Kekkonen and Kádár
in the Soviet Sphere of Influence

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In the political conditions prevailing after the Second World War, both Hungarians and Finns deemed it prudent not to recall the special relationship between the two brother nations, based on their common linguistic ancestry. Both countries now belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, and everybody knew how suspiciously the Russians eyed any kind of ‘nationalism’ but their own. Of course, during the racial heyday there had also been some overstatements, which nobody cared to remember, like Admiral Horthy’s proposal to import some tens of thousands of able-bodied young Finnish males to Hungary to add a northern component to national characteristics.¹

After 1944, the Finnish mainstream thinking emphasized the Nordic cultural, social and political heritage more than ever, because that was seen as the only legitimate channel left to avoid Russian influence. The linguistic and ethnic aspects were bypassed, which led to a break in Finnish relationships with Hungary and Estonia, abandoned to the mercy of their fates. The Finns could only afford the barest survivalism on their own.

Paradoxically, however, the Soviets tended to include Finland and Hungary in the same category.² Since the social conditions were very much different in the two countries, this was not due to any Marxist thinking, but rather to national and
ethnic considerations. Both were non-Slav nations, and hence not to be linked in Stalin’s ‘Pan-Slavist’ designs; both were former German allies, and thus in a comparable position as far as international law and relations between the victorious powers were concerned. Even in the domestic life of the two nations some features looked similar to a Russian eye, like the position of Mannerheim and Horthy before and during the war, and the importance of the agrarian parties. In 1944 and in the years immediately after that, the Russians tended to ignore the crucial difference between the two nations, which was the fact that Finland succeeded in avoiding occupation by the Red Army. Things seemed to proceed rather smoothly even without that.

This convergence theory of the Soviets was most visible on three occasions.

In October 1944, when Andrei Zhdanov arrived in Helsinki as the head of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, he had Stalin’s orders to proceed carefully, so that the interim peace agreement would not be spoiled by a pro-German coup and occupation as in Hungary. Perhaps the Arrow Cross movement, which has a contradictory reputation in the history of Hungary, did the Finns a favour, because the Soviet policy in Finland could have been harsher without the deterrent of Hungarian developments. Now the Finns were able to gain time, and, as the saying goes, nothing is so constant as the temporary state of affairs. Many of the structures, institutions and channels built between Finland and the Soviets during the nine months’ respite before the end of the general war in Europe in May 1945 remained in force until the very end of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, and self-evidently, Finland and Hungary belonged to the same group during the final peace negotiations. This point need not be elaborated on here.

Even after that, the Soviets saw a surprisingly close similarity between the two countries. When Europe was definitively divided into two camps during the summer of 1947, the Soviets harshly criticized the Finnish Communist Party for their underachievement and moderation (which originally had been strictly ordered by the Soviets themselves in 1944), and praised
Hungary as an example of what was to be done, e.g. by using the security police. Not even the Finnish comrades would be able to manage without some bloodletting, Zhdanov predicted. In January 1948, Zhdanov ordered the Finnish communist leaders to follow the Hungarian way and get their opponents arrested for a conspiracy with the western powers. That would open the way to further victories. The communists, who controlled the secret police, fabricated a conspiracy case and invited a Hungarian party representative to advice about the correct line. For various reasons, however, these preparations were abandoned and Stalin finally settled for a security treaty with the bourgeois Finnish president, J. K. Paasikivi. This course of action was deemed reasonable in Moscow because of the bitter experience of difficulties involved with the total submission of the Finns, acquired in the Winter War in 1939 to 1940. We were clever “not to do it” in Finland after the war, Molotov later recalled, because those stubborn people would have inflicted “a festering wound” in the Soviet body.

