

**President Kekkonen's Visits to Hungary in the 1960s:
Satellite Policy in the Context of Kinship**

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A high-ranking Finnish foreign policy official Keijo Korhonen wrote in his memoirs about the role-position of Hungary in Finnish foreign policy during the era of Kekkonen. To quote Korhonen:

The Russians were first in importance, after them there was no-one in importance, even after no-one there was no-one, then there were the Hungarians and at the tail of the queue there were East Germans, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Rumanians.¹

My aim is to discuss Finnish foreign policy – conducted by President Kekkonen - towards Hungary during the Kádár era, in the 1960s. At that time, the relations between Finland and Hungary were improved at both the intergovernmental and non-governmental (civic society) level. In this article, I will concentrate on the image and the structure of these relations: how were these relations established and what kind of relations were pursued? It can be anticipated that there were two contradictory elements in these relations: first, the heritage of the old cultural relations, which were based on the feeling of kinship*,

* Cf. Riikonen, H.K., "Sustaining Kinship in Wartime: Finnish-Hungarian Contacts in the Light of the Yearbook *Heimotyö* (1937-1944)". *Hungarologische Beiträge* 7, Hrsg. Anssi Halmesvirta. Universität Jyväskylä 1996, 61-73. [Ed. note]

and second, the political reality of Cold War Europe in the 1960s.

Expressions of the Finnish policy towards Hungary can be found in the context of the meetings between the countries' leadership. Therefore, I will focus on the two visits which President Kekkonen paid to Hungary: the private visit in May 1963 and the state visit in autumn 1969. The first visit was made at a time when the Hungarian relations to the West were problematic after the 1956 uprising. Kekkonen's visit, although it was officially only a detour during the visit to Yugoslavia, was the first visit of a Western Head of State since the uprising of 1956. The state visit of 1969, which was an official state visit and a part of a visit to Rumania and Czechoslovakia as well, was, on the other hand, made while the European Security Conference was being discussed and while the shadow of the occupation of Czechoslovakia was creating intense international pressure.

Especially during the era of Kekkonen the President had an unusually strong position in formulating Finnish foreign policy. Kekkonen's Hungarian relations are of special interest because as a student politician he was *aitosuomalainen*, an Ardent Finn, respected Finnish-Estonian-Hungarian kinship, and knew Hungary and Hungarians personally. Presumably, this mental heritage might have influenced his opinions and his policy towards Hungary.² The presence of power politics was, however, a reality. Relations with the Soviet Union were a primary consideration, but, at the same time, the Finnish reputation as a western and neutral state was cherished. It is worth discussing how or if these two frameworks – the idea of kinship and the prevailing political conditions – were linked to each other in Kekkonen's policy. As a working hypothesis it is presumed that these two dimensions were united in his policy to make the mutual relations between Finland and Hungary a quite unique case in the field of Cold War policy. Further, it is important to compare the attitudes of the diplomatic corps to the policy of the state leadership as well as the expressions of the press and publicity to the official rhetoric³.

These two contexts – the tradition of kinship relations and the Cold War political conditions – hypothetically affected the visits too. In the case of Finnish-Hungarian relations, the visits which President Kekkonen paid in the 1960s seemed to be symbolically valuable as acts of relations between two states. Therefore, the visits – including programmes, symbols and forms of state visits⁴ – are of special value and worth studying in order to illuminate the conduct of the Finnish – Hungarian relations.

1 Kádár's Hungary and the Recognition of Finnish Neutrality

In the aftermath of 1956, the issue of Hungary was controversial in Finland. Official Finnish policy towards Hungary can be defined as cool satellite policy and the attitude of public opinion was that of a warming cultural co-operation. As the Finnish legation in Budapest defined it, there were two different dimensions in Finnish-Hungarian relations. First, the correct state level relations – as a result of the Finnish official moderate policy on Kádárism. Secondly, there were the correct relations between Finns and Hungarians, which were based on the Finnish sympathetic attitude towards Hungarians and on the voluntary help to the Hungarians who had suffered in the revolution. To quote the Finnish legation, there were the concepts of “official gratitude” and “official aid”. There was thus a difference between public opinion and the Finnish official policy. Kekkonen was aware of this difference.⁵

In the context of the issue of kinship, Finnish-Hungarian relations seemed to be normalised soon after the revolution. As the Finnish Legation in Budapest stated, thanks to the Finnish sympathy for Hungarians, the relations between Hungary and Finland returned back to “cherishing the idea of kinship” as early as 1957. For example, *Finn-Magyar Társaság* (Finnish-Hungarian Society) visited Hungary. The chargé d'affaires, T.H. Heikkilä, warned, however, that there was no reason for too much optimism yet. According to Heikkilä, it was still important to consider the conditions in Hungary carefully, even if they seemed to be normalised.⁶ It can be argued that the state-

ment reflected, surprisingly, both the attitude of Finnish public opinion and the official moderate policy towards Kádárism.

