Summaries

Philosophical Disagreement and the Nature of Philosophical Problems
JÁNOS TŐZSÉR

Can you hold on to your philosophical views if you realize that other philosophers whom you consider your epistemic peers reject your views? Can you believe in the philosophical theory you advocate if you realize that it is but one among many theories each of which were developed and advocated by philosophers who work with the same evidential base and with roughly the same reasoning abilities as you do?

In this paper, I argue for a negative answer to these questions. Furthermore, based on my answers I suggest a kind of skeptical attitude towards philosophy: I propose you (and I) have to suspend philosophical judgments. In the first part, I analyze the standard debate between sceptical and anti-sceptical strategies; in the second, I investigate the nature of a particular philosophical problem, and in the third, I show what is really disturbing in this problem. In the fourth and last part, I state my vision about the general nature of philosophical problems, and finally, in the fifth part, I rehearse my (somewhat sad) conclusion.

The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)
JÁNOS KELEMEN

The paper is dedicated to the philosophy of Pierce on the occasion of the centenary of his death, with the aim to outline an overall characterization of his thought. Peirce’s œuvre is presented according to the following headings: Peirce and the golden age of American Philosophy; Peirce and Kant; realism and a fallibilist philosophy of science; categories, semiotics and abduction; pragmatism / pragmaticism. The author accepts Karl-Otto Apel’s interpretation according to which Peirce worked out a semiotic transformation of Kantian transcendental logic. He argues that the pragmatism of Peirce represents a communitarian view of the growth of knowledge and contains the nucleus of a reasonable theory of meaning.
Kant’s Analytic Method
HORVÁTH ZOLTÁN

Methodology was always a fundamental question for Kant, in his first work as well as in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the *Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (published in 1764) he established the principles of the analytic method, which he considered as the only appropriate one for philosophy and especially for metaphysics. In my paper I argue that there was no revolution in this regard: the later critical investigations apply the previous method. I demonstrate this claim first by the methodological considerations of the *Inaugural Dissertation* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Second, I demonstrate that in the *Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic* Kant really explores the conditions of synthetic *a priori* judgments according to an analytic method and even the *Transcendental Deduction* uses it when it sets up its highest premise. I also show that these facts are not refuted by the different and special use of the term ‘analytic method’ in the *Prolegomena*. Finally, I give a comprehensive picture of the role the method plays both for the inquiries of theoretical and practical reason by providing an interpretation of the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of some passages of the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

Determination as Causality, as Sollen and as Wollen:
The Antinomical Exposition of Moral Freedom in Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethics
BIANKA BOROS

The paper examines the topic of freedom in the ethical sense, following Hartmann’s aporetic method. It is important to note that the theme of ethical freedom is only a minor problem in Hartmann’s architectural ontology, and even in Hartmann’s philosophy of freedom. The apories of freedom are at the heart of Hartmann’s ethics and his ontological concept, because freedom plays a central role in Hartmann’s architectural ontology as the converse side of determination. Furthermore human beings as entities display all four levels of reality (inorganic, organic, psychical/emotional and intellectual/cultural level), and the “Sollen antinomy” plays a mediating role between the investigation of human beings as a natural and as a social being. The article – along explaining these apories – outlines Hartmann’s solution for the problem of human freedom, particularly on the second level of the dilemma.
The Essay of Joseph Teleki and the Difficulties of the Apology

Péter Balázs

The paper introduces a philosophico-theological essay written in French by the Transylvanian aristocrat, Joseph Teleki. The Essai sur la faiblesse des esprits-forts, published first in Leiden, later in Amsterdam (1761) is a brave attempt from a young scholar to defend, in a very Leibnizian way, the possibility of the main mysteries of the Christian Religion. Teleki positions himself as a juste-milieu Christian philosopher, as distant from the advocates of superstition as from the free-thinkers – often by way of encountering the views Pierre Bayle, a sworn enemy of rational theologies. The study aims to show the strengths and the weaknesses of this little known essay and to present its secular context.

Truth as Justice in the Second Untimely Meditation

Isztay Simon

The paper addresses the origins of Nietzsche’s conception of truth in the 1870s in its complexity. The rhetorical, language-critical notion of truth, put forward in On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense (1873) is fairly well-known. It is less known, however, that Nietzsche also elaborated another notion of truth in the same period in his Second Untimely Meditation, i.e. in On the Use and Abuse of History for Life (1873–74) that explicates truth as justice. My paper aims to uncover the set of relations between these diverse notions. In the first part, I present the Nietzschean distinction between moral and non-moral truth relying on the On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense and On the Pathos of Truth. The second part explicates the notion of historicity put forward in On the Use and Abuse of History for Life. These explorations introduce the third part, which elaborates the idea of truth as justice as represented in the Second Untimely Meditation.