In 1947-48, Finland and Hungary definitively took different paths. But for some time even after that, the connection between Hungary and Finland was made by Finnish and Russian communists in situations that seemed to involve an Eastern European perspective even for Finland. This was clear during the volatile strike movement of August 1949, when ‘Uncle’ Rákosi was consulted and used as a channel between Stalin and the Finnish communist leadership. Inkeri Lehtinen, who was a former Comintern official well versed in Soviet attitudes, at that time once again praised the Hungarian example.

In the early 1950s, when the divergence of paths became evident and definite, this kind of Zhdanovist connection between Hungary and Finland was gradually forgotten. But perhaps some traces remained, so easy was it for Khrushchev to make the connection again.

1 1956: The Crucial Year
The dominant statesmen of the post-war period in the history of Finland and Hungary, Urho Kekkonen and János Kádár, both
came to power in the turbulent year of 1956. As far as political background was concerned, they came from opposite camps. Kekkonen served as a soldier in the White army of 1918, was then an officer of the secret police, and as an agrarian politician always a staunch nationalist and anti-communist. Kádár was a communist from his youthful days, from clandestine activities to building a people’s democracy, and he had experienced both right-wing and Stalinist persecution.

In power, the two leaders had to deal with and force their reluctant nations to adapt to the Soviet Union after crushing confrontations with the Russians. For both of them, the Soviet Union was and remained the main issue, not only in foreign policy, but also as far as the national existence as a whole was concerned. In different conditions, they both adopted a similar kind of tactics, thinking that loyalty to the Soviets would finally pay off and the two nations would gradually gain new latitude and independence. They did, but the process was slow and painful, and a new backlash could lurk right behind the next corner. This fed the idea of their personal indispensability and made both statesmen cling to power to the very end, until they were involuntarily forced to loosen the grip by their advanced age and frail physical condition, that is, until 1981 and 1988 respectively. Undoubtedly, both Kekkonen and Kádár considered themselves to be the one and only person able to conduct the complicated eastern relations and to deal with “those people”, as Kádár described the Kremlin gang shortly before the Czechoslovak occupation in 1968. Both Kekkonen and Kádár seem to have developed a rather disillusioned view of the Kremlin, based on their intimate contacts with the Soviet leaders and probably also on their earlier experience of state security affairs. Of course, Kádár was much more of an insider than Kekkonen ever became.

The Soviet intervention to suppress the Hungarian revolution in 1956 brought Kádár to power and was a seminal experience for him. For Kekkonen, it was his first difficult test as head of state. He had to balance on a tightrope between the upsurge of Finnish popular solidarity towards the brother nation on the
one hand, a feeling he tended to share himself, a pan-Ugric nationalist as he was since his youth, and on the other hand, the necessities of the coolest Realpolitik, maintaining the vital relations to the Soviet Union. The Soviets keenly observed Finnish reactions, not only for general reasons, but also for the particular fear that the popular support for the Hungarian cause might later on develop into a Finnish movement to support Estonians.12

Conferring with his predecessor Paasikivi, Kekkonen took the traditional Finnish nationalist stand, adopted already by Snellman in 1863, during the Polish uprising. Although the unhappy fate of the damned ones was lamented, expressions of solidarity would not help them. Condemning the Russian action would hurt Finnish relations to the huge eastern neighbour, who would always stay there right beyond the border, if not closer. “There is no choice: we must keep a cool head, even with the heart full of pain, when the death is spreading out on unhappy, hopeless people”, Kekkonen advised the foreign minister.13 In the United Nations, Finland could only afford to refer to centennial Hungarian traditions of freedom; in the vote itself, Finland abstained.

