

Agriculture and the New Economic Mechanism

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When I was invited to the conference, held in September 2000 in Budapest, I was asked to give an introduction on the effects of the New Economic Mechanism on agriculture. In my lecture I asked the question another way around: what influence did agriculture (and within it the agricultural co-operatives) have on the process of economic reform.

If we take together the package of measures introduced on 1 January 1968 with agricultural reform measures then they do not neatly fit together. In 1965 the concept by which the whole economic system was to be redesigned was being devised, while the debates around agriculture were already dealing with practical and side issues. For example, the abolition of machine tractor stations or the cancellation of agricultural co-operative debt. In 1966 when the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) Central Committee accepted the initial principles of the economic reform, producer prices were increased in agriculture. In 1967, as the planners prepared for the economic reform, two important pieces of agricultural legislation came into force, while interest representation organs were created for the members of the co-operatives.

Therefore, the changes in agriculture, and especially as they affected agricultural co-operatives, occurred from 1966 onwards, two years before those that replaced plan instructions in the economy as a whole.

How is this discrepancy to be explained? The most common explanation is that agriculture was nothing more than the laboratory for the reform. However, this begs the question of whether this was simply a question of unintended outcomes, or whether it was the result of planned attempts by the state? What other factors need to be taken into account? For example, we might consider the impact of the agricultural co-operatives themselves, what came from below, and what the effect was of interaction between the planners and economic actors.

This study is based on the results of archival research and oral history and attempts to explain how agricultural reform and economic reform were connected. In the following parts of my paper I would like to concentrate on three principal issues:

- 1) The major problems of collectivized Hungarian agriculture during the first half of the 1960s.
- 2) The peculiarities of agricultural reform during the decade.
- 3) The effects of the New Economic Mechanism on the agricultural co-operatives.

1 The major problems of collectivized Hungarian agriculture during the first half of the 1960s

The problems of collectivized agriculture largely result in the fact that the state's opportunity for representing its interest was greater than that of the co-operatives, that is the collective decision-making process of the individual co-operative members. Indeed, as a result of the state's dominance certain process began which were against the interests of the party-state itself.

What were the major problems?

Just as from year to year the co-operatives sold a higher percentage of their produce (mainly to the state) the volume of their production hardly increased at all.¹

The second contradiction showed itself in the fact that while the co-operatives were able every year to fulfil their obligations to the state, their operating budgets were insufficient for their needs. Behind this was that pricing policy in fact drained the resources of the co-operatives, while the use of their revenue occurred in a way largely prescribed by the state. The so-called

'remainder principle' meant that any income of the collective farm was firstly spent on repaying its obligations to the state. The impact of these factors was that the co-operatives never had sufficient funds for investment and for this reason could only buy machinery on credit or with state subsidies, and therefore they became indebted. Dependence on the state translated into state control, even though the state did not formally own the co-operatives.²

The pricing system and distribution of income also prevented the co-operatives from giving a decent income to the membership. As a result of the insecure and inadequate income provided by the common farming within the co-operatives large numbers left them. Not even the three-year ban on leaving after joining could prevent this because the new industrialization drive launched in 1959 created demand for workers. This movement was largely made up of the most employable of the young, and particularly the men. Those leaving did not only represent a problem for the co-operatives but so did those who stayed because many hardly ever worked or worked poorly in the common farming element of the co-operative.³

By autumn 1961 it had become clear that the problems, together with the restrictions on investment directed at the agricultural sector, prevented the state from fulfilling their aim of "more production, more produce". This was serious as the Kádár regime's living standards policy was only visible through the provision of foodstuffs, because most people still spent most of their money on food.

At that time the HSWP sought two kinds of solutions to the problem.

