

# REGIO

## Minorities, Politics, Society

Cleavages in Cross-Border Magyar Minority Politics,  
1989-1998



Legal Regulations Regarding Hungarian Diaspora



The Experiences of Four Years of Operation of the National  
German, Slovak, and Croatian Minority Self-Governments



The Vanishing of In-Between Europe



The Structure of Hungarian Roma Groups  
in Light of Linguistic Changes



Urban Roma in the New Economic Environment



“Blacks Are Not Usually Labeled Jews” - Why Does a Colored  
Boy Go to a Jewish School?

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# ARTICLES

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NÁNDOR BÁRDI

## Cleavages in Cross-Border Magyar Minority Politics, 1989-1998

**ABSTRACT:** *The study treats three major topics:*

1. *The issue of “existence on the other side” – a conceptual approach. The author gives an overview of political self-definition and scientific approaches, and presents the independent development of Hungarian communities living outside Hungary and the emergence of separate identity under forced coexistence. From the point of political history, between 1918 and 1940, and since 1989, Hungarian organizations functioned as independent political entities.*

2. *The paper also looks at cleavages within Magyar politics in specific countries (i.e., Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, and Yugoslavia) along ethnic, territorial, religious and linguistic divisions.*

3. *The treatise ends with an outline of three important topics, part of every popular debate on minority issues: a) the changing role of the intelligencia in the new situation; b) the relation of minority parties to the community they represent; c) Hungary’s relation to Hungarian communities living across state borders.*

This study examines three phenomena: I.) the theme and concept of “existence on the other side of the border”; II.) the potential fault lines within the political elite; and III.) the most important debated public issues regarding Magyar minorities which have arisen over the past ten years.

Part of the basis of the paper is the experiences gathered through the document-collection project on cross-border Magyar interest groups since 1989. There was a great deal learned through preparing the chronologies

and bibliographies for that same project. The most useful source was the series of discussions I conducted on this paper's topics with experts on cross-border issues.<sup>1</sup>

The importance and timeliness of the discussion of this topic is based on the fact that, given they usually deal with specific areas, studies on Magyar minorities are unable to provide a complete picture of what's behind political relations. This paper hopes to provide analysts with a description of the actual issues (inner and outer conflicts), something that only a few studies (some of which are unpublished) have attempted to do.<sup>2</sup> Short-term phenomena and long-term effects and processes cannot be separated from one another. For this reason, issues often appear as a series of exigencies, while strategic positions remain undefined.

Another important issue is the composition of the Magyar political initiatives in neighboring countries.<sup>3</sup> On one hand, this will allow us to place events in the context of Central-European processes, while on the other, it is a means of approaching the policy of Budapest toward Magyar minorities living across Hungary's borders.

## I. The Definition of the Concept

Literature and press both in neighboring countries and in Hungary uses and mixes a series of *political self-definitions* and *social-science approaches*. Regarding the former, the term *nation* (*nemzetiség*), which was common in the 1980s, is no longer used. Those living across the borders went from using the term *national minority* (*nemzeti kisebbség*) to the term *national community* (*nemzeti közösség*)<sup>4</sup> as the general term of self-definition used to represent their status as independent political subjects. The documents of the VMDK (Voivodina Magyar Democratic Community) employ the term *Magyar ethnic group* (*Magyar népcsoport*), while the KMKSZ (Sub-Carpathian Magyar Cultural Association) uses the phrase *population freely deeming itself to be Magyar* (*magát szabadon magyarnak valló lakosság*) in its autonomy programs. The program goal of the national community was declared using the term *co-nation*.<sup>5</sup> In political life in Hungary the term *national community* has recently become common, while in mass media the terms *those across the borders* (*határon túliak*), and *scattered Magyars* (*szórványmagyar*) have become

common along with the term (*torn-away*)<sup>6</sup> *parts of the nation* (*elszakadt nemzetrészek*). Minority press, at the beginning of the 1990s, often used the term *mother-country* (*anyaország*) to describe Hungary, but this practice has become less common.<sup>7</sup>

Social science literature uses the terms Magyar ethnicity (ethnic community), societies of given regions (sub-regions), Magyar life-world, Magyar sphere, Magyar institution-system, or Magyar Diaspora, but these all refer to an unwritten Magyar society (with its own operational mechanisms) living beyond the borders. This category is difficult to describe because researchers in different areas of expertise use different means (anthropological, sociological, statistical, demographic, linguistic, economic, legal) to describe the criteria of the given social group.

Given the way they were established, the Magyar societies across the borders, in the sense of history and the changes of empires, are *forced communities*. Their developments are defined on one hand by the challenges of inner and outer modernization, and on the other by the efforts of the majority/state-founders of the given countries at state-building, or the political efforts of the ‘mother country’, along with the responses to such. Beginning in the 1920s these broken societies, adapting to the new situation (depending on their inner (strata-) structure and regional traditions), developed separately – in different environments – from the mother country and the Magyar groups of other detached areas. In a paradoxical way it was precisely *developing-apart*, or the most effective adaptation to local conditions, which ensured the institutions of self-identity. It was in this way that, during the Second World War, groups with unique group-identities and strong regional (minority) identities from Upper Hungary (Slovakia) and Transylvania rejoined Hungary. Through the generation change following 1945, the dual attachment developed by the 1970s, and the institutionalization of the bridging role, the cultural elites defined a new and independent self-identity ideology, which incorporated differences from the mother-country and from the majority of the state-founding nation.

In terms of political history, between 1918 and 1938/40/41, as well as after 1989, the Magyar minorities presented themselves as independent political communities, and based on ethnicity they established separate political parties. Between 1944/48 and 1989 various groups tried to present Hungarian interest within minority- or *Magyar-policy* (*magyarságpolitika*).

The establishment of the independent Magyar communities after 1990, besides the democratic changes in Central Europe in 1989, came about based on the following:

1. The renewed Magyar cultural and political elites could not assert their linguistic- and identity-policy interests within the modernization-democratization strategies of the political parties of the majority nation. Hence, their efforts began to be institutionalized as separate political interests in developing independent civil society initiatives and parties.

2. The new constitution-drafting process repeatedly put them in minority positions, as they were not declared a state-founding group equal to the majority society.<sup>8</sup>

3. Hungary's post-1990 foreign policy efforts, besides aiming at euroatlantic integration and neighbor-policy, attempted to represent the interests of Hungarians living across the borders. The minority issue was treated as an international affair: the Antall doctrine meant that Hungary declared itself the protecting authority regarding the affairs of the Magyars living across the borders, and considered the Magyar parties of the neighboring countries as a factor in international relations.

4. The cross-border Magyar elites worked out their autonomy concepts between 1992 and 1996 as a way of establishing visions for the future. They did not find political partners among the majority nations for the realization of these plans (in reality for high-standard techniques for handling minority issues). These plans made the necessity of the establishment of independent cultural and educational institution systems a cornerstone of minority politics.

In order to shade the rather dense text, I must point out some editorial and attitudinal problems.

I treat the Austrian and Slovenian Magyars as cultural communities who realize their interests through their given majority institutional systems or municipal governments. The Magyar political organizations in Croatia are closely connected to the parties of the majority, and it is within these relationships that they try to realize their interests.<sup>9</sup>

The image of given minority societies in their own, or Hungary's, public sphere is established by cultural and political elites, meaning we are dealing with constructed images and communities. Thus I must stress that when speaking of political communities and political life, I am really

analyzing and generalizing the conditions of the elites. This may seem a banality viewed from Budapest, but it is common for those dealing with these topics to talk as if they were referring to unified cross-border communities. That the structures are not complicated and not stratified is shown by the fact that in parliamentary elections the Magyar parties, regardless of the social position, can count on the unified support of the local Magyars.

My third comment refers to the lack of synchronicity between the differentiated political system in Hungary and the attempt to unify political conditions for the Magyars of neighboring counties. Election campaigns to date show that while in Hungary debates in political life center on various factual issues, in Slovakian, Ukrainian, Serbian, and Romanian political life such issues are transformed to represent questions of national fate: *political life is based on national, not democratic, legitimacy*. This is becoming truer of the Magyar politicians of neighboring countries, who conduct their own ethnic/national discourse for their own voters. When they are meeting with parties and the public from Hungary, they continue to use this discourse. This has the effect of either leading Hungarian politicians to dissect ethnic and cultural issues in an unsophisticated manner, or having their statements appear foreign and general.

## II. In Search of Cleavages

Political differences of opinion within cross-border Magyar organizations are presented in the minority and Hungarian press as if they reflected divisions within the community as a whole. The splitting of parties shows, however, that the conflicts primarily concern the inner circles of political and cultural elites.<sup>10</sup> The naming of orientations within the inner debates has developed, and most of the literature to this date has indicated that these relate to the clash of political interests. The most common categories are: liberal-national-popular-Christian; right-left; escort-solid core-collaborator; kuruc-labanc; moderate-radical; value- versus interest-oriented.<sup>11</sup> If we consider outer conflicts, as when the basic state treaties were being debated, or when language-policy conflicts arose, the above-mentioned markers did not help in distinguishing statements, which were often quite similar, regardless of which group presented them.

The opposed positions are grouped around two topics: 1. the relation of the Magyar political organizations to the majority nation's democratic/euro-atlantic-oriented forces, and the ensuing cooperation strategies; 2. the basic question of *identity policy*: is the preservation of minority self-identity enough to ensure civic equality before the law and linguistic rights, or is there a need beyond this for establishing independent minority institutions?

Oszkár Jászi, in the spring of 1918, saw the interest-differentiation of minority politicians, from the viewpoint of integrative minority policy, in the following way: "As long as a minority has no schools teaching in its own language, public administration, or courts, it is impossible to spark the interest of its members in different problems, and it is impossible to open a path to policy regarding natural class conflicts and differences in world-views."<sup>12</sup> There is consensus in the literature on the point that in the last ten years in Central Europe, integrative minority policy has not defined the framework for Magyar minority politics. We have also seen that the so-called moderate-radical opposition does not characterize the responses to the tightening of language or institutional rights: those minority politicians considered moderate have vehemently thrown themselves into the verbally active struggle.

In my opinion, based on the events of the last ten years, the debates and divides within the minority elites cannot be described along the lines of traditional political values and world-views – they are better described by utilizing other factors. (The world-view approaches cannot be denied, but they are not of primary importance, and I feel their role is found more in defining strategy.) Below, starting from the history of minorities between the two World Wars, I re-examine the fault lines of that time in terms of minority-policy strategy, generational issues, territory issues, denominational differences, and language use.

### *1. Minority Policy and Self-Organization Strategies*

The relations of Hungarian interest groups with the political organizations of the majority society may be put into three categories.

1. In the first phase of self-organization the Czechoslovakian FMK (Independent Magyar Initiative) tried to be politically active within the

NYEE (Public Against Violence) movement; the representatives of the RMDSZ (Romanian Magyar Democratic Alliance) participated in the National Salvation Front until the Spring of 1990; the KMKSZ supported a Ukrainian candidate in the vastly Magyar-populated riding of Beregszász (Berehove) in the 1990 parliamentary elections. These were those early attempts where movements based on Magyar culture tried to realize their interests through close cooperation with, or within, various majority organizations. The roots of cooperation were different in the three cases, but the Magyar organizations all cooperated with the given country's actual regime-transforming organizations.

In the Magyar-populated areas of Slovakia and Yugoslavia the majority parties ran a large number of Magyar candidates in Parliamentary and municipal elections. Even though in Slovakia a satellite party was founded under the leadership of György Gyimesi, serious results were not attained.<sup>13</sup>

2. Another model is the autonomy approach based on political legal status (of the early and mid 1990s) and the principle of self-organization. This model thought in terms of unified organizational structures, where the movement could also serve as the local government of the Magyars of the given territory. Within this model the institution tended to take on the characteristics of a political party and became the embodiment of autonomy. Thus the movement has the dual role of managing resources as a self-government, and as being a parliamentary interest group as a political party. The most developed of these forms was the RMDSZ's "state within a state" concept.<sup>14</sup>

The construction of such an autonomy concept failed in the situation of the Yugoslav war and the opposition of other elite groups, and this led to the collapse of the VMDK leadership in 1994. Due to the infrastructural weakness of the KMKSZ, and also due to the relation of other elite groups to the Budapest and Ungvár-centered attempts and the lack of personnel, no significant autonomy concept was worked out in Ukraine. In Slovakia, due to the divisions of the Magyar party and the active language- and administration-policy of the Meciar government, the "co-nation" concept and the Révkomárom decree remained only as plans.<sup>15</sup> Concerning the latter, the fear of party politics was what kept the Great Council of 100 – which was to provide the framework for the attempts at planning autonomy – from being elected. In the RMDSZ, the outlines of the "state within a state" concept were developed after the Kolozsvár (Cluj) Declaration

(1992) and the Brassó (Braşov) Congress (1993), but the establishment of the inner cadaster and the organization of the elections were put off due to political contingencies.<sup>16</sup>

3. In 1996 and 1998 respectively, a new political situation arose in Romania and Slovakia, which gave the Magyar parties an opportunity to participate in government and come into power as coalition partners.<sup>17</sup> In Slovakia this was preceded by giving up the demand for ethnically-based territorial autonomy, and in a quiet way this happened in Romania as well. In the new situation – along with regrouping within the minority cultural-political elite – the hope of personal participation in authority and cooperation in transforming political institutions came to the fore.

Differences in consideration of minority policy and strategy cannot be explained by singular factors. I feel it is very important to consider the genesis of the parties and concepts, as this was where socialization differences – regarding how given political personalities developed approaches to minority issues – became apparent.

Below I consider the divergent approaches to self-organization country-by-country, and I try to answer the question of which factors are the most significant in defining the institutional framework of minority Magyar political activity.

### *Ukraine*

Those Magyar intellectuals who were accepted by the county leadership hoped to bring the local Magyar cultural clubs (which were sprouting like mushrooms in 1988) into one regime-conform cultural organization in a manner similar to that of *CSEMADOK* (Czechoslovakian Magyar Workers' Cultural Alliance). In this case, the Party, in the interest of control, might have contributed some modest sums. The example of the county Ukrainian Shevchenko Society, which was being organized at the same time, showed that an ethnic-based social organization could be established without the direction of the state and party organs. This meant an opportunity for the intellectuals – who to that point had moved only on the periphery – to institutionalize their informal influence over local Magyar

self-organization. In February of 1989 the young KMKSZ was established as a clearly independent (of state authority) Magyar interest group, which felt its primary role was to protect Magyar cultural values. The movement was embodied in the person of Sándor Fodó. He had behind him the official Magyar cultural elite and his circle of students and friends. The first group slowly wore away from the circle of the president. The leadership of the rapidly-grown but inexperienced organization was chaotic in many ways, and depended on the president – it was criticized by the *Demokratikus Platform*, founded in 1992 by György Dupka. In 1993 the tensions centered around two issues. The first was the basic state treaty between Hungary and Ukraine, which was agreed upon without taking into consideration the positions of the Sub-Carpathian Magyars. The second concerned the parliamentary candidate for Beregszász. Regarding the first issue, media in Hungary and tensions between political parties destroyed the unified position of the leadership of the KMKSZ. In the case of selecting the election candidate, strategic considerations, not external factors, were in the fore. Fodó, the president of the KMKSZ, came into conflict with Mihály Tóth, the commissioner of the local public administration and the candidate of the local KMKSZ chapter. That is to say that the representatives of the national KMKSZ found themselves at odds with Fodó, who was an open MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) supporter, a member of the Magyar elite who had experience in administrating, of whom it was hoped that local issues could be well-handled, and who was also supported by the opposition parties in Hungary. After the local candidate's election victory the political fallout continued with the establishment of the UMDSZ (Ukrainian Magyar Democratic Alliance) and the MEKK (Community of Magyar Intellectuals in Sub-Carpathia). The number of members of the KMKSZ, which had the largest base of popular support, hardly decreased. The separation brought to life an intellectual group well-represented in the press and in Hungarian mass media, which introduced the discussion of real local problems and drew up plans for solving them, but whose inner material resources and meager outer (mostly Budapest) support did not make possible the realization of bigger plans. The leadership of the KMKSZ, which was now isolated from the Hungarian government and the county leadership, worked out a local autonomy concept and, after support from Hungary fell (in 1994), established a "private infrastructure" and

founded its independent institutional system through the establishment of the Beregszász Teachers' College.<sup>18</sup> The government in Hungary could not deny support for the new institution, and thus the KMKSZ was able to establish on one hand its own basis for training and keeping elites, and on the other hand the cornerstone for the all-important issue of educational autonomy. In the 1998 parliamentary election Miklós Kovács, the new president of the KMKSZ, defeated Mihály Tóth. According to Kovács' radical rhetoric, the fault line is drawn between the collaborating nomenclature and the hard core, or credible representatives of minority interests. According to the other camp the problem-solving, compromise-seeking, economy- and social-organization centered group stands opposed to a group which is trying to gain exclusive representation of the Sub-Carpathian Magyars and is directed by the right wing in Hungary, which is radically opposed to the Ukrainian government, and which concentrates on national grievances. Thus, the debate on division centers not on the attractiveness of autonomy, but instead on the nomenclature past (or present?).

### *(Czech)Slovakia*

The 1989 elections found the Magyars of Slovakia in a unique situation: they had established an umbrella cultural organization (*CSEMADOK*), the Minority Rights Protection Committee operated illegally, and in the person of Miklós Duray, they had a personality with a past in the opposition and good relationships who was relatively well-known and charismatic. There were four different concepts at play at the beginnings of party organization.

The generation of 1968 hoped to attract the new organizations to *CSEMADOK* and to thus establish a unified Magyar movement, which they would lead. They further hoped to realize Magyar interests by personally participating in government.

Opposed to them were the young intellectuals, from Duray's former circle of colleagues, who formed the FMK partly to support ideological differentiation. They felt that Magyar organizations should participate more effectively in the general changes taking place in Central Europe, and that

minority issues could be best handled by helping the NYEE movement to change the political system.

After a few months Miklós Duray, who joined the Czechoslovakian political processes only in December of 1989, was thinking in terms of independent Magyar political activity and party establishment – likely based on his experiences in Prague – through enlisting self-proclaimed Magyars from *CSEMADOK*, the teaching profession, and public administration.

The establishment of the MKDM (Magyar Christian Democratic Movement) was first proposed by the leaders of FMK, who hoped it would win over rural, religious Magyar voters. Later the movement separated from the Slovak Christian democrats, due to their nationalist traditions, and moved toward identifying with *Együttélés* (Co-existence) in the interest of unifying a strong organization. Its strategic relevance increased when, after 1994 (the Révkomárom Meeting), the mass media in Slovakia gave more space to the party's leaders. Due to the increase in influence of its voters, the Horn government in Budapest, which was hoping to achieve results in Slovak-Hungarian relations, found MKDM to be a more “pragmatic” partner in negotiations than was *Együttélés*.

In the time of the political isolation of Slovakian Magyars (1992-95) the leadership of *Együttélés* presented the Magyars as independent political legal subjects, and had worked out a co-nation concept and various autonomy plans. These plans related not only to the use of language and public administration techniques, but attempted to present a vision of the future based on the principles of equality of opportunity and equality of political status.

Due to the complicated nature of Slovakian Magyar political life, it would be misleading to consider the MPP (Magyar Civic Party) – MKDM – EPM (Co-existence Political Movement) axis to reflect a spectrum of positions moving from pragmatic-cooperational to autonomy and self-determination. For example, the MPP has its own serious autonomy concept. But the various strategies of the groups behind the parties was not visible under the active rights-decreasing Meciar Magyar-policy. This was foremost because, from the vantage point of human rights, the policies denied basic demands and took away some existing language-use and public administration rights. For this reason, despite political-organizational differentiation, we can observe a continuous convergence of positions concerning minority-national issues – as witnessed already in the 1930s.

## *Yugoslavia – Voivodina*

The Yugoslavia Magyar cultural elite developed in the 1970s and 1980s, and the advantages they had compared to other Magyar groups became disadvantages in the 1990s. Some of the members of this elite had positions in the political leadership of Voivodina, and had serious institutional backgrounds: Forum House, Hungarologia Institute, editing journals and weeklies. This was all based on the Yugoslavist integrative minority policy in the “brotherhood-unity” ideological period. A situation developed where access to resources could be gained by adopting intense Yugoslavism. There was no opportunity to publicly present problems which were purely local, pertained to ethnically based self-organization, or which were uniquely Magyar. Those who did not play by these rules were punished by the Magyar-language institutional system itself (Mírnic-, Yugoslavian Magyar Language Teaching Association-, Sziveri-, Viczei-affairs), or were accepted after individual compromises (*Új Symposion*, generational Sziveri period).<sup>19</sup>

A legitimate change took place in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. The ideology of Yugoslavism and welfare-liberty was replaced by national rhetoric. This led to the self-awareness of national communities, and national perspectives came to the fore in conflict-resolution and local policy. This national consolidation could not be followed by the Voivodina Magyar elite, as its entire socialization had been geared to increasing the effectiveness of the Yugoslav self-management system (the work of László Reháák). Another contributing factor was that the careers of the Sziveri-generation, which brought up actual problems, were broken by the elite of the Forum House, and the cultural elite did not know how to respond to the Ristić-affair.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, by the end of the 1980s, there was no group able to think through self-definition and consciousness, and there was no well-known, credible, or even symbolic leader to gather around. Instead, the state-owned publishers (or those with ambiguous ownership), journals, dailies, and the Hungarologia Institute/Department of the Újvidék University (Novi Sad University), that is to say the previous framework for public-opinion formation and socialization, remained.

Among these attributes, two strategies were articulated. Some saw the solution in participating in the civic transformation of Serbia. One usually

refers to Tibor Várady regarding this approach, but the election results show that this strategy has considerable support in Magyar circles.<sup>21</sup> The other notable approach was the independent political legal status advocated by the VMDK, which was put forth in their autonomy concept. The leadership of the VMDK accepted the representation of a Magyar-speaking social group, which was socialized in a completely different system of legitimation, in the face of Serbian attempts to build a nation-state. In this way the autonomy concept was worked out partly as a technique, and partly (just as importantly), it articulated and made public the need for ethnic differentiation and self-government. This all took place in the context of the war. The above-mentioned process of transforming viewpoint and self-image strengthened the Magyar-established, grass-roots anti-war peace movement, which was unique in Serbia. As a movement the VMDK was rather burdened by the circumstances of the war, and the aid tasks and the settlement of Serbian refugees in Voivodina led to regular (public-administration and ethnic) conflict. Some other social-spiritual processes were just as important. The use of Magyar-language media was of key importance to the VMDK in spreading autonomy efforts and consciousness of being an independent community. However, these were state-owned and ambiguously-owned and thus could not be influenced. In this situation of conflict the leaders of the VMDK developed a *doctrinal tone*, which was increasingly criticized in the press in 1993-94. In the middle class, the radical disintegration of the previous Yugoslav self-management framework, the difficulty in making ends meet, and the change in the relationship with the mother country (going from being the rich to the poor cousin) led to mass exodus and a *public feeling of hysteria* – as among the Serbs. Thanks to these, the conflicts between Voivodina Magyars and Hungarians become more difficult to handle, and the tone of press polemics grew coarse. The third important factor was the *effect of aid*. Beyond the above-mentioned change in relationship/status with Hungary, the material aid sent under ambiguous conditions and the responsibilities of making use of the aid compromised the moral base of not only individuals and local communities, but of organizations as well.

The disintegration of the VMDK had many causes: obstacles to presenting a platform, the effect of the Hódi affair, the efforts of the Budapest and Belgrade governments, the unmet needs of social organization among

the Magyars, and the scattered and differentiated constellation of interests. Although there are likely small degrees of difference, each of the above contributed roughly equally to the collapse of the VMDK and the establishment of the VMSZ. From the viewpoint of strategic considerations, the Zenta (Senta) meeting was characteristic, with the documents pertaining to the establishment of the VMSZ clearly showing the difference in the two levels of minority political activity.<sup>22</sup> Those elected to local governments concentrated on local affairs, possible compromises, and the quick resolution of issues, while the leadership of the party felt its responsibility was to articulate “nation-policy” affairs, self-definition, and all-Voivodina Magyar and minority interests. In the time of political isolation in all the above-mentioned countries (1991-1996-1997) the VMDK, with its given structure, after the drafting of the autonomy concept and the independent political community consciousness-raising efforts, could not realize the development of its inner structure. The VMSZ tried to make up for this deficiency and make better use of the political sphere (toward the Budapest and Belgrade governments, and toward Serbian parties). Change in strategy turned out to be as follows: while the VMDK thought in grass-roots and chosen-autonomy terms, but could not realize this technically, the VMSZ worked out a system whereby various expert groups could work within the autonomy concept.<sup>23</sup> Since its election victory its policy priority has moved from ethnic autonomy to Voivodina autonomy, in conjunction with participation in the civic transformation of Yugoslavia. The awakening of the Magyar minority society’s political consciousness has taken place, but the elite group, which led the process, has collapsed, and in this way participation in the country’s democratization has come to the fore. Whether the Magyars can be integrated in such a strategy, despite the disintegration of their elites, and while the authorities continue their efforts at national exclusivity, is an important question.

### *Romania*

The main difference between the Magyar minority in Romania and the others is its magnitude. Given this, it has a larger group of intellectuals, allowing varying groups of experts to work simultaneously. Another impor-

tant and unique characteristic is that while the vast majority of intellectuals coming out of the 1960s among other minorities have built their institutions based on leftist principles, the intellectuals of Transylvania have experienced some continuity and awareness of minority intellectual life from the inter-war period.<sup>24</sup>

After the changes of 1989, the RMDSZ had the broadest political apparatus. It had an internationally-known, credible and charismatic personality in László Tőkés. It had a person with a definitive reputation in intellectual circles, who was experienced and knew the Bucharest political elite well, in Géza Domokos. It had a person after 1989 who had mastered the political language of the young, had good contacts with the new government in Hungary, and had a dissident past, in Géza Szócs. The development of strategy was defined mostly by responses to the efforts of the majority's government. The government was not receptive as a potential partner for the cooperational politics represented by Géza Domokos. (Later the RMDSZ had to quit the oppositional party alliance.) It is important to note that the issue of transformation after Domokos was solved by the elite in part through pragmatic personal politics (with the integrative personality of Béla Markó in the foreground) and in part through constructing techniques to handle value conflicts (the roundtable led by Sándor N. Szilágyi). The maintenance of unity was further made possible because the voter base was defined ethnically (one of the RMDSZ campaign slogans in 1992 was "Let's state our Magyar-ness!"), and if one were to run in a significantly Magyar-populated area without being an RMDSZ candidate, he/she had no chance of winning. (In the case of municipal elections, this held true even for areas without a Magyar majority. Those Magyar candidates running as independents in the Sekler-lands were successful, and they were later integrated into the local RMDSZ leadership.) After the Kolozsvár declaration and the Brassó congress, two strategies had been outlined. One group consisted of those who wanted to realize autonomy through inner elections, and another was made of those who thought in terms of a longer process. Taking into consideration the opportunities in Romanian politics, they hoped to realize autonomy through institutions and parliamentary rights, and did not try to present autonomy as a given fact/situation. The tensions came to the surface in concrete political debates: the Neptun-affair, the Benedek Nagy memo affair, the omission of the national cadaster and the

inner elections, the coalition negotiations, the Bólyai University issue, the review of coalition work. The activity of the so-called autonomists and radicals is largely taken up by criticizing the coalition. There is no evidence indicating that the RMDSZ is capable of replacing its current participation logic or of working out a positive program while it is participating in government.

Based on the descriptions of the countries outlined above, we can trace three types of Magyar minority interest protection over the last ten years: 1. Representing minority interests through direct participation in the practice of authority; 2. Cooperating with the given country's civic, democratic, euro-atlantic integration-oriented forces (within their movements or within a party alliance) in the interest of transforming institutional systems to conform to European norms (within this the realization of a subsidiary relationship, the changing of the substance of borders, and the respect of international minority right norms are the means of securing the linguistic and institutional rights of the Magyar minorities); 3. Only the securing of collecting rights and the recognition of autonomy in the given country can guarantee the institutional protection of identity. This can best be guaranteed by constructing the institutions of autonomy, and based on this position one can negotiate with the representatives of the political parties of the majority as an equal.

Over the last ten years a new minority Magyar political elite has formed in neighboring countries. Their inner debates, with the exception of Romanian Magyars, have led to disintegration and the establishment of new institutions. On the level of political rhetoric there is a general emphasis on unity and the need for a unified approach, which reflects a demand for stability. These parties must respond to the efforts of the given country's majority to establish a nation-state and to the expectations of various parties in the 'mother country'. From this point of view, those Magyar groups which are lowest in number, and are weakest in terms of existence, are the most defenseless, i.e., those in Croatia, Sub-Carpathia, and Voivodina. The change in government in Budapest in 1994 affected the conditions for the KMSZ and UMDSZ-MEKK, which had close ties to the MDF. The leadership of the VMDK tried to realize its independent political strategy not only in Belgrade, but in Budapest as well, and in this way – through the

Balladur plan(s) and the Hódi-affair – its relations were soured before 1994. The neighbor-policy efforts of the post-1994 Budapest government found a Yugoslav partner which was more flexible and pragmatic than the VMDK in the VMSZ, while in Slovakia the natural ally, the MPP, had very low Parliamentary representation and influence, and thus the MKDM came into the fore. After the 1998 elections the most popular Slovakian Magyar party, the MDKM, evaded earlier promises to cooperate with the MPP, and allied itself with *Együttélés* to form the backbone of the MKP (Magyar Coalition Party). Transylvania is an exception in these regards, as the RMDSZ is able to elevate those politicians into prominence – if not into the top echelon, then close to it – who can maintain intense relations with whichever coalition is in power in Budapest.

If we try to divide the last ten years of Magyar minority interest protection, then we can see three separate periods: 1. From 1989-1992, the movements built their organizational frameworks and infrastructure, and the work of cultural personalities, who had been leaders to that point, was taken over by that of those dealing exclusively with politics; 2. In the following years these organizations drafted their autonomy concepts and attempted to map out a vision of the future for their communities, which were not accepted in any of the political institution systems defined by the majority. While consciousness of national and ethnic togetherness visibly increased in the entire region, the Magyar minority parties, from the time of constitution-drafting in their countries, become politically isolated. This was strengthened by the fact that the main foreign policy interests in the mother country had to do with euro-atlantic integration. In terms of international interest and attention, Magyar minority issues were vastly overshadowed by the distant Balkan conflicts; 3. The third period began with the RMDSZ's (1996) and the MKP's (1998) acceptance of roles in the governments of their countries. The experience of the Ukrainian Magyar minority differs, as the KMKSZ has strengthened politically, and it hopes that it can establish a type of educational autonomy. The Voivodina Magyars find themselves in a new situation, where after the increase in the number of political parties, personal contact networks, and the collapse of institutions there is no unambiguous path for acting out minority policy.

## 2. *The Generation Gap*

After the First World War, the public mood of the first decade of the Magyar minorities was characterized by the term “torn-away Magyars”: the new situation of minority status, brought about by the change of empires, led to the development of value-defending, revision-expecting behavior. This was surpassed by some groups of the generation that graduated in new conditions in the 1930s<sup>25</sup> which established the ideology of inner self-organization for minority society and the necessary intellectual consciousness of calling: the idea of *serving the nation*.<sup>26</sup> In the neighboring countries, at the middle/end of the 1960s, the institution-building efforts of the Magyars were infused by those activists using socialist phraseology, who stressed leftist tradition. Their efforts brought a new emphasis on both social action and the guiding role of the intellectuals. In the 1970s, in Romania and Yugoslavia, the so-called 1968 generation remained in the definitive position in Magyar cultural life; in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union this group was pushed to the periphery. In the 1980s a generational group came to prominence, which demanded greater expertise in the cultivation of minority self-awareness and which rejected the developed role and strategy of the Magyar minority elite. Such were the colleagues of the Voivodina *Új Symposion*, the *József Attila Klub* in Pozsony (Bratislava), those studying social science in the *Új Mindenés Gyűjtemény* and the illegal Minority Rights Protection Committee, the ethnology-anthropology group in Csíkszereda, and the philosophy-of-science circle in Sepsiszentgyörgy. In the above-mentioned Sziveri-affair, the youth questioned the cultural policy of *Forum*. In the Romanian folklore debate the Csíkszereda (Miercurea Ciuc) group took issue with traditional views of peoples. The same group, before 1989, stated that the cultural elite was presenting its own cultural values and institutional interests as if they were the interests of all of Transylvanian Magyar society.<sup>27</sup> At the same time the lack of independent and professional social science institutions was noticed everywhere.

After 1989, in Sub-Carpathia, the founding group and original leaders of the KMKSZ was brought together mainly from the group of young intellectuals who were followers of Sándor Fodó. This group later split in two (in a way reflecting the two literary groups of pre-1989, the *Forrás* circle and the József Attila Literary Studio),<sup>28</sup> but in truth no new generation

has appeared in this organization, nor in similar organizations. In Sub-Carpathia there are no Magyar lawyers or experts trained to conduct social-statistical, sociological studies.

In (Czech)Slovakia, the individuals who had leading roles in 1968 mostly joined *Együttélés*. In a paradoxical way, of the young, trained, social-science group seen as Miklós Duray's, only Iván Gyurcsik worked in *Együttélés*; the others joined the leadership of FMK or MPP. Through political activity in local government, several young intellectuals (many with technical degrees) joined MPP, while the former *CSEMADOK* activists and the pre-1989 Magyar public administrators tended to join *Együttélés*.

Regarding Yugoslavia, it would be a stretch to speak of generational groups, as András Ágoston was the number-two person in *Forum*, before the establishment of the VMDK, which later provided the background for the later "restoration opposition". The main problem in these political organizations is the lack of thirtysomethings. The reasons for this are partly the dissolution of the Sziveri-led *Symposion* group, partly the mass exodus of this generation (to other countries), and partly the lack of social-science training. There are a number of Magyars with legal or economic training working now, but whether there are reserves is questionable.

The political cooling-down period in Romania, which began in the first half of the 1970s, and which spread throughout the region, saw the generation, which took part in establishing minority institutions in the 1960s, adopt the "grass will bend" ideology. They expressed their minority grievances in letters sent to Party leaders in Bucharest, then to Budapest.<sup>29</sup> At the beginning of the 1980s the authors of *Ellenpontok* (Counterpoints) began to write of the discrimination Romanians used against Magyars as a human rights issue. By the middle of the decade those circles which attempted to maintain social self-awareness had developed (editors of *Kriterion*, Limes circles, Csíkszereda ethnology-anthropology circle, Sepsiszentgyörgy (Sfântu Gheorghe) philosophy-of-science circle). After 1989, MISZSZ (Alliance of Magyar Youth Organizations) took part in the first congress, and had an important role in electing Géza Szócs as general secretary. Later, the politically active Reform Group came from the Alliance, and currently it is the most dedicated representative of autonomy efforts. The potential reserves behind the thirtysomethings are guaranteed by very active leaders of the university student organizations. In local poli-

tics, particularly in Sekler-country, those entrepreneurs in their 30s and 40s with technical backgrounds, and who show a certain social sensitivity, are attaining an increasingly important role. Another group, which does not exist elsewhere, has also appeared: the circle of intellectuals who have completed their university studies in Hungary, and have returned.

To summarize the above, the lack of young people with legal, economic, or social science training appears to be a long-term problem. In the case of Slovakia and Romania, where thanks to higher populations the situation is somewhat better, I feel the institutional integration and securing of jobs (in the home country) for those youth with this kind of training is a key issue.

Given their somewhat unique paths, which diverged from the norm, I view the MPP and the Reform Group in Romania as generational organizations. Both groups attained positions of importance in their respective parties (MKP, RMDSZ) by engaging in professional political activity.

### *3. The Problem of Territory*

The conflicts within the Magyar minority parties often appear as being between scattered Magyars and those living in areas where they form the majority, and among cities considered centers. The political activity of those cross-border Magyars living in minority or majority areas cannot be described through generalizations. Instead, one must keep in mind that Magyar-settled areas have a series of linguistic, labor, and institution-management problems which can be handled through municipal government, but that these problems are much more difficult to manage in areas of mixed ethnicity (minority areas). Here, minority public personalities are much more sensitive to unique ethnic interests, offenses, and symbolic gestures. Further, given knowledge of the other group and the willingness to compromise, the majority of Magyar minority politicians, even dating back to the interwar period, come from settlements where the Magyars do not have definitive majorities.

In Slovakia, the Magyars are found in a torn block to the east, but there exists a divide between East-Slovakia and the western areas: before 1998, 80% of the Magyar representatives in Slovakian Parliament lived within a

30 km radius of Pozsony. In Sub-Carpathia the border-area Beregszász County and the Ungvár (Uzshorod), i.e., scattered, Magyars differ on autonomy concepts, and there is a constant conflict regarding the nomination of candidates for Parliament. But given that the KMKSZ leadership teaches in the Beregszász Teachers' College, this is where the center of gravity tends to be. In the case of Transylvania, it is common to speak of radically different political situations in the Sekler lands and in the scattered counties, given that Hargita (Harghita) and Kovászna (Covasna) counties had a uniquely Magyar life even under the previous regime. Another important political problem is the situation of the two 50% cities, Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mureș) and Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare), where it is still uncertain how the municipal governments will handle ethnic rivalry. Beginning in the 1970s, thanks to the effects of Hungarian television, the Partium region has developed differently than Transylvania in terms of community organization and flow of information. After 1989, with the permeability of the borders, Debrecen and Nyíregyháza became the region's supply and consumption centers. In Voivodina, the local government of the densely Magyar-populated areas by the Tisza made up the mass base of the VMDK, and later the VMSZ. With the strengthening of the latter organization, the leadership is now mostly from Szabadka (Subotica), as opposed to Temerin-Újvidék.

Rivalry between given cities tends to concern attaining the role of center. An important element is that the center of the majority Magyar areas is often not the same as the administrative and political center of the region. Thus a choice must be made between putting the political decision-center in the center of the given region or in the center of the Magyar-settled areas. In Slovakia, Dunaszerdahely (Dunajska Sreda) or Komárom (Komárno) cannot compete with Pozsony even in terms of geographical proximity. However, this has led to a situation whereby Dunaszerdahely, despite being the regional center of Csallóköz, does not have its own minority institutions. As the Slovakian parliamentary election system is based on party lists, we cannot anticipate a move of the center away from Pozsony. The situation is similar in the Ungvár-Beregszász relationship, with the difference that while the KMKSZ office remains in Ungvár, the college, theater, and central library are all found in Beregszász. In Romania, the traditional Bucharest-Kolozsvár rivalry appeared within the first few

weeks of the RMDSZ's existence. With the exit of Géza Domokos, the practical political work has moved to Kolozsvár, with the president's office operating in Marosvásárhely, while the Parliamentary faction and international operations are located in Bucharest. Regarding the centuries-old Marosvásárhely-Kolozsvár rivalry, the former, due to the change in ethnic ratios, is less and less able to fulfill the role of "capital of Sekler-land." At the same time, Csíkszereda is beginning to become the definitive center of the Sekler-land sub-region. This is mostly due to the development of the growing city resulting from the introduction of the county system. In the 1980s, masses of young technically-trained intellectuals settled here, feudal relations found in other Sekler cities are not characteristic here, and thanks to mass construction, the opportunities to house institutions are good. In the last few decades the Szabadka-Újvidék rivalry – in the absence of points of crystallization – has been an excuse for all kinds of things. A view of Szabadka as a bastion of civic, Magyar values, and Újvidék as a cosmopolitan, valueless city, has been constructed.<sup>30</sup> (The dissolution of the Új Symposium in 1983, as well as current cooperation within the framework of the VMSZ, are examples of Újvidék-Szabadka unity.) The role of Újvidék since the end of territorial autonomy has decreased, and further, since the breakout of the south-Slav war, the economic significance of Szabadka, as a border town, has increased.

#### *4. Denominational Differences*

Magyar minority politics between the World Wars was in part characterized by the important roles of religious denomination belonging, inherited denomination rivalries, the identity-choices of numerous Magyar Jews, churches with independent institution systems, the noteworthy minority-protection activities of freemason movements, and the fit of all these in minority political life. Following post-W.W.II secularization, the issue of denominational difference lost much of its significance. The social weight of churches decreased, but their significance as the last unique institution system of the minority societies increased. After 1989, the churches developed differing relations (by denomination and by region) to the widening minority institution system.

In Slovakia, from the beginning of the 1990s, the MKDM demanded the establishment of an independent Magyar episcopate. In terms of party preference, the Calvinist Magyar settlements seemed to favor Együttélés, while the Catholic Magyar settlements favored MDKM. In the period of MKP's local development, functional relations through the Catholic communities became an advantage, thanks to the central role of MKDM.

In Sub-Carpathia the church is in a stage of revitalization. Its significance is not to be found in the spheres of politics or culture, but instead in social work. Only this system of institutions, making use of outside resources, responded to the deficiencies of the social welfare system. Its ministers are not active in minority political life, but at the local community level they are definitive leaders of Magyar public opinion.

In pre-1989 Yugoslavia, religious life was confined to the private sphere. The significant humanitarian work of the churches during the south-Slav war did not result in influence in other areas. The integration of the church institution-system into Magyar minority policy is blocked by the right of Belgrade to name bishops.

In Romania, the person of László Tőkés and the wide church institution system – which has significant historical traditions and serious grievances – is in close contact with the political activity of the RMDSZ. Several attempts have been made to realize Magyar educational autonomy through church institutions (in a manner similar to the inter-war model). However, the postponement of church reparations has made this impossible. Between the wars, denomination had the largest role here, but today it is insignificant. What difference is visible is in the public political activity of denominational leaders, but this is more reflective of individuals than institutions.

## *5. Use of Language*

The language use of the public figures of cross-border Magyars can be split into three types.

1. The first-person plural form developed before 1989, which refers to national grievances and historical-ethnic symbols, was used mainly for

internal addresses (commemorations, election propaganda). Speakers of this type speak for their entire communities, and this point is emphasized by (generally Hungarian) journalists: e.g., “What are the expectations of Transylvanian Magyars?”

2. Pragmatic political language: regarding events as political processes, and interpreting them as such. This style does not always refer to ethnic-national connections, but instead expresses and debates direct political interests.

3. The language of self-reflex, which refers to internal affairs of the minority, responds to the personal position of the publicist. Their opinions are not meant as messages, programs, or judgments, but instead as the interpretations of situations. This is a unique approach of publicists in media, who are more and more independent of the cross-border Magyar parties.

### III. Topics of Importance

I would like to draw attention to the following three emphasized topics, which, from the viewpoint of the future of cross-border Magyars, are of definitive importance.

#### *1. The Structure of Intellectual Roles*

Before 1989 the situation of the Magyar minorities in political decision-making and state structure varied from country to country. At the end of the 1980s in Romania, only those Magyars who were openly supporting the regime remained in central Party organs. Among those working within the state structure, only Géza Domokos, the director of *Kriterion* Publishing, commanded the respect of the Magyar intellectual circles. In Czechoslovakia the situation was better, as Magyar participation in state structures was wider through the employment of Magyar experts in *CSE-MADOK*, *Madách* Publishing, various riding offices, and the Pozsony governmental sphere (e.g., József Gyönyör, László Végh). Even wider participation was characteristic of the Yugoslavia Magyar elite until 1988, which later contracted to activity in local governments and Magyar-language cul-

tural and educational institutions. The Magyar political elite in Sub-Carpathia was part of the county nomenclature, but it represented mainly local economic interests, and not unique Magyar issues. The few Magyar humanities intellectuals worked at the publisher (which also published in Magyar), in the Magyar Department of Ungvár University, and in the educational sphere.

In the last ten years this has all changed. In Voivodina and Sub-Carpathia key institutions, where intellectuals might be trained and socialized (Hungarologia institutes in Ungvár and Újvidék, *Forum, Kárpáti Igaz Szó*, Ungvár textbook publisher), have remained under tight state control. The meager number of new public opinion-leading institutes is too limited for the intellectuals. For this reason a number of them have repatriated, and others, after undergoing further training in Hungary, have not come back. Many have become stuck in the existing structures, while the political representatives of the Magyar minority constantly attacked them. By this I do not mean foremost the key institutions mentioned above, but instead the school network and the old-style management models still used there. In these places, the system for replenishing the Magyar elite is very weak, although the local governments are still able to function.

In Romania and Slovakia the press and book publishing are no longer under state control. Thus, the Magyar intellectuals working in this field can work freely, and their role in opinion-formation ties them to the Magyar political parties.

The participation of Magyars in the coalition parties in Romania and Slovakia has further divided the political elite.

1. Some have attained positions in government and state apparatus, while other members of the party elites have not. (This means approximately 300 positions in Romania and 100 in Slovakia.)

2. In both countries municipal governments have a greater role than before. If this situation remains, then it is possible that Magyar local government and public administration careers can be built independent of Magyar parties.

3. The coalition agreements have made it possible for Magyar experts to join the apparatus of their given fields.

4. In both countries the circle of entrepreneurs who are independent of the parties is growing, who, through the coalition, can gain information, direct representation of interests, and freedom from discrimination.

Among the figures of Magyar minority politics, differentiation began in terms of who was a member of which party, who the politicians were, and who was active in influencing minority issues outside of organizations (e.g., publicists, experts, journalists). On the other hand, the circle of those party politicians using demonstrative language, and of expert roles, developed internally.

## 2. *The Relationship of Minority Parties to Their Own Societies*

The political struggles within the Magyar minority parties over the last ten years have shown that the parties cannot be *political parties* and resource managing *self-governments* at once. In the first half of the 1990s, in the four largest Magyar-inhabited areas, techniques for making political decisions and distributing resources, as well as incorporating oversight by elected (from below) and legitimate bodies, had been concretely worked out.<sup>31</sup> The opposition of the minority political parties, however, stopped these plans. The problem is not that the parties could trap themselves in the role of distributor of resources. Of more concern is that authority over local social, cultural and economic life might be introduced without *social control*. (This is a historically necessary result of unified, single-party minority communities.)

Regarding the non-ethnic issues of their own societies, the minority parties are in a paradoxical situation. By the middle of the 1990s they prepared less and less comprehensive election platforms (which deal with more than just the issues of their own ethnic group).<sup>32</sup> This may be explained by the fact that they see fewer opportunities to have a meaningful say in national matters. This is supported (paradoxically) by the experiences of the RMDSZ in the government coalition, where the partners do not allow these parties to contribute to the development of policy outside of the areas of minority- and human rights, and perhaps foreign policy.