The neutrality of Finland his life’s work, Kekkonen must have been startled by the role played by the idea of neutrality in the decisive phases in Hungary. In a last ditch effort to avoid imminent intervention the Hungarian government announced withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact treaty and proclaimed neutrality.14 Although the word was not yet invented at the time, it can be said that Imre Nagy’s government aimed at the ‘Finlandisation’ of Hungary.15 While the deliberations were going on in the Soviet politburo, Khrushchev himself, at a Turkish Embassy reception a couple of days earlier, seems to have gone so far as to envisage a neutral status for Hungary similar to that of Finland.16

‘Neutrality’ and ‘Finland’ were thus mentioned on the immediate eve before a full-scale military intervention.17 Kekkonen had every reason to be nervous. Probably for that reason he at first even made an exception to his own golden rule of distance and offered himself as a mediator in Budapest. The Soviets did
not respond. Then, to alleviate possible suspicions, he assured the Soviets that Finland would never unilaterally abrogate the 1948 Treaty. Here, as in other cases when he was certain that Soviet records would remain closed, he even deemed it appropriate to pay some lip service, criticizing the Nagy government and accusing the western powers for provoking the situation in Hungary. (On the other hand, of course, the fate of Hungary once again showed to Kekkonen how willing and able to help the West would be in case of real need.)

Although Kekkonen swore by the 1948 Treaty, in fact he was planning to reduce its force, no doubt alarmed by Hungarian events. Through his confidential KGB channels, he proposed to the Soviet leadership an international treaty, by which both NATO members and the Soviet Union would promise not to attack each other through the territory of Finland. Then the 1948 Treaty would be needed only secondarily, as he said. Kekkonen tried to sell the plan by hinting at the propaganda advantages offered by a possible refusal, but Khrushchev did not take the risk of their approval and discreetly turned down the proposal.

Perhaps Kekkonen’s initiative was a factor in the Soviet assessment that a restoration of discipline was needed in Finland. A rather pungent ingredient was added to the 1956 experience, when CPSU leaders, attempting to push the slow Finnish communists into an offensive, cited the Hungarian intervention as a valiant example of the fact that the Soviet Union would never desert friends in need. If Finnish comrades would be able to acquire stronger positions, they could count on Soviet support, even by military means. When this information reached Kekkonen via the security police, he must have been shocked, even though the Soviets probably spoke at a more general level than was reported. Later on, this information was partially and incorrectly leaked to the press, in the form that the Soviets had been looking for a Finnish Kádár.

Paradoxically, the painful 1956 experience was to form the basis for later relations and mutual understanding between Kádár and Kekkonen.
First, as Kádár later acknowledged to Finnish communist leader Hertta Kuusinen, Kekkonen’s stand in 1956 did not create further difficulties for his regime, and he was thankful for the consideration. “When the situation was bad and other neutral countries acted badly towards Hungary, we noted that the government of Finland was correct.” Thinking about Kádár’s experiences from the UN visit and his isolation, this was far from negligible.

Second, both Kádár and Kekkonen had to push through their line despite domestic popular disapproval, in order to avoid further calamities. This condition drew them closer to each other.

And third, the significance of the 1956 Revolution for Hungary became comparable to that of the Winter War for Finland. Since the Soviets knew that the unconditional submission of these two nations would demand a considerable price, in terms of military force and international prestige, the Kremlin was prone to allow more latitude to these clients than it would have been willing to give in other circumstances. The Winter War and the 1956 Revolution were the basis for Kekkonen’s and Kádár’s Soviet policies also in the sense that they created a kind of backbone for the national identity, so that concessions to the Soviets could not immediately shake the foundations of national psychology. Having showed they were also able to fight, both nations could afford concessions without breaking their self-esteem.

Of course, dealing with the Soviets neither Kádár nor Kekkonen could ever, ever even hint at this kind of significance of the 1939 and 1956 experiences, if they came to think of them at all. On the contrary, they both had to condemn their predecessors’ incorrect actions and stupid policies.

These convergent trends became visible only after some time. Immediately after the 1956 shock Hungary seemed to float ever further away, as Kekkonen later confessed to have thought. For some time after 1956, even some national-minded Finnish communists feared that the new Hungarian communist leadership would stress the Soviet factor in their national history (in 1919, in
1944, in 1956) too much, which would then “easily lead into the thought that Hungarians’ own efforts are of lesser value.” In 1959, one moderate communist seemed to have been rather surprised that his visit to Hungary was “as a whole positive.”

