Just over four decades ago the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe — the revolution in Hungary — took place. Most scholars have focused on Soviet-Hungarian relations to discern causes of the conflict, while under-emphasizing the Hungarian-Yugoslav "normalization" process that took place in the months preceding the Hungarian revolt and Josip Broz Tito's ambiguous role in the conflict. Many have assumed that once Soviet-Yugoslav relations were "normalized" in the summer of 1955, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the other "peoples' democracies" quickly ensued. Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key CPSU Presidium meetings taken by Vladimir Malin, shed valuable light on the behavior and motives of Soviet, Hungarian, and Yugoslav decision-makers and information-providers, and on the events of 1956 generally. The article will explain that the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement was, in fact, especially slow and tortuous, particularly between May 1955 and February 1956. Having initiated the rift with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples' democracies in Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not so easily induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's own trip to Belgrade in May 1955. As explained below, this foot-dragging by the Hungarian dictator Mátyás Rákosi (the most obsequious "Stalinist" to exit the stage) and the lingering bitterness of Tito and his subordinates confused the Soviet leaders somewhat about the true causes of the Hungarian revolt. The "Nagy affair," which developed in the two weeks following the Soviet invasion, chilled relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc nations once again.

Yugoslav-Hungarian Relations after July, 1955

The process of forging a detente between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was first set in motion when Khrushchev took the initiative to visit Tito in Belgrade
in July 1955. At first the rapprochement looked as if it would continue uninter-
rupted, and that all the bloc members — including Rákosi's Hungary — would
play their part. In addition to Khrushchev's Belgrade trip and the disbandment
of the Cominform,8 Khrushchev's speeches at the Twentieth Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in February 1956 further paved the way toward
warmer relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Khrushchev acknowledged
the existence of "many national roads to socialism" and foresaw "peaceful
transitions to communism" for capitalist and colonial states alike. He also
claimed that war between capitalist and communist systems was no longer
"fatalistically inevitable," despite Lenin's prediction that war would continue
indefinitely between the two camps. In the closed session (the "Secret Speech"),
on February 24-25, 1956, Khrushchev clearly stated that the Soviet rift with
Yugoslavia had been an "unnecessary" and "shameful" mistake.9

The speech, with its denunciation of Joseph Stalin's brutality, "cult of
personality," and acute paranoia, clearly delighted Tito, who received a copy of
the secret text and published it in the Yugoslav party paper Barba [Struggle] on
March 20, 1956. In Tito's mind, the decisions of the Twentieth Congress were
merely the "continuation of a new trend within communist parties that began in
Yugoslavia."10 Moreover, Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence with the
West fit nicely with Tito's own ideas about "the principles of coexistence" and
the evil of separate blocs and spheres of influence. These principles — Tito told
the student body at Rangoon University (Burma) in January 1955 — are the only
way to resolve international political conflicts. Furthermore, the division of the
world into spheres of influence and blocs, Tito told the Indian Parliament in
December 1954, is "one of the four basic elements which lie at the root of so
much evil." Countries and states with different systems will not disappear
overnight, Tito said, and thus coexistence is not only possible but necessary if a
new world war is to be avoided.11

Khrushchev's rhetoric about "peaceful coexistence" between the two
socioeconomic systems also helped Tito rationalize his acceptance of economic
aid from both the Soviet bloc and the United States. From Tito's break with
Moscow in 1948 until 1956, the United States provided an estimated $1 billion
in military and economic aid to Yugoslavia.12

After the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in 1955, which launched the process
of normalization, Tito and other Yugoslav officials were determined to exact
reparations from Soviet bloc countries without jeopardizing the aid from the
United States. The 1948 rift — when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comin
form and boycotted by all members of the communist bloc — had caused great
economic disruption, and Tito wanted to make sure his country would be com-
pensated for damages. Most communist bloc countries complied, but Hungary
was reluctant.13 The Soviet Union agreed to help Yugoslavia by extending $250
million in economic credit14 and by developing Yugoslavia's atomic energy
program.15 Czechoslovakia agreed to pay $50 million in reparations over a ten-
year period at a 2 percent interest rate.16 Romania permitted several thousand
Serbian prisoners to return to the Banat region.\textsuperscript{17} According to Stuart H. Van Dyke, European operations director of the International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the Soviet bloc as a whole made nearly $300 million of easy credit available to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav relations with Hungary, however, remained at an impasse. Several problems persisted — the most obvious one being the fact that Tito detested Rákosi, the Hungarian leader — "the Last Mohican of the Stalinist Era" and "Stalin's Best Disciple" — who had clung to power long after the deaths of the other Stalinist leaders in the East European countries.\textsuperscript{18} Rákosi had conducted the 1948 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than the other communist party leaders in the "peoples' democracies."\textsuperscript{19} Thousands of Hungarian communist officials and intellectuals were sentenced to death or years of imprisonment, while tens of thousands were dismissed from their posts and the party — and an even larger group of non-communists was sent to the gallows, to prisons or to concentration camps. Among the victims were Foreign Minister László Rajk and other prominent figures of the country's communist leadership.\textsuperscript{20} Most of them had been accused of being agents for Tito, the "chained dog of Western imperialists." As Tito exclaimed in a speech in 1949: "[O]ver there, in Hungary, the leaders are the most corrupted souls, the biggest perverts!"\textsuperscript{21} Later, in the summer of 1956, Tito described his enemy to the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki: "I know Rákosi; he's an insensitive, merciless, stubborn, and heartless person." Kurimszki noted that Tito "gripped the edge of the table" as he spoke.\textsuperscript{22}

Because Rákosi had played such a prominent role in denouncing Tito, the process of normalizing Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in 1955-56 entailed a direct threat to his own power and legitimacy. Rákosi clung to power as long as he could by resorting to half-measures. He expressed his regret for the rupture in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in 1948, but blamed a conveniently dead Lavrenti Beria.\textsuperscript{23} However, Tito insisted in 1955 that several issues had to be resolved before Yugoslav relations with Hungary could be normalized: for example, the rehabilitation of László Rajk, amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary,\textsuperscript{24} fair treatment of the Yugoslav minority living in Hungary,\textsuperscript{25} and the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia.

Rajk was eventually rehabilitated on March 28 and honorably reburied on October 6, 1956. However, in his announcement of the rehabilitation — published in \textit{Szabad Nép} on March 29 — Rákosi never actually accepted full responsibility for Rajk's death. He blamed everyone from Beria, Victor Abakumov,\textsuperscript{26} Mihály Farkas,\textsuperscript{27} and Gábor Péter\textsuperscript{28} instead.\textsuperscript{29} On May 18 Rákosi admitted a degree of responsibility for the mass repression in the 1949-1952 period, although not for the Rajk case.

After some procrastination, Rákosi also freed all the Yugoslav prisoners in Hungary (197 people). On December 9, 1955, the Rákosi government allowed them either to return to Yugoslavia or remain in Hungary.\textsuperscript{30} (Rákosi had harrassed the Yugoslavs living in Hungary, arresting many of them,\textsuperscript{31} soon after the Rajk trial in 1949.)
As for the Hungarians' treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, the situation also improved somewhat, once travel restrictions on Yugoslav diplomats and journalists — the information-providers — were removed. After 1948, all schools in Hungary offering instruction in Serbo-Croatian had apparently been shut down, particularly in the town of Mohács in southern Hungary. Yugoslav children in Hungary were thus forced to learn the Magyar tongue. By 1956 only several hundred Yugoslavs in Mohács even remembered their native tongue. This situation was little known because Yugoslav diplomats were apparently unable to visit the town, which had become part of a "forbidden border zone" after the Tito-Stalin schism. Rumours also abounded that in the late fall of 1955 the Hungarian authorities had arrested a large number of Serbs living in southern Hungary. Once the so-called forbidden zone was opened in early 1956, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists made a point of attending cultural events there, and of denouncing Rákosi's "policy of magyarization," a practice which irritated Hungarian and Soviet officials no end, judging from these officials' documented conversations. The war of words was often very bitter. At one point Yugoslav attaché Radenović apparently accused the Hungarians of treating the arrested Yugoslavs the way Italian fascist authorities had treated Yugoslav partizans during World War II for the latter's violence against suspected Nazi collaborators. We should note, of course, that Tito himself had been responsible for the presence of many Yugoslavs in Hungary as he had forced thousands of Yugoslav citizens loyal to the Cominform (branded "Stalinists," "Cominformists," or ćirjevci) to flee their country after the 1948 schism. (The less fortunate ćirjevci were sent to the infamous "Goli Otok" concentration camp in Yugoslavia.) According to Belgrade sources, the entire Cominformist emigration amounted to 4,928 individuals.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, one of the most persistent sources of tension between the two countries was the issue of financial reparations, the negotiations on which repeatedly stalled, unlike the negotiations with the other bloc members. Tito wanted not only to be compensated for the ruptured trade ties with Hungary, but also to be repaid for the economic credits Yugoslavia had extended to Hungary between 1946 and 1948. Delegates from the two countries first met on September 7, but the talks ended in a stalemate on September 24, 1955. Another round of secret negotiations began on January 17, 1956. The Yugoslavs insisted on a sum of $150 million, to be paid in the course of seven years, while the Hungarians would not budge from their offer of $71-72 million worth of commodities over a period of 10 years. Again, the negotiations broke down. In mid-March the Hungarian Politburo decided to increase the proposed sum by $10 million. Talks resumed on April 19, 1956, and on May 29, 1956, a draft agreement on reparations was reached. By June 26, Rákosi was able to report to Voroshilov in Moscow that "mutual financial claims [pretenziia] with Yugoslavia have been completely resolved." Rákosi confided in Voroshilov, however, that the Yugoslav delegation behaved so "arrogantly," that he had to keep his fellow Hungarians from reciprocating, in order to prevent the
talks from breaking down yet again. The Yugoslav negotiators' attitudes — if we can trust Rákosi's report — indicate their feelings toward the Hungarian leaders, while Rákosi's report seems illustrative of the resentment he continued to feel toward the regime in Belgrade.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the rehabilitation of László Rajk, the amnesty granted to Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, improved treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, and the agreement about reparations payment, were apparently not enough to ensure good relations between Budapest and Belgrade. This fact underlines the failure of Khrushchev's "pilgrimage" to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June 1956 to bring lasting improvement to intra-bloc relations through eliminating — or, at least, greatly reducing — the mutual distrust that had existed between the Yugoslav and Hungarian leaderships ever since 1948.

Conflicting Views of Developments in Hungary

Khrushchev and his associates apparently assumed that "destalinization" in Hungary could take place as soon as new leaders were installed in the peoples' democracies. In Hungary Rákosi was at long last replaced in July as the Party's First Secretary with Ernő Gero. However, the destalinization policy unleashed forces beyond Khrushchev's power to control. A number of authors have clearly showed that Moscow had been unprepared for the Hungarian crisis. Soviet leaders were unable to defuse the situation as they had in the case of Poland. The changes they made were always too late, outpaced by the wave of popular unrest. The masses themselves — not just the party elite or intelligentsia — were dissatisfied. The Soviet leaders mistakenly believed that by putting pressure on Tito, the popular movement in Hungary could be stopped. To understand better why and how the Soviet leaders miscalculated — and why the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was so slow — we must assess the nature of the information upon which Soviet leaders' perceptions were based.

The reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest were often biased and alarmist. The embassy's staff construed the Yugoslav representatives' eagerness to strengthen ties with the Hungarians as interference in Hungary's internal affairs and a threat to the USSR. At the same time the Yugoslavs perceived the Hungarians' tardiness in responding to Tito's stated preconditions for normalization as evidence of their unwillingness to admit their mistakes committed in the 1949-1952 period.

Why were the reports by information providers not more objective? Perhaps it would be useful to consider the actual motivations of these people in order to answer this question. Although Khrushchev had, after much delay, replaced Rákosi with Gero (and eventually with Imre Nagy and then János Kádár), mid-level state and diplomatic officials in Hungary (just as in Yugoslavia and the USSR) — that is, the people actually in charge of the day-to-day
running of diplomatic relations — remained at their posts. These were officials whose attitudes had been most shaped by the events of 1948-49, and who could not easily abandon their resentments.

Indeed, mid-level diplomats and journalists — whether in Hungary, Yugoslavia or the USSR — played an important role in the events of 1955-56, but their perspectives often differed from those of their superiors (i.e., the state and party leaders). The archives reveal a steady stream of negative diplomatic reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest to the Central Committee of the Soviet Presidium or the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Although he had lost credibility after July 1956, Rákosi also sent letters to the CPSU Central Committee — by this time from his residence in the Soviet Union — warning that “Hungarians [were] lavishing attention on Yugoslavia.” Some of these reports, as well as those of the Soviet diplomats, contained unconfirmed rumours. Those filed by Yugoslav diplomats were no different. Tito himself complained about the "disinformation from our diplomatic personnel" during the secret meeting in the Crimea in late September 1956. The dissemination of this kind of disinformation had helped to prevent full reconciliation between Hungary and Yugoslavia, and between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

Perhaps it would be useful to consider the motivations of these three groups of information-providers: the hard-line pro-Soviet Hungarian officials, the Soviet diplomats in Budapest, and the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists.

The pro-Soviet Hungarian officials were inclined to give alarmist reports to the Soviet diplomats at the Budapest embassy, because it was they who felt most threatened by the rising popular discontent. Their jobs depended on Soviet power propping up the regime. They knew only too well that they — branded "Muscovites" and "Stalinists" — were hated even more than Soviet diplomatic and military personnel, because they were Magyars betraying fellow Magyars. Thus, they had a tendency to exaggerate the "danger" and to report every real or perceived rebuff (from the Yugoslavs) to the Soviet embassy personnel, in the hope that the Russians would take strong action. These alarmist reports, they hoped, served to "prove" their loyalty to Moscow.

