Naming Rights: 
Nation, Family, and Women’s Rights in the Debates on Domestic Violence in Contemporary Hungary

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Violence against women emerged as one of the prime topics in the international human rights discourse in the 1980s. In an effort to circumvent the many culturally different interpretations of women’s rights worldwide, activists began to focus on one common platform: the sanctity of bodily integrity. With the fall of the communist system, this human rights framework and associated policy recommendations — most notably the criminalization of domestic violence based on the “Duluth model” from Minnesota, USA — arrived in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Transnational norms and actors exerted pressure, most often indirectly but on occasion directly and personally, on this region to deal with this problem that until then had been unrecognized to the point of not even being named.

The debates on naming domestic violence have been indicative of the continued unease confronting this problem including an outright rejection of its existence in many countries. Many post-communist governments eventually accepted some terminological and conceptual ambiguity to align themselves with values viewed as important for both sizeable (or at least vocal) local constituents and at the same time, symbolically signaling to behave as a ‘normal state’ to international actors abroad. Although no international or EU-specific legislation against domestic violence exists as of early 2013, there is widespread expectation that the problem be recognized and effectively addressed — to the extent that taking action has almost become a sign of belonging to the “club” of democratic nations. Central and Eastern European women’s groups routinely implied in their appeals to various local authorities that the degree to which post-communist countries were willing to respond to domestic vio-
lence could be used to measure their desire to honor their integration into the European community of democratic nations.⁵

In Hungary, however, women’s and human rights NGOs’ explicit alignment with international institutions and human rights norms for normative support has created a distance from the predominantly nationalist values that the contemporary conservative-nationalist Orbán government represents. Reflecting sharply differing value orientations regarding the role of women, the family, and the nation, the debate on how to call domestic violence continues unabated. Illustrative examples of the current, official nationalist discourse conflicting with recommendations and policies from abroad are numerous in both scholarly literature and mainstream news items, many of them indicating that external influence is seen as misguided and thus unwelcome in contemporary politics.⁶ Given the conflicting normative orientations of women’s NGOs and the various Hungarian governments in the past twenty years, it may not be surprising that Hungary remains beside Estonia and Latvia one of three post-communist EU member states that have not yet established a separate law on domestic violence.

Why this lack of progress? Why did negotiations break down in January 2013 between Hungarian women’s/human rights NGOs and the government when the latter had publicly promised in October 2012, in a response to extensive and vocal protests that it would introduce a specific law against domestic violence?⁷ The analysis of the Hungarian case especially merits our attention because during the early transition period this country was an early adopter of, rather than the exception to, signing up to human rights norms and international treaties. Building on a considerable social science literature analyzing why countries sign treaties, more analysis of outlier cases is needed.⁸

Demonstrating extensive continuity with previous Hungarian social movements mobilizing against domestic violence, references to international norms and related recommended practices were some of the central parts of a large protest in front of the Hungarian Parliament on 16 October 2012. Protesters gathered there the day after Parliament rejected, with a strikingly unabashed patriarchal rationale, domestic violence being made a separate criminal offense, despite over 100,000 signatures urging them to do so.⁹ Participants also whole-heartedly rejected, in their speeches and posters, the nationalist and conservative perception of “women as baby-making machines.” This protest presented a profound challenge to politicians’ treating women’s vulnerability to intimate partner violence as dismissible because it could all be avoided if “they gave birth to three, four
Adding further urgency to the protesters’ appeal was Hungary’s being the only Central European EU-member country with no specific law against domestic violence and very sparse services to help its victims. Although domestic violence is still a debated issue worldwide, there is an emerging transnational consensus that it is a widespread problem requiring consistent and sustained attention. One notable example of this powerful international normative and legal trend was the 2011 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. This Convention requires governments to act against all forms of inequality between men and women that produce violence in intimate settings and it firmly recommends establishing a distancing ordinance (also called a restraining or protection order) that, in case of immediate danger, removes the perpetrator from the home for a specified period. This 2011 Council of Europe Convention is just one, albeit a very notable example of how emerging norms, related local awareness-raising campaigns, and international organizations have put pressure on governments to stop violence against women, including domestic violence.

How and why governments respond to pressure to eliminate domestic violence varies widely. Some post-communist countries, like Slovenia and Croatia, responded quickly to international influences, enacting legislation and attempting to implement laws effectively. Others, such as the Czech Republic, were also relatively quick, albeit rather more reluctant at least initially. Other East-Central European countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, were non-committal, producing some legislation and relevant services, but resisting passing comprehensive legislation or not allocating sufficient funds for proper execution of programs. Finally, there are the three outlier countries: Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia which to date have ignored or outright rejected efforts to pass domestic violence legislations and create effective shelters for victims.

Why does Hungary remain in this last category? How have social movements attempted to change this situation and what motivates their efforts? Since the early 1990s, Hungarian individuals, NGOs, and the social movements they organized have been extensively interacting with transnational partners to encourage the Hungarian government to produce specific legislation on domestic violence and establish services for its victims. The present article explores the three main processes that have contributed to this ongoing process: 1) bottom-up pressures such as NGO efforts, 2) top-down pressures such as deliberations among parties and...
state legislation, and 3) interweave, or transnational pressures that combine with local NGOs and the government to create and enforce policies. I investigate how and why Hungarian movements continue to struggle by analyzing the actors, their self-described motivations, and the contemporary policy outcomes in the already two-decades-long extensive engagement between international and local actors regarding domestic violence. I also highlight the most notable perspectives of both political elites and the general public to explain how and why the new terms for and against certain policy recommendations regarding domestic violence have emerged.