In spite of the quick return to the normal kinship relations, the state-level relations between Hungary and Finland remained cool. The relations were correct, but cool or reserved. Therefore, the fact that the Finnish Government opposed all open protest against the Soviet occupation in 1956 and against the Kádár regime, did not imply that the official relations between Hungary and Finland were good. It was assumed that the relations were kept cool in order to preserve Finland's position as an independent country.⁷

Obviously, at the time of the first visit, the policy of a cool attitude towards satellite countries did not seem to be essential any more. The cool relations between Finland and the satellite countries were gradually warming up as a result of developments in international politics. In the case of Hungary, there were some new aspects to consider from the Finnish point of view. Kekkonen's visit to Hungary in 1963 was part of a development during which Hungary normalised or reconstructed its diplomatic links after the events of 1956. The Finnish political and diplomatic circles saw signs of liberalisation and destalinisation in Hungary as well as signs of a new orientation in the relations between Hungary and the United Nations.⁸

The question of Finland's reputation as a neutral state was also an important indicator in Finnish foreign policy. When there were perceptible signs of western acceptance of Finnish neutrality, the Finnish political leadership was ready to improve the relations with the Eastern Bloc. After the visit to Great Britain in 1961 and France in 1962, the tone of the West gave official indications that Finland was a neutral state.⁹ In addition to this, the cultural and scientific contacts between Finland and Hungary had increased little by little in the late 1950's and early 1960's.¹⁰

The visit of 1963 can easily be seen as a turning point in the relations between Finland and Hungary. The policy in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution seemed to change. One can ask if the Finnish contradictory attitudes towards Hungary were still

apparent and one can also ask if 'Finnish sympathetic attitudes towards Hungarians' were transformed to 'the policy of kinship' and if the 'moderate attitude of the Finnish political leadership towards Kádár' was transformed into the 'Finnish satellite policy towards Hungary'.

Kekkonen himself considered that his visit had an important effect on Finnish-Hungarian relations. He stated a year after the first visit that it was the kinship movement that should form the basis for Finnish relations towards both kinship nations, Estonia and Hungary. He pointed out in his private speech to the representatives of the so-called national sciences in Finland that these relations should be based on unofficial civic society circles rather than conducted at the state level. As he said:

To the generation to which I belong and whose marvellous and good representatives are gathered here, the issue concerning Estonia and Hungary is an emotional subject... Already for a couple of years, I have had an idea that better relations to Hungary and Estonia should be established, not necessarily on a formal or official basis, because I understood that there would be difficulties with that, but merely on informal, cultural and social levels, but progress in this way should be handled very carefully.¹¹

Accordingly, Kekkonen invited the scholars to create an informal network between Finland and the kinship nations. This was a way to establish and reinforce the contacts between Finland and Hungary. One can ask if this was a way to strengthen kinship relations as such or whether it was a way to get Finns involved with Hungarians in spite of the political differences. Were these informal contacts aimed to further the official political relations?

The visit which Kekkonen paid to Hungary in May 1963 was an unofficial visit - and the aim of the Finnish political leadership was to emphasise this unofficial nature of the visit. The tentative attitude of the Finnish political élite towards Hungary can be interpreted in Finnish official reports to the press. The Finnish News Agency, *STT*, pointed out that President

Kekkonen would only call at or stop at Hungary during his way home from Yugoslavia.¹²

President Kekkonen then stopped at Hungary on May 12th-15th 1963, immediately after his visit to Yugoslavia. President Dobi and Mrs Dobi acted as hosts for him and Mrs Sylvi Kekkonen. The programme consisted of cultural events, sight-seeing in Budapest and a visit to the countryside and Debrecen. Kekkonen also met Finns who lived in Hungary. There was no mention of a meeting between Kekkonen and Kádár in the official program – a fact that can also be interpreted as a symbol of informality.¹³