In the second half of the 1990s it became common for Magyar political observers in neighboring countries to complain of apathy and passivity. Beyond parliamentary and local elections, the biggest part of minority soci-

eties has no connection to the current parties, which were formerly movements. Magyar minority politicians continue to present foremost direct ethnic problems when appearing in public. At the level of local Magyar societies, the fact that one cannot organize and strengthen inner collective life through direct ethnic discourse and cultural events can be experienced every day. Comparing the press of some cities with the national-level Magyar media organs, we see that the former write less about ideology: they write about different problems, and in a different style.

The building of the series of Magyar minority institution systems at the end of the 1930s was based on *society-directing people-serving activism*, aimed at the self-organization of Magyar society and the feeling of being “torn-away Magyars”. The Vienna decisions, and the consequences of World War II, did not allow for this generation and these institutions to develop. By the 1950s and 1960s only the tradition of leftist intellectual behavior remained, but as we could not speak of Magyar minority policy, but only of the given country’s/government’s Magyar-policy, the new institutions appeared in just this context. If these institutions began to act independently and stretched the official boundaries of Magyar policy, then they in practice, by degree, became the personal contact network of given definitive individuals. Lacking external control, the institutions working in the shadow of the Magyar-policy of the majority nations and could not separate the representation of individual intellectual interests and opinions from perceived or actual Magyar interests: these became indistinguishable in the adoption of people-serving issues. The vast majority of cultural and political elites, which came of age in these contact networks, became critical, but not problem-solving elites. They could not have been socialized in a different way. These cross-border elites are politically active today as spokespersons for the interests of their societies, in the center of ethnic problems, but they have neglected the functioning of self-developing institutional structures.

The members of minority society, having moved beyond the pre-1989 period (which made the minority role difficult in different ways across countries), today primarily seek assistance in transforming their individual life paths in light of the changes in opportunities. The life chances of given communities are not strengthened by people-serving activism, but can be secured by assisting everyday happiness and by building a network of

*professional* institutions (in the areas of education, economic development, social work, etc.). In the most successful places, giving up vertical relationships comes hand-in-hand with replacing the leading role of intellectuals and proclamations of the interest of the community with the mapping out of local processes and long-term opportunities, and connecting these to the building of institutions for local societies.

### 3. *Relations with Hungary*

The cross-border Magyar political efforts and goals of the governments of Hungary since 1918 can be divided into the following periods:

1. 1918-1938/40/41 – *revisionist view of the future*: the protection of cross-border Magyar broken-off societies' demographics, economies, cultural potentials, as the basis for an upcoming peace negotiation;

2. 1938/40/41-1944 – *the use of the principle of reciprocity and the further development of the 1868 minority law*;

3. 1944-1948 – after the narrowing of Hungary's foreign policy opportunities and the peace negotiations following W.W.II, cross-border Magyars came up as a topic only concerning the population exchanges with Czechoslovakia, and in domestic politics, this issue was *continuously taken out of public discussion*;

4. 1948-1956-1968 – the propaganda of the *automatic resolution* of the issue based on the principle of *internationalism*, and the acknowledgment that the minority issue is a *domestic matter* for all countries;

5. 1968-1972 – *emphasis on the dual-loyalty ideology: the identification of the bridge role*: although Hungary – unlike its neighbors – is able to avoid the means of national legitimation in the time of the differentiation of socialist countries (beginning in the early 1960s), attention is drawn by the national writers and the institutional construction undertaken by a new generation of Transylvanian, Slovakian, and Voivodina Magyar cultural elites, which takes place independent of Hungary;

6. 1972/74-1989 – *the rediscovery of the problem*: the grievances of the national folk writers and the cross-border (1968) elites: concerning the cultural and demographic situation; the role of the Transylvanian Magyar News Agency and the new generation of cross-border elites in the democratic opposition (*Ellenpontok, Limes, CSMKJB, ÚS*): introduction of

human rights issues and direct political issues. The foreign affairs office of the MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) begins to deal with the problem as a pan-European one, not confined to the domestic affairs of given countries (Ohrid, Vienna, Madrid);

7. 1989-1996 – attempts to handle the problem institutionally: Minority and Ethnic Collegeum, 1989. Antall-doctrine: the Magyar minorities are factors in international political representation, the Hungarian government cannot make foreign policy decisions effecting them without consulting them, the cross-border Magyars organize themselves in independent institution systems; *the beginnings of political reintegration* (1990-1994)<sup>33</sup>; *Participant-observer position*: the Magyar issue is second to integration; the minority issue does not exclusively define neighborly relations, the Magyar parties of the neighboring countries are part of the given state's political community.

*From 1986-1990 the following principles became generally accepted:*

1. Not the location, but the substance of borders needs to be changed.
2. The Magyars living across the borders, as broken-off societies, or as independent political communities, have the right to their independent institution system in order to preserve their self-identity.
3. The treatment of cross-border Magyar political organizations, and their representatives, as equals.
4. The representation of cross-border Magyar interests in international forums is a constant responsibility of the Hungarian government, based on international legal norms.
5. The policy of supporting cross-border Magyars is a continuous element of the Hungarian budget and public-purpose foundation structure.

Following the theoretical summary, I would like to introduce some "practical" problems.<sup>34</sup>

Currently Magyar-Magyar relations are not based on mutual need, but on national solidarity. Support is not handled as long-term investment, but as aid. Party politics cannot be excluded from building relationships by any of the partners. The entire system of relationships functions in the new geopolitical space, the newly-structured region of the Carpathian basin.

The Hungarian political elite has to this point been unable to transcend party politics, and has not known how to begin to handle regional relations.

In terms of the question at hand, three important international conditions have changed: the change of the substance of borders; moving beyond handling the minority issue as strictly a domestic problem; and the unavoidable need to decentralize the structure of authority in the interest of the region's euro-atlantic integration policies. This process is represented most intensively in the region by Hungary. Given this fact, along with the country's geographical attributes and economic policy, it is becoming the Carpathian basin's definitive economic and political center. The space can also be seen as an historic area which until 1918 was integrated by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy into a political and division-of-labor system, following which the region's development was defined by the state-building attempts of small nations and the (side-) deals of world politics. Beyond European integration, the current situation carries with it the possibility to develop a sub-region (new division-of-labor system and market). It is within this framework that the process of *reintegrating differing existing Magyar institution systems of different state frameworks* is taking place. Just as we can speak of dual (state and ethnic), or triple (regional-local) loyalties and ties of citizens, institutions can belong to numerous networks. *1990 saw the beginning of cooperation between Hungarian and cross-border (self-defined) Magyar institutions: political parties, self-governments, economy, media, education, science, culture, and civil society are all areas of cooperation.* (The divergent effectiveness of these areas of cooperation is the topic of a separate study.) This naturally initiated process (following models and resource access) depends on politics in Hungary and the neighboring countries, but it depends mostly on the decisions of the representatives of the cross-border Magyar political elite. Are they capable of establishing those institutions whose decisions will ensure their social control?

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> An OKTK program to collect written materials concerning the interest groups of cross-border Magyars ran from 1995 to 1997. The material can be found at the Teleki László Foundation Central-Europe Institute Library (hereonin: TLA KEI Kv.); selections from the collection can be found in: Nándor Bárdi and György Éger (eds.), *A határon túli magyar érdekvédelmi szervezetek dokumentumai 1989-1997*, 800 p. (upcoming). TLA KEI Kv. K-1978/97.; chronologies on Magyar political life in the given countries are also to be found here: András Jánki: Ukraine, Márta Orosz: (Czecho-)Slovakia, Ferenc Mák: Croatia, János Vékás: Yugoslavia-Voivodina (also appeared in: *Regio* 1998, no. 2, pp. 151-186.), Frigyes Udvary: Romania. Bibliographies on the given parties were prepared for the TLA KEI Central-Europe database by Zoltán Varannai.
- <sup>2</sup> The following summary studies were prepared for the volume entitled *A magyar nemzeti kisebbségek Kelet-Közép-Európában*: Miklós Bakk, *Az RMDSZ mint a romániai magyarság politikai önmeghatározási kísérlete*, 35 pages, TLA KEI Kv. K-1979/97. (An earlier version appeared in *Pro Minoritate*, Fall 1996, pp. 11-30.); Károly Mirnics, *A vajdasági magyarok politikai önszerveződése és a magyar politikai pártok egymás közötti harca a VMDK megalakulásától 1996-ig*, 22 pages, TLA KEI Kv. K-1980/90., Károly Mirnics, *A kisebbségi sors neveletlen gyermekei*, 28 pages, TLA KEI Kv. K-1981/97.; Iván Gyurcsík, *A szlovákiai magyar pártok politikai céljai, stratégiái 1989-1998*, 17 pages, TLA KEI Kv. K-1982/97. Some relevant analyses include: László Öllös, *A szlovákiai magyar kisebbségi szervezetek áttekintése*, 37 pages, TLA KEI Kv. K-2627/98.; "Történeti áttekintés" in *Tíz év a kárpátaljai magyarság szolgálatában*. KMKSZ, Ungvár, 1999. pp. 7-40.; Miklós Kovács, *A kisebbségben élő politikuskok által vívott hatalmi harcok logikája*, 8 pages, TLA KEI Kv. K-1669/96.; Imre Borbély and Attila Zsolt Borbély, "RMDSZ: érték, érdek és hatalom, 1989-1998," *Magyar Kisebbség*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 23-54.; Krisztina Szentimrei, 'Bal' és 'jobb' az erdélyi magyar politikában," *Erdélyi Magyarság*, no. 34, április-június 1998, pp. 7-12.; László Veress, *Az erdélyi magyar politika fő törésvonalai*. JATE Kortörténeti Gyűjtemény 4754.; Sándor Hódi, "A magyar kisebbségpolitika bukása a Vajdaságban" *Magyar Kisebbség*, no. 1, 1998, pp. 252-264., Sándor Hódi, "Vajdasági magyar pártpreferenciák. Politikai törésvonalak a vajdasági magyar körében" *Napló*, január 22, 1997, pp. 10-12.; György Szerbhorváth, "Vajdasági magyar bölcsek protokollumai," *Symposion*, no. 20-21, szeptember-október 1998, pp. 3-108.
- <sup>3</sup> Attempts to this point include: István Schlett, *Kisebbségözön* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1993), p. 269.; László Szarka, "Variációk nemzetstratégiára," *Debreceni Szemle*, no. 1, 1998, pp. 8-18.; Csaba Lőrincz, *A magyar nemzeti kisebbségek autonómiaformái és koncepciói* (manuscript, 20 p.), TLA KEI Kv. K-1983/97.; István Ijgyártó, "A szom-

szedős országok magyarság-politikája,” in *Közép-Európa az integráció küszöbén*. (Budapest: TLA, 1997), pp. 112-117.

- <sup>4</sup> The conceptual definition of such has been put forth in the autonomy plans of Sándor N. Szilágyi and József Csapó. According to the former: “a) unique, differentiating (from others) ethnic, historical, cultural, religious, and usually linguistic characteristics; b) members see themselves as belonging to the given community, have community-consciousness, have a need for the recognition of their community by others, wish to keep their identity, and attempt to preserve all that stems from their self-awareness; c) have lived in the territory of Romania for at least 100 years; d) have at least 100 members.” Sándor N. Szilágyi, *Törvény a nemzeti identitással kapcsolatos jogokról és a nemzeti közösségek méltányos és harmonikus együttéléséről*, ch. 1, passage 1. TLA KEI Kv. K-386/94. With more direct political content: “The Romanian Magyar national community, as an autonomous political subject, is one and the same with the number of Magyars in the minority, whose homeland has historical, territorial, settlement, cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions, and whose members express their membership based on individual choice.” József Csapó, *A Romániai Magyar Nemzeti Közösség személyi elvű autonómiájának statútuma*, ch. 1, passage 1, TLA KEI Kv. K-1984/97.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ehnyomott kisebbségből legyen társnemzet*. (Pozsony-Bratislava: Együttélés Politikai Mozgalom), 20 pages.
- <sup>6</sup> This is more common in conservative media in Hungary than the term mother-country.
- <sup>7</sup> Experiences gained from using the *Pressdok* and *Hundok* press databases and document collections.
- <sup>8</sup> Károly Tóth (ed.), *Kelet-Európa új alkotmányai* (Szeged: Univ. Szegediensis, 1996), 360 pages.
- <sup>9</sup> “Ünnepélyes nyilatkozat,” March 2, 1996. Vienna. *Bécsi Napló*, no. 2, 1996, p. 2.; “A nemzetiségi közösség céljai és gondjai. Muravidéki Magyar nemzetiségi Önzagatási Közösség Végrehajtó tanácsa,” *Néptűjság*, November 15, 1991.
- <sup>10</sup> After the collapse of the VMDK, some districts followed their local leaders. In this way their local significance increased.
- <sup>11</sup> The richest collection of terms is in Imre Borbély and Zsolt Borbély, cited above.
- <sup>12</sup> Oszkár Jászi, “A nemzetiségi kérdés a társadalmi és egyéni fejlődés szempontjából,” *Huszedik Század*, no. 2, 1918, p. 105.
- <sup>13</sup> In Slovakia, the Magyar People’s Movement for Peace and Welfare. In the last Slovakian elections approximately 15% of the Magyar vote did not go to the MKP, and 2-3 Magyar representatives entered Parliament through other parties. In the 1996 elections in Voivodina more than half of the Magyar representatives were not supported by the three Magyar parties, but were instead independent or can-

didates of Serbian parties. In any case, the most Magyar votes were for the VMSZ, especially in the second round. Sándor Hódi, op. cit.

- <sup>14</sup> The theoretical framework conceptualization of the model is in Sándor Tamás, *Egy nemzetiségi társadalom belső normatív rendszere, 1996*. TLA KEI Kv. K-1909/97., 8 pages.
- <sup>15</sup> *Az önkormányzat az önkormányzás alapja. Komárom 1994. január 8.*, (Komárom: Komáromi Lapok – Szinyei Kiadó, 1995), 264 pages.
- <sup>16</sup> The conditions of party structure and state institutions: Parliament–Council of Federal Representatives, parties–platforms, parliamentary factions–federal oversight and ethical committees, government–directing presidency, (strong) president–Federal President. See Krisztina Szentimrei, op. cit., p. 11.
- <sup>17</sup> The main difference between the political planning of the Carpathian-Balkan region’s two largest ethnic groups, the Albanians and the Magyars, stemming from different characteristics and circumstances, is that while the former has rejected cooperation with the oppositional-democratic-euroatlantic oriented groups of the majority – even at the cost of leading to the electoral defeat of these groups (Yugoslavian elections of 1993) – the Magyar political communities have always attempted to cooperate.
- <sup>18</sup> Ildikó Orosz, *Esettanulmány a kárpátaljai Magyar Tanárképző Főiskola születéséről*, TLA KEI Kv. K-1940/97, 23 pages.
- <sup>19</sup> Béla Csorba and János Vékás (eds.), *A kultúrtantí visszavág: A Sympson-mozgalom krónikája 1954-1993* (Újvidék: 1994), 175 pages.
- <sup>20</sup> Document collection by Ferenc Mák, *Ristic és a szabadkai magyar színházügy*, TLA KEI Kv. K-1987/97.
- <sup>21</sup> Károly Mirmics, *A kisebbségi sors...*, op. cit.
- <sup>22</sup> András Agoston and János Vékás, (eds.), *A botrány* (Újvidék: 1994), 164 pages.
- <sup>23</sup> Autonomy concepts and expert materials of the VMSZ and VDMK, TLA KEI Kv. K-1543/96.
- <sup>24</sup> Reference individuals have been around consistently: Károly Kós, Áron Márton, Imre Mikó, József Venczel, Lajos Jordáky, Zsigmond Jakó, Attila T. Szabó, Rudolf Schuller, Ernő Gál, György Bretter, József Aradi, etc.
- <sup>25</sup> Sarló, Prohászka Circles, Transylvanian Youth, Hitel circle, Szabadka Népkör youth section.
- <sup>26</sup> “A kisebbségi értelmiség önképe a második világháború előtt,” (document collection) *Magyar Kisebbség*, no. 3-4, 1998, pp. 55-128.
- <sup>27</sup> Based on pre-1989 manuscripts and debates: Zoltán A. Bíró, “Intézményképviselőt-civil társadalom,” *Átmenetek*, no. 1, 1990, pp. 5-19.
- <sup>28</sup> István Tóth, “Filmszakadás,” *Kárpátaljai Minerva*, vol. II, no. 1-2, pp. 46-51.
- <sup>29</sup> Letters of Károly Király, TLA KEI Kv. K-76/86; 89/86; 90/86.
- <sup>30</sup> This is summarized in a table by György Szerbhorváth, *Ibid.* op. cit., p. 21.

- <sup>31</sup> Révkomárom Grand Meeting, Béla Csorba – Zenta VDMK Meeting, Géza Gulácsi's various Sub-Carpathian plans. For more detail, see Ádám Ríz, *Magyar autonómia koncepciók határon innen és túl* (Manuscript, 170 p.), TLA KEI Kv. K-1984/98.
- <sup>32</sup> There were no detailed party platforms in the 1996 Yugoslav elections: every group claimed it was the legitimate representative of Magyars.
- <sup>33</sup> Róbert Győri Szabó, *Kisebbségpolitikai rendszerváltás Magyarországon a Nemzeti és Etnikai Kollégium és Titkárság története tükrében*, (Budapest: Osiris, 1997); Attila Ara-Kovács, *Határtalan vagy gátlástalan?* (Manuscript, 32 p.) TLA KEI Kv. K-1389/94.; Attila Ara-Kovács, *A többségi szándéktól a kisebbségi következményekig* (Manuscript, 13 p.), TLA KEI Kv. K-1554/96.
- <sup>34</sup> Miklós Sz. Kovács, "Konvojban (A magyar-magyar viszonyról)," *Forrás*, no. 5, 1997, pp. 77-81.

JUDIT TÓTH

## Legal Regulations Regarding Hungarian Diaspora\*

*ABSTRACT: This is the first study to examine the partly developed status of various members of the Hungarian nation living either in the Carpathian Basin as a minority, or as emigrants all over the world. The author analyzes approximately 150 legal sources issued over the last decade dealing with the Diaspora. The study covers national and international public law as well as state budgeting and public administration to consider applications to Diaspora policy over a period where governments changed. The ambivalent nature of Diaspora policy is illustrated through the legal analysis.*

### *What is a Diaspora Law?*

As part of our research<sup>1</sup> we are trying to find the answer to the question of how Hungarian legal regulations have managed or desired to handle the historic circumstance of members of the nation living as citizens of different countries all over the world. Is it possible at all to reduce the disadvantage for the members of the nation with a diversity of legal standings, resulting from not being the citizens of one single state (Hungary), and if yes, how? Do those belonging to a Diaspora possess a specific legal standing? Is there such a thing as a Diaspora law, or is it too much to expect the law to regulate such a sensitive and diverse matter?

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The simplest legal classification of the members of the nation is as follows:

1. A part of them are citizens of the Republic of Hungary.
2. Several million Hungarians are exclusively foreign citizens. (They became citizens of the neighbouring countries as a result of peace treaties or bilateral international agreements, or, on the other hand, having migrated from Hungary in the past decades, they obtained citizenship in a new, farther, European or overseas country, losing their Hungarian citizenship.)
3. Finally, the family relationships of the groups mentioned above have created multiple citizenships and a second citizenship was also obtained in individual procedures.

Attachment on the basis of citizenship is just one aspect, the other being that of registered, lawful residence. In accordance with the latter, a differentiation is made among:

- A. Hungarian citizens living in Hungary,
- B. Hungarian citizens living abroad, and
- C. Foreign citizens living abroad, belonging to the Hungarian nation.

On the basis of formal logic, by creating pairs from them, we establish six groups, the only common trait of which is belonging to the Hungarian nation:

- I. Hungarian citizens living in Hungary
- II. Foreign citizens living in Hungary
- III. Multiple citizens living in Hungary with one citizenship, that being Hungarian
- IV. Hungarian citizens living abroad
- V. Foreign citizens living abroad
- VI. Multiple citizens living abroad with one citizenship, that being Hungarian.

The simplified classification immediately allows two conclusions to be drawn. It may only be used if the meaning of belonging to the Hungarian ethnicity can be defined legally, moreover if the requirements of “living/dwelling” somewhere are also determined. It is on that basis that we

may define whether the Diaspora is constituted by the members of the nation living/dwelling outside the borders of the state exclusively, or by those persons who have emigrated from their original place of living/dwelling for a longer or shorter period of time. In a somewhat premature fashion, it is indicated already here that membership in the Hungarian nation can be determined by law only formally and not substantially. At the same time, the law would be able to define the requirements of “living/dwelling”. However, in the hustle and bustle of the past decade, the efforts of the lawmaker failed to reach that far.

One important conclusion to be drawn from analysing the legal regulations is that the lawmakers have failed to strive at a consistent, unequivocal use of words either in harmony with what was revealed above or different from it. Let us quote a few examples, indicating the diversity of the group under examination: “Hungarian citizens living abroad”; “Hungarian citizens having settled down in foreign states”<sup>2</sup>; “Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary”; “Hungarians living in the world”; “Diaspora”<sup>3</sup>; “Hungarians living outside the territory of the Hungarian Republic”<sup>4</sup>; “Hungarian citizens returning from abroad”<sup>5</sup>; “persons leaving the country with the intention of settling down abroad”; “citizens settling down abroad”; “persons returning from abroad with the intention of settling down”; and “persons living abroad but having a place of residence in Hungary”<sup>6</sup>. The expression most frequently encountered in the legal material is “Hungarians beyond the borders”<sup>7</sup>.

From the above list the following conclusion is justified: the lawmaker possesses but a very incomplete knowledge of the circumstances characteristic of the different members of the nation. Consequently, the lawmaker fails to adjust the aim and subject of regulation to the totality of those concerned (the nation), but reacts to the requirements of regulation in an *ad hoc* and situational manner instead.

Is it possible to apply one single expression to all the members of the nation living abroad and/or staying in Hungary? In view of international comparative research, we have used the expression Diaspora. With that we intended to stop the debate in literature which seems to be endless since the authors fail to use uniform concepts in the professional literature.<sup>8</sup> It is not our objective to create a definition to be followed universally. At the same time we have concluded that lawmakers made an effort to treat Diaspora in

a uniform manner merely for the sake of the linguistic and legal precision of wording. The reason for this was that there was a lack of political will to do so, although it was precisely in the period under examination that the political division of the world into “East” and “West” was discontinued, whereas the members of the Diaspora live in both areas. In this way, it was the differences, rather than the similarities, among the individual groups of the Diaspora that became prevalent in politics.

From the legal point of view, it is just a few thin threads that unite the groups of people belonging to the Diaspora.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, significant results were found through research, which defined those common legal, administrative elements applicable to the entire concept of the Diaspora, that was supported by political thinking in terms of a uniform nation, i.e., there are differences which separate the individual groups of the Diaspora from each other in terms of legal standing and administration. Those differences may prove that the government policies relating to the Diaspora have hidden or overt priorities. Such policies, on the other hand, try to take into account the specificities of groups, living and organized in different countries, in different life situations.

If in the past ten years, in addition to those differences, something in common has been created – since national attachment and ethnic identity may not be expressed contentually but formally at most – it is definitely some development in the realm of law. Examples of those connecting threads are the regulated benefits (in terms of legal standing, support financed from public resources) provided by the government to the members of the Diaspora on the basis of national attachment.

The benefits to be summarised below are not measured with a uniform yardstick in public life, since the intent is to support those living in the Carpathian Basin, while hardly any benefits are allocated to migrants.

While the building stones of the legal-administrative system serving Diaspora politics were gradually placed one upon the other, it is rather remarkable that those applying the law were not disturbed by the fact that the legal regulations on support rendered to the members of the Diaspora failed to define the scope of the beneficiaries, i.e. the persons belonging to the Diaspora. That may hardly be considered as compatible with the programme of the rule of law.<sup>10</sup> Examples of similarly “hazy” regulation may be detected in other fields as well, and that is always related to the immaturi-

ty, rudimentary nature or lack of strength of the policy hidden behind the regulation in question.<sup>11</sup>

In 1989 the political objective was worded at the level of the constitutional level, expressing national attachment and the intention to foster the co-operation and the relationship between Hungarians, wherever they may live, and the mother country.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, the legal regulations, the decisions relating to the national budget, as well as the administrative measures aiming at realizing the objective never provide unequivocal information about who the members of the Diaspora are, and who the Hungarians are. One reason is that targeted support requires relationships free from conflict with the territorial state of the Hungarians living beyond the Hungarian borders; another reason is that communication, which is clear from the legal point of view, might carry the threat of causing conflicts. A further explanation may be that there is no need to define the scope of the persons concerned in the legal regulations since everyone knows who the people involved are, and the Diaspora policy of the government may be carried out in this way.<sup>13</sup>

However, the seemingly comfortable situation and the consensus of the political players are jeopardised by a diversity of dangers. For example, the consensus among political parties might be compromised if certain issues were discussed in public (whether an exemplary minority policy is to be established in respect to the minorities in Hungary, by international standards; joining and applying the international agreements on the protection of minorities; supplementing them with autonomous regulation; policy which will radiate into the neighbouring countries, i.e. contribute to the maintenance of the Diaspora; the preservation of Diaspora identity and staying in the motherland – since 1920 this precept has been the basis, not proof, of Diaspora politics.). A different kind of danger might be evoked by investigating the question of “who are the Hungarians?” since it might change the social acceptance in Hungary of the immigration of Hungarians from beyond the borders of Hungary, making it more diverse, moreover creating more conflicts in the future. Although prejudice against Hungarian immigrants has increased, it is only moderate<sup>14</sup> compared to that directed at other migrants, and politics should react to that. Therefore the question of “Who are the members of the Hungarian Diaspora?” needs an answer because it touches upon the basis of belonging together and to the

nation. Without that, even greater doubt is to be cast upon the principle of Diaspora policies, treated as an axiom, that there is consensus among the Hungarian population in respect to the reception and assistance of the members of the nation arriving in Hungary.

It presents a problem that it cannot be defined precisely legally, and pragmatically from the point of view of the application of law, as to whom the Hungarians are who may be looked upon as members of the Diaspora. That originates from the incompleteness of law, thus, should we wait for a full elaboration of legal regulations, we would do so in vain. Today the legal regulations run along two paths: Hungarians are those who 1. currently are (or have been) Hungarian citizens, or are the offspring of such persons, and/or 2. proclaim themselves to be of Hungarian nationality.

### *Parallels in Legal History*

Antecedents in our legal history exert an influence on our Diaspora policies. Certain elements of contemporary Diaspora politics are to be discovered when analysing our old laws. For example, *ius sanguinis*, citizenship based upon the principle of origin, has been unbroken since the first act on citizenship<sup>15</sup>, which cannot be lost even through emigration, since 1929. Consequently, a significant number of “latent” Hungarians are roaming around the world today. Although the question of registration has been raised on several occasions, we only possess estimated figures concerning the number of “potential Hungarian citizens” since measurement not been carried out so far.<sup>16</sup> It follows from the principle of *ius sanguinis* that multiple identity and multiple attachments were considered as undesirable in our citizenship acts, and a real development was only brought about in this respect by our most recent legal practice.<sup>17</sup>

The other element of historical heritage is that, outside the order of origin, granting citizenship was rather liberal on the basis of the rules of settlement attachment<sup>18</sup> and taciturn naturalization.<sup>19</sup> However, this flexible principle of gaining admittance into the local community was broken by the regulation of central administration and foreign policing, which was gradually introduced since the turning of the century<sup>20</sup>, which has, since that time, given equal treatment to all foreigners who are not Hungarian

citizens. That is how all the members of the Hungarian Diaspora became part of the faceless group of foreigners, in the case that they lost their Hungarian citizenship. Since 1921, those who neglected to opt for their Hungarian citizenship (to become Hungarian)<sup>21</sup> have been treated by Hungarian law as Pygmies or Maories, being subject to a foreign policing procedure which is becoming increasingly stricter.

That has by now led to a huge number of contradictions in the application of law and political debates. Diaspora politics and migration politics will not work if they run counter to each other.<sup>22</sup> For example, there have been no public debates about whether the immigration to Hungary of the Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary can be hindered – e.g. by foreign policing restrictions (entry, residence, labour) – with the intention of encouraging the stay of the Diaspora in the motherland. Why should the members of the Diaspora not have an independent status in Hungarian regulations?

### *Legal Rules on Diaspora*

The number of the legal regulations and other instruments of state administration<sup>23</sup> adopted since 1989 have grown enormously. The norms in force amount to approximately ten thousand. The first difficulty in examining them was to decide how to conduct a complete survey of the legal material in Hungary, selecting legal regulations applying to at least one group of the Diaspora.

As a result of the remarkable size of the material, concentrating on the narrower subject, we failed to take into account the universal human rights agreements that we had become a party to, prior to the period under examination, or which are applicable – in general terms – to the persons falling under the jurisdiction of the state (foreign citizens who happen to be staying in Hungary, including certain members of the Diaspora). We disregarded the decrees of the local governments since a part of them are available in manual records only; furthermore, we did not consider as separate those norms which amended or supplemented the legal regulations within the period under examination; and certain legal regulations had lost their validity in the meantime, thus their substantial analysis was not car-

ried out in every case, since the basis of analysis was the collection of the legal regulations in force as well as the *Official Gazette*.

Taking all that into consideration, altogether merely 150 legal sources deal – directly or indirectly, partly or wholly – with Diaspora policies and various members of the Diaspora. We considered them altogether – perhaps somewhat boldly – as “Diaspora law”.

The rules of “Diaspora law” analysed contentually may be classified in accordance with several viewpoints.

### 1. *The Origin of the Legal Norm*

1.1. Among the sources of international law, emphasis is to be given to:

1.1.1. The multilateral human rights and minority political proclamations<sup>24</sup> and agreements, the quick creation of which in the past years was inspired by the effort to establish “exemplary minority policies”.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, special mention is made of the provisions concerning the relationship between the mother country and the minorities, since they set the direction of interstate relations beyond the legal relationship between the minority and the territorial state, e.g. call for concluding bilateral agreements “specifically with the neighbouring countries in order to ensure the protection of the persons belonging to the national minority concerned.”<sup>26</sup>

1.1.2. The agreements placing bilateral interstate relations on new bases of the rule of law and foreign policy, representing a specific genre, since they determine principles in a dozen topics in the relationship between the two countries at least, and later on the creation of specific agreements as well. Among them, special importance is allocated to those countries in which there are significant-sized Hungarian minorities, with respect to whom enhanced importance was given to the inclusion of provisions in the agreements which protect minorities. All that is amply proven by the comparison of the so-called “basic agreements” signed with the Ukraine, Romania and Slovakia.<sup>27</sup>

1.1.3. Protocols determining the order of execution of the basic agreements represent an independent group.<sup>28</sup> The organizational framework and the actions to be taken have been defined in respect to the execution of the provisions included in the Romanian and Slovak basic treaties.

1.1.4. Although the number of bilateral agreements serving the protection of the rights of the Diaspora living as a minority and the preservation of its identity is not high<sup>29</sup>, it has an exemplary value from the point of view of organization and foreign politics. Their significance is enhanced by the fact that the basic agreements concluded with the states concerned also provide for the minorities and not just in general terms but by making separate mention of the Hungarian minorities (e.g., the protection of the identity of Hungarians living in Slovenia and Croatia, the prohibition of discrimination, the use of their mother tongue).<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the agreements protecting the minorities mentioned above possess further guarantees as well.

1.1.5. Several of the bilateral agreements do not have the direct aim of protecting the minorities but in an indirect manner they still support the maintenance of the relationship between the mother country and the members of the Diaspora living abroad, the preservation of their identity and the protection of their rights. Their common feature is that perhaps they would not have come into existence, or at least not with such intensity and by determining a wide co-operation, if there were no Hungarians living in the given state. As to their subject matter, they represent a high degree of diversity (on issues of economics, social policy, culture, education, border control, visa-free travel, multiple citizenship, labor, etc.) and their detailed introduction exceeds our present objective.

1.2. The other large group of norms is constituted by the domestic sources of law.

Compared to the international sources of law, the number of Hungarian legal regulations is more than double the amount, but their scope is half the amount at the most. In other words, the number of international agreements is approximately fifty, and the domestic regulations amount to about one hundred. At the same time, the scope of the volume of rules relating to the Diaspora “hidden” in them hardly amounts to half of the international norms. The division of the domestic sources of law was as follows, amply demonstrating the lawmaking and decision making bodies playing an overwhelming role in the formation of Diaspora policy. (N = 103)

LEGAL SOURCES	AMOUNT
Acts	29
Parliamentary resolutions	6
<i>Parliamentary total</i>	35
Governmental decrees	28
Governmental resolutions	33
<i>Government total</i>	61
Ministerial decrees	5
Ministerial orders	2

All that comes to light from that extremely rudimentary summary is that two thirds of the norms providing for the Diaspora in the legal order were born at the level of the government and its members, closed from social publicity, while but one third of them came into existence in the process following the debate of the most important organ of representation. From the point of view of the sources of law, there are few stable and high level legal regulations (acts), the number of decrees is higher by an order of magnitude of (33), while almost half the norms are constituted by the other legal instruments of state administration (resolutions and orders, totalling 41). That in itself indicates that there are quite a few resolutions dealing with the establishment of organizations, the division of administrative tasks, allocation of money, nomination, and protocol issues, while the number of competencies of the members of the Diaspora and those dealing with them directly – since it needs regulation primarily through acts or, perhaps, governmental decrees, – is rather low. To put it briefly, the direct regulation of the legal standing of those concerned does not constitute an integral part of Diaspora policy, but, instead, a major role is played by indirect, paternalist regulation, based upon the judgement of the authorities, having the character of state support.

The classification presented below indicates groups and organisations the legal regulations refer to, as well as those who apply the legal regulations. Although this may appear to be a formal approach, it still contains a great deal of information.

## *2. Who Are the Persons the Government Wishes to Reach and Support from the Geographical Point of View?*

- 2.1. Persons arriving in Hungary (for instance, to study here)
- 2.2. Persons living in the Carpathian Basin as a minority
- 2.3. Hungarians living anywhere else

## *3. Who are the Subjects to be Supported Legally?*

*(It may be connected to the geographical subjects referred to above)*

- 3.1. Persons of Hungarian or, perhaps, multiple citizenships.
- 3.2. Those subjects for whom possession of Hungarian citizenship (the purpose may be to state or clarify that) is uncertain
- 3.3. Foreigners (i.e. possessing no Hungarian citizenship)

## *4. Who Provides Assistance and Who Are the Subjects to be Supported?*

4.1. Non-governmental organizations whose activities are partially or wholly centered on assisting the Hungarians beyond the borders.<sup>31</sup> In other words, players of Diaspora politics may be associations, foundations, and public foundations, carrying out “activities related to the Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary” as non-profit organizations.

4.2. Taxpayers which are non-governmental organisations supporting Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary, allocating a certain part of their taxes to supporting organisations (finance from the central budget, associations or foundations).<sup>32</sup>

4.3. Public foundations established by the government with the aim of supporting the Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary.<sup>33</sup>

4.4. Organisations financed from the central budget (universities, hospitals, etc.) providing benefits, support.

4.5. Authorities (consulates, notaries, public administration offices, customs, etc.) applying the rules of the preferences resulting from the legal standing, using their discretion power.

## 5. *The Regulated Objects of Law*

For the man-in-the-street, the most important point of orientation is what the legal regulations are all about. It tells far more about the specificity of Diaspora politics. In accordance with the objects of law, the following differentiation may be made:

### 5.1. Issues of National Policy.

These issues are characterised primarily by their program-orientation, their contents setting objectives, therefore they may be considered to be of normative nature to a lesser extent. Examples are the provision of the Constitution<sup>34</sup> quoted above (Par. 6. Sec. (3)) or the parliamentary resolution stipulating the regulatory principles of regulation of the Constitution under preparation. The government has made efforts to increase the legal value of the provision included in the basic act since it has included it as a norm in the decrees on the tasks and competencies of the members of the government as well as the founding documents of the public foundations aimed at supporting the Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary. We learn from them that the term in the basic act mentioned above is “public tasks of the state” for the government. The parliamentary debate of the regulatory principles of the new Constitution, which has proved to be abortive in the meantime, has yielded political lessons too. Although some attention has been allocated to the political issues of the Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary, it was manifested in debates concerning other legal institutions and not in itself. The only consensus reached was that in the future the clause of responsibility and co-operation related to the Hungarians outside the borders of the country is to be retained in the Constitution – as the objective of the state in its foreign policy – and, in an unchanged manner, multiple citizenship is to be tolerated.

At this point mention must be made of the parliamentary resolution, also of political and only partial legal significance, passed in 1990, wording principles regarding “the situation of Hungarian national minorities living in the neighbouring countries”<sup>35</sup>, valid for the whole period under examination. Since the situation of minorities is aggravating, their legal claims are refused, and that jeopardises good neighbourly relations and democratization. Negotiations are to be started on bilateral minority agreements, the

protection of their rights and the conclusion of regional agreements. Parallel to that, domestic minority politics is to be modernized, their institutional rights are to be granted by the passing and enforcement of the appropriate laws. What are the principles to be followed jointly? The respect of human rights, the mother country should be enabled to conclude agreements to protect the rights of the national minorities, to guard the identity of minorities (wherever they live), to ensure their self-organization, cultural autonomy and use of language, the undisturbed relationship of the minorities and the mother country via agreements, as well as the satisfaction of the requirements of the minorities living here with the assistance of the Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries and the neighbouring countries themselves. All this, therefore, determines the policy of remaining on the motherland and the application of the law, from which it follows that there is no need to regulate the members of the Diaspora living and faring elsewhere, or only of secondary, supplementary character at the most.

5.2. Trends in foreign politics are determined by the legal regulations, other legal instruments of state administration, authorising the conclusion of intergovernmental and international agreements as well as providing for their execution. A special significance is attributed to the documents jointly determining causes of European integration, domestic and foreign minority protection and national politics. For they make reciprocity, and minority protection, the reward of exemplary nationality politics, the basic principles of foreign politics and national policy actions, and at the same time the precondition of political nature of accession to the EU.<sup>36</sup>

5.3. In norms regulating economic co-operation, support is also encountered. Without repeating the investment, tax, customs and other preferences figuring in the bilateral agreements, here references are made only to the unilateral measures. For instance, through encouragement of small businesses, joint ventures as well as the training of entrepreneurs<sup>37</sup> they intend to solve the economic problems of the communities of Hungarians living in the Diaspora outside the borders of Hungary.

5.4. There are several legal regulations providing for the education of Hungarian students (students speaking Hungarian), the in-service training of teachers, the founding of scholarships, participating in higher education in Hungary, moreover training beyond the borders.<sup>38</sup> A part of them pro-

vide for higher education training beyond the borders in case the conditions of launching a given subject are granted outside the premises of a domestic university, or college.<sup>39</sup> The overwhelming majority of scattered, also “hidden” rules provide for students belonging to the Diaspora, studying in Hungary. From the point of view of the rules of higher education, the members of the Diaspora are, generally speaking, foreigners, just like all the non-Hungarian citizens. Thus, in respect to their admission, legal standing and studies in the domestic higher education institutions, the provisions applicable to everyone as well as the rules created within the framework of institutional autonomy are to be applied, except if an international agreement or legal regulation provides differently. It is the Hungarian Scholarship Council Beyond the Borders that determines the size of the scholarship for Hungarian students coming from outside the borders. The social board of trustees of the Council, whose composition and operation is not discussed elsewhere either, makes recommendations regarding the size of the scholarship. The Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary receive not a scholarship but actually an additional scholarship, paid by the Márton Áron College instead of the given educational institution.<sup>40</sup>

5.5. There are a few provisions regarding cultural co-operation and services, in which those living in the Diaspora and their institutions are also included by the lawmaker. For instance, central services assisting the operation and development of the system of public libraries include helping the supply of libraries outside the borders. It is the budget of the ministry of culture which covers participation in this service.<sup>41</sup> The conveyance of cultural values is the objective of the Hungarian Television Foundation since its establishment in 1992.<sup>42</sup> Similar, though less concrete, public service tasks have been defined for the Hungarian Radio and the national news agency<sup>43</sup> too. It is “in harmony with its foreign policy objectives” that the government performs the activities of the Hungarian cultural institutions abroad, fostering the relationship between Hungary and the recipient country.

5.6. The list also contains the inclusion of members of the Diaspora in scientific research, PhD training, as well as enabling senior researchers to perform research in Hungary. The support of those activities is rendered primarily through the higher education institutions mentioned several times (Higher Education and Scientific Council), public foundations (such as Arany János Public Foundation<sup>44</sup>), moreover in accordance with the reg-

ulations of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and its modest size may be excluded from the expenditures defined in the Budget Act. These efforts are intended to reduce the exodus of Hungarian academics.

In respect to the three topics discussed above, we notice that Diaspora politics intends to embrace – at least partially – not only the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin. The Hungarian cultural institutions contribute to preserving the cultural identity of Hungarians living in faraway countries as well. The Kodolány János Institute participates in the education of the children of emigrants who, perhaps, do not speak Hungarian. At the same time, the meeting “Hungary 2000” intends to provide a framework for the government to offer emigrants an opportunity to participate in the building of a modern Hungary, e.g., by making use of their experiences.<sup>45</sup> All that, however, does not mean that Diaspora law and politics are not unequivocally focused on the Carpathian Basin.

The other remark in respect to preserving and disseminating culture in the wide sense as well as conveying values is that some domestic legal regulations reflect the effort of thinking in terms of the whole nation. For example, in the national basic curriculum – obviously, to eliminate the one-sidedness of the public education of the earlier decades – one of the requirements of Hungarian literature is to “include literature from beyond the borders as well.”<sup>46</sup>

5.7. The rules of the support of humanitarian nature are to be found in scattered provisions. They include health care and social security provided on the basis of social policy agreements unilaterally, the assistance rendered to rebuild buildings destroyed in wars as well as exemption from paying charges provided on the basis of equity. On the one hand, the norms relating to emergency health care apply to all the foreigners staying in Hungary, which is covered by the central budget. It is apparently independent of the specific legal standing of the Diaspora but since a significant part of health care offered free of charge in this way is resorted to by the members of the Diaspora via informal relations or public foundations, it may at least partially be qualified as part of Diaspora law.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, the humanitarian support of the Diaspora appears openly (e.g., for reconstruction of Hungarian settlements in Croatia).<sup>48</sup>

5.8. Finally, separate mention is to be made of the legal regulations concerning migration and issues related to it.<sup>49</sup> The starting point of the

overwhelming majority is that the members of the Diaspora are foreigners, just like any other foreigners. However, the lawmaker has provided the members of the Diaspora with a few rather virtual preferences, exemptions as it were, from the rules of the period under examination, that are becoming increasingly more strict. At the same time, it has been revealed by a number of analyses that the majority of administration related to foreigners is made up by the Hungarian entry, residence, immigration, and naturalisation of the members of the Diaspora. This “preferred mass phenomenon” may, in itself, be the source of tension in the application of the law<sup>50</sup>, which is enhanced by the organizational system not adjusted to the rigor of the law.

## *6. Rules Ensuring the Execution of Diaspora Politics*

6.1. Organizational norms, establishing the institutions implementing politics, moreover regulating their internal structure, operation. Here, mention must be made of the Office of the Hungarians beyond the Borders, the competent units of the ministries, the public foundations mentioned above, and the legal regulations pertaining to them, moreover the mixed commissions co-ordinating bilateral co-operation or most recently the short resolutions concerning the institutionalisation of the Hungarian-Hungarian summit.<sup>51</sup> The secretariat of the Prime Minister’s Office dealing with the Hungarians outside the borders was replaced by the Office in 1992. Its name is strange as well, since it has no competence of an authority whatsoever; it became a body of quasi-national competence in central public administration only to improve its budgetary and organisational situation. Its legal standing (it is controlled by the Government, supervised by the state secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, its president is appointed by the Prime Minister, it has no independent chapter in the budget, it only is a part of another chapter) reflects its hybrid character. That greatly hinders its operation in public administration; it is operated in a hierarchic, formalised system, while it has a very wide scope of tasks to perform.<sup>52</sup>

6.2. The norm distributing the tasks and scopes of authority among the existing government bodies is of organizational nature, but specific.

The rules of scope of authority help to some extent to find orientation as to which ministries participate in the manifestation of the Diaspora policy of the government, and how. At the beginning of the period under examination, that was concentrated exclusively in the hands of the Prime Minister's Office, and the scope of tasks of the central administrative bodies remained untouched at the level of the legal regulations and the other legal instruments of state control. A change in this respect was brought about by the establishment of the Government Office of Hungarians Living beyond the Borders, which has carried out co-ordination among the governmental, interministerial, as well as social and political organizations since 1992. It is the innovation of the actual government that it integrated the Office into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thereby imparting it an unequivocal foreign relation and foreign politics emphasis. A further change is that, with the exception of the defence minister, the legal regulations determining the tasks and scope of authority of all the members of the government were supplemented by the responsibility clause of the Constitution, which the minister in question is obliged to manifest while carrying out the tasks belonging to his/her competence, together with the provisions of the government programme – frequently, but not in the case of each minister.

6.3. An independent group, although of a changing character, is constituted by the provisions relating to protocol and personnel issues (e.g., who will attend dinners on behalf of the Government with the representatives of the Hungarian communities beyond the borders (and when), foundation of the Prize for the Diaspora<sup>53</sup>, which is handed on the 10<sup>th</sup> of December, on the Day of Human Rights).

6.4. An outstanding role is allocated to financial rules in granting different kinds of support and objective conditions in the execution of Diaspora politics. The debate and the result of the annual budget act and the act passed provide a diversity of political lessons. One of the most important conclusions is that on the basis of surveying the annual budget acts it is impossible to tell unequivocally how much money is spent from the centralised public resources on the direct support of the Diaspora and what the size of the related (administrative) costs is. It has basically two reasons: on one hand, the destination of the sum earmarked is uncertain, frequently it may only be guessed what are the purposes it really serves. The other reason is that the details of the expenditure items serving multiple purposes are included neither in the

budget act nor in the final summary, therefore it is difficult to estimate the actual proportions of expenditure. Having said that, what we can see is that in the period under examination there was a gradual increase in the number of the items of expenditure (purposes), while nominally the total expenditure related to the Diaspora grew.

## 7. *Direct or Indirect Rules*

7.1. A different kind of classification of the sources of law makes it clear that there is a rather small number of legal regulations whose title, scope of persons and objects clearly inform all the readers whether they contain provisions relating to the whole or certain groups of the Diaspora and administrative matters pertaining to them. These may be referred to as direct Diaspora legal regulations. Almost none of the legal regulations meet that requirement<sup>54</sup>, except in the case where the different use of words is allowed<sup>55</sup>, or the rather frequently used “secret codes”. An example of such a method is the reference to Par 6., Section (3) of the Constitution, which makes the regulation of the tasks and competencies of the ministers a public task of the state. It happens rather frequently that the provisions regulating Diaspora politics determine issues of organization, competence or finance instead of addressing the members of the Diaspora directly.