Methods

For nearly two decades, Hungary has resisted both passing a specific law against domestic violence and providing comprehensive services to its victims, and thus is an important example of a country resisting official recognition of domestic violence. Unfortunately, this long-standing refusal to recognize domestic violence as an important social problem means prevalence data on domestic violence are missing from state statistics. The Hungarian state does not collect data on domestic violence and the services it provides are not transparent, so interviews with local NGOs, state bureaucrats, the police, and politicians were my only reliable sources of information about the long debates on what to call domestic violence, what kinds of services are most needed, and who should provide those services. I consulted various international documents and NGO websites to select my pool of potential interviewees. I also regularly asked my interviewees for recommendations on how to find the most important political participants in the discussion on domestic violence in Hungary. I prepared a set of central questions for my structured interviews and, depending on my interviewees’ willingness or ability to provide information, adjusted them to uncover the most pertinent information and materials.

The research for this article dates back to the mid-1990s. I observed and interviewed representatives of women’s groups that 1) produced news items about their events, such as conferences, petitions, and protests; and 2) provided services on behalf of Hungarian women. The interview sites and activists changed frequently as groups dissolved and new ones emerged. Some activists moved to a new NGO and a few particularly dedicated individuals remained active during the entire two decades. The most typical activists can be characterized as belonging to one of two main groups: 1) university students or recent graduates, and 2) middle-
aged, often professional activists. Budapest tended to be the most likely location for groups to form and coordinate activities with others both in Hungary and also internationally.

During the fall of 1994, I interviewed numerous activists of NANE (Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen Egyesület, Women for Women Together Against Violence www.nane.hu). NANE, established in January 1994, was the first Hungarian NGO to serve victims of domestic violence. A rarity among women’s groups from the early transition period, NANE has survived political and economic upheavals and continues to offer its services today. Since 1994, I have added at least five new interviews, each with different individuals from Hungarian women’s groups, to the original 42 transcribed and coded texts every summer.

The purpose of the interviews is to discover how and why international norms transpired in some countries and were resisted in others by the post-interview analysis showing the actions and interactions of NGOs, governments, and international organizations. Exclusively analyzing official documents, such as national plans to combat domestic violence — even if such plans were produced — would not offer the required insight. These documents eliminate or gloss over formative debates and negotiations taking place before such document appears in public and thus do not explain why certain terms and policies were chosen and why their implementation succeeded or failed. Interviews offer activists, government officials, and politicians the opportunity to interpret their own or their organizations’ professed values, actions, and recommended policies. Their interpretations then allow me to increase scholarly and policy-relevant knowledge on the reception and adaptation to new, trans-nationally resonant norms. The subjectivity of the interviews offers crucial perspectives on why the local and international coalitions were successful in either producing or blocking legislative and governmental action. I always explain the aim of my research to my interviewees and offer full confidentiality and anonymity.

During my interviews in June and July 2012 in Hungary, I asked NGO representatives how they reached out to supporters, established a network of activists, and attempted to convince the government to pursue changes in norms and laws. However, I have found that state employees’ freedom of expression was severely curtailed. Most of these interviewees explicitly mentioned such constraints. State employees can give interviews only with explicit permission from their boss. When I interviewed police officers and government representatives in 2012, I encountered many bureaucratically sanctioned obstacles despite the often explicit willingness
of my interviewees to share information. Understandably, few people are willing to risk their jobs for offering what could later be framed as potentially damaging or critical information on state institutions. Some state employees suggested I identify them by their membership in professional associations, such as lawyers or by their previous profession, because these NGO affiliations afforded the freedom to share information without government control.

Locating reliable police and crime statistics on how often police units were called to domestic disputes and how they responded to cases of intimate partner violence (I will discuss the choice of expression for domestic violence later in this text) proved equally challenging. I could collect such data from NGO activists and the police, but much of it is fragmented and very difficult to compare across time. Reliable and chronologically comparable data on the occurrence of and state response to domestic violence information is essential not only for scholarly research, but also as a basis for a meaningful public discussion and policy deliberation in Hungary. Nonetheless, public deliberation has started despite the lack of such comparative data, with NGOs asserting that the 72 women who are killed annually in domestic disputes in Hungary account for 39 percent of all homicides.17

I also gathered extensive amounts of archival information from newspapers, Internet sites of NGOs, and the Hungarian government. I juxtapose the interviews with this information to identify differences of interpretation between the various political actors. When I find overlaps and contradictions, I ask activists, government bureaucrats, and politicians for further information either by contacting them in writing or during the following year’s interview because this short period allows interviewees to more accurately recall other actors and arguments.

**Background: The power of a label**

Identifying obstacles to defining and establishing policies against domestic violence has particular contemporary significance in Hungary where political and economic problems, such as high unemployment, inflation, emigration, much-hyped demographic decline, and near state bankruptcy have shaken the previously unquestionable dominance of liberal norms, especially since the 2007 global financial crisis.18 The increasingly inward-looking and nationalist trends in Hungary further contribute to decreasing
the chances of including international human rights and non-traditional gender issues in policy deliberations.