2 The 1960s bridge-building
The conditions for a Finnish-Hungarian rapprochement matured after 1962, in the conditions of an international thaw after the Cuban missile crisis. The period of crises was followed by a calmer phase between Finland and the Soviet Union. In Hungary, after the anti-Stalinist 22nd CPSU Congress, Kádár was finally able to initiate his project of reconciliation and reconstruction. International conditions became favourable, when the ‘Hungarian question’ was dropped from the UN General Assembly list of problems to discuss.

Kekkonen began to plan visits and other action to revitalize Finnish relations with Hungary and Estonia.

In connection with his official visit to Yugoslavia in May 1963, Kekkonen visited also Hungary, “in private”, to avoid criticism. His first impressions of Kádár were very favourable; the Hungarian leader ”seemed to be a really agreeable and sensible man. Quiet, plain, modest. Quiet humour, tinged with irony at his own expense. Spoke openly about the 1956 events.”

Leaning on his personal confidence with Khrushchev, Kekkonen finally succeeded in arranging a trip even to Estonia, where he surprised everybody and especially the KGB watchers by delivering his main speech in an Estonian purer than most leaders of the Soviet republic could manage. Even today, Kekkonen’s trip is remembered by Estonians as a major step in their long struggle to regain their independence.

In both Hungarian and Estonian cases, Kekkonen had a prize to offer to the Soviets: in case official relations would be allowed to flourish, Finnish contacts to emigrants would naturally cool off. In foreign countries, the emigrants would be swallowed up in two or three generations, while those who stayed would forever be the nation, he assessed. To the Swedish ambassador Kekkonen explained that to himself, as to his genera-
tion, both Estonia and Hungary had been deeply felt emotional causes, although in 1944 contacts had to be cut off, and in 1956 Hungary seemed to float even further away. Now the situation seemed to allow a revitalization of contacts, which could mean a lot also in the very long run. “History does not end up today. We often talked with [President] J. K. P[aaasikivi]: if the S[viet] U[nion] would change.” So, the relations to Hungary and to Estonia had to be built thinking not only about the present, but also preparing for the distant day when the Soviet Union and the camp controlled by it would change.30

Ideological considerations did not prevent Kádár from developing closer relations with Finland. When the Finnish Communist Party chairman complained about various difficulties created by Kekkonen’s policy which thwarted all efforts, Kádár commented with a smile: “So help you God” and then began to praise Kekkonen. According to Kádár, Khrushchev had compared the Finnish President to “a swordsman, who crosses immediately, straight and honest.”31

So, the Soviet leader apparently had given a green light. Both Kádár and Kekkonen were very much Khrushchevites, they both owed a big part of their power to Nikita Sergeevich’s intervention, and they both got on well with the muzhik style of government. In the Summer of 1964, Kádár predicted to his Finnish comrade that the successor in the Kremlin, most probably Brezhnev, would no doubt continue the line.32 Even after Khrushchev became a non-person, Kekkonen tried to contact him, and Kádár sent a telegram of condolences to his widow.

Khrushchev’s dismissal in October 1964 was a profound shock both for Kádár and Kekkonen. It soon became clear that the ‘party line’ would not continue unaltered in the Kremlin. The Soviet unpredictability was once again suddenly demonstrated, and in a very disquieting way. On the one hand, an experience like this tended to press Kádár and Kekkonen closer to each other, but on the other, they had to proceed more cautiously, and initially the latter trend was stronger. The process of rapprochement between the state leaders was halted for some years.
To Finnish communist leader Hertta Kuusinen, Kádár rather openly criticized the way Khrushchev was ousted, which had brought about “a wave of concern” in Hungary. Kádár criticized Soviet political culture, where everybody was united and unanimous under the same slogans, and the next day of an opposite opinion, also unanimously. “Unity should not be proclaimed in an exaggerating way; it can help at a given moment, but later on it may backlash against yourself.” One of the Hungarian leader’s associates put it even straighter: “If we want to retain confidence, we should speak the truth.”