7.2. The overwhelming majority of the sources of law under examination are indirect rules. Partly because they are not directly addressed to the members of the Diaspora and partly because there is need for strong imagination and a thorough knowledge of the subject to realise that the intention of the lawmaker is to protect and to support the rights of the Diaspora. Who would expect to hit upon provisions concerning the Diaspora in acts on corporate taxes or dividend taxes or just in the ministerial decree on the Higher Education Scientific Council? It frequently happens that a given legal regulation encompasses in general terms all foreign students, sick or insured persons or applicants for residence permits, independently of some of those belonging to the Diaspora, at the same time the political intentions behind the application of the law or the legal regulation bring into contact with the legal standing of the members of the Diaspora, turning them into beneficiaries.

## 8. *Subjective Rights?*

8.1. The characteristic feature of Diaspora law, mentioned last but having a high degree of importance, is that at times we find provisions which would directly give the members of the Diaspora (its organization, representative) rights for some preferences, support, entry, and scholarship. Such examples include: naturalization, renaturalization, and the re-acquisition of Hungarian citizenship to those who lost it by being dismissed or deprivation, by way of a proclamation of citizenship, which has been granted free of charge since 1993.<sup>56</sup> Another part of the authorizing norms is the granting of exemptions from paying customs duty to those settling down in Hungary following at least two years of absence, as well as to immigrants.<sup>57</sup> Again another part of them refers to Hungarian taxpayers and public utility organizations spending their money directly on the Diaspora. Different rights of nomination are to be encountered on the part of Hungarian organizations beyond the borders, e.g. in boards of trustees active in the field of culture.

8.2. The majority of the legal regulations analysed do not regulate subjective rights of the members of Diaspora to act, they only authorise the government bodies, public institutions as well as public administration bodies to do so. It is from those provisions included in the statutes of state bodies, institutions and the founding documents of foundations, and institutions serving the distribution of money, from which we may draw conclusions in respect to some “indirect rights”. E.g., if an organisation decides upon bids, someone may apply for it, request assistance, or the authority may grant the permission without any member of the Diaspora being eligible to the related scholarship, entry, naturalisation, immigration permit or the compulsory copy of a publication.

## Conclusions

Constitutional law – in view of human rights exerting a significant impact on development of domestic law – and international law differentiate among a number of legal statuses. Thus they have traditionally applied the pair of citizen and foreigner; on the other hand, they have gradually

established the legal standing relating to national and ethnic minorities as well as that of refugees. They have a specific content (rights and obligations) and a diversity of overlapping differences compared to each other. A rank order is impossible to set up on the basis of one variable only since rights and obligations cannot be compared to each other; only rights can be related to other rights and obligations can be measured in respect to other obligations at best. Therefore, a rank order among the statuses is frequently set up on the basis of the magnitude of rights and stability of status. The question posed in the introduction, whether there is Diaspora law or not, worded differently, sounds like this: has an independent, specific legal standing or status been created for those belonging to the Diaspora or not?

The study proves that the answer is partially yes. On the one hand, the legal standing of the members of the Diaspora who are not Hungarian citizens is more favorable compared to other aliens both as individuals (e.g., among students studying here, persons applying for naturalization, waiting for immigration permits) and as communities too (the support rendered to different targeted groups, public foundations, NGOs assisting communities beyond the borders, also by providing benefits via a diversity of international agreements). On the other hand, it was in the interest of the Diaspora that certain rules were set up, applicable in a way, as worded, to “all foreigners” but actually primarily to the members of the Diaspora. As a result of all that, the existence of the Diaspora and the policies related to it, have exerted a strong influence on the lawmakers in the past ten years, but without forcing them to formulate an individual status for its members. That is manifested most clearly in the legal institution of the immigration permit. The overwhelming majority of the persons possessing immigration permits were foreign members of the Diaspora in the period under examination, and mainly in view of that did their status become significantly more favorable compared to all other foreigners (residence permit for an indefinite period of time, an unlimited possibility to leave the country and return, free employment, an active right to vote in the municipal elections, becoming individual entrepreneurs, joining public education, providing the legal standing of immigrant to the children born here, eligibility to social care and child protection services, exemption from customs duties). At the same time, surprisingly many legal relationships provide for the immigrants, therefore, in a somewhat simplified manner, it may be stated

that the immigrant status is the central, but not the only element of Diaspora law.

Diaspora status is “semi-finished”, fragmented because a part of their members are not Hungarian citizens. This dividing line of citizenship could not be crossed by the lawmaker in a meaningful manner. While in accordance with the Constitution the recognition of the claims of the national and ethnic minorities for selecting and preserving their specific identity, their being qualified as a factor constituting the state, their specific rights are built upon the status of citizenship, the Diaspora made up of Hungarian citizens, living abroad, also desiring to preserve their identity and culture, possess no specific rights (as individuals and as a group) because it received hardly any attention from the lawmaker. At the same time, as a result of handling “exemplary minority politics” as an axiom, law-making rigidly stuck to the precept of only persons possessing Hungarian citizenship being authorised to have minority rights: it excluded everyone living in Hungary as refugees, immigrants or other foreigners and those who perhaps, would like to join, as having the same identity, old minorities in Hungary, or have themselves recognized as a new minority.

The majority of legal sources are of a more political than normative nature from the point of view of the legal standing of the Diaspora, and their enforcement only depends on the Hungarian authorities if the given member of the Diaspora is staying in Hungary. In other cases, it is the authorities, in accordance with the citizenship and residence of the given member of the Diaspora, who are expected to enforce the provisions included in multilateral agreements, documents counting the undertaking of political obligations, as well as bilateral agreements. Following 1989, Hungarian diplomacy was highly active in the elaboration of such bi- and multilateral agreements, and since it had an unbroken faith in exemplary minority politics, attempting to set good examples to follow, it gave priority to the elaboration of the rules relating to domestic minorities in the face of formulating Diaspora law. In a few cases, the government wished to support the legal situation of the Diaspora by maintaining or terminating old agreements, “without causing any great stir.”

In spite of the fragmentary nature of the regulations, the legal rules could be classified in a number of ways. Most of them were combined by the fact that they belong to the scope of public law (constitutional law,

administrative law, financial law, international public law). Rules of private law are to be encountered as exceptions only, e.g., in relation to the establishment and operation of foundations and associations.

In the legal material concerning the Diaspora, the majority of the legal sources are decrees. There are few regulations by law appropriate for the question of status. Their further characteristic feature is that overwhelming weight is represented by other directive instruments of state administration. All this taken together demonstrates the exaggerated dominance of actual politics over (and instead of) related, stable regulation by law. Thus, we can speak about the policy of execution instead of regulation.

It would be difficult to draw dividing lines according to periods in the birth of the legal material. Far fewer legal sources (and other directing instruments of state administration) were passed in the first half of the period under examination. The lawmaking activity accelerated after 1994: approximately two-thirds of the norms analysed were established after 1994.

Objects of the regulation determining the legal standing of the Diaspora were not homogeneous at all. Far greater attention was paid to certain areas. Greater emphasis was laid on joining higher education, cultural life and mass communication, as well as on support of a humanitarian nature. On the other hand, the formation of international legal guarantees also received priority. The selectivity of the topics of regulation was coupled with concentration on that part of the Diaspora which lives in the Carpathian Basin, looking upon their members as a homogeneous, mass unity. All that together distorted the proportions of regulation.

In the legal material we could find hardly any subjective rights for members or communities of the Diaspora, because the overwhelming majority of the provisions granted the discretionary power to make decisions to the local authorities, public foundations operating as quasi-authorities, and institutions financed from the state budget. Those rules maintain the rather paternalistic mechanisms and policies for distributing money and building clientele. Strangely enough, the transparency of the state bodies providing assistance was created not by the state organizations, but by NGOs through the adoption of the act on non-profit sector.

While an enormous bulk of work was started with the intention of realizing the rule of law and European integration, the effort aimed at

autonomous, sovereign regulation, independent of international obligations, of the legal standing of the Diaspora turned out to be an extremely partial success. In that a significant role was played by political debates disregarded so far, the exclusion of social publicity and the lack of international patterns to follow; there are, at best, partial national patterns. These may not be followed mechanically. So there is nothing else to do but carry out the debates clarifying the issues – e.g., national solidarity, belonging, togetherness – and to create, in the manoeuvring room left open by international law, legal regulations which would reduce the disadvantages of the Diaspora. Such regulations would serve to enforce the equality of rights for the different groups of the Diaspora, even though the basis of the political consensus is the principle of faring and staying in the motherland. A part of the task is to recognize that a nation may find the path to the identity-formation and self-organisation of those living in a Diaspora with the help of the law – but not only with that – in manners which may recognize historical precedents. Given its merely partial character today, law would be able to accomplish more in order that we might be able to speak of a Diaspora law, built consciously, as a result of real legal development.

In summary, speaking about the legal regulations born between 1989-99 analysed in the study, we cannot say that a comprehensive, full-fledged development of the law has been carried out from the point of view of legal history; however, we may say that experiments have been conducted in respect to some legal relationships, and that the seeds of the Diaspora status have been created.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The research (1998-99) modelling Ukrainian-Russian-Hungarian minority politics (1989-1999) is being carried out with the support of the Open Society Foundation, Budapest.
- <sup>2</sup> Parliamentary resolution No. 119/1996 (XII.21.) on the plans to revise the constitution of the Hungarian Republic.
- <sup>3</sup> Governmental decree No. 90/1992. (V.29.) on the Office of the Hungarians Beyond the Borders.
- <sup>4</sup> Governmental decree No. 161/1998. (IX.30.) on the tasks and competences of the Minister of Cultural Heritage.

- <sup>5</sup> Governmental decree No. 147/1993. (X.26.) on the transitory rules of issuing and keeping records of identity cards.
- <sup>6</sup> Act LXVI of 1992 and Governmental decree No. 146/1993. (X.26.) on keeping records of personal data and residence addresses.
- <sup>7</sup> For instance, Parliamentary resolution No. 26/1999 (III.26.) on the tasks related to the establishment of the Hungarian Standing Conference.
- <sup>8</sup> In spite of the diversity of interpretations, there are common elements: a community, created by migration, possessing identical linguistic, cultural roots and identity, desiring to maintain it, institutionalized to a certain degree, fostering real or nostalgic relations with the fatherland where it wishes to return as part of the common identity.
- <sup>9</sup> There are views according to which people from Transylvania and Voivodina settling down in the mother country are also emigrants. Moreover those moving from Transylvania to Voivodina are also emigrants. Thus they may constitute a further subgroup of the Diaspora. (Conference of the European Protestant Free University, May 10-12, 1999.) Others believe that the concept of parts of the nation should be applied to those cases. (*Erdélyi Hívgató, Új Folyam*, 1998/1.)
- <sup>10</sup> Par. 2, Section (1) of the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic.
- <sup>11</sup> An example is the whole of the fragmentary, contradictory regulations relating to NGOs and the non-profit sector and, concretely, the vicissitudes of Act CLVI of 1997.
- <sup>12</sup> Par 6, Section (3) of the Constitution.
- <sup>13</sup> This is what happened, for example, to refugees following World War II. Since the international community wished to settle their legal standing, the UN agreement endorsed on July 28, 1951 actually defined the concept but failed to create procedural rules as to how to identify those proclaiming themselves to be refugees with what was included in the agreement. The deputies' wording discouraged states from joining the agreement.
- <sup>14</sup> Csepeli- and Sik, "Changing Content of Political Xenophobia in Hungary – Is the Growth of Xenophobia Inevitable?," in Fullerton, Sík, Toth (eds.), *Refugees and Migrants – Hungary at a Crossroads* (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences, 1995), pp. 121-128.
- <sup>15</sup> Act L of 1879, coming into force on January 8, 1880.
- <sup>16</sup> For instance, Dr. Iván Nagy suggested that it would be the task of the Hungarian Universal Minority Institute to "take the census of all the Hungarians living in diaspores all over the world. It would be important from the point of view of the protection of the minorities too, especially in the so-called successor states, but also from the point of view of drawing up the picture of the size and strength of the Hungarian nation as such. That, obviously, is but a secondary task from the scientific point of view but its practical realisation is still the primary interest of

Hungarians, the country to be rebuilt, the nation getting in stride with new forces.” *The Significance of National Statistics from the Point of View of the Protection of the Rights of Minorities*. Legal Library of Miskolc, No. 28, 1928, p. 26. For estimation and other related issues, see Mária Parragi “Dilemmas of Citizenship Law – with the Eyes of Law Practitioners,” in Sík and Tóth (eds.), *Aliens in Hungary* (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences, 1998), pp. 79-86.

<sup>17</sup> Although the third act on Hungarian citizenship (Act V of 1957) already tolerated multiple citizenship, it was excluded from the bilateral agreements concluded with the European states. Following 1990, Hungary revoked these agreements in order to respect multiple identity and citizenship.

<sup>18</sup> Act VI of 1868 and Act XXII of 1886.

<sup>19</sup> In opposition to the institution of *indigenatus solemnis*, granting citizenship providing full political membership, including nobility, the aliens moving into the country could gain citizenship following ten years of dwelling here, paying taxes, leading a lifestyle not objectionable on moral bases, having adjusted to the life of the local settlement. (Ferenc Faluhelyi, *Hungary's Public Law I-II*. (Pécs: 1926))

<sup>20</sup> For example, Acts V and VI of 1903. (For more details, see Ferenc Ferenczy, *Hungarian Citizenship Law* (Gyoma: 1928); Gejza Ferdinandy, *Hungary's Public Law* (Budapest: 1902))

<sup>21</sup> Act XXXIII of 1921 on the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, with special regard to its Title VII, and prime ministerial decree of 1921 No. 7200 on the enactment of the Peace Treaty of Trianon.

<sup>22</sup> Pál Tamás, “Seven Theses on the Potentials of the Reinterpretation of Our Identity Politics and Citizenship,” in: *Aliens in Hungary*, pp. 87-90; Judit Tóth, “Mosaics on the Domestic Regulation of Migration. (An Analysis of the Citizenship Law and Alien Law),” *Magyar Jog*, April 1994, pp. 213-222.

<sup>23</sup> Act XI of 1987 determines the types, sources of the legal regulations (Constitution, act, Government decree, decree of the members of the Government, local government decree, international agreement) and the other directing instruments of state administration (parliamentary resolution, governmental resolution, ministerial instruction, measure taken by the National Bank, legal guidelines).

<sup>24</sup> Specifically, the C.S.C.E. documents, Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Helsinki Final Act, figuring in the preamble of all the basic agreements irrespectively whether there is at least one Hungarian living in the given state.

<sup>25</sup> Specifically, the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe (published in Act XL of 1999, confirmed by Parliamentary resolution No. 35/1995. (IV.7.)) as well as the Framework Agreement on the

- Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe (published in Act XXXIV of 1999)).
- <sup>26</sup> Article 18 of the Framework Agreement on the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe (1995).
- <sup>27</sup> They were published in Act XLV of 1995, Act XLIV of 1997 and Act XLIII of 1997.
- <sup>28</sup> Official Gazette 1998/10. Publication of an international agreement on the establishment of co-operation and active partnership mixed commission between the Government of the Hungarian Republic and the Government of Romania, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Official Gazette 1999/2. Publication of the minister of Foreign Affairs on the establishment of a mechanism serving the promotion of the execution of an agreement on good neighbourly relations and friendly co-operation.
- <sup>29</sup> Agreement on the protection of the rights of minorities with Croatia (published in Act XVI of 1997), agreement on granting special rights to the Slovenian national minorities living in the Republic of Hungary and of the Hungarian national minority living in Slovenia (published in Act VI of 1996).
- <sup>30</sup> Friendship and co-operation agreement with Slovenia (published in Act XLVI of 1995), Article 18, and with Croatia (published in Act XLVII of 1995), Article 17.
- <sup>31</sup> Act CLI of 1997 on non-profit organisations, Appendix Par 2, c.13.
- <sup>32</sup> Par 4 of Act CXXXVI of 1996 on personal income tax, Par 29/A of Act LXXXI of 1996 on corporate and dividend tax.
- <sup>33</sup> Amended resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1068/1990. (IX.15.) on the establishment of foundations serving minority politics objectives (Illyés Foundation), Governmental resolution No. 1057/1992. (X.9.) on Hungarian Television Foundation, Governmental resolution No. 1021/1995 (III.8.) amended several times, on Handshake/New Handshake Foundation, on Arany János Public Foundation (Official Gazette No. 1997/104), Governmental resolution No. 1162/1998. (XII.17.) on Apáczai Public Foundation for Hungarian Education beyond the Borders, the founding document of the Illyés Public Foundation (Official Gazette No. 1999/23.), Governmental resolution on the amendment of the founding documents of minority public foundations.
- <sup>34</sup> Parliamentary resolution No. 119/1996. (XII.21.) on the principles of regulation of the Constitution, Appendix III/7, V/4.
- <sup>35</sup> Parliamentary resolution No. 46/1996. (V.24.)
- <sup>36</sup> For instance, Parliamentary resolution No. 94/1998. (XII.29.), 11. on the basic principles of the security and defence politics of the Republic of Hungary.
- <sup>37</sup> The New Handshake Public Foundation set as its aim the economic co-operation between the regions along the border populated by Hungarians and Hungary (Governmental resolution No. 1021/1995. (III.8.) Appendix, 4.)

- <sup>38</sup> For example, Act LXXX of 1993 on higher education, Para 11/A. on training beyond the borders, moreover Governmental resolution No. 192/1997 (IX.4.), Decree of the Minister of Education No. 30/1998 (VI.25.), Decree of the Minister of Education No. 21/1998 (V.13.).
- <sup>39</sup> Act LXXX of 1993 on higher education (Para 11/A.).
- <sup>40</sup> Governmental decree No. 192/1997. (XI.14.) Para 2, Para 3, Section (1), Para 11. Decree of the Minister of Education No. 30/1998. (VI.25.) Para 1, Section (1), Para 2, Section (3), Para 8.
- <sup>41</sup> Act CXL of 1997 on the protection of cultural assets, museums, the supply of public libraries and public education (Para 60, Section (1), Para 71.).
- <sup>42</sup> Governmental resolution No. 1057/1992. (X.9.) (Statute, 3.).
- <sup>43</sup> Act I. of 1996 on radio and television broadcasting (Para 56.), Act CXXXVII of 1996 on national news agencies (Para 2, Section (1)).
- <sup>44</sup> Founding Document 3.1. (Official Gazette No. 1997/104).
- <sup>45</sup> Governmental resolution No. 2327/1996. (XI.28.)
- <sup>46</sup> Governmental decree No. 130/1995. (X.26.) on the publication of the national grammar school's curriculum.
- <sup>47</sup> In accordance with Governmental decree No. 154/1998. (IX.30.) Para 2, Section (1), the Minister is to carry out the activities relating to the Hungarians beyond the borders as defined in the Constitution Para 6, Section (3) and the government programme, as part of the tasks of the Ministry, in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President of the Government Office of Hungarians Living beyond the Borders.
- <sup>48</sup> Governmental resolution No. 1027/1999. (III.3.)
- <sup>49</sup> Act LXXXVI of 1993 on the entry of aliens, their stay in Hungary and immigration, Governmental decree No. 64/1994. (IV.30.) on the execution of the Act, Decree of the Minister of Interior No. 9/1994. (IV.30.) on the execution of Governmental decree No. 64/1994. (IV.30.), Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian citizenship.
- <sup>50</sup> Judit Tóth, "Desirable Immigrants? (On the Act on Citizenship and Foreign Policing)," in Sík and Tóth (eds.), *Are They Coming? Going? Staying?* (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences, 1994), pp. 98-110; Péter Pál Tóth, "Is There But One Homeland?," *Püski*, 1997.
- <sup>51</sup> Parliamentary resolution No. 26/1999. (III.26.) on the tasks related to the establishment of the Hungarian Permanent Conference.
- <sup>52</sup> In the sense of Governmental decree No. 90/1992. (V.29.) Par 5: keeping contacts (with the Diaspora, the authorities of the territorial state), co-ordination (with the government bodies to execute the policy of the government), analysis (on the situation of the Hungarian minority, international processes) participation in the formation of foreign politics, presenting opinions (when legal regulations, agree-

ments are prepared), definition of financing and support priorities, assisting the operation of minority mixed commissions.

- <sup>53</sup> Governmental decree No. 183/1997. (X.17.) on the foundation of the Award for the Renown of the Hungarians, Governmental decree No. 1109/1997 (X.17.) on the rules related to the Award for the Renown of the Hungarians.
- <sup>54</sup> Except for, e.g. the decree on the Office of Hungarians beyond the Borders, the Governmental decree No. 1162/1998 (XII.17.) on the establishment of the Apáczai Public Foundation for Teaching Hungarian beyond the Borders, Governmental decree No. 2327/1996 (XI.28.) on the possibilities of the participation of Hungarians living abroad in the modernisation of the country, which undertook the objectives of the regulation in their titles and all of their activities.
- <sup>55</sup> E.g. Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1068/1990 (IV.12.) on the establishment of foundations serving the objectives of minority politics.
- <sup>56</sup> The amended Act XCIII of 1990 on charges (Appendix II/4).
- <sup>57</sup> Act C of 1995 on customs law and customs procedure law (Para 1, 28., Para 113, a.).

FERENC EILER

## The Experiences of Four Years of Operation of the National German, Slovak, and Croatian Minority Self-Governments

*ABSTRACT: Minority Self-Governments have been operating in Hungary since 1995. In this article the author reviews the work of the assemblies, committees, executives, and administrators of the German, Slovak, and Croatian self-government bodies. The past four years have been trying, given that the communities had little previous experience with self-governance. However, with experience having been gained, the groups are now more likely to move beyond mere minority interest-defense activities and into active community organization and governance.*

After a long period of preparations and negotiations, on July 7, 1993, the Hungarian Parliament, with a 96 % majority, passed the law – as harmonized with international legal decrees – concerning the rights of national and ethnic minorities. The declared goal of the law was to secure “all those rights which persons belonging to minorities have as Hungarian citizens, and further not only the human rights of these communities, but those political rights which will advance the preservation of national or ethnic self-identity,”<sup>1</sup> based on the principles of self-governance, subsidiarity and decentralization, through the establishment of a unique mixture of personal, local and functional autonomy.

One of the most important guarantees of cultural autonomy found in Law LXXVII of 1993 is the decreed goal of the establishment and effective operation of minority self-governments through democratic procedures.<sup>2</sup> In the spirit of this goal, the first minority self-governments were founded in two stages, based on the results of minority elections taking place alongside local elections on December 11, 1994, and of the November 19, 1995 minority elections.<sup>3</sup> The law made it possible for minority self-governments to convene a meeting of the electorate to establish a national local government, and of the 13 domestically recognized ethnic groups in Hungary, 11 established such national bodies in 1995.

This study examines the operation of the national German, Slovak, and Croatian self-governments from 1995 to 1998.<sup>4</sup> As the problems of the Roma minority have points of emphasis differing from those of the above-mentioned groups – who are the most populous minorities, following the Roma minority – we did not include the National Roma Minority Self-Government in the group of studied self-governments.

### *The Organs of the National Self-Governments*<sup>5</sup>

#### The Assembly

The number of members of the Assembly is set by the minority law and allows for a maximum of 53 persons.<sup>6</sup> Of the three largest minorities, the Germans and Slovaks delegated 53 each, while the Croats delegated 50 representatives to their national self-government assemblies. The vast majority of delegates in all three assemblies are intellectuals. The ratio of those with only secondary-level education is considerably lower, while the ratio of those who work in physical labor is nominal. The gender distribution favors men, with the ratio of women in the assemblies falling between 30 and 45 percent.

Based on the organizational and operational regulations, all three assemblies convene four times per year, but when necessary – and there were examples of this in all three self-governments – they may hold singular meetings. The members of the assemblies have their transportation costs to assembly meetings covered, and the Slovak self-government pays members an honorarium to compensate for time lost at the workplace.

## The Committees

In order to ensure the effective execution of self-government responsibilities and to secure legality, the assemblies establish committees. The committee structure for delimiting given areas differs across the studied self-governments. While the Germans set up five committees (legal and procedural, economic, education, culture, oversight and control committees),<sup>7</sup> the Slovaks set up six (legal and procedural, economic, education and youth, culture and religion, finance and oversight, public communication and publishing), and the Croats established eight (procedural, economic, education, public culture, sport and youth, finance and oversight, international relations, media and publishing, social policy and religious affairs).

The main criteria for membership is expertise, and for this reason there are some committee members (almost all of whom have a college or university education) who are not members of the assembly. Travel costs for committee members are reimbursed (again, in the case of the Slovak self-government, there is an honorarium paid to committee members).

It is the case for all three self-governments that there are significant differences in quality across the activities of the committees. There are some committees which work in an exceptionally effective way, but in all three self-governments there are those committees whose operations leave much to be desired (there was even a case where the same committees were unable to reach decisions numerous times).<sup>8</sup>

## The Presidency

When working out organizational and operational regulations, only the German and Slovak representatives decided to establish the institution of the presidency. The president and the presidents of the committees automatically become presidency members in both self-governments. Where for the German self-government committee presidency automatically brings designation as vice-president, the Slovak assembly elects three vice-presidents separately, who also become members of the presidency. Further, the Slovak deputy-president and the German delegates from the county self-government associations become members of their respective presidencies.<sup>9</sup>

The Slovak presidency generally meets every other month, while the German presidency convenes ten times per year. When necessary, both presidencies hold singular meetings. The Croatian self-government has no formal presidency, but the president, the two vice-presidents, and the presidents of the committees meet before every assembly meeting to prepare for the meetings. This functions as a kind of consulting body, which can present recommendations to the committees, but which does not have any extraordinary powers.<sup>10</sup> The Slovak and Croatian president (and the Slovak deputy-president) receive salaries as established by the self-governments, whereas the president of the German self-government has some of his/her costs reimbursed. While the members of the German and Croatian presidencies have cost reimbursement, the members of the Slovak presidency receive honoraria.

### The Office of the National Self-Government

All three assemblies established offices to handle the official business and administration of the self-governments' activities. These are the executive organs of the national self-governments. The offices are headed by an office director (managing director, managing secretary), who chooses staff through a tender system, and who is, in effect, an employee of the president. In the interest of effectiveness, the work of the offices operates based on an executive officer system. This system, because of the differing ways of classifying areas of activity, is structured differently by the three self-governments. The structure of the German office is a direct reflection of the structure of the committees of the national self-government. The Slovak self-government office has three specialists: they are officers for cultural affairs, educational affairs, and communication. The Croatian office has three officers as well. Two of them cover the territories of seven committees, while the third officer is responsible for following the education scene. Further, they have a chief accountant and a financial official. Besides the officers, the offices naturally employ a secretary as well. The German national minority self-government operates regional offices as well, which are subsidiaries of the central office.<sup>11</sup> In most of these offices there is one full-time employee or two part-time employees.

When selecting employees, the main considerations of all the self-governments are expertise and the ability to speak the language well. Belonging

to the minority is an advantage, but not a requirement. The salaries of the employees of the three national self-governments vary, but no one has left their job because of inadequate pay. Over the past four years the offices have been rather stable. In the Croatian and Slovakian offices, the same staff has been handling self-government affairs for four years now, while in the German office the managing director and two employees left (one of whom later returned).

### *The Financial Conditions of Operations*

Chapter VIII. of the law on minorities legally guarantees the state's role in financing the minority self-government system. The law describes two means of financing: organization-funding and activity- or function-funding. The first is meant to establish the operation requirements for the self-governments, while the second allows for the organizations and self-governments to gain state funding for activities through a tender system.<sup>12</sup>

The law on minorities granted startup capital to the national self-governments in the form of MOL (Hungarian Oil Company) shares, which for the three self-governments of this study meant 30 million HUF each.<sup>13</sup> All three national self-governments circulate their startup capital, though a portion of the Croatian shares were sold on the stock exchange, and the received sum was used to buy the 222 m<sup>2</sup> office (which was formerly rented) for the Association of Hungarian Croats on Nagymező St. in Budapest.<sup>14</sup> The law had a provision for providing the self-governments with maximum 300 m<sup>2</sup> of usable space to allow for adequate operation (which could not ensue without office space).<sup>15</sup> Since the time the law was passed, the issue of headquarters has been settled, and the three self-government offices run in their respective spaces.<sup>16</sup>

The central budget designates an annually determined sum for the operation of the national self-governments.<sup>17</sup> Since 1997 the annual operations budgets have been put under a separate title in the budget law. According to the distribution of the budget support for the 11 national minority self-governments, the German body received 22% of the total support (this rate was 20 % in 1995), while the Slovaks and Croats received 10% each.<sup>18</sup> Budget support, however, covers more or less only

operation costs. This position of the leaders of the self-governments was confirmed by the report of the State Audit Office in 1997.<sup>19</sup>

Support for various programs and events can be gained by the self-government and associations through submitting proposals to the state-established Public Foundation for Hungarian National and Ethnic Minorities.<sup>20</sup> The same goal is served by the tender system of the Ministry of Culture and Education. Beyond state support, the self-governments have the right to establish foundations to serve the more effective financing of the minority. The German and Croatian national self-governments made use of this opportunity. The organization called “German Culture in Hungary” is already operational, while “Hungarian Croats for the Third Millennium” is expected to begin its activities in the near future.<sup>21</sup>

Section 56 of Chapter VIII of the minority law makes it possible for the minorities to receive funding from foreign organizations, foundations, and individuals. In this way it has become possible for the mother country, or organizations from the mother country, to take on a role in the work of preserving and strengthening the identity of their respective minorities in Hungary. The level of support arriving from the mother country significantly differs across the three minorities of this study and – should we consider Hungarian support a given – this seriously effects the circumstances and opportunities of the ability of the minority to function.

The German minority receives the most serious support from abroad. The mother country has a thought-out concept regarding the support of German minorities living in democratic states in East-Central Europe. Germany’s economic strength makes it possible for such support to arrive in the form of serious financial aid. Through a Bundestag decree, Germany supports Hungarian Germans with 2-2.5 million DM per year.<sup>22</sup> A significant part of this sum is not given directly to the minority. The German state spends large amounts on modernizing and expanding Hungarian institutions, and equipping hospitals. But the German state does not provide money to anyone in Hungary without the approval of the German self-government. Money is most often given in those regions which are frequented by the German minority to institutions which have local responsibilities and which cannot be privatized.

Support from the German state is directed through the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Ministry of the Interior

offers support mostly for purchasing equipment and building infrastructure, while the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which has a lower aid budget, offers support for culture (retraining teachers, textbooks, teaching aids, the Szekszárd German Theater, the Lenau-house in Pécs). Germany has offered support for equipping the offices of all the national self-governments and for the salaries of the regional offices – albeit at a lower rate every year. The national self-government purchased a villa on Lendvay street (in Budapest) with German state funds, and Germany will cover the costs of renovation and furnishing.<sup>23</sup> Beyond this, large amounts have been spent on the 100-120 clubs and the equipping of daytime homes for the elderly. Beside the German federal state and states, various German foundations support the German minority in Hungary. Of these, the most significant include the Donauschwabische Kulturstiftung and the Hermann-Niermann-Stiftung.<sup>24</sup>

The national Slovak minority self-government did not have a balanced relationship with Slovak state organs from the start. It took some time for them to reach a point where the offices of the mother country – which at the beginning wanted to maintain relations only with civic organizations – considered the self-governments as partners. At the governmental level, they have relations with the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Culture and Education. Hungarian Slovak organizations receive fiscal aid more rarely – aid from the mother country usually comes in the form of goods.<sup>25</sup> However, serious aid was turned to equipping and developing the infrastructure of the national self-government headquarters.

The Cross-Border Slovaks' House, the Slovak National Culture Center, Matica Slovenska, and other foundations sometimes support the Slovak minority. They send books and offer spaces and reduced-rate accommodations for participants in conferences, reading camps, and training sessions. First and foremost they support culture, with education being less important.

Of the three self-governments, the Croatian counts on the least support from the mother country. This is only partially due to the stormy political life of the country's first few years, and is attributable more to the fact that the country – despite its good relations with Hungary – has not come to realize the meaning of its minorities living outside its borders in neighboring countries.<sup>26</sup> The self-government has a flexible relationship with the Ministry of

Culture and Education and with Matica Hrvatska, and is regularly invited to various events in Croatia. Last year there was a Hungarian-Croatians' Week organized in Zagreb. Material aid is not really provided by Croatia – to this point the self-government has received a computer and various visiting delegations have received books.

### *Relations with Local Minority Self-Governments*

A necessary condition for the successful operation of the minority self-governments is a problem-free relationship between the local and national levels. This to a large degree depends on the flow of information between the levels.

Local minority self-governments can be informed of the activities of the national minority self-governments through the reports of delegated representatives, the reports of minority press, newsletters, and personal meetings at provincial sessions. While this in theory means everyone should be informed, local-level complaints concerning the lack of information are somewhat common. The offices of the national self-governments could make up for this problem if every assembly member lived up to his/her responsibility to inform the self-government he/she represents.

Regarding the activities and problems of the local self-governments, the leaders of the national self-governments feel that they are adequately informed.<sup>27</sup> The Slovak and Croatian local minority self-governments do not report on their activities to the central body. Should one of them do so, it is based on self-initiative. The provincial meetings and system of personal contacts allow for them to have more-or-less fresh information concerning problems. By the end of the first cycle, the national German self-government, parallel to building and consolidating a county level, had achieved a system where most of the minority self-governments reported their information. The local minority self-governments report to the counties. The county level attaches the local reports to the reports of their own activities.

Should problems arise between the local minority self-government and the municipal government, the leaders of the national self-government travel to the scene and try to solve the problem. There is rarely need for this, and when it does occur, resolution is usually achieved.

For the minority self-governments to operate effectively, the representatives working at the local level must have at least minimal knowledge of the models, rights, and responsibilities of self-governments. For many – given that this is a completely new activity for them – there is a need to master much more hands-on information: e.g., how to write an official letter or how to write a proposal. This is a real problem for all three self-governments. The Croatian national self-government holds 2-3 forums per year, to which they invite self-government representatives, mayors, and even notaries. These are not really training sessions, but they do allow for discussion of relevant issues. The Slovak self-government organizes one training (and information) session per year in the mother country and 1-2 per year in chosen regions. These are not strictly ‘professional’ training sessions either, although the participating self-government members do receive information on interpreting laws. The Germans have achieved the most in this field, who – thanks to support from the mother country – have conducted live-in courses (most recently in Baja) on state law, party law, education policy, ethics, and behavioral norms, for representatives working in and elected to minority self-governments.

### *Areas Deemed Important for the Maintenance of Identity*

#### Education

Minority education has an important role in the survival of minorities and in the strengthening of their self-awareness and independence. This is well-known by the self-governments, and they have either already worked out their education strategies, or will have them completed in the near future.<sup>28</sup> It is extremely important that the state cooperate with the national minority self-governments in working out the guiding principles of education. All three self-governments have delegated experts to the appropriate agency in order that the minorities themselves may participate in working out educational reform. As a result, the minimum requirements of schools are now available. According to these requirements, given school types must include minority studies in their curricula.<sup>29</sup> The curricula are designed by the schools themselves. The Slovak self-government included

sample curricula in the minority newspaper in order to assist effected teachers and schools. The national self-governments feel it is necessary to practice control over various educational institutions. Theoretically this is possible, but given that the legal status of these kinds of schools is unclear, and that the issue of financing them has still not been settled, not one of the national self-governments has taken the first steps in this direction.<sup>30</sup>

The municipal governments themselves cannot give foreign scholarships to their young constituents, but they can participate in running higher-education study programs managed by the mother country. While the Croatian self-government only participates in preparatory stages, the Germans have the right to help judge candidates. The Slovak self-government chooses candidates itself. According to general experience, there have to this point not been enough candidates, or the qualifications of the candidates have not met desired standards. The highest number of scholarships are available for ethnic German youth, as for them, not only the state, but private foundations run competitions for scholarships as well. To a limited degree, the German and Slovak self-governments support trips – reading camps, cultural events – for elementary and secondary school students, to the mother country.

### Associations

All three minorities have local and national civic associations. The national self-governments do not contribute directly to their operation, but through tender programs they can support events and projects. While the German self-government – with the exception of a modest sum<sup>31</sup> – plays only the role of mediator between supporters from Germany and the associations, the Slovak and Croatian self-governments announce tender programs for the sums they designate from their state support sums.<sup>32</sup> The Slovaks consider the support of local organizations one of their primary goals, while the Croatians favor the financial support of events which are at least regional in character (i.e., above the local level). In some cases the German and Slovak associations can receive support from their respective national self-governments to appear abroad. Alliances which have continued to operate since the establishment of the local governments have had

a significant role in the organization of Slovakian and Croatian cultural life and in supporting cultural organizations.

Only the German national self-government has declared as a goal, and taken steps toward, the national-level integration of tradition-preservation. As a result of its initiative, the umbrella organization for 374 tradition-preservation and cultural groups, the Hungarian German Vocal, Musical, and Dance Groups Council, was established in 1996. Its role is to work out the development strategy and ensuing programs for Hungarian German vocal, musical, and dance culture, and to secure the conditions for the execution of the programs.<sup>33</sup>

### Church Relations

Paragraph 11 of the minority law states that “members of minorities have the right to attend religious services in their own language.” The question of the language of the service (mass) is influenced by several factors: it depends on the flexibility of church leaders and local ministers, on whether the church has any ministers who speak the language at hand, and on local needs. Although all three minorities have associations which deal with questions of faith, it can be said that this process is still in its infancy.

On the part of the state, municipal governments, at the end of the last cycle, made attempts to begin an official dialogue, but the first meetings will likely need to be followed by other similar meetings.<sup>34</sup> The attempts at cooperation were naturally paralleled by similar attempts by the minority governments. The national Slovak self-government and the Lutheran church, for example, established relations with one another in the interest of establishing the financial framework for the work of a Slovak-speaking ‘wandering minister’.<sup>35</sup> The Croatian self-government’s social policy and religious affairs committee has held three national conferences for the priests, catechism teachers, and school leaders of Croatian communities. The leader of the committee deemed the meetings successful, and feels that progress has been made. However, there is a certain reservation on the part of the churches. A possible reason for this may be the fear of losing some church independence.<sup>36</sup>

## Youth Organizations

Youth organizations function completely independently of the national self-governments.<sup>37</sup> They do not receive money from the self-governments, and are not obliged to report to them. Their operations are supported by the human rights committee of Parliament, and they independently raise funds for their programs. Although there is no close cooperation between any of the national self-governments and minority organizations, the representatives of the young are invited to self-government events. The German and Slovak youth organizations learn of self-government activities first-hand, as some of their leaders are concurrently members of the assembly.

## Media

All three national minority self-governments are aware that “regarding the self-identity of minorities, it is of primary importance that they be represented in public media through well-produced, quality programs of adequate length. Beyond this, it is also of primary importance for the minorities that the majority society be aware of their lives and their existence as minorities.”<sup>38</sup> The minority law mandates that public television and radio play programs in the languages of all three minorities.<sup>39</sup> In the past few years, programming changes in Hungarian Television and Hungarian Radio have led to broadcast times of minority programs which result in unnaturally low audiences. The issue was examined by the Ombudsman, and his recommendations were heard and accepted by the appropriate agencies.<sup>40</sup>

All three self-governments have employees who are responsible for media relations. According to their experiences, relationships with newspaper journalists are acceptable – although they could no doubt be improved. The attention of the media (newspapers, public and commercial television and radio) – given its very nature – is unfortunately subject to fluctuations. Regarding the official papers of the minorities, they are dependent on their national self-governments, and their finances are ensured by the Hungarian National and Ethnic Minority Public-Purpose Foundation.<sup>41</sup> The German self-government established its official paper, the German Self-Government Bulletin, which is an occasional publication, as it is planned to be printed four times per year.

## *The “Political Network”*

### Relationships with State Organs

According to paragraph 38, line 1, part a) of the minority law, the national self-government may provide opinions representing its constituents regarding draft laws. This is supplemented by paragraphs 27-31 of Law XI. of 1987, according to which the organs drafting legal regulations are obliged to consult with those thus empowered – in this case the national self-governments – in the process of preparing the law. In the previous four years the experiences of the three self-governments all show that relations in this regard with ministries and county and city assemblies were not without their problems. On many occasions the plans which were in their sphere of competence were handed over late, sometimes just a couple of days before return deadlines. Of course one cannot generalize, as there are serious differences in the practices of various organs. In this regard the weakest link in the chain is that of the counties. The relationship with the National and Ethnic Minority Office (NEKH) was often deemed as good by the leaders of the self-governments, with the added comment that after years of feeling one another out, it would now be a good idea to deepen cooperation.

### Relations with the Other National Minority Self-Governments

There is no institutionalized relationship among the different national self-governments. The minority roundtable no longer functions, and in its current form and situation the Minority Forum does not appear to be capable of harmonizing the activities of minority self-governments. All the national self-governments support some form of cooperation in their declarations, but given their own problems and their divergent interests, thinking together has been impossible to this point. Currently cooperation consists of sitting at one table when negotiating with the government, or inviting one another to larger events. The Minority Forum is undoubtedly a form of cooperation – all three assemblies have pledged their moral support – but this is really an independent election alliance, whose members join as individuals based on personal decisions, and in this way they are independent of the national self-governments.

## The Minority Law

The most positive aspect of the law, according to the self-governments, is the fact that it exists at all. They feel it is a good framework which makes clear the relation-system of the minorities, and which creates the opportunity for the minorities to organize themselves and strengthen their self-awareness. It is necessary, however, to harmonize the minority law with other laws. Another deficiency they sense is that the financial background is not adjusted to the theoretical declarations. Further, the minority law's sections on financing are only general in their nature. They can serve as guiding principles, but in the absence of their detailed description, they cannot provide full orientation.<sup>42</sup>

There is, in many cases, no guarantee for executing the opportunities described in the law, and the issue of sanctioning violations of the law is unsolved.<sup>43</sup> The institution of the ombudsman is deemed extremely important by all, but as the opinions of the Parliamentary commissioner on the rights of national and ethnic minorities serve only as recommendations, it sometimes occurs that the legally-supported positions often never come to the attention of those who break the law. The development of the county level is also an important issue whose resolution in the near future is necessary, as is the issue of minority representation in Parliament.

## Parliamentary Representation and Self-Government Elections

“The neglect of the unconstitutional conduct of Parliament, whereby it has not drafted the law concerning the Parliamentary representation of national and ethnic minorities, despite the decision of the Constitutional Court [35/1992. (VI. 10.)], and despite its own position as described in the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities [§ 20. (1)]” still stands.<sup>44</sup> The effected national minority self-governments feel that the earliest resolution of the issue is necessary. Although preliminary negotiations were conducted previous to the 1998 Parliamentary elections, the lack of political will meant that the electoral law was not modified. It must be added that the leaders of the minorities themselves lack a unified position on judging the criteria for gaining representation in Parliament.<sup>45</sup> The differences in opinion between leaders of small and large minorities regarding the

Parliamentary threshold are obvious. The unresolved nature of the problem led all three national self-governments of this study to support in principle the Minority Forum, which was registered at the last minute. It could probably have been anticipated that the Forum would not be able to send even one representative to Parliament, but its activities were meant to draw attention, and in this sense they certainly succeeded.<sup>46</sup>

Regarding elections to self-governments, a basic and contested issue is the granting of the franchise to certain groups. Currently most are of the position that, in accordance with current practice, any Hungarian citizen should be able to express his/her support by voting. Of course this can lead to the awkward situation whereby a local minority self-government with support from the majority can be established without the social support of the minority. As registering is not possible and is not supported by most minorities, this practice remained in place for the 1998 self-government elections. In the case of all three minorities an increase in the number of local minority self-governments took place, which may indicate that the self-government system is viable and beginning to consolidate itself in Hungary.<sup>47</sup>

### *After Four Years*

The leaders of the German, Slovak, and Croatian national minority governments interpret the first four years as being taken up by getting to know the new situation and making use of the opportunities established by the self-government system as defined by law. They went down an untrod-den path, but they all feel that the experiences of the first four years show that their self-governments – should conditions remain the same – will be able to operate more effectively than in the past. There are experts available for various areas of specialization, and they now have adequate experience. The main responsibility of national self-government is no longer thought to be interest defense, but, through the strengthening of political activity, a coordinating and informing role in the lives of their minority constituents.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Preamble to Law LXXVII of 1993 of the rights of national and ethnic minorities. In *Kisebbségi kódex* (Budapest: 1995), p. 14.
- <sup>2</sup> The statistical indicators regarding minorities in Hungary are found in: *Az 1990. évi népszámlálás. Nemzetiség, anyanyelv, I-II. kötet* (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1993). On the statistical analysis of the living conditions of minorities see *A nemzetiségek életkörülményei* (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1995).
- <sup>3</sup> On the number of established local minority self-governments, see *Beszámoló a Magyar Köztársaságban élő nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek helyzetéről* (J/3670), 4. Függelék, 1997 január.
- <sup>4</sup> Earlier, the three exclusively minority-interest groups we included in the study were the Association of Hungarian Germans, the Association of Hungarian Slovaks (earlier the Democratic Association) and the Association of Hungarian Croats (before 1991 the South-Slav Association). The German association dissolved itself, while the other two operate to this day.
- <sup>5</sup> See "A Magyarországi Németek Országos Önkormányzatának Alapszabálya," *Német Önkormányzati Közlöny*, 1997., 1. pp. 4-14. The organizational and operational regulations of the Slovak and Croatian self-government can be found in the document collections of the respective self-government offices.
- <sup>6</sup> Law on National and Ethnic Minorities. §63. paragraph 3.
- <sup>7</sup> The oversight committee reports the results of its investigations directly to the assembly.
- <sup>8</sup> Based on conversations regarding the German self-government with Lőrinc Kerner and Albert Koncsek, the cultural committee seemed to be outstanding. In: *Akadémiai Kisebbségkutató Műhely (AKM) Hangtár (HT)*, cassette 1.; Ételka Riba and Gyula Alt considered the efforts of the education committee of the Slovak self-government to be noteworthy. In AKM HT 4.; Richárd Pezenhofer and István Karagity also pointed out the outstanding work of the Croatian educational committee. In AKM HT 6.
- <sup>9</sup> The ten county association and Budapest delegate on representative each to the presidency.
- <sup>10</sup> AKM HT 6.
- <sup>11</sup> The German national self-government has 11 regional offices. *A magyarországi németek* (Informational publication) (Budapest: 1998), p. 44.
- <sup>12</sup> The selection and establishment of minority self-governments in Hungary. Expert panel. Stuttgart, 1995. p. 7.
- <sup>13</sup> Law on National and Ethnic Minorities. §63. paragraph 4.
- <sup>14</sup> AKM HT 6.