The most important finding of my research to date has been the renewed importance of naming domestic violence. Naming implies a normative frame and connects to particular policy instruments. In the late 1990s, women’s NGOs translated “domestic violence” from English and interpreted it as “intimate partner violence” (párkapcsolati erőszak) that included past and present partners, married, engaged, living together, separated, heterosexual and homosexual alike. Because language and the construction of nation are intertwined, additions in the language reflect the changing standards, norms, beliefs of a nation, especially if we consider idioms. The term “violence against women” (nők elleni erőszak) was immediately rejected by the public and most politicians for focusing on adult women, and for implying victimhood and a need for feminist-inspired policy solutions in the form of shelters and quick, easily enforceable distancing ordinance against perpetrators. As the naming and consequent policy debate progressed, it stripped domestic violence of any feminist connotations, calling it “violence in the family” (családon belüli erőszak) to include — and eventually focus on — children and to a lesser degree, the elderly. Focus on the young generation, as the key to the future of the nation, is the long established rhetorical focus of conservative-nationalist forces that neither the liberal-socialist (2002–2010) nor the more explicitly populist recent governments (in power since 2010) wished to challenge. This comprehensive and inclusive, but entirely gender-neutral approach aims to reduce and eliminate violence within the general family setting but it also requires extensive services for a large and very diverse set of the population. Both the consequent considerable expansion of welfare services and their unfocused nature would have made such a proposal unlikely during times of increasing austerity. More importantly, conservative-nationalist forces, such as the Christian Democratic Party objected to the notion that the family could be a site of violence because they regard it as a sacred place where future generations of Hungarians are nurtured.

The naming debate is at risk of being dismissed as superficial or trivial, but it depicts a historical trajectory and serves as the public face of profound normative and political differences. The most important line of differentiation concerns the interpretation of individual rights and the limits of state intervention in private life. This concern is especially notable against a backdrop of the relatively recent historical experience of communist-era invasive state intrusion in family life. This historical
heritage has also been identified as limiting the appeal of women’s social movement activism.\textsuperscript{20} Other important policy-relevant debate concerning domestic violence is the contemporary embrace of capitalist values and the related inviolability of private property, exemplified by the frequently raised concern that distancing ordinance would imply the perpetrator losing ownership of the apartment/house. A particularly controversial aspect of naming domestic violence and finding suitable policies to address it is homophobia, and more specifically the fear of including — and thus legitimating — gay partners by using the term “intimate partner” violence (\textit{párkapcsolati erőszak}).\textsuperscript{21} For conservatives and nationalists, including gay partners in the definition of partners amounts to nothing less than an overt threat against the role of the nation and the sanctity of procreation.

\textbf{An emerging movement}

The Hungarian NGOs working to raise awareness of domestic violence have used many creative techniques rooted in their home environments, and also borrowed ideas and arguments from international experiences. Most local campaigns found inspiration from abroad but developed into localized, grassroots awareness-raising efforts. For example, volunteers at NANE, the first and thus far only NGO to have a hotline for victims of domestic violence in Hungary, mounted a persistent campaign of placing stickers displaying its hotline number on public transport vehicles. Initially assisted by a regional fund from the Open Society Institute,\textsuperscript{22} NANE launched a traveling exposition of “red dolls,” life-sized red cutout images of “Silent Witnesses” that represented women killed by domestic violence, as a large-scale awareness-raising and political lobbying project. The red dolls had previously appeared in the United States and Western Europe as part of the annual Sixteen Days Against Violence campaign and their symbolism translated flawlessly across physical and linguistic borders.\textsuperscript{23}

The initiation of a coordinated human rights campaign to criminalize domestic violence at the end of the first decade of the 21st century marked a sea change in Hungarian women’s social movements. Earlier waves of contemporary women’s activism in Hungary were barely — and very rarely — connected to international networks of feminist and human rights causes. Finding inspiration from and cooperating with transnational social movement activists and at the same time being constrained by such collaborations, Hungarian activism concerning domestic violence demon-
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strates this double-sided nature of transnational flows. On the one hand, using a typical “boomerang pattern,” trans-national social movements allowed women’s groups in Hungary to refer to and use the leverage of various international norms and organizations to advance their agenda at home. On the other hand, the predominantly Western, liberal democratic framework of human rights and women’s activism also narrowed the definition of domestic violence to exclude economic violence, contrary to the hopes of many post-communist women’s groups. The Western feminist interpretation of domestic violence as both gender specific and part of the broad notion of violence against women also conflicted with the Hungarian political environment which would only address this issue in a gender-neutral manner.