The Soviet diplomats in Budapest also felt threatened by the rising discontent long suppressed during the Stalin era. The fact that they were in a foreign country for protracted periods of time made them suspect to the Kremlin leaders. Indeed, only a very few members of the Soviet elite were ever trusted to be sent abroad. Once given such an assignment, Soviet diplomats were constantly aware of the need to prove they had not "gone native." This way of thinking is revealed in their characterization of other diplomats. For example, in a collectively written biographical reference (spravka), Soviet diplomats described both Ferenc Münich, and Lajos Csebé to be partial to Yugoslavia, simply because both Hungarian officials had once served as ambassadors to Yugoslavia. This tendency of the Soviet diplomats to take a hard-line position in order to prove their loyalty to Moscow probably became even more intense when they were stationed in a country that was perceived to be in rebellion against the
Soviet Union. The fact that an "anti-Soviet movement" was growing in Hungary increased the danger that they, the diplomats, would be deemed, at the least, as not having been "strict" or "vigilant" enough, or at the most, as having encouraged anti-Soviet feelings. Being especially "vigilant," however, could improve one's chances for promotion in the Soviet hierarchy. It is noteworthy, for example, that Ambassador Yuri Andropov, who took a very strict approach to the 1956 revolution, was promoted in 1957 to the post of director of the CPSU Central Committee's department for ties with communist parties in the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{56} János Kádár's government also presented him with a special award.\textsuperscript{57} Clearly, Andropov's "vigilance" was richly rewarded.

Both Soviet diplomats and the Hungarian loyalists, described earlier, believed that "interference in Hungary's internal affairs" in the period before mid-October included the Yugoslavs visiting factories and preaching "the Yugoslav way" to the workers there, as well as publishing long articles about Imre Nagy's activities in major Yugoslav newspapers while abridging or virtually ignoring the speeches of Gérou. For these Soviet and Hungarian information-providers, the Yugoslavs' support of Nagy was especially vexing, since Nagy had not even been readmitted to the communist party until October 14, 1956.

To some extent the Soviet and Hungarian officials were correct: the Yugoslavs were interfering in Hungary's internal affairs. According to international law, a diplomatic envoy should remain politically neutral and not become involved in the local politics of the host country. But at times these officials appear to have confused "interference in the internal affairs" of Hungary with freedom of the Yugoslav press. They complained that the Yugoslav newspapers, especially the major ones, like \textit{Borba} and \textit{Politika}, were giving excessive coverage to the "counterrevolutionary events" in Hungary, while virtually ignoring major events in the USSR or in the People's Republic of China. These critics tended to forget that it was the Yugoslav journalists' professional duty to collect as much information as possible, especially about a country on their own border. By merely reporting, these journalists did not violate the sovereignty of Hungary. Accusations of interference by Yugoslavia became especially ludicrous after the November 4 invasion. Who were the Russians — who sent tanks crashing into Budapest — to talk about "interference in the internal affairs of Hungary?"\textsuperscript{58} Perhaps the reason why the proliferation of Titoist ideas so exasperated both Hungarian and Soviet officials is that they could not openly protest this influence: Khrushchev had publicly "made up" with Tito, so the latter had been certified respectable again.

For many Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the 1948-1949 events in Hungary had been formative experiences in their careers. Well-acquainted with the hardships Yugoslavia's population had endured as a result of the humiliating dismissal from the Cominform and economic boycott by the Soviet bloc countries, it was hard for some of them to change their thinking about Rákosi and his Stalinist colleagues. Like Tito, they were pleased with Khrushchev's speeches at
the Twentieth Party Congress, which they considered "a qualitative leap," but they expected much more direct criticism of Stalin at future party congresses.59 Their hatred of Rákosi only intensified after he admitted in March 1956 that Rajk had been innocent, because it further discredited their own colleague Lazar Brankov. In 1948 Rákosi had ignored Brankov's diplomatic immunity, arrested him and got him to testify against Rajk and Tito during the September 1949 trial.60 (Brankov had been consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest at the time and was chargé d'affaires in the absence of Ambassador Mrazović.)61

The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that many of the Yugoslav diplomats had "built their careers on" the 1948 rift and now had difficulty readjusting.62 For example, Marko Zsigmond, second secretary of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and thus "knew the history of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift well."63 Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency to harp on the 1948 events in conversations.64

For many Yugoslav diplomats the temptation to say "I told you so" was overwhelming. Many had traveled throughout Hungary, visiting factories and cultural events put on by the Yugoslavs, telling Hungarian workers that the 1948 rift had been the "Stalinists' fault." After the verbal abuse they had endured just a few years earlier, they must have been tempted to gloat over Rákosi's setbacks and boast about Yugoslavia's accomplishments. The ultimate repercussions of their encouragement of Imre Nagy's supporters do not seem to have troubled them. For them the reason why the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was so slow was simple: it was all Rákosi's fault. Many Yugoslav journalists attended the Petőfi Club's discussions,65 and attributed the complaints by the students and writers to the fact that Rákosi had not fully recanted his mistakes.66 For these Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the measure of Khrushchev's sincerity was his willingness to whip Rákosi into line or to dismiss him.

The Yugoslav diplomats also spread the rhetoric about the "third camp" and how there could be "alternative roads to socialism," which was in some ways reminiscent of the earlier ideological quarrel of the 1940s between Stalin's "popular front from above" and Tito's "popular front from below." In contrast to Soviet and Hungarian officials' claims of excessive coverage of the Hungarian "counterrevolution" in the Yugoslav media, the Yugoslav journalists complained about the scanty coverage of Yugoslav events and speeches by Yugoslav officials in Hungarian newspapers. Several speeches, they claimed, were "printed in such an abridged form that the information was distorted," while unimportant events in the other socialist countries were covered extensively.67

It should be noted that the Yugoslavs were not the only proselytizers. Some of the attempts to improve ties (especially at the non-governmental level) between the two East European countries came at the initiative of the anti-Stalinist (or even anti-Soviet) Hungarian intellectuals themselves. As an anecdotal example, the Hungarians wanted to resurrect the Hungarian-Yugoslav cultural society, which had been banned in 1949.68 Ambassador Andropov
immediately notified Moscow with alarm. "Pay attention to the fact that, despite the liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the enclosed document shows," he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian intelligentsia seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against accusations of "interference." As Tito wrote in one of his post-invasion letters to the CPSU, in essence: it is not Yugoslavia’s fault if Hungarians look to Yugoslavia as a model to emulate.

Tito's Attitudes

Tito's own perspectives serve as further explanation why initiatives like Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June 1956 did not quickly dispel the mistrust between the Yugoslavs and Hungarians. To Tito destalinization entailed much more than simply the replacement of Stalinist leaders with national communists in the East European communist countries, or simply the resolution of the concrete issues outlined above — although all these matters were important to him. Rather, Tito sought a fundamental recognition that Yugoslavia was just as important as the Soviet Union in the international communist movement. Thus, while in many respects, Tito's individual perspective resembled that of the Yugoslav information-providers, the slowness of the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement stemmed also from Tito's own memories and values. His vivid recollection of Rákosi's ruthless anti-Tito campaign, beginning with the Rajk trial in 1949, made it difficult for Tito to forgive and forget.

Furthermore, Tito greatly valued Yugoslavia's unique brand of national communism which had emerged from Yugoslav soil and the experiences of World War II. From Tito's perspective, Yugoslavia's historical achievements were hard-earned and thus needed to be cherished. It was the "twofold character of the National Liberation Struggle" — against both fascist aggressors and internal traitors — that made Yugoslavia unique. In an article written in October 1946, Tito had written:

[T]he people of Yugoslavia were not fighting only against the invaders but also against their allies, the local traitors — the gangs of Pavelić, Nedić, Rupnik, and Draza Mihailovic. Despite the fact that the invaders and domestic traitors joined forces, the people prevailed in their great struggle. Therein lie the specific features of the liberation struggle of the nations of Yugoslavia, therein lies its greatness. No other occupied country in Europe can boast of such a struggle and our people have a right to be proud of it.

It should also be kept in mind that Tito’s Partisans had defeated the Nazi occupiers without the help of the Soviet Red army. True, Stalin sent security guards for Tito, but this was after the war and intended more as a means of
Soviet control than of protection for Yugoslavia. Then, in June 1948, Stalin banished Tito from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), just nine months after its founding congress in Szklarska Poreba (Poland). The Cominform resolution calling for Yugoslavia’s expulsion accused the country of “pursuing an incorrect line” in foreign policy, representing a “departure from Marxism-Leninism.” It also stated that the Yugoslav Communist Party had spread “slanderous propaganda about the “degeneration of the CPSU,” thus borrowing “from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism.” At the heart of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was Tito’s refusal to obey Stalin. Stalin first became angry at Tito already during the final phases of the war for supporting the Greek communists as well as for claiming the city of Trieste, thus complicating Stalin’s wartime alliance with the British and Americans. When all the communist bloc countries broke off trade with Yugoslavia, Tito’s Communist party managed to stay in power, despite the sudden economic boycott. To the Soviet leaders’ dismay, Tito succeeded in receiving economic and military assistance from the Americans while still remaining communist. Both Tito and his representatives in Budapest were fond of reminding Hungarian and Soviet officials of the fact that they had not “surrendered to the imperialists,” despite their ostracism from the socialist camp. Tito certainly had not disappeared when Stalin had “shaken his little finger.” Indeed the Stalin-Tito feud was so intense that Tito expected the Russians to intervene while the West was distracted by the war in Korea. Stalin may also have authorized an assassination of Tito in the fall of 1952, which was aborted only because of Stalin’s own unexpected death in March 1953. Having fought and won independence from both the Nazis (militarily) and from the Russians (economically and ideologically), Tito vowed never to relinquish Yugoslavia’s new status, never to capitulate to Moscow.

Tito’s peddling of the third-path model evidently worried Soviet and Hungarian officials for both ideological and political reasons. The concept frightened Moscow because it was providing communists with an ideological sanction for disobedience. Even after the disbanding of the Cominform in 1956, the Soviet leaders insisted that their Party should play a leading role in the world communist movement. (One of the “twenty-one conditions” for admission of a communist party to the Comintern, one might recall, had been rigid allegiance to the Bolshevik party line in Moscow.) As Khrushchev explained to Tito, apparently in earnest: “we didn’t seek a leading role; historical conditions have given us this special responsibility, and now we need to fulfill it.”

In the context of politics, Tito’s advocacy of a “third path” bespoke possible intentions to form a separate alliance between Yugoslavia and some of the other communist countries, excluding the Soviet Union — a new regional federation of states, this time including Hungary. The notion of intrabloc ties independent of Moscow repelled Soviet leaders — and the Hungarian leaders dependent on Soviet hegemony — because it reminded them of the Titoist threat back in the mid-1940s, when Tito strove to form independent ties with other East European countries without Moscow’s participation. Tito’s Balkan Pact with
Greece and Turkey, established in 1954, was bad enough. Having ties with these two countries was tantamount to joining NATO, the Soviet leaders felt. But an alliance of communist countries, or small countries with sizable communist parties, that excluded the Soviet Union could not be tolerated. To the Soviets Tito seemed intent on forming one, or at the very least, driving a wedge between the USSR and the other bloc countries. They could not understand the concept of neutralism; any alliance excluding them would ipso facto be an anti-Soviet alliance.

Even if a separate bloc or federation were not formed, what the Soviet authorities and Hungarian Stalinists feared was the "spillover effect," or ideological contamination of the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media. As mentioned earlier, the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists to some extent caused the Soviet leaders to misinterpret the origins of the discontent in Hungary. The Soviet leaders tended to think that only a small coterie of writers and intellectuals was causing the trouble, not the "toiling masses" of Hungary. This mentality was especially true of Soviet party stalwart Mikhail Suslov, who was sent to Budapest in mid-June 1956, and wrote back to Moscow, assuring the Kremlin that "...the mood of the workers and peasants is healthy.... Among them, as well as in the lower industrial party organizations, there are no conversations about a 'crisis' in the party leadership or about distrust toward the leaders."

Meanwhile Moscow also received numerous reports from Andropov, Gerő, and others, complaining about Yugoslav influence on the Hungarian intelligentsia. Thus the Soviet and Hungarian leaders tried several times in the months preceding the crisis to get Tito to exert pressure on his diplomats and journalists. For example, when the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki visited Tito at his retreat on Brioni Island on July 21, 1956 to deliver the official note about Rákosi's resignation, he also "reminded Tito about the commentaries on the Yugoslav radio and articles that appeared in the newspapers Borba and Politiaka.... He compared the roles of Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos with the activities of Milovan Djilas." Tito evidently ignored him. The issue was raised again, both when CPSU Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan visited Tito on the same day, and also when Khrushchev, Tito, Gerő, Kádár and others convened in the Crimea (Yalta) in September-October, 1956. (Earlier, on September 3, the CPSU had warned all the East European communist parties in a secret letter not to "take the Yugoslav example" too seriously; the purpose of the Crimea meeting was, in part, for Khrushchev and Tito to iron out their differences). "The Yugoslav mission in Budapest openly maintains ties with people in opposition to the CC HWP... [and] the Yugoslav newspapers shield the opportunists banished from the communist party... for example, Imre Nagy in Hungary," Khrushchev claimed.

The Soviet leaders believed the Hungarian intellectuals were being "infected" by the Yugoslavs. If only Tito would clamp down on them, they thought, the situation in Hungary would calm down. It is significant that during
the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting, according to the recently declassified Malin notes, Khrushchev thought he could use the Yugoslavs' influence on Hungary to Soviet advantage. He asked his colleagues: Would it not be appropriate if the Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians? Moreover, during this same meeting, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov acknowledged that "the influence of the [Hungarian Communist] party on the masses [was] weak," despite the initial reassuring messages from Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov that the Hungarian government was strong. Despite Molotov's sober assessment, Khrushchev, as late as November 2-3, during his meeting with Tito on Brioni Island, apparently believed that at least some Hungarian workers could be mobilized against Nagy:

the workers in the Miskolc region, where Hungarian miners had remained loyal though reactionaries were in power. The Czechs had given the miners some arms and it might be possible to try some political action against Nagy with the help of those Hungarian miners or jointly with them.