- <sup>15</sup> Law on National and Ethnic Minorities. §59. paragraph 2.
- <sup>16</sup> The headquarters are not considered the property of the national self-governments. As long as the self-governments operate, they have the right to use them, but should operations cease, the properties must be returned to the owner.
- <sup>17</sup> The financing of the operations of the national self-governments is independent of financing for local minority self-governments. On the financing system see "A kisebbségi feladatok költségvetési finanszírozásának rendszere," in *Beszámoló a Magyar Köztársaságban élő nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek helyzetéről*.
- <sup>18</sup> This sum for the German body was 56.1 million HUF in 1996, 63.2 million in 1997, and 81.8 million in 1998. For the Slovak body the sum was 27 million HUF in 1996, 32 million in 1997, and 42 million in 1998. With the exception of 1998, the Croatian body received the same amount as the Slovaks. In 1998 they received 300,000 HUF less. See *A Magyar Köztársaság vonatkozó évi költségvetései*. CD-rom legal database.
- <sup>19</sup> Állami Számvevőszék, *Összefoglaló értékelés, következtetések, javaslatok*, V-1008/1997, Tsz. 371.4.
- <sup>20</sup> *A Magyarországi Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbségekért Közalapítvány 1996. évi támogatásai* (Budapest: 1997); *Magyarországi Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbségekért Közalapítvány 1997. évi támogatásai* (Budapest: 1998).
- <sup>21</sup> "Founding Document of the "Német Kultúra Magyarországon" Foundation," *Német Önkormányzati Közlöny*, 1997.2. pp. 21-31.
- <sup>22</sup> AKM HT 1.
- <sup>23</sup> According to plans, the building will be the center for Hungarian Germans. The official German minority newspaper and library will move here. It is possible that the GJU, the Hungarian German youth organization, currently housed in Pécs, will move its office to this new location.
- <sup>24</sup> The Hermann-Niermann-Stiftung, for example, has provided hundreds of thousands of DM to construct the loft of the Sopron Lutheran Lyceum (rooms, assembly hall).
- <sup>25</sup> The Slovak Cultural Center in Békéscsaba and the Slovak House in Bánk have received significant material support from the mother country. AKM HT 4.
- <sup>26</sup> AKM HT 6.
- <sup>27</sup> In 1996 the national Slovak self-government conducted a survey to map out the concrete steps and needs of the settlements. The results were published in 1997 in *A magyarországi szlovák nemzeti kisebbség helyzete* (Budapest: 1997), pp. 69-98. The national German self-government tried to measure the relationship between local minority self-governments and municipal governments in 1995-96 through the use of a questionnaire survey. See *Vérhältnis zwischen ungarndeutschen Minderheitenselbstverwaltungen und der örtlichen Selbstverwaltung 1995-96*. The sum-

- mary of the results is available in the document collection of the German self-government office.
- <sup>28</sup> Stipan Blazetin (ed.), "Irányelvek és követelmények a magyarországi horvát oktatási rendszerben," *Hrvatski Glasnik*, 1998.; *Pre ucastnikov pracovneho stretnutia slovenskych organizacii a CSS, konane v Bekesskej Cabe* (Békéscsaba: 1997). The document can be found in the Slovak self-government's collection.
- <sup>29</sup> "Nemzeti alaptanterv, tantervi alapelvek (Melléklet a 31/1994. Kormányrendelethez)," in *Kisebbségi kódex* (Budapest: 1995), pp. 211-212.
- <sup>30</sup> The German self-government did not take over educational institutions either. The Hungarian German Education Center in Baja is operated as a public-purpose foundation. The city of Baja and the assembly of Bács-Kiskun county are, along with the German national self-government, members of the board, and contribute funds for the operation of the Center. AKM HT 2.
- <sup>31</sup> The cultural committee receives 500,000 Forint per year from the self-government with which it may support associations.
- <sup>32</sup> The national Croatian self-government designates 2 million Forint per year for this purpose. AKM HT 6.
- <sup>33</sup> On the structure and programs of the Council, see *A magyarországi németek. Információs lap* (Budapest: 1998), pp. 27-32.
- <sup>34</sup> AKM HT 5.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup> AKM HT 6.
- <sup>37</sup> The youth organizations operate through provincial centers. The German center is in Pécs, the Slovak is in Békéscsaba, and the Croatian is in Szombathely.
- <sup>38</sup> *Report on the Activities of the Parliamentary Committee on National and Ethnic Rights. J/4048*. (Budapest: 1997), p. 48.
- <sup>39</sup> See *Beszámoló a Magyar Köz társaságban élő nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek helyzetéről*. Sections on Croats, Germans, and Slovaks.
- <sup>40</sup> *Report on the Activities of the Parliamentary Committee on National and Ethnic Rights* (Budapest: 1997), pp. 47-50.
- <sup>41</sup> The official German paper is *Neue Zeitung*, and it receives support from the self-government. The official Slovak paper is *Ludove Noviny*, while the Croatian paper is *Hrvatski Glasnik*. On the support of the papers, see the 1996 and 1997 annual support of the Public-Purpose Foundation for Hungarian National and Ethnic Minorities.
- <sup>42</sup> For this reason section 64, paragraph 5 of the law calls for the drafting of governmental decrees regarding fiscal issues.
- <sup>43</sup> An outstanding example of this is the case of the Lucfalva school. The commission of the school principle, who was delegated by the village's municipal government with the support of the Slovak minority government, was later revoked

by the municipal government. Regardless of the protests of the minority self-government which were based on its right to veto, the assembly did not change its decision. AKM HT 5.

<sup>44</sup> *Report on the Activities of the Parliamentary Committee on National and Ethnic Rights* (Budapest: 1997), pp. 95-97.

<sup>45</sup> The leaders of minorities with low populations are for the most part of the opinion that the just solution involves sending one representative from each minority to Parliament. The leaders of more populous minorities are not opposed to setting a – naturally preferential – threshold in the election law regarding gaining a seat in Parliament.

<sup>46</sup> Opinions on the activity of the Forum split the members of assemblies. Some considered it a necessary move, while others feel the entire project did too much damage.

<sup>47</sup> The number of local self-government initiatives is 267 for Germans, 77 for Slovaks, and 75 for Croatians.

GUSZTÁV MOLNÁR

## The Vanishing of In-Between Europe

*ABSTRACT: Over the last few years a number of fundamentally important events have taken place which – given the extent to which they were not unexpected, to which we could prepare for them – make it possible for us to give clear and unambiguous answers to the questions arising from the radical changes in the Central European geopolitical situation. The processes of empire-building and institutional collapse have played roles in determining the chances of success for the countries of the region. The author traces these processes back to explain how the meanings of modernization and Westernization have been interpreted in Central and South-East Europe. The following of the Western model is a terribly long and painful process, which is full of breaks and attempts to restart. This must always be taken into consideration when we are trying to understand the current situation of Eastern Europe.*

The comparative approach to the development of Hungary and its neighbors, or, if you like, to their European development, has reached a turning point. Not in the sense that the traditional and necessarily biased national viewpoint must be given up for a wider-horizon regional approach – one which acknowledges the state and national components of the region, and sees their European development as a complex, yet unified process.

Such a turning point had taken place among Hungarian researchers of ‘European development’ at the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s. Here I am thinking foremost of István Hajnal’s study of 1942 on the ‘development-research’ on small nations or ‘peripheral nations’<sup>1</sup>, or of Domokos Kosáry and Kálmán Benda’s ‘Carpathian Europe’ study in the one-time Teleki Institute.<sup>2</sup> Jenő Szűcs and Domokos Kosáry’s studies of the 1980s may be seen as organic continuations of the above.<sup>3</sup>

Writing in the early 1990s and following the steps of Oscar Halecki<sup>4</sup> and Jenő Szűcs, and combining their ‘historical-cultural’ East-Central Europe term with the core-periphery model, Piotr S. Wandycz describes the history of the ‘re-appeared Central-East Europe’ (i.e., the Visegrád countries) after the 1989 collapse of the Soviet block. The Polish Yale historian is, however, uncertain about the anticipated results of the Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovakian “post-communist transitional period, which can be seen as the biggest test in their histories.” “Will they try to succeed individually, or will regional cooperation give meaning to the term Central-East Europe? Will they take their old places, or will they fight for a new place in Europe, possibly in a united Europe? Only the future will provide an answer, but certainly the past may be the main compass.”<sup>5</sup>

Ignác Romsics – summarizing the experiences of the first half of the 1990s – is even more skeptical than his Polish colleague. “The peoples of Central- and Eastern Europe have proven themselves incapable of developing honest relations and effective cooperation over the last four-five years, i.e., they are in a vacuum, lacking the dominance of a great power...” Further, given that European integration and the entire future of the European Union is ‘questionable’, Romsics feels that “the power vacuum will be filled by geopolitically predestined continental powers.” Central- and East-Europe’s peoples have lost the spirit of opposition to such a large degree – he writes – that they not only “simply tolerate being ‘conquered’, they are actually quite happy about it.”<sup>6</sup>

### *Geopolitical Turning Point*

Over the last few years a number of fundamentally important events have taken place which – given the extent to which they were not unexpected, to which we could prepare for them – make it possible for us to give clear and unambiguous answers to the questions arising from the radical changes in our geopolitical situation. We can claim that the selective expansion of Western integrative organs – and not the 1989-90 collapse of the Soviet block and communism – is the true historical turning point. This is so from two points of view – one positive and one negative. The positive dimension of the change – which holds true for just some countries – is the

strengthening of Western integration. The negative dimension – which holds for the other countries – refers to the frustration and lack of success in accepting the Western model.

Together, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, as full members of the North Atlantic alliance system, became permanent members of the West – in a geopolitical sense – in the spring of 1999. It is worth noting the circumstance whereby this took place. It was an historical moment where the West was ending its ‘futile experiments’ and was instead trying to ‘politically unify’ the Western ‘sphere of culture’ on the civilizational level.<sup>7</sup> As any effective policy, or I might even say any policy at all, is possible only within well-defined borders, it is rather fortunate that we find ourselves newly within the West at a time when its borders are literally becoming political. Istvan Hajnal, the one-time researcher at the Teleki Institute, felt that Hungary, or Carpathian-Europe, was unambiguously Occidental in the historical sense. But at the time, the West – which was in geopolitical suspended animation – was at a great distance not only from us, but from all the peoples of the ‘peripheral belt’. And after 1945, as a response to the Russian challenge, it awoke, and distanced itself even further.

From our present point of view, it has become clear that geopolitical borders are also geo-economic. This means that with the introduction of a common currency, the European Union is moving from its period of pre-history to an historic one, and only some of the states of Central- and Eastern Europe will become full members as such. Besides the three new members of the North Atlantic alliance, the likely candidates are Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia<sup>8</sup>, and the Baltic states. (*Figure 1.*)

As such, I have outlined the negative dimension. For many countries the entire attempt at modernization, or, more precisely, ‘Westernization’, is becoming a failure, or is becoming impossible to complete. The democratization which followed the collapse of communism has, for these countries, become the visible cause of the weakening of the economic capacity and political stability. A unique situation has come to exist, whereby integration into Western geopolitical and geo-economic structures, which could potentially halt or turn around this entropic process, has become impossible. This is so because the viability of the West is precisely dependent on keeping a clear distance from the belt of destabilization and chaos. It is noteworthy that the Romanian philosopher H.-R. Patapievici said “the




Figure 1. *Europe in 2010* (Molnár, 1998)

situation in which Romanians now find themselves, ought to keep them awake at night.”<sup>9</sup> This quote is from the summer of 1997!

To summarize the above, the historical-typological meaning of the geopolitical turn which matured over the last decade is synonymous with the vanishing of In-Between Europe or East-Central Europe. Europe has been divided into two regions – West and East – since the appearance of Latin Occidentalism.<sup>10</sup> This does not mean that there were two equally ranked geopolitical units or two self-developing sociological models. Jenő Szűcs speaks of an ‘incomplete’ Eastern Europe which came to exist north of the Black Sea (South-East Europe is consciously left out, but without a proper explanation). This region was made ‘complete’ by expanding to the Pacific at the same time Occidental Europe expanded across the Atlantic.<sup>11</sup> This approach is not justified in topological nor in typological terms.

First, the nomadic wedge driven through the Ural gates to the steppes of the Eastern and Southern Carpathians and the Hungarian plains, as well as the spread of Catholicism through the Eastern Carpathians and the line of the Vistula, blocked the development of a uni-



Figure 2. *The Unified West and Divided Eastern Europe in 1000*

(source: Colin Mc Evedy, *The New Penguin Atlas of Medieval History*, 55.)

fied, single-capital civilizational and geographical Eastern Europe or ‘Greek-Eastern Europe’.<sup>12</sup> (Figure 2.) Second, from the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Orthodox center (Russia) and the elites of South-Eastern Europe – who were under Turkish authority but who kept their own unique political identities (e.g., Romania) – began to turn more and more to the West, acknowledging its civilizational lead.

By more and more vehemently imitating Western forms in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, so-called divided countries came to exist, as opposed to new Western countries. Huntington writes: “The dominant culture of divided countries would have them put into a defined civilization, but their leaders want them put into another... Those politicians who out of arrogance think they can transform the cultures of their societies are doomed to fail. While they introduce numerous elements of Western culture, they are incapable of continuously drowning out or eliminating significant elements of the original culture. At the same time, if the Western virus penetrates another society, it is very hard to get rid of. The virus does not spread,




Figure 3. *Types of States in 15<sup>th</sup> Century Europe (Molnár, 1998)*

and it is not fatal. The patient survives, but will never be healthy again. Political leaders are able to make history, but they cannot escape from it. They establish divided countries, and do not establish Western societies. They infect their countries with cultural schizophrenia, which becomes a continuous and defining characteristic.”<sup>13</sup>

### *Empire-Building and Institutional Collapse in the Outer Belt of the West*

Two countries of key importance in the so-called outer belt of the Occident, Hungary and Poland, had to struggle with this virus. A glance at the maps of Figures 3 and 4 – which were planned based on the work of the Norwegian Stein Rokkan – shows how right István Hajnal was when he claimed that outer societies of the Occident were characterized by “dreadfully strong expansion,” interchanged with “sinking into insignificance.”<sup>14</sup>

At the end of the 11<sup>th</sup> century the Kingdom of Hungary become an empire in the Western sense. (‘Hungary’ had somewhat of an antecedent,

given that in the 9<sup>th</sup> century the nomad state which spread from the Szeret to the Dniester, as a part of the Kazar Empire, took over the latter's structure.<sup>15</sup>) When St. László spread the area of rule of the Hungarian crown, the Croatian state retained its legal status within the Kingdom of Hungary. Within the framework of the Middle Ages Occident, this was exactly what empire meant: an often merely transcendently valued (but quite real in its effects) superior state, within which one or more publicly and legally attributed legal units, or loyal states, operated.<sup>16</sup>

In the first half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, when the geopolitical situation was defined by the powerful spread of the Catholic West compared to that of Orthodoxy (whose pinnacle was the establishment of the Latin Empire in Constantinople), the imperial character of the Kingdom of Hungary became more emphasized in the south and in the north-east, with the conquering of Bosnia and Halics (later Galicia) respectively, and with the establishment of the Bánság and Hercegség south of the Sava and Danube. But nothing illustrates the efforts of the Kingdom of Hungary to fill the geopolitical vacuum caused by the (temporary) collapse of the Byzantine Empire more convincingly than the fact that the Hungarian kings added "King of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Kumania" to their title. The Tatar invasion put a stop to these efforts at expansion for some time, but these were restarted in the following century by the kings of the Anjou dynasty and by Mátyás.

This unique imperial-styled tradition was so strong that when the western part of Hungary and later – after the Turkish occupation – the rest of the Kingdom of Hungary came under Hapsburg rule, Hungary's 'integration' took place through the consideration of the unique legal situations of the countries of the Holy Crown, i.e., Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania. The latter, though it remained an independent principality, became a part of the Hapsburg Empire indirectly, through remaining under the Hungarian Crown.

Another noteworthy instance of Hungarian empire building could first be seen in the 1830s, and was an idea which was often discussed by the representatives of the independent Hungarian government after March of 1848. According to the idea, the responsibilities of Austria, which was disintegrating and was joining Germany, ought to have been given to Hungary, which had "grown under the rule of the Hapsburg dynasty" and which would be the "inheritor of the middle-ages Hungarian empire." This was




Figure 4. *Types of States Europe, 1815 (Molnár, 1998)*

according to Lajos Kossuth, as written in a letter to Foreign Minister Ferenc Pulszky on June 7, 1848.<sup>17</sup> Given the political situation abroad, this was not entirely unrealistic.

English agent J.A. Blackwell was the first to put this idea into a coherent form.<sup>18</sup> In his study, which appeared in the London *Athenaeum* in 1837 (*Acts of the Hungarian Diet of 1832-36*), he emphasized that the reform national assemblies took the annexation of former territories of the Hungarian Crown to be of the highest order of the so-called preferential offenses. Blackwell writes, “The reforms, which no doubt will soon be executed, along with those which have already been executed, will turn the country of Hungary into the seed of an empire, which will spread north-south from the Carpathians to the Balkan mountains, east-west from the border of the Czech lands and Bavaria and the coast of the Adriatic to Bessarabia and the Black Sea.”

In his letter of March 28, 1848 to England’s ambassador in Vienna, Posonby (but which was to be forwarded to Palmerston), Blackwell concretely outlines “how it would be possible to establish the [now independent

Hungarian] kingdom in a way which best serves English interests.” Starting from the premise that the “Austrian Empire has collapsed” and further that “in a few months Italy will be a unified kingdom, and Germany will be a unified empire,” Blackwell logically gathered that “the Austrian-Italian states will be annexed by the former, and the so-called hereditary states will be annexed by the latter.” It was ‘obvious’ that a unified Italy and a unified Germany were favorable in terms of British interests, given that Great Britain would no longer need to fear “Europe’s two aggressor powers, France and Russia.” At the same time it was true that a unified Germany would become “a much more fearsome power than it is at present,” and that the Germans “might become a more dangerous competitor than the French.” The English observer thought that Hungary, and the new imperial structure which could be organized around it, would alone be capable of serving the unification of Germany and of keeping Germany at bay.

Blackwell thought that Germany could be kept away from the Adriatic and the Balkans only by establishing a “grand Danubian state”, a triple monarchy, under Hungarian hegemony. The Kingdom of Hungary would consist of Hungary and Transylvania, the Illyrian Kingdom would consist of Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Istria, Krajina, Karinthia, Croatia, and Slavonia, and the Dacia Kingdom would consist of Walachia, Moldva, and Bessarabia.<sup>19</sup> Blackwell marked the borders of this ‘Danubian Empire’ or ‘federal state’ on a map which unfortunately is not to be found among the documents in the archives of the Academy, but which was familiar to the members of the 1848 Hungarian government. (*Figure 5.*) Bertalan Szemere, for example, in a letter dated May 24, 1848, asked László Szalay, delegate to Frankfurt, to look for Blackwell in London. Blackwell had old plans, in which the Slavic provinces would not melt into one state, but instead “each would be a federal province, with separate languages, separate tongues of local administration, but somewhat connected to us. He has a map of this. He can show it to you.”<sup>20</sup>

Given that Blackwell’s imperial plans for “Hungary’s great future surpasses even the most fantastical Hungarian variations,” Hungarian historians, who, with the exception of Jenő Horváth are under the spell of positive Hungarian ‘facts’, never took Blackwell seriously. This approach is unjustified. Not only because – as stated by István Hajnal – “it is impossible to doubt Blackwell’s personal seriousness,”<sup>21</sup> but also because in the




Figure 5. Balckwell's Concept of the Danubian Hungarian Empire (Molnár, 1998)

given historical situation the concept of a Hungarian-centered Danubian empire was a quite rational hypothesis. We would likely not be mistaken to think that Kossuth's later idea for a Danubian Confederation was based on this imperial construct. This of course would not have made an 1848 triple monarchy or federal state any more realistic or likely, but it should lead Hungarian historians to state that the drafting of a Hungary with imperial dimensions did take place in the modern age.

What is interesting and characteristic for us is that in the reform age, the modern concept of nation building began in parallel with empire building, and expansion ran aground just like more successful earlier efforts had. In my opinion this too is related to the destruction which comes with executing Western models (in this case that of the French-style nation). The histories which took place in the outer belt, it appears, are characterized mostly by the duality of imperial expansion and disintegration.

Based on the above, the reason for Hungary and Poland's inclusion in Rokkan's paradigm system as *border-empires* and later as land peripheries, becomes understandable.<sup>22</sup> Poland, which had grown massively in the

16-17<sup>th</sup> centuries, not only ceased to be a border-empire at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but at times disappeared from the map. The imperial periods of Austria and Prussia followed, but they did not fare much better: Prussia ceased to exist, while Austria became a modest and insignificant little state. Hungary's history shows three examples of disintegration following empire building (the first and second halves of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century and beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, and 1848-1918), being an example of a central position within the outer belt and being pushed to the periphery.

What is the reason for the instability of the outer belt, and within this, that of the Hungarian state structure? With the acceptance of Western forms, the goal – be it the 11<sup>th</sup>, or the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, or 1848 – was the construction of an effective governing organ, but this, in the first, decisive phase of model-copying, brought with it ‘other things’, according to István Hajnal.<sup>23</sup> It was this ‘other’ that carried the most significance, in both positive and negative ways. The Western ‘deep-structures’ which became commonplace were actually formative elements which actually led to the destruction of the desired governing structure.

I see regularity here. I would state it in the following way: *in the process of adapting Western institutional forms, the receiving countries regularly experience institutional collapse and the collapse of central authority.*

Nicolae Iorga, the Romanian historian and nationalist ideologist, is right when he writes “neither the Hungarians, the Czechs, nor the Poles can claim to have a complete national life... Here everything came too suddenly, or inorganically and catastrophically, as opposed to Western kingdoms whose inner structures developed organically, slowly, and naturally over time. In the West the monarchy was not a response to social conditions which did not exist in the past, like in the East, where monarchy was not a result of local historical development. Here the monarchy establishes everything, not according to inner legal traditions, but according to external effects.”<sup>24</sup> This was truly the case. According to recent research the Hungarian king Béla III, who reigned in the last decades of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, had an annual income equal to 23 tons of silver, while that of the French king was 17 tons, and that of the English king was 9 tons. The other side of the coin is that “while the income of the Hungarian king was practically the same as that of his country, in the case of Western rulers, income, which

came mostly from collected taxes, was just a fraction of the country's income. Therefore, here the king was the economy, and there the country was the economy!"<sup>25</sup>

This example illustrates the unique fact that in following the Western model, adapting the institution embodying the main authority (the monarchy) generally resulted in stable and powerful structures, while the integration of elements which secured society's inner dynamism and were thus essentially more 'democratic' generally led to disorder and the inability of institutions to operate. Anonymous, the author of the *Gesta Hungarorum*, which was written around 1200, came back to Hungary from the Parisian university convinced that "the king must share his power with his lords, and must establish a decentralized constitutional order."<sup>26</sup> When this 'democratic' principle was expressed in the forcibly obtained Aranybulla (1222) and its later numerous revisions (1231, 1267), the result was not the ordered sharing of power between the king, the lords serving in the court (the so-called *szerviens*), and the barons. Instead of the 'democratization' of power, authority went through a kind of 'wild privatization' where the private authority of the barons increased greatly in opposition to the public authority as represented by the king. The barons, as written in the Rogerius canon, which described the horrors of the Tatar invasion, in practice divided the country among themselves (*per pares diviserant*). "The beneficiaries of the process were the oligarchs, who established their own independent states in the territories which were removed from the supervision of the king's authority," writes the Romanian historian Serban Papcoatea, analyzing the reasons for the disintegration of the Kingdom of Hungary at the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>27</sup>

Rebuilding after the complete institutional collapse that resulted from the dying out of the kings of the House of Árpád (1301) was undertaken during the Hungarian rule of the Anjou kings, who were more organically connected to the West than the Árpáds, and who were of French origin, but could be considered the second national ruling family. Great development resulted from grand institutional, economic, and financial reforms. Data originating from the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century indicates that – not counting the provinces beyond the country's borders – there was a population of close to three million people in more than 21 thousand settlements, more than five-hundred city-type settlements, and 49 contemporary cities. The

country's foreign policy playing field was considerably increased and the flowering of foreign trade was assisted by the economic and dynastic cooperation which was established between Hungary, the Czech lands, and Poland in 1335 at the Visegrád Congress by the Hungarian king Róbert Károly.<sup>28</sup> Finally, with the development of city counties which operated under the local self-governing bodies of the orders and lords, a unique innovative basis for the entire institutional structure was established, and the conditions for Western-style autonomous social development, which was free of direct model adaptation, were established.

All this, however, could not stop the new institutional collapse of the 15-16<sup>th</sup> centuries and the transition from oligarchic 'democracy' to 'national' catastrophe (1526). The Western model continued to not only build, but, by its very nature, to destroy.

The third institutional and economic-financial infusion to arrive from the West was represented for Hungary by the Habsburg House. This made possible the survival of institutions through the 150-year Turkish occupation, and then the two hundred years of continuous development and expansion. The Western-style autonomous social development which began in the Anjou period was completed, and as a result, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the 'imagined' nation (i.e., it was thought of as such all over Europe), based on Hungary's centuries-old tradition of 'feudal' democracy, was able to execute its own revolution and achieve representative democracy on its own, from its own resources.<sup>29</sup> And this created the conditions for yet another institutional collapse, leading to a (now literal) national catastrophe.

Hungary of 1848 was not a unified state in administrative or legal terms. The county system had not been executed across the entire country, which thus included several Middle Ages, and several Habsburg-established curious administrative territories. The real problem was caused by the fact that the area of rule of the Holy Crown, which was the symbol of Hungarian statehood and the legal basis of the special status within the Habsburg Empire, spread across three countries (Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania), i.e., it spread over a separate Hungarian empire. Within the borders of historic Hungary, which covered the entire sphere of control of the crown, there was an effort to establish a Magyar nation based on the centralized French model, which would cover all citizens. At the same time,

or in some cases with a lapse of a few decades, there began the natural independence-seeking national movements of the Croatians, Serbs, Romanians, and Slovaks began, which all followed the Western model, but which resulted in the division of the country into small pieces. The fact that the collapse was late (in the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) because of the importance of the Hapsburg monarchy in Europe – or from a different point of view, was early because of the breakout of the First World War – is merely trivial. Sooner or later it surely would have happened.

This was the third – and last – instance when institutional collapse occurred as an inescapable side effect of the progress of Western social development. The effects of the institutional *tabula rasa*, which came from the taking of power by the communists in 1948, were especially damaging and caused the country to fall back for decades, but they could not take root within institution-establishment and within the deep structure of society-building. Thus, after the collapse of communism, the country simply returned to its own political and legal traditions – which formed the outer belt of the Western model.

This 'return' represents a newer – and permanent – period in following Western models, which, as a result, is leading Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and some other countries to becoming institutionalized parts of the West. What is important is that the long historical process of integration may be completed without an institutional collapse. If Hungary and Poland's historical catastrophes were caused by the 'overzealous' adaptation of Western freedoms in environments which lacked the necessary social background, or by the effect of the disintegration of traditional power relations, today it is precisely the stability of democratic political institutions and operational economies which make possible privatization in market conditions. And it is the unambiguous existence of a civil society in the 'outer belt' of the West, i.e., the full acceptance of 'Western-ness' as an inner principle of organization, which makes possible the successful completion of integration processes. As a result the states leaving In-Between Europe, which have helplessly suffered the consequences of external effects for the last centuries, will enter the new, post-national periods of their histories as active participants in the West's institutional revolution. As a result of the closing of the thousand-year period of following Western models, these countries will experience the end of

their national-based histories, and begin a new historical adventure, taking on a new historical role – one which they filled once in the Middle Ages, under entirely different circumstances and in a different form.

### *Following the Western Model in Orthodox Eastern Europe*

Western model adaptation in the areas of political and legal institutions in the past and present is entirely different in those countries which began this dangerous process late, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The anti-Western elites of the orthodox countries were, and continue to be, convinced that problems began exclusively with the adoption of Western forms, and that before, when political and legal forms were based on their traditional civilizational values, all was good and well. The local adaptations of Byzantine ruling forms and legal principles, first and foremost unlimited – *authentēs, samoderzhavniy* – main authority, as well as the nomadic methods of taxation<sup>30</sup> undoubtedly made possible the development of the small states of South-Eastern Europe and the Moscow-based Grand Duchy. In the latter case this led to the rise of the Russian empire, but statehood, and generally political institutions and social structures in contact with the main authority, were unstable and insecure in the East-European region.

A few examples serve to illustrate the situation. The situation of the Bulgarian-Vlach empire was uncertain, mostly in geopolitical terms.<sup>31</sup> The new independent Balkan state was born from the uprising of the Vlachs, (who Byzantine historians referred to as ‘barbarians’) living in the mountains, against the weakened Byzantium in 1186. The north-Balkan Vlachs, who took part in the Monoiolosz’ 1166 attack on Hungary, demanded that the emperor give them property rights in their home lands, i.e., that they become constituents with full rights in the empire, in exchange for their military services. Given that Byzantium rejected this request, the “depraved and unlawful” Vlachs (Choniates) revolted. After the Bulgarians and the Cunians, who lived together with the Vlachs north of the Haemus practically symbiotically, joined, a unique state, led by Asenids, incorporating the ‘ethnic cooperation’ of the three groups, was established, continuing the tradition of the first Bulgarian empire.

The kingdom or empire of the Asenids (sources of the period use both terms) joined Latin Christianity, in an effort to break from the wedge established by the Kingdom of Hungary and the Latin Empire established in Constantinople in 1204. Ionita (Kaloioannis), who exchanged letters with Pope Ince III, did not accomplish anything with his geopolitical maneuver, because neither the Kingdom of Hungary, nor the Latin Empire acknowledged the legitimacy of his rule over the north-Balkan lands, which were formerly under Byzantine authority. His subjects wanted no part of adopting the Christianity of Latin rituals. Neither the geopolitical situation nor the obvious conservatism of the true-to-Orthodoxy peoples favored the longevity of the Western geo-political orientation of the Bulgarian-Vlach state. At the same time the renewed spread of Orthodox authority over space brought tangible results, as the re-appearing Byzantium, though weakened, saw only its own imperial borders as legitimate. In this way, it had no interest in strengthening the institutions of the mini-empires which followed its example. (It must be stated that an ‘institutional revolution’ akin to that in the West, and the organic expansion of Eastern Europe could only have taken place if the ancient model, the East-Roman Empire, had collapsed earlier.)

The real situation of the Balkan states, which could be seen as local adaptations of the Byzantine model, was well reflected in the situation of Bulgaria after the Asenids died out. This history is dominated almost exclusively by the conspiracies of local contenders to the throne against one another. As stated by a recognized American expert on Balkan history, it is “the endless chain of betrayals, violent acts, and murders, the historical significance of which is merely to emphasize: the second Bulgaria, like the first, was an unstable construction.”<sup>32</sup>

The situation of Serbia in the Middle Ages was similar. Stefan Nemanjić’s 1217 ‘flirtation with Catholicism’ only served to more forcefully turn the Serbs and the developing church organization toward Orthodoxy.<sup>33</sup> Regarding the solidity of institutions, it can be said that the undoubtedly successful state-building activities of certain significant and exceptional kings were, as a rule, followed by long periods of civil war marked by “the spirit of tribal particularism.”<sup>34</sup> The Balkan Serbian empire of Dusan, who crowned himself “Czar of the Serbs and Greeks”, fell to pieces ten years after the death of the czar in 1355.<sup>35</sup>

It is worth quoting Miklós Oláh's notes on the wisdom of his father, who escaped the murderous madness of the rivaling prince family in Walachia and went to the court of Mátyás. The twelfth chapter of *Hungaria* reads, "King Mátyás decided several times to take him back with arms to his kingdom, but my father... decided to marry my mother, Borbála Huszár, in Transylvania and live as a private man as opposed to living in tyrannical power and exposing himself to a thousand dangers and risk being murdered, as his ancestors did."<sup>36</sup>

István Hajnal sheds light on the reason for this permanent institutional chaos. Given that the Slav peoples (and, along with them, the ancestors of the Romanians, the Vlachs) adapted the Byzantine forms, no synthesis followed, and no new civilized nations developed, as in the West. The gist of the Byzantine model was the existence of rational ruling forms which were the extensions of an "over-ripened, mechanical antique system" and below them existed archaic societies. There was no organic connection between the two, and "the elemental methods of society-building" could not develop. Actually, Orthodoxy was the 'organic connection', but Hajnal did not include it for a reason. He could not have included it, because he was using the language of (Western or Roman) institutional forms, and he could only interpret those things from Byzantium and its civilization which could be described in the language of institutional terms.

Given that the totalizing, unity-establishing strength of Orthodoxy never took on an institutional character, it was in vain that the Byzantine ruling form stood on Orthodox ground to a degree, for the Balkan peoples following the Byzantine model the entire political institution system, in fact everything that was above the level of the local community – in both social and political terms! – remained foreign, "interest-like, and external." In this way the mass of subjects retreated to the "intuitive" structures of the extended family and the tribe-ethnicity.

Byzantium sought to place entire civilizational structures on peoples, but they did not at all affect the archaic structures below the foreign forms. The fundamental difference from the West is best shown by the fact that those Slavs who followed the Western model – as opposed to the Southern and Eastern Slavs, and the Vlachs – were able to overcome the archaic Slavic social forms. Among them, just like among the Hungarians, the "perfect shattering of intuitive ethnic connectedness" followed. Among the peoples

who followed the Byzantine model, pluralism and ‘habitual adaptation’ became common only on the social-anthropological and folkloric level, and did not become an elemental method on the actual political, society-building level.<sup>37</sup>

Or if it did, it resulted in a kind of negative, feigned society-building, whereby there was an attempt to appear true to the habits of ‘contract-abiding Europe’<sup>38</sup> and to show ‘feigned good will’ (*simulata benevolentia*), of which Johannes Sommer (the humanist from Saxony who later taught at Lublin, then at the Cotnar Latin school, and finally in Transylvania) wrote when describing the habits of the Moldavian Vlachs.<sup>39</sup> The feigned adoption of Western forms – as evidenced by the bloody 1563 Moldavian uprising against voivod Despot’s Protestant reforms – were often followed by deep-rooted so-called civilizational fault-line conflicts (Huntington)<sup>40</sup> in Orthodox-majority countries and provinces. These conflicts appear to be more durable than the so-called national conflicts which could be interpreted as the internal civil wars of Western civilization.

Sommer writes that during the uprising against voivod Despot, who was of foreign background and who wished to bring foreign habits, the Moldavians, who were insisting on their Orthodox faith and habits, considered the Latin school in “Cotnari, which was populated by Saxons and Magyars”, which was established by the prince for children collected from the area of the entire country, a symbol of ‘foreign tyranny’ (*externa tyrannia*) as it used ‘foreign letters’ (*peregrinae literae*).<sup>41</sup> Thus, while the Moldavian chroniclers who attended the Polish humanist schools already valued their peoples’ Latin origins, Latin letters became a symbol of foreignness in the country.



The question of border lines within In-Between Europe, which are becoming more and more clear, are, according to many, merely superficial, conjunctural issues, which should not even be discussed, as this would obstruct the quick development of a “unified Europe without dividing lines”, which ought to be dependent on merely the appropriate political decisions.

*But if we consider the independent historical-sociological and geopolitical differences between the western and eastern parts of the vanishing entity called In-Between Europe, we see that the differences are not decreasing, but in fact are increasing, and that these differences are the result of long historical processes. This is a much more realistic approach. East-Central Europe (or, defined from the other direction, western In-Between Europe) disappeared, or may disappear as an autonomous historical model because it has adopted the social method from the West – through struggling with the Huntington virus for a thousand years – which the East could not adopt from Byzantium, and which it could not adopt from the West because of its late start and because of the old tradition of executing adoption from the top down.*

The following of the Western model is a terribly long and painful process, which is full of breaks and attempts to restart. This must always be taken into consideration when we are trying to understand the current situation of Eastern Europe, which is drifting further and further away from us.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> István Hajnal, “A kis nemzetek történetírásának munkaközösségéről. I–II.,” *Századok*, 1942, 1–42., pp. 133–165, and “Magyarország helye az európai fejlődésben,” in *Az újkor története*. (Budapest: 1936), pp. 146–160.
- <sup>2</sup> Domokos Kosáry, “Sur quelques problèmes d’histoire comparée,” *Revue d’Histoire Comparée*, 1943, No. 1–2., pp. 3–32; Aux lecteurs, *Revue d’Histoire Comparée*, 1946. No. 1–2., pp. 3–6; Kálmán Benda, “Lidée d’empire en Europe carpathique à la fin du moyen âge,” *Revue d’Histoire Comparée*, 1944, No. 1–2., pp. 54–80; Domokos Kosáry “Kárpát-Európa”-kutatás a Teleki Intézetben. Tóth János interjúja,” *Válóság*, 1983/9., pp. 32–41; Domokos, “The Idea of a Comparative History of East Central Europe: the Story of a Venture,” in Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak (eds.), *Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and South-East Europe* (London), pp. 124–138.
- <sup>3</sup> Jenő Szűcs, *Vázlat Európa három történelmi régiójáról* (Budapest: 1983 [1980]). Also: Domokos Kosáry, “Az európai fejlődési modell és Magyarország,” and “Az európai kisállamok típusai,” in *A történelem veszedelmei* (Budapest: 1987), pp. 7–19, 451–483.
- <sup>4</sup> Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (New York: 1950), and *Borderlands of Western Civilisation* (New York: 1952).
- <sup>5</sup> Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (New York–London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 5–11.

- <sup>6</sup> Ignác Romsics, “Közép- és kelet-európai perspektívák,” in *Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében* (Budapest: 1996), pp. 361, 363, 368.
- <sup>7</sup> István Hajnal, “A kis nemzetek történetírása...” p. 8.
- <sup>8</sup> After Vladimír Meciar’s election defeat in September of 1998, Wolfgang Schüssel, the foreign minister of then EU president Austria, stated that as long as the new government forms properly, “Slovakia’s EU integration” would immediately become a negotiable issue. (*Le Monde*, September 30, 1998)
- <sup>9</sup> H.-R. Patapievici, “Româniii încă nu și-au găsit, metafizic vorbind, modul lor propriu de a se instala în modernitate,” *Ziua*, 1997, August 14.
- <sup>10</sup> Mackinder’s East and West Europe concepts, see Gusztáv Molnár, “The Geopolitics of NATO-Enlargement,” *Hungarian Quarterly*, Summer 1997, pp. 3-16.
- <sup>11</sup> Jenő Szűcs, *Vázlat...* pp. 14–15.
- <sup>12</sup> István Hajnal, “A görög-keleti Európa. Az Orosz Birodalom,” in *Az újkor története*. pp. 267–283.
- <sup>13</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: 1996), pp. 138, 154.
- <sup>14</sup> István Hajnal, *A kis nemzetek történetírása...* p. 38.
- <sup>15</sup> Gyula Kristó, “A magyar nomádállam,” in *A magyar állam megszületése* (Szeged: 1995), pp. 120-126.
- <sup>16</sup> Gustav Molnár, “Imperii și pseudoimperii,” 22, Bucharest, 1998. Nov. 10-16.
- <sup>17</sup> Gábor Erdődy, *A magyar kormányzat európai látóköre 1848-ban* (Budapest: 1988), pp. 61–62.
- <sup>18</sup> On Blackwell writings from 1846 to 1851, see István Hajnal, *A Batthyány-kormány külpolitikája* (Budapest: 1987).
- <sup>19</sup> The sources of the Blackwell quotes are: Jenő Horváth, “Blackwell András József angol ügynök magyarországi küldetései. 1843–1848. I.,” *Budapesti Szemle*, 213. k., 616. sz., 1929. március, 383–384; III. *Budapesti Szemle*, 213. k., 618. sz., 1929. május, 265–268.
- <sup>20</sup> István Hajnal, *A Batthyány-kormány külpolitikája*, p. 80.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>22</sup> Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe,” in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), and Rokkan, “Territories, Centres, and Peripheries: Toward a Geoethnic-Geo-economic-Geopolitical Model of Differentiation within Western Europe,” in Jean Goffmann (ed.), *Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variations in Politics* (London: Sage, 1980).
- <sup>23</sup> István Hajnal, *A kis nemzetek történetírása*, pp. 8, 16, 21.

- <sup>24</sup> Nicolae Iorga, “Desvoltarea așezămintelor politice și sociale ale Europei. I.,” *Evul mediu. Conferințe la Academia Militară*. București, 1920., p. 143.
- <sup>25</sup> Ferenc Makk, *Magyar külpolitika (896–1196)* (Szeged: 1996), p. 219.
- <sup>26</sup> Z. J. Kosztolnyik, *Hungary in the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 14.
- <sup>27</sup> Șerban Papacostea, “Criza de structură a Regatului arpadian,” in *Români în secolul al XIII-lea. Între cruciată și Imperiul Mongol* (București: 1993), p. 134. On Rogerius see *ibid.*, p. 128.
- <sup>28</sup> Domokos Kosáry, *Magyarország története* (Budapest: 1943), p. 47. On the Anjou-period, pp. 42–53.
- <sup>29</sup> András Gergely, “Közép-Európa parlamentjei 1848-ban,” in György Szabad (ed.), *A magyar országgyűlés 1848/49-ben* (Budapest: 1998), pp. 15–63.
- <sup>30</sup> On the political institutions of the Romanian principalities, see Dimitrie Onciul, “Originile principatelor române,” in *Scrieri istorice, I.*, (București: 1968), pp. 560–715;
- <sup>31</sup> On the Bulgarian-Vlach state, see Gheorghe I. Brătianu, “Asenastii,” in *Tradiția istorică...* 10–49; and Șerban Papacostea, “Înfruntări politice și spirituale în sud-estul Europei (1204–1241),” in *Români în secolul al XIII-lea*, pp. 11–55.
- <sup>32</sup> Ferdinand Schevill, *A History of the Balkans* (New York: 1991), pp. 151.
- <sup>33</sup> Károly Szilágyi, “Az államalapítás,” in Dénes Sokcsévics, Imre Szilágyi, and Károly Szilágyi, *Déli szomszédaink története* (Budapest: 1994), pp. 25–27.
- <sup>34</sup> F. Schevill, pp. 147.
- <sup>35</sup> Károly Szilágyi, “A középkori szerb állam széthullása és a török hódoltság.”
- <sup>36</sup> Miklós Oláh, “Hungária,” in *Janus Pannonius – Magyarországi humanisták* (Budapest: 1982), pp. 1076–1077.
- <sup>37</sup> István Hajnal, *A kis nemzetek történetírása...* pp. 13–15; 23–24; 32; 39.
- <sup>38</sup> Claude Karnoouh, “Societatea civilă,” *Dilema* (Bukarest), 1999. Jan. 15–21. Also see the author’s work on Romanian identity, *L’invention du peuple*. Chroniques de Roumanie. Essai. Paris, 1990.
- <sup>39</sup> Johannes Sommer Pirnensis, “Vita Jacobi Despotae Moldavorum reguli – Viața lui Jacob Despot, Principele moldovenilor,” in Johannes Sommer Pirnensis and Antonius Maria Gratianus (eds.), *Viața lui Despot Vódă*, Ed. bilingva, Iași, 1998, p. 74.
- <sup>40</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations...*
- <sup>41</sup> Johannes Sommer, pp. 46, 50–51, 69.

ISTVÁN KEMÉNY

## The Structure of Hungarian Roma Groups in Light of Linguistic Changes

*ABSTRACT: Hungarian Gypsies can be divided into three main linguistic groups that are also distinguished by having their own specific life-style: Magyar speaking Romungros, the Magyar- and Romani-speaking Vlach Gypsies, and the Romanian and Magyar-speaking Boyash Gypsies. This paper examines the changes in Hungarian Gypsy population based on the data of special Gypsy census of 1893 and national surveys carried out in 1971 and 1993/94. Between 1893 and 1971, the overall Hungarian Gypsy population increased five-fold, with number of Romungros growing four-fold, the Vlach Gypsies more than nine-fold and the Boyash Gypsies eight-fold. It is suggested that this striking expansion in Gypsy population can only be explained by massive immigration from Romania and, to a lesser degree, Serbia. Attention is also drawn to the continuous shift from the Romani to Magyar language – a trend which was already noted in the last century – but one which does not inevitably lead to a loss of Gypsy identity.*

For some time it has been known that “Hungarian Roma are divided from one another according to lifestyle groups” and that “linguistic factors play an important role in the development and separation of these groups.”<sup>1</sup> It is also known that the most significant linguistic groups are the Magyar-speaking Romungro, the Romani- and Magyar-speaking Vlach Roma, and the Romanian- and Magyar-speaking Boyash Roma.<sup>2</sup>

This study attempts to trace 100 years of linguistic changes beginning with the 1893 “Roma Census”, and following with the 1971 and 1993-94 national representative Roma studies.

### *The Census of 1893*

According to one of the most important documents on the history of Hungarian Roma, on January 31, 1893, 280,000 Roma lived in the country.<sup>3</sup> The number of recorded Roma was 274,940 (this is the generally cited number), but Budapest, where there were likely 500 Roma, was left out of the census. Further, “the census found no settled Roma” in several cities.<sup>4</sup> The publication further states: “those who were unaware of their Roma being were excluded... and given these facts, the total number of Hungarian Roma, giving a rounded number, should be at least 280,000.”

The volume presenting the results of the census gives a breakdown of the Roma population by district. As the Peace Treaty of Trianon drew new borders through many counties and districts, and as the public administration boundaries were adjusted several times since 1893 and the county and district boundaries have been shifted, the number of Roma living at the time within today’s national borders can only be roughly estimated. According to our estimate, in 1893, 65,000 Roma lived within today’s borders.<sup>5</sup> For the same year, 160 thousand Roma lived in territories which are today part of Romania, with numbers of 40–42 thousand for Slovakian and 8–10 thousand for Yugoslav territories.

Of the 65,000 persons, 23 thousand lived in the Trans-Danube area, 18 thousand between the Danube and the Tisza (excluding Bács-Bodrog county, but including the city and district of Baja and Heves county), 10 thousand in contemporary Hungary’s northern regions (including Borsod county, and those parts of Esztergom, Nógrád, Abaúj and Zemplén counties which remain in Hungary) and 14 thousand in the eastern region (including Békés, Hajdú, and Szabolcs counties, and the remaining part of Szatmár county).