NANE: An enduring force

Established in 1994 with the active involvement of Antonia Burrows, an American feminist, NANE was the first organization in Hungary to raise awareness of the problem by effectively using the media. Eventually, NANE’s telephone number made its way into the general information section of the telephone books. NANE also extensively engaged in advocacy to establish laws against perpetrators. In an initially fruitful cooperation between NANE and the Hungarian Policewomen’s Association, the police started to train some of its members to recognize and deal with domestic violence. In 2004, 240 police officers, followed by another 80 in 2005, were trained to recognize symptoms of domestic violence, but the police found it very difficult to obtain funding for this training. Along with the human rights advocacy group Habeas Corpus Munkacsoport (Habeas Corpus Working Group) and Krisztina Morvai’s Női és Gyermekjogi Kutatási és Képzőközpont (Women’s Rights and Children’s Rights Research and Training Center), NANE advocated for the recognition of “intimate partner violence” and the provision of services to battered women and children in the mid-1990s. The pinnacle of their collaboration was the 2003 Budapest police directive that compelled the police to intervene in all cases of domestic violence. Two tragic cases in September 2002 had created an unexpected political opportunity for the three NGOs to promote their case. One case involved Tomi Balogh, an eight-year-old boy who was killed by his father. The other was that of fourteen-year-old Kitti Simek, who shot her abusive stepfather. Myriad letters and calls followed an emotional appearance on television by Krisz-
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tina Morvai, who asked Hungarians to demand that their parliamentary representatives pass legislation to eliminate domestic violence. The three NGOs gathered over 50,000 signatures on a petition showing Tomi’s picture; and these signatures, as well as Hungary’s then-pending EU admission, put extensive pressure on the broader public and politicians to produce parliamentary legislation. When the three NGOs accepted framing of domestic violence as child abuse, this de-gendered political message finally convinced two members of the Hungarian Parliament to draft a comprehensive proposal for state action to handle domestic violence. The bill was presented to Parliament in a revised form in March 2003 under number H/2483. During the formulation of the bill, the Hungarian Socialist Party female representative who submitted it insisted that men were equally victims of domestic violence and should therefore be protected, thus showing the enduring power of dominant gender hierarchies. Between 5 March and 16 April 2003, the Parliament discussed and eventually passed a nonbinding policy-oriented document, “Decision on the Formulation of a National Strategy for Preventing and Efficiently Responding to Violence in the Family” that obliged the legislative body to formulate a law on domestic violence within a year. The governing coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats, totaling 203 representatives, voted in favor of the decision, whereas the conservatives, 160 representatives, abstained. However, this national strategy and the demand for a separate law against domestic violence have still not been fulfilled a decade on. Although in 2006 a distancing ordinance was established, both this and its slightly revised 2009 version were considered useless except in the most serious cases, when the police could intervene using other means.

NANE found a dynamic and internationally recognized partner in Amnesty International (AI). By widely publicizing the unheard cries of women who do not enjoy even rudimentary protection from rape and sexual violence in the home, AI’s cooperation with NANE became part of a worldwide effort to draw attention to violence against women. With its direct involvement with NANE’s “Silent Witnesses” campaign, AI became the first major international human rights NGO to engage, in a direct and sustained way, with advocacy related to the criminalization of domestic violence in Hungary.

Joining AI in exerting pressure on the Hungarian government and many of its neighbors, The Advocates for Human Rights invited fellow NGOs and government representatives to a February 2008 regional workshop to enhance legal reforms against domestic violence.
notable transnational involvements of AI and The Advocates for Human Rights signal the increasingly tangible impact of transnational forces in social movement activism to eradicate domestic violence.

NANE persisted in finding international partners, such as the EU’s Daphne–supported trainings and major corporations — for example, in 2011–12 it collaborated with Vodafone, a mobile phone company — to support its cause. Vodafone was behind a successful project in Spain and Britain whereby women who were victims of domestic violence could be immediately connected with the local police in emergencies.\(^{34}\) Vodafone’s effective technical and monetary support for NANE was a central focus when the Hungarian government started to deliberate the definition of and policies against domestic violence in the fall and winter of 2012.\(^{35}\)

While NANE quickly procured moral and financial support from abroad, its first major Hungarian state financial support arrived only in 2009 when the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour offered to fund a two-day training session for the police and social workers with a focus on protecting children from abuse. As the child-centric training indicates, the conceptual debate about who is the most likely victim of domestic violence has continued unabated between Hungarian state agencies and NANE.

The official Hungarian discourse on domestic violence has fundamentally erased the feminist and women-specific signifiers of domestic violence, calling it háztartási (household) violence. A woman activist bitterly joked about this new name, arguing that the adjective equated violence with cookies (háztartási keksz is a type of cookie), as both share a colloquial terminology. Such a popular association did not bother the Christian Democratic Party, the minority party in the governing coalition, which coined and heavily promoted the new term to avoid the negative association of violence with the family.\(^{36}\) These trends were not unique to Hungary because gender-neutral arguments have gained ground internationally, erasing gender from policy debates concerning domestic violence at least in part due to neo-liberalism offloading government responsibilities and reducing public spending on welfare.\(^{37}\)

A main reason why a small NGO such as NANE could maintain a decade-long and extensive record of engaging with public policy and maintain persistent contacts with the Hungarian police, the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs\(^{38}\), and major corporations is that it entered into and maintains, within the constraints of its limited resources, an extensive transnational network. NANE managed to establish an active connection to Western European and North American feminist women’s advocacy
organizations that use human rights instruments, such as the UN’s CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women), to combat violence against women. It is also using its connections with Western European organizations, such as WAVE (Women Against Violence Europe) to find partners. Although personal face-to-face meetings were infrequent among women activists in different countries, a transnational communication network operated effectively, mostly via the Internet.

Although NANE continues to be the single most persistent voice lobbying to establish legal recognition and treatment of domestic violence in Hungary, other national and transnational pressures have also emerged to exert an influence. The November 2012 “16 Days Against Violence” campaign ended with an official statement calling for the Hungarian government to follow the Polish example and sign The Council of Europe (CoE) binding “Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.” Although Hungary — along with only a few other CoE member states — has not signed this convention, it is unlikely that it will be able to maintain its position for long owing to a combination of external and internal pressures.