Since Tito's death in 1980 numerous biographies of him have appeared, reappraising his character and policies. They challenge the orthodox view of his official biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, and describe Tito's skills of Realpolitik. Undoubtedly Tito — like the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists — sincerely believed in the superiority of the "Yugoslav way" and the equality of all communist countries. Yet, as an experienced politician, he must have realized the usefulness of the third-path rhetoric. Permitting his subordinates freedom of expression won the approval of American policymakers, especially of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

At the same time, much like Dulles's own "Liberation" rhetoric, it created the illusion of being on the offensive, of encouraging Nagy and his supporters. ("Liberation," it will be recalled, was coined by Dulles during the 1952 presidential campaign to present the American people with an alternative to the more passive-sounding "containment" strategy of Truman and the Democrats, whom Dulles accused of being "soft on communism.") To some degree, Tito's call for "alternative roads to communism" served to mask his own secret fears about the Hungarian rebellion.

Tito's Secret Fears

Like Khrushchev, Tito was caught off guard by the October-November, 1956 events in Hungary, specifically when the Hungarians' anti-Stalinist mood shifted to an anti-communist mood. Publicly Tito was propounding the third-path rhetoric, "different roads to socialism," and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. It was known that Nagy, like Tito, was also
attracted to the Five Principles (Pancha Shila) propounded at the 1955 Bandung Conference. In early 1956 Imre Nagy was writing his book, *In Defense of the New Course*, the third chapter of which is devoted to these principles.\(^9\) Nagy argued that the principles must extend not only to the Third World, or to the capitalist system, but also "to the relations between the countries within the democratic and socialist camp."\(^9\) (Interestingly, according to the Malin notes, the Pancha Shila was mentioned during the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on October 30, 1956 by Lazar Kaganovich, who said "I don't think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.")\(^9\)

Despite his outward support of Nagy, inwardly Tito felt threatened by Nagy's movement. With the opening of the communist party archives, it can be seen that Tito's perspective changed as discontent turned into violence in Hungary.\(^9\) Tito realized the potential of nationalist (non-communist) "spillover" into multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. He had always been careful to conceal the fact that he was born into a peasant family from north Croatia and actually fought on the Austrian-Hungarian side against Serbia in 1914.\(^10\) It was much easier to encourage faraway Poland, than nearby Hungary. Between October 31 and November 1, the leading Yugoslav newspaper *Borba* stopped supporting the Nagy government and began denouncing its connection to "right-wing elements." Indeed, as his own fears of spillover intensified, Tito probably began to empathize somewhat with the Russians concerning their fear of the possible spillover of Yugoslav ideas into other communist bloc countries.

Recently opened archives provide some detail about Tito's fears.\(^10\) In his letter of November 8 to Khrushchev (and later on November 11 in his speech at Pula), Tito stated clearly that he had agreed with Khrushchev on the need to intervene.\(^10\) In fact, Khrushchev himself apparently was surprised at how readily Tito agreed with him on the need to intervene.\(^10\) Moreover, Tito was quoted often by the Soviet Presidium as having asked rhetorically: "What kind of a revolutionary, what kind of communist, could Nagy be, if with his knowledge they hanged and shot leading workers, communists and public figures?"\(^10\) Two months after the Soviet crackdown, Tito confided in Firiubin, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, that "the reaction raised its head [podnial golovuj, especially in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly incited the employees of the Yugoslav security organs to violence." After Firiubin told him that his speech in Pula, and the speech of Yugoslav Vice-President Eduard Kardelj later, made a bad impression in Moscow, Tito said, "I did not want to complicate in any way Soviet-Yugoslav relations."\(^10\) The Soviet Presidium also claimed that Tito himself had plans to intervene militarily in Hungary.\(^10\) Tito, in his talk with the Soviet military delegation on Brioni Island on November 18, 1956, allegedly declared, "If the Soviet troops were not used to put down the insurrection, then Yugoslav troops, which were by that time braced [podtianutyi] on the Yugoslav-Hungarian border, would have been sent in for that purpose."\(^10\) (Khrushchev himself may have thought about a possible Yugoslav intervention when he said during the October 31 CC CPSU Presidium meeting "We should negotiate with
Tito... There will be no large-scale war.")\textsuperscript{108} In a conversation with Andropov, Kádár said, "The Yugoslavs apparently are trying to save Nagy not because they need him, but because they fear he can cause some undesirable things for them."\textsuperscript{109}

Tito's fears about spillover come into focus when one considers the larger historical context of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. It is worth remembering that the state of Yugoslavia was created by incorporating large parts of southern Hungary after World War One. In November 1918 the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia severed its ties with the Kingdom of Hungary and the Serbs took control of the Bácska, the Baranya, and the western Bánát, presenting the Hungarians with a fait accompli. The Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), sanctioned these territorial changes. In fact, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its pre-war territory. The territory ceded to Rumania alone — Transylvania and half of the Bánát — was larger than the area left to Hungary. Czechoslovakia gained Slovakia and Ruthenia, while other, much smaller areas were awarded to Austria, Italy, and Poland. Whereas in 1914 approximately 21 million people lived in Hungary, by 1920 Hungary had under 8 million inhabitants. Not surprisingly, many Hungarians — including those living in Vojvodina and elsewhere in Yugoslavia — clamored in the interwar years to have the Trianon Treaty revised.\textsuperscript{110}

Later, during World War II, Hungary became increasingly dependent on Hitler's Germany. The Hungarian prime minister László Bárdossy (who took over in 1941 when his predecessor, Pál Teleki, committed suicide) ordered the Hungarian army to follow in the steps of the German \textit{Wehrmacht} on 11 April 1941 by invading Yugoslavia and occupying parts of the Vojvodina. Thanks to German support, Hungary recovered an area of 80,000 square kilometers with 5 million inhabitants, including over 2 million Magyars.\textsuperscript{111}

During the war a strong Serbian partisan movement under Communist leadership developed in occupied Yugoslavia, particularly in the Vojvodina. The Hungarian military command there responded by anti-partisan raids and summary executions. The largest anti-partisan campaign took place in Novi Sad (the main city in the Vojvodina) late in January 1942, when units of the Hungarian military and gendarmerie executed a great many suspected partisans — estimates range from several hundred to a few thousand — mainly Serbs and Jews. At the end of 1944, the Serbs reoccupied Vojvodina. Between 1941 and 1944 Serbian propagandists had exaggerated the size and extent of the massacre in Novi Sad. Not surprisingly, a far more bloody Serbian vendetta was carried out against the Hungarian population. Tito, the commander-in-chief of the partisan army at the time, condoned the campaign of violence and apparently issued verbal orders to his partisans to avenge all "injustices" suffered by partisans and Serbs during the four years of the war.\textsuperscript{112}

During the following years, bitter emotions abounded on both the Hungarian and Yugoslav sides. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift gave the Hungarian Stalinists like Rákosi and Gerő the opportunity to vilify all "Titoists" and the
Yugoslav minority in Hungary generally. Thus, given the history of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, Tito no doubt feared that the ethnic Hungarian minority in northern Yugoslavia, consisting of over half-a-million people, would help spread the ideas of the Hungarian Revolution inside his own country.

On the question of exactly who Tito had in mind to succeed Rákosi as Hungary's leader the evidence is unclear. While some scholars have asserted that Tito wholeheartedly favored Nagy as a replacement for Rákosi, there is surprisingly little evidence in the Soviet archives to prove this. On the contrary, Soviet sources indicate that Tito seemed willing — although unenthusiastically — to tolerate the Stalinist Gerő, but would have preferred János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó to head the new post-Rákosi regime. When Tito was informed by Kurimszki that "Rákosi had resigned," he never mentioned Nagy's name. Of course, this may be because Nagy was not readmitted to the Hungarian communist party until October 14, 1956. However, it appears that Tito did not regard Nagy as highly as did the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists in the summer of 1956.

Indeed, as much as he detested Rákosi, perhaps he was willing to tolerate Rákosi in the interest of maintaining calm relations between the Yugoslav and Hungarian communist parties. As he said in July 1956 to the envoy Kurimszki:

> Whomever the Hungarian people choose and recognize as their leader is their business... I also said in Moscow that I do not support Rákosi, but if the Hungarian people want him, then let him be. It is their business. We thought and still do think...that the settling of the issues between the two parties should not cause shocks to the Hungarian Workers' Party.

This is not to say that Tito did not denounce Rákosi during the 1955 Belgrade and 1956 Moscow meetings. However, even these negative comments would not have persuaded the Khrushchev leadership to dismiss Rákosi in 1955. The contemporary Western press speculated that reparations payments from Hungary — which were finally negotiated in May 1956 — may have persuaded Tito to end his overt opposition to Rákosi's incumbency.

Moscow finally insisted that Rákosi resign, because the situation in Hungary was getting worse. Even the Hungarian Politburo did not want him, but they were too afraid to tell Moscow; they were waiting for Moscow to take the initiative. Of course, Ernő Gerő, who took Rákosi's place, was no different. Hungarians quipped: "In place of a fat Rákosi, we got a thin one." Even Khrushchev during the November 3 Presidium meeting remarked candidly: "It is my fault and Mikoyan's that we proposed Gerő rather than Kádár."

Given his wariness of Imre Nagy, why did Tito offer the latter political asylum in his Budapest embassy? Scholars have been puzzled about Tito's motives. This event is worth examining in detail, both because Tito's act of granting Nagy asylum epitomizes his political philosophy, and because his
reticence in handing Nagy over to the USSR contributed to a new cold phase in Yugoslav relations with both the USSR and Hungary.

Until the November 4 invasion, most of the Soviet and Hungarian remarks were directed against the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats in Hungary, and against the pro-Nagy reporting of the Hungarian situation by the Yugoslav journalists. Even at the Crimea meeting when Khrushchev discussed this problem with Tito, he approached it in a delicate way that would enable Tito to save face. It is plausible that Khrushchev, until the November 4 invasion, had been willing to give Tito the benefit of the doubt and assume that the Yugoslav journalists and diplomats were simply acting on their own and not on Tito's orders. But after November 4, when Nagy and forty-one others received political refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, the Soviet leader attacked Tito: How dare Tito shelter this leader of the counterrevolution? Khrushchev was enraged.

The course of events is well-known. At 5:20 a.m. Nagy made his last appeal on Radio Budapest and then went to the Yugoslav embassy with Zoltán Szántó and eleven other party leaders and intellectuals with their families. In the Yugoslav embassy, Nagy remained safe from the invading Soviet army until his final departure from the embassy compound on November 22, 1956. What is less known, however, is how exactly Nagy's group ended up in the Yugoslav embassy and what Tito's motives were in giving him asylum. From the newly available correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito, the following scenario emerges. On November 1, Szántó spoke with the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, Dalibor Soldatic, about the possible need for political asylum. He was afraid of possible violence against Hungarian government members by the anti-communist insurgents. Soldatic gave a preliminary affirmative answer, and Szántó was supposed to tell him exactly when he and others would be coming to the embassy. Soldatic also informed Tito of this request.

The "Agreement" at Brioni

The next day Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, and Veljko Mićunović (the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR) met with Khrushchev and Malenkov at Tito's retreat on Brioni Island and discussed the Hungarian situation from seven o'clock in the evening to five o'clock the next morning. Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the Yugoslav leaders of Moscow's plans for invading Hungary, but not the actual date. As mentioned earlier, by November 3 Tito had agreed with Khrushchev both on the need to intervene militarily and on the wisdom of selecting Kádár as the new leader. Tito also agreed to try to persuade Nagy to issue a declaration announcing his own resignation, admit his inability to stop the violence in the country, and proclaim his support for the new Kádár government. During the course of the conversation, according to Mićunović, Tito informed Khrushchev about Szántó's request for asylum in the Yugoslav embassy:
They [Khrushchev and Malenkov] again asked what possibilities we had of trying to do something about Nagy. Apart from Losonczi we mentioned Zoltán Szántó, who has already asked for asylum in our embassy because of the danger of reprisals. It seems to us that such people are not to be distrusted, because they are decent folk with good intentions.

The question arises: if Khrushchev objected so much to Nagy's refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, why did he not protest this possible scenario when it was first broached during the meeting at Brioni? Several answers can be deduced. First, Tito apparently mentioned only Szántó, and not Nagy, so perhaps Khrushchev did not realize that Nagy himself might also seek asylum in the Yugoslav embassy. Second, the most pressing concern for Khrushchev and Malenkov at the time was getting Tito's support for the intervention and his promise to try to persuade Nagy to resign and announce publicly his support for the Kádár government. It was clear to the Yugoslavs that Khrushchev had already decided to intervene, and that he merely wanted Tito's ex post facto approval — not his advice or permission. Khrushchev needed Tito's help in making the Soviet invasion look more legitimate to the international community, which would then facilitate the "normalization" in Hungary.

In addition, since Tito had been surprisingly supportive of the Soviet invasion plan, Khrushchev evidently assumed that, even if Nagy sought asylum in the Yugoslav embassy, Tito would quickly turn Nagy over to the Soviet authorities. This is indicated in the telegram of November 4, in which Khrushchev instructed Soviet Ambassador Firiubin to tell Eduard Kardelj, Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Government, that

as far as the further sojourn of Nagy and his group in the embassy, excesses could occur with them, not only by the reaction but also by the revolutionary elements. Thus, bearing in mind that the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government [headed by Kádár] does not have security organs at present, it would be expedient to deliver Nagy and his group to our troops for transport to the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government in Szolnok.

