87.
32. *IBID.*, p. 131. Note: Below is a letter from A. Dudley Mann, Special Emissary to the rebel authorities, appointed by President Zachary Taylor, to the Secretary of State, that illustrates the effect Kossuth had on convincing the Americans to support his cause: “The question whether continental Europe shall be under Cossack or Republican rule hereafter will, in all probability, be definitively decided on the plains and in the passes of Hungary.” 8 August–27 September 1849, Spencer, p. 26.
33. Kossuth, *Select*, p. 131.
34. *IBID.*, p. 191.
35. *IBID.*, pp. 228–229.
36. *IBID.*, p. 340.
37. Spencer, p. 179.
38. Historian and *North American Review* editor Francis Brown wrote an article for the review calling the Hungarian War of Independence a “war of races,” and Kossuth and the Hungarians, “arrogant, cruel and tyrannical”. Harvard University's board of overseers revoked his appointment to the distinguished McLean Chair. See Spencer, pp. 43–44; Brown, Francis, “The War of Races in Hungary,” in *North American Review*, 70 (January 1850), p. 121; Bowen, Francis, “The Rebellion

- Against the Magyars," *IBID.*, 72, (1851), pp. 238-240; Also *National Cyclopedia of American Biography*, II, p. 452; Ekirch, Arthur A., *The Idea of Progress in America, 1815-60*, p. 59.
39. Kossuth, *Select*, p. 78.
 40. According to Pajkossy, the Habsburgs did not need to show that the Hungarians were a minority in Hungary. Statistics, specifically church and those of Elek Fényes, *Magyarország statisztikája*, I-III (Pest, 1842-3), Vol. I, pp. 33-4, Table 52B, showed the Hungarians were minimal, but no minority. *Conversations*.
 41. *IBID.*, p. 80.
 42. *IBID.*, p. 86.
 43. *IBID.*, p. 147.
 44. Komlos, p. 124.
 45. Kossuth, *Select*, p. 72, and *Memories*, p. 100.
 46. Komlos, p. 126.
 47. This is not General George Pickett of the Confederate Army who led the illfated charge at Gettysburg, 3 July 1863. He became a captain in the American army in 1855.
 48. Komlos., p. 124.
 49. *IBID.*, p. 126.
 50. Spencer, p. 179.
 51. Jánossy, *Britain*, pp. 111-112; also, *Komlos*, p. 105, from Eugene Pivany, *Sixty Years Ago*, An address delivered before the First Hungarian Association for Self-Culture. Philadelphia, 4 December 1911.
 52. This idea circulated amongst the different emigre communities of Europe. All of them believed that a European war would see the weakened Monarchy go asunder.
 53. Jánossy, *Britain*, p. 112.
 54. Kossuth, cited in Spencer, p. 174.