A new wave of activism

Two successive signature-collection campaigns in 2010 and 2011 signaled a newly strengthening wave of public debate on domestic violence. The 2011 signature drive gained the support of the international cosmetics company AVON, whose network of mostly female agents mobilized enough support to collect over 100,000 verifiable signatures. In July 2012, I interviewed government politicians, NGO activists, and Pálma Halász, the organizer of both signature-collection campaigns, and at that time it was becoming obvious that the Hungarian Parliament would have to discuss whether domestic violence merits a separate bill. These two signature-collection drives emerged after the 2003 extensive mobilization that also produced substantial pressure, but ultimately failed to produce legislative action and comprehensive services for victims of domestic violence.

However, even the 100,000 signatures collected in 2011 proved to be insufficient evidence of a mandate for the conservative-nationalist governing coalition and it scheduled the legally mandated debate on
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domestic violence for 3 a.m. on 12 September 2012. The most frequently quoted intervention at this late and sparsely attended parliamentary debate was that of representative István Varga, from the ruling FIDESZ–Magyar Polgári Szövetség (the Federation of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union). His argument that “women should give birth to two or three, preferably four or five children” to avoid domestic violence generated enough outrage both in Hungary and abroad that the ruling party decided to abruptly change course and establish a committee to review their legal options, promising to establish a separate domestic violence bill by the end of 2012. The conservative position that István Varga represented in the parliamentary debate on domestic violence clearly demonstrated the firm and unchanged sexual hierarchies within the present government and their preference to give priority to nationalism in the form of promoting demographic growth versus (women’s) individual rights and desires. To the supporters of Varga, deliberations on domestic violence appear as a challenge to the nation, to (the exclusively heterosexual interpretation of) the family and, within it, women’s (assumed) subservience.

Comparative analysis on domestic violence has identified two main clusters of factors that most influence attitudes regarding violence against women at the individual, organizational, community, and societal levels: culture and gender. These two meta-factors shape attitudes on multiple levels that then contribute to a fundamental and causal relationship to the perpetration of violence against women. For example, men with more traditional, rigid, and misogynistic gender-role attitudes are more likely to resort to marital violence. With nationalist-conservative values and a right-wing leaning centrist government enjoying broad popular support in Hungary, legislation against domestic violence will continue to encounter obstacles, even if its two-decades long history shows persistent signs of increasing appeal.

Two theoretical challenges and their relevance

Two main theoretical venues directly contribute to explaining why the process to produce a separate domestic violence bill and establish services to its victims has been so long and difficult in Hungary: a) postmodern feminist theory on intersectionality, and b) recent reformulations of social movement theory, including transnational movements. The intersection of these two perspectives provides the most useful explanations of how and why women’s and human rights NGOs have added domestic violence to
their agendas and pursued related policy changes in the past twenty years in Hungary.

It may be tempting to assert that Hungary’s increased transnational engagement has initiated and contributed to the changes in activism related to domestic violence. However, such a monocausal explanation would grossly underestimate both the effects of national political forces and the diversity of the women who participated in this social movement. Thus, the postmodern interpretation of the diversity of women’s interests and the corresponding diversity of women activists is the first theoretical perspective to be discussed here.

**Intersectionality: A postmodern perspective**

Post-modern feminist theory highlights the diversity among women and within women’s movements. Data emerging from the research on Hungarian women’s movements underscores the arguments of contemporary feminist theorizing on the multiple characteristics of women, also labeled as “intersectionality.” This postmodern line of thought rejects an essentialist notion of femininity and instead recognizes that the entity we call “woman” is a fluid construct of various facets, such as ethnicity, sexual orientation, economic class, and religion, etc. Consequently, the Hungarian movement against domestic violence combines many of these facets in changing ways.

Recognizing diversity, however, does not negate that the social and political category of “women” can account for both the impressive political solidarity of women and their explicit differences. While some men participated in the protests to call for a separate law on domestic violence and in the signature collection campaigns both as activists and supporters, the overwhelming majority of activists were women. My own observations and interviews have revealed that only women acted as the main spokespersons for the movement against domestic violence. Thus, while I keep the diversity of women in mind, I highlight when and how a sizeable group or combination thereof mobilized in support of what they considered an important shared interest concerning domestic violence in Hungary.

Ethnicity is one of the important perspectives of intersectionality in Hungarian women’s movements. The country’s largest ethnic minority — the approximately 10 percent of Gypsy/Roma ethnicity — has created and maintained women’s groups separate from the other women’s groups.
With a few exceptions, the pursuits of Roma women’s groups have remained disconnected from the Hungarian movement’s waves of actions, including domestic violence. Roma women’s groups’ focus has been mainly on job creation and anti-discrimination, both of which have encountered continuous and strong obstacles, and both they and individual Roma women have been largely absent from mobilizations against domestic violence in Hungary. Their general absence may be explained by a strong anti-Roma sentiment that explicitly emerged in the form of the 17 percent electoral support for Jobbik — The Movement for a Better Hungary, an ultra-right and explicitly racist party, which entered Hungarian Parliament in the 2010 elections.

Jobbik has a special relevance for Hungarian women’s movements, because Krisztina Morvai became one of its best-known representatives and its presidential candidate in 2010. An internationally known feminist lawyer who served as a UN CEDAW Committee member between 2002 and 2006, Morvai, as described earlier, was one of the most notable activists fighting for legal changes regarding domestic violence in Hungary. However, her swift turn to the extreme Right, including her broadly publicized, vitriolic anti-Semitic comments caused a rift that halted women’s and human rights groups’ organizing against domestic violence. Morvai’s anti-Roma rhetoric entered national and international politics when she became a representative of the European Parliament. Despite her long-established record of supporting a separate law on domestic violence, she remained silent in September 2012 when conservative-nationalist politicians questioned the credibility and mandate of the petition signed by over 100,000 people calling for such a bill.