Despite Tito's assent to "work on Nagy," what complicated matters was Khrushchev's silence about when the invasion would begin. Mićunović writes:

The Russians still said nothing about when their troops would intervene. We can't ask them, and they don't want to say. For that reason the time factor remains unclear: We don't know what opportunity we may have to influence Nagy and try to reduce the number of casualties and the amount of unnecessary bloodshed. But we agreed that we would try and influence Nagy.
Before Szántó could reply to Soldatic about when he would seek asylum, the actual invasion had begun, on November 4. Soldatic called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on the same day in the Hungarian Parliament building and invited him to the Yugoslav embassy. Thus, on the basis of the first tentative conversation on November 1, the Nagy group fled to the embassy.\textsuperscript{130}

Since Tito had mentioned Szántó's request during the Brioni meeting, he apparently concluded that Khrushchev condoned the possible offer of asylum to the Hungarian leaders. This is indicated in the November 4 telegram in which Firiubin wrote:

Kardelj reported that on the night of November 4 they called Imre Nagy, as it had been agreed with comrade Khrushchev... It is still not clear, said Kardelj, whether or not Imre Nagy made his last declaration in the name of the government in Budapest. If he did make this declaration, then they, the Yugoslavs will try to get him to state that he made it under pressure from the reactionaries. They also intend to persuade Imre Nagy to make a declaration of support for the government headed by Kádár in Szolnok. In Kardelj's words such a declaration will facilitate discussion of the Hungarian question in the Security Council and [facilitate diplomatic] recognition of Kádár's government as the legitimate government.\textsuperscript{131}

This means that Nagy's group was already in the embassy before the Yugoslavs knew that Nagy had declared Hungary's neutrality.\textsuperscript{132}

Later, in explaining to Khrushchev why he had granted asylum to Nagy, Tito cited the sheer "speed of events" and "absence of detailed information."\textsuperscript{133}

"This problem... in the final analysis... is a result of our conversation on Brioni, although because of the events in Hungary, things developed differently than we expected," he wrote. The conversation between Szántó and Soldatic had already taken place before the Brioni meeting, and Tito did inform Khrushchev of it. Khrushchev appears to be the one to blame for the initial presence of Nagy's group in the Yugoslav embassy, since he did not tell Tito at Brioni that the offer of political asylum to Nagy was unacceptable. He also did not give Tito a reasonable amount of time in which to persuade Nagy to make the declaration supporting Kádár. Soviet troops went into action less than twenty-four hours after Khrushchev and Malenkov left Tito at Brioni.

The quarrel between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders developed later when Khrushchev realized that Tito would not easily relinquish Nagy and his group. It was simply incomprehensible to Khrushchev that Tito could continue to harbour Nagy, the "leader of the counterrevolution," when Tito had been so understanding during the Brioni meeting.

The Soviets then, in all likelihood, decided to intimidate the Yugoslavs in another, non-verbal, way. By explicitly mentioning in the November 4 telegram that "excesses" could occur, the Soviets seem to have been preparing a cover for a little-known event that took place on November 5 at 3:30 p.m.\textsuperscript{134} On this day
a Soviet tank fired on the Yugoslav embassy. The cultural attaché Milenko Milovanov was killed in the gunfire, the building was damaged, and all the windows were shattered. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović, accused the Soviet authorities of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy, knowing that it was indeed the Yugoslav embassy and that Imre Nagy and his supporters were inside. To reinforce Popović's complaint, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR, Veljko Mićunović, visited the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Dmitri Shepilov, the next day. Dalibor Soldatic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, also complained about the incident to Andropov. Soldatic requested that Soviet tanks near the Yugoslav embassy be moved. Andropov relayed this message to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature."

As we know from Malin's notes, these messages were discussed at the Presidium meeting by Khrushchev, Zhukov and Shepilov. A cable was prepared for the Yugoslav government and transmitted via Firyubin to Popović. On November 9, 1956 a commission composed of Major-General K.E. Grebennik, Colonel K.V. Boskoboinik, and Major A. B. Lukin conducted an investigation of the circumstances. The Yugoslav government later presented a claim of $84,446 to Hungary for the death of Milovanov.

Although the Soviet officials claimed that it was an accident, the attack on the Yugoslav mission could very well have been deliberate (although this cannot be verified until other documents from the Soviet military archives are declassified). The Soviet leaders resented Tito for giving the Nagy group political refuge, and this would have been an easy way to take revenge. They had both the motive and the opportunity, and the incident could be readily explained. After all, Tito himself had earlier asked the Soviet government to "take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it."

From the Yugoslav point of view, once Nagy's presence in the embassy became known throughout the world, the situation changed; Tito was caught in a dilemma. As Mićunović aptly articulated it: "[the Soviets] have decided to sling mud at Yugoslavia as the organizer of the counterrevolution if we don't hand Imre Nagy and the others over to them. But if we do hand them over, they will then point to us as a country which does not keep its word and which nobody should depend on."

Tito concluded that he might as well take advantage of this opportunity to persuade Nagy to resign — something he had promised Khrushchev he would do. As Tito wrote in his letter to Khrushchev, the act of granting asylum to Nagy "did not contradict the Brioni agreement." The Yugoslavs, Tito assured Khrushchev, wanted the same thing Khrushchev and Kádár wanted: a strong communist government in Hungary. They had sincerely tried to persuade Nagy to declare his support for Kádár. The fact that Nagy turned out to be stubborn, Tito noted, should not be blamed on the Yugoslav Communist Party. Furthermore, as he tried to explain to Khrushchev, not all of the members of
Nagy's group were "anti-Soviet"; some were "honest communists" who would be great assets to Kádár's new government. What was wrong with offering them asylum?\textsuperscript{147} Zoltán Szántó, for example, was one of the original leaders of the underground Hungarian communist party; he helped recruit Hungarians into the communist party while at a POW camp near Suzdal in the USSR in 1943.\textsuperscript{148} He had also once been the Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia, and was highly regarded by the Yugoslavs. Moreover, the Yugoslav leaders also evidently believed that, once Nagy and his group left the embassy and "confronted the actual situation," they would eventually "abandon their quixotic attitude" and "realize that they have to contribute to the building of socialism."\textsuperscript{149}

When Tito refused to turn in the Nagy group, Khrushchev began to accuse him of protecting Nagy, the very man Tito had described at the Brioni meeting as having "cleared the path for counterrevolution." From the Soviet viewpoint, offering Nagy political asylum was a supreme example of "interference in the internal affairs of Hungary."\textsuperscript{150} The longer Tito kept Nagy, the more convincing became the reports filed by the Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials in Budapest in 1955 and in the early months of 1956. As time passed, the accusations became more shrill. Tito, the Soviet leaders said, had "warned Nagy of the upcoming invasion."\textsuperscript{151} This "Titoist perfidy" no doubt strengthened the clout of Molotov's Stalinist faction in the Soviet government. Molotov had opposed the 1955 reconciliation with Tito, and was later ousted in 1957 for his "erroneous stand on the Yugoslav question." (He apparently believed that even Kádár was too much of a "Titoist;" during the November 4 CC CPSU Presidium meeting Molotov urged his colleagues to exert more pressure on Kádár "so that Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia.")\textsuperscript{152}

It is true that the Yugoslavs did "warn" Nagy about the invasion; Soldatic called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on November 4 and told him.\textsuperscript{153} But by then probably everyone could see that an invasion was imminent. Also, Soldatic could not have known exactly when the Soviet invasion would begin, so if he had warned the Hungarians, it was only in a very general way.

Given Tito's wariness of Nagy, his agreement with Khrushchev on the need to intervene,\textsuperscript{154} and his desire for harmonious relations with the USSR, one must ask: why did Tito not quickly hand Nagy and his associates over to the Soviets? Why did he object to sending them to Romania, Khrushchev's chosen destination for the group?

The answer lies, again, with Tito's values and fears. He valued Yugoslavia's reputation as a responsible, sovereign state, and was convinced that Yugoslavia should honor the principles of international law as befits such a state. It is noteworthy that Tito kept the Brioni meeting with Khrushchev secret from the Yugoslav public for several days, to avoid tarnishing Yugoslavia's reputation.\textsuperscript{155} Once Nagy's presence in his embassy became widely known, Tito took the concept of political asylum seriously. In his February 1957 letter to the CPSU's Central Committee, Tito maintained that he could not "violate his word
and simply give up these people," citing the Yugoslav constitution on the issue of political asylum.\textsuperscript{156}

Apart from this reason, one must also remember Tito's considerable skills in realpolitik. Just as the "third-path" rhetoric served a dual purpose (winning the approval of both the Yugoslav people and U.S. policymakers), so sheltering Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy served both to incarcerate Nagy (thereby defusing the uprising), and also to win the approval of the international community for "protecting" Nagy from the Soviet aggressors. As Mićunović wrote: "[I]t could not be disputed that the fact that the Nagy government had in effect disappeared from the moment it entered the Yugoslav embassy had proved useful and had helped both Kádár and the Russians."\textsuperscript{157}

Tito could then take advantage of Nagy's presence in the embassy to coax him to cooperate with the Kádár government. If he could discredit Nagy, perhaps he could reduce the chances of anti-communist "spillover" into Yugoslavia. Tito was so sure he could get Nagy to support the Kádár regime that he believed the Yugoslav embassy might be attacked "when the reaction finds out that Nagy, who is in the embassy, supports the Kádár government."\textsuperscript{158}

Tito understood the political advantage of seeming (to the West) as if he were protecting Nagy. Although Tito himself may not have fully supported Nagy's movement when it turned anti-communist, some observers in the West thought that he did. To simply hand Nagy's group over to Kádár and the Russians would destroy Yugoslavia's reputation as an independent sovereign country with respect for human rights. Meanwhile, those domestic opponents who knew how Yugoslav prisoners at Goli Otok were treated did not dare to contradict Tito and his followers.

During the rift of 1948-55, Tito had discovered the advantages of being neutral, even before the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser did. U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been eager to extend economic aid to Yugoslavia, confident that the Yugoslav example would encourage Hungary and the other Soviet satellites to fight for independence. In a speech to the Four-H Club in Chicago in 1954, Dulles said:

\begin{quote}
In 1948 Yugoslavia broke free from the grip of international communism and reasserted its own nationalism. Now, the Soviet Union treats Yugoslavia with deference while it continues to treat with contempt the puppet governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. That may embolden the satellites to demand a measure of independence.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

When Dulles visited Tito in May 1955, Tito ostensibly told him what he wanted to hear, speaking about "independence," rather than about "national communism." He told Dulles that the "transformation in the satellite countries" would take place faster than Dulles could even imagine, and that he, Tito, was trying to accelerate this process, so the satellites would become independent, which Tito wanted very much.\textsuperscript{160} In the tightly bipolar world of the 1950s, both
superpowers vied for client states among the neutral countries. Tito could pretend to do the bidding of each superpower, but neither would know his real intentions.

Moreover, if Tito had simply handed Nagy over to Kádár's government, Khrushchev might have been encouraged to see Yugoslavia as just another obedient Soviet satellite. Tito feared the prospect of Yugoslavia once again getting pulled back into the Soviet camp. He had swallowed his pride enough at the Crimea meeting, when he assured Khrushchev that he had "no fundamental disagreements," and that in Yugoslavia "only a different method of building socialism [was] being applied." Khrushchev had replied, "The methods and forms can differ, but there must be a single principled line." Tito had agreed: socialism can never be divided into various sorts; it is a "single revolutionary doctrine, which we, communists, should adhere to."

Thus, respecting Nagy's political asylum was a useful way of reminding Khrushchev that he, Tito — despite the official normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations — would still act independently, even if that displeased the Kremlin. His concern for Nagy's physical safety probably stemmed more from his determination to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation than from any desire to encourage Nagy and his plans for a multiparty system in Hungary.

As if to retaliate for Tito's stubbornness in holding on to Nagy, the Soviet leaders made a deliberate decision on November 17 to kidnap the Nagy group as soon as it left the Yugoslav embassy. On November 22 a bus was driven up to the embassy's doorsteps, supposedly to transport Nagy and the other asylum seekers to their apartments. While the Hungarians were climbing into the bus, a Soviet military official also entered the bus, despite the Yugoslavs' vehement protests. (The bus driver was also a Russian.) To make sure that the Hungarians were taken to their homes, the diplomat Milan Georgievic and military attaché Milan Drosa were ordered to accompany the group. The bus proceeded just around the corner from the embassy when the Soviet officer forced Georgievic and Drosa to get off. The bus took the Nagy group first to the closest Soviet military headquarters and then continued on to Romania where the group was imprisoned, contrary to the assurances that Kádár's government had given to the Yugoslavs.

What angered Tito so much about the kidnapping was the blatant deception. Nothing quite stings the ego as outright betrayal after lengthy negotiations in good faith. In an official letter to the CC CPSU on November 24, Tito wrote:

The Yugoslav government regards the abovementioned action a crude violation of the agreement negotiated with the Hungarian government. The [actions taken by the Kádár government]... are completely inconsistent with the agreement. The Yugoslav government cannot accept the version that Nagy and the others voluntarily went to Romania, since it
was known... — while they were still here in the Yugoslav embassy — that they wanted to stay in their own country. The Yugoslav government expresses an energetic protest to the Hungarian government, and demands that the agreement be followed immediately. [Failure to do so] will damage Soviet-Yugoslav relations. [T]he... violation of the agreement is in complete contradiction of widely recognized international legal norms.  

Tito's indignation probably equalled or surpassed the outrage Nagy felt when he had realized that the negotiations on November 3 for Soviet troop withdrawal had been a complete hoax. Until November 22, the discussions concerning the Nagy group's departure from the Yugoslav embassy had been conducted between Dobrivoje Vidić, Tito's delegate, and representatives of the Kádár government. The document that had emerged from these talks "guaranteed[d] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible" for past events.  

Both of these pledges were broken: Nagy and several others were abducted, and Yugoslavia was blamed for fostering the "counterrevolution" in Hungary. This deception, Tito felt, had made Yugoslavia a laughingstock in the international community. Characteristically enough, the Romanian (and probably Soviet) officials were surprised that Tito was so angry about the abduction; they thought he might even raise the issue at the United Nations. During the November 27 meeting of the CPSU's Presidium, Khrushchev expressed his regret about Soviet involvement in the kidnapping. "It was a mistake for our officer to go into the bus," he said, according to notes taken by Malin's deputy Vladimir Chernukha. He thought the matter should have been left up to the Hungarians.  