The census was commissioned by Károly Hieronymi, the Minister of the Interior, who took office on November 19, 1892, and within two weeks ordered the Statistical Office to conduct the census. The introduction to the publication indicates that the Minister’s goal was “to nationally handle the issue of vagrancy and thus to settle vagrant Roma”, but the census was not limited to wandering Roma. It also covered those who “had completely assimilated into the civic and bourgeois society, and cannot be distinguished from the population by lifestyle, means of earning a living, culture,

or habits, but at most by some anthropological nuances.” The census also explored living conditions, the state of the family, religious distribution, literacy, employment, means of earning a living, and last but not least, mother-tongue groups and knowledge of languages.

The scientific analyses of the collected data and the preparation of the general report were directed by the president of the Statistical Office, Antal Hermann, who was “an ethnologist known for his Roma studies.”

The results were surprising at many points. Antal Hermann foremost thought the large number of Roma was surprising. He referred to the 1873 “Roma census”, which was commissioned by the Minister of the Interior, which gave a “rather unfounded” number of 214 thousand Roma, but he could have cited earlier data as well. The census of 1850 found 140 thousand Roma in the “legal population”. The census of 1857 found 143 thousand Roma among the “native population”.<sup>6</sup>

In fifty-three years the number of Roma doubled, while their proportion, as part of the total population, went from 1.16 to 1.8%. However, in this time, the natural rate of growth of the Roma could not have been significantly higher than that of the rest of the population. This is supported by the fact that the proportion of children under the age of 14 among the Roma was 37%, while for the entire population it was 36.6% in 1890.<sup>7</sup>

In this period, the country’s population grew by 30%, while the Roma population grew by 100%. The difference can be attributed to immigration, foremost from Romania, where the proportion of Roma was the highest. The effect of immigration can be seen by the fact that the proportion of the Roma population in the Trans-Danube and inter-Danube-Tisza regions was 0.8%, while it was almost 5% for Transylvania. For contemporary eastern counties within Hungary, the rate was 1% in Békés, 1.5% in Hajdú, 1.8% in Bihar, and 2.6% in Szabolcs. (Migration toward the northwest is shown by rates of 2.4% in Abaúj county, and 1.9% in Borsod and Zemplén counties.)

The fact and direction of further migration from Transylvania is shown by the following: according to the 1850 census, of 140,092 Roma, 78,906 (i.e., 53%) lived in Transylvania, while the number for 1893 was 105 thousand (i.e., 37.5%) of a total population of 280 thousand.

The Roma migrated from Romanian principalities to Transylvania, and from Transylvania into the Kingdom of Hungary, beginning in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The rate of migration increased in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> and first half

of the 19th centuries.<sup>8</sup> The rate of migration in the second half of the 19th century was considerably higher than the earlier rates.

According to József Vekerdi, the immigration of Romungro was much earlier, and followed a different path. “The so-called Magyar Roma (Romungro) came into Hungary centuries ago through Serbia (or Bulgaria), without traveling through Romanian language territories. They settled long ago, and their vast majority has forgotten Romani: they speak only Magyar.”<sup>9</sup> The Romani-speaking Vlach Roma “mostly came into our country in the last one-hundred years.”<sup>10</sup>

Zsolt Csalog also thought that the Roma who had immigrated through the Balkans in the Middle Ages and stayed here had lost their Romani language and that their “descendants are the unilingual, Magyar-speaking, so-called Magyar Roma.”<sup>11</sup> He also postulates that the bilingual (Romani- and Magyar-speaking) Vlach Roma are the descendants of later immigrants. “In the case of a third group, linguistic assimilation occurred in a Romanian language territory, and the members of the group arrived in Hungary in the 18–20th centuries as native Romanian speakers, or as bilingual (Romanian- and Magyar-speaking) so-called Romanian Roma.”

Vekerdi and Csalog’s position, that the Magyar-speaking Roma are likely descendants of earlier immigrants, is likely true. It is less likely that the earlier migration was in the Middle Ages, or that ancestors arrived without traveling through Romanian language areas. The ancestors of Transylvanian Romungro, for example, certainly arrived from Romanian language territories, and a part of the Magyarized descendants of those arriving from Romanian principalities moved on to other areas of the country.

One-third of the Roma recorded on January 31, 1893, were fresh immigrants or the children of such, who arrived in the country after 1850. A further 50,000 were descendants of those who had immigrated after 1809.

Accordingly, 38 percent spoke Magyar as their native language, while 30% spoke Romani, and 24% spoke Romanian. The rest spoke Slovakian, Serbian, German, Ruthenian, Croatian or other mother tongues. Given regions of the country differed greatly in this respect.

In the region between the Danube and Tisza, 82% spoke Magyar as their native language, while 8% each spoke Romani and Serb. In the Trans-Danube area the proportion of those who spoke Magyar as their native tongue was 72%, with Romani at 11%, Romanian at 8%, and

German at 6%. Of contemporary Hungary's eastern counties, the proportion of Magyar speakers was 89% for Békés, 94% for Hajdú, 98% for Szabolcs, 70% for Szatmár, and 45% for Bihar. Romani native speakers numbered 12% in Bihar, and 17% in Szatmár, while Boyash were 29% in Bihar, and 13% in Szatmár. In the northern counties, the proportion of Romungro was 76% in Nógrád, 88% in Borsod, 75% in Abaúj, and 47% in Zemplén, while the proportion of Vlach was 16% in Nógrád, 12% in Abaúj, and 29% in Zemplén. Slovak native-speaking Roma are found in these counties: their proportion in Nógrád is 8%, 11% in Abaúj, and 22% in Zemplén. In Borsod, 10% of Roma were native speakers of Ruthenian.

Taking the contemporary territory of Hungary as a whole, in January of 1893 the proportion of Magyar native-speaking Roma was 79.5%, with a proportion of 10% for Romani-speakers, 4.5% for Romanian speakers, and a further 6% composed of speakers of Serbian, Slovakian, German, Ruthenian, Croatian, etc. There is a marked difference between the numbers for the country as a whole and for the contemporary national area. But the difference is even greater when we compare the 1893 Roma population of today's territory with that of Transylvania, where the proportion of Romani native-speakers was 42%, and that of Romanian native-speakers was 39%. In the Tisza-Maros wedge, the proportion of native Magyar-speaking Roma was only 5%.

The above leads us to believe that of the Roma living within today's borders in 1893, the most were descendants of earlier immigrants: their ancestors came not after 1850, and not even in the 19th century, but before. However, regarding non-Magyar speakers, we may think of more recent immigration: for example, in Baranya county, where Boyash and Vlach arrived from south-Slav areas, and where the proportion of Romungro was only 53%, or Bács-Bodrog county, where Vlach (22.5%), Serbian-Roma (38.5%), and Boyash (4%) arrived from the south, and where the proportion of Romungro was only 34%.

### *The 1971 National Survey*

The native-language distribution of Hungarian Roma had changed by the time of the 1971 national survey. At this time 71.0% of Roma spoke

Magyar, 21.2% spoke Romani, 7.6% spoke Romanian, and 0.2% spoke other languages. The number of Roma was 320 thousand, of which 224 thousand were Magyar-, 61 thousand were Romani-, and 25 thousand were Romanian speakers. In the given territory, over 78 years, the total number of Roma rose almost five-fold, and within this that of Romungro grew four-fold, that of Vlach grew nine-fold, and that of Boyash grew eight-fold. Eight- or nine-fold increases – or even four- or five-fold increases – can be explained only by immigration. Immigration into Baranya and Somogy counties has been analyzed by Gábor Havas.<sup>12</sup> He is likely correct in stating that a part of the Teknővájó Roma were resettled by estate owners from their southern estates. Most of them moved to Hungary before 1914, but the immigration continued between the wars and immediately after World War II. Havas also shows that after resettlement there followed a scattering northward.

Katalin Kovalcsik distinguishes three ethnic sub-groups of Hungarian Boyash.<sup>13</sup> The Muncsan of the southern part of Baranya county are related to the Croats living south of the border. Argyelan speak a Bánát dialect. Ticsan arrived from the Nagyvárada area from 1910-20, and after living in Szabolcs and Szatmár, they moved to the Tiszafüred area. László Pomogyi refers to archive materials in Somogy and Zala counties, which indicate that the Roma arrived from Croatia-Slavonia at the beginning of the century.<sup>14</sup>

It is worth noting that the Roma classified as native speakers of Slovak, Ruthenian, Serbian, and Croatian all disappeared without a trace by 1971, or changed their native language. The four-fold increase of Romungro cannot be explained without taking into consideration language change or language assimilation, or the settlement of Romungro.

After immigrating, in 1971 the majority of Boyash Roma lived in the southern Trans-Danube region: they form the majority of Roma in Baranya and Somogy counties. A part of the Vlach Roma crossed the same border at the end of the last century and the beginning of this one, and to a lesser extent between the wars: in 1971 they made up one-fifth of the Roma of the southern part of the Trans-Danube area. Part of the Vlach of Bács, Csongrád, and Szolnok arrived from Serbia and the Bánát, who in 1971 made up 19% of the Roma of these three counties.

Vlach Roma emigrated from Transylvania/Romania into Szabolcs, Szatmár, Bihar, Békés, and Hajdú counties. Along with earlier arrivals, they make up 21.6% of this region's Roma residents.

Before 1918 it was natural that Romani-speaking Roma moved to Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Nógrád, and Heves counties, and this was a relatively obstacle-free path between the wars as well. László Pomogyi quotes a Ministerial decree from 1927: "Foreign, never-before seen Roma families, which wander from village to village, are appearing in communities bordering on Czechoslovakia. This is a serious drawback in terms of public health and public safety. According to reports the Czechoslovak state is banning vagrant Roma *en masse* from its territories, and hence these Roma cross relatively unguarded parts of the border and scatter from there, foremost across the territories of border communities."<sup>15</sup>

The proportion of Vlach Roma was largest in the Budapest region (Pest, Fejér and Komárom counties), at 24.1%. Their number here was around 15,000.

Beyond immigration and moving, between 1893 and 1971 provincial and Roma life underwent changes and restructuring. However, the changes between native-language groups did not decrease, and neither did the distance between them.

One of the big changes was urbanization. At the end of the last century, and in 1971, there were far fewer urban than non-urban Roma. This was particularly true of Boyash.

*Distribution of Language-Groups Across Settlement Types (%)*

SETTLEMENT TYPE	MAGYAR NATIVE-SPEAKER	ROMANI NATIVE-SPEAKER	ROMANIAN NATIVE-SPEAKER	TOTAL
Budapest	8,3	9,9	—	7,7
Provincial cities	15,5	11,5	6,2	13,9
Villages	76,2	78,6	93,8	78,4
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

There was a wide difference between the given native-language groups regarding the proportion of those living in settlements: 65% of

Romungro, 75% of Vlach, and 48% of Boyash lived in settlements. This is part of the explanation (among other factors) for the fact that the average number of dwellers per home among the Vlach was 6.3, while it was 5.5 for Romungro and 4.9 for Boyash. Sixty percent of Vlach, 56% of Romungro, and 40% of Boyash lived in families with three or more children. The number of dependents per 100 earners was 250 for the Vlach, 221 for the Romungro, and 191 for the Boyash. In 1971, of those over the age of 14, 33% of Romungro, 54% of Vlach, and 57% of Boyash were illiterate.

Before World War I the proportion of children not attending school was 60% among the Romungro, 90% among the Vlach, and 100% among the Boyash. Between the wars this proportion decreased to 40% among the Romungro, and 70% for the two other groups. A bigger change took place following World War II. After 1957, the proportion of school-aged children (for whom schooling was compulsory) not attending school was 6% among the Romungro, 10% among the Boyash, and 17% among the Vlach. However, school attendance for Roma children was usually irregular, and lasted only a few years. In 1971 26% of Roma children had completed eight grades, with a breakdown of 30% for Romungro, 21% for Boyash, and 7% for Vlach.

### *The 1993-94 National Survey*

According to the 1993-94 national study, of those who were at least 15 years of age, but no longer studying, 5.5% claimed to be Boyash, 4.4% claimed to speak native-Romani, and 6% referred to another non-Magyar language. Since the 1971 survey, the proportion of Boyash decreased from 7.6% to 5.5%, while the proportion of those speaking native Romani decreased from 21.2% to 4.4%.

#### *Distribution of Roma According to Native Language in 1971 and 1993 (%)*

YEARS	MAGYAR	BOYASH	ROMANI	OTHER	TOTAL
1971	71,0	7,6	21,2	0,2	100
1993	89,5	5,5	4,4	0,6	100

In 1971 – and well before – the Boyash and Romani-speaking Roma were bilingual: they spoke their native language and Magyar.

*Distribution According to Spoken Language in 1993 (%)*

MAGYAR	BOYASH	ROMANI	OTHER
77,0	11,3	11,1	0,6

Bilingualism changed among the Vlach and Boyash in a way which Zita Réger characterizes as having one language become “the in-group, intimate, familial means of communication”, with the other becoming “the formal, official” means of speaking. (“As a rule, this means the language is useful in education, official agencies, the workplace, and while when meeting members of the other language group. Further, the language is used to communicate *within* the group when themes concern education, official agencies, the workplace, etc.”)<sup>16</sup> The movement from being a native speaker of Boyash or Romani to being one of Magyar takes place within this bilingual framework.<sup>17</sup>

A contributing factor to language change was no doubt the elimination of the majority of Roma settlements between 1965 and 1985. We have already mentioned that in 1971, 75% of Vlach Roma and 48% of Boyash lived in settlements. By the end of 1993 this proportion fell to 4.9% for the Vlach and 1.1% for the Boyash. It must be mentioned that the number of 48% for the Boyash in 1971 was the result of a long process. At the beginning of the century they lived in forest settlements far away from villages. Their resettlement into villages began between the wars, and rapidly increased after World War II.<sup>18</sup>

Moving out of settlements changes language patterns not only by loosening the bonds of community, but perhaps more so by making contact with the Magyar majority a daily event, making the use of Magyar throughout the day rather unavoidable. Language change was also brought on by the fact that by 1971, 84% of Boyash and 75% of Vlach men worked in workplaces where they by necessity spoke Magyar. At the same time a quarter of the women were in a similar situation, and this rose to one half of women by the end of the 1970s.

Welfare officers, doctors, and lawyers could only be spoken to in Magyar, and official matters could only be handled in Magyar. The biggest effect was likely found in the practices of kindergarten and school, where, with one or two exceptions, the teachers could not speak a word of Romani or Romanian. The process of language change is presented by Gabor Fleck


and Tünde Virág in their book (*The Past and Present of a Boyash Community*).<sup>19</sup>

Fleck and Virág identify three separate generations: the 40-50 year-old grandparents, the 20-40 year-old parents, and the children. Among the grandparents, “the functional separation of the Magyar and Boyash languages was characteristic. The Boyash language was used in the community and within the family, while Magyar was only used when speaking with peasants and in official institutions, schools, and local government.”<sup>20</sup> The parents were not successful at school, given that they did not know, or hardly knew, Magyar. For this reason, some parents only spoke Magyar with their children at home. Today it is characteristic of those between 25 and 35 to use not Boyash, but Magyar with their peers. Boyash is used when speaking with parents and the friends of parents, but the children are spoken to in Magyar. “The children, at the early age of three, are placed within the framework of institutionalized education, and kindergarten education requires the use of the Magyar language. After kindergarten and school the children do not spend the most of their time with the family, but instead are out in the street with their kindergarten and school friends. In these groups Magyar is spoken almost exclusively... the generation growing up now speaks both languages inadequately, and they are characterized by bi-half-lingualism.”<sup>21</sup>

Fleck and Virág, with a good conscience, report that there is an awareness in the Gilvánfa village community that the Boyash language can be used as a means of achieving nationhood and establishing political prestige. This approach is most characteristic of the mayor, whose children and grandchildren do not speak Boyash. Some of the young adults took part in a course which was designed to revive the Boyash tongue. However, in daily interaction, these young people do not use the Boyash language.

The majority of families studied by Fleck and Virág were placed in two categories: the resigners, and the strategy-changers. Among the resigners, the researchers note “a visible consistent, relatively slow, integrational death of the language.” Among the strategy-changers, conscious intra-generational language change is characteristic.

Fleck and Virág’s writing and analysis concerns the Boyash community of Gilvánfalva. The degree of language change in other Boyash and in Vlach communities is different, given that there exist differences in given



*Qualified Population of Hungarian Gypsies (1984-1990)*

phenomena and in the rate of behavioral occurrences, such that, naturally, unique behavioral patterns and factors will arise. However, similar patterns, causes, and consequences can be seen across the country. Factors encouraging language change remain, and factors which would limit or hold back change are weakening. Language change, then, is likely to continue, but this does not necessarily mean a weakening or loss of ethnic identity. Vlach Roma are likely to keep their identity as Vlach Roma even when they speak Romani poorly, just as Boyash Roma will cling to their identity even having lost the ability to speak Boyash well – this is especially the case if the two Roma groups continue to see one another as strangers, or even look down on one another and on the Romungro.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> István Kemény, Kálmán Rupp, Zsolt Csalog, Gábor Havas, *Beszámoló a magyarországi cigányok helyzetével foglalkozó 1971-ben végzett kutatásról* (Budapest: 1976), p. 9. (This publication provides a detailed analysis of the differences between Magyar-, Gypsy-, and Romanian-speaking Roma.)

- <sup>2</sup> On the linguistic groups, see Kamill Erdős, *A Békés megyei cigányok és cigánydialektusok Magyarországon* (Gyula: 1962).
- <sup>3</sup> Result of the Roma Census conducted on January 31, 1893. *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények, Új folyam.* IX köt. Bp. 1895.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- <sup>5</sup> Others have arrived at the same estimate. Árpád Mészáros and János Fóti, "A cigány népesség jellemzői Magyarországon," *Statisztikai Szemle*, 1996/11, pp. 909-10. László Pomogyi estimated a number of approximately 65-66 thousand. László Pomogyi, *Cigánykérdés és cigányügyi igazgatás a polgári Magyarországon* (Budapest: Osiris-Századvég, 1995), p. 11.
- <sup>6</sup> *Az 1850. és 1857 évi népszámlálás* (Budapest: KSH, 1993), pp. 61,67.
- <sup>7</sup> Endre Kovács and László Katus (eds.), *Magyarország története tíz kötetben. 6. kötet. 1848-1890* (Budapest: 1979), p. 1127.
- <sup>8</sup> Migration to Háromszék is reported in Ernő Albert, "A cigányok útja Háromszékre és itteni életük," in Károly Bari (ed.), *Tanulmányok a cigányságról* (Gödöllő: 1998), pp. 81-91.
- <sup>9</sup> József Vekerdí, *A cigány népmese* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974), p. 16.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- <sup>11</sup> Zsolt Csalog, *A cigánykérdés Magyarországon 1980 előtt* (Budapest, 1979), 2nd vol, 1991, p. 282.
- <sup>12</sup> Gábor Havas, "A Baranya megyei teknővájó cigányok," in *Cigányvizsgálatok* (Budapest: Művelődéskutató Intézet, 1982), pp. 61-140.
- <sup>13</sup> Katalin Kovalcsik, "A beás cigányok népzenei hagyományai," in Gábor Barna (ed.), *Cigány néprajzi tanulmányok. 1.* (Salgotarján: Mikszáth Kiadó, 1993), pp. 231-244.
- <sup>14</sup> László Pomogyi, *Cigánykérdés és cigányügyi igazgatás a polgári Magyarországon* (Budapest: Századvég-Osiris, 1995), p. 11.
- <sup>15</sup> Pomogyi, p. 11.
- <sup>16</sup> Zita Reger, "A cigány nyelv: kutatások és vitapontok," *Műhelymunkák a nyelvészet és társtudományi köréből*, IV szám, 1988. augusztus. MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet, p. 159.
- <sup>17</sup> Anna Borbély reports on similar changes in bilingualism and on forced language change. Anna Borbély, "A magyarországi románok nyelvhasználata a változások tükrében," *Regio*, no. 3, 1995. Language change among Slovaks was almost as rapid as it was for Vlach Gypsies between 1971 and 1993.
- <sup>18</sup> On resettlement into villages, see Pomogyi, pp. 231-249.
- <sup>19</sup> MTI PTI Ethnoregionális Kutatóközpont, Budapest, 1999.
- <sup>20</sup> Fleck and Virág, *Egy beás közösség múltja és jelene*, p. 69.
- <sup>21</sup> Fleck and Virág.

LÁSZLÓ ENDRE HAJNAL

## Urban Roma in the New Economic Environment

*ABSTRACT: The author accompanies a group of successful Roma entrepreneurs and traders in Budapest, examining relations within the Roma community as well as between Roma and non-Roma in the context of business and trading activities. He concludes that the methods of communication and the survival strategies of the Roma are conditioned by traditions and dependence on the majority population. He identifies some general characteristics of the Roma's behavior, such as a high degree of mobility and a capacity for adapting to a variety of situations, strong kinship ties, an information network that binds Roma families with very different living standards, and examples of conspicuous consumption (e.g., jewelry, large cars, feasting). Much of this wealth is concentrated in a few hands. The author asks the question "Does the increase in riches of a few challenge the traditional egalitarian structure of Roma society?"*

This essay, which is based on observations made from 1994 to 1998, examines the cultural habits and social structure of Vlach Roma living in Budapest.

I was looking to answer the question, how does the life of a group, whose habit system largely differs from that of the majority, change in the context of a large city, whose own environment is undergoing significant changes at the time of observation? In this environment the members of the group live scattered, at greater distances from one another, in areas densely inhabited by others with differing habits, resulting in constant contact or even conflict with the non-Roma population.

Despite the way they were settled, the studied group can be called a functioning community based on the following criteria:

- current information regarding the events of one another's lives,
- common experience of ritual occasions,
- practice of similar activities among gender groups,
- definitive role of familial ties, endogamy,
- like value system regarding the relationship to the environment and the community.<sup>1</sup>

The two studied areas, economic activity and use of urban space, show the community from the same vantage point, i.e., these areas allow for the observation of the most contact between the Roma and non-Roma worlds. The question is: what survival mechanisms are developed in this unique environment, and of the several possibilities offered by the culture of a globalizing large city, which elements are adopted, and which are rejected?

My observations were mostly limited to a specific group – I observed mainly those families which had successfully taken advantage of the social-economic changes of the last decade. The heads of the families were successful businessmen with considerable material backgrounds, which were comparable to those of the city's upper-middle class. I feel it is important to emphasize this because these people had considerably more opportunities to become familiar with, or even try out, elements of lifestyles, which differed from their own. The possible adoption of known urban habits – dress, decorating the home, spending free time, raising children, etc. – did not pose a financial problem.

With the help of these families I was able to make detailed observations of the lives of Budapest Vlach Roma. We spent a great deal of time together during both work and community events. They were aware of the fact that I was a university student, and that I was interested in their habits – it was at these times that I was referred to as a 'sociologist'. My interest in economic activity spawned some confusion and distrust in me, and for this reason I rarely taped my interviews and I avoided taking written notes – thus my comments are based on direct observation.

*The Development of Relationships –  
As Connected to the Methods of Utilizing Urban Space*

Budapest's most striking characteristic is its high degree of heterogeneity. Many kinds of people live in differentiated ways beside one another. Every community develops for its members a certain unique view of the city, and the arising mental maps allow individuals to reduce and utilize the otherwise endless spaces and potential social contacts.<sup>2</sup> As a result the city falls into two separate levels in the eyes of its users: the institutionalized and the folkloric. The institutionalized level includes the whole of cultural practices demanded by the dominant groups of the city's society, various parts of which must be learned and, in certain situations practiced, by all groups.<sup>3</sup> Everyone sends their children to school, votes in a similar manner, the sick go to the same hospitals, everyone knows what the norms of behavior are in court, or what to do when using public transport. The folkloristic level contains those models which every group characteristically creates for itself, and which are separate, or separable, from the institutionalized level of urban society as a whole, but from the folkloristic levels of other groups as well. The cultural practice of the folkloristic level provides a sense of security for the members of the group establishing the practice, as it provides an acceptable means of assisting the individual in solving everyday problems.<sup>4</sup>

The use of the city by Budapest Roma is definitively influenced by the need for knowledge related to economic activity, and further by the fact that relatives are scattered and that moves (in and among districts) are common. As a result, it can be stated that, based on their unique vantage point, their basic and unique knowledge of the city is not restricted to the vicinity of their homes, but extends to some distant places as well.

The settlement of Budapest Roma is characterized by scattering throughout the city. The traditionally known Roma quarters which existed in the 1950s and 1960s (Zugló, Pesterzsébet) are now largely gone, mostly as a result of the socialist-era council-flat program and the 1965 large-scale land-use program, which was a result of a 1961 Party decree.<sup>5</sup> Although since the 1970s there has been an observable process of ghettoization in various parts of the city, which affects mostly the poorest strata, settlement leading to family separation is a more general phenomenon.<sup>6</sup> According to

surveys the rate of Roma families which live in areas dominated by other Roma families is low – it is 6.5%. This is only a small fraction of the proportion in other parts of the country.<sup>7</sup> The Roma population is largest in districts VII, VIII, IX, and XX. It is important to note that there are some districts where there are hardly any Roma inhabitants, e.g., districts I, II, V, XI, and XII, which are essentially the downtown and the elite districts in Buda. These districts are unpopular among Roma for more reasons than just their expensive nature.

The more well-to-do prefer the suburban quarters of the Pest side, from where the more densely populated downtown is easy to access. The most prominent area is the suburban-styled part of Zugló: many families consider it a life goal to move there, and living there is a prestige-carrying factor in the eyes of the community.

Other favored areas for building or buying homes are Pesterzsébet and the area close to the center of Kőbánya, as well as the similar area in Rákosszentmihály. Here properties are less expensive, but the downtown is still at a close enough distance. In periods when business is slow (less successful), some families sell their houses and move out to less frequented and cheaper parts of the city, but this is rare, and at the first opportunity they will move back to the above-mentioned quarters.

The development of contact networks and the use of city space is closely related to the economic activities of the men, as well as the keeping of daily contacts with relatives. A definitive element of economic activity for most is movement and a high degree of mobility, which is an indispensable condition for the collection, supervision, and utilization of large masses of information. A basic work tool is the car. Even the poor Roma use public transport only as a last resort, and they hardly know which routes go where, where they can buy tickets, or what the cost of the fare is. If they have no other choice, they will take a taxi, even if they have little money at the time. The car is a factor which increases prestige, hence the model is chosen with great care, and efforts are made to keep the car clean both inside and out. The car might be taken to the carwash several times per week. Beyond increasing prestige, the car gives a great sense of security, and can even be seen as an extension of the home in this respect. Along with shutting out the outside environment and unacceptable or alien forms of behavior, the car establishes a micro-area which, at any point in the city, is

characterized by familiar, personal contacts and the community norms and dominant identity they define. Those spaces which are crossed between the point of departure and the point of arrival remain alien and uninteresting; only those places where there is something concrete to do are acknowledged. This is one way in which the number of contacts which are alien and uninteresting to the Roma world are reduced. Thus, the urban space structure is divided into well-known places – where one can move around comfortably, knows the usual behavioral patterns, and has personal contacts – and unknown places, where all of the above is missing. The number and variety of places known by individuals largely depends on the substance and volume of economic activity. Those well-to-do men who trade goods of large value generally move comfortably in much larger areas. Those who trade real estate behave and negotiate in a secure manner whether in lawyer's offices, banks, or fine restaurants. Those who are able to learn and use these skills can find grand opportunities, as they become able to communicate in a social field which is closed to others, and can take advantage of the benefits of such.

Another factor defining the use of urban space and the development of contact networks is the practice of keeping in touch with relatives, which can be closely related to economic activity. The strata of Budapest Vlach Roma I studied were characterized by the separate and scattered settlement of families. There were some places where differing generations lived together, but the separate residence of nuclear families was more common.

Frequent change of residence was observable in many families. This was usually the case for financial reasons, when families would move to worse or better places. In any case, it can be said that no matter how formally settled the lifestyles may be considered, the area of residence still does not play an important role in identity.<sup>8</sup> Those families in which the financial situation is improving look to move to better places, into higher quality flats or houses. The process of establishing a home is in all cases maximally quick: renovation or construction is moved along quickly to completion even when this means a very large financial burden. This often leads to overspending, which means shortly after moving in, the property must be sold.

The families of like generations do not make efforts to live together or near one another, but it is important to mention that distances within the

city do not seem great enough to them to keep them from maintaining intense contacts. The daily meetings of men are ensured through the use of cars, telephones, and mobile phones, and thus family members have fresh information on the events of one another's lives.

The financial condition of the extended family is often characterized by polarization, and over time the condition of given families can change rather quickly. This was characteristic of the 1990s. In this way, close or distant relatives are to be found in all types and levels of residential areas of the city, from the single-room flats of inner-city blocks to the family houses of exclusive suburbs. They can move securely in parts of the city which are dangerous zones on the map for most other city dwellers. Examples include the Havana complex (district XIX), a large part of district VIII, the Pongrác út complex (district X) and the part of Ferencváros between Haller utca and Vaskapu utca (district IX). They know the areas, and they know the useful behavioral patterns. As one of the characteristics of the areas listed above is the running of private sphere matters in public spaces, daily contacts can be maintained by briefly driving around the area. At such times a quick hello and a few sentences exchanged with an acquaintance appearing on the street is enough, and through this the connection is newly activated and fresh information concerning business, friends, and relatives can be collected.

The orientation of Roma who spend most of the day driving through the city is assisted not only by street names, but by other points of reference as well. The most important are those hospitality establishments where a part of the day is spent. Their role was even greater before the popularization of the mobile phone: they were places from which to make phone calls, and where the server would pass on messages. It was rare that non-Roma would enter such establishments, but there were no atrocities at such times. These places were generally in the central areas of the city, from where most other points were quick and easy to access. The men spent much of the day drinking coffee, talking, or playing on machines in these places. They exchanged information, weighed the potential of various business opportunities, and when a good opportunity opened up, they drove away in their cars and returned once they had finished their business. Wherever a place for a meeting was to be designated, they would describe the point using the names of bars and cafés, or arcades, as opposed to street names. Other points of reference included the names of various markets

(Bosnyák Square, Keleti Station, Teleki Square, Garai Square, etc.) or pawnshops and jewelry stores.

To summarize, it can be stated that the space utilization of the studied group was characterized by a high level of mobility, and by the ability to move among divergent space- and social-structures. This was related to the nature of economic activities and the form of settlement of extended families. The ‘imagined’ city as such was rather group-specific, and minimally understandable or usable to outsiders.<sup>9</sup>

### *Some Characteristics of Economic Activity*

It is a generally accepted view that the choice and form of various Roma groups’ economic activities are to a large degree defined by the surrounding majority society’s structure, where activities include each of providing services, buying and selling, begging, collecting, and stealing.<sup>10</sup> This is what leads to the high level of flexibility, which is often referred to as a definitive characteristic.<sup>11</sup> The Roma economic strategy adapts quickly and effectively to changes in society; the same thing occurs when the Roma community changes the framework of its life, by moving to a new type of settlement or a new country. Among other things, this ability to adapt was studied by Michael Stewart, when he studied lifestyle development of a Vlach Roma community living in an inflexible (in terms of economy and labor policy) socialist Hungary, which was based on compulsory work.<sup>12</sup> This is an issue dealt with by Leonardo Piasere as well, who analyzed the survival methods of those Slovenian Roma who often crossed the western Yugoslav border into Italy, taking advantage of the economic characteristics of both sides of the border.<sup>13</sup>

From the 1980s a new term has been used to understand the wandering-Roma cultures, this being the category of “peripatetic communities” which stresses the dependence of these communities on the client society in both political and economic ways. Given the cultural characteristics of the Budapest Vlach Roma, it seems worthwhile to examine to what degree this term can be used regarding formally settled communities.<sup>14</sup>

Stewart examined the adaptation strategies of Vlach Roma in the then-socialist Hungary of the 1980s. His work was done in a village environ-

ment, with the exception of some “successful Roma” who managed to enter the city market through selling brooms or used cars.<sup>15</sup> From the end of the 1980s the transformation to the market economy has brought significant and rapid changes in Hungarian society. The changes have produced winners and losers, especially in terms of livelihood. The years of uncertainty which accompanied the transformation meant that many were unable to find their place within the new parameters. Many legal foggy patches and difficult-to-interpret laws were passed, and many social institutions no longer offered protection. These tendencies slowly made their effects felt in Budapest, where, in a relatively small area, a great number of people and families became acquainted with the feeling of insecurity. Here, for a wide stratum, the early years of social reform meant using up the savings and properties accrued under the previous system. At the same time – partly as a result of the above – it became possible to redistribute some materials and material goods, and to develop significant new-styled personal wealth. With relatively little capital, taking advantage of the uncertainty of the transition, high profits could be attained throughout the economy, but especially in the gray- and black-markets. Orientation and information became especially important, in order that nearly daily changes could be followed. Flexibility, the ability to recognize situations, and the ability to adapt, were huge advantages. This period – although it is not quite over – is coming to a close.

Thus, through the 1990s, Hungary’s economy changed, and with it Hungarian society changed as well. In this changing environment Hungarian Roma had to find those economic opportunities which could cover their financial needs. They needed to find and make use of opportunities in a way in which the forms and responsibilities of activities would not stand in sharp contrast to their habits. It can be said that the changes favored the group which I studied: many activities, which earlier were carried out illegally and at the risk of running in with the law of the day, were legalized. The regime change legalized the view of the economy based on market relations, and liberalized trade and the offering of services in the private sector.

I try to approach the economic activities of the Budapest Vlach Roma from two aspects. First I would like to try and show which activity forms were developed and/or continued as a response to the changes in the econ-

omy as a whole. What does the oft-mentioned flexibility and ability to adapt mean in a concrete place and in a concrete historical period? Second, we may ask whether social-structural changes occurred as a result of the appearance of economic opportunities, the plurality of activities, and the resulting differentiation in wealth within the community; and if they did occur, how did they make themselves felt in the division of roles and the distribution of goods? Did the traditional, egalitarian relations of the Roma men remain, does the segmentary model continue to function, or, like in other communities, are changes observable?<sup>16</sup> Most of their contacts with the society surrounding them are through economic activity, whose value system has changed. Successful businessmen can become acquainted with more and more lifestyles, and there are no material obstacles to being attracted to them or even adopting them. A few financially successful families have the opportunity to adopt consumer habits to which only a small and limited portion of the majority population has access, and this may strengthen stratification within the community.

Trade is not a new-style Roma vocation. Various groups were described centuries ago as trying to make money through independent means, with men, for example, trading in horses and small objects.<sup>17</sup> In Hungary – even in the time of the state socialist model – they tried to avoid wage labor, or at least escape it at the first available opportunity. Many of them had fictitious official workplaces at collective farms or factories, where they never showed up, and could thus freely make use of their time.

Trade was a definitive activity of the studied stratum. The heads of families were businessmen, and referred to themselves as such. They deal gold, precious stones, watches, antiques, works of art, cars, scrap metal, clothing, and real estate: anything with quick turnover and acceptable profit. Stewart tried to describe Roma business-dealings with Ricardo's exchange of goods formula: the trader buys goods for cash, and then sells the goods for more cash, that is to say, makes money from money without adding to the quality of the goods.<sup>18</sup> This was characteristic of the business practices of the Budapest Roma as well: little energy needs to be put into improving the quality of the goods, and should it be done, the improvement is minimal and short-term. It was common to 'dress-up' the good to be sold in a way that made it seem more valuable for only one or two hours.

This may have meant wallpapering wet walls in a flat or shining a corroded car, which in both cases would cover up the serious faults. If a flat was being sold in a house where several Roma lived, and where non-Roma would have been reluctant to move in, it would happen that the businessman would order everyone to go inside their flats (from the gallery) for the time at which the buyer would arrive, in order that a higher price be demanded for the flat. But beyond improving surfaces, it was very rare to invest energy in improvements requiring more time, even though there was awareness that this could mean not acquiring lucrative profits. At times they begin construction, but if they get a good offer before completion, they will sell. According to their philosophy, “what’s in the pocket is secure” and “quick money must be respected.”

It was characteristic of the studied group that women took part less and less in economic activity, and instead, domestic and child-rearing duties become of primary importance for them. This does not mean that women earning money was in contrast to community norms. Sometimes husband and wife travel the city together, or the woman will handle the work which is tied to a space – for example at the door of a pawnshop, while the husband roams the street. If the man and woman are seeking opportunities together, they will often play on the view held by non-Roma according to which Roma women are of loose moral fiber. If the potential business partner is male, then the woman will approach him on the street or in the wine-bar, and regardless of his age and appearance, will call him “sweet young man”, will pull up close to him, put her arm around him, invite him to buy her a drink, or even pay herself, should the situation demand it. At these times the husband will watch the events from afar, but act as if he is not noticing his wife’s ‘flirtatious’ behavior with the potential customer. In this way, by the time the question of whether there is any jewelry or any antiques for sale, or whether he wants to sell his flat and buy a smaller one, is put forth, the business partner’s sense of trust has significantly increased, as he feels he is an irresistible man.

Despite these examples, the men dominated such work. The foundations of their work were mobility, quick and rich information flow, and a high level of openness to any type of quick and potentially profitable business. Not once were they unable to recognize a good opportunity, and in such situations they were able to improvise.

Large areas were covered by travel every day, making the car an indispensable tool for work. Travel usually took place within Budapest, but trips to the countryside were not rare, and neither were trips to foreign countries – mostly neighboring countries – when news of promising businesses there arrived. In such cases information came from acquaintances, relatives, or friends living in the given areas.

The car was not just a means of transportation, but was also a prestige-increasing factor. It was a way for Roma businessmen to gain recognition and draw bewilderment from their surroundings, as well as to illustrate the success of their business dealings. Further, it was an important means of hiding their ethnic identity – they were trying to belie the negative stereotypes of the majority of other Roma.<sup>19</sup> They tried to present a picture of themselves which was more reflective of the identity of the city's majority, but this was limited to a portion of the non-Roma population with which they maintained business relations.<sup>20</sup> It is difficult for them to conduct business, as a large part of the population consider them part of the perceived thieving, violent, and cheating Roma ethnic group. To make themselves acceptable as serious business partners, they had to pay serious attention to how they presented themselves. The kind of car with which they arrived at the scene of doing business was not a trivial matter, and for this reason money was not an obstacle. The most favored makes were Mercedes and BMW, and within these the larger, gas-engine models were preferred, which suggested strength and economic power. Attention was paid to ensuring that the interior of the car was most impressive. Large cars of a good make gave self-confidence, and helped the Roma to act decisively when in contact with the non-Roma environment, guaranteeing the seriousness of the car user, strengthening his position and trustworthiness at various business transactions.

The factors mentioned above also affect the mode of dress. The widely held stereotype of the Roma appearance is that of one who is dirty, unwashed, and wearing raggedy and unkempt clothing. This cannot be the case, however, for serious businessmen. Thus, the men paid more attention to having a clean and immaculate appearance than did their non-Roma business counterparts.

The wearing and love of jewelry is characteristic of both sexes and all ages, and this is a Roma trait which had been observed some time ago.<sup>21</sup>

Gold is most favored and is the favorite symbol of wealth, even compared to other, seemingly more rational options. It is a means of payment, especially for transactions within the group, and many Roma own scales which are accurate enough to establish the weight of the gold.

The men leave home at a relatively early hour, around 7-8 a.m. If they do not have a specific business meeting planned, then their first trip is to their regular bar or coffee bar. These are usually found by the city's major intersections, markets, or railway stations, where there are many people about, and from where most points in the city can be accessed quickly. In the regular haunts, they try and obtain fresh information, and plan the execution of some promising deals, through personal meetings or phone calls. There are numerous means of obtaining information: it can come from the many relatives living within and without the city, or through the established and developed network of daily contacts. The numerous relatives, friends, and acquaintances might have daily encounters with people who may represent good business opportunities. This might be a flat owner who is unable to pay his/her growing utility bills, a person who does not know the value of his/her recent inheritance (e.g., antiques), or someone who is in financial trouble and quickly wants to sell his/her car. Truly advantageous business deals can be done with those who are in a position of constraint, be this due to one's own mistake or a change in social environment – i.e., the break-up of a family, alcoholism, financial burdens, debt, unemployment – or with those who are unable to adapt to changing conditions.

When someone hears of such an opportunity, he will personally, or through the telephone, get in touch with his relatives or friends who are known to have enough cash or capital to handle to the potential business transaction. He will provide details regarding the potential 'clever' dealings, describing the amount of money needed for the transaction, the fee for providing information on the deal, and the plans for the meeting of the potential business partners. This fee is called the "mita" or "sight-money", and when accepting it the informer must guarantee that the transaction will take place according to the spoken conditions, that the seller will not withdraw, and that no complications will arise.

It is important to make a good impression on informers, given that having a large car, elegant clothing, and good jewelry will give the informer the impression that the businessman has ample capital, and thus, when an

opportunity arises, he, and not others, will be sought out. It can be said of the business appearance and behavior of the men that they try to give the impression of the successful businessman, often beyond the point of reflecting reality. Naturally they are good businessmen, but not necessarily in the way that this term is usually thought of. They lack long-term strategies, which may be due to their adaptability and flexibility. They have no bank accounts, as they use only cash as an acceptable means of payment. They do not buy shares, and are wary of long-term credit and leasing contracts. Most of them do not pay tax or social security. In the years of the transformation many economic factors escaped the attention of the authorities, but avoiding these now comes with a higher risk. As a result of the change of economic relations, the desire to be regular tax payers and to have accountable incomes is increasing.

It is not characteristic for the men to have long-term associations with one another to undertake economic activity. Associations are usually incidental, and last for the duration of one or two business deals. It is often said that money can be made only with money, and this is observable in practice. For this reason the request for a loan – should one not have enough capital for a good business transaction – can be a point of conflict. In such cases the only acceptable route is to incorporate the lender as a business partner, and to split or share the profit according to the level of the investment. Exclusive professional specialization is rare: an exception is the handful of families dealing antiques at the Ecseri market, whose stands stood there even in the times of the socialist system. Everyone does have his main profile, however, and this is known among the members of the community and among those they are in direct contact with. People know who deals mostly with real estate, or antiques, or jewelry, and who has the most experience in given areas. This, however, does not mean anyone is fenced out from ‘reaching in’ to a given business area when there is a chance to make quick money – knowledge of various areas of trade is rather wide.

The above-mentioned flexibility, high level of information, and ability to orient one’s self in the markets of different kinds of goods makes possible a common form of transaction, the barter. This is an opportunity which is a great advantage for the Roma trader, especially when the offer to barter originates from the customer. It is not a great accomplishment to buy something which is offered at a low price. But the number of those inter-

ested in the transaction decreases when the customer asks for not only cash, but a barter object as well. For example, one might want to sell his flat, but wants a smaller one in exchange. Or one might want to replace his car with a cheaper one, given that he needs some cash but still needs to get around. Sometimes a person will ask an unrealistic price for the object of the transaction, and at these times the trader will try and take another approach. He may offer some cash, and pay the rest by offering a car, watch, piece of jewelry, VCR, stereo, or anything the customer will accept, and which the trader can present as an object of high value.

They are able to respond quickly to changes. If scrap metal is not doing well, they can switch to antiques. If the press is beginning to write about the “flat (real estate) Mafia” they can quickly switch to selling cars. This is easy for them to do because they do not use registered companies, agencies, or expensive employees: executing a quick and risk-free change in profile for a short or long period of time is relatively easy.

In the group of Budapest Roma traders I studied, income usually came from the profits of transactions with non-Roma. This of course does not mean that they do not trade with one another: such dealings are usually problem-free and please both partners. They know one another’s habits well: the border between the ethical and non-ethical is the same for both sides. If a Roma family which has encountered tough times offers to sell its jewelry to a Roma trader, it is aware that the trader is making a business agreement as opposed to taking the goods in the name of charity. It is natural for both parties to assume that the price in such a case will be below market value, as the trader still needs to find the final buyer, which will require time, must spend money on gas for the car and mobile phone costs, and needs to make a living. Once someone has sold something and received the agreed amount of cash, he/she cannot ask how much profit the trader made on the deal.

For similar reasons they are happy to do business with the members of other minorities living in Budapest, like the Chinese, Arabs, or Turks, for whom trade is an everyday practice, and who are clearly aware of the advantages of the (potentially less, but) “quick” cash of the moment.

Despite its large circle of potential clients for the traders, it is difficult to establish any kind of relationship with the majority population. The Roma businessmen must deal with the stereotypes found in public opin-

ion, which makes many in their environment careful and distant when maintaining relationships. In several instances a transaction was cut before closure because the non-Roma customer was scared, or was talked out of the deal with the Roma by neighbors or relatives. Non-Roma buyers or sellers must be convinced over some period of time that the potential business deal will be problem-free, that the money will be paid, that the goods will be delivered, etc. Those traders who are able to relegate to the background the marks of their ethnicity or, alternately, take advantage of those characteristics, are the ones who have been truly successful over the years. They try to execute this invisibility strategy through the above-mentioned style of dress, but this goal is also served by using fancy business cards, which often are marked with the title “manager,” or by using an overly-fancy style of speaking.<sup>22</sup> An extreme but relatively common form of this tactic is for the Roma trader to bring along a non-Roma [*span*] on various occasions. Such a contact can be a real advantage, as this can bring about access to some customers who, because of their prejudices, would otherwise not be willing to do business.

Further, the good trader must know how the customer thinks, and must be clear regarding the fact that non-Roma think of business somewhat differently. Many, particularly from the older generation, condemn such “making money without work.”<sup>23</sup> They try and convince such customers that they are practiced businessmen, but that in this case they mean to purchase for themselves, or that they want to use the object of negotiation for a future trade, and in this way don’t want to make a profit on the deal, but are only trying to adjust to their current material situation.

When dealing with business transactions with non-Roma, one can often observe the tactic which is the opposite of those described above, where the trader emphasizes his ethnic characteristics, often to the point of exaggeration. These characteristics are chosen and adjusted according to the stereotypes held by the majority, and the traders play out the negative roles which are deemed the most characteristic based on either real observation or imagination. Such negative elements include: forcefulness, loud speech, threatening, swearing, and scaring tactics. These traits are stressed in a degree and form which is not characteristic of their daily behavior.