2 Reflections on the Visit

Kekkonen's visit attracted some attention in the Finnish media: in the press there was a slightly critical tone. Before the visit, Kekkonen was annoyed about the tone of the newspaper *Uusi Suomi*. According to him they were questioning the judgement of the Finnish political leadership – in other words, his judgement. In *Uusi-Suomi* the question was asked if it was reasonable to visit a country in which the prevailing conditions were suspect. Kekkonen brought this matter up with the chief editor, Eero Petäjaniemi, who denied that he had criticized Kekkonen in this way.¹⁴

After the visit, it was claimed in a Finnish magazine *Kuva-Posti* that the state visit to Yugoslavia was successful, but the informal extended visit to Hungary aroused more criticism. "Was the visit at all necessary at this time?" asked the journalist Väinö Länsiluoto.¹⁵ The reason for these comments can be found in the post-1956 context: the press might well be fearing that Finland was being identified with the Eastern bloc.

Also in Hungarian media comment the visit of the Finnish presidential couple aroused some attention. The press seemed to have concentrated on the informal nature of the visit. For example, the Hungarian magazine *Nők Lapja* concentrated on Mrs Sylvi Kekkonen. The women's magazine also wrote about *Kalevala* and presented the city of Helsinki in a richly illustrated article. In the pictures published in newspapers and magazines,

President Kekkonen was photographed in informal situations: in Pusta and visiting suburban housing developments.¹⁶ In other words, in the traditional Hungarian context and in the modern one – one can ask if these pictures reflected symbolically new Finnish-Hungarian relations in which the traditional context and the modern one were present concomitantly?

Afterwards, in the political rhetoric certain value was given to the visit. The discourse reflected the idea that the visit was to be interpreted and expressed as an opening of relations between Kekkonen's Finland and Kádár's Hungary. One year later, the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter stated in the Hungarian parliament that the relations between Hungary and Finland did not reflect only "a romantic ethnographic kinship", but that the relations were at a level of modern progress. Péter argued that there were "many useful economic and cultural achievements" between Hungary and Finland. Later, in the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Péter's statement was given as an example of the prevailing image of Finnish-Hungarian relations.¹⁷

Kádár himself stated to Finnish Ambassador Palas after Kekkonen's visit that Hungary carefully observed Finnish foreign policy. Kádár emphasized the good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. He – like many others – used the concept of kinship in a modern sense. Kinship was designed as being not only a cliché, but a scientific truth. At the same time there was in Kádár's rhetoric another concept, peaceful cooperation: the idea of small peaceful nations in the field of international politics.¹⁸ The Finnish diplomats might have regarded this as a sign of peaceful co-existence. Therefore, in the 1960s, two different aspects were found in Finnish-Hungarian relations by the Finns: the two kinship countries wanted peaceful co-existence.¹⁹ A traditional concept and a modern one were thus used in the policy of the relations.

An interesting detail in terms of the relations between the two different political systems was a discussion between Kádár and the Finnish Communist Party Chairman Aimo Aaltonen a year after Kekkonen's visit. The discussion was reported to Kekkonen by the Finnish State Policy Service. Aaltonen com-

plained about various difficulties created by Kekkonen's policy. He explained to Kádár that one of the reasons why there could not be a communist revolution in Finland was that the Finnish Communists were not successful because Kekkonen was taking the wind out of the sails of the revolution. Kádár commented with a smile: "So God help you!"²⁰

At the informal level – as Kekkonen wished – there began to appear concrete signs as symbols of good relations. A sign of the understanding between the two countries was that in 1964 package tours to Hungary were for the first time organised in Finland. This implied – as the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated – the "popularisation of Finnish-Hungarian relations".²¹ Tourism and travel as well as an increasing number of Finnish scholarship students in Hungary were undoubtedly ways to strengthen and re-establish the contacts between Hungary and Finland. Later, as a result of Kekkonen's state visit to Hungary in 1969, the travelling conditions were further simplified, as the result of an agreement that compulsory visas between the two countries should be discontinued.