For the Yugoslavs it felt like a "return to 1948."

Tito's disappointment extended to Kádár. As early as the summer of 1956, Tito had favored Kádár as a possible replacement for Rákosi. At the November meeting on Brioni Island, the Yugoslavs persuaded Khrushchev and Malenkov to choose Kádár rather than Münnich to head Hungary's new Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, since Kádár had been in prison while Stalin and Rákosi had been in power, whereas Münnich had been Hungarian ambassador to the USSR. (This was clearly a wise choice, since Münnich was evidently involved in the plans to abduct the Nagy group.) Kádár had given his word concerning the Nagy group; now he had turned out to be almost as deceitful as Rákosi.

It should be pointed out here, however, that Kádár was not as hawkish during the October-November 1956 events as most books published in the West have portrayed him. In fact — as the Malin notes reveal — Kádár did not at first advocate a massive Soviet military intervention. At the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on November 2, Kádár warned the Soviet leaders that "the use of military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed" and would "erode the authority of the socialist countries," causing "the morale of the Communists [in Hungary] to be reduced to zero."
Ironically Kádár was deceitful in the one area where Western accounts have been more forgiving of him: the abduction of the Nagy group. Most writers have expressed the view that Kádár had not known about the kidnapping plan and had disapproved of the Soviet treatment of Imre Nagy. But recently declassified documents indicate that Kádár knew and approved of the secret KGB plan to arrest Nagy and the others the minute they stepped outside the Yugoslav embassy. If Nagy remained in Hungary, Kádár worried, he would inspire the Hungarian "reactionaries." Rumours about an American intervention vexed him as well. Sporadic gunfire in Budapest could be heard until December and widespread passive resistance continued into 1957. To gain the peoples' cooperation, Kádár had to resort to lies, namely, that he would share power with Nagy as soon as Nagy returned from the Yugoslav embassy. Clearly, Kádár wanted Nagy taken out of Hungary — not to Yugoslavia (technically a neutral country), but to Romania (at the time a loyal Soviet satellite). He knew that if Nagy went to Yugoslavia, "there would be two existing Hungarian governments: one there, and one here in Budapest." Not surprisingly, given Tito's disappointment with Kádár, Hungarian-Yugoslav relations cooled after the "Nagy affair." Hungarian diplomats snubbed their Yugoslav colleagues by rejecting the latter's invitations to social events, and by declining to invite the Yugoslavs to their own social events. Thus, Yugoslav-Hungarian relations had come full circle. This clear case of betrayal began a brief new cold war between Hungary and Yugoslavia. In preparation for the Nagy trial, the judicial proceedings of which were initiated in February 1957, the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministries went to great lengths to gather data on Yugoslavia's "role in the Hungarian counterrevolution." In November 1957 the Yugoslav delegation alone refused to attend the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow and sign a declaration affirming the Soviet Union's leading role in the communist movement. In late April 1958 the Soviet leaders then refused to send a delegation to the Yugoslavs' Seventh Party Congress held in Ljubljana, where a document was signed that rejected the USSR's claim to any leading role in the communist movement. Evidently at this time Khrushchev also decided to act on an earlier decision to punish Imre Nagy. On June 16, 1958 Imre Nagy was hanged. The Hungarian authorities warned the Yugoslavs not to make a fuss about the execution, or they would publish more "evidence" of Yugoslav involvement in the Hungarian events. Jovo Kapičić, the new Yugoslav ambassador replied that the Nagy trial was just "another link in the chain of the new anti-Yugoslav campaign, being conducted by the USSR and other bloc countries." The Yugoslavs were keenly aware of the similarities between the Nagy trial and the Rajk trial nine years earlier.
Conclusions

This article has attempted to show that, despite Moscow's rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia in 1955, tensions between Hungary and Yugoslavia remained. Rákosi's Hungary had played a leading role in the anti-Tito campaign in the late 1940s, and Tito wanted a full apology. The Hungarian government's reluctance promptly to redress other Yugoslav grievances also helped to prevent the achievement of a full reconciliation between Belgrade and Budapest. These outstanding issues included: the rehabilitation of László Rajk, amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, fair treatment of Hungary's Yugoslav minority, and the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia. At the same time, Hungary's communist leaders also had complaints: they — as well as Soviet officials — resented the uncensored, pro-Nagy coverage manifest in the Yugoslav media. It should also be mentioned in this connection that reports by Yugoslav journalists and diplomats contributed to a Soviet misinterpretation of the Hungarian revolutionary movement's origins: the Soviet leaders came to believe that only a small core of intellectuals — not the masses of workers and peasants — was causing problems. Thus if only Tito would use his influence to help silence the "troublemakers," they thought, the conflict in Hungary could be resolved.

The newly-surfaced documentary evidence offers glimpses of the attitudes that prevailed at the time in Belgrade. There it was realized that while reconciliation with Hungary (and the USSR) would benefit Yugoslavia financially, it also brought a risk of renewed domination by the Soviet bloc. Tito in particular valued Yugoslavia's status as a neutral, nonaligned country that could stand up to Joseph Stalin. At the same time, the Yugoslav leader was also wary of the nationalist ferment of the Hungarian revolution, and in early November worked with Khrushchev behind the scenes to prevent it from spreading to Yugoslavia. The history of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, from World War I and the 1920 Trianon Treaty to World War II and the Serbian partisans' revenge against the Hungarians in the Vojvodina, provided a basis for Tito's fears of a spillover. Indeed, the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has demonstrated that Tito certainly had good reasons to fear ethnic conflicts in his own country.

Tito's willingness to shelter Imre Nagy after the Soviet crackdown in Hungary, and Kádár's collusion in his abduction, served to open all the old wounds in Yugoslav relations with Hungary — as well as with the USSR. Ironically, Khrushchev was just as chagrined as Tito about the new rift between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Yet, had it not been for the Sino-Soviet dispute of the early 1960s, the events of November 1956 might have led to another complete break between Yugoslavia and the bloc countries closest to the USSR.
ABBREVIATIONS

Explanations of Hungarian, Yugoslav and Russian abbreviations and terms:

ÁVH Államvédelmi Hatóság [State Security Authority] (name of the Hungarian secret police agency after 1949)
ÁVO Államvédelmi Osztály [State Security Department] (name of the Hungarian secret police agency until 1949)
AVP RF Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation], Moscow
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPY Communist Party of Yugoslavia
CC Central Committee
GARF Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation]
HSWP Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
HWP Hungarian Workers' Party (under Rákosi’s leadership)
KGB Committee for State Security of the USSR
MOL Magyar Országos Levéltár (Budapest)
RTsKhIDNI Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History
SZKP KB Szovjet Kommunista Párt Központi Bizottsága [the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]
TsAMO Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva obrony Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation]
TsKhSD Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii [Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation], Moscow
TsK KPSS Tsentral’nyi komitet Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]

F Fond [Fund]
O Opis’ [Inventory]
Por. Portfel’ [Portfolio]
P. Papka [Folder]
Per. Perechen’ [List]
D Delo [File]
Dok. [Document]
L [Page]
Rolik Reel

NOTES

1. In this paper we tried to provide diacritical marks for Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian names in the text and the endnotes, but not in the quotations where these had been omitted originally. I would like to thank Alexander Stykalin, Vyacheslav Sereda, Tofik Muslimovich Islamov, Janos Reiner, Csaba Bekes, Istvan Deak, Raymond
Garthoff, Mark Kramer, and the anonymous reviewers for earlier assistance and comments. Research for this article was supported in part by a Fulbright Scholarship, Kennan Institute grant, and ACTR scholarship. Responsibility for views presented here is mine alone. Portions of this work were presented at the AAASS Convention (Seattle, 1997), International Conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956" (Budapest, Sept. 1996), and V World Congress of Central and European Studies (Warsaw, 1995).


4. These are: the former top-secret archive of the Communist Party's Central Committee called the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents [TsKh-SD], the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry [AVP RF], the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History [RTsKhIDNI], and the State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF]. Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all Presidium meetings, although verbatim transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings were not kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the Malin notes pertaining to the Hungarian uprising (October-November 1956) crisis in mid-1995 to a Russian historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who had exclusive access to the materials until the spring of 1996, when the full set were published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda and János M. Rainer, eds., *Döntés a Kremłben, 1956*: A szovjet pártelnökség vitái Magyarországról (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996). The Russian version was published in the summer and fall of 1996. See "Kak reshalis вопросы Vengrii: Rabochie zapisi zasedани Presidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'noyab' 1956 g.," *Istoricheskiy arkhiv* (Moscow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp.
73-104 and 87-121, respectively. Malin's handwritten notes are now available to all researchers in TsKhSDD. See F 3, O 12, D 1005-6.

5. Yugoslav relations with Albania also remained tense. See AVP RF, Fond Referentura po Vengrii, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L. 4, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Advisor of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Osman Dikić," June 2, 1956, June 18, 1956.

6. AVP RF, Fcnd 077, Opis 37, Por. 8, Papka 187, List 29, From the Diary of V.V. Astafiev, "Note of a Conversation with the Chairman of the State Assembly of Hungary Sandor Ronai," March 27, 1956. "Ronai reported that... at present, of all the peoples democracies, Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary are the very worse."


8. The Cominform was disbanded on April 17, 1956.


The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this "affair;" it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country (emphasis added).


13. One exception to this might be Albania, with which Yugoslav relations were also at an impasse.

14. According to Stuart H. Van Dyke, European operations director of the International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the USSR promised Yugoslavia a ten-year loan of $30,000,000 in gold and convertible currencies at a two percent interest rate. The U.S.S.R also offered a ten-year line of credit of $110,000,000, also at a two percent interest rate, for specific investment projects, mostly in the field of mining. See John D. Morris, "Soviet Bloc Help to Tito is Huge," *New York Times*, April 29, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.

15. "The financial and technical help given to Yugoslavia by the USSR, especially in the sphere of atomic energy, is highly valued by the Yugoslavs." AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 146-147, From the Diary of Y. P. Sanzhak, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievic," February 17, 1956.

16. AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 146-147, From the Diary of Sanzhak, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievic," February 17, 1956. (The agreement was reached on the day of this conversation). According to Van Dyke, Czechoslovakia also offered $75 million in credit to Yugoslavia. See Morris, p. 1, col. 7.


18. The other Stalinist leaders include: Bierut (Poland), Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), and Dmitrov (Bulgaria). As Rákosi complained to Voroshilov in June, 1956: "They say that Hungary needs leaders not connected with the past. You can hear talk in Hungary about how Rákosi was... 'the faithful student of Stalin,' and that after the deaths of Dmitrov, Gottwald, and Beirut, Rákosi is 'the last Mohican of the Stalinist era' and thus... he doesn't fit the spirit of the times." TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 2, "Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rákosi," June 26, 1956.

19. Tibor Méray, a noted Hungarian Communist writer who after 1954 supported Imre Nagy, wrote: "Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is equally certain that Rákosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors, since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian colleagues. Intent on gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a complete success of this spectacle... [T]he methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved to be the best of all because they were the simplest." Tibor Méray, *That Day in Budapest: October 23, 1956* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 114. See also
Ferenc Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, 62. "It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come." (emphases added)

20. László Rajk (1909-1949) was a leading functionary of the underground communist party before 1944. He was Rákosi's Hungarian Minister of the Interior from 1946 to 1948 and then Foreign Minister. He was sentenced to death in a show trial in September-October 1949, which marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign. The three other high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949 were György Pálffy, Tibor Szönyi, and András Szalai. The total number of those in some way purged in the 1948-1956 period was approximately 350,000. This figure includes those accused of being "class enemies" (kulaks, clerical reactionaries, etc.), those accused of being "Zionist agents" (Jews), and those accused of having "infiltrated the party" ("Titoists," "Trotskyists," "cosmopolitans," etc.). See György Litvan, *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression*, 1953-1963 (London: Longman, 1996), 19.


23. Lavrentii Beria was KGB Chief under Stalin.


26. Victor S. Abakumov was Soviet Minister of State Security, 1947-51. He was executed in December 1954, in connection with the plot against Beria. The basis of the accusation was the repressive measures Abakumov took against Zhdanov's closest aides in the "Leningrad case." After Beria's arrest, Abakumov, along with Ryumin (deputy of Minister of State Security Ignatiev, winter 1952-53), was arrested and tried in public.

27. Mihály Farkas (1904-1965) was a member of the Politburo of the Hungarian Communist Party, and from 1948 to 1953 served as Minister of Defense. He carried a large share of the responsibility for the mass repressions from the late 1940s-1950s, in part as one of the main organizers of Rajk's trial. The decision to reexamine the role of Farkas in the repressions was made by the Hungarian Politburo in April 1956. In July
1956 he was expelled from the Hungarian Workers' Party [HWP]). In 1957 he was sentenced to sixteen years in prison, but three years later, he was given amnesty.

28. General Gábor Péter was for eight years the director of Hungarian State Security [ÁHV] during the trials of Rajk and János Kádár. He was a member of the Hungarian Communist Party and also of the party's Central Committee. In January 1953, he was arrested along with other ÁHV officers. Rákosi had heard that Péter had complained about him to Beria.

29. It should be noted that, while Stalin was alive, Rákosi did imply that he was responsible for Rajk's death. "Do not think that my decision in the Rajk case was so easily arrived at: I spent long sleepless nights before I decided to strike. But in the end we got that gang of criminals firmly into our grip." In 1955 and 1956, however, Rákosi sought scapegoats. See Méray, op. cit., 112.