It can be said that exceptional business successes over the years are attained by those who, when dealing with the wider environment, are able

or willing to emphasize or de-emphasize the marks of their ethnic identities when this is to their advantage. Those who know the value system and the view of Roma held by the minority are in the best position to do this. They need to know the everyday practices of the non-Roma world, even when, in many cases, they do not adjust to them. This is the only way they can take advantage of the economic opportunities offered by a city of two million inhabitants. This means a larger and wider stratum accepts them as partners within the non-Roma society. It is a great advantage to be able to move comfortably among the layers of society which are slipping downward, as this is an opportunity to buy anything from gold chains to property under market prices. Or, relationships can be established with the representatives of the gray- or black-markets, from which goods can be obtained. Further, it is a big advantage to be able to sell goods at market price without the help of middlemen. To do this, one must be able to inspire trust and to conduct business negotiations with those from other layers of society who have buying power. The business activity of a successful Budapest Roma trader can be understood as the ability to establish the flow of goods among strata which would otherwise not (or, only rarely) be in touch with one another. This ability to establish contacts and relationships springs from the tactic of being able to control the intensity of ethnic identity marks according to given scenarios.

The urban living space, maintaining intense relationships with the wide environment, and resulting chances of economic success all contribute to the development of long-term positions of authority within the Budapest Vlach Roma community, and affect inner relation structures. A successful trader will make new contacts in the city every day, is increasingly oriented in the business world with its regulations, formal conditions, and official matters, and is thus better able to skillfully and effectively make use of opportunities and resources available to him. He may have a lawyer who helps with complicated matters; he has acquaintances in official agencies, the local government, and perhaps even the police; he has control over adequate material resources, with which he can activate his network of contacts when necessary.

The demonstration of success is also directed back to his own community, and often the exaggerations which ensue are part of the momentary "bluff strategy".<sup>24</sup> This is one of the important means of attaining and keep-

ing an exceptional position within the community, and of course this brings with itself a great deal of expenses. The superficiality of the home, hospitality, dress and car use all serve this purpose.

The members of the community more and more often look to such successful people for help with their matters and problems, and ask them for all kinds of assistance. But the enlisting of successful people is an increasingly common solution for solving conflicts within the community. This means that personal authority based on prestige and economic might have been introduced within the traditionally male-egalitarian Roma community. This may impair communal authority, and may lead to the questioning of, or opposition to, communal judgments (which are traditionally expressed by the “court”, the *Roma Kriz*). The level of influence of personal authority is increasing, as the portion of acquired goods meant for redistribution in the community has become “symbolic capital” collected in the hands of the successful man, and it can easily be transferred to economic capital.<sup>25</sup> Successful men are sought not only to solve problems, but in the hope of helping potentially good business deals by handling the complicated or dangerous or high cash-value transactions, or helping in times of – often physical – conflict.<sup>26</sup>

This type of authority is closely related to the given individual’s material resources, and its development was brought forth by the unique economic opportunities of the 1990s. It has brought a change in the life of the Roma community by introducing a new kind of vertical structure. This change is still at its beginnings: positions of authority are not tied to families or institutions, but only to specific individuals thanks to their level of economic success. The practice of this kind of authority in community matters is opposed by the majority, including many of the successful. Practice, however, shows that such theoretical opposition is not enough to stop the process.<sup>27</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Patrick Williams, “The invisibility of the Kalderas of Paris: some aspects of the economic activity and settlement pattern of the Kalderash Rom of the Paris suburbs,” in Salo, Matt T. (ed.), *Urban Gypsies: Special issue of Urban Anthropology*, 1982 (11), p. 318.

- <sup>2</sup> Péter Niedermüller, "A város: kultúra, mítosz, imagináció," *Mozgó Világ*, 1994 (5), p. 13.; Martin Laba, "Városi Folklor – viselkedésmódbeli megközelítés," in Annamária Lammel and Péter Niedermüller (eds.), *Folklor, kultúra, életmód* (Budapest: 1986), p. 36.
- <sup>3</sup> Niedermüller, p. 15.
- <sup>4</sup> Niedermüller, p. 16.
- <sup>5</sup> Gábor Havas and István Kemény, "A magyarországi romákról," *Szociológiai Szemle*, 1995 (3), p. 12.
- <sup>6</sup> Péter Ambrus, *A Dzsembuj* (Budapest: 1988), Katalin Berey, "A cigánytelepek felhasználása és újratermelődése," in Utasi Ágnes and Mészáros Ágnes (eds.), *Cigányélet* (Budapest: 1991), p. 42.; János Ladányi, "Szegregáció és gettószódás Budapesten," in Nagy Gábor Tamás (ed.), *Félünk* (Budapest: 1993), pp. 25-8.
- <sup>7</sup> Havas and Kemény, p. 15.
- <sup>8</sup> Gábor Wilhelm, "Kultúra, társadalom, etnicitás az oláh cigányoknál." in Barna Gábor (ed.), *Cigány néprajzi tanulmányok 1.* (Salgótarján: 1993), p. 30.
- <sup>9</sup> Niedermüller, p. 6.
- <sup>10</sup> Patrick Williams, "Paris–New York. L'organisation de deux communautés tsiganes," *L'Homme*, 1985/25:3, p. 127.; Michael Sinclair Stewart, *Daltestvérek* (Budapest: 1994), p. 132.; Leonardo Piasere, *A cigánológusok szerelmei (Válogatott tanulmányok)* (Budapest: 1997), p. 58.
- <sup>11</sup> Piasere, p. 29.
- <sup>12</sup> Stewart, chapter VII.
- <sup>13</sup> Piasere, p. 122.
- <sup>14</sup> Cf. Sir Angus Fraser, *A cigányok* (Budapest: 1996), p. 202.; Judit Törzsök, "Két észak-nyugat-indiai peripatetikus nép: a lohárok és a bandzsarak," *Cigányfűró*, 1995 (1), p. 3.
- <sup>15</sup> Stewart, p. 131.
- <sup>16</sup> Stewart, p. 120.; Wilhelm p. 30.
- <sup>17</sup> Fraser, p. 196.
- <sup>18</sup> Stewart, p. 200.
- <sup>19</sup> Williams, 1982, p. 326.
- <sup>20</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, "Az identitás és a reprezentáció," *Szociológiai Figyelő*, 1985 (4), p. 18.
- <sup>21</sup> Fraser, p. 114.
- <sup>22</sup> Williams, 1982, p. 325.
- <sup>23</sup> Stewart showed this difference in viewpoints by contrasting the farmer who earned his wealth through hard work and the lucky Roma horse-trader. Stewart, p. 200.
- <sup>24</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *A társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek újratermelődése* (Budapest: 1978), p. 394.

<sup>25</sup> Bourdieu, 1978, p. 390.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Marcel Mauss, "Ajándékok és viszonzásuk," in Paul Bohannon and Mark Glazer (eds.), *Mérföldkövek a kulturális antropológiában* (Budapest: 1997), p. 370.

<sup>27</sup> Other pieces used for this study include: Károly Kocsis and Zoltán Kovács, "A magyarországi cigánynépesség társadalomföldrajza," in Ágnes Utasi and Ágnes Mészáros (eds.), *Cigánylét* (Budapest: 1991); János Ladányi, "A lakásrendszer változásai és a cigánynépesség térbeni elhelyezkedésének átalakulása Budapesten," *Válóság*, 1989 (8); Judith Okely, "Szimbolikus határok," *Café Babel*, 1991 (1); Csaba Prónai, *Cigánykutató és kulturális antropológia (Rövid vázlat.)* (Budapest: Kaposvár, 1995).

ÉVA KOVÁCS and JÚLIA VAJDA

## “Blacks Are Not Usually Labeled Jews” – Why Does a Colored Boy Go to a Jewish School?<sup>1</sup>

*ABSTRACT: Emma was born in 1956. Her parents survived the Holocaust with the help of false documents and their Slavic appearance – goes the family legend. Emma was brought up by her parents, according to communist principles. She is already 17 when she first learns from her aunt that she is Jewish. She meets her husband, Ben, a Nigerian, in 1976, and they leave for Nigeria. A year later Emma returns alone, pregnant, and from then on, her relationship with Ben is almost completely cut off. In 1990, Emma sends her child to a Jewish school.*

*The analysis of the narrative interview reveals that for Emma, the meaning of choosing a stranger from a different culture was to get rid of a stigma. The presence of the colored child born from the relationship comforts her – if she manages to hide the Jewishness of the child, this covers her Jewishness as well. Along with this, she seems to be trying to protect her son from her identity problem: the color of his skin gives clear evidence of who he is and where he comes from. A decade later, she changes her strategy: now she wants the hidden stigma to be revealed and seen. And once more she uses her son to achieve this: if her son attends a Jewish school, he becomes Jewish. And if he is Jewish, that means that she too is Jewish.*

*ANDRIS: They didn't call me a Jew. Which is understandable, because I don't look Jewish. There are people who think that you need sideburns and a big nose and black hair, but anyone can be Jewish, like if you are blonde... Some people I can*

*recognize, concretely... I don't know whether they're Jewish, but they have all the characteristic features, but that doesn't mean they're Jewish. It's just likely. They make good money, they're smart... When I heard about the Jews, I usually heard that they are very smart, smarter than average. And their appearance, they have big noses. That's the average... Religious people think that they are a separate group, and that they are the chosen ones, and that they didn't get baptized then. That leaves me cold. I don't understand, maybe they need faith, but I have no need for it. Any company is good for me.*

*I didn't know anything at all about Jewry. I knew there was a Second World War, that there is a different calendar, so I knew about the big things. I don't know much more even now, but don't tell anyone.*

*It wasn't separated for us, because when we spoke about religion maybe, I really don't like it, I still hate it, I don't like religion, I don't believe in God, and we were talking about Christianity and Judaism too.*

*There are Jews in our family. My cousins are Jewish, and my mother, and my grandmother, and apparently my great-grandmother, but not many in the family, more acquaintances. I don't know when I found out, probably it came up by accident, maybe grandmother... but for sure, nothing influenced me at all... It didn't mean anything to me, so I don't like matzo ball soup because it's the symbol of Jews, but just because I like it.*

*We don't talk about the war, and I don't talk about... the past at all, about what's happening or what happened a couple of years ago or a long time ago, so that to me is a subject for history, which doesn't really interest me.*

Since 1989, Jewish primary schools operate in Hungary again. Originally only one school was planned, but ideas on what it should be like differed to such an extent that teaching has been going on in two places.<sup>2</sup>

The regime change offered a chance to reformulate various individual and communal identities, but, at the same time, a situation was created in which no one could sidestep a rethinking of his/her identity. The extension of social publicity and the gradual construction of a civil society led to the pluralization of communal identities. The change in the political system and the growth of democracy increased the choice of political identities. The ethnic and religious renaissance of the eighties meant that notions of ethnic identity had to be reformulated.

Earlier research into the Hungarian Jewish identity has shown that one can no longer speak of a group that can be clearly and quantitatively described in sociological terms.<sup>3</sup> However, there are certain marks of collective identity which continue to characterise Jews, perhaps now more than ever before. Perhaps the most important element is a reactive sense of identity, which derives from the Shoah and anti-Semitism.<sup>4</sup> A new feature of the eighties was that the social environment also favored certain positive aspects of identity.

Sociologists of migration in the West look on the revival of ethnicity as a “third generation” phenomenon. Following the desire of earlier generations to assimilate – perhaps because this had failed – this new generation rediscovers or mobilizes its ethnic identity, returning to the symbols of its grandparents, or creating new ones. The Hungarian Jewish renaissance can also be considered a third generation phenomenon, in the sense that this renaissance primarily concerns the third post-Shoah generation. Parents belonging to the second or third generation can once again send their children to Jewish schools, freely practice their religion and join Jewish cultural associations or Zionist organizations. Following the collective silence of the grandparents and their desire to assimilate, they can now own their Jewish identity or create pluralist forms of identity without precedent in 20th century Hungary. Their children – the third and fourth generations – are the first for whom pluralist forms of identity are a given fact.

The schools are just part of a process in which a group that is very heterogeneous in its sociological characteristics or lifestyle makes an attempt to reformulate its collective identity, creating new symbols for their purpose. Their true significance – in contrast to other alternative schools – is therefore not found in the difference between the education they offer and that available in state schools, but in their role in the reorganization of the Jewish identity of three generations (children, parents, grandparents) and of Hungarian Jewry as such.

The reason for the latter is that such a step by parents is by no means considered “normal” in Hungarian society: the parents themselves become “norm-breakers” in the eyes of those in their gentile environment. We searched for an answer to the question: why do parents do this? What is their individual motivation to do so?

The answer lies in the individual life stories of the parents. Below we present an individual case history. (With changes in particular names and sites, in order to protect the individual rights of the interviewee.)

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The analysis of our interviews was focused on the above issues. The narrative life history interviews were conducted and analyzed with a method based on structural hermeneutics.<sup>5</sup> This means that the subject speaks freely about his or her life story, i.e., it is he or she who 'edits' the narrative – both the topics and the chronology. The role of the interviewer is 'restricted' to supporting the subject by his or her presence and attention. All we said to our subjects was that we found *the given school attractive* and that was why we were interested in what kind of parents took their children there. We then asked them to relate their life history, thereby outlining the frame of the conversation. We deliberately did not say that we were specifically investigating a *Jewish* school; the emphasis was put on the *attractiveness* of the school. We let the subjects themselves explain what the school meant for them.

Thus the main emphasis in the analysis was laid on understanding the internal logic of the interviews, formed by the speakers themselves. This was preceded by the assessment of biographical (family historical) data collected from the narrative and put into chronological sequence. These two together helped us to form hypotheses on the structure and interrelation of the narrated and real life histories. The hypotheses gained this way were tested by the fine-grain analysis of parts of the narratives.

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In the spring of 1994 we contacted Emma and Andris to interview them. Emma was one of the parents who, following our request, expressed willingness to talk to us concerning the Jewish school. During our preliminary telephone conversation Emma appeared exceptionally helpful and open. She also apologized repeatedly for not knowing much about the school.

As it happened, we met Andris first. Therefore, at the time of our conversation with Emma, we were already aware of the fact that Andris was a mulatto boy, born from the marriage of a Nigerian man and a Jewish woman.

Emma was born in the spring of 1956, as the third child of parents belonging to the nomenclature.<sup>6</sup> Her father, Andor Kállai, was a university student at the time of the so-called “Act of *numerus clausus*” (1920). As he could not study in Budapest, he read economics in Vienna. During the German occupation (1944) he was hiding in Hungary and, being an activist of the resistance movement, was commissioned by the Party to forge documents. This is where he met his future wife, Etelka, Emma’s mother, who was attracted to the communist movement as a young woman. Later on the mother, Etelka, worked for the „Pioneer Association” and in 1980 she retired from the Party Headquarters. The father, Andor, worked as an engineer at „Tungsram” factory, where he finally became the head of a major department.

The family shared their upper middle class flat with Etelka’s aunt, Zsófi. Etelka’s mother had died in childbirth and her father – in accordance with Jewish tradition – married his deceased wife’s younger sister, Zsófi. It was she who brought up Etelka.

Among the members of the parent’s (Andor and Etelka’s) families, only a few survived the Holocaust. Etelka, whose Slavonic appearance hid her Jewish identity, delivered forged passes to those in need, dressed as a nun. None of them wore the yellow star. Auntie Zsófi returned from Auschwitz by herself. The other surviving relatives emigrated to Australia or to Israel. Auntie Zsófi continues to light the candles every Friday, attends the synagogue, pays the religious community contribution and keeps a kosher household for herself, while cooking for the rest of the family as well.

Emma is a young girl with average abilities. After leaving primary school she goes to grammar school, where she specializes in Russian. After a year, however, she moves to a class where they follow the non-specialized curriculum. She takes an active part in the activities of the Young Communists’ Organization at the school and in its district. Her suggestions are rejected in a debate over the nomination of the members of the delegation to the World Youth Festival (VIT). She quits the Young Communists’

Organization and never returns to the movement. As an adolescent she does not share the political views of her parents.

She is offered a place at the mathematics and physics department of Lóránd Eötvös University (ELTE) with the help of personal connections only. After a year she gives it up and transfers to the College of Finance and Accounting. While still at ELTE, she meets her first great love, who, shortly after they split up, emigrates to Israel with his new girlfriend. Emma tells Auntie Zsófi about her misfortune in love – this is how she discovers that they, as well, are Jewish.

At college Emma has an eventful social life. They frequently go on excursions, to clubs, or to discos. At a summer camp by Lake Balaton in 1976 she meets her future husband, Ben. Ben is a Nigerian man, a medical student at Moscow University. For Emma's sake he transfers to the University of Medicine in Budapest, albeit with considerable difficulty. This is where he completes his final year.

They get married at Christmas in 1977 and Ben moves to Emma's flat. According to their plans, Emma is to take a year out of College and go to Nigeria with Ben. In the spring of 1978 Ben flies home to make the necessary preparations for Emma's arrival, who duly follows him in the summer. They stay with Ben's family. Emma soon gets pregnant. Two months later she returns to Budapest and moves back to her parents, where her brothers and Auntie Zsófi also live. She decides not to take the year off and continues her studies.

Not long before her final examinations Andris is born. At the time of the child's birth Ben comes to Hungary for a fortnight. Emma soon receives her degree and stays at home with her son for two years. Auntie Zsófi dies shortly thereafter. After the two years at home Emma finds a job with the district's state-owned property management office. Andris goes to nursery school, but he is often ill and Emma often takes sick leave. She falls in love with an old friend from grammar school, and they go out together for three years.

At junior school Andris practices swimming competitively and most successfully. He is 8 years old when they visit Ben in Nigeria, where Andris meets his father and his father's family. Finally, after a two-month stay, they return home. Andris takes up fencing instead of swimming and soon becomes a member of the national team.

In 1986 Emma's father dies. In 1988 Emma enrolls in a management-training course at the University of Economics. In 1992 she applies for a position as a company director in Szolnok and she is accepted. She moves to Szolnok, and spends only her weekends in Budapest. In 1993 she enrolls Andris at a Jewish school.

During the interview, Emma mentions more than once that she is *uninformed* about the school, but it is not the only topic that she cannot talk about. We asked her to tell us the story of her life.<sup>8</sup> She finds this question difficult, and often asks us to clarify what we mean. She cannot give herself up to her story. Her short, interrupted communications initially concern the times when her parents met. She begins her story with the parents' story – they met in the resistance movement in 1944. She thus immediately brings up the subject of Jewry. Her evaluating comments, which interrupt her narrative time after time, suggest that she is undecided as to what extent her parents' Jewish origin was important for them. Presumably, she regarded the interview situation as a challenge. She felt she needed to give an account of her Jewish origin.

Indeed, she goes on to talk about her father, specifically about the period between the two world wars, about her father's studies in Vienna. She interrupts her story, however, with the comment that her parents never talked to her about their earlier days. Emma believes that the reason for this could be her parents' *confused* attitude towards their own origin. She explains that her parents regarded Jewishness as a religion, which was of no concern to anyone in the 1950s. Therefore, they could concentrate on their professional lives and the movement. Next, Emma tells us about her parents' professions and communist careers, closing her account with the remark that her *parents worked all the time*. She then attempts to describe their family life. She does not, however, get around to recalling concrete experiences. What her short reports convey is that she had an *ordinary* childhood. In this context, she starts to speak about her parents once again. Through her explanations an idyllic picture soon unfolds about her childhood. In this picture her mother is *friendly and sociable*, while her father is an *abstracted character*. The adjectives used by Emma suggest a kind of distance, since these adjectives are unusual in characterizing a parent-child relationship. They seem more suitable for describing the sentiments of one adult toward another.

Later on Emma is still unable to relate stories from her childhood. She prefers to evaluate. Other important personal relationships in her life appear in her narrative in a similar fashion. She cannot talk about Auntie Zsófi, her sisters, Ben or Andris without keeping a greater or lesser distance. Then Emma herself seems to be alarmed by this distance, and she turns to her parents' defense. *The grandchildren loved Emma's mother and her father was a very honest person, she goes on to say. She completes their characterization with the statement that after all, her parents had a very good marriage. After a short pause Emma adds their work and the movement was very important for them.* Following these fluctuations we had the feeling that she cannot talk about her parents from close, perhaps because she could never get close to them, or perhaps closeness would only evoke painful memories.

When the movement comes up again, it indeed evokes negative memories. Emma recounts that as an adolescent she had serious political debates with her parents. She does not give the details of these perhaps painful conflicts, but returns to the subject of their Jewish identity instead. She points out that her aunt was of *Semitic persuasion* and that in spite of this she still was not aware of their Jewish origin. In her opinion, the reason for this was her parents' prim attitude towards everything. Jewishness and the movement were not the only things they could not talk about openly in the family: talk of sex was also taboo. There is a prolonged pause again in her narrative. Then she goes on to report on her parents' Holocaust experiences. From this broken discourse we learn that her parents were hiding and helping others as part of the illegal movement. Emma emphasizes that what made this feasible was the fact that her parents did not have visible Jewish features, and that they worked in "disguise". This is where it first emerges that for Emma the questions of origin and visibility are closely related. As if the stigma existed only if it could be seen, as if one's origin could be put on and taken off again. All this emerges from allusions only. She cannot leave the subject but perhaps its proximity alarms her, too. The remarks interrupting her reports explain that she does not know more about this because it is one of those subjects which was treated primly by her parents. They did not boast of their deeds, not even in retrospect. In her evaluating comments, Emma emphasizes how *humane* her parents were in those times.

Next, Emma gives an account of the family's losses in 1944. The succession of subjects suggests that she is concerned with survival.

Contrasting her parents, who escaped from the Holocaust, with the lost members of the family, shows the inheritance of the survivors' sense of guilt. She tells us that her parents went so far in not talking, that she was already at college when she had to find out from her aunt that she is Jewish. Why is it at this point that she can relate a fragment of her story coherently for the first time? Possibly, this is when she has first departed from her attempts to describe her childhood, the moment when the secret determining her childhood has been revealed. The taboo subject of Jewishness could be one of the reasons she cannot talk about her childhood. A new detail comes to the surface, that her *Semitic* aunt has the knowledge of the secret – and it is her to whom Emma could turn with her disappointment in love. Emma is ambivalent, however, about revealing the secret: she cannot recount the story itself, even though she emphasizes repeatedly how little it worried her. From her narrative, which is rich in allusions, what exactly it was that did not worry her cannot be reconstructed: that the secret had been revealed, or Jewishness itself.

After this episode there is a long pause in her narrative, she is waiting for us to help. When, however, we want to ask her about her aunt, she interrupts us with the information that Auntie Zsófi did not talk much about this, either, that she *held back* her religion. Emma interprets this with ambivalent feelings. On the one hand she respects Auntie Zsófi for being able to do this – for the sake of peace in the family –, and on the other hand she tries to justify her parents having compelled Auntie Zsófi to do this. The motif that her parents must be forgiven for everything returns, since who knows what they had to go through in those days? As we listen to Emma defending both sides, we feel that as a child she experienced the ideological conflict between the two generations as a choice between her parents and Auntie Zsófi.

Emma is so concerned with the secret, that following her only story about the unveiling, she returns to the subject with her next narrative. She tells us that not long before her father's death, she *demand[ed] an explanation* as to why they had concealed that she was Jewish from her. Her father replied that he was glad neither of his daughters had married a Jewish man, which, as her comments reveal, upset Emma to a great extent. Finally, just as before, she defends her father's reaction by noting that he lived through different times than did she.

From then on, Emma stays with the subject of Jewishness for a long time. First she tells us about another conflict with her father. She explains that *perhaps* she would have liked to have her son, Andris, circumcised *for medical reasons*, but her father disapproved. She then notes again how important it was for her father that his children should not choose Jewish spouses. We are again faced with the problem of visibility: circumcised men can be recognized as Jewish, there is no disguise that could hide it perfectly. In Emma's intent to have Andris circumcised, the wish to make her origin visible and irrevocable if not in herself, then at least in her child, may play a role. As a bizarre twist of life, this same child is one whose origin could be "seen" right from the moment of his birth, since he inherited his father's black skin color and features.

It is through this subject that Emma's son, Andris, first appears in her story. Next, we hear broken stories about Emma's attempts to clarify her origin within her environment, which invariably failed. Finally, she talks for a relatively long time about a Jewish girlfriend who took her to a few Jewish gatherings in the university years, and who later married an Orthodox Jew. From Emma's comments we find out that she did not consider these gatherings really important. She preferred to go out. She is ambivalent about her own attempts: she seems to be angry with those who were unwilling to talk about the subject, but at the same time she cannot really accept submitting to Jewish identity. The way she does not differentiate between the "Friday nights" and going out not only suggests that she is trying to lessen the significance of these gatherings, but also shows certain associations in seeking a partner. The context also implies a fantasy about choosing a Jewish partner, which is rejected together with the meetings. Emma's ambivalence about Jewishness appears in her comments. She is jealous of those who are religious, she says, and she would like to bring up her son in a similar vein, but she herself is unable to do it. That is why she enrolled him in a Jewish school.

In the end she concludes that, as she could not have her son "visibly" Jewish, she will arrange Jewishness for him in the form of religion. If one cannot see it, at least one can believe in it. Religion can be put on and taken off again, and can be held back the way Auntie Zsófi held it back. By regarding Jewishness as a religion Emma returns to the old family model: her adult environment consisted entirely of "believers", the religious Auntie

Zsófi and her fundamentalist communist parents, who could reconcile the two fundamentally different ideologies in everyday living presumably on this same basis.

What is the significance of the Jewish school in Emma's relationship with her son? With her choice Emma wants to turn Andris into a Jew, to strengthen this thread of his origin and with it the connection between them. Due to this family constellation, she does not experience her Jewishness as an inherited ethnic identity, and it is understandable that she sees religion as a mediator, through which she may be able to rediscover her Jewish identity. At the same time, due to her choice of school, Jewish identity becomes somewhat "visible" for her as well. Andris is not only Nigerian, but Jewish as well, and both can be seen.

In the final section of our interview we asked Emma about her first meeting with Ben. As previously, she begins with forced laughter. "*Just when we were on holiday at Lake Balaton (laughs), the usual things, nothing special...*" she answers. Then she remains silent for a long time. Finally, she begins a broken narrative about the problems they had: it was difficult for them to put together the necessary documents for their marriage, they lived with her parents, Ben finally went home to look for a job, while she continued her studies at college and enrolled in an English course with her girlfriend. *As I said, it was important for her that she was Jewish and they, for example, had the children circumcised, but properly, I mean not in the hospital but ritually, yes and then I went to Nigeria. [She closes her story before a long pause.]*

When we ask her about Ben's two-week visit, she gives a short answer again: *It was nothing special*, she says and then falls silent. It can be seen that Emma cannot really talk about her relationship with Ben. That story is not part of the picture she has created about herself. Only the long pauses and her forced laughter allude to her embarrassing experiences. Her motherhood and her Jewish origin seem to be much more important for her. It is this, again, that she contrasts with the enclosed story of her marriage. The sudden appearance of the subject of circumcision can only be interpreted as the rejection of the non-Jewish Ben.

We asked Emma to tell us about the period when they lived together in Hungary. *It was all quarrelling...* she begins after a short pause, because Ben had a large company of young men, which she did not like. She immediately adds that her parents did not mind, because they were *very good*

natured, and they did not have much of a family life anyway: *We lived like two children*, she finishes. She then goes on to say that everyone liked Ben, even Auntie Zsófi, because he was a *friendly chap*. Emma does not depict their relationship as man and woman living in matrimony, but rather as the loving relationship of a brother and sister. She does not like to talk about the quarrels. She returns to the idyllic picture with which she would like to characterize her childhood. She keeps a distance in presenting Ben and mentions Auntie Zsófi again. What part could her aunt have here? Is she just one of those who liked Ben or did her appearance show Emma's attachment to the Jewish context? Could it be that Auntie Zsófi's approval of Ben justifies Emma's choice for her?

We ask Emma about the day when Ben moved in with them. She becomes irritated and starts arguing with us: *I've no idea, perfectly normal, listen, someone moves in with you, either a boy or a girl, from this point of view it doesn't really affect you, at least I can't remember, the whole thing's like, I can't remember...* Then she becomes apologetic, that in general there are a lot of things that she does not notice. Then she turns to us, *just ask me more!* Next, she mentions that a Jewish girlfriend of hers also stayed there for a while, *So people can come here any time, it's not a problem, there's nothing to notice, that someone else sleeps here, too*, she says.

Emma really cannot talk to us about their marriage. It in part may be due to her idea that she needs to appear as a Jew in front of us. She would like to lessen the weight of her past choice. She presents Ben as one of many friends. The meaning of the reappearance of the Jewish girlfriend may be three-fold. First, it plays a role in de-emphasizing Emma's relationship with Ben. Second, it implies that the presence of Jews in the family flat was nothing remarkable. Third, it may be a message to us, in the interview situation. Taking the associations further: if Jewishness was not dealt with in Emma's family, why should they have been concerned with Nigerian origin at all?

*My parents had a large circle of friends as well*, continues Emma, further decreasing the importance of the relationship, *...though Dad wasn't a very social type, maybe Andris takes after him a little*. Andris, therefore, has the outside features of his African father, his nature, however, is from Emma's father, a person who is ambivalent about his Jewish origin.

At the end of the interview the second trip to Nigeria comes up again, for the last time. Emma emphasizes again that it was *unpleasant*, but did not

change anything in their lives. *Ben and Andris got to know each other and decided whether they wanted to keep in touch... I'm not against it, either...*

It seems that Emma cannot bear the burden of their trip and of her unfortunate marriage. She feels guilty for taking Andris's father away from him, but she cannot let him identify himself with him. She thus creates a situation where her son is confronted with a task, which Andris cannot possibly cope with at his age.

ANDRIS: *It was eight years ago. It was good then, because it was the first time in my life that I flew, and I liked that, and I saw the whole city there, and I swam in the Lake, so I had a good time there... I thought it wasn't him, because several people came to pick me up, and I didn't know who he was, he was the tallest, and I thought that's him, and it was... I don't know what day we left... in the morning we went out to the airport, and I had to transfer in London. That was good. I remember the food, because it was really great. Arriving in Budapest was a big event, because Mom made cake. That was the trip, really. I only think about it when I look at pictures or some object, I remember the lake, my Father's brother was a stock agent, so I was at the stock market, and my Father's other brother worked in a gem buffing plant, and I was there, and I really liked that. We were in other places too, like a ranch, that was good... We don't talk about me being Nigerian. No, we don't talk, we don't even talk about my father at all... They're used to it, that's how they know me. I'm used to it too, this is how I was born, that's it... I could become disadvantaged because of this. If you think about it, about opportunities, then no. I don't know. I didn't even know I was Jewish. There are so many different kinds of people in our class.*

During the interview we asked Emma about Andris several times. The subject finally comes up twice, in very similar ways, as if 'by chance'. Finishing the story of her latest successes at work, she tells us about her having the child. For a long time, it is not clear what she is talking about. She starts her narrative with adjectives suggesting an uplifted emotional state, such as *superb* and *I felt wonderful*, which appear again and again in her story. These adjectives – as before – are followed by calmer, less emotional evaluative comments. We do not know whether she is talking about her pregnancy or the trip to Nigeria. Then she mentions her coming home. It is not clear to what event she attributes the happiness that she tells us

about: to her pregnancy, to her trip to Nigeria or perhaps to her return, or maybe to the fact that she became pregnant soon enough. It is also possible that she felt relieved as she had returned home and it was this relief that the superlatives express. Later she tells us how nice it was that she could continue her studies and *it* did not show. Emma's classmates at college, who learned about the *event* from her, were also *pleasant and friendly – in their own way*, she says. Emma's words suggest loneliness; even if her pregnancy gave her pleasure, she had no one to share it with other than her (*in their own way*) pleasant classmates, who did not notice the *event*. Our impression is that she would have had to be grateful to her classmates for simply not hurting her, even though they knew about the event. But what is this *event* that her classmates could only acknowledge in their own way? Perhaps it is not simply the fact of being pregnant, but the hidden, not yet visible stigma.

After a long pause Emma tells us about childbirth, qualifying it with all positive adjectives. At the same time, the recalled experiences suggest suffering and pain. She then goes on to describing Andris as *a beautiful, adorable baby*, who she often *lent* to close or distant relatives. In these stories her son does not really appear as a flesh and blood child, but rather as a doll with beautiful hair. As his story unfolds, Andris still does not come alive.

In the present as well, Emma only sees her son from outside. She emphasizes more than once that she does not know what happens to him at school, or how he experiences his mixed Jewish and Nigerian origin. *He is a big boy, he can decide what he wants, I can't worm it out of him*, she says more than once.

The narrative, of course, shows that these are not the words of an irresponsible mother. As Emma is worried that she cannot solve the problem of his origin and that she might weigh down her son in her loneliness, she chooses to leave the big questions of life to Andris. This is also evident from the fact that the episodes and experiences related to the adolescent Andris are embedded in the story of Emma's new life. While she does not emphasize her job or career at all during the period when Andris was a little boy, and talks about her informal, social life only, in the recent past she also becomes a career woman. In those days Andris was a social link, *a beautiful baby*. Now he is a grown-up partner, who supports her in her successes at work. In this role Andris appears as a real person.

It can be seen from the radical change of jobs and Andris's enrolment at a Jewish school that Emma alters her life fundamentally, and this is reflected in her altered narrative. Up to this point her life was determined by the play of identities and stigmas. Making visible the stigmas she previously wished to hide enables her to shape her own self. In doing so, she also tries to transform her relationship with her son. While she urges Andris to become an adult, perhaps prematurely, and pushes their personal mother and child relationship into the background, placing it on a different level, she also gets closer to her son. From now on their Jewish identity (as well) connects them.

INTERVIEWER: *Tell me about this drawing. (A woman and a young boy sit facing one another.)*

ANDRIS: *They share feelings. They look a little sad, maybe it's a mother and child. They belong together, the boy looks sad. That's it. Maybe they called him Jewish. That's what I think. Maybe he did something wrong. Maybe he failed his homework assignment.*

INTERVIEWER: *What are they saying?*

ANDRIS: *'Don't do that...' or something like that. The child is nodding, and saying, 'sure'.*

INTERVIEWER: *Here's another drawing. (A man and a small boy facing one another.)*

ANDRIS: *The father is taking, saying something interesting, and the boy is listening with interest. He's saying something interesting or very important, and the boy is sitting and listening. Maybe the father is teaching the boy something...*

INTERVIEWER: *Here's the third drawing. (A man, a woman, between the a small boy, adults facing the boy.)*

ANDRIS: *It's actually two parents who are proud of each other, because the boy loves them. That's why the boy is looking like that. There's a look of praise on his face... Both are really saying what a bright and good-looking boy they have... The boy is just listening. Only they believe the boy is really on their side. The boy is actually not even there...*

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Our research project was supported by the National Foundation for Scientific Research (OTKA). The present study was conducted using the hermeneutic case-reconstruction method. This method was also employed in our study entitled "Leigazoltam a zsidókhoz' – A társadalmi zsidó identitás élettörténeti gyökerei," *Thalassa*, 1994, No. 1-2. (Appeared in English as: "I Have a Certificate of Not Being Anti-Semite' – Identity of a 'Social Jew': its Its Roots in Life History," *East European Review*, Special Issue (II), 1998.)
- <sup>2</sup> See Éva Kovács and Júlia Vajda, "Jewish School – Jewish Identity," *BUKSZ, English Edition*, 1993.
- <sup>3</sup> For information on history and identity research see the following volumes, Nathan Katzburg, *Hungary and the Jews. Policy and Legislation 1920-1943* (Ramat-Gan, 1981); Viktor Karády et al., *Jewry in Hungary after 1945* (Paris: 1984) – published in Hungarian; Balázs Füzfa and Gábor Szabó (eds.), *On the Jewish Question* (Szombathely: 1989) – published in Hungarian; Ferenc L. Lendvay (ed.), *Seven Decades in the History of Hungarian Jewry, vol 1, 2* (Budapest: 1990); Péter Hanák (ed.), *Jewry, Identity, History* (Budapest: 1992) – published in Hungarian; Jenő Lévai, *Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry* (Zürich: 1948); Ferenc Erős, András Kovács and Katalin Lévai, "Comment j'en suis arrivé à apprendre que j'étais juif?," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, (56), 1985.
- <sup>4</sup> On the losses of the Hungarian Jewry in the Holocaust, see Randolph L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York: 1981). On the Shoah-identity, see Teréz Virág, "Children of the Holocaust and their Children's Children," *Dynamic Psychotherapy*, vol. 2., 1984, pp. 47-60; Ferenc Eros, Júlia Vajda and Éva Kovács, "Intergenerational Responses to Social and Political Changes: Transformation of Jewish Identity in Hungary," in Yael Danieli (ed.), *International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma* (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1998).
- <sup>5</sup> See Ulrich Oevermann, "Die Methodologie einer "Objektiven Hermeneutik" und ihre allgemeine forschungslogische Bedeutung in den Sozialwissenschaften," in H. G. Soeffner (ed.), *Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften* (Stuttgart: 1979). Also by the same author, 'Zur Sache. Die Bedeutung von Adornos methodologischen Selbstverständnis für Begründung einer materialen soziologischen Strukturanalyse', in L.V. Friedeburg (ed.), – *Habermas, J. Adorno Konferenz*, (Frankfurt: 1983); F. Schütze, 'Biographie-forschung und narratives Interview,' *Neue Praxis*, 1983, 3. On the empirical application of the method see Gabriele Rosenthal (ed.), *Die Hitlerjugend-Generation. Biographische Thematisierung als Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Essen: 1986). The same

author, 'Geschichte in der Lebensgeschichte – Leben mit dem "Dritten Reich" gestern und heute,' *Bios*, 1988, vol 1-2. The same author, 'The Biographical Meaning of a Historical Event,' *International Journal of Oral History*, 1989, vol. 3. The same author, 'Als der Krieg kam, hatte ich mit Hitler nicht mehr zu tun' Opladen, 1990, 6. *Methodischer Anhang*, 246.

- <sup>6</sup> Emma's biography was reconstructed and arranged in chronological order on the basis of the narrative life history interview made with her.
- <sup>7</sup> Words and expressions taken word by word from the interview with Emma are marked by italic typeface.

# REVIEW ARTICLES

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VILMOS TÁNCZOS

## An Unusual Study of the Csángó

Valentin Stan and Renate Weber,  
*The Moldavian Csango*, 32 p.

On June 16, 1998, at the Szabadság Square headquarters of the Inter-Európa Bank Co., an English-language booklet on the Csángó of Moldavia, by two Romanian authors from Bucharest, was presented in the presence of the President of the Republic of Hungary and representatives of international diplomacy and human rights organizations.<sup>1</sup> The study, of which 3000 high-quality copies were published, was commissioned by the Budapest-based *International Foundation for Promoting Studies and Knowledge of Minority Rights*. The production and printing of the summary was supported by the Inter-Európa Bank Co., which operates the Foundation.

We generally do not expect such summaries to provide new scientific results, but instead we await primarily correct orientation and information through which the publication, in an indirect manner, can contribute to the preservation of minority identities and cultural values. The study at hand is particularly important as it will undoubtedly influence those international political and human rights organizations whose activities affect, or may affect, the Csángó of Moldavia.

Below, I will voice some of my reservations regarding the study by the two authors from Bucharest, foremost in order that I may draw attention to the misinformation it contains, and thus alert public opinion and political elites of such.

### 1. *To Whom Exactly Are We Referring?*

The authors should, before anything else, clearly answer the question of which minority is being studied. The definition of the subject of the study may be approached through classical means (which, in my opinion, could have been utilized in this case), for example, declared identity, linguistic-, religious-, or other culturally-unique traits, the origin of the ethnic group, or geo-historical divisions or definitions. The authors use none of these approaches to state a definitive position, and thus their summary does not shed light upon who exactly the Csángó are. In one passage (p. 8, note no. 4.) they seem to suggest that the Csángó must be sought among the 250,000 Moldavian Catholics, noting that some researchers put their number at 200,000.<sup>2</sup> If this is the case, then they must answer why the remaining Moldavian Catholics are not Csángó, and must address the mother-tongue divisions of those labeled Csángó, in light of their assimilation into Romanian culture. It appears that the authors want to hide the fact that a significant portion of the 200,000 Moldavian Catholics considered Csángó speak Hungarian to this day. According to my own calculations, those Csángó who speak Hungarian (among other tongues), i.e., those who are not fully assimilated, number over 60,000 in Moldavia.<sup>3</sup>

If there exist no Csángó of Hungarian origin, or who speak Hungarian, then there is no linguistic or cultural assimilation to speak of – this is a quite logical consequence of the position of the authors. One of the most significant gaps in the study is that the authors make no mention of the rapid assimilation of the Csángó – be this forced or spontaneous integration – which threatens the unique, if archaic, culture and language of the ethnic group. Naturally, missing is the mention (or admission?) of the fact that this process of assimilation, which is in its final phase, strengthened at the time of the birth of the modern Romanian nation-state, i.e., the second half of the 19th century, and is today not independent of Romanian nationalism.

But if the authors do not wish to acknowledge the existence of Csángó with Hungarian-style traditional culture in Moldavia, then who exactly is the summary about? Which minority is it meant to defend? It appears the answers to these questions is in the chapter on demography, where the authors treat declared identity as an objective and authoritative starting

point. They state that in the 1992 census the majority of Csángó declared themselves to be Romanian, while a smaller portion declared themselves Hungarian, and further, 2165 Romanian citizens were found who claimed they were Csángó (p. 11.). This statement, however, is rather unclear. First, the 2165 individuals claiming to be Csángó were registered in the *area of the entire country*, meaning this number included self-declared Csángó from Transylvania (e.g., from the Gyimes, Hétfalu and the Déva areas, and Csángó who had settled in Transylvanian cities). Thus, according to official data, the number of *Moldavian* Csángó should be even lower. Further, the study does not state how many Csángó claimed to be Magyar, compared to the number of those claiming to be Romanian. To supplement the work of the authors, I add that the 1992 census found 525 Magyar-origin Catholics in the villages of the Moldavian Csángó settlement area. If these two numbers (2165 and 525) are compared to the number of Moldavian Catholics (close to 250,000), then the following quotes from the study must be viewed as misleading: “Generally the Csángó claim to be Romanian (the majority) or Magyar.” (p. 11.) “Populations in other villages are mixed, where some Csángó claimed to be Romanian, while others claimed to be Magyar or Csángó (these latter two groups speak the Csángó dialect).” (p. 18.)

The publication then clouds the fact that the number of those officially claiming to be Magyar or Csángó is quite insignificant. The authors themselves, at one point, note that the credibility (impartiality, reliability) of the census data is questionable (p. 24, note no. 57.), but when trying to define the term Csángó, they use declared ethnic identity as found in the census, and use no other approaches. This leads to a rather rough simplification of the question of Csángó identity, because, as we see, the official 1992 Romanian census – which reports 525 Magyar and two-thousand Romanian (non-Magyar!) “self-confessed” Csángó – practically leads us to the “zero-version”.<sup>4</sup> This official stance is accepted by the authors, which is odd in light of the fact that we would expect something different from a human rights publication. In fact, we might expect such a study to *shed light on the nature of the unique Csángó identity*, and to explain why a significant proportion of Csángó is linked to the Hungarian language and culture, despite the fact that practically the whole of the Csángó identify themselves as Romanian. If only those identifying themselves as Csángó (maximum 2165 persons) or Magyar (525 persons) speak the Moldavian “Csángó dialect”

(i.e., Magyar vernacular), as stated in the study, then how is it possible that folklore researchers and linguists studying Moldavian Catholics have collected such a large mass of Magyar material in recent decades? (It is well-known that Moldavian Csángó folklore has preserved some of the most archaic elements of Magyar folk-poetry. A large number of publications are testimony to these cultural characteristics. To our knowledge, there are to date no publications on Romanian-language Csángó folklore.) If there exists no unique Csángó identity tied to Magyar culture, then how is it possible that a portion of Moldavian Catholics to this day demands Magyar-language education and church services? If we use exclusively the official census data as a starting point, how do we make sense of the fact that while the 1948 Romanian census reported altogether 6618 Magyar-speakers in Moldavia, the Magyar People's Association supported numerous Hungarian schools in Csángó villages?

One of the relevant passages of the publication also presents misleading information: "In the first years of the Communist dictatorship, from 1947-1959, the Magyar Csángó living in Moldavia had Magyar-language education, and were able to practice religion in their mother tongue," write the authors (p. 21.). The Hungarian schools of Moldavia – with the exception of the Lészpéd school, which was shut down in 1960 – were open only until the summer of 1953, and the majority of them were closed even before then. Religious practice in the mother tongue never existed among the Moldavian Csángó, particularly not under the time noted above, as after 1940, as a counter-effect of the Vienna decision, the opportunity to sing in Hungarian was closed even in the churches of those villages where this practice had survived the anti-Magyar acts of the 1920s and 1930s.

According to the official census, Moldavian Catholics today have completely lost their mother tongue and Magyar-consciousness: this, however, is naturally not the case in reality. *The authors play into the hands of Romanian state-nationalism when they use declared identity of the Csángó as a starting-point and further refuse to acknowledge those linguistic and cultural peculiarities which do not appear in official measurements.*

The publication – which takes the declared identity of the Csángó to be authoritative – neglects to note the widely publicized fact that the 1992 census was preceded in Moldavia by the strong propaganda of the Catholic church. The gist of this is to be found in the false etymology dating back to

the last century, whereby, as the *Roman Catholic* (in Romanian: *romano catolic*) faith actually means *Romanian Catholic* (in Romanian: *român catolic*), the Csángó ought to identify themselves as Romanian. Magyar publicists and researchers were also aware that in certain villages the census data-collectors, without even asking the question, automatically marked everyone as being Romanian in the national identity category. Further, they even refused to mark down certain individuals as Magyar when these census subjects insisted upon it.

The publication makes mention of a dozen or so “Bákó County” villages where, according to the authors, the Csángó speak the “Csángó” or “Csángó-magyar” dialect at home in the family. (p. 18.) In light of the above, this is self-refuting, as the study indicates that the number of those who do not speak Romanian cannot be merely 2000-2500 persons. The “geographic approach” utilized in the study contains what we must consider a “minor” mistake, whereby of the listed villages, four are not to be found in Bákó County: Szabófalva (Săbăoani), Kelgyest (Pildești) and Újfalú (Traian) are in Neamț County, while Jugán (Iugani) is in Iași County. Further, with the exception of one or two elderly individuals, no one in Jugán knows Magyar, and very few speak it in Újfalú. There are, however, a number of villages in Bákó County where Hungarian (or, using the authors’ terminology, “Csángó” or “Csángó-Magyar”) is known and well-spoken, but which were not listed: Trunk (Galbeni), Lujzikalagor (Luizi Călugăra), Forrófalva (Faraoni), Somoska (Șomusca), Csík (Ciucani), Külsőrekecsin (Fundu Răcăciuni), Gajcsána-Magyarfalú (Arini), Lábnik (Vladnic), Szászskút (Sascut-Sat), Frumósza (Frumoasa), Láruga (Larguța), Gajdár (Coman), Diószeg (Tuta), Szőlőhegy (Pârgărești), Újfalú (Satu Nou), Szitás (Nicorești), and Gorzafalva (Grozăști). These are all villages not mentioned by the authors, but which are well-known by those researching the Csángó.