3 In a Spirit of 'Peaceful Co-existence' – The 1969 State Visit

If the visit in 1963 was remarkable because it was understood to be the opening of a new era of relations between Finland and Hungary, the visit of 1969 had also a similar importance. In the late 1960s, respect for Soviet interests was still the primary consideration in the relations across the iron curtain. But one new element in the foreign policy of Hungary was an increasing openness to the West. A key motivation behind such moves was the opportunity which the West offered to gain access to the latest technologies and to participate in economic opportunities. The first contacts in this respect were Finland and Austria. The visit paid by the Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus in 1967, as well as Kekkonen's visit, were given huge publicity.²² For Kekkonen, the tourney in Eastern Europe offered an opportunity to formulate the Finnish position on post-Prague international politics. In 1969 there were signs of normalisation in international relations after the events in

Prague. This might have encouraged Kekkonen to visit Eastern Europe. As Kekkonen's biographer, Juhani Suomi further explains, the Finnish state leadership wanted to get acquainted with the situation in Eastern Europe.²³ Therefore, the situation in 1969 resembled the situation in 1963: stabilisation after tension.

Before the visit, the Finnish Embassy in Budapest assumed that the policy of peaceful co-existence had given Finland a certain position in Hungary's policy. In the report concerning the political events in Hungary it was again estimated that relations with the Soviet Union formed the basis of Hungarian policy. This basis was, however, not contradictory to the idea of peaceful co-existence. It was stated that "this pleasant side of the socialist bloc is more evident in the case of Hungary than in other socialist countries".²⁴

In addition to the political conditions, attention was also drawn to cultural relations. Culture and science were seen as central aspects of these mutual relations. A report which was drawn up by the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated that the reason for the good co-operation was that Finland accepted Hungarian cultural policy: the policy which was conducted at the higher political level.²⁵

4 Expressions of Relations

The speeches provide an interesting insight into the image and to the system of the relations between the two countries. Kekkonen's speeches in Budapest in 1969 reflected both the concept of kinship and the concepts of progress: old concepts were interlinked to new ones. As Kekkonen expressed it, the relations between Hungary and Finland were founded not only on historical grounds but also on modern co-operation. For example, Kekkonen praised the progress Hungary had made during the 1960s: the development in Hungary between the years 1963-1969 had shown "the high level of Hungarian civilisation and culture". He emphasized both political and cultural understanding between the two countries.

Further, it was stressed that kinship was a scientific truth, not a romantic speculation or a myth. This was undoubtedly a way to reinforce the value of the kinship. In this rhetoric, the kinship was not, however, the only aspect of brotherhood. Kekkonen defined the brotherhood between Finland and Hungary as not only a tradition of the awareness of the kinship but also as the willingness to establish mutual cultural and commercial agreements. The concept of a small nation implied this brotherhood. The idea of small nations in the field of modern politics was thus one of the uniting links between the two countries. Therefore, the concepts of kinship and brotherhood, progress and small nation formed the basis of the rhetoric.²⁶

The kinship aspect – in a more traditional sense – was visible also in the informal part of the state visit. Such details were the *Kalevala*-show, which was held in Budapest and a new *Hungarian-Finnish Dictionary*. According to Kustaa Vilkuna, the *Dictionary* was a “neat or, in other words, smart and solid expression of the special status of Finnish-Hungarian relations”. Vilkuna had recommended that the dictionary should be presented to some of the Hungarian high-ups.²⁷

The discussions between the heads of state can be linked to the idea of small nations in the field of international politics. Discussions of world politics and mutual interests dealt with the typical, actual political issues. Notes of the discussions show that an exchange of views concerning NORDEK, European security and commercial and economic co-operation were on the agenda.²⁸ The official memorandum which the President and the Finnish Foreign Ministry gave on the state visit emphasized the correct nature of the relations between Finland and Hungary. It is worth noticing that there was an expression of “the similarity of opinions on world politics and of the direction of the mutual relations between the two states”.²⁹

5 “Muckraking Journalism” – A Dissonance to the Official Liturgy

The Finnish press, however, did not adopt a similarly high tone: their discussions were not necessarily in accordance with the

official rhetoric. One of the interesting incidents of the latter visit was the case of "muckraking journalism" of which Kekkonen accused one reporter of the Finnish newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, Lauri Karén: the codes of the official 'liturgy' were disturbed by Karén's critical articles on the president's visit to Hungary.