My interviews were testament to the deep ethnic divide among Hungarian women activists, rooted in discrimination against both Roma and Jewish compatriots. The ethnic divide usually manifests not as outright hostility, but as organizational segregation. I have not encountered Roma women members in other women’s groups, although I have seen a few ethnic Hungarians attend high-profile meetings of a few Roma women’s gatherings. This ethnic segregation continues despite a much-publicized integration effort, called “Roma Decade 2005–15,” which is supported by many European governments, the EU’s various institutions, the Open Society Institute, and other notable international funders, and which has its secretariat in Budapest. In part because most Jewish women activists refrain from publicly identifying as belonging to this long-discriminated-against minority in Hungary, anti-Semitic sentiments
have appeared latently or as comments in my interviews, but I have not yet observed them in the public actions of women’s groups.

Reformulations of social movement theory

Reacting against the new global neoliberal order and the related imposition of austerity measures, social movements in post-communist Europe seized on emerging transnational networks. The post-communist trans-national experience does not negate the global and international inquiries, but adds to them Foucauldian considerations of disciplining power structures and normative regulations of individuals and their groups. When viewing globalization as a disciplining regime, a Foucauldian analysis reveals a form of govern-mentality built both with economic-political structures and deeply incorporated meta-norms, such as individuality and competition, and based on these, certain rights. Nationalist and traditionalist interpretations of community, such as family and nation, attempt to counter these influences.

Although often described as weak, illiberal, and ineffective in post-communist Europe, social movements in Hungary have explicitly broadened the scope of political contestations. For example, especially during 2011 in Hungary, conservative-nationalist voices stated their own critique of neo-liberalism alongside what is usually seen as a “red-green” (social-democratic and environmentalist) protest. Domestic violence has fallen in between these two dominant and culturally resonant framings.

From the globally dominant neoliberal perspective, domestic violence is cast as an individual rights violation. At the same time, the neoliberal perspective also creates strong incentives for objectifying women and using their bodies to sell in the — purportedly free — marketplace. In Hungary and in post-communist Europe in general, naked or scantily clad women’s bodies are pervasively used for economic gain both legally as advertisements and illegally, as prostitutes. These two normative constraints, simultaneously emerging from the neoliberal framework, leave Hungarian women’s groups with precious few options for framing domestic violence in a way that could appear as an important problem their communities need to address both for international and national audiences.

Thus far, Hungarian women’s mobilizations chose to hybridize the arguments of individual human rights with national considerations to raise attention to domestic violence. The results have been strong signs of gender neutrality and a child-centered focus in national deliberations. The
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combination of these arguments produced tensions both within and between women’s groups, but in this regard they appear similar to other contexts, including Canada where activists against domestic violence recently adopted gender-neutral frames that de-emphasize feminist arguments. This phenomenon highlights the difficult task of discursive framing inside a social movement. Benford and Snow argue that it is crucial to include social movement framing alongside political opportunity structures and resource mobilizations to understand the emergence and assess the effectiveness of movements.

The major benefit of using the transnational framework is that its epistemology encourages the incorporation of various kinds of otherness. This flexibility allows for multiple opportunities that neo-liberalism enlivens. The transnational frame also invokes the necessity to include the long-neglected “Second World” experience to re-enter the already well-established North-South dialogue. In order to accomplish this newly interpreted recognition and renewed incorporation of the contributions of the communist/post-communist period regarding women’s movements, post-communist women’s movements must overcome two major obstacles. First, Central and Eastern European women must reject being labeled persistently as “backwards, apolitical and full of apathy,” which inflicts false consciousness. Second, the whole region must overcome having been erased as an entity: “Eastern Europe itself (in its Cold War borders) has in any case probably ceased to exist.”

Unearthing, validating, and analyzing contemporary Hungarian women’s movements reveals many shades of the seemingly two-fold process of women’s empowerment and disempowerment. On the one hand, free association, increased travel opportunities, and new media offered by the Internet are emancipatory and afford self-expression. On the other hand, the example of Hungarian women’s activism in the past twenty years demonstrates the rise of new forms of unequal power relations and conflicts between international and local interpretations of the “appropriate” gender-specificity in social movements and their claims about public policies. Due to the intermingling of these two contradictory effects of transnational forces, women’s mobilizations had to — or chose to — creatively hybridize external and local expectations so that their claims could reach an audience. The process of hybridizing is ongoing and it is moderately successful in navigating the sensitivities of an increasingly anti-democratic national environment and a powerful neoliberal global regime.

Conclusion: Domestic violence and contemporary Hungarian women’s movements

This paper has described and explored successive waves of Hungarian women’s activism while defining and interpreting domestic violence as they interact with one another, national politics, the transnational environment, and the broader social issues of gender and nation. The terms defining domestic violence has changed from the initial “intimate partner violence” through various iterations to arrive at the same term, only slightly modified after nearly two decades of activism and awareness raising. In an environment of economic crisis in Hungary, the focus of women’s movements has shifted to a selection of gender-specific topics that already carried a seal of transnational resonance, such as domestic violence. The transnational socio-economic and cultural forces affecting Hungary produced not only more openness and diversity of voices in the public arena but also various limitations on women’s activism. Although social movements tend to benefit from the increased opportunities for transnational networking, women’s movements have also been constrained by the underlying norms and implementation of neo-liberalism.