The first was that in 1961–1962 the party leadership launched a reform programme, planned to end in 1963.⁴ It had three planks:

- 1) The reform of the agricultural pricing, taxation and financial system
- 2) The examination of agricultural management
- 3) The introduction of a new co-operative law

On the other hand, until the end of the reform, efforts had to be made to do something about stabilizing the situation of the co-operatives. A large number of examples arrived from the socialist countries, simply because in the first half of the 1960s there were reactions to the problems that appeared in the agricultural sector in both the Soviet Union and in other Eastern and Central European countries.⁵ As a result, they reorganized the party and state direction of agriculture. Under the influence of these reorganisations the channels of influence were open to the central authorities in the fields of production and purchase, while both agricultural co-operatives and state farms came under unified direction.

The Hungarian leadership did not choose to go down this road, but instead from 1960-1961 chose their own strategy for dealing with problems. This rested on the recognition that the production responsibilities of the co-operatives, alongside the constraints imposed by investment, could only be fulfilled if they secured or expanded the interest of the individual member in both collective production and production on the household plot.⁶

The improvement of the work ethic of the membership could only be secured through giving them supplementary sources of income. The possibilities for securing such extra income were definitely constrained. At the same time the 1959 Law No. 7 that regulated the co-operatives laid down the basic institutions for binding the membership financially to the co-operative through the basic institution of the 'remainder principle' – the 'work unit' system.⁷

It was in the resourcefulness of the peasants that the solution was found that ensured the realization of the interests of the membership came before the interests of the state. They used forms of remuneration (like share cropping and periodic bonuses) that allowed for the realization of this. At this time there were very many semi-legal solutions which had one simple constraint. The local initiatives of the co-operatives could only to a very defined extent mitigate the larger negative forces that affected the co-operatives (the income, however it was distrib-

uted, was always too low). This is so even without speaking about how the effect of state intervention on the agricultural co-operative really constrained the interest realization of each unit.

2 The peculiarities of agricultural reform during the decade

These experiences were built into the reform measures in agriculture that were implemented in the first third of the 1960s, and these were connected to the two means of dealing with the problems that are referred to above. The realization of the reform measures was frustrated at the turn of 1963 and 1964 because of macro- and micro-economic problems.⁸ At the same time numerous large questions of principle had already been decided by the reform attempts in 1963, and therefore in large part the 1966–1967 reform package was built on the 1963 reform package.

The next part of this study concentrates on comparing and contrasting the 1963 reform plans and the specifically agricultural parts of the 1968 New Economic Mechanism.

As a result of the initiatives that were introduced from below and the financial problems of the co-operatives the question of the realization of interest came to the fore. The new model for the financing and income distribution of the co-operatives had already been formed in 1963. The financial infrastructure for independent enterprise production had to be created. In 1963 political considerations had interfered in its implementations, mainly in the maintenance of low consumer prices. The question of consumer prices, far more than ideological considerations, was a crucially important crisis because it made the low level of agricultural prices necessary, so that grocery prices could be kept low, and thus wages kept down.

By the middle of the 1960s it was widely accepted that solutions to the problems of giving adequate incentives could not be solved either at the level of the membership or that of the co-operative, unless the price system was restructured.

The Politburo on 6 July 1965 decided to raise agricultural prices by 9% in 1966, and a further 10% in 1967–70.⁹ The increase in prices was not, however, sufficient to allow the co-

operatives to wipe out their debt. For this reason, as part of the same decision, the state wrote off 60% of total co-operative debt. Alongside this, short-term loans were converted to long-term loans.¹⁰

The co-operative model introduced in 1966 together with the price and financial measures taken did not, however, go much further than the 1963 reform plan, except in the respect that the authority for making decisions about investment and finance remained with state bodies. The major constraint, therefore, on the enterprise based production was that of state investment policy.