32. The term "information-providers" will be used in this article to refer to diplomats and journalists collectively.

33. AVP RF, F. 077, O.37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 148, From the Diary of V.N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy Marko Zsigmond and Attaché Novak Radenović, March 5, 1956. Of course, from the Hungarians' point of view, the discrimination against the Yugoslavs was minimal compared to that inflicted on the large Hungarian community (420,000) in Vojvodina at the time. Furthermore, eight years (1948-1956) is probably not a long enough period of time for 6-7,000 Yugoslavs to become entirely "magyarized." However, this was the Yugoslavs' perception.

34. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 37, P.190, L. 1, From Andropov in the Soviet Embassy in Hungary to V. S. Semenov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1, 1956.


36. The term comes from the initials "I.B." for Informburo or Cominform (Communist Information Bureau).

37. AVP RF, F. 077, O.37, Por. 10, P. 188, L. 301. Soviet diplomat Timofeev recounts his conversation with Gojko Petrovic, a Hungarian citizen but "Yugoslav by nationality" who was sentenced to death in absentia for supporting the 1948 Cominform decision to expel Yugoslavia. According to Timofeev, Gojko was afraid to return to Yugoslavia in 1956, because those Yugoslav political emigres who did were "arrested and sentenced to 10 or 15 years in prison." See also *New York Times* (August 16, 1948), p. 3, col. 8, regarding purges of Cominform sympathizers within Yugoslavia. One Yugoslav (Colonel General Jovanovic) was apparently killed while trying to flee to Romania with two other high officers. See *New York Times* (August 19, 1948), p. 1, col. 6.


40. Ibid., L 9.

41. Ibid., Por. 7, P. 187, L. 54. From the Diary of V. V. Astafiev, Advisor of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the Former Director of the Balkan Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Karoly Erdei," January 19, 1956. This winter round of meetings was not reported in the local press.


46. See note #2 supra.

47. In Poland workers from heavy industrial plants in Poznan staged a large protest rally on June 28, which turned violent. The Polish army and security forces suppressed the protest, but the two days of clashes left 53 dead and many hundreds wounded. After a tense deadlock with the Polish government headed by Ochab, the CPSU Presidium decided not to intervene militarily but to seek a political compromise instead. Archival documents reveal that some Polish officers tried to resist the decision to shoot the demonstrators, but they were outnumbered by others in the security forces who were willing to carry out the orders. Also Soviet commanders (and their Polish allies) still dominated the Polish military establishment. See the collection of declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, *Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych* [Pacification of a Rebellious City: the Polish Army in Poznan in the Light of New Documents] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992).

48. During various meetings with Tito, Soviet and pro-Soviet Hungarian officials had repeatedly discussed the issue of the Yugoslavs’ media coverage of the Hungarian events, requesting that Tito reign in his journalists. For example, Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan, as well as the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki, both visited Tito’s country around July 21, 1956. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L. 81.

Ernő Gerő, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria, and reported that the Yugoslavs had "agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances."

49. "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR." See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P. 191, D. 39, Ll. 75, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations, from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," (signature is illegible). See also AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P. 191, D. 39, List 8-10. "O Sostoyanii Vengersko-Yugoslavskikh Otnosheni — Kratkaya Spravka, 8-ogo fevralya, ot N. Skacheva, sovyetnik V Evropei-
skogo Otdela MID SSSR." It is instructive to note that both of these reports were written about the "problems" the Yugoslavs were causing as early as August 1956 — long before the second Soviet-Yugoslav split over the "Nagy affair" developed. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, Ll. 68-73. By V. Kazimirov, "About the State of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations," August 23, 1956. Other reports earlier in May alleged that Dalibor Soldatić, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, had "very good ties" with American envoy Ravendal and "even passes on military and political information." AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, P. 191, Por. 39, L. 22. "Soobsheniye ob otnosheniyakh jugoslavskogo poslannika Soldaticha s rukovoditelyami amerikanskoi missii, Budapesht, 9 maya 1956 g."

50. These include, on the Yugoslav side, Dalibor Soldatić (Yugoslav envoy in Budapest), Novak Radenović (attaché of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest from 1955 until June 1956), Osman Dikić (advisor in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest during the October-November, 1956 events), Milan Georgiević (first secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest), Marko Zsigmond (second secretary of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest), etc. On the Hungarian side, these include János Boldoczki (Hungarian Ambassador to USSR), V.V. Altomar (Minister of Food Industry of Hungary and member of the Central Leadership of the HWP in 1956), and many others. On the Soviet side, these include B.V. Gorbachev (second secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, 1956-57), Kazimirov (attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary in 1956), Vladimir Kriuchkhov, (Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, October 1956-1957), and others.

51. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 70, L. 3, Protocol #90 of the CC CPSU Presidium on April 18, 1957, "About the Request of the Hungarian Central Committee regarding Rákosi, Gerő, and Other Hungarian Comrades Located in the USSR, and about the Letter from Comrade Rákosi of March 25, 1957 to the CC CPSU." Also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 54, L. 5, From the Diary of Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Notes of a Conversation with János Boldoczki, Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR," November 28, 1956. Ernő Gerő, András Hegedüs (Hungary's Prime Minister before Nagy), Lajos Piros (Hungarian minister of internal affairs from 1954 to October 27, 1956), István Buta (Hungarian defense minister until October 24, 1956), together with their families, were flown secretly to Moscow in a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of October 28. Hegedüs and Piros remained in Moscow until September 1958, and Gerő stayed there until 1960. Originally there may have been some plan to send these officials to Bulgaria. See TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin. Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on October 28, 1956.

52. Ibid., Rolik 5173, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 403, L 7. By L. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956." "Comrade Tito stated that relations between us have become colder than they were before his trip to the USSR, and that the necessary trust toward him is absent on the part of the CPSU leaders [and] on the part of the communist and workers' parties of the peoples democracies. These doubts arose among them as a consequence of the disinformation, which they received mainly from their diplomatic workers, and also as a result of great confusion which they have in issues of ideology," (emphasis added)
53. Indeed, during the normalization period, even when the economy began to improve and the majority of workers returned to the factories, these pro-Soviet Hungarians were surreptitiously squeezed out of jobs, or at least harassed, as late as July, 1957. The novelist and playwright Béla Illés, for example, had a talk with Soviet diplomat L. F. Illichev, in which Illés warned: "there is still a very strong anti-Soviet mood in Hungary among all types of people: intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and even in the Kádár government." Illés recounted his experience of arriving at a Hungarian radio station, ready to expound on Soviet literature and asked instead to extemporize on French literature. TsKhSD, O 28, Rolik 5195, Delo 479, L. 1-2, From the Diary of K. A. Krutikov, "Notes of a Conversation with Sall, the Chargé D'Affaires of Hungary in the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1956.

54. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 39, P 195, L 21-23, "Characteristics of the Political Statesmen: Information on the Members of the Party Delegation of Hungary," January 17, 1957--August 8, 1957. "In August 1956 Münich was appointed Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia... Several Hungarian comrades in chats with the embassy officials noted that upon his assignment as ambassador to Belgrade,... Münich has made statements approving the [Yugoslav] path of socialist construction and the forms and methods of administration in that country. [T]his is confirmed by Münich’s speeches after his appointment, especially during the reburial of Rajk, Pálffy, and others in October 1956... In months after the crushing of the counterrevolution, several Hungarian comrades expressed a dissatisfaction toward Münich, and his... Yugoslav orientation..." Münich’s term as ambassador to Yugoslavia ended on October 25, 1956.

55. Ibid., L 20, From the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N. Firiubin, "Short Reference on Lajos Csebi, the new Hungarian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, January 14, 1957." "...Csebi participated in the Hungarian Revolution [1919], after its failure, he emigrated to Yugoslavia, and then to the USSR.... In 1949 in connection with the Rajk affair he was arrested and imprisoned until 1954.... In January 1957 he was appointed Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia. According to data received from the employees of the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, Csebi is an embittered [ozloblennyi], anti-Soviet person. He criticises the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist camp [and]... praises the... "Yugoslav path"... The Yugoslavs think they will establish very close relations with him when he arrives in their country." On allegations about Csebi’s ties with Yugoslavia, see also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 67, L 5. Letter of Mátyás Rákosi in Moscow to Khrushchev, February 15, 1957.

56. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 75, L 3, "Notes of Yuri Andropov to the CC CPSU of August 29, 1957." This document is signed "Andropov, Head of the Department of the CC CPSU for ties with the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries."

57. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 3, P 192, L 11, From the Diary of P. S. Dedushkin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow Boldoczki," December 4, 1957. "[T]he Presidium of Hungary issued a decree on Sept. 28 awarding Andropov the 'Order of the Banner of Hungary' as a token of gratitude for his fruitful activity in deepening Hungarian-Soviet friendship."

58. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L 7, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC CPY, Tito, January 10, 1957. "Tito is always saying that one must not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, but that's what he did in his speech [at Pula]..."

60. Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at the rigged trial of Rajk in September 1949. He testified that he had attended meetings during which Tito and Ranković instructed Rajk about "overthrowing the socialist order in Hungary." It is unclear whether or not Brankov was coerced to testify. He left Hungary in 1956. See Banač, With Stalin against Tito, 225, and Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 62.

61. Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech made on October 1, 1949 at the end of maneuvers by the Yugoslav People's Army in Serbia. "[I]t is interesting that Brankov, who is also one of the accused, immediately, from the very beginning, came out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it is well-known who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written about him earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to be the leader of all likeminded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our country, how is it possible that he was put on trial in such a role?" Josip Broz Tito, "Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist Countries," in Pejčinović, ed. Josip Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works, 302.

62. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 7, P 187, L 94, From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jozsef Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said it is still difficult to restore normal relations with Yugoslavia. The diplomats of the Budapest mission are a big obstacle. The majority of them, in Marjai's words, "had built their careers on the rupture of relations with the democratic camp, on slander and lies, and now it is difficult for them to start on a new basis." (emphasis added). Ponomarev agreed: "I said [to Marjai] that in reality the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry is littered with people who are hostilely disposed [zasoren] toward the normalization of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as between Yugoslavia and the other democratic countries. But we must work with these people."

63. Ibid., L 148, From the Diary of V. N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Marko Zsigmond and the Attaché Novak Radenović," March 5, 1956. At a film presentation at the Czech embassy, Zsigmond "tried to again begin a conversation about the events of 1948-1949, saying that he knows well the history of the rift of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, since he worked in the archive of the CC CPY and is acquainted with the correspondence of that period. Then he tried to lay the blame for the rift completely on the USSR."

64. Ibid., L 95, From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jozsef Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said 'with a person like Zsigmond, it is hardly likely that anything can be done.' In a footnote to his report, Ponomarev wrote: "The second secretary of the Yugoslav mission [Zsigmond] is indeed different from the other Yugoslav diplomats in his reactionary views. In a number of conversations with our comrades he asks provocative questions about the normalization of relations and responds in a wholly unfriendly way about Hungary."

65. The Petőfi Circle, named after the Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi, was a club organized by Hungarian communist intellectuals, which served as a forum for anti-Rákosi speeches in the spring and summer of 1956.
66. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L 112, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgievic," July 2, 1956. "Georgievic said that, unlike in Yugoslavia, there are many people in Hungary who are not satisfied with the present situation [in Hungary]. He mentioned the resolution of the CC HWP of June 30, 1956, as well as information received from a Yugoslav journalist who attended the June 27 Petofi Circle discussion. 'In Yugoslavia,' Georgievic said, 'party members and famous social figures do not openly denounce the policies of the party and government as they are doing here. In my opinion a large part of the Hungarian population is displease with the fact that the HWP leaders are unwilling to correct their serious mistakes.'"

67. Ibid., P 191, D 39, L 75, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "On December 6, 1955, in a conversation with the Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, Georgievic (First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission) complained that the Hungarian press is giving very scanty information about Yugoslavia, and that several speeches of Yugoslav leaders are printed in such an abridged form that it amounts to unobjective information. The same goes for the Soviet press, Georgievic claimed, but he gave no details." (The signature on this document is illegible.)

68. Ibid., Por 39, P 191, L.43-47, From Yuri Andropov to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. S. Patolichev. "About the Rehabilitation of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society," trans. from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov. (One of the society members was Geza Losonczy, a close Nagy supporter who died in prison even before Nagy was executed).

69. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 15, From the CC CPY, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "We reject the hint about our close ties with the Petofi Circle. Yugoslavia exists as it is, with its revolutionary past and experience...If separate people in Hungary speak about Yugoslavia, that does not give anyone the right to throw blame on Yugoslavia as being responsible for the internal events [of Hungary]."


71. GARF, F 9401, Special Folder [Osobaia Papka] of Stalin, D. 97, L. 351-352, July 13, 1945, To Stalin from L. Beria, "about the Guard on Tito and Security Measures in the City of Belgrade." Also F 9401, Opis 2, D 97, L. 69-70, June 29, 1945, To Stalin and Molotov From Beria, "About the Measures for Strengthening the Guard of Marshal Tito. A total of "509 cadres" were sent to serve in Tito's personal group of bodyguards or to keep order in the city.

72. For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! [the Cominform's newspaper], 1 July 1948, p. 1. Note: the Cominform communique announcing the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was first made public on 28 June 1948 in Rude Pravo, organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

74. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L 112, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgiević," July 2, 1956. "Georgiević said 'Despite the unfair accusations, as well as the difficulties, arising as a result of the rupture in relations, Yugoslavia continued to proceed along the path and did not surrender to the pressure of the imperialist states.'"


76. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 3, "Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rákosi," June 26, 1956. Rákosi informed Voroshilov that the Yugoslav official Vukomanović-Tempo told him that in the beginning of the war in Korea "guerrilla bases were created" in Yugoslavia "in case of attack by the Soviet Army." N.B. Yugoslavia's election to the U.N. Security Council in 1950-51 probably increased the chance of UN intervention if the USSR did attempt to intervene. A desire for such assistance may have been a motivating factor in Tito's decision to vote in favour of the UN "police action" against North Korea in 1950.