One of the ideological-tactical premises of Romanian nationalism takes aim at dividing the Magyar ethnic community, and thus nationalism likes to speak of Romanian-Magyars, Seklers, and Csángó. The authors of the study use this ideological approach when they write of the speakers of the “Csángó dialect.” This rather unclear and contradictory term is used to further divide those identifying themselves as Magyar (whose number, as we have seen, is hardly more than 500). They make the following confus-

ing statement: “Those Csángó who identify themselves as Magyar are further divided. One part of them feels they are members of the Magyar minority, while they speak an archaic Magyar language, which we know as the Csángó dialect; others, who also speak this old Magyar language, consider themselves Magyar-origin Csángó.” (pp. 10-11.) On one hand, they acknowledge that the Csángó dialect is a version of old Magyar, yet on the other hand, based on the uniqueness of the “Csángó tongue” – following D. Martinas – they conclude that the language is that of those Romanians who were forcibly Magyarized in Transylvania (pp. 15-16). Whatever the situation concerning the uncertain term, there is no mention in the study of the large number of those officially identifying themselves as Romanian who speak this “Csángó dialect”.

## 2. *The Csángó Past and the Question of Origin*

The authors feel that, from the viewpoint of the protection of minorities and human rights, the origin of a group is irrelevant when we are speaking of the community’s actual civic, political, economic, and cultural rights. (pp. 19-20.) If this were actually the case, it would not make knowledge of the origin and past of the minority redundant, because a completely ahistorical approach would make the understanding of factors defining contemporary identity rather difficult. The authors themselves share this understanding when, in the first half of their study, they write about the minority’s linguistic and ethnic origins, its geo-historical divisions and historical demographic developments, the etymology of the term *Csángó*, etc. As researchers of the Csángó have aimed most of their attention at these ‘traditional’ scientific questions – while very little research has focused on the ‘modern’ problems of the factual existence of Csángó identity – we should expect the authors to state a position based on knowledge of the latest scientific results.

Instead, what is presented to us is a mixed bag of varied scientific and pseudo-scientific stances. The authors attempt to introduce theories on the Csángó ethnicity in both parallel and soma form, but unfortunately they are unable to comfortably navigate through the literature. They know only a portion of credible Romanian and Hungarian scientific results, and they list

refuted romantic theories (e.g. the Kunnian theory of E. Geró and G.D. Ciroeanu, the Turk theory of N. Iorga, or the theory of Atila de Gérando or Jean Tatrosi, who think the Csángó are ancient inhabitants of Moldavia) and newer, completely unscientific theories alongside credible scientific results.

Neutrality and impartiality on the part of the authors is, however, only superficial. It is conspicuous that whatever detail is being discussed, the greatest emphasis and space is given to the points of D. Martinas' infamous book, which the authors introduce with minimal commentary and criticism. (According to the theory, the Csángó were Transylvanian Romanians who were Magyarized while in Transylvania, but only with partial success – explaining the mixed nature of their language – and who, because of national oppression, left in the 17-18th centuries for Moldavia.) The authors do not write one sentence which would distance themselves from this dilettante, nationalistic theory, and in some areas they adopt certain positions of the book without referring to the source.

The Martinas theory is “supported” by the linguistic characteristics of the Csángó dialect, which can be found among Transylvanian Romanians, but not among Moldavian Romanians. As the support of the theory in the study is limited to only some pieces of linguistic data, let's review the argument.

a) One of the pieces of evidence is that in certain Csángó dialects the *sh* sound is pronounced as *s*, while the *zh* sound is pronounced as *oo* (!), which “indicates their non-Magyar origin.” (p. 16)

Magyar linguistics shows that the so-called ‘hissing’ pronunciation (*s* instead of *sh*) is a Magyar linguistic characteristic from the Middle Ages. According to one theory, two forms of Magyar dialect existed in ancient times, one using *s* and the other using *sh*. The existence of the two dialects is indicated, for example, by the related etymologies of *sző-sővény*, or *szőr-sőrény*. The inhabitants of Middle Ages Moldavian Magyar villages – the northern and southern Csángó – carried with them the *s*-dialect, whose traces are to be found not only in Moldavian Magyar, but in Slavonian and Burgenland Magyar as well, i.e., they are preserved in the most archaic linguistic islands of the Magyar language. Thus, the study's position that this characteristic is not to be found in the Hungarian language is untrue. The replacing of *sh* with *s* is not found as characteristic of Romanian

Transylvanian dialects – refuting the position of the authors – not even in Bánság or Oltenia. (p. 16.) This unique Csángó characteristic is thus one of the pieces of evidence supporting the theory of the Middle Ages Magyar origin of the Csángó.

The pronunciation of *zh* as *oo* (!) (Ibid.) is characteristic of neither Moldavian Csángó-magyar nor Transylvanian Romanian dialects. Such a phonemic twist would go against the very nature and laws of phonemics, and is a linguistic impossibility. (The study does not provide any examples of this occurrence.) It appears that this is a case of the sloppy handling of sources, as the Romanian linguist Mircea Borcilă did write a study reporting the pronunciation of *sh* as *s*, and of *zh* as *z* (and not *oo*!). (Un fenomen fonetic dialectal: rostirea lui *s* ca *s* și a lui *j* ca *z* în graiurile dacoromane. Vechimea și originea fenomenului. *Cercetări de lingvistică*, X. 1965. 2.) D. Martinas did not even get the title of this study right (he was the first to see *zh* as *oo*, in his well-known book; p. 175.), and by following his footsteps, the Bucharest authors have made the same mistake.

b) Another piece of “evidence” supporting the relationship of the Csángó tongue to Transylvanian Romanian is based not on sound, but on lexicology and morphology, whereby the Csángó has “preserved some Transylvanian archaisms.” (p. 16.) The authors of the study use only one example to support this: the word for “brother-in-law” in Csángó is *ler*, which derives from the Latin word *levir*, which – with the exception of Csángó – “is extinct in all Romanian dialects,” including Transylvanian (Ibid.).

The Csángó word *ler* is very well known in both Magyar dialects and in the historical Magyar tongue. Following Dezső Pais, Magyar linguistics – including all the Academic publications and dictionaries – indeed traces the origin of the word to the Latin *levir*, meaning ‘husband of the older sister or of the mother’s aunt’, which was directly transplanted into the Magyar language of the Middle Ages. The first written instance of the work is from 1395, in the Beszterce Glossary. (To avoid misunderstanding: the glossary was found in Beszterce, but its origin has nothing to do with Transylvania.) Other historical Magyar sources are from 1405 (Schlagli Glossary), 1418 (János Rotemburgi, Magyar Linguist), 1570 (will of Ferenc Petőpolyai Tyukovit Horvát, captain of Eger, in *Régi*

*Magyar Nyelvelméletek*, II. 216.), 1572 (Zsélyi Glossary), and other sources from the beginning of the 16th century (Peer Codex, Leveles Tár I.).<sup>5</sup> The only dialect to have kept this word (in the form *rer*, which also means ‘brother-in-law’) outside of Moldavia is the Slavonian.<sup>6</sup> It is then appropriate to ask the question: how can one single word constitute the evidence of the Romanian origin of the Csángó ethnic group, especially given that it is not found in any Romanian dialects or Romanian historical sources, but has existed for centuries in versions of the Magyar language? One piece of evidence does not make for scientific evidence. This is especially the case for a false piece of evidence.

The most respected Magyar linguists (Gábor Szarvas, Bernát Munkácsi, Mózes Rubinyi, Bálint Csűry, Attila T. Szabó, Gyula Márton, Loránd Benkő, György Wichmann from Finland) have studied the Moldavian Csángó dialect, and they all expressed their positions in professional scientific journals. It is thus impossible to understand why the study makes uncritical references to a dilettante Romanian nationalist propaganda publication (D. Martinas) but makes no references to the work of the scientists listed above.

There are, further, several Romanian authors who have studied Moldavian Catholics, whose names are not to be found in the study. Without claiming to be comprehensive, I list a few, in order of the dates of their publications, whose ideas I would gladly have read in such a summary: D. Cantemir, G.I. Lahovari, Gh. Rosetti, C. Auner, C.I. Filitti, R. Căndea, Gh. Năstase, Gh. Călinescu, Gh. Moisescu, P. Râmneantu, C.C. Giurescu, M. Crăciun, etc.

### 3. *How Should We Handle Historical Sources?*

The authors do not feel it is justified to use the term *Csángó-magyar* to describe *Moldavian Catholics*. They state that throughout history this ethnic group has been bilingual, i.e., that it has always used the Romanian and Magyar languages equally. “It is an old confusion to mix the Moldavian Catholics with the Magyars. The two terms, to a certain degree, naturally overlap, as all the Csángó (who are considered Magyar by many authors) are Catholic. But the great portion of Moldavian Catholics are Romanian,

and it was this way quite some time ago as well” – claim the authors in note no. 29 (p. 14.). They try to support their position with a historical piece of data, a passage from a report by an Italian missionary named Del Monte, written in 1671. The text is paraphrased as follows: “For example, in 1671, the Italian missionary Del Monte showed that the mother tongue of the Moldavian Catholics was Romanian, adding that the Magyar language was also necessary.” (Ibid.) As this is one of the key sentences of the study, it is worth quoting the original Italian text: “...7. La Provincia di Moldavia, subiacce al domino di un Prencipe della natione Vallacha; ma tributario al Turco. 8. Che linguaggio vi sij necessario. Il Vallacho e proprio il nativo; ma perche anco in detta provincia vi sono dei Ungheri, ancora vi e necessario la lingua Ungarica.”<sup>7</sup> In English: “...7. Moldavia’s ruler is from the Romanian nation, and pays taxes to the Turks. 8. The country’s language is Romanian, while, given that Magyars also live here, the Magyar language is necessary as well.” Therefore, the source referred to makes no mention of the mother tongue of Moldavian Catholics being Romanian, but instead refers to the use of the Romanian language *over the entire province* (la Provincia di Moldavia), noting that given the presence of Catholics, knowledge of the Magyar language is also necessary.

In a similar manner, the authors misinterpret a passage from another report on Moldavia from 1781, which reports to Ignác Batthyáni, the Bishop of Transylvania, that the “Csángó-Magyars” (!) speak a unique style of Magyar. The term “*multo blesus*” in the original Latin refers to the “hissing” dialect of the Csángó (recall the pronunciation of *sh* and *zh* as *s* and *z*), and can in no way be interpreted as saying that the Moldavian Catholics speak poor Hungarian because their mother-tongue is Romanian. (p. 15.) The latin term means hissing, or lisp. The ‘missionary’ traveling through Moldavia thus was able to distinguish between the archaic Moldavian Magyar and the common Transylvanian Magyar dialects, which is natural, given that the person at hand is the Sekler Catholic parish priest Peter Zöld, who hid in Moldavia for four years after the Madéfalva Sekler murder (1764), and who, in his report commissioned by the Bishop, stated his position that Magyar priests should be sent in the place of Italian missionaries to the Moldavian “Csángó-Magyars”.<sup>8</sup>

Referring to refugees from Transylvania in the 17th and 18th centuries, the authors make a baseless claim that “the majority were Csángó, but some were Sekler.” (note no. 29.) With this they try to indicate that beside the Catholic Seklers, “Csángó” Romanian Catholics also arrived in Moldavia. However, historical sources of the time make no reference to Catholic Transylvanian Romanians before the religious union at the beginning of the 18th century, nor do they make mention of the need for Transylvanian Romanians who had taken on the Greek Catholic faith to escape to Moldavia. As historians have shown, the religious union – just as the establishment of the border guard at the end of the 18th century – was an opportunity for the social and spiritual development of the Transylvanian Romanian serfs.<sup>9</sup>

While the publication – unconvincingly – uses the misinterpretation of historical sources to show the historic presence of Moldavian Romanian Catholics, it does not mention that a mass of data from these same sources shows that from the 17th to 19th centuries, Moldavian Catholics insisted on having priests who spoke Magyar, and that the *De Propaganda Fidei* organization in Rome wanted to send Transylvanian Franciscans instead of foreign missionaries to Moldavia. Data indicating the above is to be found in the following 17th century documents, just to name a few: the letters of the Bákó, Tatros, and Románvásár Catholics to the *De Propaganda Fidei* congregation in 1653<sup>10</sup>, the request of Tatros to the visiting Archbishop of Bandinus in 1648<sup>11</sup>, the Magyar language complaint of Szabófalva and surrounding villages to the same organization in 1671<sup>12</sup>, the requests of Csöböröcsök to the Jesuit missionary Pál Beke in 1644, and to the ambassadors of Ferenc Rákóczi in 1706.<sup>13</sup>

These sources have been published in volumes edited by Romanians – foremost in the four-volume collection of the *Diplomatarium Italicum* series from 1925-1939. Antal Horváth, a parish priest of Csángó descent, recently published a Romanian-language collection of documents (*Strămoșii catolicilor din Moldova* (Sf. Gheorghe: 1994)) which presents basic and significant documents pertaining to the history of Moldavian Catholics. This publication was not used at all by the authors of the study.

#### 4. *How Should We Use Historical Data?*

The use of demographic data is also rather selective. In the chapter on demographics, the authors use only post-1930 census data, and they do not note that according to the 1859 Romanian census, 86.6% of the Catholic population of Bákó County (22,426 of 25,896 Catholics) and 94.6% of the Catholics population of Roman County (14,736 of 15,588 Catholics) identified themselves as Magyar.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, in the middle of the 19th century, the ethnic proportions of the two large Csángó masses were comparable to those in Sekler country, given that the vast majority of Catholics saw themselves as Magyar, according to the data of the Romanian census.

Unfortunately, the next Moldavian census, conducted in 1899, did not examine mother-tongue and ethnicity. But the shortcomings of the census are somewhat compensated for by the five-volume *Marele Dicționar Geografic al României* (Romanian Grand Geographical Dictionary), published between 1898 and 1902, which is a well-edited scientific piece, and which presents ethnic data from official sources by locals. Based on the demographic data in the volumes, we can conclude that the number of Moldavian Catholics declaring themselves as Magyar dropped in the second half of the 19th century, but was still very significant.<sup>15</sup> This fundamental Romanian source book was not used in the study, as knowledge of the official 19th century Romanian data would have forced the authors to conclude that the earlier spontaneous assimilation of the Moldavian Magyar Catholics sped up as a result of the assimilation policy of the modern Romanian state established at the end of the 19th century.

The census data used in the study, from 1930, 1956, and 1977 (pp. 12-13.), must be handled with care, as the authors did not note that the borders of administrative territories shifted between census years, therefore demographic data from various geographical areas cannot be compared across time. (e.g., the provincial boundaries of 1956 cannot be compared with the county boundaries of 1977; the 1977 and 1992 census reports list a part of the Gyimes Catholic Csángó among Moldavian Catholics, which had not been the case previously. The statement that in 1977 only 3813 people declared themselves as Magyar in Bákó county can only apply to

Moldavian Csángó if we subtract the 3000-person Catholic population of the Gyimesbükk community, as well as the county's Magyar Calvinist residents.)

The selective use of demographic data means attention is diverted away from those assimilation processes which have taken effect on the Moldavian Magyar ethnic group since the middle of the 19th century. These processes are in rather advanced stages today, to the point where currently only one-quarter of the Csángó understand and speak (to varying degrees) their ancient mother-tongue.<sup>16</sup> In order to stress the ratios of the process (which is unacknowledged by the study), I present the following table, showing the development of the Csángó's numbers.

The table clearly shows that the number of Moldavian Catholics increased almost five-fold between 1859 and 1992 (from 52,881 to 240,038), and that their proportion within the larger population also grew: while in the middle of the 19th century they constituted four percent of the Moldavian population, their proportion in the province today is six percent. This population increase is particularly worthy of attention given the increase in population of other Moldavian groups and the exodus of 65,000 Csángó over the past few decades.

At the same time it is clear that in the studied time the Magyar-origin Csángó – at least according to the census data – have completely lost their mother tongue and Magyar identity. In the middle of the previous century 71.6 percent of them (37,825 of 52,881 Catholics) declared themselves to be Magyar, while today only 0.8% (1826 of 240,038 persons) does so. If we note the geographic distribution of Moldavian Catholics in 1826, we see that the census found 1301 Magyar Catholics in the cities, while the number of Catholics declaring themselves as Magyar in villages was altogether 525 (excluding Gyimesbükk, which was later annexed to Moldavia). Therefore, according to census data, *the number of Magyars in Moldavian Csángó villages dropped to about 500 at the end of the 20th century.*

*The Number and Proportion of Moldavian Magyars  
According to Official Romanian Census Data:*

(1 = year of data collection; 2 = total population; 3 = number of Catholics; 4 = proportion of Catholics within the total population; 5 = number of Magyars; 6 = proportion of Magyars within the total population; 7 = proportion of Magyars among Catholics; 8 = data sources, all from census)

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1859	1 325 406	52 881	4,0 %	37 825	2,9 %	71,6 %	f.c. <sup>17</sup>
1899	1 848 122	88 803 <sup>18</sup>	4,8 %	24 276 <sup>19</sup>	1,3 %	27,3 %	f.c. <sup>20</sup>
1912	2 139 154	97 771 <sup>21</sup>	4,6 %	—	—	—	f.c. <sup>22</sup>
1930	2 433 596	109 953	4,5 %	23 894 <sup>23</sup>	1,0 %	21,7 %	f.c. <sup>24</sup>
1941	2 769 380	—	—	9 352 <sup>25</sup>	0,3 %	—	f.c. <sup>26</sup>
1948	2 598 259	—	—	6 618 <sup>27</sup>	0,3 %	—	f.c. <sup>28</sup>
1956 <sup>29</sup>	2 991 281	—	—	8 829 <sup>30</sup>	0,3 %	—	f.c.
1966 <sup>31</sup>	3 391 400	—	—	4 748 <sup>32</sup>	0,14 %	—	f.c.
1977 <sup>33</sup>	37 63 211	—	—	3 276	0,09 %	—	f.c.
1992 <sup>34</sup>	4 079 046	240 038	5,9 %	3 098 <sup>35</sup>	0,08 %	0,8 %	f.c. <sup>36</sup>

The authors not only *cloud the processes of assimilation* which are clearly visible in the official statistics, they also refuse to inform international public opinion of current assimilation, as they are unwilling to acknowledge the unique Csángó identity as described above.

★

To summarize, I evaluate the publication as follows:

1. The authors have incomplete and superficial knowledge of the literature on the Csángó and the Moldavian 'field' and thus suffer from insecure orientation.

2. The reliability of the data in the publication is decreased by the inaccurate and incautious handling of sources (e.g., missionary reports, census data) and the refusal to critique references (recall the inaccuracy of the quoted Csángó linguistic 'data').

3. The listing of the most varied views, without taking a stand, results in a clouding of the issues, which means that an under-informed reader, who may be reading of the term ‘Csángó’ for the first time, *will not receive answers to basic and expected questions*: what is the origin of the ethnic group? how many people speak the Csángó language? how is this language related to the Magyar and Romanian languages? to what degree is the community assimilated? what are the most important cultural characteristics of the group? how are language use and ethnic identity related? etc.

The most surprising aspect is that the infamous fallacies of one of the leaders of the Romanian legionnaire movement, D. Martinas, is used over and over again as if it were the Romanian scientific position (pp. 15-16.), and is never refuted, even though this theory is not supported by any other Romanian researchers.<sup>37</sup> (The book was published in 1985, at the time of the Ceaușescu-period’s frenzy, and its contents are deemed scientific only by the most unscientific nationalist propaganda publications.) In truth, Romanian researchers do not have a consensus view of the Csángó. Some agree or partially agree with Hungarian researchers concerning the question of origin (D. Cantemir, A.D. Xenopol, C. Auner, Gh. Rosetti, Gh. Năstase, etc.). The names of these researchers are either unmentioned, or mentioned just rarely, by the Romanian authors. It is unfortunate, for example, that Gh. I. Nastase’s 1935 piece is not mentioned in the study, in which the author reports results matching with those of Gábor Lükő regarding the origin of the Csángó and their geo-historical divisions.<sup>38</sup> (Because of this study, his name was left off the Romanian historians lexicon.<sup>39</sup>)

4. At several points, the study leads one to conclude that the ‘impartial’ handling of sources is purposefully causing confusion: *by presenting ‘information’ in the way it does, the study serves Romanian nationalist interests striving to assimilate the Csángó*. I find it unfortunate that many people – because of their lack of orientation – did not notice this.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Valentin Stan and Renate Weber, *The Moldavian Csango*, p. 32.
- <sup>2</sup> Among such researchers, they mention *James Kapalo*, whose name is mis-spelled throughout the study, as James Kapdo. (J. Kapalo, a British citizen, is, to my knowledge, of partial Hungarian descent.)
- <sup>3</sup> See Vilmos Táncoz, "Hányan vannak a moldvai csángók?," *Magyar Kisebbség, Új folyam*, III. évf. 1-2., pp. 370-390. An English translation of this piece, with a map appendix, was published (100 copies) by the Teleki László Foundation. Vilmos Táncoz, *Hungarians in Moldavia* (Budapest: Teleki László Foundation, Institute for Central European Studies, 1998).
- <sup>4</sup> Professor Vladimir Trebici, president of the Romanian Academy's Demography Committee, writes the following in one of his studies: "According to some Magyar sources their [the Csángó's] number is between 50-100,000. Yet the 1992 census recorded only 2100 Csángó, who were found under the "other nationalities" category." Vladimir Trebici, *Revista de cercetări sociale*, Anul 3., 1996, 1., p. 110.
- <sup>5</sup> See Jolán Berrár and Sándor Kárloy, *Régi magyar glossarium* (Budapest: 1984), p. 592, and Gábor Szarvas and Zsigmond Simonyi (eds.), *Magyar Nyelvtörténeti Szótár II.* (Budapest: 1891), p. 1417.
- <sup>6</sup> See Gábor Szarvas, "A slávoniai tájszólás," *Magyar Nyelvőr*, 5. évf., 1876. p. 12; József Balassa, "A slávoniai nyelvjárás," *Magyar Nyelvőr*, 23. évf., 1894, pp. 307-08; Olga Penavin, *Szlavóniai (kórógyi) szótár* (Újvidék: 1978), p. 27; Réka J. Lőrinczi, *A magyar rokonsági elnevezések változásai* (Bük: 1980), esp. pp. 77, 80, 88-92, 209.
- <sup>7</sup> Kálmán Benda (ed.), *Moldvai csángómagyar okmánytár* (Budapest: 1989), p. 641. Also in Gh. Călinescu, "Alcuni missionari cattolici italiani..." in *Dimplomatariu Italianicum I.* (Roma: 1925), p. 109.
- <sup>8</sup> Péter Zöld wrote of his Moldavian experiences in two pieces. The first was written in 1780, and was published in 1783 in Pozsony in János Molnár's volume entitled *Magyar Könyvház*. The German translation is to be found in *Ungarisches Magazin*.
- <sup>9</sup> See István Imreh, *Látom az életem nem igen gyönyörű: A madéfalvi veszedelem tanúkihallgatási jegyzőkönyve* (Bük: 1994), pp. 15-18; László Makkai, *Magyar-román közös múlt* (Budapest: 1987), pp. 885-89, 1032.
- <sup>10</sup> Kálmán Benda (ed.), *Moldvai csángómagyar okmánytár* (Budapest: 1989), no. 87, pp. 495-508. The translation of the details of the Románvásár letter is available in Antal Horváth, *Strămoșii catolicilor din Moldova: Documente istorice. 1227-1702* (Sf. Gheorghe: 1994), pp. 95-96.
- <sup>11</sup> *Okmtár* no. 76, p. 366.
- <sup>12</sup> *Okmtár* no. 119, pp. 667-69; Horváth, op.cit. pp. 113-15.

- <sup>13</sup> *Okmtár* nos. 56 and 141; Horváth, op.cit. pp. 62-63.
- <sup>14</sup> *Population de la Moldavie*, 1859 (București) (Populațiunea după naționalitate și cult). See Mihály Szadabos, "A moldvai magyarok a román népszámlálások tükrében," in Gy. Kiss (ed.), *Magyarságkutatás: A Magyarságkutató Intézet Évkönyve* (Budapest: 1989), pp. 89-102.
- <sup>15</sup> According to the calculations of Mihály Szadabos, in the 31 Magyar-inhabited communities of Bákó and Román counties noted in the *Nagy Földrajzi Szótár*, the proportion of Magyars in the last four decades of the 19th century went from 89.6% to 71.1%, thus "in 35 years, one-third of ethnic Magyars became Romanian." (Szadabos, *Ibid.*)
- <sup>16</sup> See the data in my study, footnote #3.
- <sup>17</sup> Szadabos, 1989, p. 91.
- <sup>18</sup> One part of them – at least 15,000 persons – are foreign (see the 1912 data).
- <sup>19</sup> The *Marele Dicționar Geografic al României* counts this number of Catholics as having Magyar as their mother-tongue in the 19 communities of Bákó county and 12 communities in Román county. (Szadabos, 1989. p. 94.) Others with Magyar as their mother-tongue lived in some other villages as well (e.g., the Catholic villages around Aknvásár), whose Magyar populations are not mentioned in the dictionary. Based on local experiences, these settlements – which are often completely Magyar – are marked accurately by Pál Péter Domokos (Domokos, 1938. pp. 304-08.) In the majority of these villages the Magyar language is alive even today. Thus, the number of native Magyar speakers at the turn of the century was larger than that stated in the dictionary.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>21</sup> Of these, 77,227 are Romanian citizens (3.6%), 19,429 are foreign citizens (0.9%, of which there are 8,226 Hungarian citizens, i.e., 0.4%), 1103 have no citizenship (0.1%), while 12 are of unknown citizenship (0.0%).
- <sup>22</sup> Source: I. Scarlatescu, *Statistica demografică a României: Extras din Buletinul Statistic al României*. 1921, Nr. 6-7. 55. 70.
- <sup>23</sup> According to mother tongue. When using nationality, 20,964 residents were found to be Magyar.
- <sup>24</sup> Source: Manuila, 1938.
- <sup>25</sup> According to ethnic origin.
- <sup>26</sup> *Recensământul general al României din 1941 6 aprilie. Date sumare provizorii* (București: Institutul Central de Statistică, 1944), XI.
- <sup>27</sup> According to mother tongue.
- <sup>28</sup> A. Golopenția and D.C. Georgescu, *Populația Republicii Populare Române la 25 ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii ale recensământului*. Extras din Probleme Economice. 1948. Nr. 2. 38.

- <sup>29</sup> According to the 1992 public administration boundaries, excluding Suceava county and Gyimesbükk.
- <sup>30</sup> According to nationality. The number based on mother tongue would be 15,000. (Using 1992 public administration boundaries, available data for 1956-1977 is based on nationality. Mother tongue data in 1956 and 1966 is based on the county boundaries of the time.)
- <sup>31</sup> According to the 1992 public administration boundaries, excluding Suceava county and Gyimesbükk.
- <sup>32</sup> According to nationality. The number based on mother tongue would be 7,000.
- <sup>33</sup> Excluding Suceava county and Gyimesbükk. The number of Magyars according to nationality.
- <sup>34</sup> Excluding Suceava county and Gyimesbükk.
- <sup>35</sup> According to nationality. (The number based on mother-tongue would be 3,118). Of these there are 1,826 Roman Catholics.
- <sup>36</sup> Source: *Recensământul populației și locuințelor din 7 ianuarie 1992. Structura etnică și confesională a populației*. București, Comisia Națională pentru Statistică, 1995.
- <sup>37</sup> The newest of these is a recently published volume: Bucur Ioan Micu, *Încercări violente de maghiarizare a "ceangăilor" români. 1944-1997* (București, 1997).
- <sup>38</sup> Gh. I. Năstase, "Ungurii din Moldova la 1646 după "Codex Bandinus", *Arhivele Basarabiei VI*. 1934. 397-414 and VII. 1935. 74-88.
- <sup>39</sup> Ștefan Ștefănescu (ed.), *Enciclopedia istoriografiei românești* (București: 1978).

MIHÁLY DOBROVITS

## Role-Player and Scholar: The Historical Essays of Miklós Gáspár Tamás

Miklós Gáspár Tamás is undoubtedly one among our authors who needs not fear complete and infinite death. He can be sure that his reputation and legacy will long outlive him. His works, though not carved from stone, are certainly enduring enough to ensure that they will live on in two countries. And this is how it should be. In the case of Miklós Gáspár Tamás, we must acknowledge both the body of work and the author's personality. Miklós Gáspár Tamás was capable of – sometimes spontaneously – renewing the image of the Hungarian citizen, and he plays this out with his sympathetic gestures to the arts. His walking stick, salon-jacket, “Sir, Friend, Member of Parliament” style is not an image to laugh at, but a consciously adopted example. This was how a liberal representative was supposed to be in the times of Andrásy and Kálmán Tisza, and, following the British tradition, it is how one ought to be these days. So the role was given. Miklós Gáspár Tamás's historical essays must be understood and interpreted in light of this, acknowledging that they are a verification of the picture of the ideal politician. Thus, we are not dealing with the works of a professional historian, but with parables. They are parables concerning how Magyar citizens in Central Europe should understand their historically-rooted role in contemporary days. This is a commendable position, given that at present, Miklós Gáspár Tamás is the only liberal author who does not acknowledge the intellectual livestock pen, which was established in and around 1992 by the governing intellectual elite of the time, according to which only they

can authentically comment on the history of the nation. Liberals thus have two options: they can either deny the existence of the nation, or they can accept the language of the other group.

In his volume called *Törzsi fogalmak* [Tribal Terms], the author is admittedly searching for values. Every line of his writing drips of the dignity of one who takes responsibility for his values. This is a great honor in a time when, to quote Miklós Gáspár Tamás, “every assistant director with any self-worth is beyond good and bad.”<sup>1</sup> Miklós Gáspár Tamás does not hide which values he is seeking. In his work he appears as the supporter of a liberal national state, the conservative, the liberal, the Protestant believer. In his own words, we are reading the work of a Christian thinker when we read his essays. The fact that this attitude does not seem to acknowledge that the leftist neophytes who lost in 1998 pay little attention to Miklós Gáspár Tamás’s opinions is largely beside the point. The prefaces to his works show that his positions are part of a debate, which the author is continuing with himself – even if he does not always make this perfectly clear. His changing positions regarding daily political events – even if these are a little too regular for my taste – are not the result of being a coat-turn, but of the close examination of his own positions. Whether this should lead the author to hold back a little from his nearly daily editorial writing is another question altogether. Admittedly, it can be a little painful to see how, with consistent moral positioning and detail, Miklós Gáspár Tamás opens fire against all that which only yesterday seemed to be the key to reaching his goal. But we must note that the author’s commitment to solid national-state values was already made clear when he was sympathizing with liberalism and was openly overturning the postmodern canon. He was practically the first author in the liberal camp to warn that culture (and especially public education) which was not based on strict value preferences would result not in a hundred blooming flowers, but instead in chaos. Miklós Gáspár Tamás’s intellectual position – which is often unfortunately somewhat hidden by the sudden temper of the publicist in him, in which he, in the manner of youths arguing in the beer garden, begins to throw open insults at Fidesz and Csurka (even though he was the one that told us that a gentlemen does not do such things, even on the gallows pole!) – is that of a scholar, and not a publicist. This is evidenced by his knowledge of the classical canon, which up to the 1950s was a mandatory condition for par-

ticipation in European cultural discourse, and whose golden age was precisely the middle and latter half of the 19th century, when acceptance of the canon was considered the basic condition for membership in the civilized (Western) world. One of Miklós Gáspár Tamás's basic virtues is his constant – though not overly repeated – reminding of this absence. One of the great values of his work is not just the attempt to speak in the language of lost tradition, but the fact that he draws attention to blemishes in the Hungarian cultural past. In other words, it would be good to go beyond the bankruptcy of postmodernism by trying to find points of reference through rediscovering (in his words, re-instating) our own cultural heritage. The breaking with this tradition was in the air since the 1920s (its foreshadows were apparent in the last decades of the 19th century), but the true break occurred in the cultural and social movements of the 1960s, which appeared revolutionary at the time. All this is summarized, along with a wide critique of 1989 Eastern Europe, in his essay entitled *Értekezés a civil társadalomról* [A Study on Civil Society].<sup>2</sup> This short paper pointedly shows that “As long as we do not believe in the independence of the mind or spirit, we are doomed to return to Communism again and again. What is certain is that in ‘civil society’, as it is imagined today, communism will seem proper, and liberalism will seem improper.”<sup>3</sup>

Miklós Gáspár Tamás's texts can be divided into two groups. The first consists of those pieces where he sticks to his own profession, where he writes as a philosopher. These are generally short and brilliant pieces. The second group is made of those long, stylistically difficult pieces, which the author dedicates to examining the past. It is a general misconception that historical writing is prose concerning the past, and not story writing. The realization of both these circumstances is a necessary but insufficient condition for executing the tasks of the guilded historian. At this point it is worth distinguishing the crafts of the storywriter and the historian. The storywriter hopes to summarize the lessons of his day, or turns to days gone by in order to speak about the questions of his day. There is nothing exceptional about this. Since Huizinga we've known that “history is always formation facing the past,” and in the fact that the past is being discussed, there is no difference between the storywriter and the historian. The *style of speaking* is what makes for the difference. Recently I had a chance to speak with a kind, attractive, and young female philosopher, who happens to write in

the same journal as I do, and thus it was little wonder that we began to talk about the difference between the craft of the historian and that of the philosopher. She claimed that all that interested her in the works of Plato were those things that were absolutes. I claimed that bringing to light the details of the past was the issue that concerned me. It was hardly more than a decade ago that I too sat in on the long lectures of middle-ages historians – lectures which lacked rhetorical bravado – where I experienced, with hardly withering intellectual excitedness, that the detailed texts of the past were rather different than the superficiality-filled ‘grand narratives’ explaining the same things. Boring historical discourses are bad historical discourses, while the excitement of good historical discourses is never attributable to the style of discourse, but to drawing out and making visible the fabric of the past. Given this, the principle of *historia est magistra vitae* is not, or is only rarely, valid for the historian. The past is not a pile of moral lessons which, presented properly, can be utilized in the present. Instead it is a past, antecedental reality which we hope to reconstruct – perhaps in order to understand our own days. But in any event, this is a backward process. The issues of my day may provide the idea as to where and how to begin questioning the past. But if I attempt to adjust myself to the past, I am committing the crime of historicization. One of Gyula Illyés’ most damaging statements – and with this he precisely exhausted Miklós Gáspár Tamás’s cloudily described oracle concept – was that in Hungary it is the right (and responsibility) of writers to write history. Few people these days remember, but those who do remember will never forget that in the 1970s the Hungarian history profession (and literary historians) had to fight a war of independence against the oracle. The only problem is that Miklós Gáspár Tamás visibly wanted to put on the robe of the oracle, and he decided that the only way he would take up the fight against the right-wing oracle of the 1990s was by playing an opposing myth.

‘Nothing but a myth?’ we might ask. The answer is clear. Over 60 years ago Károly Kerényi drew our attention to the fact that the difference between the myth and the story is not the content, but the attitude of the audience. In the case of the myth, I accept that I am facing a unique view of the world, which offers an example to follow. We are dealing with the processing of a real question transposed onto a story. The great Central-European plains (and its extensions into the Balkans) offer myths today not

for history's sake, but because they are faced with challenges which can only be answered through myths. (And in this way the region attempts to find its own imagined calling.) The modern fable is constructed of the coming to life of the individual calling, which springs from myths. If I think of Linda Degh's latest fable theory, then it becomes apparent that the Western man, who is so proud of his rationality, actually lives in a rather primitive fable world, full of UFO-s, monsters, people running amok, and bank robbers. And what is quite disturbing is that he sometimes tries to play out these roles. This is what makes for scattered teenagers and rivaling street gangs. The parallel playing out of fables and myths (in the worst case) is found in Bosnia and Kosovo, where, in the condition-system of myths, everyone can play their own fable part.

If not to such a tragic degree, this is exactly what happened in Hungarian intellectual life after 1992. It is well known that the trauma of birth causes a stoppage in the oxygen supply to the brain of the newborn. If a brain does not receive enough oxygen, a unique trance condition follows, in which sub-conscious images appear. This is the state in which Hungarian intellectual life found itself in the third year after the regime change, when after leaving the caul and the ever increasingly burdensome womb of socialism, it did not know what to do in the fresh air. In a paradoxical manner, this feeling was increased to the level of ecstasy by the euphoria of just having learned to breathe. This is how those myth and the fable roles, which made up their background, came to life. The language of Hungarian public life came up with a rather dirty expression for this: the media war. New myths were built around symbols of the past, which were hardly understood. Miklós Gáspár Tamás's virtue lies precisely in the fact that he picked up the glove, which was left behind by the opponents, and he tried to take them standing on their own playing field. Stepping into the role of a fabled hero, the author hoped to oppose two historical myths (which he thought were both imagined) right at the point when they were attacking one another. The only problem was that the science of history knew nothing of these myths.

When Miklós Gáspár Tamás crashed into Hungarian intellectual life, his first successes were attributable to his style. Finally, here was someone who could be, and actually wanted to be, quite articulate! And this is precisely what makes the reading of his historical essays disappointing. He cap-

tures the reader with his labored style, and then immediately lets the reader go. It is more difficult to follow the author's style and read through his texts than it is to understand the thoughts hiding within them. Moreover, the author's occasional affected use of words is painful. Although he has a right to be proud of his Transylvanian Calvinist roots, the words *kereszttyénség* [a vernacular for Christianity] and *evangéliom* [a vernacular for Gospel] are not part of the scientific language of Hungarian public life, unless we are reading the pages of *Confessio*. And these terms should especially be avoided when analyzing the *Catholicism* of Eötvös! This is not an exceptional observation. Mistakes in style – as almost always – are mistakes of the profession. They show that the author is not aware of the subtleties of the fabric of the past he is proposing to examine. This is especially disappointing, because when he takes off the forced disguise of the oracle, then Miklós Gáspár Tamás once again becomes the fine and well-styled philosopher, who is a joy to read. The small pieces in which he analyses the 'delegated nationalism' of the Western Left, or in which he examines the relation between pluralism and relativism, are splendid.<sup>4</sup> But I encounter these often, as an occupational hazard. The (at best) half-educated nature of European culture today, and the loss of the traditional canon (i.e., relativism) are the reasons that the European is looking for the prison of being uncultured rather than for the freedom of education. When it dresses in ancient Magyar romanticism, or when it joins the students of wondergurus, then it is searching for imprisonment. More precisely, it is hoping for an instant, just-add-water intellectual orientation whose forced isolationism eases existence in societal chaos. It is just this situation which is examined in the author's (possibly) most brilliant study – which completely saves him from the pose of the liberal oracle – called *Etnarichia és etnoanarchizmus* [Ethnarchy and Ethno-anarchism], which, as it was in control of its topic, uses a splendid language and style.<sup>5</sup> We can perfectly agree that the existence of modern (East European) nationalism is perfectly dependent on the nationalisms of 19th century liberal nation-builders. Chechnya serves as an example, where, as opposed to our legends, we do not have the case of a freedom-loving little nation fighting its war of independence against the Russian bear, but just the opposite – we have a postmodern ethnic thief war, or liquidation thereof, and this is excellently analyzed by the author. That the outer world is perfectly indifferent in the eyes of postmodern

nationalism is well illustrated by the fact that the Chechnyans committed acts of violence against the very foreigners who were arriving to help them. Here we can see the difference between the Chechnya and Kosovo crises, i.e., the extent to which the international community really had no idea as to what was going on. Elsewhere, Miklós Gáspár Tamás not only repeats his previous theory, but uses it to examine Chechnya.<sup>6</sup>

We do not need to believe that this phenomenon concerns only our unfortunate world. Western Europe is not exempt. The nationalisms which threaten the nation state are perhaps more dangerous there, even if the curtain of welfare manages to hide them. The example of Belgium is well known. In Switzerland, the social system is to this day merely a *simulacrum* of civic democracy. What kind of civic democracy is it where governmental positions, *regardless of election results*, are distributed on the basis of ethnic parities in a way where all political groups are represented? This situation is well examined in the short piece called *Philosophical Post-Script to Nationalism*.<sup>7</sup> I thought I was going to pop open a bottle of champagne in celebration when I read: “Philosophical nationalism is necessarily relativistic. One does not need to be bloodthirsty or intolerant – we need only think of the newfangled theories of multiculturalism or postmodernism, under whose misleading titles, a new form of brain-dead nationalism is hiding in the West.”<sup>8</sup> African-American racism and the fundamentalism of British Muslims are naturally threats, but a much larger threat is the possible collapse of the republican principle. The new, multicultural view of society is not that of free citizens proclaiming common values, but an outwardly closed, inwardly authoritarian pile of communities, where one can only be a member of society insofar as he/she is a member of the tribal association or caste system of one of these communities.

Our author, although he could take them on, avoids contemporary Hungarian examples. We must consider this a mistake of his, as he could do otherwise, and do so explicitly. (Perhaps this makes up for the otherwise unacceptable historical part.) He could explicitly state that the Carpathian Basin is, at present, threatened by the development of post-modern tribal association. One who thinks that the policies of Hungarian nationalist (mistakenly called right-wing) parties can simply be put into the categories of nationalism, or anti-Semitism is mistaken. The question is not the exclusion of Jews, as demanded by traditional anti-Semitism.

The ethics of tribal association is based on the acceptance of an authority ordering, derived from a myth, which is accepted by members when in contact with one another. From the examples of Central Asia and the Urals, one is not simply an Uzbek, a Turkmen, a Kyrgyz, a Baskir, or a Kazhak (or possibly, but exceptionally, a Tadjik), but one must necessarily be a member of some sub-ethnic group as well. These sub-ethnic groups allow for overlap and transfer among the numerous present-day ethnicities in the region. A Baskir *Qypsaq* will obviously show solidarity with his Baskir peers, but will show solidarity with the members of a *Qypsaq* tribe in Kazhakstan as well, or, if we stretch the example, with a Hungarian Cunnian. (Ad notum: American-Hungarians, American-Poles, American-Italians... etc.) At the same time, when in the circle of one's own ethnic group, one instinctively knows and follows the authority ordering which was set up among sub-ethnic groups through tradition. A *Teke*-Turkmein in Ashabad will never marry a *Jomud*-Turkmein from Nebit-dagi, never mind an oasis dweller. But even the oasis dwelling *Ajnallu* can be proud of being Turkmein, as opposed to Russian or Persian. Naturally, if the mother is Russian or Persian, then the child is still Turkmein, but only *Gul* [servant], and will remain so not just alone, but her offspring will always be so as well. They are defended from the outside, but inside they will always be subordinate. This strict system can be broken only by going in one of two directions: going 'Soviet', or going Islam.

In a somewhat more postmodern form, we can see the vision of society held by the deep-Magyars. If those 'who claim to be so' are Magyar, then the Magyars are those who accept OUR myth. He/she takes his/her place where WE tell them to (the myth itself exempts us from the question of who defines 'WE'). In this way, the nation is made of a tribal association within the borders, which is constructed of (pseudo-) ethnicities and regions, which are organically connected to the parts of the nation found across the borders, with their own oracles. Miklós Gáspár Tamás's position deserves even more respect when we take into consideration those party colleagues who – without realizing they were walking into a trap – lightly began to participate in the newest anti-semitism discourse of the current governing parties. The aim of this discourse is not to see pogroms on every street corner in this country – that is unimaginable – but in effect to exclude liberals from discourse on the nation.

Miklós Gáspár Tamás's historical essays are available in a single volume published by Atlantisz. For the most part these studies were not written for a Hungarian audience, but instead were first published abroad, mostly in the United States, and were then translated into Hungarian. Many of the essays in the volume were published in a volume a decade ago, entitled *Idola tribus*. The titles in the new collection show a clear allusion. That the texts and notes are not the responsibility of the translator, but of the author himself, is clearly stated by the publisher.<sup>9</sup>

The author himself is especially responsible for the content mistakes. Miklós Gáspár Tamás's historical illustrations are full of minor mistakes. Perhaps this does not negatively affect the philosophical elements, but for the historian, such mistakes make the credibility of the text questionable. The small mistakes are all rooted in a larger one. Our author is not interested in the past for its own sake, but – as we have already noted – tries to wear the costumes of his heroes by historicizing. Miklós Gáspár Tamás is just as ahistorical when writing about the 19th century as were those in the 18-19th century tradition who ahistorically idealized the Roman *res publica* image and tried to make it their own. The intellectual liberation of the middle and the second half of the 19th century is attributable to shaking the misconceptions regarding the Classical Age (although Marxism brought these back to life in Eastern Europe). Having given up the search for a *res publica* in the heavens, there was finally the freedom to be self-reflective, and this led to the rediscovery of the Classical Age. And the rediscovered Classical Age consisted not only of the eloquence of Cicero and Seneca, but also of public latrines and the stench of dirty markets. And we were able to realize what was common knowledge since Morgan, though it was reinforced by Andras Alföldi, that the newly expanding *res publica* was not a democracy in the modern sense, but was a rather closed alliance of settled agricultural tribes based on a market. And this is how we view the leading principles of the 19th century today. In the way that period attempted to make itself classical, Miklós Gáspár Tamás attempts to dress in the robes of his heroes. This is more than a crime: it is a mistake. The fundamental mistake in the historical essays of Miklós Gáspár Tamás is that the author simply does not realize how he should approach the subject. He not only lacks in informing the reader of the historical literature on the period, but he makes mistakes in his knowledge and interpretation of the entire period.

This is how it was possible for the fiasco to come to be, whereby the author, who considers himself a believer in the liberal nation-state – as if he hopes to be the József Eötvös of our times – leapfrogs somewhere into the *Gesammtmonarchie* of the Austrian liberals, and then slides deep into the boots of Metternich. I do not wish to repeat the secretive gospel of the author, therefore I will not draw on the fact that too many people sacrificed their lives for Hungarian independence over the 19th century for us not to consider such independence an unwanted burden. Obviously Miklós Gáspár Tamás captured the spirit of early 1990s Hungarian liberals, which sought to lead the small nations of East-Central Europe out of misery through the revival of *Gesammtmonarchie* – which never really existed anyway. The inherent mistake of the monarchy-fever which ruled Hungarian liberalism at the beginning of the 1990s was that despite facts to the contrary, it accepted the Austrian liberal picture of a black-yellow empire stretching from South Tyrol to Bukovina and from Galicia to Dalmatia. This of course would have been a useful oppositional block to grand German imperialism and to the selfishness of small nations – had it come to exist. But it never did! In a legal sense, it was precisely the Hungarian Compromise that obstructed its establishment, and in a political sense no one living in the territory considered it his/her home. (This despite the efforts of Prince Rudolf and Jókai.)