The creation of independent co-operative production was not only necessary in order for a larger proportion of earned income to remain with the farms, but also for the co-operative to decide itself what it did with its income. Already in 1963 it was recognised that the agricultural co-operatives had to have responsibility themselves. At that time the greatest weight was placed on the amortisation fund. In the middle of the 1960s the criticisms of the system of distribution co-operative income became stronger.¹¹

The Law No. 3 of 1967 on agricultural co-operatives set up the new financial system. Within its scope fell the creation of the amortisation fund, as well as the share fund.¹² The importance of the latter lay in the fact that the sums paid to the members for their work were counted as an expense of the co-operative, and that its payment took precedence over the needs of the state and the supplementation of economic means. In this way the system was reformed.

The shift to independent enterprise production did not only require the securing of an appropriate financial background, but whole spheres of decision-making authority were transferred from the state to the co-operatives. The major changes only took place with the financial measures in the middle of the 1960s. In contrast to the previous situation, the role of the state to intervene in the affairs of the agricultural co-operatives was restricted, and this increased the independence of the co-operatives from both the central and local organs of govern-

ment, and particularly the bureaucracies in the district councils which had frequently directly intervened. It is, however, necessary to point out that the ability of central organs to intervene still remained strong.

In order to validate these changes there had to be amendments to the law as well. In the three reform packages designed in 1963 the envisaged end result was a plan for a new agricultural co-operative law.¹³ During the drafting of the law the major effort was to attempt to eliminate the asynchronous relation between the *de jure* and *de facto* elements of co-operative life. They did this so that the practice of co-operatives was incorporated into the law, allowing for the legalization of various informal initiatives at the level of work organisation and remuneration.¹⁴

The 1963 plan defined the agricultural producer co-operative through two basic principles in just the same way as Law No. 3 of 1967. On the one hand, it stated that the co-operative was an agricultural plant that was a productive enterprise based on independent accounting. On the other hand, it talked about the co-operatives' organisation and economic independence. Agricultural co-operative independence was legally protected in two ways. On the one hand, it stated that the owners of the co-operative were the members: in other words that they were responsible for their own affairs. On the other hand, the law stated that to some extent the co-operative came under state direction, but that its directing role was not the same as direct control over co-operative members and property. It emphasized that state bodies could not make a decision that affected production, farming and the distribution of income.¹⁵

The novelty of the 1967 package was the proclamation of legal equality for agricultural co-operatives. Behind this was one very important political decision. Previously official ideology had regarded only direct state ownership as the highest form of socialist property. Every other form of property figured as the indirectly socialist form of property like co-operative property. With the law co-operatives were recognized as a directly socialist form of property, and a major ideological revision occurred.

It is important to draw attention to the fact that this political decision, taking into account the great differences between socialist countries, was not without its problems. It is only necessary here to mention that in the Soviet Union many *kolkhozes* turned themselves into *sovkhozes*, drawing attention to the higher nature of their form of property.

3 The effects of the New Economic Mechanism on the agricultural co-operatives

The New Economic Mechanism, introduced on 1 January 1968, cleared away many ideological, judicial, constitutional and financial obstacles in the path of agricultural development. In this changing political and economic atmosphere it was the agricultural co-operatives that adjusted themselves to the new possibilities most rapidly and most successfully. While produce in the entire agricultural sector increased by 5.5% a year, the growth of the agricultural co-operatives was 9.4% after the reform.¹⁶

What were the factors which promoted this dynamic growth? In the last third of the 1960s the quantity of agricultural investment increased, which had not only state farms but also agricultural co-operatives receiving their share. The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s affirmed the tendency that the major part of the investment did not serve as a compensation for the implements anymore that had fallen short as a result of collectivization, but was used for real development instead. This period also brought forth a decisive change in the structure of investments. The centre of interest was shifted from building investment to machinery investment.¹⁷

Beside large-scale mechanisation, the extension of the utilization of chemical agents and artificial fertilisers as well as the appearance of 'closed production systems' was carried out in this period. Due to the reform the process of technological regeneration grew stronger. Traditional large-scale production was gradually replaced by industrial-type production systems using engines of high capacity that had mechanized the entire process of production as well as efficient chemical agents in

great quantities.¹⁸ An important preliminary condition for the reception and the adaption of the above mentioned had been the rise of an adequate staff of managers and experts within the co-operatives by the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to a wide-ranging agricultural secondary and university education.