The President made his attitude to Karén's articles clear. Kekkonen would not accept critical reporting and accused Lauri Karén "of taking a waste bin instead of a pen" with him to Hungary. Kekkonen further complained that "it was clear that a journalist who had equipped himself with these kind of tools cannot write a truthful description".

Karén had written that Hungary had shown only little interest in Kekkonen during his visit. Karén gave an explanation of this: the Soviet Union disliked the potentially increasing contacts between Hungary and neutral countries. Karén noticed that the typical symbols of a state visit had been lacking in Budapest: there was no red carpet at the airport and Kádár was not there to personally welcome the president. In addition to this "lack of symbols at the airport", there were only a few Finnish or Hungarian flags in the streets of Budapest. He considered that the atmosphere in Czechoslovakia and Rumania had been much warmer towards Kekkonen. Karén had discussed this with some British and French representatives, who had considered that the reception was rather cool and who had also noticed these things.³⁰ Thus maybe his tone of reporting was not typically Finnish, but more French or British? Karén personally stated later in his memoirs that the Hungarians had not paid much attention to his writing.³¹ Nevertheless, the recent Hungarian appraisals of Kekkonen's visit in 1969 have pointed out the huge publicity which was given to it in Hungary.³²

6 Two Ideas of Brotherhood

For Hungary, the correct state level relations with Finland were important in order to create and develop techno-scientific contacts with the West.³³ For Finland, relations with Hungary were – in terms of state level politics – an integral part of Finnish pol-

icy towards the satellite countries. In the case of Hungary, the satellite policy was, however, conducted by connecting the idea of tradition to the modern Cold War policy. Therefore, the tradition of cultural co-operation and the tradition of cherishing the idea of kinship were linked to the Finnish (Satellite) policy towards Hungary – at least at the rhetorical level.

The concept of kinship was undoubtedly a way to establish Finnish-Hungarian relations. This myth offered a common discourse and it was a way to assure the structure of good relations. As Kekkonen put it, these relations were meant to be primarily unofficial: academic contacts, cultural co-operation and increasing tourism. It will be worth extending the analysis concerning the role of the unofficial kinship activities in Kekkonen's policy in further studies: what was the role of these contacts in the field of international politics?

Nevertheless, the kinship activities offered a basis not only for popular, unofficial contacts between the Finns and Hungarians but for the political rhetoric as well. The only limitation on the use of the old tradition was, according to Korhonen, that the players of the game knew the rules of it. In other words, the rhetoric of tradition was to be used in the context of the limitations of the international policy.³⁴

Accordingly, the efforts of unofficial contacts, which was founded on the idea of kinship, could be used as arguments in political relations. The visits reflected this policy. There was, however, a trend to modernise the concept of kinship in order to strengthen its value. First, the kinship was claimed to be a scientific truth, and secondly it was stated that it was not the only tie between Finland and Hungary.

In addition, the concepts of a small nation and progress were used in the political rhetoric. Similarly, just as with the concept of kinship, these arguments referred to the ties between the two countries. The role of science, both in terms of the kinship aspect and techno-scientific co-operation was essential. In conclusion, there were two ideas of brotherhood to launch: the traditional one and the modern one.