77. Sec Dmitri Volkogonov, "Nesostoyavsheesya Pokushenye: Kak Sovetskii Agent Maks Gotovilsya k Terroristicheskomu Aktu Protiv Tito [The Assassination that Didn't Take Place: How the Soviet Agent Max Prepared for a Terrorist Act Against Tito] Izvestia, June 11, 1993, p. 7, No. 109 (23964). Ironically the appointed "hit man" (Joseph Romual'dovich Grigulevich, alias "Max") was also involved in one of the assassination attempts on Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Also see Khrushchev, The Glasnost Tapes, 72. "[Stalin] was ready to go to war against Yugoslavia, and I suspect that he was thinking about this, although I never heard any conversation mentioning military action. Stalin, however, began to send out agents and put on displays of strength as soon as the break with Tito occurred."

78. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 2, By I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, which took place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956." "Comrade Khrushchev stated that we do not lay claim to any special leadership, but we understand our responsibility before the peoples' democracies on the strength of historical conditions, which developed in the struggle for socialism."

79. A "little entente" had been formed during the interwar period consisted of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. This should not be confused with Stalin's plan — when relations with Tito were good — for the formation of a Balkan Federation consisting of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Khrushchev, Glasnost Tapes, 105.

80. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L. 10, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957. "What also does not help is the position of the Yugoslav comrades in the issue of the two world camps. You repeatedly speak out against military blocs, include the Warsaw Pact, and declare that Yugoslavia does not belong to any blocs and pacts. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Yugo belongs to the Balkan Pact, and the Yugoslav military organs cooperate with the military circles of Greece and Turkey. Via these partners in the Balkan alliance, you are simultaneously members of NATO..."
We cannot ignore the inconsistencies in the official Yugoslav position regarding blocs and pacts."

81. See, for example, the anti-Yugoslav report prepared just after the invasion. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 39, P. 191, L. 90. From I. Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the CC CPSU, "About the Issue of the Yugoslav Leaders' Support of Imre Nagy and His Politics: A Reference," December 4, 1956. "According to a report by Italian comrades, one of the leading workers of the Yugoslav Union of Communists, Mordić, who is now the director of the Institute of Party History in Zagreb, insinuated during a conversation with them that the USSR no longer reflects the interests of the workers of the small countries like Italy and Yugoslavia, and he even suggested that they 'unite the organizations of the small countries into their own International, without the USSR.'"

82. However, scholars have not been able to ascertain just how much influence Tito's "third-path" idea had on the Hungarian population as a whole. Soviet fears may have been unwarranted, given the historic animosity between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Hungarians massacred about 3,300 Yugoslavs in Novi Sad in January, 1942. In retaliation, Yugoslavs killed about 30,000-40,000 Hungarians in October 1944. These events marred relations between the two countries. Hungarians may have looked more to Poland — which had never been a military adversary — as a model. See Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, 179n.

83. TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 2, L. 1. "Information of Mikhail Suslov from Budapest, June 13, 1956." Many other documents state that the majority of Hungarian people were not involved in the uprising. See, for instance, TsKhSD F 5 O 28 Rolik 5195, Delo 479, List 14. "Report of the Delegation of the World Federation of Unions About its Trip to Hungary," November 23-27, 1956. "The overwhelming majority of the population tried to hide from the battle. A portion of the population demonstrated against the counterrevolutionaries and supported the new Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government in order to end the fascist terror. A third group supported the counterrevolution." The author of this document went on to explain that, of the members of this third group, a half of them simply didn't understand that the Soviet troops had come to help Hungary put an end to the "white terror." The other half actively fought against the Soviet army and socialist forces of Hungary. Also, Tito hinted at this misperception later in his Pula speech, November 11, 1956, when he stated: "Their [the Soviet leaders'] eyes have now been opened and they realize that not only are the Horthyites fighting, but also workers in factories and mines, that the whole nation is fighting. (emphasis added)" Cited in Zinner, National Communism, 529.

84. See AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Por 9, P 187, D 036, L. 55-56. From the Diary of V. N. Kelin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Employee of the Newspaper Népszava, Lorant, and the Editor of the Journal Csillag, Király," June 17, 1956. "Lately the Hungarian intelligentsia is very strongly attracted to the Yugoslav question. The fact that Tito went to Moscow through Romania, and not by the more natural route — through Budapest — is seen as an open demonstration against Hungary. In Hungary Dedijer's biography of Tito is passed from hand to hand. It was published in the Hungarian language for Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. The book is enjoying exceptional success..."

85. Ibid., P 191, D 39, L 41, To Shepilov from Andropov, "About the Visit of Kurimszki, the Hungarian Envoy, with Tito in Yugoslavia (Brioni)," July 21, 1956.
Milovan Djilas was a high official under Tito, at first a zealous communist, but later a harsh critic of communism. Tibor Déry and Tibor Tardos were veteran Hungarian communist writers who later turned against the Rákosi regime.

86. Ibid., L. 41. "Tito didn't answer this question; he was only interested in what kinds of elements participated in the Petőfi Circle discussions. I've been informed that the majority of those present were workers and only comrades who didn't oppose what was being said there."

87. Ibid., L. 81. Gerő, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria, and reported that the Yugoslavs had "agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances."

88. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L. 9, I. Vinogradov, to M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956."

89. Ibid.

90. AVP RF, Fond 077, O 37, Papka 191, D. 39, L. 75. August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hinderung the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR. Also see TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 5, Sept. 17, 1956. Gromyko wrote that "the reactionary part of the intelligentsia and the opportunist elements in the party are conducting a policy to try to rip Hungary away from the Warsaw Pact and replace USSR influence with Yugoslav influence." (emphasis added)

91. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, "Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session on October 28, 1956," compiled by V. N. Malin. (Hereafter cited as Malin, "Working Notes"). The other bloc countries — China, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia — were also mentioned in the same sentence. As a result of this decision, the CPSU Presidium sent a cable to Tito expressing support for Nagy's new government and for the statement Nagy issued on October 28. The following day, October 29, the Yugoslav government published a message to the HWP, in Politika (the main Belgrade daily), which urged "an end to the fratricidal struggle" and warned that "further bloodshed would only harm the interests of the Hungarian working people and socialism, and would only promote the aims of reactionaries."


93. Veljko Mićunović, Moscow Diary (New York: Garden City, 1980), 134. Of course, Khrushchev apparently did understand that some workers were "supporting the uprising," judging from Malin's notes of the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting. Malin, "Working Notes," October 28, 1956.

94. Cf. note 2 supra.

95. On August 21, 1952 in a television debate with Averell Harriman, Dulles said: "The first thing I would do would be to shift from a purely defensive policy to a psychological offensive, a liberation policy, which will try to give hope and a resistance mood inside the Soviet empire." Transcript of television program "Pick the Winner," August 21, 1952, Dulles Papers, cited in Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 131. The liberation policy was quietly dropped
early in the Eisenhower presidency; it was primarily for domestic consumption, and lacked operational content. Of course, Dulles' liberation rhetoric also helped to stimulate the Hungarian revolution and to encourage the "freedom fighters" to continue their resistance.

96. These are: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. See Imre Nagy, *On Communism: In Defense of the New Course* (New York: Praeger, 1957), 22-23. Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru first endorsed these principles in a joint statement in New Delhi on June 28, 1954. The principles were intended to "guide relations between the two countries" as well as "relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world." For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962)* (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.

97. Ibid.


99. AVP RF, F 77, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 99. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. Bakunov and Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Information about the Position of the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. "[T]he display of revanchist aspirations by counterrevolutionary elements, uttering the slogan 'Great Hungary,' noticeably influenced the Yugoslavs' position. If before this the Yugoslav press praised the actions of the Nagy government, so after the counterrevolutionary nationalist demonstrations, the press and various Yugoslav representatives spoke with alarm about the growth of the anarchic, counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. This anxiety was noticeable in Tito's letter to the CC of the HWP on October 30." (This quote merely reflects Tito's subjective fears, based on effective Soviet disinformation. It does not reflect the conditions in Hungary, since no one among the Hungarian revolutionaries expressed "revanchist aspirations" or uttered the slogan "Great Hungary." The issue probably weighed on Tito's mind, given the fact that, after the Trianon Treaty (1920), Yugoslavia received significant Hungarian territory, amounting to 20,956 square kilometers.


101. See, for example, Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, 350-51. It should be noted that many of these statements were reported by Soviet and Hungarian officials, and thus could be considered "hearsay." Given the numerous references, however, we have good reason to believe Tito actually did make these remarks.

102. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L.1-2, From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "It is true that during our conversation on Brioni we agreed with your assessment, that the weakness of the Nagy government and its actions led to the danger of the destruction of the essential socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists should not remain in such a government, and that they should... decisively resist the reaction. There is no need to remind you that we expressed our doubts about the consequences of open assistance from the Soviet army from the very beginning, as well as during all conversations. But... such help became unavoid-
able." Also see Tito's speech delivered in Pula, November 11, 1956, as reported in Burba, November 16, 1956, or cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, 516-541.

103. "I expected even more strenuous objections from Tito than the ones we had encountered during our discussions with the Polish comrades. But we were pleasantly surprised. Tito said we were absolutely right and that we should send our soldiers into action as quickly as possible." Strobe Talbott, ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 421.

104. AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Papka 191, Por 39, List 100. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, V. Bakunov and Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Reference about the Position of the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. Also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 3, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957.

105. TsKhSD, F. 89, O 2, D 4, L 43, Information of Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, "Notes from a Conversation with the President of the Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito)," January 11, 1957.

106. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC CPY (Tito) with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957. Ivan Gosnjak, the Yugoslav State Secretary for Defense Matters, allegedly said something similar at the reception in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade on November 23 in honor of the Soviet military delegation. AVP RF, F 77, O 37 Papka 191 Por 39, List 82-93, "About the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, Reference." December 4, 1956, by I. Zamchevskii, the Director of the Fifth European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR. Some speculate that Tito, and other prominent Yugoslav officials around him, may have contemplated this preemptive intervention, both to keep the Soviet army out, and to prop up the communist government in Hungary. See Richard Lowenthal, "Tito's Affair with Khrushchev," The New Leader, v. 41 (October 6, 1958), 14. Also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 351.

107. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with enclosed Text, January 10, 1957."


111. Ibid., 150.


113. Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), 137. "Thus, with Tito as a key player now, and Nagy as Tito's obvious choice the Russians were increasingly interested in Nagy and the authority he could command." (emphasis added). See also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 249-50.
114. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 2, Protocol 54, Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Group," November 10, 1956. "][Y]ou completely shared our positive view of Kádár, as a prominent and authoritative leading statesman of the communist movement of Hungary, who is capable in the present difficult conditions to lead a new revolutionary government... You were very satisfied that the CC CPSU still in the summer after the departure of Rákosi tried to have Kádár appointed First Secretary of the CC Hungary (HWP)." (This may suggest that Khrushchev's choice of Kádár was overruled by Molotov and other hard-liners in favour of the Stalinist Gerő.)

115. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," by V. Kazimirov. "][O]n July 23, 1956, Gerő in a talk with Andropov said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria... Gerő stated that if he correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gerő as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó." (emphasis added). Zoltán Szántó (1893-1977) was a revisionist communist, a member of the moderate wing of the opposition before October 1956. He sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on November 4 along with Nagy and his other supporters, but was taken to Romania on November 18 as a "guest" of the Romanian Communist Party (along with Zoltán Vas, chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies). Later, in the Spring of 1957, proceedings were initiated against him and the others, and the Hungarian security police arrested him. In 1958 he was permitted to return to Hungary.

116. Ibid., L 41, From Andropov to D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1956. "Then Tito unexpectedly started to ask [Kurimszki] about the state of health of comrades Gerő, Kádár, and Révai... Comrade Tito did not mention Imre Nagy even once in the course of the whole conversation. and did not even drop a hint about him." The words in italics were underlined in the original document.

117. More evidence would be needed to substantiate this view, of course. Prominent scholars have always believed that Tito did insist that Rákosi be dismissed before Yugoslav relations with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for example, Sándor Kopácsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York: Grove Press, 1986), 89. "The Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had mounted the false trials of Rajk and Kádár in which everybody had been 'agent and spy for Tito's clique.'" Or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 207. When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948, Tito demanded Rákosi's ouster." And Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 223. "He [Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rákosi and his associates removed from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly refused."


119. See TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, Feb. 7, 1957. "In the course of our conversations with comrades Khrushchev, Bulganin, and others in May and June of 1955, we expressed our negative position regarding the policies of Rákosi. You passed by these remarks, defended Rákosi, and used the whole authority of the Soviet Union in defense of this person and his policies,
which he personified, right to the very last moment, that is, until the majority of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party eliminated him." Also see Tito's speech in Pula, November 11, 1956. "When we were in Moscow... we said that Rákosi's regime and Rákosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state.... [T]heir actions could only bring about grave consequences.... [W]e were not insistent enough with the Soviet leaders to have such a team as Rákosi and Gerő eliminated." (emphasis added) Cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, 523-4.

120. John MacCormac, "Hungary Meeting Yugoslav Claims," New York Times, May 4, 1956, p. 6 col 3. "In return for getting his way, it is believed that Marshal Tito will cease his active opposition to Mr. Rákosi, who is chief of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party."

121. See TsKhSD F 89, O 2 D 2, L. 9. "Information of Mikoyan from Budapest," July 14, 1956. When Mikoyan flew to Budapest on July 13 he had the impression that "the Hungarian comrades [in the Central Committee] had long ago come to the conclusion that Rákosi must go," but that they were "too afraid" to say so openly, and were simply waiting for the Soviet leaders to make the first move. Also see TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. Letter of Tito of the CC CPY, Belgrade, to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), February 7, 1957, from Belgrade. "We are forced, in the interests of truth, although we do it unwillingly, to draw your attention to the fact that the CPSU leadership, Soviet government, and Soviet media rendered the greatest support to these people [i.e., Rákosi et al.] and their politics, even when when it became clear that even the Central Committee of the HWP and all the members of the HWP no longer wanted these people to lead their party and government, not to mention the wider working masses." (emphasis added)

122. Imre Horváth's notes of Khrushchev's speech at the November 3 Session; Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL), XIX J-1-K Horváth Imre külgülmiszter iratai, 55, doboz. This document is also contained in the Hungarian document collection Döntés a Kremlben, 1956 (pp. 92-93), cited in note #4 supra.