The spread of 'closed production systems' in Hungary in the second half of the 1960s commenced with the produce of chicken-meat and eggs and then continued with the field growing of plants in the 1970s. The new system was applied most successfully in the domain of maize-cultivation, employing organisational and technical experience from the United States among others and partially making use of their imported machine systems. By the middle of the 1970s about half of the quantity of maize was cultivated within the scope of the new system.

The first results of the efforts to boost the technical and intellectual background of agricultural production were making themselves felt in a short time. The abrupt increase in the average yield of both wheat and maize formed the basis – through the increase of cattle stock and meat produce – of the tripling of Hungarian agrarian exports between 1965 and 1975.¹⁹ This growth is of great importance considering that the country had been in need of bread-grain and meat imports up to the middle of the 1960s.

Underlying this running-in of the co-operatives' produce we find the particular division of labour between the household plots and the communal part of the co-operatives. While large-scale production operated very well in the field growing of plants, household plots succeeded significantly in labour-intensive growing (e.g. horticulture and viticulture). 25% of the total returns of plant cultivation and stock-farming of the agricultural co-operatives were produced by household plots. This level of production could be achieved in spite of the fact that they were in possession of a mere 12% of the entire area of the co-operatives and had a rather scanty stock of implements, since the instruments of production they needed were largely missing from the market or were extremely expensive. The de-

gree of co-operation between collective and household farming was different in virtually every single co-operative. Many co-operatives undertook the production, purchase and distribution of the main implements needed by the household plots (seed-corn, breeding animal, artificial fertiliser, plant protectives, fodder). It was more accepted to sell produce excess through the co-operatives.²⁰

Household small-scale produce, thus, had had an important role in stabilizing large-scale production success. In fact, we may add, it had become a significant factor of the gross national product and Hungary's export capacity. There had been another important aspect of the collaboration between collective and household farming. The communal part of the co-operative ensured but a small income to the members; the household farming in turn provided an opportunity for industrious members to grow richer and rise socially. Countryside families were willing to make enormous efforts to obtain durable consumer goods, build family houses of personal property, and, last but not least, to provide school education for their children. The greatest change in the way of country life in the history of the twentieth century in Hungary took place.²¹ The immense change in the consumption and the standard of living of countryside families made this era the golden age of "consumer's socialism".

Beside the household produce, the widening range of co-operatives' supplementary establishments played a significant part in the rapid increase of co-operative and membership earnings. The restrictions of the Soviet *kolkhoz*-model limited the activity of agricultural co-operatives to plant cultivation and stock-farming and restrained other temporary activity; albeit this had had a long tradition in Hungary in the organisations of both the old *latifundium* and the peasant farming. Following the reform of the Mechanism, the non-agricultural, subsidiary activity (so called ancillary enterprises) – including activity in industry, building industry, transport and trade – grew considerably wider, in fact, tripled in the period between 1968 and 1975. The net receipts of the co-operatives outside the base ac-

tivities grew from 9.2 billion a year in 1968 to 22.4 billion a year in 1971 (271%), building industry activity increased from 3.2 billion to 6 billion (182%), the net receipts coming from trade grew from 2 to 7.4 billion (350%).²² These ancillary enterprises developed particularly vigorously in the co-operatives which had significant drawbacks in agricultural produce, since they retrieved the earnings the base activities would not cover, and, on the other hand, ensured continuous employment, and, thus, a guaranteed income, for the members.

The positive effects of the agricultural reform could be perceived in the entire society through improving food-supply or through the appearance of goods regarded until then as scarce material. A significant outcome of the period between 1966 and 1972 had been a rapid and balanced increase in consumption, as well as the improvement of commercial balance. Both the population and the state, thus, had become beneficiaries of the running-in of agricultural co-operatives. Despite all this, an anti-co-operative campaign started to develop in the beginning of the 1970s. Who were the leaders of this fight and why did they battle against agricultural co-operatives?