Kádár admitted that the ‘biological aspect’ was also valid, that is, Khrushchev’s advanced age (he was 70). “Growing old, a person becomes crazier. How to solve the issue? I’d have a prescription, but it cannot be used because of its inhumanity. That is, our leaders should be checked every day and when they reach the top they should be shot before they have time to grow old. Of course, this was a joke, but we should find appropriate ways to remove people into retirement.” (In 1982, when Kádár himself turned 70 and had quite some experience of Soviet gerontocracy, he probably did not recall this modest proposal.)

During the first years of the Brezhnev regime, Kádár’s influence in Finland was mainly felt through the Communist Party, where Hungarian attitudes provided tactful support for the liberal-minded moderate wing. Inside world communism, MSzMP assumed a mediating role between the Moscow camp and emerging Eurocommunism, and this became so well-known even in the West that Hungarians were soon seen “as usual to have played the role of intermediary.” For the majority wing in the Finnish CP, this mediation was entirely welcome, providing them with new latitude in their silent effort to achieve some distance from Moscow. In 1968, their confidence in Kádár’s moderate statements misled Finnish communist leaders into believing in a settlement between the Soviets and the Czechs. Two weeks later, the occupation shock was then so much the worse.

Kekkonen learned about Hungarian influence and was satisfied with it. From his point of view, it was far from negligible, since strengthening moderate, national-minded Communist
thinking was a main element in his long-term strategy and even in short-term power play, communists being a party in government after 1966. Also in the field of state relations, important new steps were taken, particularly in cultural affairs, where a cooperation treaty was signed in 1967 on a Finnish initiative.

3 From the Prague Shock to European Security
The occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 created common interests between Finland and Hungary, and this time they were real, strong and specific, of a raison d’état type. Between the states, that kind of common interest should be counted as the solidest one.

During the action itself, Kekkonen and Kádár were in extremely different positions. Despite his close contacts with the Soviets, Kekkonen was basically an outsider, to whom nothing was told about the preparations. He was especially hurt, realizing that the Soviets had outright lied to him, “to a person like myself.” Usually, when something important happened in the Soviet Union, Kekkonen was given information, in many cases similar to that received by eastern European allies, but this time he was kept in the dark.

Kádár for his part was an insider and an important accomplice in the Soviet plans. He had to demonstrate diplomatic skills similar to those adopted by Kekkonen in relation to Hungary in 1956, but he was much closer to the events and had to take a direct part in the Soviet action. Feelings and judgements about the appropriateness and consequences of the Kremlin policies had to be suppressed and a ‘realist’ attitude adopted.

Although the position of the two statesmen was rather different, they both seem to have experienced a depressing shock. Kádár was “sulking in his tent,” and Kekkonen went so far as to reveal his feelings to the British ambassador, who was surprised by the open bitterness of the man who usually held his cards very close to the chest as far as his dealings with the Soviets were concerned.

After the occupation, the basic foreign political interest of both Kekkonen and Kádár was to avoid Czech-type develop-
ments in their own countries and in their relations to the unpredictable Soviets and to find new, stabilizing elements on which to build their positions. But this had to be done cautiously, so that the Soviets would not be provoked into some kind of preventive action. The only way open for these two statesmen was to further some pro-Soviet efforts and to mould them in such a way as to strengthen the position of their nations as a kind of diminutive and hardly discernible by-product of the overwhelming process, where the Soviets would have something considerable to gain.

The initiative for a European security conference, presented by Finland and eagerly developed by Hungary, must be interpreted in this light.

Of course, also the general situation had to be favourable, and in 1969 it was, the Soviets wary of the Chinese threat and the Americans in trouble with their Vietnamese mess. Both sides had something to gain in a European compromise.