123. TsKhSD, F. 5, O. 28 D. 403 L. 9, From I. Vinogradov to M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October, 1956."

124. These included Júlia Rajk (widow of the executed Communist leader), Zoltán Vas, György Lukács (the philosopher), Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donát, Gábor Táncos, (president of the Petőfi Circle), journalists Sándor Haraszi, Miklós Vásárhelyi, György Fazekas, and others. Altogether there were ten men, fifteen women, and seventeen children in the group. Elie Abel, "Nagy Is Abducted by Soviet Police; Sent to Romania," New York Times, November 24, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.

125. Aleksander Ranković (1909-1983) was the second most important public figure in Yugoslavia. He was minister of internal affairs and party secretary responsible for cadres.

126. Tito wrote: "....[W]hen they [the Nagy group] showed up here in our embassy,...[we] persistently tried to prove to them the usefulness of such a resignation for the regulation of the situation in Hungary." TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 8. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, February 7, 1957.

127. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 137.

128. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.2 Telegram from the CC CPSU (Khrushchev) to Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Firiubin), November 4, 1956.

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132. *Ibid.*, Dok 38, L. 12. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," November 8, 1956. (Ties between Hungary and the USSR were not completely severed, since among other things — Ambassador Andropov remained in Budapest, and Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR Boldoczki remained in Moscow.)
133. *Ibid.*, 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," Brioni, November 8 1956. "If you take all this into consideration, then it becomes clear that only the speed of events was not anticipated and created problems that now are essential to solve. We think the question of whether or not our embassy acted correctly in Budapest no longer has any significance. What is important now is that we work together to solve this problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we already established between our countries and parties."
134. *Ibid.*, Dok 29, List 3, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR Mićunović," November 7, 1956. There is a discrepancy in the time of the incident. Mićunović and Shepilov said it occurred on November 6 at 12:45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of the occurrence as November 5, "around" 3:00 p.m. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, L 38, From General-Lieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth Administration of the General Staff, to N. S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, "Act."
136. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, Ll. 1-3. From D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR Mićunović," November 7, 1956. Shepilov told Mićunović that the Soviet military command would comply with the Yugoslav request to "pull back the military unit next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound."
138. Malin, "Working Notes." See the formal protocol for this session TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64, D. 485, L. 141 "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g." The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened. See the following note infra.
139. Major-General Grebennik was Serov's deputy in the KGB and Soviet commandant of Budapest after November 4, 1956.
140. AVP RF F 77, O 37, D 18, P 188, L 35, From Major General Grebennik, Lieutenant-Colonel Kuziminov, and Gaspar (Deputy of the Hungarian Government Assembly), November 6, 1956, "About the Accident to the Employee of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest on November 5, 1956." This report was later sent directly to
Colonel General N. Pavlovskii on November 9, 1956 and other superior officers in the Soviet General Staff. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, Ll 38-39, To Comrade N S Patolichev and Beliusov, November 9, 1956, From the Commission composed of Grebenrik, Bokshoboinik and Lukin. "The Soviet soldiers said that the Soviet tanks were being shot at from the direction of apartment buildings situated near the Yugoslav mission. In reply to this shot, a Soviet tank opened fire on the indicated house. Apparently because the tanks were moving, a volley of shots fell on the embassy building, and as a result, one of the employees who was standing at the window was killed." The Soviet authorities pledged to transport the body to Yugoslavia.

141. Ibid., F 144, O 18, Por 4, P 41, L 25, "Telephone telegram no. 185 from V. Astafiev, Temporary Charge d’Affaires of the USSR in Hungary (Budapest) to I. K. Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry," April 14, 1957.

142. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L 4, "Telegram from the CC CPSU to N. Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade," November 4, 1956.

143. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 146.

144. Mićunović stated that... "During the conversations on Brioni it was agreed that Imre Nagy and others could facilitate the situation of the new revolutionary worker-peasant government [headed by Kádár] if they in some way or another declare their intention to cooperate with the government or at least, not demonstrate against it. The present location of Imre Nagy and others in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict that agreement that was made with comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov with Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders during the Brioni meeting. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per 45, Dok. 29, L. 2, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Mićunović," November 7, 1956.

145. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Commmunist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," Brioni, November 8 1956. "Despite the absence of detailed information, we nevertheless thought that such a declaration from Nagy would have been essentially useful to Kádár's government... and could help to correct the situation in Hungary, which is what we suggested to you."

146. Ibid., Dok 84, L.. 8, To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, February 7, 1957. "As far as the remark about the resignation of Nagy is concerned, we'd like to remind you that we informed Nagy and his comrades of our opinion when they ended up in our embassy and persistently tried to prove to them how useful such a resignation would be in regulating the situation in Hungary. The fact that Nagy did not take our advice is not the business of the Yugoslav Union of Communists; it is his personally. We even went too far in this, wishing to ease the situation of the Kádár government and USSR by taking advantage of Nagy's presence in the Yugoslav embassy."

147. Ibid., Dok 25, L. 4. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N. Firiubin, Belgrade, to CC CPSU, November 4, 1956. "Tito asked also for the Soviet government to tell the Kádár government not to carry out repression against those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the latest events in Hungary." Kádár also urged lenient treatment for many of the members in the Nagy group. Since Tito supported Kádár, he was receptive to this idea. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, L. 2, Telegram from the CC CPSU to Andropov, Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, November 9, 1956.


151. Ibid., Dok 83, L 4, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito," January 10, 1957. [Paraphrased] Thus, because of your contacts with Nagy, he was warned about the upcoming action of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

152. Malin, "Working Notes," November 4, 1956," (In the November 6 Presidium meeting Khrushchev accused Molotov of thinking about "bringing back Hegedus and Rákosi."

153. Endre Márton, the Hungarian journalist employed by the Associated Press, wrote: "Béla Kovács was the first to tell me that Nagy and many Communists who remained loyal to him went to the Yugoslav embassy after Ambassador Soldatí called Nagy at dawn to say that Khrushchev had informed Tito about his decision to use force to quell the revolt.... Nagy was invited to seek refuge in the Yugoslav embassy at one o'clock in the morning, November 4th, by Dalibor Soldatić." (Béla Kovács was secretary-general of the Smallholders Party until his arrest in February 1947, and was appointed minister of agriculture by Imre Nagy on October 27, 1956). See Endre Márton, The Forbidden Sky, 197.

154. In his Pula speech (November 11, 1956), Tito said: "We are against interference and the use of foreign armed forces... [but] if it meant saving socialism in Hungary, then... Soviet intervention was necessary." Earlier in the speech he stated: "The first intervention, coming at the invitation of Gerö, was absolutely wrong."


156. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L. 14. Letter from CC CPY (Tito) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), November 8, 1956.

157. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 150.

158. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.106. Telegram from N. Firiubin (Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), November 4, 1956. Tito asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from these possible attacks.


160. AVP RF, F 77, O 37 Papka 191, List 89, December 4, 1956, "On the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, A Reference," by I. Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, USSR.

161. TsKhSD, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October 1956."
162. Although Tito did not state this bluntly, he did imply repeatedly in the secret correspondence with Khrushchev that the reason he could not simply relinquish the Nagy group to Kádár's government was because he needed to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation. He wrote: "We understand your conclusions in your letter and consider them logical, but... absent in your letter is a deep understanding of our situation and especially of our readiness to solve this question in the spirit of mutual friendly relations and not to the detriment of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country." TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 10. "From the CC CPY (Tito) to the CC CPSU (Khrushchev), Brioni, 8 November 1956."

163. TsKhSD, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," November 17, 1956. "Our recommendations are: a) provide for the arrest of Nagy as soon as he is released from the Yugoslav embassy; b) demand that Nagy sign a declaration in which he admits his mistakes; c) send him and his group to Romania; and d) prepare a text for the Hungarian government about Nagy."

164. TsKhSD, F 89, Per. 45, Dok 56, Ll. 9-10. "Protocol #62 from the CC CPSU Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko, "About the Answering Note to the Yugoslav Government's Note of Nov. 24, 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group." See also the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on November 24, 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, O. 2, D. 5, Ll. 19-26, and TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64, D. 488, Ll. 95-96. Information from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, November 23, 1956. This elaborate plot was devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials. Interestingly, Serov thought about using the same trick to arrest Cardinal Mindszenty — who had sought refuge in the American embassy. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 53, L. 2, "Notes of Serov on November 27, 1956." (There were several communications, incidentally, between Szántó and the Hungarian leaders, as well as several telegrams between the Yugoslav Embassy and Belgrade, in the final days before the Nagy group left the Yugoslav Embassy).

165. For details on the abduction, see the newly declassified correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now stored in the former CPSU Central Committee archive "Pis'mo Tsentr'al'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentr'al'nому Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslaviyi/Pis'mo Tsentr'al'nogo Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslaviyi ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentr'al'nому Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," (Top Secret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, Ll. 1-12 and D. 84, Ll. 1-18.

166. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 56, Ll. 10-11. "Protocol #62 from the CC CPSU Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko, About the Reply to the Yugoslav Note of November 24, 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group, including enclosed copy of the November 24 letter.

167. Ibid., Dok 49, L. 2, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," November 22, 1956. In the end two promises were broken. The document "guarantees[d] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible" for the past events.

168. Ibid., O 2, D 5, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev from Bucharest," November 26, 1956. Emil Bodnaras (head of the Romanian armed forces from 1947 to 1957 and senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej) told Nikolaev: "We didn't think the Yugoslavs
would raise a fuss [podnimut shum] about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. However, as You know, they appealed with notes of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be presented at the United Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for various speeches and conversations in connection with Imre Nagy." The CC CPSU Presidium later discussed this telegram, which went on to state that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (the Romanian leader) planned to have high-level talks with Yugoslavia to soften tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64, D. 488, L. 177 "Excerpt from Protocol No. 60 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session," 27 November 1956. The protocol stated that "on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Comrade Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej." Later that same day, Bulganin called Gheorghiu-Dej, which he later recounted in writing for the other CPSU Presidium members: "I told Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile...."TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L. 16-17, "Information of Bulganin to the CC CPSU Presidium about the telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej," November 27, 1956.  


170. "We asked the Yugoslavs to refrain from any additional declarations about the Nagy affair. The Yugoslav ambassador said any talks are useful, but the situation is deteriorating, as if we are returning to 1948." (emphasis added) TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 3, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev," November 26, 1956.  

171. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Papka 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956. "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "On July 23, 1956, Gerő, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria and reported that the Yugoslavs agreed not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio... Gerő emphasized that if he correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gerő as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó." (emphasis added)  

172. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 135.  

173. TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 3, L. 11. "Yesterday, late last night, the negotiations of comrades Kádár and Vidić were concluded.... On the evening of November 22 Nagy and his group must leave the Yugoslav embassy. Essential measures [neobkhodimye mery] in connection with this have been prepared jointly by comrades Serov and Munnich." (emphasis added)  

174. Ibid., F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L 24 (on the back), "Working Notes of the CC CPSU Presidium Session on November 2, 1956," compiled by V. N. Malin. It is true that Kádár did agree to travel to Moscow without informing Nagy and other government officials, and he did say during the November 3 Presidium meeting that "the correct course of action [in Hungary] is to form a revolutionary government." Also, he emphasized the fact that the Nagy government had failed to prevent the "killing of Commu-
nists" and said he "agreed with [Soviet officials]" that "you cannot surrender a socialist country to counterrevolution." However, even then Kádár stated that they should avoid creating a "puppet government." Apparently Kádár had not planned to head this new pro-Soviet regime either. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 32. "Working Notes from the CC CPSU Presidium Session on November 3, 1956, compiled by V. N. Malin. N.B. Until the declassification of the Malin notes, scholars had not known what Kádár was doing in Moscow on November 2 and 3. Both Kádár and Münich participated in sessions of the CPSU Presidium on these two days, although Kádár spoke the most. On November 2 they were joined by István Bata (Hungarian defense minister until October 24), who was flown to Moscow on the evening of October 28 (along with Gerő, Piros, Hegedűs). On November 3, they were joined by Imre Horváth (Hungarian foreign minister until November 2), who took detailed notes of that day's session.

175. Mártón, Forbidden Sky, 211.
176. TsKhSD, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," November 17, 1956. "Kádár has agreed with these recommendations." (emphasis added)
177. Ibid., Per 45, Dok 38, L 4. November 10, 1956, Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and his Group," with the enclosures: telegram from Andropov and Epishev in Budapest; letter of Khrushchev to Tito; letter of Tito to Khrushchev. "Kádár in a slightly worried tone also said that information reached him that the United States began military mobilization. He requested that someone tell him whether there is any truth to these rumors."
178. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, L 2, "Draft of the Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador Andropov in Hungary," November 9, 1956.
181. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 14, Papka 193, From the Diary of V. K. Gulevskii, Attaché, and V. Astafiev, Temporary Chargé D'Affaires, "Notes of a Conversation with János Péter, Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister and István Sebes, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, June 17, 1958." Péter told Gulevskii about a recent talk he had with Jovo Kapičić, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary. Kapičić had just learned about Nagy's sentence and execution. Péter told Kapičić that other material — about the role of Yugoslavia in the Hungarian events — would be included in the report of the Nagy execution. Péter warned that if the Yugoslav government begins to attack Hungary, then "Hungary will be forced to publish other materials in its possession."
182. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 77, L 8, Text of the "verbal note" from the Yugoslavs given to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on June 23, 1958 by the Yugoslav Ambassador Kapičić, transl. from from Hungarian, enclosed with "Telefonogram from Astafiev of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest to P.S. Dedushkin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, June 24, 1958."