In search of the reasons we must first consider that there had been opponents of the economic reform of 1968 from the very beginning. One of the opponent groups was represented by the big industrial enterprises. In the course of a development of nearly a quarter of a century the priority of industrialization had led to heavy industry (metallurgy, steel metallurgy and machine industry) obtaining the greatest part of investment. In addition to this a strong lobby had emerged, even supported by the idea that in the building of socialism, the prominent part should be taken by the working class (which, by the way, had never come about). All this had ensured them privileges not only in the obtaining of resources but in each and every question of political supremacy. Their representatives took the key positions in the Party, the trade unions and the state institutions.²³ After 1968, they had to realize to their great astonishment that co-operatives could make more capital out of the adaptable scope enabled by the reform than giant factories.

They had also been disturbed by the agricultural lobby that had gained strength in the meantime and had started to formulate its interests with a growing explicitness. The lobby criticized the extremely high retail price of agricultural machinery and industrial raw material and the growing gap between prices of agricultural and industrial products.²⁴

This conflict itself, however, would not have been sufficient for an assault on agricultural co-operatives. The decisive factor had been the fact that international opinion on the reform had changed. The stifling of the reform process in Czechoslovakia by force of arms did not only mean that Hungary had been left alone with the reform but also that the Hungarian developments had attracted the close attention of the other socialist countries with special regard to the conservative leadership of the Soviet Union led by Brezhnev. They were afraid that the New Economic Mechanism would result in undesirable consequences for politics, power and ideology. The “follow-wind” from Moscow showed favour towards all with an aversion to the New Economic Mechanism from the beginning. Factory managers, heads of trusts, the general staff of the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions, as well as loyal, but non-expert party members from central and county economic boards formed the opposition of the reform, led by Béla Biszku, Zoltán Komócsin and Sándor Gáspár. They were disturbed by the fact that through the dynamic growth of household farming and ancillary enterprises, the income of large-scale industry workers had gradually been overtaken by the income of co-operative members. Moreover, the heavy industry lobby insisted that the sudden development of co-operative farming, and, as a result, the income of peasants, could not have taken place in a “legal” manner.²⁵

Since opposition could not be overtly aired in public, the covert attack on the reform was launched with a reference to the protection of the interests of large-scale industry workers. The decisions of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Central Committee made in their session on 14–15 November 1972 meant practically a suppression of the reform process.²⁶ Within

the next two years, the politicians involved closely with the reform (Rezső Nyers, Lajos Fehér, Jenő Fock) were dismissed.

The main line of attack had been the sector of agricultural co-operatives and the measures taken ranged from ideological debate, economic regulators and executive measures to legal and criminal proceedings.²⁷ Despite the fact that the reform of 1968 had acknowledged state and co-operative property as equal, the debate whether co-operative property – including household plots and ancillary enterprises – had to be considered directly socialist property, started afresh in the press in the beginning of the 1970s. There had been comparable discussions regarding the interests involved. The hierarchy of interests, a pivotal formula of the socialist system, had declared that interests hierarchized downwards from the top to the bottom. ‘People’s economy’ ranked first, an enterprise or a certain group second, the individual last. This had also been a hierarchy of assertion, which means that the interests of the socialist economy and society represented by the Party had always had the upper hand of the group interests of co-operatives or the interest of their members.