Basically to promote the CSCE initiative and to find new ways to further it, Kekkonen in September-October 1969 made a carefully balanced visit to Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Prague was selected to please the Soviets, who wanted international recognition for the Husák regime, and Bucharest to show ability to defy the Soviets and go where Nixon had gone; Kekkonen had no sympathy for Ceausescu, “a charmless, monotonous, humourless chap [...] with boundless egotism and greed for power.” And then Budapest, which was where the Finnish President really wanted to go to. To show that the Hungarians should not be blamed for the Czech occupation and to take a new symbolically very important step, the Finns agreed to approve visa-free travel between the two nations. Hungary was the only socialist camp nation whose citizens were allowed to Finland without a visa.

The Finnish record of the three hour one-on-one discussion between Kekkonen and Kádár is short and unsatisfactory; in part perhaps reflecting the fact that not every card was shown right away, many things were left unsaid and the partner had
Perhaps this need to watch the mouth was the main reason for the fact that Kekkonen became so disproportionately furious, when the correspondent of the leading newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* suggested in his news report that Hungarians were playing the visit down in response to Soviet pressure. Hungarians probably did not try anything of the kind, but Kekkonen was very nervous not to provoke or raise any Soviet suspicions towards his dealings in Eastern Europe. After the trip, however, only a Finnish left wing socialist newspaper (financed by the Soviets) wrote that some of Kekkonen’s remarks might fuel anti-Soviet elements in the West.

According to Finnish notes, Kekkonen and Kádár seem to have mainly discussed the past, most of the time the Prague Spring. Kádár explained the course of events as he saw them, admitting, “as a lawyer” (to another lawyer) that sovereignty was violated by the occupation. Perhaps even the future was talked about, or at least understood, because Kekkonen used his discussions with Kádár to sell the European security conference idea to reluctant and suspicious Americans. In the White House in June 1970, he explained to President Richard Nixon that smaller Eastern European nations (“satellites”, as the American memo read) strongly desired such a conference, seeing it as an occasion to express and to strengthen the national identity.

History has shown that armed rebellion does not work, as evidenced in Hungary. It has also shown that quick economic change does not work, as evidenced in Czechoslovakia. The last resort for the East Bloc satellites is to get more individual freedom through the conference table.

The only solution left was to find a way somehow acceptable also to the Soviet Union. The proposed conference could possi-

bly open up a peaceful development, where Eastern European national aspirations would become better represented. In this sense, it was a kind of risk also to the Soviet Union.

This was the kind of talk Nixon understood. He invited his advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger from the adjoining office to join the discussion and repeated to him what the Finnish President had said. The Americans now gradually adopted a more positive attitude, sensing after all that there was something in it for the West also.46

This was only a first step, but it was an important one. During the complicated and lengthy preparations a special working relationship developed between the Finns and the Hungarians, although the latter had – especially in public – to be very careful. Not to raise any Soviet doubts, the Hungarians stressed that their special relations in the cultural field derived from common linguistic ancestry (that is, not from e.g. political considerations).47 On state visits, Hungarians avoided paying respects at the graves of the unknown soldier or Marshal Mannerheim, knowing how the Rumanians succeeded in provoking the Russians by acts like this.48 But privately or even semi-officially Hungarian leaders spoke so straight that the Finns were astonished, even a bit shocked. Introducing to his colleague Kekkonen the famous painting on King Árpád’s arrival in the Budapest parliament house, Pál Losonczi pointed out the vanquished Slavs, saying that Slavs (and even Germans) had always tried to suppress Finns and Hungarians, but in vain.49 In Helsinki in January 1971, Prime Minister Jenő Fock boasted how he told about a power cable to Austria to Prime Minister Kosygin only afterwards. The Soviet colleague looked shocked, “because I had not asked his permission first.” Fock entertained his Finnish hosts by telling a Hungarian joke, according to which many socialist countries were like men who wanted to relieve themselves in a swimming pool and did so quietly in the water. But the Czechs had insisted on doing so from the diving board.50 This kind of talk was certainly understood in Finland.