The real tension is thus not between Miklós Gáspár Tamás's proposed pair of *freedom* and *independence*, but between the concepts of homeland and empire. More precisely, the tension was between *homelands* and the poorly organized empire's two perfectly divergent notions. This was like a bad marriage. The empire was something which – beyond the hardly existent two sets of elites – no one wanted, but whose interests everyone feared would not be represented when dividing it among homelands. To use the words of Ignotus, it was a pile of colonies – without a motherland. The motherland was the dynasty, or more precisely the physical person of the ruler. (Legally, this was two persons.) The Austrian political elite consistently claimed that the countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown construed merely a *corpus separatum* within the united empire, while the Hungarians would recognize only the principle of two independent states connected through one dynasty. The Hungarian position won, and thus, by the 1900s, there was virtually no remaining connection between the two halves of the

empire, beyond deep and consistent mutual hatred, the result of which was that when the empire fell apart, Hungary paid the higher price. I am not referring to Trianon. Trianon was just an act of mercy. The populations of provinces represented in the Imperial Council, through the right to vote, could elect an inoperational parliament, behind which the good, old, quite permissive *aufklärista* absolutism continued. The likewise *aufklärista* Hungarian elite (which claimed to be liberal) took its parliamentocracy very seriously, i.e., it used its minority authority, which was based on voting rights, to reign above the majority it felt was undeveloped. (And to show this, it often pointed to beyond the Lajta River.) But when the empire dissolved, the elites of the provinces beyond the Lajta appeared almost immediately and stood their ground. The three-way political playing field of contemporary Austria, for example, was already present at the turn of the century, with the existence of social democrats, social Christians, and great Germans. A similar thing happened among the minorities of Hungary. Nations appeared from under the cloak of the empire, with the Hungarians being the possible exception.

The essay on Eötvös is where the cat jumps out of the bag. In Eötvös, Miklós Gáspár Tamás obviously want to see his own shadow and predecessor, i.e., the liberal-*aufklärista* reformer who, in the interest of modernization, argues with his own party colleagues. The problem is that – based on his own examples – in struggling against the new-styled nationalism of our day, he, through writing on Eötvös, attacks what Eötvös would never have touched: the traditions of the Hungarian enlightenment and reform age. This is what is most disturbing about the tendentious misunderstandings in *Eötvös: a nyugat-keleti liberális* [Eötvös: The West-Eastern Liberal]. The basic premise of the article is one with which we may agree. The ethnicist Magyar nationalism which flared up in the first third of the 19th century, the precedent to postmodern tribal association, was not a result of the tradition of 19th century Hungarian liberalism. But this does not mean that Magyar nationalism across the entire 19th century can be attacked through Eötvös, especially given that Miklós Gáspár Tamás had once taught us that we are dealing with two unconnected phenomena. The assumption that Eötvös was an enlightened believer in the *Gesamttmonarchie* is also debatable. Although the flaring up of ethnicist Magyar nationalism leads us to gather that the mistake can be traced back to the reform age, or that the age

of linguistic renewal sparked the process which led all the way to the euphoria of the 40s, it is a shaky proposition. Independence in itself did not mean the end of a free and cultured Hungary.

Miklós Gáspár Tamás's fundamental misunderstanding is that Hungarian modernization was Austria's doing.<sup>10</sup> The situation is that Hungarian modernization was a Hungarian creation of all the significant legal-public actors! Even if it was the result of necessity. This is all the more sad when I encounter Miklós Gáspár Tamás's writings regarding the current situation. The picture of today's East-Central Europe, where 'European' actually means North American, hits the mark. But why should this require the distortion of Hungarian history? This same thought is basically repeated in another historical vision of his, whereby he tries, through examining the Balkan conflicts, to simplify the history of our region as a fight between a two-hundred year old enlightening authority and local nationalisms.

Miklós Gáspár Tamás the philosopher and statesman deserves all our respect. But the liberal oracle, who is attempting to replace misunderstood historical myths with new myths on the political playing field, does not deserve such respect. There is no need for it. Hungarian politics will not become healthy from our telling ourselves that Hungarian independence and Hungarian modernization are bad. It will improve when we accept that something different is going to happen now.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Miklós Gáspár Tamás, "A nemzeti érzés erkölcsi lényege," in Miklós Gáspár Tamás, *Törzsi fogalmak I.*, p. 72.
- <sup>2</sup> *Törzsi fogalmak II.*, pp. 367-84.
- <sup>3</sup> "Értekezés a civil társadalomról," in *Törzsi fogalmak II.*, p. 384.
- <sup>4</sup> "A nemzeti érzés erkölcsi lényege," in *Törzsi fogalmak I.*, pp. 234-36, 259-63.
- <sup>5</sup> *Törzsi fogalmak I.*, pp. 303-46.
- <sup>6</sup> "Filozófiai utóirat a nacionalizmushoz," in *Törzsi fogalmak I.*, pp. 94-296.
- <sup>7</sup> *Törzsi fogalmak I.*, pp. 275-302.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 289.
- <sup>9</sup> *Törzsi fogalmak II.*, p. 439.
- <sup>10</sup> "Kétszáz éves háború," *Beszélő*, 1999. július-augusztus.

# BOOK REVIEWS

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KÁROLY KOCSIS

## You Say ‘Lwów’, I Say ‘Lemberg’

Péter Bencsik, *Helységnévváltozások Köztes-Európában 1763-1995*  
[Changes in the Names of Places in In-Between Europe 1763-1995],  
(Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1997)

The publication is the index to the map collection assembled by Lajos Pándi with the cooperation of Nándor Bárdi called “*Köztes-Európa 1763-1993*” [In-Between Europe 1763-1993] (Osiris-Századvég, 1995, 798 p.), which was very successful in Hungary. The index presents to the reader the most important historic names, and foremost official name changes, of settlements in the examined area for the given period. The borders of states, political systems, and along with them the names of places and geographical phenomena changed rather regularly in the regions of conflict between the formerly great empires of Europe, mainly Germany and Russia. From the viewpoint of ethnicity and religion, the populations of the settlements in this belt (which was often turned into a mosaic of small nation-states) have remained remarkably pluralistic to this day, despite ethnic-religious cleansing and, for close to four centuries, they have been subject to repression by great powers. As a result, in given territories, e.g., the Polish-Russian, Polish-Ukrainian, Romanian-Russian, and Romanian-Ukrainian zones of conflict or in some of the perimeter regions of the Carpathian Basin, the names of important settlements have changed up to five to eight times since 1763. Among the especially ill-treated cities is Lwów, which until 1772 was Polish, and then passed through Austrian, Polish, Soviet, German, Soviet and Ukrainian changes of authority, – not including the front movements between 1914-1920 which brought with them Austro-German, Russian, Ukrainian and Polish authorities – going through a series

of name-changes: Lwów, Lemberg, Lwów, , 0000, Lemberg, , 00 00, L'vov. We can find similar examples here in the area of the Carpathian basin, as well. For example, the largest city of the currently Serbian Bánság, the capital of the former Torontál county, Nagybecserek, has been, as a result of changes of authority (Austrian, Hungarian, Serbian (Yugoslavian), German, Yugoslavian), presented on various public administration maps with different names: Groß-Betschkerek (until 1867), Nagybecskerek (until 1918), Veliki Bečkerek (until 1935), Petrovgrad (until 1941), Großbetschkerek (until 1944), Zrenjanin (since 1946). The expertly assembled 344-page index presents the most diverse name-change variations and the historic lessons drawn from them. It will serve as a useful aid for Hungarian and foreign historians and geographers in light of the seemingly chaotic nomenclature situation as described above. It is an indisputable fact that the In-Between Europe region, lying between the Laplands of Finland and the Greek Island of Crete, or spreading over the lands between the Elbe, Po, and the Dnieper Rivers, has to this point not been presented in a similarly detailed (it includes Latin, Cyrillic, and Greek names!), well-founded, and broadly-scoped manner. Referring to the outstanding name-place lexicon-dictionaries by Mihály Gyalay (1989) and György Lelkes (1992), and making an effort to create a territorial balance, the author does not describe the Carpathian Basin in more detail than the other territories in the index, which will increase its international utility and prestige. The reader wishing to learn more about the place-name problems of given areas is offered a general description of published general and regional works of a similar nature (pp. 9-12.) and a bibliography reflecting an exceptional knowledge of the literature (pp. 93-99.). More than two-thirds of the publication is composed of the place-name listing which covers 4,000 settlements and approximately 11,000 name variations. This expertly edited (articulation, letter-type, abbreviations, directives, etc.) section will be of use to any reader, regardless of his/her language. The current official names of settlements (or the formerly independent or somehow important quarters thereof) appear in bold print. The listing includes information on the current and past states to which the settlements belonged, the relevant periods of time, and other living and "dead" name variations in the various In-Between European languages. A valuable part of this section is the register, which presents information on place-names in a large variety of Cyrillic – and

Greek – lettered (e.g., Russian, Ukrainian, Serbian, Bulgarian) languages (pp. 306-344.). The historical lessons and connections, which can be traced through the name-changes presented in the listing section, are described by the editor in the chapter called “The History and Linguistic Background of Naming Places.” The naming of given settlements (generally like other geographical objects) – at least in the early stages – can be related to nature (e.g., size, form, layout), culture (e.g., persons or ethnic groups) or various events. In describing the practice of naming the author emphasized the practice of so-called official naming. In Hungary, 1898 serves as the date which divides the periods of unsystematic and systematic official naming. In most In-Between European countries systematic, official place-naming dates back only to the inter-war period, given that many countries became independent only then. A particularly interesting section, which is supplemented by illustrative examples, introduces the reasons for name-changes. In the period of unsystematic naming, the disappearance of the motive for the original name, the change of landowners or the modification of man’s relationship to the land (expansion, contraction, transformation or switching, etc. of meaning) were the most common reasons for changing names. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century systematic name-changes usually followed changes in state authority – often related to ethnic structure – while domestic political factors, naming for persons and other indirect reasons were also common. The use of the book and orientation within the exceptionally complicated place-name changes of In-Between Europe are made considerably easier by supplementary chapters: e.g., “The Organization of Terms,” “Alphabetical Order,” “Name-Change and Pronunciation Rules,” “Name-Change Guide,” and “Pronunciation Rules According to Alphabetical Order.” Appendix 1 offers an overview of maps and text concerning the changing of hands and detachment of lands, which has been one of the most important reasons for settlement name-changes. The informative maps are presented in the style of those of the above-mentioned “*Köztes-Európa 1763-1993*” [In-Between Europe 1763-1993] volume, whose precision, in some cases, could have been increased. Appendices number 2 and 3 (“The Names of In-Between European Countries in the Languages of the Region” and “Dictionary of Terms Found in Geographical Names”) make easier the use of the index and are a real treat for those who appreciate foreign languages and geography. While editing the publication the editor had to analyze a

massive place-name database, which resulted in small mistakes in meaning in the descriptive sections and in the listing. The low number of mistakes in no way compromises the utility of the index, which is simply an indispensable handbook for those experts and casual readers interested in territory and in the specific topic.

FRANK T. ZSIGÓ

## Acclimatizing Liberalism

János Kis, *Az állam semlegessége* [The Neutrality of the State],  
(Budapest: Atlantis Kiadó, 1997), 430 p.

In *Az állam semlegessége* [The Neutrality of the State], János Kis presents to the reader a series of essays based primarily on the premise that democratic public life and politics are based not solely on the battle of divergent interests, but also on a series of principles and values. In other words, politics should not be seen solely as a struggle among those competing for power, but as a matter of philosophy. The main argument of his book is that it is the liberal state and political framework which can best ensure and protect democracy, pluralism, and equality. While such premises and arguments are implicit in most normative political theory (certainly of the liberal school), Kis makes them explicit as a response to the widespread view in Hungarian public opinion whereby politics is a dirty game best left to dirty politicians. Thus, the real strength of *The Neutrality of the State* is not found in its contribution to political theory, but in its precise and expert application of liberal theory, within the Hungarian political context, to issues which will be familiar to most followers of Hungarian public life. For this reason, the book will be of interest mostly to Hungarians (or those studying Hungary). However, those studying liberal theory (be they Hungarian or not) will also find this book to be a worthy read.

The book is divided into two main sections. The first is largely theoretical. In it, Kis presents some of the standard questions of contemporary liberal theory. What kind of normative framework is appropriate for democratic life? What is distributive justice? How can a democratic state achieve

the unity and equality of citizens in conditions of deep moral and cultural pluralism? (p. 12.) To approach these questions theoretically, Kis takes up the issues of tolerance, neutrality, and multi-culturalism.

Chapter One begins by introducing the issue of the state recognition of churches. The reader may recall the debate, largely between large historical churches and small, newer ones, over the legality of the latter. Kis uses this debate to introduce and consider the principle of tolerance. For the most part, the chapter reads like a political theory seminar. The author covers some of the historic development of the principle and introduces some of its justifications, drawing from both legal and political theory literature. The chapter becomes more interesting when Kis begins to consider the question of drawing boundaries between what is to be tolerated and what is not. Largely rejecting the Millian version, Kis attempts to transform the harm principle in a context of moral uncertainty and pluralism. He arrives at the conclusion that tolerance in a modern society must consider the ability to manage (and preserve) pluralism, the ability of the individual to make autonomous life choices, and the preservation of a public sphere of debate. It follows that rational criticism becomes the foundation of political community in a society marked by deep pluralism. How does this apply to demarcating the areas of tolerance and intolerance? Kis uses the examples of racism and euthanasia. While public debate has seen racist theories largely defeated, and thus such theories need not be tolerated, euthanasia remains a publicly unresolved issue. Here, the public debate approach offers no solutions. Kis 'resolves' the practical side of the euthanasia issue by calling for religious opponents of the practice to tolerate regulations that would allow for assisted suicide. Why? Because the harm done to the religious opponents in this manner is indirect (the regulation would offend their beliefs, not their persons), while a policy banning assisted suicide directly harms the interests of the suffering patient (assuming the patient has made his/her choice with the full faculty of reason). The interests of the latter simply outweigh those of the former. The religious opponent of euthanasia, then, is paying the price of pluralism, whereby offensive views and regulations must be tolerated. This approach, however, does not resolve the issue in the case of a patient who is clearly suffering and approaching an unavoidable death, but who does not, at the time, possess the ability to make a rational decision concerning the will to live.

While the chapter on tolerance addresses mainly the behavior of individuals, Chapter Two, on neutrality, is addressed to the state. In it, Kis demands the state be neutral on issues of belief, conviction, world-view and lifestyle. In this sense, neutrality is a more demanding principle than tolerance. The tolerant person may express opposition to the convictions of others while living and cooperating with them. The neutral state may not take any such stands. Kis reviews some of the arguments opposed to state neutrality (from within and without the liberal school) before going on to give his important justification for the neutrality principle. State neutrality, according to the author, is the only authority-related position which ensures equal status – as members of the political community – to all subjects of the state. Thus, taking no position on the existence of a deity ensures that neither the faithful nor atheists will be bracketed out of the public sphere. (Recall, this is not a principle demanded of individuals.) While the application of the principle of neutrality seems relatively obvious in the case of theology, it becomes more complex regarding other matters. Is a state which supports ‘traditional family values’ behaving in a neutral manner? Is a state which does not allow the teaching of creation science in public schools behaving in a neutral manner? Such issues are taken up when the author lays out, in some detail, principles related to the neutrality principle. For example, the neutrality principle demands that the state address its citizens in terms which can be understood by all (p. 116). Kis’ framework on neutrality is reminiscent of Rawls’ *Political Liberalism*. Both authors call for a neutral state, for the practice of public reason, and for a public sphere which encompasses and addresses all. In Rawls’ case the public sphere may be based on a very thin overlapping consensus. In Kis’ case it is based simply on membership in the state. Both theories run into similar troubles at the extremes. The political liberalism of Rawls does not adequately address those who are without the overlapping consensus, while Kis’ principle of state neutrality does little to address those subjects of the state who exclude themselves from the political community by not practicing tolerance (as demanded in Chapter One).

After laying down the argument for a state which is neutral in matters of faith and world-view, in the third chapter János Kis argues for a state which is not neutral in matters of ethnicity. The starting point for the argument is the historic convergence of liberalism and nationalism, despite

their seemingly poor fit. The author builds his case for what he terms 'multinationalism' by taking up and refuting nationalism, liberal nationalism, and national neutrality. Nationalism is rejected essentially because of its inability to peacefully accept minorities: nationalism on the part of the majority will be responded to with minority nationalism, leading to conflict. By liberal nationalism, Kis means something akin to civic nationalism, where loyalty to the state, and not to the dominant ethnic group, is the key to membership in the national community. Where public life in the liberal nationalist state is directed in the language of the state, minorities may preserve their language and heritage within the confines of private life. Kis, however, refutes this position by arguing essentially that members of minority groups, whether they choose to assimilate or not, will in some way remain second-class citizens. This would be a direct violation of the liberal principle of civic equality. The author then turns to the case of the state which handles ethnic groups the way it handles religious groups (as argued in Chapter Two): the ethnically neutral state. This position is rejected on the grounds that a state, for practical reasons, cannot be neutral on ethnic matters. For example, administration requires the use of someone's language. Allowing for the use of any language anywhere – which is what the ethnically neutral state would demand – is clearly impossible in practical terms. Further, the ethnically neutral state would provide no grounds at all for identification with the state.

Having refuted the three alternatives, Kis turns to arguing for the multinational state. Such a state is essentially liberal and is composed of two or more ethnic groups. The state, in attempting to provide equality of opportunity, recognizes that the members of minority groups are at a disadvantage when competing for resources (particularly those distributed by the state). Thus, to ensure equality, the state grants members of minorities certain rights, of which some are individual in their nature (e.g., language rights), where others are collective in their nature (e.g., education rights). Kis reconciles individualist-based liberal thought with collective rights by confining collective rights to those groups which are not voluntary in their nature. This is a slippery slope. It would be rather difficult to argue why the collective rights demands of bilingual young adults who cling to minority identity (e.g., bilingual education, whose extra costs are covered by the state) differ from those of young adults of a minority religious persuasion (who

might demand state-funded religious education in public schools). Is the choice to remain in the ethnic minority less voluntary than the choice to continue to adhere to the religion in which one was raised? Are matters of religious conscience voluntary?

In any case, the arguments for the multi-national state will be largely familiar to those who have followed the multi-culturalism debate. (It is unfortunate that the author does not make use of the wide literature concerning nationalism and multi-culturalism in this chapter.) The argument for the multinational state becomes a part of the argument of the book when the issue of the constitution of the political community is addressed. In previous chapters toleration and state neutrality served as the principles allowing for wide inclusiveness of the civic community in matters of faith and world-view. The multinational state is presented as the appropriate liberal approach to ensuring the inclusion of all in the political community in conditions of ethnic pluralism. This is the most convincing part of the multinational argument, but it appears to function best in those states with two large ethnic groups (i.e., in a binational state). Could Kis' multinational framework resolve education and language issues for a larger set of small minorities? How might administrative issues be approached in the liberal framework for a small minority which is geographically scattered?

The second section of the book concerns the application of the theory of tolerance and neutrality to some concrete issues. (Unfortunately, application of the multinational state framework is not attempted.) While discussion of these kinds of issues is common to debates within liberal theory, Kis' valuable contribution is to place the discussion in the Hungarian context. This is a rather significant and instructive exercise. While Kis argues that liberalism in Hungary has roots deeper than one might think (thanks not only to liberal political activity in the first half of the 20th century, but also to the evolution of liberal thought and practice among the democratic opposition and party reformers in the 1970s and 1980s), the examples he puts forth, and the public opinion and official positions concerning these examples, show Hungary's lack of experience in operating within a liberal political framework. If the official positions were liberal in their nature, Kis would have little to write about. In this way, the issues of abortion (Chs. 5-6), euthanasia (Ch. 7), and hate-speech (Chs. 11-12), receive a treatment which should be of interest not only to those interest-

ed in Hungarian politics and liberalism, but also to liberal scholars everywhere – some of whom study politics in environments where liberal/democratic culture and institutions have had time to mature. The context of nascent, post-communist democratic systems and cultures, where the standard liberal position is supported by a very small minority, is unique. Hence, the analysis of issues of general interest to political theorists in this context is also unique.

A rather interesting issue to which Kis devotes two chapters is the association rights of homosexuals (Chs. 9-10). At the center of the analysis is an association called the *Szívárvány Társulás* [Rainbow Association], which was established as an interest-protection group for homosexuals. The group was denied official registration by the courts, which demanded that the association set an age limit for membership in order that it may protect minors from the homosexual lifestyle. Kis attacks the positions of the courts from the liberal position. The court position is shown to be not only unconstitutional and in violation of the rights of parents and the members of the association: it is also shown to be discriminative of homosexuals, and thus in violation of not only the principle of toleration, but the state neutrality principle as well. The most interesting part of the discussion is the consistent application of the central thesis of the book, the state neutrality principle, to the *Szívárvány* case. Kis' arguments regarding the case will certainly serve as a solid starting point for debates concerning issues like homosexual adoption rights.

Throughout *The Neutrality of the State*, János Kis emphasizes his view that the key to the resolution of seemingly unsolvable moral and political tensions is continuous and open political debate. His presentation of the principles of tolerance and neutrality serves to provide an ethical and principled framework for such debate. The discussions of contentious issues relevant to Hungarian public life serve as a deepening of the content and moral seriousness of the debate ensuing within the liberal framework. Thus, where Kis, for example, does not succeed in reconciling the deep differences between the pro-life and pro-choice camps in the Hungarian abortion debate, he does succeed in showing how liberal principles can and should be applied to issues – such as abortion or euthanasia – where reasonable people disagree. While his arguments – which are well thought out and presented logically, thoroughly, and consistently – may leave even the

liberal reader unconvinced at times, Kis has made a valuable contribution to the study and application of liberal theory in Hungary. He has also invited his readers to take part in the political discussion which gives meaning to membership in the political community. Recommended.

FERENC EILER, LÁSZLÓ SZARKA and ÁDÁM SZESZTAY

## A Guide to Research on Minorities in South-East Europe in the 20th Century

Gerhard Seewan and Péter Dippold (eds.),  
*Bibliographisches Handbuch der ethnischen Gruppen Südosteuropas I-II.*  
(= *Südosteuropa – Bibliographie, Ergänzungsband 3.*)  
(München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), 1450 p.

A most significant piece of work, from the viewpoint of diverse and intense research on ethnic groups, conflicts, and inter-ethnic relations in East, East-Central, and South-East Europe, was published at the end of 1997. Gerhard Seewann, the director of the Südost-Institut library in München, with the cooperation of Peter Dippold, the director of the László Teleki Foundation's library and documentation service, has assembled a bibliography on work concerning South-East European minority groups in the 20th century. The great mass of data contained in the bibliography on 35 ethnic and religious groups in 20 states took the two editors, with the help of their disciplined colleagues (data collectors, bibliographers, statisticians, cartographers), five years to collect, not including a long period of preparation. The book, which contains 12,030 entries, is the third supplementary volume of the München institute's South-East Europe bibliography series.

“The new South-East Europe bibliography attempts to collect document materials from South-East European states covering all aspects of life, from the natural environments of the countries, to the populations and histories, to economies, science, and cultures.” It was with these words that

Fritz Valjavic began the Südost Institute's project's first volume on Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1956. The series proved to be successful, and to date seven two-volume publications and three supplementary volumes have been published. Most recently, the series' third supplementary volume, *Bibliographisches Handbuch der ethnischen Gruppen Südosteuropas*, edited by Gerhard Seewann and Péter Dippold, was published (in 1997) in München.

The supplementary and, in its category, unique publication covers all the ethnic groups which, according to German terminology, live in South-East Europe. The project actually goes beyond this framework, as, in the interest of providing a more comprehensive picture, it covers literature on Italy, Austria, and the Sub-Carpathians (which, after World War Two, 'switched regions') – areas which are traditionally not considered part of the region. This was a justified decision, as the border regions of these areas are home to several ethnic groups whose territories are directly related to the minority settlement regions of unambiguously South-East European countries. Another convincing decision of the editors was to provide separate space for Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Voivodina, Kosovo, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia above and beyond the chapter dealing with literature on the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia.

The editors of the bibliography consider the bulk of 20th century literature to cover the period from 1918 to our days. The two-volume publication contains bibliographic data on 12,030 books and articles. Given our knowledge of high-quality minority journals, it is unfortunate that the pre-1945 material covers mostly monographs, and rarely includes journal articles. However, the justification for this given in the introduction, whereby the editors refer to the large mass of material and the space limitations of the volume, is acceptable.

It is also unfortunate that, despite its original goals, the bibliography has annotated bibliographic data for only a limited span of material (covering a part of Albanian, Kosovar, Greek, and German materials), while for the majority of titles we are provided only with the original and German titles, and standard bibliographic data. According to the table on the distribution of title headings (p. LIV), the most material in the two volumes is on Czechoslovakian Magyars (697), Romanian Germans (655), and Magyars (617). The relatively small number of headings on Transylvanian

Magyars, for a long time the largest minority in the region, shows that research in both Hungary and Romania (even despite difficulties and contingencies in data collection) has some ways to go.

The largest number of headings covering the data of the 20 analyzed countries and the region refer to Magyar minorities (2006), then Germans (1864) and Jews (1089). Armenians, Bunjevac, Gagauz, non-Macedonian Macedonians, and Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians living outside their respective countries' borders, are covered by less than 50 titles each. Of the titles and bibliographic data referring to the region's Roma populations (altogether 655), 262 are on Hungarian Roma, 45 are on Romanian Roma, 68 are on (Czecho-)Slovakian Roma, while 52 headings refer to scientific research on Roma living in Bulgaria.

In the general theoretical section referring to the region as a whole, the editors split the bibliographic data into three chapters. The first chapter presents data for theoretical basic research, which the reader can review in the following categories: handbooks, bibliographies, terminology, minority research; nation, nation-state, theories on nationalism; national, ethnic, and regional identity; ethnic conflicts; minority rights, conflict resolution; language, and language policy. The second chapter covers those scientific publications dealing with central- and southern-Europe as a whole, and these are grouped according to theme and period. Among these, the most headings refer to minority rights. The chronology shows that publications covering the inter-war and post-1989 periods are quite numerous. The latter show that scientific and political interest in minority issues has significantly grown in the region.

One of the greatest and most obvious virtues of the bibliography is the balance of titles. By this we foremost mean that the editors have largely succeeded in eliminating (through selection) a large number of short and uninteresting studies and dilettante pieces. Further, it is commendable that the editors attempted to include a wide variety of materials on each of the various countries and ethnic groups.

The chapter on theoretical and basic research in the general section reveals an absolute dominance of literature written in German or by German authors. Further, particularly in the period of 1970-80, there appears to be an abundance of Anglo-American political science, legal, and sociological research recorded in the South-East European bibliography.

This reflects the moderate interest of the region's own researchers in theory and synthesis. Another characteristic also reveals a weakness in the literature: of the nearly 100 headings on Roma in the general section, not one is written by a Hungarian or local Magyar researcher, despite the fact that the two volumes cover a wealth of Hungarian research on Roma. The situation is better regarding literature on minority rights, with a good deal of literature by Hungarian researchers from both the inter-war (Artur Balogh, Zoltán Baranyai, László Búza, István Egyed, Iván Nagy) and contemporary (Antal Ádám, Gáspár Bíró, Géza Herczegh, István Íjgyártó, Erzsébet Sándor Szalayné, Tibor Várady) periods.

In their introduction (which, given the significance of the publication, is too brief), the editors note that in their data collection of minority history in 20th century South-East (i.e., central- and southern) Europe, their main emphasis was put on the years following 1918. However, research on the pre-1918 period, even given space constraints, was given too little attention. This imbalance is as visible in the general section as it is in the sections covering the 20 states, where there are a total of 187 entries dealing with the Habsburg Monarchy (surprisingly with no maps), and covering the Jews of the region.

The decision to collect and categorize ethnic-minority literature dealing with the Jews of the region was undoubtedly a good one: anyone lacking knowledge of the role of Jews in the urban cultures of central and eastern Europe, the controversial relationship with majority ethnic groups arising from cohabitation, and the mass migration, urbanization, and assimilation of the Jewry, will no doubt have imprecise or misleading knowledge of the region's ethnic structural changes. However, for a long time the local literature on South-East European Jews has almost exclusively dealt with questions concerning the Holocaust.

The 'country' chapters begin with mother tongue and ethnic statistics (up to our day), along with a detailed map of the given country and/or maps of the ethnic groups and their settlement regions. It is somewhat unsettling that the introductions are not uniform. The cases of Bulgaria and Romania provide a good example. While we are given only a mother tongue and ethnicity statistical table for Romania, for Bulgaria we are provided with data concerning population growth, religious identity for various periods, and five statistical measures of mother-tongue use. Another table shows the dis-

tribution of ethnic composition and vocations of the active population for 1965, and a further two tables review the distribution and composition of minority schools in 1931. The section of the book on Italy lacks a map and statistical indicators.

Within the chapters on given countries and regions, the listing of literature on 'ethnic groups' precedes the introduction of brief, and thus necessarily sketchy yet important information on examined minority communities. The summaries cover minority settlement areas and historical highlights. An important part of the summaries is that they discuss the current situation of ethnic groups, briefly describing schooling, religious divisions, newspapers, self-government organizations, and political parties.

Regarding publication groupings found in the volume, the most uneven parts of this otherwise outstanding piece of work concern the headings of handbooks. In this aspect, the data collectors and editors were equally challenged, given that from lexicons to various discipline syntheses, from representative glossaries to title indices and bibliographies, this collection had to leave space for many formats. Inclusion of the regular national bibliographies or the official census publications would have broken the well-thought-out balance used by the editors.

However, the collectors and editors did manage to neglect some publications which would have provided great assistance and a sense of orientation to those trying to make their way through bibliographies. For example, one of these missing pieces is the Slovakian historical bibliography series published by Michal Potemra, or his urban and press history bibliography of Kassa. Other missing pieces include: Tibor Mikó's 97-page bibliography (Mikó Tibor, "A nemzetiség kérdés magyar irodalma," in Károly Mártonffy (ed.), *Közigazgatásunk nemzetközi kapcsolatai* (Budapest: 1941) pp. 1011-1108.) and Imre Bédi's continuation of this, the 6,500-entry manuscript bibliography on minorities (Imre Bédi, *A nemzetiségi kérdés magyar irodalma [Die ungarische Literatur der Nationalitätenfrage.]*, 1-2. OSZK kéziratári jelzete: Fol. Hung. 33289/1-2.)

The titles on literature concerning Austrian (Burgenland, Stajerland, Carinthia) ethnic groups and minority issues are extremely instructive. First, research in Austria was not subject to the same ideological controls for four decades, and second, it shows parallels with the under-appreciated methods of similar Hungarian research on ethnic groups. It appears impor-

tant that interest in Austrian Croats and Slovenians (and to a much lesser degree Burgenland Magyars) from the ‘mother country’ is visible when reviewing the titles, which in terms of the measurement of the situation of given minorities meant research competition and mutual professional control.

The (Czecho-)Slovakian chapter is somewhat controversial given the decision of the editors to deal with the Slovak nation as a majority and state-founding group from the time of the establishment of Czechoslovakia (which is a majority view of Slovaks). This in turn means that literature on the Slovak autonomy movement or on the debates and conflicts leading to the break-up of Czechoslovakia does not appear in the volume, despite the fact that these were important and definitive elements of Czechoslovakian ethnic and minority policy.

In the future, the examination of local-regional questions will gain in importance. For this reason, the (undoubtedly difficult) inclusion of local history and native awareness, which was previously largely ignored, is one of the great achievements of the volume. The Slovakian titles show that today there is a relatively low number of publications concerning local issues which can serve as the basis for in-depth study or which were thoroughly researched. However, the publications of local Slovakian Magyar history to 1995 (the collection includes communications to this date) show that the minority situation and the assistance of Magyar-led local governments have provided significant support and background for the writing of village-monographs.

The beginning of the chapter on Slovakian Magyars (pp. 263-320.) provides a brief and accurate description of the minority communities. Only the statement which claims “the vast majority of Slovakian Magyars speak a dialect similar to Palóc” (p. 263.) is inaccurate: its lexicon-glossary factual style is, for this reason, rather unfortunate.

Comparing the titles referring to Slovakian Magyars and Romanian Magyars, it is apparent that the number of sources regarding both minorities is rather low: a possible CD-rom version of the bibliography would benefit from such a supplementary collection of data (e.g., including published inter-war League of Nations minority-related propositions available in English and French, parliamentary speeches available in separate publications, minority-policy documents from the party-state era, etc.). The bib-

liographies for local history concerning both minorities, due to inadequate research, could also benefit from expansion. It is surprising that the communist era appears all too little in, for example, the chapter entitled “State Minority Policy”, when both the Husak and Ceuasescu regimes both awkwardly publicized and documented their minority policies over long periods of time.

Next to Romania, the largest number of bibliographical titles (2105) refers to Hungary. The low number of handbooks, as in the general section, is apparent. The section entitled “The Minority Question” purposefully covers two widely researched areas: foreign policy and border revisions, and culture and education. Further, the structuring of the material reveals the largest gaps in the literature and research. Both “The Minority Question” section and the parts dealing with specific minorities clearly show how little attention historians have paid to the study of the economic situation of minorities in Hungary.

Both the ratios and sums of the literature on specific minorities (ethnic groups) show that the most widely researched groups are the German and Jewish ethnic groups. There is an attempt made to map out the regions inhabited by almost all the covered minorities – which is stressed for smaller minorities – as well as their settlements and ethnic cultures. It is a fortunate fact that since the 1970s, research on Roma has constituted a significant portion of Hungarian minority studies, and that such research has not been limited to folklore, but has striven to understand Roma social structure and lifestyle as well.

Next to Hungary, the most literature on ethnic groups is collected and ordered concerning the state of Romania. The decision of the authors to take up separately, where possible, the Romanian Germans, Bánát and Satu-Mare Svabians, Bukovinian Germans and Transylvanian Svabs, and further the Romanian Magyars, Seklers and Csango when discussing the German and Magyar minorities, was a good one.

The vast majority of publications deal with Romanian Magyar, German, and Jewish minorities. In these sections, as in the chapter dealing with minority issues, the areas of foreign policy, culture, education, and economy are rather detailed. In the case of German and Magyar minorities, it is noteworthy that a good deal of regional material has been collected over time. While the sections concerning the three minorities mentioned above

orders a serious amount of literature on most every aspect of minority existence; research on the remaining minorities – beyond the fact that the number of publications is very low compared to those on the other groups – leaves much to be desired. This is especially true of the Romanian Roma, which has become the second largest minority group, behind the Magyars. The significance of the issue is poorly reflected in the low number of published studies – possibly because the research is at the initial stages and is of a problematic nature.

The strength of the publications collected on minorities in Italy lies in the pieces on local history and on state minority policy studies. The latter is unsurprising, given that the Italian state did everything in its power to quickly assimilate the 500,000-strong Slovenian minority. The uniform structure of the country chapters is inconsistent in this case, given that the chapter on Italy does not include ethnic or mother-tongue statistical indicators, nor does it include a brief summary of the history and present situation of the Slovenians. (Note: it is unfortunate that the editors' structure could not include South Tyrolia. The northern-Italian region, despite its controversial and conflict-ridden history, has today become a positive model for East-Central and South-East European minority policy. The multi-faceted and wide research literature on South Tyrolia could have been a useful starting point for comparing existing and hoped-for regional minority self-government models.)

The chapter on Bulgaria is longer than most others, and besides providing statistics on mother tongue and ethnicity, it presents tables on minority vocations, and minority and religious schooling. This is true of not only the part preceding the general introduction, but also of the sections concerning the Jewish and Turkish minorities. Of the sections dealing with specific minorities, we must point out the one presenting literature on the 800,000-strong Turkish minority. The 20th century history of this minority is well reflected in the composition of the literature, where the most books and articles deal with the topics of state minority policy, migration, deportation, and expulsion.

The general section of the Macedonia chapter presents unusually little literature to the reader. The "Minority Question" section shows that the topics of national awareness, nationalism, and nation-building are of some concern. It is unfortunate that to date, research on Romanians and

Cserkész has been more widespread than that on the Albanian, Turkish, and Roma populations, which are far more numerous.

The chapter on the Sub-Carpathians is a pioneering work given its bibliographical summary and literature concerning the Magyars of the region – a similar overview of work on this region has not been prepared until now. It presents the tendentious and ideologically burdened, but significant source material, collected from Soviet-Ukrainian literature. (A critical reading of this literature, given the scarcity of other sources, reveals a great deal on the history of the Sub-Carpathians.) A very interesting tendency is visible: in the 1970s linguistics brought a breakthrough in Soviet scientific life, as it was in this time that analyses of Hungarian-Ukrainian (in truth, Hungarian-Ruthenian) mutually operating influences began to appear. The bibliography in this way refers to the post-1945 history of the Sub-Carpathians. The inter-war materials are also interesting, and not just from a Magyar viewpoint. It is unfortunate that books on the Sub-Carpathians have not, to this point, rested on this base of literature.

The bibliography attempts to provide an overview of the economic and political aspects of the minority question. This is quite appropriate, given that the problems of ethnicity are multi-faceted. At the same time, one should not forget that in socialist times taboo topics could be discussed only in frameworks which might escape the attention of today's researchers. For example, in the Sub-Carpathians one could make mention of the few studies which appeared in the second half of the 1960s in Hungarian literature journals (e.g., *Tiszatáj*), in which information on the region's Magyars was presented foremost in the guise of workers' movement articles.

As rather little could be known about the development of the Sub-Carpathians thanks to the Soviet information block, the brief summary and description of the Magyars of the region is useful. Notably, despite the fact that the introduction is brief, there is mention made of the Magyar Jewry, and the concept of dual identity is introduced. However, the introductory sentence of the passage, which attempts to describe the Sub-Carpathian Magyars linguistically, is inaccurate: it claims (exclusively) that the Magyar spoken there is essentially standard Hungarian, but is full of imported Russian and Ukrainian words. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it

should have been added that this is not the result of an organic development, but is instead a product of neologism.

The use of the official term *Transkarpatenukraine* instead of the terms used in historical German and English language literature (Subkarpathien, Subcarpathian) is justified from two vantage points: attention must be paid to political sensitivities, and efforts need to be made to directly use the official term. From a Ukrainian and Russian viewpoint the term makes sense, as does the Polish term TransCarpathian Rus (which is more organic than the previous term, and does not refer to present-day Ukraine), but the use of the term *Transkarpaten* is as foreign to German geography as it is to Hungarian geography. True, this terminology is not used consistently. The term Sub-Carpathia, taken from the Hungarian titles, is translated into the bracketed German as Carpath-Ukraine, which is rather distant from the traditional and Hungarian terms, but is still not the same as the Moscow-centric or Kijiv-centric term of *Trans-Carpathia*.

The brief passage describing the Sub-Carpathian Germans is rather superficial (although it is a bit longer than the listing of the nine bibliographical references). It takes sides on debated issues such as the German founding of Beregszász, although it makes no mention of the inner ethnographic divisions of the Sub-Carpathian Germans. (The Svabs of the plains and the Cipszers also contributed to the development of the region's cultural pluralism, given that despite their common language, they represent diverse mentalities and cultures. Certain mountainside cities, like Rahon, are unique due to the existence of the one-time "Zipserei" alongside two or three other languages.)

The titles concerning the Jews of the Sub-Carpathians should have included the memoirs of those who were deported but survived the Holocaust. For the sake of clarity, the mention of Jewish dual-identity should have been made not only in the section on Magyars, but in the Jewish and German sections as well.

The existence of Roma, Slovaks, and Romanians in the Sub-Carpathians is evidenced in this bibliography only through statistical tables. It is possible, though not probable, that there is no literature on these groups. Neglecting the Ruthenian issue is, however, a serious error. The scientific bibliography, which for the most part attempts to be politically neutral, takes a stand at this point in the debate between Ukrainian nation-

alists and the leaders of the Ruthenian ethnicity concerning whether the Ruthenians of Sub-Carpathia should be considered a minority, or whether they are part of the Ukrainian majority. The view of the editors was likely that the Ruthenians are to be viewed as part of the Ukrainian nation. The trouble with this opinion is that it is not shared by a significant number of Ruthenians. In this way, by neglecting Ruthenians, the volume essentially sides with Ukrainian nationalists. In this sense though, there is not a total lack of literature, given that some studies on this topic are listed in the general section (notably the works of Paul Robert Magocsi). There are researchers of the Ruthenian issue who emigrated to other countries in the Carpathian basin, and whose help could have been enlisted in constructing the bibliography (or in writing a short description of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians). The Ruthenian ethnic movement has issued several publications recently, which could have usefully been brought to the attention of the readers of the bibliography.

The attempt to establish the neutrality of the bibliography was correct in not taking a stand in the debates of the former Yugoslav republics. There are thus chapters on both Yugoslavia and on the separate successor states. Even the two formerly autonomous regions of Kosovo and Voivodina have their own separate chapters. Unfortunately, this division does not succeed in precisely separating various regions, provinces, and countries, as is the case with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, where various minority groups are discussed based on the borders of the states established after the break-up of the empire. In the case of the south-Slav states, there is a little confusion concerning what should be sought under Yugoslavia, and what should be sought under the titles of the various republics. The editors tried to use a system whereby issues going beyond given republics are discussed on a federal level, while domestic issues are discussed on the level of the republic. This can, however, lead to misunderstandings, given that in some instances federal-level decisions had local effects within given republics. It may have been more useful to treat the issues of various "ethnic groups" until 1991 under the auspices of "the former Yugoslavia."

The inconsistent withdrawal of geographical terms in this way leads to distortions. For example, in the chapter on Croatia, under the heading of state minority policy, only literature on the World War II crimes of Croatia is listed. This leaves the impression that Croatia's past is identical with that

of the wartime Ustasha regime, which is a stark contrast to the usual political neutrality of the bibliography. It should also be noted that the listed literature is captivatingly expansive, and might go a long way in ensuring that the now vogue topic of Yugoslavia be approached more factually and professionally. Some of the annotations provided are very useful, in that they draw the reader's attention to the potential propaganda nature or one-sidedness of given entries. This is particularly the case concerning literature related to the Serbian-Albanian conflict.

The division of themes is often inconsistent. The Yugoslav school reforms of the 1950s and 1960s are often listed in both the educational and bilingualism subjects. (This is not to mention the fact that school policy could basically be put under the title "State Minority Policy", given that the lack of community self-government meant that this was the main area for the execution of political ideas concerning ethnic minorities.) The Yugoslav constitutional reforms (1963, 1974, 1991) are found at times under the state minority policy title, and at other times under the minority rights heading. It is interesting that the relative political weight of minority communities largely explains the fact that there are some ethnic groups, like Magyars, Germans, and Italians, who are present at all levels, while there are others (e.g., Bulgarians) who are presented only under the chapters of certain republics.

The short introductory passage on Yugoslavian Magyars (pp. 926-28) accurately emphasizes the two-faced nature of Tito's minority policy. It is worth noting that which strongly characterized socialist Yugoslavia: its very successful political image at the time. This made it possible for Tito's minority policy to serve as a model for the minorities in the socialist block and for public opinion in Hungary, despite its two-faced nature. This was one of the most important areas in which Yugoslavia succeeded in developing its positive image, even though the reality behind the image was rather unclear.

Of the Yugoslav successor states, Magyar settlement names were omitted only in the case of Slovenia. In other former republics there is mention of names used in Magyar, and Slovenian Italian names are marked. The omission of Magyar names was not likely the result of some conscious policy, but instead fell out of focus due to the multi-faceted nature of the project. For Yugoslavia, as for Hungary, there are remarkably short and superfi-

cial introductions of that part of the given country's majority ethnic group which lives as a minority elsewhere. This despite the fact that in both cases this is (or was) a prominent problem in public opinion and, in certain times, in foreign policy as well. Literature published in the mother country is naturally found in the sections on the minority ethnic group, but it is still difficult to understand why there is a need for separate yet incomplete topic sections.

The bibliography provides an expansive list of literature on Greece compared to the fact that public opinion knows little of minority issues in that country. However, there are not even brief descriptions of the given minorities. The book only presents statistics at the beginning of the Greek chapter, and offers no explanation of them. This is clearly due to the fact that the literature is difficult to obtain, or is perhaps superficial. This, however, does not mean that Greek or Greek minority issues (be they concerning Macedonians, Turks, or Albanians) are not serious concerns in the politics of our day.

The excellent bibliographical work is supplemented in the appendix by László Sebők's expansive, three-language Central- and South-East European minority map. With the help of the EuroGraph geographical information system, the map is based on official census data from 1951-1992. Taking into account community boundaries, it presents in a most clear way the region's ethnic space-structure at the end of the 20th century.

Taken as a whole, the potential reader or researcher (potential because, at least in most of the countries covered by the volume, the book costs about the amount of one month's pay) using the bibliography has access to a truly informative guide. The two-volume bibliography provides a means of becoming oriented in the theoretical literature, and allows for the greater realization of comparative approaches which are so important to minority studies. The databases of the CD-rom version, which is under construction, will hopefully be maintained and kept fresh, which would allow for research to keep pace with a quickly-changing world. Reviewing the outstanding book, the data-collection and research for which was completed in 1995, the reader is left with a numbing feeling: in the last two and a half years another volume's worth of research results has been produced on the examined region's ethnic and minority groups. Accessing and making use

of this new material is again left to us. The reviewers, to show their deep respect for the data-collectors and editors of the bibliography, have attempted to offer their critiques and comments in order that the computerized version may benefit. Thanks to the work of editors Gerhard Seewann and Peter Dippold, the minority researchers of the region now have access to a indispensable resource, whose utility cannot be described in a short review. Its utility will instead be felt in the everyday process of research.

# REGIO

A review of studies on minorities, politics and society

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1989 and Other Ceasuras in German History Writing Concerning Hungary

## REVIEWS

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The Search for the Frameworks of Interpretation (Nándor Bárdi)

Hungarian History Writers on Tour from the Balkans (Mihály Dobrovits)

Politicized Hungarian History Writing from the Balkans (Tamás Kende)