The agricultural co-operatives could see their situation growing worse not only in the field of ideology but also in the domain of economic regulators. Their assessed taxes had been increased, the taxes on household parts had been steepened retroactively, which was a case without parallel. The subsidization of their investments had been reduced. The collective farms’ non-agricultural activity had been limited by executive means. First, steps had only served for preventing expansion, later they were also used to restrict industrial activity outside of the state sector. A number of restrictive measures were taken from the beginning of the 1970s. From 1 January 1971 on, the progressive taxation for all activities in the co-operatives had been increased. Rates and taxes applying to state officials had been extended to co-operative employees as well. First in Budapest and its environs within a radius of 60 kilometres and later in the surroundings of other towns as well, they prohibited outworker-activity for the machine-, chemical-, and light

industry of the co-operatives. Thirty-eight different scopes of activities had been deemed completely forbidden for agricultural co-operatives.²⁸

Conservative anti-reform forces were not content with a mere acceleration of the regulation system. Legal and criminal procedures had been launched against many co-operative-leaders overstating a common activity which, however, did not suit the opinion of the opposition to the reform. They picked out a few people involved in these activities with the intention of setting an example and intimidating the others. The people prosecuted were exactly the ones who made the greatest effort to meet the expectations of the New Economic Mechanism, hence, those striving for greater efficiency, more profit in farming and the assertion of the spirit of a market economy. These show trials particularly affected the most ambitious people, who had risen above their fellow leaders through their creativity and their spirit of enterprise. This process was the farthest-reaching wave of political retribution in Hungary since the massive retaliation that came to an end in the beginning of the 1960s. Legal and criminal proceedings against co-operative-leaders made it clear that unlawful show trials still belonged to the set of instruments applied by the so-called "soft dictatorship".

The negative consequences of the restrictions and interventions concerning co-operatives came out in a short time. The spectacular fall-off in household produce, the forcing back of the supplementary activities provided by the agricultural co-operatives had the most unfavourable effects on food-supply. Since the self-legitimation of the Kádár-regime had largely depended on accomplishing the policy of living standards, from the middle of the 1970s, they started to revoke the measures that had had disadvantageous effects on the development of both producing capacity and the basis of production.

4 Summary

Two years before the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism, from 1966 on, the managements of agricultural co-operatives launched the switch-over from central directives to

economic regulators. By doing so, they had built up a system based upon the idea that economical regulators might substitute for central directives, moreover, in the event they could add to the producer's interests, they might help the implementation of central objectives even more effectively.

The most recent archival research affirmed that experience gathered in the agricultural sector as well as material on the reform completed by 1963, had had a stimulating effect on the entire process of economic reform.

In the course of general reformist endeavours, deliberate efforts were made to make use of models of work organisations, remuneration, decision-making in state-owned companies that had worked very well in the co-operative sector. We must add, however, that there still remained a discrepancy between realization and its adoption. Furthermore, since the traditional conflict of different ideologies and interests could not have been settled in the beginning of the mechanism reform, the asynchronism between official conception, legal regulation and practice still remained, albeit in a much milder shape. Moreover, conservative anti-reform forces started a counter-attack in 1972–1973, causing serious damage in the national economy.

The 'attack' on agricultural co-operatives illustrated clearly that their fate had continued to depend largely on the political climate. Underlying all this was the fact that the New Economic Mechanism had been based on the notion that politics and ideology were separable. The cancellation of the reform process had resulted exactly from the revelation that the changes started in the economy would inevitably affect the remaining domains of society. The process that had resulted in agricultural co-operatives becoming independent was deemed particularly perilous. Dogmatic forces of the political structure were afraid that co-operatives' growing independence would result in unfavourable political and ideological processes. In the first half of the 1970s, however, they managed to drive the genie back into the bottle.