At the state dinner after the solemn signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975, Kekkonen had Kádár placed next to
himself. The placement was no accident (to use Stalin’s vocabulary), since the CSCE was a triumph for these two statesmen, who now had every reason to hope for a more secure future for their countries.51

4 Closure

The troubles of the mountains are followed by the troubles of the plains. Developments after the security conference were far from smooth. But Kekkonen and Kádár could use their mutual understanding to help each other to better understand what was going on in Moscow, also in very sensitive matters, as was demonstrated during Kekkonen’s visit to Budapest in November 1976. The Hungarian Ambassador to Helsinki, Rudolf Rónai, seems to have been an important actor in cultivating these contacts.52 This structure was inherited by Kekkonen’s successor, President Mauno Koivisto, for whom discussions with Kádár were of great importance especially in the beginning of his tenure, because of the Hungarian leader’s close relations with new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov.53

Of course, this is only the roughest outline. More detailed research into the development of these relations should be conducted, before any conclusions about their significance can be made, even on the basis of Russian materials. The wish expressed by Kekkonen in 1964 about a change in the Soviet system and sphere of influence was realized in a far deeper way than he or Kádár could ever have predicted. It remains to be seen, if their inheritance can at all be developed in new Europe by new generations.
NOTES


2 In a 1969 discussion with Kekkonen, Kádár himself saw the position of Finland and Hungary in 1944 rather similar, as compared e.g. to Bulgaria. Notes of the conversation between Kekkonen and Kádár, 29 Sept 1969, Kekkonen archives 21/97.


7 Memo of conversation between Zhdanov and Finnish communist leaders Hertta Kuusinen and Yrjö Leino, 2 Jan 1948, RGASPI, f. 77, op. 3, d. 88, pp. 21-31. A slightly different memo in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1171, 1-7.


9 Hertta Kuusinen to her father, O. V. Kuusinen, 19 Aug 1949. Kansan arkisto [Peoples Archives], Helsinki.


11 Kádár’s speech at the HSWP CC plenum, 7 Aug 1968, The Prague Spring 1968, A National Security Archive Documents Reader. Compiled and ed. by Jaromír Navrátil et. al. Budapest, CEU Press 1998, 331. Saying farewell to Dubček at Komáro railway station on 17 August 1968, Kádár is reported to have said: “Do you really not understand the sort of people you are dealing with?” Zdenek Mlynár, Nachtfrost. Er-
fahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus.

12 Kekkonen’s notes on a discussion with Ambassador V. Z. Lebedev, 12 Nov 1956, Kekkonen archives 21/35.

13 Kekkonen to Ralf Törngren, 12 Nov 1956, a draft, Kekkonen archives 21/42.


15 The description was used by Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller in their Hungary 1956 Revisited. London, George Allen & Unwin 1983, 10.


17 Of course, the decision to intervene was not due to these factors, but a rather complicated and confused process, as can now be seen from the documents published in Sovetskii Soyuz i vengerskii krizis 1956 goda. Dokumenty. Moscow, Rosspen 1998. Cf. Rainer M. János, “Hossú me-netelés a csúcsra 1954–1958”. Rubicon 2000/7–8, 38-39.


19 Ambassador V. Z. Lebedev’s memo on his discussion with Kekkonen on 12 Nov 1956, AVP RF, f. 0135, op. 40 (papka 213), d. 3, ll. 145-46. The memo is quoted also by Jukka Nevakivi, Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui, Keuruu: Otava 1996, 119-21. The criticism to Nagy and the West was not mentioned in Kekkonen’s own notes of the meeting (cited above).