The contemporary Hungarian case presents a challenge to a monolithic understanding of women’s mobilizations by showing that when domestic violence emerges as a topic of public debate, successive waves of movements have tended to downplay the potentially women-specific arguments in favour of a more gender-neutral framework in hopes of attracting broader popular support. As Alena Heitlinger and Steven Saxonberg point out for the Czech case, despite the obstacles feminists face, it might be possible to mobilize more people around women’s issues if social movements frame their arguments in a manner that takes into account the specific cultural sensitivities of the region. The more successful Slovene, Croat, and Czech cases of recognizing and defining domestic violence and creating and implementing policies against it serve as evidence that such harmony between transnational, national, and local contexts is entirely possible in a post-communist context. In contrast, the current Hungarian discursive frames tend to portray the sexes as complementary, with women acting as the more docile figure, in part because of contemporary nationalist and conservative attitudes, and in part because of the historical legacy of communism and the contemporary economic crisis, which emphasize the need for solidarity within the private sphere.
There are at least three main points of significance in the notable shift from welfare to narrower, often gender-neutral but trans-nationally more resonant issues in Hungarian women’s activism.

First, transnational support is becoming a requirement for sustained mobilization, and increasingly so even for partial policy success. At the same time, resource-dependence, co-optation by Western donors, and “NGO-ization” (i.e., professionalization) can be to the detriment of women’s social movements focusing on local concerns. It is important to note that even this otherwise seemingly simple hierarchical relationship has produced an ongoing and substantial exchange about interpretations of gender roles and differently lived realities — that is, the expression of intersectionality and difference between women and their various movements. For example, women’s NGOs from the former communist bloc have emphasized the inclusion of economic violence, which women’s NGOs promoted as a fundamental part of defining domestic violence, much to the chagrin of US-based activists.

Second, the much celebrated and seemingly open neoliberal system has brought a new set of structural constraints to social movement activism. These increasingly normalized (and thus, most often invisible), but powerful constraints cannot be explained by exclusively relying on the routine argument that Central and Eastern European movements are weak because the fear inherited from the communist past blocks activism or women’s continued solidarity with men against the oppressive state. The movements that Hungarian women have produced in the past twenty years are real-life examples of using the meager benefits of structural changes while creatively fighting against a political environment that does not want to take any notice of them. The mobilization against the government’s position in the form of large, vocal protest in front of the Parliament the day after István Varga’s now infamous speech shows how effectively women’s and human rights NGOs can use this admittedly narrow structural opening.

Third, the activities of women’s groups not only create political agency but also assist in creating heightened awareness of gender roles, the extent of gender inequalities, and conflicts with both national and international norms. The price of continued engagement in national political affairs has been the toning down or complete elimination of gender-specific and feminist claims in public policies. The usefulness of transnational lens is evident in this respect because these women’s movements would otherwise be barely visible from the traditional standpoint that focuses on governments and political parties.
By transferring norms, symbols, terms, best policy and mobilization practices that were useful in one setting to another context, transnational activism can bring up and help solve public policy problems. Either on a temporary basis (as in the case of the 2011 campaign collecting over 100,000 signatures with the help of a one-time dedicated AVON network) or longer-term transnational coalitions (such as the network of NANE, AI, and WAVE), the women’s and human rights NGOs have reached out to numerous potential partners to gain support for their definition of problems and then together lobby the public and authorities to implement favourable policies. To gain more visibility and resonance, Hungarian women’s movements have frequently applied trans-nationally interpretable symbolic devices (such as the “red dolls” of domestic violence victims in the Silent Witnesses campaigns), regularly referred to the internationally used terms for domestic violence, and used the arguments and data collected abroad to challenge the existing order at home. As this set of evidence shows, a large selection of women’s groups in Hungary have moved beyond their national confines, entered transnational networks, and applied the framework of human rights norms and international policy recommendations when lobbying to criminalize domestic violence. The increasing transnational engagement on their part during the past twenty years was in part due to necessity, given the persistently conservative interpretation of gender and the popular support for nationalism. Further exchanges between the local and transnational contexts may help eventually decrease the gap between interpretations of gender and nation in post-communist Hungary and lead to an effective legislation against domestic violence while meaningfully supporting its many victims.

NOTES

1. Two of the best-known books that testify to this trend are Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006) and S. Laurel Weldon, Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence against Women: A Cross-National Comparison (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002).

2. A domestic abuse intervention program, the Duluth model is a widely used inter-agency model. It was developed in the early 1980s in Duluth, Minnesota, USA; see http://www.theduluthmodel.org/. Although its effectiveness is contentious, this model has been adopted in more than 4,000 communities in all
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50 US states and at least 26 countries. A good review of the debates about the Duluth model can be found at [http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/10/21/duluth-treatment-model/](http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/10/21/duluth-treatment-model/).


6 For example, in the 8 January 2013, issue of *The New Yorker*, Hanri Konru argued that the new Hungarian constitution “recognizes the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood,” and art that is deemed blasphemous or “anti-national” is now the target of a full-blown campaign of suppression.


8 Diana Panke and Ulrich Peterson describe how international relations literature needs to move beyond norm creation and diffusion to cases of degeneration and substitutions in “Why international norms disappear sometimes,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 18, no. 4 (2011): 719–742.