NOTES

- ¹ Mezőgazdaságunk a szocialista átszervezés idején, 1958-1962. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 1963, 176-178.
- ² Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive, hereafter MOL] 288.f. 28/1961. 6.ő.e., 230-237; Tájékoztató jelentés a Politikai Bizottság részére a termelőszövetkezetek 1960. évi zárszámadásáról. (1961. április 15.)
- ³ Mezőgazdasági Statisztikai Zsebkönyv. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 1963., 1964.; MOL 288.f. 28/1961/8.ő.e. Előzetes jelentés a mezőgazdasági termelőszövetkezetek 1961. évi termelési és pénzügyi tervének várható megvalósulásáról és a tsz tagok várható jövedelméről.
- ⁴ MOL 288.f. 5/245.ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1961. szeptember 26-i üléséről; 288.f. 4/45.ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 1962. február 9-i üléséről; 288.f. 4/47-48.ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 1962. március 28-30. üléséről.
- ⁵ For more on the reorganisations of party and state direction in Soviet and East European agriculture see Chaykin, Piotr: "Noviye organi upravleniya sel'skovo hozhaystva – organizatori proizvodstva". *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 40 (1962); Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeievich, Organizovanno provedi perestroyku sel'skovo hozhaystva. *Pravda*, 28 March 1962; Komjahov, Valeriy, Uluchsheniye rukovodstva - vazhnoye sredstvo podyoma sel'skovo hozhaystva. *Ekonomika Sel'skovo Hozhaystva*, 8 (1962):20-29.; Nove, Alec, An Economic History of the USSR. Harmondsworth, etc., Penguin Books 1978, 468-488; Wädekin, Karl-Eugen, Agrarian Policies in Communist Europe. The Hague/London, Allanheld, Osmun Publishers; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982, 44-62.
- ⁶ Varga, Zsuzsanna, Politika, paraszti érdekérvényesítés és szövetkezetek Magyarországon, 1956-1967. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest 2001, 71-81.
- ⁷ A Népköztársaság Elnöki Tanácsának 1959. évi 7. számú törvényerejű rendelete a mezőgazdasági termelőszövetkezetéről és a termelőszövetkezeti csoportról. Törvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyűjteménye 1959, 95-104.
- ⁸ Pető, Iván and Szakács, Sándor, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története, 1945-1985. I. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó 1985, 527-531.
- ⁹ MOL 288.f. 5/369.ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1965. július 6-i üléséről. 6. napirendi pont: Előterjesztés a mezőgazdasági ár-, adó- és pénzügyi rendszer továbbfejlesztéséről.
- ¹⁰ Fazekas, Béla, A mezőgazdasági termelőszövetkezeti mozgalom Magyarországon. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1976, 167-170.

- ¹¹ László, János, A gazdasági irányítás és a termelészövetkezetek anyagi érdekeltsége. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1970, 254-258.
- ¹² Mezőgazdasági termelészövetkezeti törvény. Földjogi törvény. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1968, 68-73.
- ¹³ MOL 288.f. 28/1963./4.ő.e. Az új termelészövetkezeti törvény vitaanyaga, 1963. január.
- ¹⁴ Varga, 112-117.
- ¹⁵ Mezőgazdasági termelészövetkezeti törvény. Földjogi törvény. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1968, 9-14, 151-154.
- ¹⁶ Szakács, Sándor, "A reform kérdése és a termelés". *Agrártörténeti Szemle* (1-4) 1989, 109-110.
- ¹⁷ Donáth, Ferenc, Reform és forradalom. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1977, 230-231.
- ¹⁸ Swain, Nigel, "The evolution of Hungary's agricultural system since 1967." In *Hungary: A decade of economic reform*. Eds. Hare, P. G., Radice, H. K. and Swain, N., George Allen & Unwin, London 1981, 236-240.
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- ²¹ Valuch, Tibor, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2001, 284-294.
- ²² Mezőgazdasági Statisztikai Zsebkönyv. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 1974-1978.
- ²³ Budapest Oral History Archive (OHA), Interviews with Economic Leaders.
- ²⁴ Berend T., Iván, A magyar gazdasági reform útja. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1988, 316-329.
- ²⁵ Tőkés, Rudolf, A kialakított forradalom. Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest 1998, 107-112.
- ²⁶ MOL 288.f. 4/119-120.ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság kibővített üléséről.
- ²⁷ Berend, 335-348.
- ²⁸ Szakács, 111-115.