NOTES

- ¹ Korhonen, Keijo, Sattumakorpraali. Korhonen Kekkonen komennossa Keuruu 1999, 122.
- ² See Suomi, Juhani, Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962. Keuruu 1992, 64.
- ³ In this context: to study arguments, contents and forms. See Palonen, Kari, Summa, Hilka, Retorinen käänne? Pelkää retoriikkaa. Tampere 1996, 10-13; Perelman, Chaïm, Retoriikan valtakunta. Tampere 1996.
- ⁴ The programmes consisted of speeches, reception ceremonies, presents, dinners, discussions about world politics and mutual interests, visits to culturally and historically valuable places and to countryside and factories. Kekkonen saved some materials from the visit: leaflets, invitation cards, menus etc. An interesting item and memory of the visit of 1969 was a wooden menu with signatures of Ahti Karjalainen and other participants.
- ⁵ Suomen ja Unkarin suhteet, T.H. Heikkilä (Budapest) to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 11.1.1958. UM/12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, Foreign Ministry Archives (=UMA); See Suomi 1992, 63-68; Nevakivi, Jukka, "Kekkonen, a magyar '56 és a finlandizáció kezdete". *Hitel* 13 10/2000.
- ⁶ Suomen ja Unkarin suhteet. T.H. Heikkilä (Budapest) to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 11.1.1958. UM 12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, UMA.
- ⁷ Suhtautuminen Unkariin. T.H. Heikkilä (Budapest) to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 3.10.1959. UM/12/L/Unkari 1958-1959, UMA.
- ⁸ Romsics, Ignác, Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Budapest 1999, 332-333; For Finnish interpretations see Memorandum by Finnish Foreign Ministry. Presidentin epävirallinen vierailu Unkariin 12.-15.5.1963. UM 101/3/H/ Kekkonen, UMA; R.R. Seppälä (Washington) to Max Jacobson (Foreign Ministry) 18.4.1963 and Otso Wartiovaara (Wien) to the Finnish Foreign Minister Veli Merikoski 22.4.1963. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ⁹ See Suomi 1992, 383; see also Suomi, Juhani, Presidentti. Urho Kekkonen 1962-1968. Keuruu 1994, 88-97.
- ¹⁰ See Katsaus Suomen ja Unkarin välisiin kulttuurisuhteisiin. Presidentin vierailu Unkariin 26.9.-1.10.1969. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ¹¹ Vuosikirjat 1964. Kekkonen papers, President Urho Kekkonen's archives (hereafter PUKA).
- ¹² See Memorandum by Veikko Hietanen 25.3.1963. UM 101/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA. The visit was paid on Hungary's initiative. President Dobí's invitation was presented when Hungarian Ambassador, Sándor Kurtan left his letter of credentials in Helsinki.
- ¹³ See the programme of the visit. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA; Vierailut 1963-1966. Kekkonen Papers 22/8, PUKA.

- ¹⁴ For the debate with *Uusi-Suomi* -newspaper see Vuosikirjat 1963. Kekkonen papers, PUKA.
- ¹⁵ *Kuva-Posti* 21/1963. Vierailu Unkariin, Lehtileikkeet 1963-66. Kekkonen papers 41/61, PUKA.
- ¹⁶ *Nök Lapja* 18.5.1963 and Lehtileikkeet. Vierailut 1963-33. Kekkonen papers 22/8, PUKA.
- ¹⁷ Katsaus 1968. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ¹⁸ Palas (Budapest) to Finnish Foreign Ministry 20.5.1963. UM/5/C27, UMA.
- ¹⁹ Martti Ingman (Budapest) to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 9.9.1969. UM/3/ H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ²⁰ Vuosikirjat 1964. Kekkonen papers, PUKA.
- ²¹ Memorandum by Finnish Embassy, Budapest 30.9.1968. UM/5/C27, UMA.
- ²² Romsics, 408-409.
- ²³ Suomi, Juhani, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta. Urho Kekkonen 1968-1972. Keuruu 1996, 232-233.
- ²⁴ Martti Ingman (Budapest) to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 9.9.1969. UM/3/ H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ²⁵ Katsaus Suomen ja Unkarin välisiin kulttuurisuhteisiin. Vierailu Unkariin 29.9.-1.10.1969. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ²⁶ See the speeches. Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ²⁷ Kustaa Vilkuna to President Kekkonen 14.8.1969. Vilkuna Papers 1/54, PUKA; for the program see Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969. UM/3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ²⁸ Tasavallan presidentin keskustelut Unkarin pääministeri Fockin kanssa 26.9.1969 klo 16.30; Tasavallan presidentti Kekkonen ja Unkarin Presidentti Losonczin keskustelut 27.9.1969. Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969. UM/3/ H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ²⁹ Tasavallan Presidentin Unkarin vierailun tiedonanto. 1.10.1969; Yhteinen tiedonanto Suomen tasavallan presidentin tohtori Urho Kekkonen valtiovierailusta Unkarissa. Kekkonen vierailu Unkariin 1969. UM3/H/Kekkonen, UMA.
- ³⁰ *Helsingin Sanomat* 27.9.1969, 28.9.1969, 29.9.1969, 30.9.1969, 1.10.1969. Lehtileikkeet. Valtiovierailu Romaniaan, Unkariin ja Tshekkoslovakiaan 1969. Kekkonen Papers 41/88, 41/89, PUKA.
- ³¹ Karén, Lauri, Herrasmiehiä valepuvussa. Juva 1994, 174.
- ³² See for example Romsics, 409.
- ³³ Ibid, 408.
- ³⁴ Korhonen, 123.