20 Kekkonen’s notes 27 Dec 1956, 5 Jan, 30 Jan and 16 Feb 1957, Kekkonen archives 21/35. Suomi, 83-84.

21 Report no. 1060, 4 Apr 1957, case file I K 1b; Information report (to the President) no. 5, 2 Jun 1958, Information reports. Both in Finnish Security Police (Supo) archives. In 1955/56 Supo succeeded in recruiting a high level source in the Finnish CP headquarters. The allusions to Hungary were made in a Moscow conference in February 1957 by politbureau member Frol Kozlov and – in more vague terms – by Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov.


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24 Kekkonen’s notes, 14 May 1964, see below.
25 Aino Lehtinen’s report on a party delegation trip to Hungary, 21 Apr 1958, Finnish CP International Dept papers, file no. 4.
26 Jorma Hentilä’s report on a visit to Hungary at a pro-communist student society meeting, 1959, Organization file II G 6c, Supo.
29 Former Estonian President Lennart Meri has stressed this also in his recent interviews.
30 Kekkonen’s manuscript notes, ‘Reflections on Estonia and Hungary’, 14 May 1964, The President’s yearbook for 1964, Kekkonen Archives. In his yearbooks Kekkonen collected his most important papers. Swedish ambassador Ingemar Hågglöf is mentioned as making a question.
31 Intelligence report on a discussion between Kádár and Aimo Aaltonen in Budapest in June 1964, dated by Kekkonen on 10 Aug 1964, Yearbook 1964, Kekkonen archives. This report was written or at least brought by Professor Kustaa Vilkuna, Kekkonen’s personal intelligence chief, who received information from Aaltonen’s interpreter. See Kekkonen’s diary entry, 11 Aug 1964.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 See e.g. Anna-Liisa Hyvönen’s report from Hungary, 30 Mar 1967, and Olavi J. Laine’s and Toivo Pohjonen’s report from a party delegation trip, [Jan 1967], The Finnish Communist Party International Dept papers, file no. 81. Thinking about a Finnish way to socialism, party chairman Aarne Saarinen read carefully the HSWP CC theses of 16 July 1970, translated for him, and underlined sentences that could be interpreted as alternatives for or criticism of the Soviet model. See a copy of the theses in Saarinen’s papers, file no. 15. See also Saarinen’s positive assessment on Kádár, in his memoirs Kivimies. Keuruu, Otava 1995, 319-20.


38 This conclusion is based only on the documents published in The Prague Spring 1968.

39 Shawcross, 234.

40 Report by ambassador R. D. J. Scott Fox to Foreign Minister Michael Stewart, 18 Oct 1968, FCO 33/719, PRO.


42 Notes of the discussion between Kekkonen and Kádár, 29 Sept 1969, compiled later on by the interpreter Ulla Hauhia-Nagy, Kekkonen archives 21/97.

43 This was assured by former Ambassador to Helsinki, Kurtán, to British Ambassador to Budapest, G. E. Millard, whose report on 9 Oct 1969, FCO 33/721, PRO.

44 This was assured by former Ambassador to Helsinki, Kurtán, to British Ambassador to Budapest, G. E. Millard, whose report on 9 Oct 1969, FCO 33/721, PRO.


47 Telegrams by former ambassador to Helsinki, Kurtán, from Wien, and ambassador Rónai from Helsinki, 31 Dec 1970, ibid.


49 A.C. Stuart from Helsinki to C.L.G. Mallaby in Eastern European and Soviet Department, 21 Jan. 1971, FCO 33/1578. The source was the Finnish Foreign Ministry deputy chief of the political section, Paavo Laitinen.

50 A photograph is published in Kekkonen’s biography (Juhani Suomi, Liennytyksen akanvirrassa, Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976. Keuruu, Otava
On the opposite side of the table, Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger are seen in lively discussion with Cypriot president Makarios. In his memoirs (Years of Renewal, New York. Simon & Schuster 1999, 200), Kissinger tells that the Americans had denied the Cypriot president a one-on-one meeting with President Ford. “We shall see”, the Archbishop said, and at the state dinner Ford and Kissinger were found to be sitting with Makarios for more than an hour. So, who was sitting with who was not an accident.