10 The statement by MP István Varga was: “we would need to busy ourselves that there be not only two or three children born [in each family] but three, four, or five children. In this case, they would appreciate each other more and violence would not even occur.” MTI, “Varga István lemondását követeli az MSZP” [The Hungarian Socialist Party demands the resignation of István Varga]. *Népszabadság*, 16 Sept. 2012.

11 In addition to Hungary, the two post-Soviet Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia are also EU-member post-communist countries that have not passed such legislation as of January 2013, but both of these countries provide more extensive services to victims of domestic violence than Hungary does. Passing a specific law against domestic violence in advance of applying for EU membership has become a trend among prospective candidates, even though the EU does not have the capacity to demand such a law.

As of January 2013, 25 of the Council’s 47 members have signed and ratified the Convention, among them EU member post-communist states such as Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and aspirant countries, such as Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine, see http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/default_en.asp.


Comparing Hungary with other countries, NGOs argued that the lack of specific legislation and emergency services for victims of domestic violence has produced three times as high a murder rate as in other democratic countries. The NGOs stated that 40 women would be dead in Hungary per year if US laws were implemented and less than 20 if Spanish or German policies were used, quoted by Szonja Krezinger, “A nők szülnenek?” [Women: should they give birth?], Metropol, 12 September 2012.


While the field of sociolinguistics holds that the transmission of social norms happens through language and indicate that language reflects attitudes and belief systems, some scholars also caution taking this perspective too far, see Deborah Cameron “Demythologizing Sociolinguistics: Why Language Does Not Reflect Society,” in John Johnson and Talbot Taylor, eds. Ideologies of Language. (London: Routledge, 1990) 79–93.


Judit Takács’ recent publications on homophobia and xenophobia in contemporary Hungary attest to this deeply entrenched trend. See “Homofóbia Magyarországon és Európában” In Homofóbia Magyarországon [Homophobia in Hungary], L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2011), 15–34.


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25 Economic violence against women includes their lesser remuneration for work equal to men’s; limited access to funds and credit; limited, nonexistent, or controlled access to health care, employment, or education; exclusion from financial decision making; and discriminatory laws on inheritance, property rights, and use of communal land, among others. See, for a more extensive discussion, Olufunmilayo Fawole. “Economic Violence To Women and Girls: Is It Receiving the Necessary Attention?” *Trauma, Violence, and Abuse*, 9 no. 3 (2008): 167–177.


29 Krisztina Morvai’s book was the first volume dedicated to domestic violence in Hungary and as such broke ground in creating more awareness and dispelling myths. Krisztina Morvai, *Terror a családban* [Terror in the Family], (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1998) 213–236.


31 Táv voltartás [Restraining order], 2006. Available at: http://nane.hu/eroszak/index.html.


33 Personal correspondence with Cheryl Thomas, director of The Advocates for Human Rights 2008.

34 Interview with Györgyi Tóth, manager of NANE, 1 July 2011.
Hungarian governments have very frequently reorganized the welfare-related administrative structure of the state to reflect their ideological approach. The Ministry for Family and Social Affairs (Szociális és Családúgyi Minisztérium) functioned between 1998 and 2002 merging the previous Ministry of Welfare (Népjóléti Minisztérium) and the Ministry of Labour (Munkaügyi Minisztérium), both in operation between 1990–1998). After operating between 2002 and 2004, the Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs (Egészségügyi, Szociális és Családúgyi Minisztérium) developed the single, “long-named” ministry, the Ministry of Youth, Social Affairs, Family and Equal Opportunities (Ifjúsági, Családúgyi, Szociális és Esélyegyenlőségi Minisztérium) that existed between 2004–2006. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (Szociális és Munkaügyi Minisztérium) existed between 2006–2010. As of 2010, the mega-institution Ministry of National Resources (Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium) brought under its aegis the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, see http://www.nefmi.gov.hu/english.

A Magyar Női Érdekvényesítő Szövetség, Magyarországi Női Alapítvány NANE Egyesület
Patent Egyesület, Egyezményes fellépést a nők elleni erőszak ellen — kövessük a lengyel példát! [We should sign a convention and fight against violence against women: Let’s follow the Polish example!] http://noierdek.hu/?p=482

MTI, “Varga István lemondását követeli az MSZP” [The Hungarian Socialist Party demands the resignation of István Varga], Népszabadság, 16 September 2012.

Michael Flood and Bob Pease, “Factors Influencing Attitudes to Violence against Women” Trauma, Violence, and Abuse, 10, No. 2 (2009): 125–142. This article, among others, offers extensive literature that provides consistent evidence of an association between violence-supportive beliefs/values and the perpetration of violent behavior against women, at both individual and community levels.


Marcela Corsi, Chiara Crepaldi, Manuela Samek Lodovici, Paolo Boccagni, and Cristina Vasilescu. Ethnic Minority and Roma Women in Europe —
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46 Some of the events and the demands of the then emerging coalition can be found at www.prostitucio.hu.


48 Substantial amount of information about this multi-agency effort can be found at http://www.romadecade.org.


51 Kristen Bumiller, *In an Abusive State; How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence* (Duke University Press, 2008) deals with the complicity of the state appropriating and undermining violence against women.


The Minister of Human Resources indicated that even at a very advanced stage of preparing a bill in mid-January 2013, there was no agreement on what to call domestic violence, MTI, 14 January 2013.


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